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Contemporary Chinese Social Mentality and Human Buddhism Actively Guide Chinese Society: On the Internal Mechanism of the Adaptation of Religion to Socialist Society

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Abstract
The authors analyze the main manifestations and basic characteristics of contemporary Chinese social mentality, discuss the ways and characteristics of the human Buddhism nebula model to actively solve social problems, and the treatment of social morbidity and the guiding path of social mentality in the human Buddhist nebula model. The basic proposition of the social harmony and stable development of the meta-governance (culture and human heart) discusses the mechanism of the adaptation of religion to socialist society. The article believes that the issue of people's hearts still needs to be guided by the "holy" and "vulgar" culture. The governance and construction of society will be completed in a natural way, and social harmony will have a more solid internal foundation.

Keywords: Buddhism, Contemporary China, Social Mentality, Social Adaptation, Socialist Society, Religious Role

I. Introduction

Marxism believes that religion is the illusory reflection of real life in people's minds and is an inverted world view. It reflects the daily life that dominates people's daily lives in the form of supernatural and superhuman power, and is continually sanctified by people who believe in this supernatural and superhuman power, making it the dominant force that rules people's daily lives. This is not only the essence of religion, but also the basic feature of all religions. Lenin even regarded religion as "the opium of the anesthetized people." How to guide religion to adapt to the socialist society is a problem that the Chinese Communist Party and state leaders have attached great importance since the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is also a concern of atheists and religious believers.

Since China's reform and opening up, with the implementation of China's religious policies, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, Christianity and other major religious venues have resumed activities or reconstruction, the number of religious beliefs has increased, coupled with the development of market economy and globalization. The influence of individual citizens in social development is increasing. Western hostile forces attempt to implement a "color revolution" through peaceful actions such as human rights and religious freedoms, or promote

peaceful evolution; or use religious freedom as an excuse to spread religious extreme ideas. Create terrorist activities and undermine our national unity and social harmony.

In recent years, ethnic separatist forces, religious extremist forces, and violent terrorist forces in Europe, Central Asia, West Asia, South Asia, and North America have penetrated China's Xinjiang and Tibet regions, posing a huge threat to China's social stability and national prosperity. The interweaving of religious issues and ethnic issues has made it more difficult for China to solve ethnic-religious problems, and it has also increased the difficulty of guiding religions to adapt to socialist society.

It is worth noting that the positive guidance of human Buddhism to the contemporary Chinese social mentality provides a reference for us to explore the mechanism of the adaptation of religion to socialist society. This paper intends to explore the internal mechanism of the adaptation of religion to socialist society by analyzing the social mentality of the human Buddhist nebula model.

II. Literature review and evaluation

Buddhism culture also plays an important role in the development of Chinese civilization. For a long period of time, people's understanding of Buddhism in mainland China mostly stayed in the historical cognition of Han Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism, but there was not much attention to the relationship between Buddhism in Buddhism and Buddhism and Chinese culture. The knowledge is not the same.

Li Xiangping (2007) believes that the contemporary development of Chinese Buddhism is not a secularization tendency, but an inherent requirement of "socialization" with sociological significance. Put forward the "socialization" proposition of "human Buddhism" to truly discuss the socialization requirements of contemporary Chinese Buddhism. Li Xiangping (2008) explored the institutional change model of human Buddhism from the comparison of the four major temples in contemporary China. Gao Yongwang (2011) explained the important issues of Buddhism and humanism, sacredness and secularity, transcendence and humanity, and believed that Buddhism theory is not a contradictory structure of binary opposition, but a system of transcendence that transcends all opposites Yang Haiwen (2013) analyzed the relationship between "human Buddhism" and the modernization of traditional culture. Lai Yonghai (2013) believes that the "human Buddhism" developed in modern times inherits and carries forward the Zen tradition of paying attention to real life. An important aspect of *Taixu* masters' reform of Buddhism is to pay attention to "Buddha" in traditional Buddhism. Become a focus on "humanity."Jiang Jianyong (2015) proposed that strengthening Buddhism culture construction, strengthening Buddhism education, strengthening Buddhism's foreign exchanges, striving to practice "Human Buddhism" and actively serving the society and benefiting the people are important missions of contemporary Chinese Buddhist deeds.

Hong Xiuping (2017) believes that the theory and practice of contemporary human Buddhism originated in the process of human biochemistry and humanization of Chinese Buddhism since the Tang and Song Dynasties, while the human Buddhism in modern times began to advocate the master of *Taixu*, through the *Yinshun* Master. Zhao Puchu's layman, giant praise master, and net Hui master further developed. Zhao Cuicui et al. (2015) centered on the relevant theories of the three Buddhist thinkers of *Taixu*, *Guzan* and *Zhao Puchu*, and combed and discussed the basic concepts of "social construction" in the "human Buddhism" theory. Zhao Cuicui (2017) believes that the mode of promoting the Fa-life of the Fa-dharma, the resource mobilization model based on Buddhist associations, and the social belief model with human Buddhism as the link are the three major elements of contemporary human "nebula mode." It is the fundamental reason why Foguangshan's "human Buddhism" thought has been practiced and achieved great achievements. Yang Zengwen (2009, 2012) analyzed the relationship between human Buddhism and national development and progress and ecological civilization construction. Peng Xin et al. (2011) believe that "human Buddhism" appeared for the first time as a proper noun. It originated from the article "How to build human Buddhism" in *Taixu*. Buddhism in human world is now showing more and more vitality and becoming a commonplace among the Buddhist circles on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. High banner. Tan

Yuanfang (2013) discusses the theoretical evolution and multi-value orientation of "human Buddhism" from *Taixu* to Nebula in the past 100 years. Li Xingling (2017) reflects on the implicit ideology behind contemporary political order with the concrete practice models of contemporary Buddhism in Asian countries such as India, Tibet, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Japan and Taiwan. The violence of the state and the identity of the other.

In addition, Cheng Gongrang (2017) put forward the issue of the inevitability of human history in Buddhism, and according to the relevant ideas of Master Xingyun's "Buddhist Buddhism in the Human World", put forward the three major directions of Buddhism, Huahua, China, and globalization, which represent the development direction of modern human Buddhism. Important and basic spirit. Li Mingxuan (2018) believes that the contemporary development of Chinese Buddhism has brought about the convergence of human Buddhism and Zen Buddhism, which is the Zen of human religion and the modernization of Zen Buddhism. Lai Junxing (2018) believes that human Buddhism has become the mainstream of contemporary cross-strait Buddhism development. However, although the development of Buddhism in the world has injected new vitality into Buddhism, it has brought many doubts such as vulgarization and sanctification. How the future of human Buddhism should develop has become a subject worth pondering. Li Xiangping (2018) discussed the construction of the Buddhist order in the "Belt and Road" from the intrinsic relationship between the Buddhist system and the belief order. Yao Binbin (2019) explored the development of human Buddhism in contemporary Taiwan from the perspective of "secularization" and "vulgarization" （Li Xiaolong, 2017；Chen Erxiang, 2017).

In terms of works, Deng Zimei's(2017) "Contemporary Humanity Buddhism Lights Record (1949-2015)" (up and down) collected 113 high-ranking virtues from 1949 to the Chinese mainland, across the Taiwan Strait, and overseas. Life and career information. "Contemporary Human Buddhism" has explored from the modern trend of thought and the "humanization" of East Asian Buddhism, the contemporary Chinese Buddhist thoughts, the birth of human Buddhism and the wisdom of Taixu, the rise of Buddhism in the world, and the thoughts of Yinshun. (Deng Zimei et al. , 2009) The "Human Buddhism and Contemporary Ethics" edited by Xue Yu (2012), collected 24 papers and explored the issues related to human Buddhism and contemporary theory from two aspects: ethical thought and ethical practice. Xue Yu (2012) edited "Buddhism and Management" from the perspective of society, history and hermeneutics to explore the connotation of Buddhist tradition, explore the development of modern human Buddhism, and develop the modern significance of Buddhist tradition. The theory and practice of human Buddhism uses the theme of "the theory and practice of human Buddhism" to demonstrate and analyze the concept of human Buddhism from the aspects of classics, history and field investigations (Jue Ji, Xue Yu, 2007). "Buddhist Tradition and Contemporary Culture" explores the connotation of Buddhist tradition from the aspects of society, history and interpretation, and discusses the development of modern human Buddhism and the modern significance of developing traditional Buddhism (Fang Litian, Xue Yu, editor, 2006).

On the whole, scholars have done a lot of research on Buddhism and Chinese society, Buddhism and Chinese culture, as well as the secularization and modernization of contemporary human Buddhism, and have achieved fruitful results. However, it is not too much to discuss the theory of human Buddhism and the contemporary Chinese social mentality, as well as the adaptation of contemporary human Buddhism to the Chinese socialist society. It needs to be expanded and deepened.

III. Main manifestations and characteristics of contemporary Chinese social mentality

Strictly speaking, social mentality belongs to the category of social psychology. This article is more about discussing social mentality from the perspective of sociology, that is, studying social mentality as a social phenomenon or social problem, rather than as a social psychology.

1. The relationship between social mentality and social structure

The social mentality in the sociological sense emphasizes the social characteristics of the group. We know that society is not only layered but also structured. Social stratification and social mobility have both positive and

negative effects on social structure. In the process of social horizontal space flow, different social classes will be formed due to differences in academic degrees, industry occupations, jobs, economic income, and status. Of course, this horizontal social space (or horizontal) flow is shallow and visual, and the opening or solidification of social classes is easily perceived by people. However, the social stratification caused by the vertical (or vertical) flow of society caused by the horizontal social space (or horizontal) flow is deep and difficult to be perceived. However, whether the society is a horizontal flow or a vertical flow caused by horizontal flows, it will have an impact on the social structure. The impact of social mobility and social stratification on social structure can be measured by social mentality.

2. The main performance of contemporary Chinese social mentality

Different researchers have different dimensions of social mentality measurement. This paper mainly analyzes from three levels: individual citizens, social groups and countries.

(1) Contemporary society is a society marked by Internet information and big data storage, analysis and application technology. It is different from modern or modern society based on machine production. The Internet is not only a virtual community, but also a real space on some levels. Between virtual and real, people's "crowd," "watching," or herd mentality is more obvious when information is asymmetric. This kind of "crowd," "watching" or herd mentality is mainly characterized by personal characteristics.

(2) Contemporary society still carries the basic characteristics of industrial society. People's pursuit of material wealth and diversified secular life enjoyment have not changed, life is rich but happiness is not strong. People of the same class have different perceptions of contemporary society. The bottom-level people have higher satisfaction with the society. The middle class has a general sense of anxiety about the development of contemporary society, while the upper-class society is deliberately disappointed. These "satisfaction" diminishing phenomena reflect social (group) characteristics.

(3) The contemporary society is still a society in which the nation-state sovereignty is governed. The development of globalization and global governance encounter bottlenecks in the human and public spheres with countries, national borders, and supranational or borderless human borders. The mentality of blind big powers and the narrow social mentality of the widows coexist. Restrict the healthy development of contemporary Chinese society. This is the performance characteristic of contemporary Chinese social mentality at the national level.

3. The basic characteristics of contemporary Chinese social mentality

In August 2014, the "People's Forum" Questionnaire Center conducted an online questionnaire survey on "The current social morbidity in the eyes of the public." The results show that more than 80% of the respondents believe that the current Chinese society has a sub-health state, and that "below of faith," "visitor mentality" and "social anxiety disorder" are the three most prominent manifestations of today's society. In the past 40 years of reform and opening-up, China's social transformation has accelerated, and the values and social mentality of our people have become more open and diversified. However, China's original social and economic systems have lagged behind, social uncertainty has increased, and the reform dividend distribution has been uneven. And the influence of factors such as differences in attitudes towards life, the social mentality of our people have turned from positive to negative, and the overall performance has been positive before 2000. After 2000, especially after 2008, the negative mentality increased (Zhou Xiaohong, 2014: 21-23). Impetuousness, jealousy, flicking, hype, show off wealth, pretending to be poor, violence, and indifference have become eight unhealthy social mentalities in China.(Xia Xueluan,2011:48-50)
Some scholars also believe that the social mentality of the Chinese people at this stage is highlighted by the general sense of injustice and the anger of deviant wealth and rights corruption. The opposition between the rich and the poor still exists. Network accusations and criticisms become the norm, and it is necessary to face up to hot issues.

Form a consensus on social values, guide health network public opinion, and strengthen social psychological services (Zhu Li and Zhu Zhilin, 2014: 8-10; 2015: 16-20).

We believe that the changes in the mentality of contemporary Chinese society are not only manifested in the level of individual psychology and belief, but also in the moral and value aspects of social groups, and also in the level of national governance. To sum up, the contemporary Chinese social mentality has the following basic characteristics:

(1) Mental morbidity: It is prominently manifested in the loss of one's own disadvantages, the bad faith, the unbelief, the fear of fruit, the fear of not being faithful. Among them, the detriment of others is also manifested in gloating, dying, tormenting people, and harming others.

(2) Moral utilitarianism: It mainly shows that the industry emphasizes "*Dao*" and less "moral," while the profession says "morality" is more about "*Dao*," and there are "moral" and no "method" or "method" without "moral."

(3) Value diversity: Different classes have different values, and different professions or industries of the same class also have different values.

(4) Secular secularization: It mainly manifests in true faith and false beliefs, believes in ghosts but does not believe in people. In addition, with the enhancement of China's comprehensive national strength and the "centralization of the world stage," China has played an increasingly important role in global governance and international affairs. The "great state of mind" and the belief in Chinese civilization have attracted the attention of scholars. A major theoretical issue in rebuilding the contemporary Chinese mentality order with the Chinese civilization belief (Li Xiangping, 2018: 1-14).

IV. Human Buddhism actively enters the reality of the world to solve social problems

Buddhism originated in India, and light is greater than China. Through the development of modern *Taixu* masters and Zen genius six ancestors, Chinese Buddhism is increasingly integrated into real life. Master *Xingyun* has pushed human Buddhism to a new height of development, making Chinese Buddhism move from the traditional jungle system to the urban society, rooting Buddhism in the human world, making Buddhism a life, living in Buddhism, and creating Buddhism in Buddhism Nebula mode.

1. The main features of the human Buddhist nebula model

Since the mountain was opened on May 16, 1967, *Foguang* Mountain has passed through Master *Xingyun* (1967-1985), *Xinping* Monk (1985-1995), *Xinding* Monk (1995-2005), *Xinpei* Monk (2005-2013), Mindful Master (2013-present) and other nine abbots have established dozens of branches and established corresponding organizations around the world, through the establishment of universities, Buddhist colleges, libraries, publishing houses, translation centers, arts and literature. Centers, teahouses, nursery schools, homes for the elderly, high schools, newspapers, TV stations, and mobile-style clinics, etc., have constructed a relatively complete and unique Buddhist practice system in *Foguangshan* Temple, forming a human Buddhist nebula model. Its main features are as follows:

(1) The core concept: to make the cause of secular society in the spirit of transcending the world, so that Buddhism truly returns to the Buddha.

In the past, people viewed Buddhism from a negative level. The Master Nebula advocated that all four people should look at Buddhism from a positive perspective. He said: "Today Buddhism, we must explain from a positive side, not a ghost, not a superstitious, not a spiritual Buddhism, let it become a Buddhist life on earth, become a Buddhism that is being built, and become a fair and just Buddhism. Human Buddhism that allows people to settle down."(Master Nebula,2016:004) Buddhism in the world emphasizes that "actively entering the secular world is

more important than escaping the world, life is more important than life and death, and altruism is more important than self-interest. *Puji* is more important than self-cultivation." (Master Nebula, 2016: 020) If you do not reconcile the secular world and actively enter the secular world, you will not have the Bodhisattva heart; without the Bodhisattva, you will not be able to study Bodhisattva, and Bodhisattva is the intermediate link and practice that must pass through from "humanity" to "Buddha." Therefore, "Bodhicitta" and "Buddhist Road" constitute the foundation of human Buddhism belief and practice. Returning to the Buddha's heart and fulfilling the world's entry into the world, it constitutes the core concept of human Buddhism.

(2) The fundamental purpose is to promote Buddhism through culture, to cultivate talents through education, to charity and welfare society, and to cultivate people's hearts.

In order to promote the development of human Buddhism, Master *Xingyun's* compassion for the relief of *Guanyin* Bodhisattva, the mundane of *Manjushri's* great wisdom, the sacredness of the Samantabhadra, and the sacred bodhisattva "I am better than hell, who goes to hell" sacrifices self and saves The spirit of the willingness of all sentient beings has been carried forward. The title of "Four Holy Ghosts" of the original Buddhism and the "Four Vows of Mahayana Buddhism" have been combined with the "four sacred sacred prayers." Four points of the future: "The first is to promote Buddhism in culture, the second is to cultivate talents through education, the third is to charity and welfare society, and the fourth is to cultivate people's hearts." (Master Nebula, 2016: 021) He also said: "Although the world has the role of cultivating talents and maintaining social stability in all aspects of education, culture, and charity; but Buddhism's education, culture, charity, and meditation are acting beyond social secular, because Buddhism pays attention to no phase, no me, no, no demand, and presents an endless and boundless world. This is where Buddhism differs from ordinary society." (Master Nebula, 2016: 021-022) Of course, the starting point of human Buddhism is to promote the Dharma, but the foothold is still to purify the human heart, which seems to go the same way as secular education.

(3) The main creed: to say good things, to be good, to do good things; to give people confidence, to give people joy, to give hope, to give people convenience.

Buddhism pays attention to the cause and effect industry. The so-called "industry" means "behavior" and "report" means "retribution." Master *Xingyun* believes that "the fortunes and misfortunes of each of us are promoted, the fate of good or bad, the result of the city's own behavior, that is, the result of 'karma.' Therefore, for ordinary Buddhists who like to pray before the Buddha, I think' Consumerism is more important than 'blessing.'" (Master Nebula, 2016: 011)The main way to "eliminate the industry" is that everyone must pursue "three goods" (that is, speaking good things, keeping a good heart, doing good things), and practice the "four givens" (that is, four infinite hearts: giving people confidence, giving people joy, giving hope, giving convenience). Why? Because '"confidence" naturally does not speak and hurt people, 'rejoicing people' will naturally admire with joy, this is 'speaking good words' (mouth purification); 'giving people hope' others have setbacks, will give encouragement, care Blessing, this is 'save good heart' (intentional purification); 'convenient for people', acting naturally will not 'bureaucratic' and actively help people, this is 'good things' (purification of the body), so 'three goods' and 'four givens' are the principle of thought that is human Buddhism.' (Master Nebula, 2016: 011-012) These ideological principles are very "grounded," which is in line with Buddhist thoughts and can penetrate the secular society and constitute the main creed of human Buddhism.

(4) Development Goals: Promote human Buddhism, build a pure land of humanity, build a four-member religious group, and promote universality and compassion.

Master *Xingyun* believes that the goal of the Buddha Light Society is to "promote human Buddhism, build a pure land of Buddhism, purify the people of the world, and achieve world peace." (Master Nebula, 2015a: 117-120) In the direction of the development of the Buddha's Light Society, Master *Xingyun* emphasized that it is necessary to go from the monks to the believers, from the monasteries to the society, from self-study to other studies, from static to dynamic, from disciples to teachers, from home to the world. (Master Nebula, 2015a: 142-146) Now "the

activities promoted by the *International Fo Guanghui* in all parts of the world are to follow the example of the Buddha's original mission." (Master Nebula, 2016: 042) "Today's human Buddhism is in international exchange every day. Everyone does not distinguish between religion, nationality, and no distinction. You come to me, I come to you, symbiosis, mutual respect, and mutual respect. This is not the appearance of the pure land of the world. Yet?" (Master Nebula, 2016: 238-240) This shows that the power and influence of human Buddhism has transcended national boundaries. In a certain sense, it can be said that it has better played the role of civil public diplomacy.

(5) Basically carry forward the tradition of Buddhism: Basically carry forward the tradition of Buddhism: eight sects have both, and there is mutual trust; collective creation, respect for tolerance; learning to carry out, democracy, acting; religious sects, sacred equality; political and religious cooperation; Harmony; international exchange, the same symbiosis but not flow; human Buddhism is the pure land of Buddha.

The eight major sects of the Mahayana Buddhism in China (*Tiantaizong, Huayanzong, Sanshizong, Weizhizong, Jingshizong, Zen, Luzon, Tantric*) "all have a common place, that is, they have not left human life and have not left the people." (Master Nebula, 2016: 015) Only the various sectarian groups of Buddhism can combine one, the sects are mutually tolerant, and the mutual respect between the sects can promote the sects and the shackles, the life of the people, and so on, and can better learn to practice and promote Buddhism and achieve symbiosis. Not only that, human Buddhism also emphasizes the social law of the political and religious circles, international exchanges, advances with the times, and realizes the modern development of Buddhism.

Human Buddhism "must advance with the times and promote the Dharma in a way that is acceptable to modern people. Thus, human Buddhism must conform to today's human minds." (Master Nebula, 2016: 015) As early as the early 1990s, Master Xingyun summarized the Dharma "modern language culture," mission "modern science and technology," practice "modern life," and temple "modern schoolization" as the "four modernizations" of modern Buddhism.(Master Nebula, 2015b: 149-155)

After the establishment of the *International Foguang Society* in 1991, Master Xingyun was recommended as the president of the *International Foguang General Association*. He practiced his ideals of "Fo Guangguang's three thousand circles, the French waters and five continents," and also accelerated the internationalization of human Buddhism. Master Xingyun also pointed out that the hope of Buddhism today, "mainly in the Buddhism, there must be new ideas. These new concepts are to improve the system, self-reliance, welfare society, promote rich music, develop education, enterprising creativity, unity and cooperation, Talent." (Master Nebula, 2015b: 164)

Master Xingyun himself has devoted himself to promoting cultural, educational and charitable careers. He has created more than 200 temples and temples around the world, and established 16 Buddhist colleges at home and abroad to cultivate Buddhist professionals. He also founded 9 art museums. 26 libraries, publishing houses, 12 bookstores, more than 50 Chinese schools, as well as the United States West, Taiwan's Foguang, South China and the preparation of Australia's Nantian University, are worthy of being masters.

2. The main way of human Buddhism to solve social problems

(1) Through practice, we will solve people's inner greed and resentment and promote interpersonal relationship and social harmony.

The master of the nebula believes that "the heart of Buddhism is the most important thing." (Master Nebula, 2014: 99) Development is not indispensable. "Getting the heart is to build oneself; development is to build the world. Help yourself to be 'hearted'; help the world to 'develop.'" (Master Nebula, 2014: 99) The inner world and the outside world are built together, and people and society can be harmonious. In Buddhism, compassion is the foundation of Buddhism and a shortcut to Buddhism. Therefore, human Buddhism also emphasizes that people should be compassionate and resolve their hatred, arrogance and fear with compassion. In addition, Buddhism in

the world also advocates the promotion of the triumph of the heart, the spirit of the same body and the heart of Bodhi. This "three hearts" and the compassionate heart together constitute the "four verses of the Buddha's light members" in human Buddhism: "Compassion, love, and willingness are all within the Dharma, and the blessings are beneficial to the people and nature; Zen, quit, equality, Tolerance and jealousy; and gratitude, great willingness"(Master Nebula, 2014: 99).

People are people in society. In real life, everyone is inevitably connected to family and others. Therefore, in addition to self-discipline, building your own inner world, you must build your own external world through "development." Therefore, in addition to self-discipline, building your own inner world, you must build your own external world through "development." (Master Nebula, 2014: 2) In this way, "Compassion, compassion, Bodhicitta and development and development" becomes "every modern person, not only for himself, for the family, for society, for the country, even for the human beings of the universe." (Master Nebula, 2014: 113) It can be seen that the importance of human Buddhism to the practice of the human heart is very emphasized.

(2) Use "truth" beyond politics to save sentient beings, improve society, eliminate human horror, hindrance, attachment, sadness, pain, etc., and seek the affiliation of life.

Marxism believes that the establishment of a country based on the class base is to achieve political rule through the martial arts of the rule of law. It is inevitable to use violent organs such as the army, the police, and prisons to dictate. In the view of human Buddhist believers, those who are "dictatorship" believe that they have karma. To remove their karma, it is necessary to use Buddhist Buddhism that transcends secular politics to transform them.

(3) The two are not equal to the nobles, the rich and the poor, men and women, occupations, races, and beliefs, giving equal treatment; breaking the solidified class hierarchy and resolving disputes.

Master Xingyun believes: "The Buddha of the world has always advocated ordinary, ordinary, dull, equal, living and humanized." (Master Nebula, 2016: 060) "Looking people and me as a state of no distinction, and respecting men and women and all things equally." (Master Nebula, 2016: 098) "In the teachings of Buddhism, people of different countries, races, classes, genders, and ages are best given respect and equal treatment." (Master Nebula, 2014: 34) "Human Buddhism believes that everything in the world is mine, and everything is selfless. I can blend with the Dharma world. That is to say, I am equal to all beings in the universe." (Master Nebula, 2016: 011) Human Buddhism emphasizes the return to the Buddha's heart, and the peace and tranquility of the people, the symbiosis of the same body, the impermanence, the ignorance of the Buddhism, the sect of the Buddhism, the sect of the sect, the sect of the sect of the sect of the sect.

(4) Attach importance to simplicity, attach importance to peace, attach importance to the integration of the world, and bring happiness and happiness to the world.

During the primitive Buddhism period, the Buddha often talked about bitterness, emptiness, impermanence, and no me. Some believers who did not recognize the Buddha's cultivating body "reported from the negative, the bitterness, emptiness, impermanence, and selflessness of the human being, making the general believers follow the negative Face to experience, people feel that there is no beauty and no brilliance in Buddhism." (Master Nebula, 2016: 063) On the positive level, Buddhism on earth understands the bitterness, emptiness, impermanence, and selflessness of human beings, attaches importance to simplicity, values peace, values symbiosis, values "three goods" and "four givens," attaches importance to harmony, attaches importance to perfection, and values happiness and happiness.

V. The active guidance of the humanistic Buddhist nebula model on the Chinese social mentality

1. The "treatment" and guidance of Human Buddhism on human morbidity

(1) Politics needs Buddhism to assist in education, and Buddhism needs political protection and communication.

Master Xingyun believes: "Buddhism and politics are closely related to each other and complement each other. Politics needs the auxiliary education of Buddhism. Buddhism also needs political protection." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 55) Specifically, Buddhism "especially can help the political deficiencies, prevent crimes in the first place, inspire people, and be good, have the characteristics of enthusiasm, equality, inclusiveness, mutualism, and harmony. Buddhism's contribution to national politics. There have been many records in the past, and there are too many enumerations." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 55-56) How does Buddhism help the country's politics? "In a place where political power can't be reached, Buddhism can make up for the inadequacy and exert its effects. Buddhism's compassion is far-reaching, and it can turn the savage frontier into a cheerful and courteous middle land; Buddhism's humiliation is invincible. It is possible to eliminate the hatred of generations from invisible; the gratitude of Buddhism is unwilling to fill the gap of desire; the wisdom of Buddhism has nothing to do, and it can influence the tenacity to be docile." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 73-74) To put it simply, it is to lead the way, to eliminate resentment, to be content-free and greedy, and to be tenacious.

The national politics in Buddhism's ideals should be "political and democratic politics," "a harmonious and respectful society," "choose a reasonable economy," and "optimistic and diligent life." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 74) In the relationship between politics and Buddhism, the Master Nebula summarized the following 12 aspects:

1) Politics is a group that manages all people and maintains society; Buddhism is to educate all beings and purify The power of society.

2) Politics hopes that everyone can live in peace and happiness; Buddhism requires everyone to be compassionate I am happy to be a man.

3) Politics is glaring at King Kong, and everyone must be disciplined; Buddhism is a low eyebrow of Bodhisattva Self-discipline.

4) Politics is to protect hair and demon and defend the country; Buddhism is to protect students from suffering and support the country.

5) Political attention to the ability to change, to force people; Buddhism attaches importance to discipline and cause and effect, to serve people.

6) Politics is the law of expediency, which is adapted to the time, the place, and the person; Buddhism is the real law, affirmed by religion, law and reason.

7) Politics is curvilinear, and the song is far-reaching, everyone is equal; Buddhism is straight, pointing straight People, seeing sex into a Buddha.

8) Politics attaches importance to effective implementation, and it is completed on the same day; Buddhism attaches great importance to the benefit of the future and saves all beings in the afterlife.

9) The political world is the universal world of reality and the ideal goal; the pure land of Buddhism is the wish Health.

10) Politics governs the country with financial and military power; Buddhism supports the country with virtue and *mana*.

11) Politics starts from the outside and asks the people to practice law and obey the law; Buddhism starts from the inside and asks people to cultivate their hearts and kept their way.

12) Politics requires everyone to pursue three classes and five regulars, four dimensions and eight virtues to repair the family and govern the country; Buddhism requires everyone to practice the conversion of the three treasures, five precepts and six degrees, to self-esteem and influence others.

It should be said that these generalizations of the Nebula Master may not be comprehensive, and some content may be debatable, but his views on the fact that Buddhism should actively serve secular politics are commendable. He said: "Today's Buddhists are prosperous and philosophical. They should not hold a school-level attitude toward politics. On the contrary, they should be more actively concerned and bear the burden. The society also needs the majority of Buddhists to join the ranks of politics." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 76)The teachings "purify the people, improve the atmosphere" and provide relevant "mental construction" for a harmonious society.

(2) Modern family ethical morbid treatment : everyone is doing it to me and loving each other.

The family is the basic cell of society, the relationship between parents and children, the relationship between husband and wife, husband-and-wife relationship, brother-sister relationship, property division and inheritance relationship, etc., "The latent morbidity is becoming more and more serious, and many family ethics have already turned red."(Master Nebula, 2015c: 129-130) To this end, Master Xingyun advocated the "prescription" of the treatment of modern family ethics from the Buddhist ideology and culture. He said: "Buddhism attaches great importance to human morality, especially the harmonious coexistence between the genus, and the mutual respect between people is very important in the people-oriented Buddhism." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 44) As everyone knows, the kinship in the family "is like a chain of chains, and it is inseparable. Everyone is doing it in me, loving each other, and family theory is happy." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 132) In other words, everyone in the family is also symbiotic with the same body, and needs to be happy, respectful, and equal and peaceful in order to be able to be at ease.

(3) Occupational morbid treatment of agricultural workers - stressing causal morality, self-discipline, diligence, and remorse.

In the process of rapid development and transformation of today's society, "because society has more money, pornography and violence, it lacks ritual, virtue and good knowledge" (Master Nebula, 2015c: 134), "Many problems are lack of adjustment, and many situations cannot be mastered. As a result, occupational dilemmas and mental emptiness are all kinds of morbidities." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 132) Therefore, "Today's society needs a cause and effect, needs five precepts, needs gratitude. Needs repentance, we need to use these to treat our inner sufferings and improve our lives." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 137)

(4) Illness treatment of educational ethics - instead of blaming by encouragement, love instead of resentment, care instead of indulgence, and colleagues instead of estrangement.

Since the reform and opening up, China's social transformation has accelerated, social uncertainty has increased, and many families have become distorted and utilitarian in the education of their children. To this end, Master Xingyun proposed a treatment plan for education morality: "We educate our children not only to teach them how to work hard to make exams, to make money, but also to teach them how to behave and how to do things. We must instill their causal ideas and teach them to understand their causes. Have a compassionate spirit and moral behavior, so that they learn to respect themselves, love others, and further love society and love the country." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 139)

(5) Illness treatment of modern healthy life - need proper diet, legitimate love, proper work, proper life; proper behavior, proper language, just being a human being, justified.

In today's society, many people "live the life of the morning faint, sleep late and get up late, play late at night, eat up late into the habit, breakfast instead of eating, so that the stomach can not get rest during the break, the time to eat To the nutrients, and hurt the body"; "Today's active life has improved, but spiritual life has not improved. Many people travel by car when they go out, making the streets suffocating, suffocating, affecting environmental quality and mental health. Weekend holidays are better at I wear bump slippers at home, step on the gym, or go to the lounge restaurant to listen to songs and dances, but I don't bother to go to the green mountains and green waters, so far away from nature, health and nature are going downhill. Many women are impatient to do housework, like Going out to dance, jogging, practicing yoga, eating supplements, or losing weights is really a way to keep your health." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 140) Need to return to the standard in diet, love, work, life, language, behavior, life and life. "In daily life, give more help to family, friends and people around, so that their minds can get some nutrition and increase some life. The good fortune, then, the social morbidity can naturally be reduced, and our society is more peaceful" (Master Nebula, 2015c: 142).

(6) Treatment of psychosocial abnormalities.

1) Illness treatment that harms people unfavorable : to be good with others, to give people convenience; and to be happy with people, to be happy with others; "Psychological morbidity that harms others and self-interest comes from the inner greed and vain, from the heart's reversal thoughts, the heart's deception. The heart disease still needs the medicine. Just insist on 'I hope that all beings will suffer, not for themselves. 'The Taoist thoughts, the Japanese repair month, naturally can break the greed, wash the heart and scale, become a big freedom." (Master Nebula,2015c:150)

2) I believe that the bad ill treatment is good. I want to go to the distance, look at the distance, and go to the same place. "Humans have a bad root of stupidity: everything believes bad, does not believe in good." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 151) Everything should be thought of in a good way. "There is no absolute good or bad in the world. It is a difference between different positions and different concepts. The heart is good, the world is beautiful; the heart is not good, the greed is blazing, It's not good to see the world. It's raining, people in the car think the rain is beautiful, but the people on the road are complaining; for any personnel, the benefits and the bad things can be different." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 153) In the same way, look at the distance, go to the truth, and go to the same place to solve the problem. Therefore, "we must work hard to be a person who believes in not believing in the bad, and the transfer of heaven and hell is between this thought" (Master Nebula, 2015c: 154).

3) Illness treatment without fear of fear - all evils, selflessness, no heart, no feelings. Buddhism said: "Buddha fears, all beings are afraid of fruit." As the saying goes: "The good and the evil are reported at the end of the day, only to come early and come late." Master Xingyun said: "We don't think that the cause and effect are invisible, invisible and invisible. Ignore the karma. The fear of the fruit is not a cause, it is a pathological condition." (Master Nebula, 2015c: 155-156) It is necessary to stay away from all evil causes and avoid causal barriers. It is necessary not only to know because of fear, but also to do more good deeds, fear and fruit, and to fear all the sufferings.

4) Believe it or not, believe that it is really like Nirvana; believe in geography and *feng shui*, it is better to believe in self-reliance; believe in eating and drinking gambling, it is better to believe in quiet and defensive; believe in money power, it is better to believe "truth "Faith; believe in healthy power, it is better to believe that life is impermanent; believe in people, right and wrong, it is better to believe that there is no equality." Therefore, it is necessary to use good faith to understand good or bad, to use prajna to judge true and false, to use print to choose right and wrong, and to use empty body to have nothing.

(7) Pathological treatment of social folklore.

1) Illness treatment of folklore numbers—To treat the digitally feared morbidity with the correct concept, any number in Buddhism is good and auspicious.

2) The pathological treatment of folklore weddings and funerals - not vain, not persistent, not extravagant, not superstitious, not allowing the deceased to compete with the living, cremation is best.

3) Pathological treatment of folk time and space - the time lag is a good time, the space is the good space, the right time and space is a good time.

4) The pathological treatment of folk beliefs - beliefs are natural and out of nature. True faith must have the conditions of faith. Believe in morality, ability, reality, and history.

2. The main features of the human Buddhism *Foguangshan* nebula model guiding the social mentality

(1) Buddhism in the world has entered the world with the spirit of being born, and has stepped out of the mountains and forests, integrated into the society, and kept pace with the times, adapting to the needs of social development. When Master Zhao Yunchu met with the former president of the late Chinese Buddhist Association, Zhao Puchu, he said: "In the future, when Buddhism develops on the mainland, it must have a benefit to the people and contribute to the country, that is, to promote the so-called 'human Buddhism.' The mainland generally welcomes Buddhism as outdated, superstitious, and devilish. Because human Buddhism advocates creating happiness and happiness for people, there are many places similar to communism." (Master Nebula, 2016) "Now the two sides of the strait have a recognition and tacit understanding of the promotion of human Buddhism. In particular, the newly appointed Chinese Buddhist Association president, Xue Cheng, is young and promising. He uses modern technology to spread the Fa and spread Buddhism in more than a dozen languages. Culture, I think, the promotion of Buddhism in the future, for example, is even more limitless." (Master Nebula, 2016)

Although Master Xuecheng resigned as the president of the Chinese Buddhist Association on August 15, 2018, the development of human Buddhism on both sides of the Taiwan Straits should not be greatly affected.

(2) Human Buddhism plays an important civil society force in the social governance of co-construction, joint governance and sharing, and can form a synergy with the new era of social governance forces led by the party and the government. The effect of Buddhism's "Humanization and Benefits" can make up for the shortcomings of secular politics in social construction. This is an important embodiment and illustration of the adaptation of religion and socialist society in the new era, and it is also the mechanism for the adaptation of religion to socialist society.

(3) Human Buddhism participates in social governance and social construction with its active spirit of joining the WTO. Through co-cultivation, self-quietness, self-management, self-education, etc., it prevents and resolves social conflicts from the aspects of cultural education and ethics, and stabilizes people's hearts. The peace of mind of the society provides a civil foundation for the coordinated development of social co-governance.

6. Conclusion: Culture and people's heart are the basic propositions of social harmony and stable development

Society is a society composed of people. The reason why society needs to be governed is because society is in the process of operation, due to contradictions or conflicts in cognitive deviations and interests, leading to social differentiation and disharmony（Liao Yang, Meng Li, 2018).

Culture is the glue of society. A society that leaves culture will not be formed into society; even if it exists, the social community will be in a dissipative structure. Therefore, social governance needs to return to its meta-governance, that is, return to culture and people's hearts. Culture has a layered structure. At the core of the core is the spiritual culture of values, ethics, beliefs, etc. Religious beliefs and their culture have a profound impact on society, culture and people. Therefore, the meta-governance of society should start from it.

For more than half a century, Master Xingyun advocated that human Buddhism walked out of the jungle and returned to the Buddha's heart. In the spirit of being born into the world, people and I are different, but all beings,

emphasizing the self-cleanness, self-management, and self-education of the public; Co-cultivation and assembly, "respect each other on the instrument, share the same in the mind, balance the economy, share in the society, praise the innocent language, and enjoy the meditation on the mind."

The Buddhist model of Buddhism in *Taiwan's Foguang Mountain* has played an active guiding role in the mentality of human society. It can provide "food and nutrients" for people in the real world, "filling the emptiness of the soul" and "improving the morality of life." "Stabilizing the hearts and minds of the society" can also help people "settle their lives," "promoting self-reliance, happiness, harmony between people and respect, family harmony, social harmony, world peace," which deserves attention and reference.

The *Foguang* Mountain Buddhism created by the Master of the Nebula is adapted to the social development of the society. The social governance and social construction model is formed in Taiwan, but it originated in mainland China. In the modern era, the masters of *Taixu*, *Yinshun*, and *Hui Neng Liuzu* The "Faith Buddhism" or "Human Buddhism" has been promoted, and the Master of the Nebula has further promoted the modernization and internationalization of human Buddhism.

Although some socialist countries such as Cuba and Vietnam have adopted a more tolerant attitude towards religion, they may even allow their own Communists to believe in religion(2013). However, this does not mean that the Chinese mainland will also liberalize the "Christian" belief in religion. The principle that "party members cannot believe in religion" cannot be shaken. However, our Constitution has clear provisions on the freedom of religious belief, and the articles directly related to religious issues are Articles 34 and 36. This "freedom of religious belief" is only for the majority of non-communist members and their reserve army (communist youth members). Communists and Communist Youth League members cannot believe in religion. Mainland China has a population of more than 1.3 billion, Communist Party members are only 890 million, and there are more than 100 million members of the Communist Youth League. Various religious believers and potential believers are several times or even ten times more likely to be united and led by the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League. Religious and potential believers are decisive in building a well-off society in an all-round way and successfully realizing the "Chinese dream" of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Obviously, it is necessary to further do a good job in united front.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed: "To do a good job in the united front under the new situation, we must master the law, adhere to the principles, and pay attention to the methods. The most fundamental thing is to uphold the party's leadership," mainly political leaders, but also "good at friendship and friendship." "(Xi Jinping, 2017) "To maximize the unity of the majority of religious and non-believing people. Actively guide religion to adapt to the socialist society." "Do a good job in the religious work of the party and adhere to the basic principles of the party's religious work. The key is to 'guide' I think deeply, see through, and get the right one. I want to be 'directed' and 'guide,' and the 'guide' is effective, and firmly grasp the initiative of religious work." (Xi Jinping, 2017) This has pointed out the direction for the religious work in the new era of China. In fact, the issue of people's minds still needs to be guided by the "holy" and "vulgar" culture. The governance and construction of society will come to fruition, and social harmony will have a more solid internal foundation.

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External Conflict Escalation Among the Nilotic Pastoral Communities of Northern Kenya

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Abstract
This article discusses the external dynamics that resulted in the proliferation of arms into Kenya in general and Northern Kenya in specific. The paper has two major arguments. First, during the cold war, there was an arms race in the region because of its strategic position. This resulted in the two superpowers, USA and USSR, to arm specific countries that were considered to be friendly to them. Second, the paper argues that beginning in the early '70s into the '80s and early 90s, a number of countries in the Horn of Africa experienced turmoil or civil strife. Political instability in Somalia made Kenyan Somalis able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia and then slipped back into Kenya. The current study found that the conflict in North Eastern Kenya is caused by scarcity of resources, economic and political marginalization, active resistance by pastoralist communities to assimilation, resource depletion, and demographic changes, and the growing availability of small arms and light weapons. Livestock has become the triggers and the medium for sustaining conflicts through cattle raiding for wealth accumulation and also for dowry payments. Modern technology has also become a clear instrument of conflict escalation. Pastoral communities in northern Kenya provide an excellent market for firearms. The study concludes that political instability in Somalia made Kenyan Somalis able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia and then slipped back into Kenya. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea led to an arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in the massive acquisition of arms.

Keywords: Clan, Conflict, Nilotic Pastoral Communities, Northern Kenya, Cold War

1.1. Introduction

After 1990, there were serious external dynamics that took place in the Horn of Africa (HOA), which have had a direct influence on the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. These external dynamics indirectly resulted in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the arms of pastoralists in northern Kenya, aiding in the transformation of traditional conflict into all-out warfare in pastoralist regions.

This paper discusses the external dynamics that resulted in the proliferation of arms into Kenya in general and Northern Kenya in specific. The paper has two major arguments. First, during the cold war, there was an arms race in the region because of its strategic position. This resulted in the two superpowers, USA and USSR, to arm specific countries that were considered to be friendly to them. Once the cold war ended, these arms were flooded in the market as they were no longer controlled by the superpowers. Eventually, they got into the arms of civilians, particularly the pastoralist communities, and exacerbated already existing conflict.

Secondly, the paper argues that beginning in the early '70s into the '80s and early 90s, a number of countries in the Horn of Africa experienced turmoil or civil strife. Such incidents resulted in many citizens of such countries being armed. These arms eventually found their way to pastoral communities in Northern Kenya, which precipitated the conflict. The specific country upheavals discussed in this chapter are: political instability in Somalia; Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry; instability in Uganda; and, the conflicts in Sudan.

1.1. Statement of the Problem

Michael (1998) opines that for over a century, the Horn has been a theatre for strategic power struggles and the Cold War confrontation when each of the principal countries of the Horn of Africa switched sides at crucial junctures. According to Schwab (1978), the USA increased its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, the Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Additionally, the United States intended to keep the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean opens for international trade as well as for Israeli shipping. The United States' alignment to Ethiopia changed when conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The decision by the Soviet Union to support Ethiopia against Somalia insurgency during the Ogaden war, which led to the eventual defeat of Siad Barre in his quest, angered Somalia who decided to terminate its military treaty with the Soviet Union.

By taking into consideration these situations, it is clear that the rivalry between the superpowers had its effect on today's conflict in Northern Kenya because the states around the Horn were systematically thrown into a Cold War that has been raging in spite of assumed détente. This premise is supported by Schwab (1978), who observed that when the Soviet Union and the United States started to internationalize regional conflicts on the Horn of Africa, the whole region automatically turned into a serious flashpoint. According to Baxter and Hogg (1990), livestock rustling has been commercialized in the recent past, and as a result, economic entrepreneurs have proved to be both arms dealers and livestock traders. Baven (2008) and Boutwell (1999) argued that several factors account for this flow of small arms. Un-manned Porous borders pastoralists groups across the common borders, conflicts in the Horn of Africa; and, middlemen and brokers. The unstable states in the Horn of Africa are one of the principal sources of small arms and light weapons to Northern Kenya. Kenya stands at the crossroads between the conflict areas of South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Ethiopia. The modern technology has become a catalyst in conflict escalation, as observed by Villanueva (2009). The current study, therefore, attempted to determine the external dynamics of conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

1.2. Objectives of the Study

1.2.1. General Objective

The general objective of the study was to determine the external dynamics of conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

1.2.2. Specific Objectives

i. Examine the influence of commercial entrepreneurs on conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

    ii.   Establish how the availability of small arms and light weapons contribute to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

    iii.   Establish how the introduction of modern ways can lead to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

1.3. Hypothesis of the Study

    i.   **H_o:** Commercial entrepreneurs have no significant influence on conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.
        H_1: Commercial entrepreneurs has a significant influence on conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

    ii.   **H_o:** Availability of small arms and light weapons does not significantly contribute to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.
        H_1: Availability of small arms and light weapons significantly contributes to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

    iii.   **H_o:** Introduction of modern ways does not significantly lead to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.
        H_1: Introduction of modern ways significantly leads to conflict escalation among the Nilotic pastoral communities of northern Kenya.

2.1. Literature Review

2.0.1. Cold War and Instability among Political Regimes in the HOA

The Horn of Africa is one of the most complex and conflicted regions of the world. For over a century, the Horn has been a theatre for strategic power struggles and the Cold War confrontation when each of the principal countries of the Horn of Africa switched sides at crucial junctures (Michael 1998). Cold War was generally driven by material interests or ideological controversy, and the Horn of Africa as a strategic location was turned into a pawn during the Cold War (Mohamed, 2009). Its strategic location which is directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula thus located close to major oil-lines constituted a prime spot for the United States and Soviet Union and their allies to project power, control politics, and provide advanced military support to their Middle East and Persian Gulf allies (Lefebvre, 1991). Aware of this strategic location, United States embarked on increasing its presence in the region which among others was necessitated by the need to support and stabilize pro-Western governments, control of the sea route, and ensure the economic security of the West thereby restraining the possibility of a Soviet Union's attempt at influencing post-colonial societies into joining the communist camp.

According to Schwab (1978), the USA began to increase its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, the Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Additionally, the United States intended to keep the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean open for international trade as well as for Israeli shipping. The control of the strategic ports in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean were critical for both superpowers, mainly the Kismayu, Berbera, Boossaso in Somalia, Masswa in Ethiopia, and Port Sudan in Sudan. Their strategic influence of these ports enabled them to control the political activities in the Horn of Africa

The Soviet Union's foothold in Somalia was strengthened following the overthrow of Siad Barre's government, who thereafter established what he called scientific socialism (Birnbaum, 2002; Mohamed, 2009). Through sheer blackmail, both Somalia and Ethiopian governments being anxious to benefit from this international political situation, threatened their newly found allies to change sides in case of inadequate support. While the United States was aware of these schemes, the Soviet Union fell into the trap and went a heard to sign a Friendship and Cooperation agreement with Somalia in 1974, thereby making Somalia as one of the most heavily militarized

countries in the continent (Parsons, 1995). Through this Friendship and Cooperation agreement, Somalia received heavy arsenal from the Soviet Union.

The United States' alignment to Ethiopia changed when conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. United States' advised Ethiopia's leadership against using an untrained peasant militia in Eritrea. In a subsequent slaughter of Eritreans, Ethiopia was rendered by the United States ineligible for military aid when it was listed as among the human rights violators. However, United States' suspension of military aid to Ethiopia occurred not only when the country was running out of essential military hardware but was also facing Eritrean and Somali insurgents. To overcome the twin problems, Ethiopia turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. The Soviet Union's recognition of the benefits of allying with Ethiopia brokered a $1 billion arms deal and signed a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia while simultaneously continuing their presence in Somalia.

The decision by the Soviet Union to support Ethiopia against Somalia insurgency during the Ogaden war, which led to the eventual defeat of Siad Barre in his quest, angered Somalia who decided to terminate its military treaty with the Soviet Union. Siad Barre then welcomed the United States' military and economic aid leading to the swapping of an alliance between Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Cold War superpowers. The new-found alliance remained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of the polarization of the world. As the sole superpower, the United States did not have any real need or interest in Somalia any more.

The strategic importance of Somalia vanished following this collapse, leading to the suspension of all financial and military aid. Starved of much needed financial and military aid, Somalia's regime became extremely vulnerable, leading to its collapse. Somalia did not have the chance or ability to establish a functional political system because it benefited from the ideological rivalry for a long time. Due to huge amounts of both Soviet and American military hardware, Somalia became the most militarized state per capita in the Horn of Africa (Parsons, 1995). The precarious situation, that was more than welcome to the Somali warlords who saw their chance to step into the huge vacuum of power. When the Soviet Union and the United States started to internationalize regional conflicts on the Horn of Africa, the whole region automatically turned into a serious flashpoint (Schwab, 1978).

2.0.2. Political Instability among Regimes in the Horn of Africa

Somalia has had less than ten years of relative peace since its independence in 1960. Conflicts in the country arose following the assassination of its second president in 1969. This occasioned power struggle among competing for political forces. The ensuing leadership and political vacuum were exploited by the military, who, through a coup-installed, its military chief-Siad Barre- as the country's new president. The new president established a governing council called the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) to steer the country until new elections of a civilian president. Barre's attempts to consolidate and have a firmer grip of power led him to embark on a systematic exclusion of clans and civil society from the government. However, he did these on the pretext of promoting a stronger sense of nationalism in the government. With that enemy fallen, Mohamed (2009) observed that their ideals began to clash, and each clan hungered to establish itself superior over the others. Warlords emerged from the ranks of the former military and also through the endorsement of clan elders and sub-clan leaders. These groups are but not limited to Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Peoples Movement (SPM), Somali Salvation National Movement (SSNM), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and Somali National Front (SNF).

Baxter (1993) asserts that the disintegration and indiscipline in the ranks of rebel movements was also a mechanism through which the militarization of the civilian populations has occurred. Many armed political movements experience schism within their organizations. This situation resulted in splits, massive recruitment of new fighters, who are usually civilians. For instance, the quarrel between Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi that arose as a result of political differences led to the split of the Somali National Alliance. Such factional groupings appealed to members of their respective clans for political support and recruitment. This occasioned the proliferation of clan-

based political movements with armed militia wings. The disintegration and subsequent indiscipline in these militia movements saw the systematic mobilization and arming of civilian populations resulting in a high number of arms in civilian hands.

One of the most bizarre developments in Barre's led Somalia was when the government decided to release arms to the public to scare off a determined opposition. This was seen as a colonial tactic of 'divide and rule' to ward off opposition forces. However, despite these dirty tactics, Barre was deposed in 1991 by Farah Aideed. Aideed's government was not internationally recognized, and his leadership was fiercely contested, particularly by Ali Mahdi Muhammad. However, Aideed and Mahdi were not the only figures vying for power. With an absence of established government, a power vacuum emerged, and all political and military leaders from Barre's fallen regime took up arms that made available through the millions of dollars' worth of weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and the United States. Further, other clan leaders questioned the legitimacy of Aideed's government, leading to the eruption of total chaos and disorder in entire Somalia. Since then, Somalia has become one of the sources and transit points of small arms and light weapons, which unfortunately have been pilfered into Kenya. It is today estimated that about 15 out of 100 civilian populations in Somalia own firearms (Knighton, 2003).

Many Kenyan Somalis were able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia and then slipped back into Kenya. In some cases, renegade Somali soldiers did the same. The establishment of the Daadab Refugee camp in Northern Kenya to offer sanctuary to Somalis escaping from the conflict in their country also fueled the availability of arms in the region. Although the majority of the refugees were ordinary citizens afflicted by protracted wars in their country, a significant number of the refugees comprised of the former soldiers of the ousted Siad Bare's government with others coming from the numerous armed groups that emerged after the fall of the military government under Siad Bare. A number of these refugees could not be easily accommodated in the camps while in possession of arms, thus prompting the sale of weapons cheaply to the locals. Pastoralists in Northern Kenya were the immediate beneficiary of these arms, making Northern Kenya saturated with automatic guns from the Kenyan Somalis. Pastoralists replaced their spears with guns. At the height of the conflict in unconfirmed estimates for the volume of arms entering Kenya from Somalia ranged as high as 5,000 automatic rifles per month, with recovered weapons reportedly showing Chinese, Soviet Union, U.S., and Bulgarian markings (Muggah & Breman, 2001)

2.0.3. Ethiopia-Eritrea Rivalry

Apart from the conflicts in Somalia, the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea also contributed to the militarization of civilians in the region. This rivalry is traceable to the late 1990s. The regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea were the product of an alliance between rebel movements to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Ethiopia was partitioned by mutual consent of the new rebel governments. Bilateral relations were normal between the two countries until the border war broke out in 1998. It is after this period that the warring neighbors sought an alliance with Sudan and perhaps other neighbors to destabilize each other. Eritrea urged the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to accelerate armed action against Ethiopia. In return, Ethiopia played an active role in the creation of the Eritrean Jihad Movement (EJM) and Eritrean Forces Alliance (ENFA) to weaken Eritrea. The two countries have continued to fight proxy wars through providing military and other forms of support to various warring groups (Assefa, 1998).

The Ethiopian government provided broad and vital support to the Transitional Federation Government of Somalia (TFG) and friendly Somali clans, which included materials, training, and troops even before it invaded it in late 2006. While the amount of support that Ethiopia has provided to date is difficult to verify, successive U.N. reports have pointed to substantial support from Addis Ababa to the TFG and authorities in Puntland and Somaliland. The UN Monitoring Group (2005) reported that Eritrea had supported and armed groups in Somalia fighting the TFG. The Monitoring Group's report in 2010 also reports that Eritrea was providing significant and sustained political, financial, and material support, including arms, ammunition, and training, to armed opposition groups in Somalia

since at least 2007. Eritrea's involvement, as noted by the report, an attempt to counter Ethiopian influence in Somalia, especially because it perceives the TFG as a proxy for the Ethiopian Government (Straight, 2009).

The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has led to an arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in the massive acquisition of arms. Eritrea, for instance, purchased weapons from Belarus, Bulgaria, and France between 2006 and 2009 worth over have 15 million pounds, the majority of which were small arms and light weapons. In the same period, Ethiopia purchased weapons from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and France worth over 25 million pounds. Although these purchases are done in readiness for war between the two nations, some of these weapons are diverted and used to fuel wars in Somalia. While not training their guns at each other, the two countries find themselves supporting proxy wars in the horn of Africa, with Somalia being a particular concern. The danger of the unregulated arms supply to Somalia and other militia groups in the Horn of Africa is that other than fueling protracted conflicts in Somalia, there is an escalation of arms availability and access to other areas, including Northern Kenya (Osamba, 2000).

2.0.4. Instability in Uganda

An ideological paradox has been played out in Uganda under its most enduring presidents: Milton Obote, Idi Amin, and Yoweri Museveni. In the First Republic under Obote, the country flirted with socialism at home while remaining basically part of the Western camp. In the so-called 'Second Republic' under Idi Amin, the country flirted with the Soviet Union in foreign policy, while trying to Africanize capitalism. Under Museveni, capitalism at home and pro-Westernism in foreign policy converged (Lefebvre, 1991).

Uganda plunged into conflict just about four years after independence. The conflict was triggered by the invasion of Kabaka's palace in 1966 by Ugandan soldiers under the command of newly appointed army commander Idi Amin. Prior to this, the country experienced strained relations between the state, led by President Obote and the Baganda Kingdom led by Kabaka Mutesa. Subsequently, the state, through the introduction of a new constitution, abolished both the hereditary kingdoms and nation's federal structure and in their place, established the position of an executive president, with Obote doubling both as the president and the prime minister. Aware of the disapproval of his action by several Ugandans, especially the proponents of traditional kingdoms, Obote enlisted the services of the military and the police to silence any dissent arising from his actions. Despite of the conflicts between Obote and Mutesa (1966) Obote and Amin, (1971), Obote and Museveni (1985), the small arms acquired by these factions were mainly confined to the domestic problems in Uganda, and limited supply to the neighboring countries including Kenya (Irin 2005, Irin 2006).

Obote's reign in Uganda came to an abrupt end while on an official visit abroad. He was deposed by the army chief Idi Amin in 1971. Obote decided to settle in neighbouring Tanzania, where he maintained a small army of Ugandan exiles under the command of Tito Okello. Amin's tragic decision to invade Tanzania in 1978 without provocation offered Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian president, the opportunity to not only repel Uganda's invasion but also to topple Amin's government. Therefore Obote was once installed as the president with Tito Okello as the army chief. Obote's second assumption of power lasted between 1979 and 1985, during which time the country was turned into a police state, the economy deteriorated, and ethnic conflicts reached new heights. The ensuing disorder led to the ascension of Tito Okello into power, but whose rule lasted for only a year. Yoweri Museveni, once Uganda's defense minister, with the assistance of guerrilla army-National Resistance Movement- toppled Tito Okello in 1986, and has to date remained Uganda's head of state. However, most parts of Uganda still remain volatile following consistent attacks by armed rebellions, with the most notable one being Lord's Resistance Army, under Kony (Tornay, 1979).

The military assault on Kabaka's palace by government forces and the ensuing resistance marked the first known avenue through which arms in Uganda began to pilfer into civilian hands. Although Kabaka's forces were no match for Amin's troops, Kabaka managed to escape alongside some of his forces, who were also heavily armed. While Kabaka eventually sought political asylum in London, most of his forces retreated into the civilian population.

Further, Kabaka's palace after the assault remained unguarded, leading to arms looting by both members of the public and renegade soldiers both from the government and the defeated kingdom (Österle, 2007).

The Special Forces and the GSU were largely dominated by individuals from Obote's own district of Lango and were favoured in terms of arms, equipment, and budgetary allowance. This drew the fury of the regular police and army. This behaviour drew an equal reaction from Amin, who mobilized his own ethnic affiliates from West Nile to counterbalance the inflated numbers of Langi and Acholi in the army. The disarmament of the Obote's forces-following his ouster in 1971- without appropriate disbarment program meant that most of the soldiers left the barracks with arms, most of which were sold to the civilian population while others used for criminal activities by the former soldiers. The fact that soldiers lacked a common command structure further implied that monitoring their activities and enforcing appropriate discipline became a bit cumbersome. The result of this was the flooding of the civilian population with illegal firearms (Mace & Houston, 1989).

The dramatic and unexpected fall of Amin's government in 1979 led to soldiers at Moroto and Kotido Barracks flee, leaving behind huge stoke piles of firearms unprotected. It is estimated that 15,000 guns, and approximately two million rounds of ammunition were stolen (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999). These barracks were situated in the larger Karamoja cluster, which is not far away from the Kenyan border. The development allowed Dodoth, Karamojong, and Jie morans to loot arms from the barracks. These developments have led to the proliferation of arms in the Karamoja cluster. It is today estimated that nearly half of the illegally held firearms in Uganda are found within the Karamoja cluster. Dodoth and Karamojong have, over the years, used these arms to launch massive cattle raids throughout the neighbouring districts. Cattle rustling was contained briefly until rifts developed between the Acholi and the Langi, which led to the July 1985 overthrow of the Obote II government. However, with such massive firepower, the Dodoth and Karamojong extended their raids into neighbouring Kenya, with Turkana and Pokot communities being their greatest target (Kimaiyo, 2009).

Dodoth's and Karamojong's initial incursion into the Turkana community seemed to have caught Turkana community unawares, leading to heavy casualties and livestock losses. The Government of Kenya intervened by providing ammunition to the Turkana community for self-defense. Although the government's intervention was welcome, the Turkana community felt that they needed to arm themselves for self-defense. The Turkana exploited the ethnic rivalry between their foremost enemy in Uganda-the Dodoth and their Ugandan cousins, the Jie to get arms supplies from the latter. Similar tactics were used by the Turkana community to obtain arms from Sudan, where they purchased arms from Didinga, who happened to be the traditional enemy of the Toposa, who coincidentally has over the years been the Turkana's foremost challengers from the Sudan side (Boutwell, 2002). The Turkana armed warriors extended their cattle raids to their Kenyan neighbours, the Pokot and Samburu. During the cattle raids, Samburu and Porkot Morans benefited from the guns of the killed Turkana morans.

2.0.5. Conflicts in the Sudan

The administration perceives the 60-year-old regime in Khartoum as among the most heinous in the world. It is accused of sponsoring terrorist groups in at least a dozen countries, housing would-be assassins, human rights violations, denial of food aid to starving people, and complicity toward an active slave trade within its borders. Moreover, Khartoum has imposed strict Islamic laws over the people in the non-Muslim south (Eller & Coughlan, 1993).

The complex factors that divide the people of the Sudan (north and south) have given rise to two prolonged wars during most of the second half of this century. The first war (1955-1972) ended in a negotiated settlement. The next phase of the civil war, started in 1983, and is primarily between the radical Arab-Islamic northern government in Khartoum and southern rebels (SPLA --Sudan People's Liberation Army) who are primarily Christian and animist Africans. Many, including some American officials, had hoped that the United States could be part of a new negotiated agreement to bring the war to a less divisive end (Schlee, 1989).

In the early 1980s, a personal agreement between president Moi, and the SPLA leader, John Garang, allowed for the creation of a relatively small SPLA base in Kenya. The station, named Key Base, was situated about 3km to the north of Lokichoggio. The base offered the SPLA a rearward base of operations and a convenient resupply location for military materiel shipped overland from Mombasa and Nairobi, or by air to the airstrip at Lokichoggio. However, this base soon became an important nexus of Lokichoggio's arms trade throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The implication of this was the beginning of the transformation of conflict in Northern Kenya (Collins, 2006).

2.2. Empirical Literature

2.3. Economic Entrepreneurs

Economic entrepreneurs are mostly arms dealers and livestock traders. They often supply weapons to livestock keepers, traders 'bandits, and even mercenaries. The political transformation in Somalia after 1991 generated a change of shifta 'banditry towards financed and well-connected trade barons who recruit from retired army personnel; and school leavers to form a new class of professional and sophisticated highwaymen. To a certain extent, all raids are "commercial," not just those usually referred to by the term, in which the promoters and paymasters are businessmen, officers or administrators. The so-called "commercial raids," do not represent a separate category in which "external" interests interfere with the pastoral economy. They are probably better understood as an aspect of the wider integration of pastoralists within a market economy. It is usually overlooked that the early 1980s not only saw an upswing in the marketing of light weapons, but was also a turning point in Kenyan development policy for pastoral districts. The adoption of a neoliberal perspective in which the introduction of a market economy had first priority, was seen as the instrument and not, as before, the objective of development (Evangelou, 1984).

The marketing of livestock has always been part of the East Pokot landscape. All along, they were the suppliers of livestock at the Nginyang River market every Saturday. The longtime and established buyers were the Tugen and Kikuyu from Marigat, Mogotio, and Nakuru, and they enjoyed a monopolistic position on livestock pricing. According to the FGD participants of Nginyang and Chemolingot, in particular, indigenous livestock traders at Nginyang, the Tugen, and Kikuyu traders would form a cartel and agree beforehand on the maximum prices for particular livestock irrespective of size. Alternatively, they would deliberately arrive at Nginyang Market late, find desperate livestock sellers afraid that they would go back with their livestock, and, out of desperation, the sellers would dispose of their livestock at appallingly low prices. The study by Hjort (1981) captures this scenario and argues that the purchasing trick of the main buyers of livestock favoured them, thereby decreasing the profit of small producers and manipulating the timing of sales and auctions.

According to Baxter and Hogg (1990), livestock rustling has been commercialized in the recent past. Cases of well-organized raiding missions to gather spoils for the market have been reported in Turkana, Marakwet, West Pokot and Samburu districts. Commercialization of cattle enables people who are not herders to profit from livestock raiding. It also enables the herders themselves to raid independently from the actual availability of land or labor for livestock management and excludes reciprocity as marketed cattle cannot be raided back. As in livestock, both relations of property/exchange and social boundaries overlap, changes in the patterns of ownership affect inter and intra-ethnic relations as well as values associated with sociality. Together with mercenaries (group of hired fighters), commercial and political raids are increasing, organized around wage labor. Mercenaries and guns are used by other clans or groups to counter raids or help such groups acquire pasture and grazing territory for them. In recent times nomadic pastoralists are defended or spear headed by hired groups well-armed to enable them graze and water livestock in hostile territories.

According to the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (2009), Kenya will have a beef deficit of about 4,500 tons in 2014 due to high local consumption and export demands. The Kenya Meat Commission estimates that some 500 tons of beef are exported from Kenya each week to the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,

Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) and Africa (Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). In many areas, an intensifying shift from a `breeding herd' (rearing for prestige) to a 'trading herd' (rearing for sale) in part to take advantage of the growing markets for animals and livestock products in urban areas as well as export markets. There is an emergence of commercialized cattle-rustling where wealthy businessmen, politicians, traders, or local people pursuing economic objectives finance raids among the pastoral communities. The meat-loving urbanite Kenyans are the unsuspecting accomplices of these unscrupulous businessmen.

2.4. Proliferation of Small Arms in Northern Kenya

Baven (2008) and Boutwell (1999) argue that several factors account for this flow of small arms. Un-manned Porous borders pastoralists groups across the common borders, conflicts in the Horn of Africa; and, middlemen and brokers. The unstable states in the Horn of Africa are one of the principal sources of small arms and light weapons to Northern Kenya before 1990. Kenya stands at the crossroads between the conflict areas of South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

It is also important to note that while the proliferation of small arms is generally associated with conflict and post-conflict situations. The long and porous nature of Kenya's borders and the relative ease of concealing small arms make it difficult to control the movement of weapons into Northern Kenya. Moreover, the agencies responsible for border control are underfunded and ineffective. The map in Figure 2.1 is an illustration of small arms inflow into Northern Kenya.

Figure 2.1: Map of the HOA and the flow of SALW to Northern Kenya.
Source: Author, 2017.

The map shows the routes and the flow of small arms to Kenya and specifically to the Northern Kenya. South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia are the main sources of small arms and light weapons to the region. The movement of arms to the region is a very gradual process taking several years before guns reach their intended destination, this is because these guns are illegal and could only be sold through a black market or commercial brokers.
The Karamojong during dry spells crosses the Kenyan border in search of pasture and water. Naturally, this creates conflict between the Karamojong and the two pastoralists group in Kenya, namely the Turkana and the Pokot. The Karamojong had superior guns than the Turkana and Pokot of Kenya, and every time the Karamojong cross the

Kenyan border, they raid the Turkana and Pokot and push them away from the common border. Consequently, the Turkana and the Pokot turn to the less armed Samburu in order to restock from the losses occasioned by the Karamojong raiders. A continuous fighting between the Karamojong and the Kenyan groups, enabled the Pokot and Turkana to access guns. Though the Karamojong did not sell their guns to the Kenyan groups, serious cattle rustling episodes are one way in which Pastoralist groups armed themselves (Irin 2003).

Turkana and Pokot continued to attack the Samburu since they remained a soft target for these groups. The Samburu could not resist these groups because they possess guns that were superior to the Samburu spears and swords. To continue attacking the Samburu, the Pokot and the Turkana formed a rugged group of cattle rustlers called the Ngoroko, who became mercenaries for hire. The Ngoroko were members of these two communities, and their main role was to raid cows from the Samburu in order to feed the militant elements from the Turkana and Pokot communities. The Ngoroko mercenaries could occasion raids at will since they possessed guns against the Samburu Morans who had traditional spears. All the time the Samburu Morans remained victims since they could not match the power of the gun from the Turkana, the Pokot and the Ngoroko (Irin 2003).

Several decades of regional instability have adversely affected Kenya. According to Mkutu and Wandera (2013), there are sustained arms flows across Turkana's long, porous borders, such that the Turkana community has become the most militarized in Kenya. They also explain that Turkana has a small government presence, and is heavily dependent on the KPR force as its first line of security. This has led to more arms in the hands of civilians, especially in Pokot and Turkana and Samburu regions, where KPRs are the first option for security.

In an FGD held in Lokichar, it was reported that the Turkana used homemade guns, which they used to raid the Pokot and other neighboring communities. Then, raiding was not as frequent as it is now. But with the advent of merchants bringing arms for sale from Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda, they only needed to give 3-5 cows for a gun depending on its cost. This cost has considerably dropped to around 2 cows for a gun now. This is probably due to the ongoing conflicts in neighboring countries sustaining arms flow into Northern Kenya. Presently, pastoralists spend cash instead of cattle because the guns have become cheaper and easier to access. At the moment, one AK-47 would go for Ksh.60, 000 while a G3 would go for 30, 000. With the cheapness and abundance of guns in the region, there is a constant supply throughout, sustaining and escalating the conflict in the region (Mtuku & Mandera, 2013).

2.0.1. Introduction of modern ways or technology

The modern technology has become a catalyst in conflict escalation. Villanueva (2009) found that vernacular radios can play important roles in conflicts. They can be the channel of communication between the parties to the conflict, provide information about the parties to the conflict and issues at hand, and offer education on the different ways to peaceful resolution of the conflict. They can also help in building trust among parties to the conflict and the public, counteract misinformation, analyze the conflict, help identify the underlying interests of issues, allow parties to express their emotions, empower the parties like marginalized groups and help in consensus building.

Osamba (2011) suggests the abuse of ethnic competitions through sending money through M-pesa between local political leaders prompt groups into ethnic viciousness all together for self-protection in control. Likewise, Krätli and Swift (2010) claim the involvement of legislators in backing attacks to increase political mileage among the voters and to have the edge over contenders. Cottle (2006) writes that conflicts provide the raw material for strong human interest stories where people use cellphones to find pathos and tragedy, heroism and camaraderie's, acts of selfishness, and personalized experiences of suffering. Galtung (1993) says that not only do cellphones have a perverse fascination with war and violence, they also neglect the peace forces at work.

Furthermore, Brown (2001) in Yanacopulos & Hanlon (2006) argues that many ethnic and internal conflicts are triggered by selfish leaders who will do anything to get to power. They often incite ethnic violence. Youths in

these areas have been supplied with trucks which they use in carrying out attacks, as well as carry the raided animals to the markets in towns and cities. As such, humanity's failure to prevent, mitigate, and resolve ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that those seeking to end them may be missing certain insights or new alternative perspectives and dynamics involved in the conflict.

3. Methodology

3.1. Population

The estimated population of Samburu West, Turkana South, and Tiaty sub-counties is approximately 347,000 people based on the 2009 census of Kenya. (KNBS, 2009). The proposed study focused on persons aged 18 years and above, which was estimated to be 164,825 people translating to 47.5% of the entire population.

3.2. Research Design

The study used a descriptive research design because of its capacity to fuse both quantitative and qualitative data in the study (a mixed design). The fundamental concern in descriptive research is to highlight the conditions, practices, structures, differences, or relationships of variables evident in the study. The characteristics enabled the study to take a multifaceted approach towards data collection to capture and give a detailed description of the factors contributing to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya.

3.3. Sample and Sampling Techniques

The researcher interviewed key informants from each of the identified counties in the region. These Key informants were categorized as: security experts; elected leaders; Morans; county officials; local traditional elders; representatives of women groups and CBOs (specifically Oxfam, World Vision and the Peace Caravan).

The sample size for the study was calculated using the formulae as proposed by (Yamane, 1973).

$$n = \frac{N}{1+Ne^2}$$

n = sample size
N = population
e = error of sampling method = 0.05

$$n = \frac{164,825}{1+ 164,825 (0.05)^2}$$
$$= 399 \text{ respondents}$$

3.4. Sampling Procedures

The study adopted the Afro-barometer Methodology in carrying out the survey. The researcher divided each county (Samburu, Turkana and Baringo) into sample Sub- counties, Administrative Divisions and locations. The researcher gave each location a number and used random sampling to select location 1 marked (X), skipped one location and picked the 3rd (X) and continued in that order for the rest of the sample frame. In each of the randomly sampled locations, he interviewed 133 respondents from each sub-county selected.

Within each location, the researcher randomly selected a sampling start point. This practice was essential since it helped the researcher and his assistants could know where to start the interview within the location. Starting as near as possible to the sampling start point, the researcher chose any random point (like a church, school, water point). From this point, the researcher and his 3 assistants followed a strict walk pattern. Research Assistant (RA), 1 walked towards the East, 2nd walked to the West, 3rd to the South and 4th to the North. Each RA used a 3-interval pattern (i.e., an interval of three households for the entire exercise, using the Manyattas as the main point

of random sampling). Once a household has been selected, the RA identified themselves and requested to conduct the interview with preferably the head of the household, taking into account a realistic gender balance.

3.5. Focus Group Discussions

The researcher aimed at collecting data from specific groups in the community who, in one way or another, had been involved or affected by the escalation and perpetuation of conflict in the region. The groups targets were; elders, women, morans, security officers, Peace Committees, County Government officials, and NGO s and/CBOs officials. One FGDs was composed of a minimum of 10 persons but with a maximum of 18. A homogeneous group could be 10, this is a situation where only one group is interviewed, for example, Morans, Elders, or Women. Non- homogeneous consisted of 18 people. Consequently, this situation drew up mixed membership from various groups, three members from each of the above groups made up the composition.

4. Results

The study sought to determine the external triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. The study sought information on the influence of commercial entrepreneurs, availability of small arms and light weapons and introduction of modern ways of conflict escalation, on the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya.

4.1. Influence of Commercial Entrepreneurs

The study sought to find out the Influence of Business People/Economic Entrepreneurs in the escalation of crime/cattle raiding in Northern Kenya. Figure 4.1 shows the findings.

Figure 4.1: Influence Business People/Economic Entrepreneurs on conflict

From the findings, majority of the respondents (66%) were in agreement that business people/economic entrepreneurs had influenced the rise of crime in Northern Kenya. However, 31% of the respondents were of the contrary opinion, while 3% were not aware of any influence from business people/economic entrepreneurs. This shows that the emergence of economic (warlords) entrepreneurs in Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya has led to the rise of conflict.

The study further sought information on the contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana in the escalation of cattle raiding in the regions. The findings are presented in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Contribution of Conflict by People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana Communities

From the findings in Figure 3.2, majority of the respondents (61%) were in agreement that there is contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana in ethnic conflict. However, 27% of the respondents stated that there is no contribution of people outside the three communities.

The study further sought information on the explanation to the contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana. Table 3.1 presents the findings.

Table 4.1: Contribution of conflict by People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana Communities

	Frequency	Percent
Supply sophisticated weapons	149	37
Provide ready market	145	36
Participate in raids	22	6
Political reasons	41	10
Acquisition of local land and resources	42	11
Total	**399**	**100**

People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana supply sophisticated weapons, provide ready market for the animals and participate in the raids as shown in Table 4.1.

The study further sought information on where commercial entrepreneurs took raided animals. The findings are shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Location of Raided Cattle

The raided cattle, as shown in Figure 4.3, are sold outside Pokot, Samburu and Turkana based on the response of the 55% of the respondents. However, 43% of the respondents indicated that the raided cattle are retained within the communities. People outside Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana who are the beneficiaries of the cattle from the regions also contributed to the escalation of conflict in the region.

The study sought to know the markets set by commercial enterprises for raided cattle. Figure 4.4 presents the summary of the findings.

Figure 4.4: Raided Animals' Final Destination

From the findings, 45% of the respondents identified Dagoreti Market as the major destination where raided animals are identified but never recovered. Dagoreti market is known to have the biggest slaughter house in Nairobi, justifying why raided animals are not recovered once they reach there. Other destinations are Isiolo/Meru, Nakuru/Central Rift, and Foreign countries like S/Sudan, Uganda, S/Arabia and Yemen. In Samburu, it was discovered that many of the raided cattle ended up for sale in Dagoretti or Isiolo.

4.2. Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons

The unstable states in the Horn of Africa are one of the principal sources of small arms and lights weapons to Northern Kenya before 1990. Kenya stands at the crossroads between the conflict areas of South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia. For the last 50 years, these countries have been embroiled in a series of civil wars and unending strife as political ambition has overtaken common sense, resulting in violent changes of government and the release of more tools of violence into society (Boutwell 1999).

Figure 3.5: Map Showing Proliferation of Small Arms before 1990 (Times Series 1)

The map in Figure 3.5 shows the routes and the flow of small arms to Kenya and specifically to the Northern Kenya. South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and later Somalia are the main sources of small arms and light weapons to the region. The movement of arms to the region is a very gradual process taking several years before guns reach their intended destination.

On the Eastern Kenya in particular, the Samburu did not have access to arms from the Somalia because of the traditional enmity between the Samburu and the Somali.

4.3. Introduction of modern ways or technology

The study sought to find out how the modern Moran used modern ways to escalate conflicts in the Pastoralist communities. Figure 19 presents the findings.

Figure 19: Modern Ways of Conflict Escalation

From the findings, 76% of the respondents indicated cell phones as a modern way of conflict escalation. The perpetuators use cellphones to communicate to Morans on the best tactics to use during the raid and the specific routes to use. Elites from these communities communicate to their rural folks every day using cell phones. Every morning and evening, the elites would inquire on their kins safety. Almost all morans have cellphones for this purpose.

Discussions

For the last 50 years these countries have been embroiled in a series of civil wars and unending strife as political ambition has overtaken common sense, resulting in violent changes of government and the release of more tools of violence into society as alluded by Boutwell (1999).

The movement of arms to the region is a very gradual process taking several years before guns reach their intended destination. This is because these guns are illegal and could only be sold through a black market or commercial brokers. In general, small arms entry to Northern Kenya was from the western side, mainly from Uganda and Sudan. The findings of this study are echoed by (Irin 2003) in that the first beneficiaries of these small arms are the Turkana and the Pokots of Kenya. The study similarly premised that the Karamoja from Uganda are also among the first pastoral groups to acquire guns in the region. The Karamoja are cousins to the Turkana and Pokots but they never valued this relationship and continued to terrorize the Kenyan groups through cattle rustling. A continuous fighting between the Pokot and Karamoja and Turkana enabled these two Kenyan groups to access guns through cattle rustling and deaths of the armed militants as corroborated by (Irin 2003).

Samburu people have no borderline with either Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, or Somalia (Murunga 2005). Similarly, the study findings found that Samburu county has fertile soils, plenty of water, forestry, wildlife, commercial minerals, thick clay soil well-drained soils suitable for farming and livestock production. The county receives higher rainfall than other pastoralist areas, both short and long rains, unlike any part in Northern Kenya. This makes Samburu more attractive to other pastoral groups in search of pasture and water. Samburu is surrounded by six pastoral Counties, namely Turkana to the northwest, Baringo to the west, Laikipia to the south, Isiolo to the southeast, and Marsabit to the northeast. Most of these pastoral communities in the above counties have access to the border line.

According to (Bevan, 2008), Samburu Morans inspiration to arm themselves might have been overdone to an extent that Morans acquisition of small arms created a violent situation, hence perpetuation of conflict in the region. In support of this finding, the current study confirmed that Samburu did not have access to the cross border trade in small arms, therefore continued to rely on the middle men or the alliances with either of these groups to

acquire small arms. Samburu had a limited supply of guns since they never had direct contact with the source, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Somalia. The Samburu remained the least armed in the region and were vulnerable to the attacks. It is this vulnerability to attacks that gave the Samburu people and Morans in particular to arm themselves to the fullest.

After the collapse of Siad Barre, who funded the Shifta menace, a new crop of Somali businessmen emerged. These businessmen were not part of the greater Somali expansion agenda, and when the guns were easily available, they found a quick way of making money, by selling guns to anyone willing to purchase. The current study found that the Samburu Morans became the first beneficiaries of this trade as the Morans sold their livestock to purchase the guns. Morans always exchanged livestock for guns, for example, a G-3 would be exchanged with three bulls, an AK-47 and an M-16 with two bulls and pistols with an effective range of 75 meters with a heifer as highlighted by (Farah 2005).

On the third objective, the current study perpetually found that vernacular radios can play important roles in conflicts. They can be the channel of communication between the parties to the conflict, provide information about the parties to the conflict and issues at hand, and offer education on the different ways to peaceful resolution of the conflict. Similarly (Villanueva, 2009) confirmed that such radio stations could also help in building trust among parties to the conflict and the public, counteract misinformation, analyze the conflict, help identify the underlying interests of issues, allow parties to express their emotions, empower the parties like marginalized groups and help in consensus building. Osamba (2011) suggests the abuse of ethnic competitions through sending money through M-pesa between local political leaders prompt groups into ethnic viciousness all together for self-protection in control. Likewise, Krätli and Swift (2010) claim the involvement of legislators in backing attacks to increase political mileage among the voters and to have the edge over contenders. Cottle (2006) similarly found that conflicts provide the raw material for strong human interest stories where people use cellphones to find pathos and tragedy, heroism and camaraderie's acts of selfishness and personalized experiences of suffering. Galtung (1993) says that not only do cellphones have a perverse fascination with war and violence, they also neglect the peace forces at work. Furthermore, Brown (2001) in Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006) found that many ethnic and internal conflicts are triggered by selfish leaders who will do anything to get to power. They often incite ethnic violence. The current study similarly found that youths in these areas have been supplied with trucks which they use in carrying out attacks, as well as carry the raided animals to the markets in towns and cities. As such, humanity's failure to prevent, mitigate, and resolve ethno-political conflicts suggests that those seeking to end them may be missing certain insights or new alternative perspectives and dynamics involved in the conflict.

Conclusion

The development of increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of capitalist by the USA marked the beginning of the significant presence of the two former superpowers' in the Horn of Africa. USA began to increase its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Its increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of socialist influence prompted it to provide financial and military support to Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

Political instability in Somalia made Kenyan Somalis able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and then slipped back into Kenya. In some cases, renegade Somali soldiers did the same. In Ethiopia and Eritria, the rivalry between the countries led to arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in massive acquisition of arms. Meanwhile, The Turkana exploited the ethnic rivalry between their foremost enemy in Uganda-the Dodoth and their Ugandan cousins, the Jie to get arms supplies from the latter. Similar tactics were used by the Turkana community to obtain arms from Sudan where they purchased arms from Didinga, who happened to be the traditional enemy of the Toposa who coincidentally has over the years been the Turkana's foremost challengers from the Sudan side.

Therefore, one of the reasons why conflict is escalating in Northern Kenya is the proliferation of small and light weapons, an effect of the upheavals experienced in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. Transformation of the conflict from a traditionally sanctioned practice to an all-out criminal activity can be attributed to the increased prevalence of so-called 'Small Arms and Light Weapons' (SALW) in the area. Pastoral communities in northern Kenya provide an excellent market for firearms. Where they traditionally relied on bows, arrows, spears, pangas, and rungus for protection and warfare, they now resort to assault rifles such as the AK-47 and the G-3 rifles, which are relatively cheap due to high availability. The availability of SALW's has scaled up the number of fatalities and indiscriminate killings among the Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya.

Other modern triggers of conflict like M-pesa/Cellphones and Vernacular radio stations are used by economic entrepreneurs to communicate and finance with the hired Morans during the raids. They use M-pesa to send money after the raids as a form of compensation. Cellphones are also used to advice on the best route to follow during and after the raid. This helps hired groups or Morans to know which route to follow for the raid to be successful.

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Citizen Participation in Local Democracy Online: A Snapshot of Trends and Challenges in Adoption of Crowdsourcing Methods in Tanzania[*]

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Abstract

Although numerous studies concerning local democracy have been carried out in Tanzania, most of them have fallen short of analysing crowdsourcing citizen participation in local democracy online. Local democracy aims essentially to promote fundamental rights of the citizen to participate in policy and decision-making processes. On the other hand, crowdsourcing in the modern digital age - is increasingly expected not only to transform relationships between local politicians and voters in democratic processes, but also to engage and empower ordinary citizens to have a voice in monitoring electoral procedures by new electronic means from below. Promotion of citizen participation with better platforms for monitoring local elections and information sharing in near real-time is a vital element for healthy local democracy. This is why in recent times; we have witnessed emerging of digitally empowered citizen voice platforms such as Uchaguzi open source and social media pages like Facebook for citizens' crowdsourcing systems. In that regard this paper attempts to map citizen crowdsourcing methods, trends and challenges of online participation in monitoring local elections in Tanzania. Crowdsourcing methods through information and communication technologies create an agenda for collective citizen participation, collaborative production and sharing of local information.

Keywords: Local Democracy, Citizen Participation, Online Participation, Crowdsourcing, Digitalization, Tanzania

1. Introduction

In spite of the widespread success of the latest wave of democratization since 1989/1990 and the end of the Cold War, many of the newly democratized political systems have remained merely electoral democracies. This is because democracies have emerged in increasing numbers since the beginning of the 19th century in which the waves of democratization - "the third wave" (Huntington, 1991), resulted in electoral democracies in order to

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create legitimacy for a political system (Kersting & Cronqvist, 2005). Electoral democracies have taken some stronger roots, but a number of them are still marred by manipulation which undermines the legitimacy of the newly elected government. At the local government level, there is a serious problem of monitoring democratic procedures compared to national-level elections. On the other hand, local democracy is a "cornerstone of a democratic society" (Pratchett, 2004, p.361). Citizens' crowdsourcing method is one of the cornerstones for participation and monitoring local democratic processes because of the growing digital information and communication technologies (ICTs). By the beginning of the 21st century the crucial role of the internet in global society beyond mere commercial use had become undeniable (FES, 2017, p.5). But also, digital technology is increasingly expected not only to transform relationships between local politicians and voters in democratic processes, but also to engage and empower ordinary citizens to have a voice in monitoring electoral processes by new electronic means from below (Shayo, 2017). This is because engaging citizens in the forgotten level of local government can improve participation and the ability of local authorities to create more inclusive and cohesive communities and to champion initiatives made by ordinary citizens in promoting democratic society.

Crowdsourcing and digital information and communication technologies have changed the way of observing and disseminating electoral information. Digital technology has been presented as a means to promote transparency, openness and accountability, as well as new forms of participation and political communication (Kersting & Baldersheim, 2004). In this sense, crowdsourcing citizen participation with digital information and communication technology platforms for observation and information sharing among electoral stakeholders is a cornerstone for promoting integrity of local democratic processes. This is why in recent times; we have witnessed emerging of digitally empowered citizen voice platforms such as *Uchaguzi* Swahili word means "election" platform for citizens' crowdsourcing systems and social media accounts for generating and sharing election information at both local and national levels (Shayo, 2017). These initiatives for citizen participation in local democracy can be in terms of "invited" platforms (top-down) by government institutions and "invented" platforms (bottom-up) initiated by civil society organisations (Kersting, 2012). These initiatives of engaging citizens online (invented spaces) through crowdsourcing methods at the local levels are unexploited and undocumented in Tanzania (Shayo, 2017). This paper is an attempt to offer a snapshot of citizens' crowdsourcing methods, trends and challenges of online participation by drawing examples from 2014 civic elections and 2015 election of ward councillors in Tanzania.

The discussion that follows is divided into various parts. Part one follows after this introduction and highlights briefly invented spaces for citizen participation in local democracy online. New forms of online participation are being innovated and implemented by government and non-state actors in this age of electronic democracy. Also, in this part different spheres of citizen participation in democratic spaces are highlighted. In part two the discussion focuses on the context of local democracy in Tanzania. Part three, therefore, looks at crowdsourcing local democracy online, focusing who participates in online crowdsourcing system? Part four is a brief methodological note, following by exploration of trends of citizens' crowdsourcing such as availability and usage of digital tools, digital election watch and example of crowdsourcing platform for monitoring local elections. In addition, challenges are highlighted and these challenges need to be addressed for citizen participation to be a reality. Final part is about discussion and conclusion.

2. Invented Spaces for Citizen Participation in Local Democracy Online

Crowdsourcing citizen participation through digital technologies and other innovations like innovated open-source platforms serve as an instrument of promoting integrity of local elections in developing and fledgling democracies. This is because eligible voters' need to be engaged in the electoral process in order to detect and generate incidents related to electoral malpractices and positive conduct of elections. As a result, online participation requires "people to be aware of what is happening and to be able to participate in the country's political processes" (Arias, Garcia & Corpeño 2015, p.185). Therefore, in recent years, different forms of online participation are being implemented by government (invited space) and civil society organizations (invented space) (Kersting, 2013). Here the question is who is engaged in local democracy online? This is because invented spaces include bottom-up approach where citizens and non-partisan organisations come together to monitor electoral incidents (Shayo, 2017). Digitalization

of local democracy using various forms of online participation reinforces the emergence of citizen-oriented monitoring and generating electoral incidents. In the context of this paper, the case of *Uchaguzi* platform and the use of social media page such as Facebook *Taarifa Za Uchaguzi Tanzania* and Twitter account *@ChaguziTanzania*, serves as an example of digitally empowered citizens to participate in local democracy online in Tanzania. These digital platforms promote novel forms of citizen collective action in monitoring integrity of local elections.

The invented space created by civil society organisations, citizens are invited to participate in democratic processes in the space which is already formalized using different digital tools and methods. These invented spaces are characterised by new digital instruments used to connect digital citizens and other stakeholders to participate in promoting integrity of electoral procedures (Shayo, 2017). Figure 1 shows that citizens can participate in democratic spaces into four different sphere namely - participation in representative sphere, participation in direct sphere, deliberative participation and demonstrative participation. In this case, all political systems have different forms of engaging citizens in their localities either in the invited space or invented space. Here "invited space" is initiated and controlled by the government (top-down) and "invented space" is initiated and controlled by civil society democratic monitors organisations together with active citizens (bottom-up).

Participation in *representative democracy* can be seen as the "default case of liberal democracies" (Kersting, 2013, p.272). Participation in representative democracy began in the third wave of democratization, the period of transition from mono-party to multi-party political system. In this sphere of democracy, citizens are given opportunities to participate through voting of their representatives and recently observation of electoral procedures through crowdsourcing methods to observe and share electoral incidents in dedicated digital platforms. This is due to the fact that "institutions of representative democracy are mostly highly formalised and defined in the constitution or in a legal framework" (Kersting, 2013, p.273). The principle of representation is a characteristic form of modern liberal democracies that promote democratic participation. Besides elections, this sphere involves direct contacts to politicians via e-mail, social media accounts and mobile short message services (Kersting, 2012). Representative sphere of participation developed new instruments, which not only inform the citizen, but also simultaneously ask the citizens the reasons for their vote, i.e. turning the citizen into an information subject (Kersting, 2012). It is at the local level that "the relationship between representative democracy and widespread citizen participation makes most sense" (Pratchett, 2004, p.361).

Participation in *demonstrative sphere* can be seen as an informal participation, and more often is associated with the invented space rather than the invited space (Kersting, 2012). This sphere of participation includes forms of participation which are not always instrument of the invited space provided by government or political parties, but are sometimes introduced and invented by civil society organisations (Kersting, 2012). Demonstrative participation includes different illegal waves of violent protests. Here demonstration is the typical occurrence, electoral conflicts or even violent post-electoral political protect. Demonstrative participation is a way of expressing dissatisfaction with democratic processes and other governance-related matters.

Figure 1: Invented and invited spaces for online participation
Source: Adapted from Kersting (2012, 2013)

Direct plebiscitarian participation is the area of democratic involvement, which vote-centric, and the focus is not on the election of incumbents rather on the policy-decision making process (Kersting, 2013). This is because direct democracy is defined as a direct participation in the issue-oriented to the decision-making process (Kersting, 2007). In this way, direct participation weakens the power of elected representatives and awards political veto-power to the citizens. On the other hand, representative and direct democracies are "both confronted with waning interest in politics. These types of democracy are not mutually exclusive political participation instruments rather they are two sides of one coin and complement each other" Kersting, 2007, p33). This is because "without a vibrant participatory democracy at the local level, representative democracy at both the local and broader level cannot flourish" (Pratchett, 2004, p361).

Deliberative participation has its origins in the deliberative turn of democratic theory in the last decade of 20th century. Its nature is talk-centric because deliberative democracy bases on normative ambitious discourses (Kersting, 2013). Participation in deliberative sphere focuses on consensual deliberative decision-making or instrument of dialogue-oriented political participation and "with normative rigor applied to highly elaborated rational discourses also has elitist elements" (Kersting & Cronqvist, 2005, p.17). Dialogical democratic innovations often implemented to solve manifest or latent moral conflict and mediation when it comes to political electoral conflicts (Kersting, 2012). Deliberative participation "may produce higher rationality but not broader democratic control. The high normative standard includes empathy; political tolerance and a strong orientation to common consensus within a public reflective discourse but, neglect the articulation of particular interests" (Kersting & Cronqvist, 2005, p.17). Research shows that web forums, blogs and social media lack the quality of adequate deliberation (argument, respect, reflexivity) and have more aggressive dialogue or pure monologues (Kersting, 2012). On the other hand, on the internet exclusive homogenous group discussion in filter bubbles or "echo chamber" with sometimes radicalizing character is often observable (Chadwick, 2006). In the context of

this paper, the main focus is participation in the representative sphere because in this sphere citizens' crowdsourcing, political contacts, voting and observation are the key instrument for citizen participation in electoral democratic procedures. Here citizen participation in the invented space is at the co-production and co-dissemination of local democracy information in the digital platforms.

3. The Context of Local Democracy in Tanzania

According to African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance of 2007, Article 3 requires observance of democratic principles such as to hold regular and transparent elections, and to have effective participation of citizen in democratic and development processes and the governance of public affairs, and the right of all people to participate in the politics of their country. In addition, the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) of 1977, Articles 8(1), 145 and 146 and the amendments that followed from time to time, emphasizes the supremacy of the people and underlining that the government is accountable to the people (URT, 2015). It also highlights that the people have a right to participate and establish levels at the region, district as well as at the village (URT, 2015, p.1). Citizen right to participate in political affairs is a much needed political right such as freedom of association, information, expression and freedom of assembly which together with participation are basic principles of a growing local democracy (TACCEO, 2015).

The local government in Tanzania consists of the country's constitution, various laws that operationalise the constitution and other policy pronouncements that issued from time to time. The URT constitution recognises local government as autonomous bodies with legal status operating with discretionary powers over local affairs (REPOA, 2008), and participation of the people in the affairs of local government such as decision making in democratic procedures and monitoring political processes, as well as information sharing. Surprisingly, the Minister responsible for local governments has authority over the coordination of local government affairs such as electoral matters and by-laws. Since the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in Tanzania, the country conducted five civic elections held from 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. The local government elections in Tanzania are supervised and coordinated by the Minister of State, President's Office - Regional Administration and Local Government. The next local government elections will be held November 2019. There are two types of elections in local government systems for electing local authorities leaders. These are neighbourhood or civic elections held for the purposes of electing Village Chairpersons and Hamlet leaders in rural areas and *Mtaa* Chairperson in urban areas, and second type of election is ward level election for electing ward councillors conducted during general elections. Neighbourhood/civic elections are coordinated by the Minister of the State (Regional Administration and Local Government), while ward level election is managed by the National Electoral Commission (NEC).

Tanzania is one of the democratic states in Africa which respect the rights of the citizens to take part and participate in the governance of the state (TACCEO, 2015). This is because active participation in local democracy is necessary for improving a citizen's quality of life (Chaligha, 2014). In today's globalized world, there is a growing emphasis and recognition of the importance of the quality of democracy at the local level. This is the level closes to the citizens and the space where citizens experience the practice of democracy on a daily basis as they interact with democratic institutions and processes (IDEA, 2013). As a result, it is through democratic procedures that the right to take part in elections is realized for most citizens to participate in voting, and even monitoring and sharing information related to the conduct of electoral processes at the grassroots level.

4. Crowdsourcing Local Democracy Online

In the networked era which is characterized by a shift from offline to online participation or using hybrid participation, the crowd participation in local democracy is a means of promoting democratic principles. Technology has contributed to citizen participation in democratic processes through crowdsourcing systems. At the core of the concept of crowdsourcing is the idea that a large pool of "undefined" crowd through "open-call" (Howe, 2006, 2008) will be engaged in local democratic procedures. In this, the move toward crowdsourcing

systems allows a wider use of technology that enables ordinary citizens with mobile-cellular phones or the internet access to participate in local democracy online. The term "crowdsourcing" coined by Jeff Howe in 2006 *wired* magazine, describes the term as the process by which many (undefined) can be involved to accomplish tasks that were once performed by few individuals. Different explanation offered by Howe placed emphasis on engaging *large group of people* in the form of an *open call* to collaborate in performing the tasks. According to Bailard and Livingston (2014, p.355) defined crowdsourcing "the mobilization of the general public-the crowd-to perform what are usually small, incremental tasks that, taken together, accomplish significant goals." In his part, Fung (2011) defined crowdsourced election monitoring as a system in which "any individual can register an observation about an election, and that observation is pooled with other individuals' observations to create a public depiction of the reality of the election that is offered back to the public and to election officials in real-time on election day" (pp.194-195).

It is arguable that, the rate of citizen participation in monitoring electoral democracy has been increased because of the advent of information and communication technology (Kersting, 2012). The growth rate of online participation platforms offers opportunities to re-connect citizens in democratic processes. Also, the trend towards quality democracy has increased the demand for engaging citizens' crowdsourcing in order to protect their votes, livelihoods and welfare of the communities (Shayo, 2017). The idea behind crowdsourced citizen participation in local democracy online is the timely detection and near real time sharing of information of democratic processes (Bader, 2013). Because of the crowdsourced citizen online, "the possibility for citizens to consult political information is the most widespread function delivered by the new information and communication technologies. Information can be disseminated more effectively, and the democratic objectives of transparency, for example, can be achieved more easily" (Kersting & Baldersheim, 2004, p.4). After the third wave of democratization, political participation of the citizen has remained mostly limited to voting. But emerging digital technologies expand a wider range and spaces of participation in democratic processes (Kersting, 2013). In this context, we can argue that digital information and communication technology revives Athenian form of participation in the modern liberal democratic processes. Nowadays crowdsourced citizen participation in local democracy online is advocated because citizens are no longer satisfied to participate in voting and leaving the polling stations, but want to have more active roles in promoting the integrity of the electoral procedures (Kersting, 2012).

Most of the literature on crowdsourced citizen participation in electoral processes through digital information and communication technologies focuses on national-level elections. For example, Bailard and Livingston (2014) investigated the capacity of new technologies in facilitating crowdsourced promoting accountability in the 2011 Nigerian election. In their analysis, observed that "the number and nature of crowdmap reports generated by citizens are significantly correlated with increased voter turnout in the 2011 Nigerian presidential election as a result of providing officials with improved information about the functionality of local polling stations" (Bailard & Livingston, 2014, p.349). This study by Bailard and Livingston in the Nigerian general election, serves the positive contribution of crowdsourced citizen monitoring method and how new information communication technologies can be deployed to share timely actionable information from the citizens to inform relevant authorities about the state of the conduct of electoral processes.

The work by Bader (2013) assessed the collective ability of the citizen contributor in the 2011-2012 Russian elections. The question addressed by Bader was how effective is crowdsourcing a tool for collecting credible information about election fraud. Analysis shows that citizen observers were very effective in detecting and reporting fraud in polling stations on election-day and provide insight into how elections in Russia are manipulated (Bader, 2013). Other study by Bock (2012) focuses on citizen participation in the prevention of election violence using information and communication technologies in Kenya. As a result, Bock (2012) observed that georeferencing citizen generated data in the 2008 post-election violence created the potential to identify potential violence at a specific location for early warning at a local level.

The work by Hellström (2015) examined how and under what conditions access to information and communication technologies such as mobile phone devices and citizen monitoring crowdsourcing platforms can be useful for

political participation in Uganda. Analysis shows that with expanded mobile penetration, coverage and access to mobile devices in Uganda, facilitated platform such as UgandaWatch to be launched prior to the 2011 general elections. The role of crowdsourcing platform is to offer increased equality of political participation and to advance efforts toward increased citizen engagement in electoral procedures in Uganda. Also, Hellström (2015) shows that citizen election crowdsourcing monitoring platforms like UgandaWatch and *Uchaguzi* complement traditional ways of observing and sharing political incidents.

In Tanzania, study by Shayo (2017) analyses crowdsourced monitoring citizen-generated data for the 2011 Ugandan, 2013 Kenyan and 2015 Tanzanian general elections. This explorative work shows that information and communication technologies diffusion, and leapfrogged in the areas of mobile phones in the three enabled citizen participation in monitoring elections and makes it easier in detecting and sharing positive and negative electoral incidents. This study suggests that crowdsourcing systems and digital tools for citizen engagement and monitoring electoral events, create an agenda for partnerships among election watchdogs and collaborative production and dissemination of electoral integrity incidents in real-time. Also, Shayo and Kersting (2018) explore the role of digital citizens in monitoring election campaigns for the 2015 general election in Tanzania. Analysis found that digital citizen generated data on electoral campaigning were virtually mapped in the *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* crowdsourcing platform. In addition, Shayo and Kersting (2017) attempted to analyse the ability of trained crowdmonitors to detect pre-election activities, especially in mobilization of women, youth and people with disabilities to participate in the electoral processes during 2015 Tanzania general elections. The findings show that technology usage enhances citizen participation in monitoring pre-election observation information that goes beyond the radar of traditional observers.

In the context of local democracy, limited literature attempted to address the component of information and communication technologies in Tanzania. The work by Babeiya and Masabo (2017) addressed the question of information and communication technologies, and citizen participation in decision-making in local governments in Tanzania. Particularly, the paper focuses in exploring the position of information technologies in fostering participatory decision making. In their analysis, authors observed that policy makers and researchers have accorded limited attention to the role of information technologies in promoting inclusive decision making at the local governments (Babeiya & Masabo, 2017). In this case, this paper attempts to focus on local electoral democracy using crowdsourcing methods and technology. The aim is to contribute knowledge to the literature on local democracy, crowdsourcing and technology usage in Tanzania.

4.1 *Who Participates in Crowdsourced Local Democracy Online?*

Crowdsourcing local democracy can either be carried out through 'open or unbounded crowdsourcing (more informal, citizen-generated data where participation is non-discriminatory and, in principle, anyone is voluntarily allowed to participate and share information), through bounded crowdsourcing (more systematic and organised method that recruited and trained volunteers, workers or observers undertake), and through passive crowdsourcing (data mining from social networks or from a combination of both)' (Hellström, 2015). Figure 2 is a presentation of the three types of citizens' crowdsourcing methods namely: bounded, open/unbounded and passive crowdsourcing.

Figure 2: Crowdsourcing methods
Source: Modified from Shayo (2017:28).

Bounded crowdsourcing involves recruitment and training of the crowd to participate in monitoring democratic processes actively. Unlike passive and open crowdsourcing, bounded crowdsourcing comprise few citizens, who are also called "trusted" or "trained" observers. For example, 2014 civic elections and 2015 elections of ward councillors, bounded group was recruited, trained and engaged to be active participants in generating election observation information through digital information and communication technologies. Bounded crowdsourcing as the method of recruiting trusted network of people is cheaper than the conventional way of recruitment because participants are recommended and attracted by those within their already established network (Meier, 2009).

Open/unbounded crowdsourcing citizens are engaged through "open-call" to participate in monitoring electoral processes through technology tools. Open groups of the crowd are invited to generate observation data in the digital platform such as social media pages and open-source platforms like *Uchaguzi*, but their election-related observation information are processed for verification by citizen data verifiers (Shayo, 2017). This group of citizen observers are engaged through digital tools such as short-massage services, mobile short code, Facebook account, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram accounts, as well as e-mails and web form for them to share observed incidents. Therefore, unbounded crowdsourcing simply means that digital technologies can be used by anonymous individuals to monitor and share electoral incidents in a crowdsourcing platform (Shayo, 2017). Crowd generated information are treated as "untrusted information," in which these information require authentication to determine the genuineness of the incidents before sharing for public view. This type of crowdsourcing is also better known as untrained, undefined, open, untrusted crowd, who voluntarily participates in co-production of electoral information.

Passive crowdsourcing share election observation information in the online platform such as social media networking sites, microblogging and weblogs. Passive crowdsourcing are unengaged group of citizen in the crowdsourcing process and that could possibly be the majority of ordinary citizens on the grassroots (Shayo, 2017). This group of passive crowd do not report incidents to the crowd-initiators or calling and even sending messages to the medium established and advertised by the initiators, but the group complain in their own online initiated networks, especially illicit act in the electoral process. Digital volunteers through data mining from online forums or social networks can capture shared information by passive group on the online platforms. Passive crowdsourcing – citizens are indirectly engaged through the use of digital information and communication technologies and more specifically, social media platforms by feeding information to the crowd-initiators system.

5. A Methodological Note

This is an exploratory work using document review (election observation reports, survey reports, among others) to analyse the trends of citizen participation in local democratic processes and challenges of using digital information and communication technologies. This is because already there are some initiatives by civil society election observation organisations for engaging citizen online at the national and local level elections (Shayo, 2017). The national election in Tanzania involves election of president; member of parliaments and ward "councillors," and local elections comprises Village, *Mtaa* and Hamlet leaders.

For the 2014 local government elections (civic elections) the use of information and communication technologies amplifies citizens' concerns through participation in election observation. The use of social media platforms namely, Facebook page "*Taarifa Za Uchaguzi Tanzania*" and Twitter account *"@ChaguziTanzania*," as well as WhatsApp number serve the purpose of public communication during local elections (TACCEO, 2015). In the 2015 election of ward councillors, technology was used to generate and map observation data in an open-source platform called "*Uchaguzi Wetu 2015*", especially information related to campaign event. It is worth noting that for pre-election monitoring, bounded crowdsourced data were collected one month before voting day. In this context, bounded citizen observers were equipped with pre-election structured tool for observation and generating electoral incidents. Crowdsourced citizen observers used *magpi* application installed in their smartphones, tablets or laptops to generate electoral incidents visually mapped in the *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform.

This explorative work will inform further research at the level of survey. The survey will be expected to look at the citizen views regarding awareness, satisfaction and usage of online platforms for participation in local democracy, and the extent to which technologies are used by ordinary citizens to generate local government-related election observation information.

6. Trends of Citizens' Crowdsourcing Methods

Democratic innovation for citizen participation, especially election monitoring in young democracies witnessed how digital technologies are transforming observation and generating electoral incidents in real-time. In this era of digital democracy, non-partisan monitoring organisations invented spaces for engaging with citizens in electoral processes. Citizen participation in the digital environment has the role to play in monitoring standards of democratic elections, in which every stage, and not just the election-day, counts. Technology represents the "dawning of a new age for democracy, offering new opportunities for citizens to participate in local through to global public spheres and grassroots movements" (Smith, 2009, p.142).

Tanzania experienced a digital revolution in electoral politics with the widespread use of mobile phone (short message services), smartphones instant messaging applications (WhatsApp), social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube) (Shayo, 2016; Shayo & Kersting, 2016), as well as open-source platform such as *Ushahidi/Uchaguzi* (*Ushahidi* "witness" and *Uchaguzi* "election") and similar innovations (Shayo & Kersting 2017; Shayo 2017). This modern information and communication technology and open-source platform opened the door for monitoring elections by new electronic means "from below." As a result, the 2014 local government elections, the use of technology like social media account (Facebook page and Twitter account) promotes citizen participation in electoral processes through generating and sharing election information (TACCEO, 2015). Also the 2015 election of ward Councillors, an electronic election monitoring platform called *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* was created by Tanzania Election Monitoring Organisation (TEMCO) and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO) for monitoring and mapping pre-election, election-day and post-election day incidents. In order to observe the 2015 Tanzanian elections (ward councillors) through technology, TEMCO and TACCEO formed Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania (CEMOT).

6.1 *Availability and Usage of Digital Tools*

Mobile phones and internet access have become relatively widespread, and constitutes a new important resource for citizen participation in local democracy and its decentralized crowdsourcing methods. Given the ubiquity of mobile technology and other creative innovations, citizen participation in electoral process through crowdsourcing using digital tools contribute in addressing critical problems of electoral integrity (Schuler, 2008). The growth of "mobile phones and other information technologies have dramatically reduced the cost of information. This in turn allows motivated persons to pursue solutions to endemic political ills […] that would have been, in the absence of the lower costs, too difficult to sustain" (Livingston, 2011, p.11). Mobile phone technologies and other digital communication channels may help to promote citizen participation and improve election integrity, but not panacea for all problems of local electoral politics (Livingston, 2011). Availability of technology provides a number of opportunities for implementing and using different communication technology solutions regarding local electronic democracy (Haug, (2007). But the use of technology in electoral process brought worry in terms of digital divide (Norris, 2001; Kersting, 2012), especially the cost of technology and skills to use technology tools. Facebook launched "Internet.org" program for free use of Facebook page, which in turn enabled platform users to access and share information with limited data bundle (Shayo, 2017).

The trend of internet penetration in figure 3 by the end of 2018 (43%) and mobile penetration (81%) presents aspects of digital inclusion for mobile phones and to some extent digital exclusion in internet subscription rate. With mobile technology for texting, calling, sending and receiving mobile money system, suggests degree of public inclusion in political affairs compared to web-based usage and participation in political activities. The trends of internet penetration and mobile penetration for the year 2013 - 2018 show that there is a growth rates from (21%) to (43%) and (61%) to (81%) respectively.

Figure 3: Trend of the Internet and mobile penetration in Tanzania
Source: TCRA 2018 Quarterly Communication Statistics

6.2 *Digital Local Elections Observation*

The use of emerging technologies and crowdsourcing in local elections creates space for citizens to participate in electoral processes using their digital devices. Citizens' participation assists in the creation of a more rapid reporting and early alarm warning or alert of electoral malpractices. Also, using technology helps to bring in citizens voices as a new dimension in election monitoring through crowdsourcing systems a method used multiple channels to collect and share information to a large group of people (TACCEO, 2015). In 2014 local government

election, technology-enabled citizens to become part of the election monitoring exercise. Also, the use of technology was considered as a golden opportunity to ensure maximum citizens' participation in the process of monitoring and that peoples observation in the electoral conduct are timely reported to the relevant authorities for action (TACCEO, 2015). In this context, the 2014 local government election multiple digital channels were deployed, such as mobile cell phones for texting, Facebook page and Twitter account, as well as WhatsApp number was provided for citizen to share election incidents in their localities.

The set-up of the TACCEO information and communication technology hub was used to filter/verify information from the public, and verified incidents were communicated back to the public through different channels, especially Facebook page "*Taarifa ya Uchaguzi Tanzania*" and Twitter account *"@ChaguziTanzania*." The use of social media platforms facilitated the purpose of communication, collaboration and electoral incidents sharing during election for the public awareness and knowledge on the ongoing electoral processes (TACCEO, 2015). Also, deployment of crowdsourcing methods for local election monitoring, citizens observers were able to use social media to send videos and pictures, and even stories which were then shared on Facebook page and Twitter account for public consumption (TACCEO, 2015). Until December 2014, the Facebook page set for election observation had attracted about 682,142 people worldwide, and there were 12,659 Facebook subscribers who were interested to send in and receive local election reports (TACCEO, 2015, p.37).

The use of technologies for crowdsourcing local government elections of village chairpersons, *mtaa* and hamlet leaders, TACCEO was able to monitor and generate incidents on Election Day (E-Day). Most of the election issues presented in figure 4, among others, are delays in opening polls centre, insufficiency ballot papers, names of the registered voters missing at polling stations, corrupt environment, groups of political party members that intimidate voters and voting procedures were not followed. These reported incidents related to the election of village and *mtaa* chairpersons, as well as hamlet leaders. These reports show that the use of technology and crowdsourced methods can detect incidents related to irregularities of local elections. This is the real case for the data presented in figure 4 like station opened late (17%) and insufficiency of ballot papers (13%).

Figure 4: Percentage of issues reported most
Source: TACCEO, 2015, p.34

6.2.1 *Crowdsourcing Platform in Monitoring Local Elections*

Ushahidi means "witness" open source software, perhaps the most celebrated platform for citizen participation is a key example for crowdsourcing systems and problem solving platform in electoral processes. *Uchaguzi* platform

is a customized version of *Ushahidi* designed for monitoring, co-production and mapping electoral incidents in order to promote integrity of electoral processes (Shayo, 2017). *Ushahidi* platform was developed during post-election violence in Kenya 2008. The post-election violence was triggered by lack of trust of the electoral results due to electoral fraud and other executive abuse (Diamond, 2015). The platform was launched to gather information from citizens using digital tools, specifically mobile phone message services on hate speech and electoral violence. Citizen-generated data were uploaded and visually mapped in the crowd-mapping platform. Since then, *Ushahidi* platform has been gained popularity and deployed in more than 159 countries ranging from elections monitoring and violence to crisis response (Shayo, 2017). Since 2010 civil societies together with other local and international partners innovated *Uchaguzi* platform for election watch in East Africa' namely: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The platform enables citizens to participation in monitoring the integrity of electoral processes in order to detect, deter and mitigate problems of election fraud, as well as mapping positive incidents. In the 2015 Tanzanian general elections, CEMOT as a non-partisan election monitoring group launched an Election Observation Center (EOC) whose bounded crowdsourced observers gather and share information about election incidents. CEMOT aims to enhance citizen participation in monitoring electoral processes. *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* as a model of election observation and citizen participation was jointly initiated by TEMCO and TACCEO (LHRC & TACCEO, 2016; TEMCO, 2016). *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform was designed to generate and share pre-election data from the deployed team of bounded crowdsourced observers across the country. Figure 5 *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform was initiated in order to allow mapping of crowd election monitoring information from bounded group of citizen observers. Unlike conventional way of observing election and releasing reports several months after the election, using technology and crowdsourcing method – crowdsourcers managed to share generated election observation reports in the crowd platform in near real-time.

Figure 5: *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* crowdsourcing platform

Uchaguzi Wetu 2015 platform plays an increasingly innovative role in the ways citizens can observe, generate and communicate local elections. In this, any attempt to engage citizens' crowdsourcing in observing local elections aimed to promote credible local democratic procedures. Therefore, citizens' crowdsourcing methods initiated by

"non-partisan election observation and monitoring organisations can contribute significantly to improving the democratic quality of legal frameworks for elections, the conduct of election processes and broader democratic development" (GNDEM, 2012, p.3).

It is worth noting that bounded crowdsourced pre-election observation data were generated through magpi software application, and the reports were mapped in the *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* crowd-mapping platform. Data generated by bounded citizens' observers captured presidential, parliamentary and councilors related campaign incidents. For the purpose of this paper, figure 6 presents observation data generated from 22nd September to 24th October 2015 for the general observation data and more specifically, ward councillor campaign data. In this graphical presentation, one of the timeline data represents overall generated data for presidential, parliamentary and ward councillor campaigns incidents and the other timeline offer specific data on local elections for the ward councillors campaign incidents for the 2015 elections.

Figure 6: Timeline graph of general elections and local elections crowdsourced data
Source: CEMOT 2015 Magpi Data (22nd September 2015 to 24th October 2015)

7. Challenges of Citizens' Crowdsourcing

We are now living in the digital age and citizen participation in local democracy through technology and internet is indispensable. On the other hand, "alongside the countless advantages it offers, the internet creates almost as many challenges for society-in different ways and to different extents, depending on the country concerned" (FES, 2017, p.7). Because growth of modern means of communication technologies, internet and information sharing creates more opportunities of using available, accessible and affordable digital tools for citizens participation in democratic processes. In this, citizen participation in local democracy online through crowdsourcing systems does not exist without challenges.

Tanzania's digital legal framework entails a contemporary government legal response to the challenges presented by digital transformation and the internet. This is because the internet does not automatically provide a space for citizens to express themselves freely - the internet must be regulated, administrated and governend (FES, 2017). Development of the new digital legal framework is to set the laws, rules and regulations for safeguarding the

cyberspace as more and more users and content gets online (Jeremia, 2017). In order to achieve this objective the government enacted a wide array of laws such as the Electronic and Postal Communications Act of 2010 (EPOCA), the Statistics Act of 2015, and the Cybercrimes Law of 2015. While the underlying rationale for enacting these laws seems to be useful for bolstering digital government, on the other hand the laws have challenges as regards to citizen participation in local democratic procedures. For example, EPOCA is one of the relatively old law that was enacted in the year 2010 with the aim of keeping pace with developments in the electronic communications industry, to create a framework for regulating electronic service providers, to establish the Central Equipment Identification Register (CEIR) for mobile phone SIM cards, to provide the duties for electronic communications licensees, agents and customers, and to provide for digital content regulation (Jeremia, 2017). The Act also addresses fair competition and practices in the digital economy, and delineates electronic offences and associated penalties (Jeremia, 2017). However, EPOCA has circumvented the freedom to get information through digital media.

The right to receive, search and impart information is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the country Constitution. And information and communication technology instruments are used as a tool for promoting freedom of expression, access and information sharing. But the decision of the government to enact Statistics Act and Cybercrimes Act of 2015 is perceived as a way to limit media functioning and generating self-censorship on the internet (EU EOM, 2015). This was the case "cybercrime law was 'quickly' passed and assented to by the President for implementation at the middle of campaigns. LHRC/TACCEO and a number of individuals were the first victims of this draconian law; LHRC/TACCEO had its data centre's equipment seized by the police (under this law) before the release of the presidential election results" (LHRC & TACCEO 2016). Arguably these kinds of laws often create new problems because they focus on various questions about content and not the *processes* of governing how users behave (Suzor, 2019). The raiding of the national observers group "TACCEO/ Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) by the police, where analysis of electoral data including results was being conducted, and the consequent arrests and confiscation of equipment and documents under section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act, raised concern over the use and implementation of the Act" (EU EOM, 2015, p.8). On the other hand, it argued that there is "no easy way to ensure either that the rules are consistently enforced or that they are enforced in a way that is fair and free from bias" (Suzor, 2019:14).

In order for crowdsourcing methods to be successful, it requires partnerships that are well agreed among the stakeholders (Shayo, 2017). Partnership may bring front electoral incidents and, in particular through crowdsourced whistle blowing incidents. But the core risks and challenges arise around the concept of trust in building for crowdsourcing partnerships and methods (Bott & Young, 2012). Lack of trust may affects partnership between civil society organisations as initiator of crowdsourcing and other networks of observers in general. Shayo (2017) observed that some civil societies opted for more decentralised modes of election observation and developed channels of communication between citizens and crowdsourcers in terms of generating data and feedback action. But using the case of *Uchaguzi* platform research found that some civil societies were not willing to collaborate because of different interests and lack of trust to each partner (Shayo, 2017). Deployment of crowdsourcing methods - the idea is to promote one-sourcing centre for generating electoral information and gain collaboration that will accommodate all interests and build trust among each stakeholders involved (Shayo, 2017).

Citizen participation in local democracy online requires adequate resources in terms of human and financial resources for the sustainability of crowdsourcing methods. In this, it is suggested that 'investments directed toward the betterment of enabling infrastructure can substantially enhance the participation of the crowd' (Bott et al. 2014). In low-income countries like Tanzania, "investments directed toward the betterment of enabling infrastructure can substantially enhance the participation of the crowd. In low-income countries, performance-based donor funding of local community development could be used to create a positive incentive for governments to allow greater citizen scrutiny and participation, for example, through crowdsourced monitoring and reporting platform" (Bott et al. 2014, p.6). It can be argued that "funding is typically the biggest concern and one of the most frequent sources of tension within observer organisations and networks, the availability of funds and the timely

disbursement of funds are all potential sources of friction amongst and within observation groups" (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

8. Discussion and Conclusion

Although citizens are engaged in monitoring local electoral process – in general terms- are usually engaged in voting process of the candidates. In representative form of participation, the selection of the candidate is a crucial instrument for the quality of democracy. On the other hand, digital technologies and crowdsourcing open up more spaces and opportunities for citizen participation in electoral procedures. The on-going revolution in the sector of information technologies and the potential effect of citizen observers has expanded considerably and citizen observation is a means to promote credible local elections. The emerging crowdsourcing local election monitoring through technologies, changes the perception that elections with integrity is determined by a few specialized domestic observation groups. Mapping the trends of crowdsourcing methods and technology usage in local elections provides insight that the voice of the crowd generated through technology tools many contribute to the integrity of elections. This trend is a success story of citizen participation in local democracy driven from below on the one hand, but on the other hand, it seems obvious that citizen participation in local democracy online through crowdsourcing methods encountered various challenges. Because this trend of citizen participation in the modern wave of electronic democracy is a new dimension of using crowdsourcing and technology to be active participants in promoting integrity of local elections.

Citizen participation in local democracy online seems to be correlated with the growing access to and use of technology, as well as other different forms of participation initiated by electronic civil society organisations. On the other hand, "the potential for using ICT to increase and deepen citizen participation in political decision-making has lagged somewhat behind" (Smith, 2009, p.142). Nowadays non-partisan organisations focus on using online technology instruments to observe the electoral contest of representative democracy. For example, innovated space by TACCEO for initiating social media Facebook page in 2014 and *Uchaguzi Wetu* platform for 2015 local elections managed to engage citizen in local elections and become an instrument for monitoring electoral contest.

In the 2014 local government election, the use of social media platform like Facebook page and Twitter account has shown the importance of communication as it serves as an evidence-based outlet for information sharing from and to the public (TACCEO, 2015). Especially, the creation of the Facebook page and Twitter account for generating and sharing election observation information opened showcased evidence of the situation in the grassroots levels during local electoral processes. The use of crowdsourcing platforms and mobile applications like Magpi for pre-election observation managed to capture information on campaign incidents of ward councilors. According to TACCEO (2015) local government election monitoring information that was shared on social media and crowdsourcing platform, empowered people to dialogue, share and even become aware of the situations in the campaigning and voting processes. However, reaching out the majority of rural population was one among the biggest challenges in social media as its users are more prevalent in urban areas compared to those in the rural areas (TACEO, 2015). With technology like social media channels, and crowdsourcing methods, arguably it was easy to engage citizens on election process in order to generate and share verified information to the general public. The case of 2014 local government elections of village, *mtaa* and hamlet leaders, as well as 2015 election of ward councillors, digital information and communication technologies and citizens' crowdsourcing offer an amplified opportunity to promote citizen participation in local democracy online. Through digital technologies for information sharing from and to large group of people, participants in the online platforms can monitor, share, question and receive timely response from relevant authorities about electoral concerns. In this, citizen participation in local democracy online and crowdsourcing method can successfully be deployed in order to improve the overall integrity of local electoral processes. Not only electoral process, but overall citizen participation could be enhanced in this way, strengthening democracy as such. But citizen participation through technology tools and crowdsourcing systems by itself is no panacea for all possible shortcomings of local elections, but one additional tool in conjunction with other existing methods. Crowdsourcing platforms, social media pages

and its possibilities of visualizing citizen voices offers a means for citizen participation in local democracy online and likelihood of promoting integrity of local electoral procedures. Digitalising local elections and crowdsourcing methods is a creative means of engaging ordinary citizens in the protection of their votes at the grassroots level.

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The Main Challenges of Public Management in Afghanistan and the Possible Solutions

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Abstract

The public management of a country has a direct relationship with the governance affairs, the components of good and bad in governance have been defined based on developed and undeveloped countries and indicators of governance. Given these components the governance and public management of a country can understand. Afghanistan is a country that has experienced good governance since 2002, after the fall of the Taliban regime. In order to study Afghanistan's public management, we need to look closely at governance in Afghanistan in order to identify the extent to which international standards of governance in Afghanistan have been acceptable, and through it, we can identify the challenges of Afghanistan's administration. This paper, which is titled "The Main Challenges of Public Management in Afghanistan and the Possible Solutions," seeks to provide challenges and possible solutions of public management with a comprehensive vision based on global norms and with respect to cultural complexity, historic and traditional. This paper is written in three chapters, the first chapter which discusses good governance with a short manner and recognizes the position of the Afghan government with regard to the indicators of good governance, the second chapter defines the challenges of the Afghan management, the third chapter addresses the possible solution and ends with a conclusion. The purpose of writing this paper is to identify precisely the components that have had a profound negative impact on the Afghan public management and to prevent the increasing of these challenges proposes the solutions ways. This paper, based on library research, has gained to the authoritative sources that contain the principles of global management and the real challenges facing Afghanistan.

Keywords: Indicators of Good Governance, Public Management of Afghanistan, Main Challenges, Possible Solutions

Introduction

The paper is titled "the main challenges of public management and possible solutions in Afghanistan" defined the good governance and public management based on global indicators, especially in non-developed countries, and tried to find the main challenges and possible solutions of public management of Afghanistan based on those indicators.

Global indicators of good governance help the researcher to define the main challenges of public management. In this paper, the rule of law, transparency, capacity building, high standard of living, solidarity, and reforms have known as indicators of good government in non-developed countries, based on these indicators, Afghanistan has faced to the following challenges in its public administration, such as poverty and unemployment, insecurity and immigration and violation of human right, administration corruption, the negatives role of media, the increasing of Islamic extremist schools, lack of rule of law, illiteracy and lack of capacity, lack of administration reform, lack of solidarity and lack of population census, these are administration challenges of Afghanistan based on indicators of good government in non-development countries, and it is a big threat to people's life.

To escape this disastrous situation in the Afghan management and to identify a good governance in Afghanistan, this paper points out and evaluates the possible solutions for the challenges which define in the following: the exit of foreign military forces based on replaces best option, the emergence of a responsible government, getting the mechanism of preventing the Islamic extremism in the country, promote the rule of law, maintaining transparency and accountability, creating the national solidarity and political stability, the equal realization of socio-economic development, attention to the meritocracy, and decentralization of power.

The securing rule of law, extending transparency and administrative reforms, and preventing extremism are the main solution way and they will provide a high-quality public management and enhance the legitimacy of Afghanistan.

First chapter

1.1. The indicators of Good Governance

In a transformed world today, governments alone will not be able to respond to new needs. This requires new patterns that can use all of the community's capacities in public, private and civil sectors to maximize the production and delivery of public services (Amin 2016:2). And this is not possible, except the global indicators for good governance. Based on most scholars and policymakers, good governance is a fundamental ingredient of sustained economic development. In this section, we discuss, in turn, rules-based indicators of governance, and there are many rules that defined from the side of the scholar as indicators (Kraay:4). Aspects such as rule of law, human rights, political stability, education, economic equality, social trust, political legitimacy, and lack of corruption have been pointed out from the side of some others scholars as essential in order to promote economic growth (Bjorn, Hans Ekbrand 2014:8).

But the World Bank emphasizes four dimensions of governance: the capacity and efficiency of the public sector, accountability, legal framework for development, and transparency and information (Rosario G 1999:6). In another perspective the origins of good governance can mostly be traced in societies enjoying a democratic background and tradition, good governance in these kinds of societies and countries were built as a sequence of expanding democratic political parties, transparent elections, independent judiciary systems that observed the rule of law and extension of citizenry values true education and civil movements. But in some countries where are, non-developed countries provide examples of the absence of good governance. In Bulgaria, for instance, non-development, lack of democratic experience, and consequently lack of democratic infrastructure to perform good governance have confronted the country with plenty of problems.

Accordingly, the status of good governance in Afghanistan is more similar to the situation in Bulgaria than in any of the Western European or some others developed countries: good governance and other related concepts such as the constitution, rule of law and democracy in Afghanistan is new and the country doesn't enjoy long historical and practical democratic and good governance experience. The literature of management has described and evaluated the concept of good governance from two perspectives:

1. The general perspective, which doesn't restrict the concept only to the government, but also includes the private sector, civil society, and the systems and mechanism which affect the management, planning, and governance.

2. The specific perspective, which focuses on government. From this perspective, good governance means the transparent execution of duties and responsibilities by a government within the framework of existing laws and principles. I will mostly evaluate the good governance in Afghanistan from the specific perspective and focus on the Afghan government, its possibilities and problems of performing good governance.

By choosing the 'special perspective,' in this paper, I offer sixth concepts, namely: the rule of law, transparency, capacity building, high standard of living, solidarity, and reforms as the major indicators of good governance. Actually, these indicators provide the framework for this paper. The reason I select these sixth indicators comes out of my understanding of Afghanistan's socioeconomic and politico-cultural realities as a non-developed post-war country.

1.1.1. Rule of Law: in public management literature, the rule of law, in general, means all public duties to be done under the rule of law rather than the rule of man. In other words, it means that under the rule of law, we prevent the rule of man, which in most cases results in authoritarian regimes in which man rules the law and uses it as a personal instrument.

1.1.2. Transparency and Accountability: Financial and administrative corruption is one of the most negative elements affecting good governance: As the level of corruption in government increases, the level of good governance decreases. Corruption has its economic, cultural and institutional effects on good governance. It increases the social gap between rich and poor, culturally weakens the moral values of a society and politically decreases the legitimacy of a government and enhances social distrust.

1.1.3. Capacity Building of Human Resources: in most studies and statistics 'human resources' is recognized as a major index to evaluate the level of development in countries. In those studies, the quality and quantity of expertise and educated population is specified as an independent variable for development. Governments that lack efficient expertise and educated population are not able to properly use the existing resources to implement the government projects and achieve governmental and societal goals (Sayed Nasim2016:4).

1.1.4. High Standard of Living: refers to the level of wealth, comfort, material goods, and necessities available to a certain socioeconomic class in a certain geographic area, usually a country. The standard of living includes factors such as income, quality, and availability of employment, class disparity, poverty rate, gross domestic product, inflation rate, quality and availability of education, etc.

1.1.5. Solidarity: solidarity is unity (as of a group or class) that produces or is based on unities of interests, objectives, standards, and sympathies. It refers to the ties in a society that bind people together as one. (Wikipedia)

1.1.6. Reforms: means to provide and motivate the governmental institutions to conduct their duties effectively and achieve the defined goals. For instance, revitalizing the employment and salary mechanisms based on meritocracy, create new governmental structures and rationalizing governmental institutions to keep the public sector lively. (Sayed Nasim2016:5) In general, reforming the public sector requires the following circumstances:
‣ Decentralization of decision making
‣ Improving the employment mechanisms based on meritocracy

1.2. Good Governance in Afghanistan

Afghanistan, before the rule of the Taliban, was able to experience a relative government based on the rule of law through consensus and reconciliation between tribal leaders and peoples, but it was not a long time, the Taliban terrorist group regime emerged, and they were known as anti-human value and darkest period, and this regime continued for five years and ended in 2001, and so on the new government has established since 2001,

(Aarya2014: 7). Therefore, the concept of good governance in Afghanistan is new, and the country lacks a practical background of performing good governance in its contemporary history. As mentioned before, the concept of good governance for the first time entered into Afghan political literature after the fall of the Taliban in the Bonn Conference. (Sayed Nasim 2016:5).

After the Bonn conference, the interim administration, the transitional government, and three presidential elections were formed. Not only, these three elections in Afghanistan have not experienced transferring power from one leader to another leader in the form of global norms, but rather the process of electing more support for traditional groups and power networks in the direction of politics or the distribution of resources and state institutions were been based on protection Political focused, therefore, state institutions have formed on the basis of political and group considerations, not on the basis of good governance indicators which I mentioned above, such as the protection of the law, human rights, and so on.

As a result of the third election, the national unity government was created, this election due to the lack of criteria for elections announced without legitimacy, due to widespread fraud and US interference in the election affairs (government in public opinion 2016:12). On the other hand, the Afghan government has achieved relative achievements in these two periods, which has not been so visible in the face of many managerial and governmental challenges, for example, expanding of media in its works area, democracy, and freedom of expression and relative rights for women.

With regard to these electoral challenges and the lack of unity among leaders and many other challenges, the results of two survey in 2014 and 2017 in Afghanistan has shown that Afghans are losing their hopes for the future day by day, (Henry dock& M. Fahim2016:12)

Is Afghanistan going the right way or wrong?

years	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013		2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005
People/ percentage		%	%	%			%	%	%	%	%	
Right	32,8	29,3	36,8	35,5	58,2		70	40	54	55	56	77
Wrong	61,2	42,8	31	28,3	21		21	38	24	25	24	6
Fifty-fifty	3	4	6	5	3		5	14	15	17	12	11
No idea	5	3	6	4	2		3	9	7	5	4	6

What are the big challenges in Afghanistan from your idea?

The big challenges of Afghanistan	2010		2016-2017
People / percentage	%		%
Poverty and unemployment	34		19
Insecurity	32		33
Administration corruption	14		10
the lack of reconstruction	8		9
Foreign intervention	2		6
Illiteracy and lack of capability	4		6
Narcotic	2		2
Lack of coordination and solidarity	1		7
Lack of the rule of law and accountability	x		7
No idea	2		1

Based on the annual results of these surveys and based on the World Bank mentioned, "Good governance is synonymous with sound development management (Hashimi 2016:4), There is a big difference in reducing people's expectations about the future as well as in the problems of people in recent years.

Second chapter

2.1. The challenges of Public Management of Afghanistan

After 17 years from the fall of the Taliban regime, due to the formation of a transitional, contemporary, and three elected government, Afghanistan is still far from achieving the minimum standards for good governance, this is clearly based on the selected indicators which I mentioned above. Based on the good governance indicators and based on the facts that show Afghanistan in the ranking of corruption countries, the third poorest country in the world, the country with the highest crop of drugs, the most insecure country after Syria, with all these facts the main challenges for public management of Afghanistan can be clear, and these are the following: poverty and unemployment, insecurity and immigration and violation of human right, administration corruption, the negatives role of media, the increasing of Islamic extremist schools, lack of rule of law, illiteracy and lack of capacity, lack of administration reform and lack of population census. Why has Afghanistan changed since 1996, especially from 2001 up to now as a corruption, insecure, poorest, and human right violation country, while much assistance was provided to Afghanistan? There are many questions about Afghanistan that will respond to discuss each challenge incomplete form (summary report: 25).

2.1.1. Lack of Rule of Law: Afghanistan, as a non-developed country, suffers from a lack of the rule of law. In Afghanistan, particularly culturally-rooted believes challenge the rule of law: believes that the "victor is the right"; the religious interpretation of law, as well as the traditional, belief that "the status quo is eternally out of our control." The domination of Taliban and commanders that prefer the rule of ethnicity to the rule of law, and a historic lack of law-oriented regimes and experiences has seriously damaged the rule of law in Afghanistan, finally, even the person who has a responsibility in the government has not attended to the rule of law (Sayed Nasim 2016:12).

In a research by "the Afghanistan Freedom House Foundation" has revealed that in all three articles of constitutions nearly two articles have been violated, it has also been shown that over the past 14 years, from162 articles of the constitution 92 of them have been violated, and most of the Contradictories are the government, opposition group (Taliban), irresponsible gunmen and foreigners who are military presence. The Highlights issues that have violated include Non-observance of the election time, the release of prisoners without a court order, the presence of the courts by the irresponsible person, the lack of media attention to national interests, and failure to execute court order against the NATO forces that committed the crime. (Ali Aqa, Mazidi 2016:31-32)

2.1.1.1 The Presences of Islamic Extremist Groups: The lack of clarity of the constitution against the activities of religious clerics on opposite of the government has provided a way for terrorist's activities. Afghanistan is a religious country, and its people are heavily dependent on long-standing traditions, and traditional culture is more applicable than law in some cases, and that is why the religious clerics have used wrong most of the traditional status of the community, the presence of clerics in the queue of the terrorists is a sign of the wrong culture of these groups, according to the some media in Afghanistan, Seventy percent of clerics inside and outsid of Afghanistan do negative propaganda by using religious schools against the government.

2.1.1.2 The Negative Role of Media: The media in Afghanistan has grown dramatically in recent years, and it has made open overview for the Afghan society, so this decade can be considered media advance in Afghanistan, in addition, these media has played a positive role in some sectors, they also have played a negative role, that, it has put a very serious adverse effect on the society and government of Afghanistan. Due to the lack of deterrent laws against the media and the media's open system in Afghanistan, the media did not attention to the public interest of Afghanistan, thus the vast majority of media programs in Afghanistan prioritize the interests of small party groups than national interests of Afghanistan or serve the interests of the countries which has major beneficiaries of Afghan affairs. Also, the terrorist groups have used negatively from this afghan open media system. (Wikipedia: Afghan media system)

2.1.2. Lack of Capacity Building of Human Resources and Illiteracy: Most of the international institutions have considered the level of education, skills, and expertise of a nation as the main factor of development and prosperity. Therefore, I claim that a lack of efficient educated, and skilled in the Afghan public sectors are one of the major challenges for good governance and development (human right 2010:3). According to UNESCO, 11 million people are still illiterate in Afghanistan, and only 34 percent of men and 18 percent of women are literate, according to this statistic, 90% of women and more than 60% of men in rural areas are not adequately educated, this is a shocking issue and a great challenge to the Afghan government. (the summary report:12).

2.1.3. Administration Corruption: Corruption means deviation from legal approaches in administration and generally is a kind of 'illegitimate usage of power' in favor of personal interests. Many factors, including complexity and inefficiency of laws, unaccountable bureaucracy, lack of awareness among the citizens regarding their individual rights, lack of access to governmental information, lack of accountability culture and social irresponsibility regarding good governance can be considered as the reasons of growing corruption in Afghanistan, and Existence of corruption has caused decreased in social prestige and prestige of administrative system. (administration corruption :1)

Based on this definition, the International Center for Private International Law (CIPE) is mentioned: "The corruption in Afghanistan is widely recognized as a key challenge for governance and the rule of law, and it has become a barrier to sustainable economic growth." The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) says that a high level of authority, or lack of competition in Afghanistan, will make systems more vulnerable to corruption. UNDP emphasizes that corruption is fundamentally a result of a lack of good and effective government.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan in 2010 has listed the corruption causes in Afghanistan: 63 percent of Afghans believe that this is due to weak accountability systems, 57 percent say low salaries play a key role in corruption, 49% believe that corruption in large amounts of money in circulation is possible in Afghanistan, and 60% of the people believe that donor countries through their private companies have promoted corruption and money laundering in Afghanistan.

According to Annual Transparency International Report, Afghanistan is known as the third country in the world in terms of corruption. Based on Annual Transparency International Report which has just released about Corruption in Different Countries in 2017, categorized countries in 180 categories, Afghanistan ranked in 177th with 15 points.

In 2016, Afghanistan ranked among the 176 countries with the same score of 15 located 169 ranks, in 2015 is located in 166 ranks from 168 countries, and in 2014 after Sudan, North Korea, and Somalia ranked 172 out of 180 countries. (Akser2017:5&71)

Corruption perception indicators for Afghanistan, 2005-2018

Source/indicator	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010		2016	2017	2018
Transparency International, corruption perception index Afghanistan's rank, out of	117/158	-	172/179	176/180	176/178	-		169/176	177/180	
World bank/worldwide governance indicators	2.0	2.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0		-	-	
Asia foundation survey /% of afghans who see corruption as a problem	-	18%	16%	14%	17%	14%		-	10%	11%

2.1.4 Insecurity, Immigration, and Violation of Human Right: According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission which was released in the " war and peace" book, civilian casualties and violence against women and human rights violations have increased in recent years, according to this report, in 2017 more than 16,700 human rights abuses cases were registered in the commission. According to this report, more than 2,800 civilians killed, more than 7,700 injured and 5575 cases of violence against women were registered in the AIHRC in 2017, based on this report, 37 non-trial executions, assassinations, honor killings and field trials, 203 violations of the right to liberty and private security, 82 cases of torture and ill-treatment, 183 violations of the rights of defendants and convicts, 27 cases of violations of the right to freedom of choice in spouses , 59 cases of violation of property rights, a two percent increase in the number of unemployed, were including cases of human rights abuses which was happened only this year.

On the other hand, the AIHRC reported on the increase in displaced Afghans from 1.2 million to 1.5 million, as well as it remembered that 600,000 Afghans in the region countries and 354,000 in the European, American and Australian countries are as a migrant, and mentioned, it is a big problem about escaping human capacity from the country.

2.1.5 Poverty and Unemployment : According to the survey of The Central Statistics Bureau of Afghanistan, and the Institute of Technology (ICON),54.5% of the population of Afghanistan live below the poverty line, this figure represents an increase of 16.2% since 2012, according to this survey in 2016, the unemployment rate in Afghanistan has increased from 32% to 35%. Based on findings of the recent Central Statistical Bureau survey after 2014 and the established of the National Unity Government, the social crisis in Afghanistan has grown. This report has mentioned, unemployment is one of the outcomes of poverty in Afghanistan, and 35% of young people in Afghanistan suffering from unemployment. According to the ADB report, Afghanistan's economic growth has reached from 2.4 to 2.5 percent between 2016 and 2017 (Akser2017:72) and it stopped to 2,5 in 2018.

The Gross Domestic Product per capita in Afghanistan was last recorded at 618.30 US dollars in 2017. The GDP per Capita in Afghanistan is equivalent to 5 percent of the world's average. GDP per capita in Afghanistan averaged 511.02 USD from 2002 until 2017, reaching an all-time high of 633.70 USD in 2013 and a record low of 364.10 USD in 2004. (Wikipedia)

2.1.6 Lack of Reform: Institutionalization Reforms in structures of government based on the needs are among the good governance indicators. The bureaucracy on the administrative system will form, given the old management system and lack of reform in one country (Hashimi 2016:12). Afghan Institutions did not reform yet, except the education sector, other administration in Afghanistan still suffers from a lack of reform. The issue of the lack of

networking in most Afghan administrations is still considered a major challenge, most Afghan administration still uses it from the classic system. (Asker 2017:5)

2.1.7 Lack of Population Census: The exact population statistics of a country are vital for the accommodation of human and economic development programs, and countries try to census its population every five or ten years. But in Afghanistan, over the past three decades, there has been no precise and comprehensive census of population, and there are various statistics available. According to Central Statistics, nearly 31 million people live in Afghanistan, while this number is considered by some institutions as a possible figure.

2.1.8 Lack of Solidarity: Lack of coordination among the three bodies of the state (executive, legislative and judicial) is very dangerous for governance, also this issue is main challenges for peoples of Afghanistan, and they are suffering from the inconsistency, ethnics challenge is a big challenge in Afghanistan and it has driven from a lack of solidarity between ethnic's groups, also it has continued a long time in Afghanistan. In major national processes such as elections, the values for the majority of people of Afghanistan are ethnic and language, not law, (government in public opinion, 8 am news paper2016:3) Law and meritocracy take second place after ethnic values.

Third chapter

3.1. The Possible Solution for Public Management of Afghanistan

When a country has experienced not just months or years but decades of disruption, long-term insecurity and etc., it is unreal to think and act in such problems in a short time. Complex problems need carefully conceived responses (William 2008:7)**;** therefore, Afghanistan needs to focus on all challenges from two perspectives.

3.1.1. External Perspective

The presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan is an effective factor for increasing of challenges in the management of Afghanistan and it has paved the way to excuse of western countries, especially the USA as a struggle against terrorism in Afghanistan, at the result the presence of USA and terrorism is a caused that the neighbors of Afghanistan don't trust to Afghanistan.

Therefore, Afghanistan needs to review in his foreign policy and it must pave the way to exit of foreign forces and try to find a good option for replacing of USA aids and preventing of terrorism. In this case, Afghanistan has to do: A- find convergence ways with neighbors' countries. B- solve its problem with Pakistan in a peaceful way.

3.1.2 Internal Perspective

Based on all management challenges which I mentioned above, the government of Afghanistan needs to find best and possible solution way in internal affairs, and that is very important for authorities and people of Afghanistan,

seventy percent management challenges of Afghanistan find among the peoples, so government needs to focus on seriously, and those are the following:

3.1.2.1 **The Contribution of All Groups in Power Based on National Reconciliation***:* In order to successfully break the "vicious circle to repeated war" national reconciliation has to be established as a political process on the national level, reconciliation with the opposite of Afghan government who are satisfied to join the government and want to accept the constitution of Afghanistan, reconciliation with minorities and others who are not happy from government. This process is very important as a huge picture in the political affairs of Afghanistan. (government in public opinion, 8 am news paper 2016:5)

3.1.2.2 Decentralization of Power *:*After the long history of armed conflict and instability, the Afghans are in desperate search of a way to govern their country. Many political observers are advocating for strengthening the community's self-governance and building local capacities for sustainable development. The majority of Afghans and scholars argue that a decentralized model of governance, based on consensus, devolution of power to the village, district, and provincial levels, and a significant degree of local autonomy is the most suitable model of governance, which can keep the Afghan nation together. Also, in this model, major responsibilities of the central government can be marginalized, e.g., to draft and ratify budget, centralize justice systems for various crimes by using traditional customs, (Sajid 2012:39) to appoint important officials, enforce local laws and regulations, collect local revenues, etc.

3.1.2.3 Transparency : Corruption is a serious challenge of good governance in Afghanistan. To cope with this challenge, the Afghan government must expand and develop transparency in different levels of administration, and Transparency means revealing any financial information and the mechanisms of budget expenditure on time as well as making them accessible to the public and the media.

3.1.2.4 Improving the Rule of Law in the Country: *To* enjoy a rule of law government, a country must have democratic and democratically approved laws, the independent judiciary and neutral and lawful police. (Afet 2017:12) To provide a rule of law government, taking the three following steps in Afghanistan is crucial:
‣ Improving the capacity of the Afghan judiciary
‣ Improving the coordination of judiciary with other governmental bodies
‣ Improving the quality of justice

3.1.2.4.1 Struggling Against Extremism: The radical religious groups become more aggravated in the absence of preventing law and good governance in Afghanistan, leading to a decline in governance, they penetrate to the public opinion every day by using radical religious mentality and make change peoples idea to negative form. Given this situation, the government must take appropriate measures to prevent this phenomenon, and it will be useful for the government to prevent from this phenomenon by military pressure on religious schools in a short period and design a long-term strategy for making mentality by the scientific institutions.

3.1.2.4.2 The Prevention of Media Propaganda: Regarding the negative points of the media mentioned above, the government is obligated to pass a new law to prevent the publications which are against national interests. While a majority of people of Afghanistan are illiterate, and most of them cannot analyze the political issues, the existence of an open media system is not useful for peoples with the current status of Afghanistan.

3.1.2.5 Accelerating the Reforms: *Based* on this background and culture, which I mentioned above, the mechanisms of employment and management have been influenced by the ethnic, religious and political leaders who perform as parliamentarians or ministers and prefer political and ethical ties to professionalism. Consequently, the traditional culture of management, which is based on political and identity-based values, dominates the Afghan public sector, which prevents any type of reforms. Eventually, the public sector rules the citizens instead of providing services for the citizens. (Sayed Nasim:13)

Therefore, the Afghan public sector must be reformed. The Afghan government, as its constitutional responsibility, first must establish a sound administration and must be committed to continuous reforms in the future. Administrative reforms in Afghanistan, as it is described in the Afghan National Development Strategy and the Civil Services' Employees Law, must be based on meritocracy and build a sound and accountable administration, which are not affected by political, or identity-based influences. Accordingly, to materialize the administrative reforms described in the Afghanistan constitution and other national documents, the government must take the following steps:

- Employment must be based only on professionalism
- Reforms must be done in different levels of administration
- An observation system must be created, through which the reforms and also the quality of services should be observed.

3.1.2.6 The Equal Realization of Socio-Economic Development: As I noted above, the persistence of lack of balance in development has had a profound impact on vulnerable youths and poor peasants, which are an important part of society, and it has brought the high levels of unemployment and the lack of opportunities, illiteracy, and drug trafficking in Afghanistan. (government in public opinion, 8 am newspaper,2016:3) All Afghan citizens, regardless of ethnic interests, political relations, relations with the government, geographic location, etc., are equal and should benefit from development assistance alike, and the government should pay attention to this issue.

Conclusion

Although the Afghan government has had a little achievement after the fall of the Taliban, these achievements have not been able to recognize based on the Afghan administration's challenges, and these achievements have covered by challenges in different sectors.

The challenges facing the Afghan administration are due to both internal and external factors:
A. The external factor of these challenges, as I mentioned in the body of this paper, is the presence of NATO, which at the result, has createsd Challenges such as the internal distrust between the ethnic groups in Afghanistan, concern for neighbors of Afghanistan and administration corruption.
B. The internal factors of administration challenges of Afghanistan are as follows:
- The lack of independence in decision-making by Afghan leaders
- Formation of the idea of extremism and lack of a strategy to combat this phenomenon.
- The absence of a clear long-term plan by the government to combat the administration challenges.
- The increasing of ethnic tensions which are a major part of all the challenges in Afghanistan.

In order to eliminate the major factors and challenges of the Afghan government, the government, people and the elites of Afghanistan must accept the following approaches as the first steps:
1. Attention to the regional convergence
2. Get a reasonable solution to the political and Territorial tensions with the neighbor
3. Declaring a general peace within the country based on participating of parties and communities
4. Creating a long-term plan for creating an idea against extremism through academic institutions
5. Making a long-term plan for combating administrative challenges such as poverty, corruption, lack of rule of law, etc.
6. The creating a committee for preventing of media propaganda.
7. Neutrality in regional competitions with a clear policy.
8. Commit to building a capable and competent Afghan National Security Force to provide security to its citizens without depending on foreign troops.
9. The Afghans themselves will need to step forward, take the initiative, and bring an end to the culture of aid dependency. The international community cannot do this for them for good.

If the Afghan government with a huge approach can identify the diminutive and hidden angles of security, then with identifying and solving the security challenges will be able to solve all administrative challenges such as poverty and unemployment given the strategic position of Afghanistan, because Afghanistan is located in a macro-projects way, and there are a lot of economic priorities for Afghanistan, if Afghanistan can solve security challenges.

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Evaluation of Public City Branding Policies

"Sparkling Surabaya"

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Abstract
Competition in the global era requires in every local government to have a competitive advantage to maintain its existence. The strategic solution in facing this competition is to strengthen the brand as the identity of a city. City Branding is the right step in completing the selling power of a city. Seeing the City of Branding in Surabaya is one of the policies of the City of Branding in Indonesia, it is necessary to evaluate the policy problems that have been taken. In terms of public policy, communication becomes important so that public policy can work and have an impact on development. This study looks at the level of awareness of the people of Surabaya in the City of Branding they already have. The method used is a survey method with a sample of 600 respondents. The results of this study indicate that the city policy of "Sparkling Surabaya" carried out by the Surabaya city government is carried out through efforts to maximize the use of communication and resources. The communication carried out by the Surabaya City government to introduce the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding generally uses billboards or billboards, in addition they also communicate through government offices and other public services. While the resources (resources) as a support of efforts to popularize the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" to the community. Resource facilities and infrastructure used for example, are media facilities for city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" to the public using television, radio, internet and other facilities and infrastructure. So that the existence of these resources can realize the effectiveness of policy communication that has been carried out to realize the success of the Surabaya City branding development. Because without the support of resources, the implementation of the city branding policy "Sparkling Surabaya" even though it has been well communicated to the target group but still will not run effectively.

Keywords: Public Policy, City Branding, Brand Awareness, Policy Evaluation

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Indonesia has a strong tourism potential with hundreds of local governments in it as tourism managers have the opportunity to become the country with the most tourism destinations for both domestic and foreign tourists. A

strong policy is needed, especially in developing the tourism sector not only in terms of infrastructure and accommodation but also in building images or trademarks of a city in order to win the development competition. Some experts define tourism as' all activities in society related to tourists (Soekadijo, 2000). Suwantoro (1997) defines tourism as a process of traveling temporarily from someone or more to another place outside of their place of residence. The drive to travel includes economic, social, cultural, political, religious, health interests, just being curious, adding experience or learning.

On the other hand, the challenges in this increasingly open age make interconnectivity between regions and information accessibility easier. That makes the cities of the world (including big cities in Indonesia) must compete with each other in attracting attention (influence), influence (influence), markets (markets), business & investment destinations (business & investment destinations), tourists (tourist), residents, skilled labor and also organizers of various events / events in the arts, sports and culture (Van Gelder, 2008 in Muktiali 2012). City branding is a process or an effort to form a brand of a city to facilitate the owner of the city to introduce/communicate the city to the target market (investors, tourists, talents, events) of the city by using sentence positioning, slogan, icon, exhibition, and various other media widely known (high awareness), accompanied by good perception. The purpose of city branding is to make the city widely known (high awareness) and get a good perception; so that it becomes a place for investment, tourist destinations, residential destinations, and organizing activities/events. Currently, the tourism marketing communication strategy by carrying out City Branding is indeed an activity that is very intensively carried out and greatly improved in its development, city branding has good prospects for shaping a positive image of a city as a tourist destination. The formation of city branding has been done for a long time in world cities, this is because many cities in the world have been prepared as tourism destinations that can be sold to local and international communities (Bungin, 2015 in Lubis 2018).

The implementation of city branding strategy itself is usually made in the form of slogans with artistic layout, in the sense of slogans that can represent a city itself. For example in Singapore with the brand Uniquely Singapore, from this slogan can explain and represent the city of Singapore, which has an image as a unique destination, namely a prosperous society and country, people living side by side, and building a strong nation. Destinations Singapore is a unique tourism object that is symbolized by a unique merlion statue, lion-headed, and a body of a mermaid, it is a unique and interesting creature. (Henderson in Bungin, 2015).

Since the end of 2005, Surabaya tourism actually has a city branding policy to support tourism marketing, namely "Sparkling Surabaya." The tagline in the early days became a policy that not only became a new Surabaya branding, but also reflected a tourism development strategy. Sparkling means shining and shining, it is hoped that all corners of the city will become tourism attractions. Starting from central Surabaya, west, east, north and south (Anshori and Satrya, 2008). Surabaya has a policy direction towards being an industrial city, trade, maritime, and education (abbreviated as Indamardi) which is rapidly advancing, certainly it needs carrying capacity in the tourism sector. Surabaya Mayor Decree No. 188.45 / 30 / 436.1.2 / 2006 concerning the Establishment of the Surabaya Tourism Promotion Board (STPB), a non-profit organization that has legality in promoting Surabaya tourism. "Simultaneously, completing STPB, Sparkling Surabaya city branding was launched" (Satriya, 2013: 14). STPB mobilizes branding awareness strategy for Sparkling Surabaya in various lines. Some of them are promotions on television, print media, brochures, videos, map making, websites, souvenirs, free magazines, holding roadshows, familiarization trips, cooperation with several universities and various parties to hold tourism events. Sparkling Surabaya has the tagline "You will love every corner of it." Through this tagline, it is implied by Arif Afandi's desire to make the whole city corner prima donna with its own uniqueness (Anshori et al., 2008: x). This concept appears in a 5-star visual that represents 5 sub-regions of Surabaya (north, east, west, south, and central Surabaya) on the Sparkling logo in Surabaya. The "Sparkling Surabaya" logo written in blue and green shows that Surabaya is located on the seafront and suggests that Surabaya is not hot in accordance with the city government's program to create a Surabaya Green and Clean. The green color also means many golf courses in various areas in Surabaya.

Logo Sparkling Surabaya

Marketing a city branding policy, a city is not only imaged through the process of strengthening infrastructure but also that city branding must be communicated to the community, both local people as "hosts" of migrants and visitors to the city of Surabaya, and in communicating them to the community, it is necessary to understand several concepts communication of a product to the community (Bungin, 2015: 76). In terms of public policy, borrowing the theory of the four factors that play a role in the implementation of a policy, according to Edward III (in Subarsono, 2006) communication, disposition, bureaucratic structure and resources are important collaborations for a policy. Without good communication between policymakers and policy implementers, public policy will not be able to run properly, ineffective, or even fail. This means that communication conveys a policy in the form of branding needs to be evaluated continuously. So it is interesting to study further about the performance of the implementation of City Branding Policy "Sparkling Surabaya" which could be increasingly forgotten by the people of Surabaya. As a basic argumentation building it is known that theoretically, an evaluation of public policy can be carried out as long as the policy is still carried out.).

1.2 Literature Review

1.2.1   Public Policy

Public policy is one of the main studies of the science of state administration. According to Thoha (1983), the administration carries out the organizing function of the organization, including policy as a form of solving a problem on a particular issue. According Suharyanto (2006), Public policy exists when there are issues relating to public needs and demands, where public policy is intended to answer or solve the problems of an issue. Public policy is the government's decision to do or not do something in response to a problem. Woodrow Wilson in While Ripley (1985) in Subarsono (2006) explains that the stage of public policy starts from the preparation of the agenda (policy), policy formulation, policy implementation, and evaluation (of the implementation, performance and impact) of the policy, then from the evaluation policy can emerge new. While Nugroho (2008) describes the process of public policy through a looping mechanism that starts from the process of identifying policy issues, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy performance where the policy performance steps are also evaluated on the policy. Of the two opinions above, there are at least three main activities in the public policy process namely policy formulation, policy implementation and finally policy evaluation. From some of the expert opinions above, it can be understood that public policy is a response to a public problem in the form of a government decision or binding rules as a solution to the problem.

1.2.2   Evaluation of Public Policy

Mc.Queen (2001) defines evaluation as a process that uses scientific methods to assess the implementation and outcomes of certain policies. Whereas Subarsono (2006) defines policy evaluation as an activity to assess the performance level of a policy. Subarsono added that the evaluation can be carried out after sufficient time has passed. Edward III (1980) in Subarsono (2006) holds that in evaluating a policy implementation there are four influential variables namely communication, resources (resources), disposition, and bureaucratic structure. The four variables can be explained further as follows:

1. Communication
Communication is about how to inform as easily as possible so that it can be understood by the target community about the aims and objectives of the policy taken.

2. Resources
Resources or resources in question is about the availability of financial resources, resources and adequate facilities. Without sufficient resources, the implementation of public policies, although well communicated to the target group, will still not be effective. Therefore, resources are an important factor that influences the successful implementation.

3. Disposition
Trends in the behavior or characteristics of the policy implementers play an important role in realizing implementation in accordance with the goals or objectives. Honesty and high commitment from policy implementers are important points in the successful implementation of policies. A good attitude will provide a better opportunity for effective implementation, while an attitude that does not support the implementation will not be implemented properly.

4. Bureaucratic Structure
The bureaucratic structure has a significant influence on the implementation of the policy, bearing in mind the bureaucracy as the implementor or implementer of the policy. There are two aspects in the organization, the first mechanism (usually in the form of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which serves as a guideline for implementers) and the second aspect is the bureaucratic structure. The fatter and longer the flow of the bureaucracy in the organizational structure, the organizational activities cannot be flexible and reduce the efficiency of a policy.

1.2.3   City Branding
There are still many who confuse understanding of brand and branding. A brand is a brand that is owned by a company, while branding is a collection of communication activities carried out by the company in the framework of the process of building and growing a brand. Without communication activities to consumers that are well organized and planned, a brand will not be known and have no meaning to consumers or their target consumers (Maulana, 2008). Muktiali (2012) cites Chaniago's opinion that city branding is a process or effort to form a brand of a city to make it easier for city owners to introduce their city to the target market (investors, tourists, talent, events) of the city by using posisitioning sentences, slogans, icons, exhibitions and various other media. While Pratikno, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia, defines city branding as the process of introducing a city that is represented on icons, ambassadors or events held in the city so that the city will be known as a unique city and different from other cities.

Meanwhile (Kawaratzis, 2007) stated that in city branding there are at least two aspects/dimensions that must be communicated to various parties. Both aspects/dimensions should be comprehensive, integrative, and integrated to support the image of a city/region to be better and more competitive. The main aspects/dimensions of city branding (primary communication) communication consist of 4 main aspects, namely landscape strategies (urban design, public space, public art), behavior (city vision, events, service quality), organizational (pubic private partnership)) and infrastructure. While the second dimension/aspect is in the form of publications and advertising, public relations, design and slogans. More can be seen in the picture below.

Sumber : Kavaratzis (2004)

From the development of the spirit of city branding according to the picture above it can be seen that there is an important role in the primary process of communication, in addition to infrastructure support it also needs PPP (Public-Private Partnership) support, community networks and community participation. The structural role of organizations that live in a city branding building is very important considering that without the participation of the public and PPP (Public-Private Partnership) as well as existing community networks in the community becomes unsuccessful despite being encouraged and supported by large regional budgets even if they have to using third parties like advertising companies to increase the marketing impact of a city. From the picture above it can also be seen that primary communication has a greater role than secondary communication.

1.2.4   Brand Awareness

Brand Awareness or Brand Awareness is the main thing where companies compete to get a good impression of the products they produce. By reflecting a good impression of its products, consumers will always remember the brand of the product used. So consumers will realize that brands of similar products are marketed by other consumers. Therefore building brand awareness towards consumers is the most important thing in marketing a company. Brand awareness describes the existence of a brand in the minds of consumers which can be decisive in several categories. Increasing brand awareness is a mechanism for expanding brand markets. If brand awareness is low then it is almost certain that brand equity is low so it can be concluded that awareness is very important to build the perception and behavior of consumers in consuming a product. Measurement of brand awareness is based on levels of brand awareness, namely Top of Mind, Brand Recall, Brand recognition, Unaware of Brand. (David A. Aaker in Sianturi, 2010).

1. Top Mind; a condition which describes the brand that the respondent first remembers or is first mentioned when the person concerned is asked about a product category. Top of Mind is a single response question, meaning that one respondent may only give one answer to one question.
2. Brand Recall; a reminder is a reminder of a brand without assistance.
3. Brand Recognition; brand recognition is a minimum level of brand awareness, where brand recognition reappears after recollection through the help of brand recall.
4. Unaware of Brand; not realizing a brand is the lowest level in the brand awareness pyramid, where consumers are not aware of a brand.
In this case we associate promotional activities that we do, mainly advertising with consumer responses to our brand. Consumer responses include: Awareness (brand awareness), Comprehend (understanding the content of advertising messages by consumers), Interest (interest in products), Intentions (interest to buy), and finally Action

(actual buying actions). Consumer response becomes small because of the low consumer response to a brand (poor response). If illustrated in a diagram like below:

Sumber : David A. Aker (1997), Manajemen Ekuitas Merek : Memanfaatkan Nilai dari Suatu Merek, halaman 92.

2. Research Method

2.1 Operational Research Variables and Definitions

This study consists of one variable, namely Brand Awareness:
- Operational Definition of Brand Awareness, namely public awareness as part of the city branding policy in seeing the brand "Surabaya Sparkling."
- The five dimensions used to see the level of awareness of city branding are Top of Mind (the first brand to remember), Brand Recall (Slogan / Image of the City Branding Logo), Brand recognition (knowledge of tourist destinations, sources of information), Unaware of Brand (Brand Loyalty)..

2.2 Sampling Procedures

Population is an object or subject in a group of individuals who have the same characteristics (Creswell, 2013). The population in this study is the entire population of the City of Surabaya, which is 2,885,555 (in 2018). A sample is a group of objects or subjects in a study selected from the population (Creswell, 2013). The sampling method in this study is included in the type of probability sampling, with the type of sampling design is simple random sampling. The reference made is based on the Yamane table (1967). In this study, consider using a precision level of ± 5% so that the number of samples to be used is a minimum of 400. In this study a sample of 600 respondents will be used throughout the sub-district in the city of Surabaya.

2.3 Data Type and Analysis Techniques

The type of data used in this study are primary data and secondary data. Where primary data is obtained directly from respondents by distributing questionnaires, while secondary data are data obtained from indirectly or interviews with relevant service officials and documentation data. The analysis technique used in this research is descriptive analysis and hypothesis testing using SPSS Software. Descriptive analysis is to describe and explain the demographic characteristics of the respondents relating to the variables studied (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Descriptive analysis is also used to describe the tendency of respondents' perceptions of questions as a measurement of variables

3. Results

From the results of research that has been carried out produces data which is then processed and analyzed based on the distribution of questionnaires in each sub-district in the city of Surabaya regarding the evaluation of the

"Sparkling Surabaya" city branding public policy which is presented in accordance with categories based on respondents' identities and finding data. The respondents' identity categories consisted of age, sex, last education level, sub-district origin and length of stay in the city of Surabaya. Then the findings data category consists of awareness of Surabaya city branding, the number of understanding of Surabaya city branding, the popularity of city branding in Indonesia, the city branding association "Sparkling Surabaya", the knowledge number of the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo, the last time knowing / seeing the logo "Sparkling Surabaya ", And the media to popularize" Sparkling Surabaya ", as well as public services and" Sparkling Surabaya ". The results of the study are explained in the tables below:

3.1 Identity of the Respondents

3.1.1 Age
The following are the results of questionnaire distribution to respondents by age, explained in the table:

Table 3.1.1 Distribution of Respondents by Age

	Age	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	<21 (Gen Z)	168	28.0	28.0
	21-39 (Millenial)	218	36.3	64.3
	39-59 (Gen X)	170	28.3	92.7
	>59 (Baby Boomers)	44	7.3	100.0
	Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the above data it can be seen that from 600 people the number of respondents, the most are at the age of Millennial Generation that is 218 respondents or 36% and for Generation Z and Generation X respondents are 28% where Generation Z respondents are 168 people and Gen X respondents there are 170 people, while for the Baby Boomers Generation, there are 44 people or 7%.

3.1.2 Gender
The following are the results of questionnaire distribution to respondents based on the sex of the respondent, explained in the table:

Table 3.1.2 Distribution of Respondents by Genders based on the sex of the respondent, explained in the table:

	Gender	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Men	250	13.9	41.7
	Women	350	19.4	58.3
	Total	600	33.3	100.0

Source: Primary Data

From the above data it can be seen that from the number of respondents a total of 600 people consisted of 41.7% male respondents or a number of 250 people and female respondents numbered 350 people or as much as 58.3%. So it can be seen that respondents in the distribution of this questionnaire are dominated by women.

3.1.3 Latest Education

The following are the results of the distribution of questionnaires to respondents based on the respondent's last education level as follows:

Table 3.1.3 Distribution of Respondents by Latest Education

	Last Education	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Primary School	64	3.6	10.7
	Junior High School	106	5.9	17.7
	Senior High School	346	19.2	57.7
	College	84	4.7	14.0
	Total	600	33.3	100.0

Source: Primary Data

From the above data it can be seen that the number of respondents totaling 600 is dominated by respondents with a high school education level of 346 people or a number of 19.2% of the total respondents, while respondents with elementary education only numbered 64 people or as many as 3.6% and respondents who have a junior high school education of 10.7%. Then respondents with tertiary education level amounted to 84 people or as much as 4.7%. So that it can be seen that from the last education level all respondents are present, indicating that the last education level of the respondents is in the medium category.

3.1.4 Respondent by District List

The following are the results of the distribution of questionnaires to respondents based on the location of each district contained in the city of Surabaya, as follows:

Table 3.1.4 Distribution of Respondents by District

	District	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Bubutan	21	3.5	3.5
	Genteng	14	2.3	5.8
	Simokerto	20	3.3	9.2
	Tegalsari	22	3.7	12.8
	Asemrowo	9	1.5	14.3
	Benowo	13	2.2	16.5
	Lakarsantri	11	1.8	18.3
	Pakal	11	1.8	20.2
	Sambikerep	12	2.0	22.2
	Suko Manunggal	22	3.7	25.8
	Tandes	19	3.2	29.0
	Dukuh Pakis	12	2.0	31.0
	Gayungan	9	1.5	32.5
	Jambangan	10	1.7	34.2
	Karang Pilang	15	2.5	36.7
	Sawahan	42	7.0	43.7
	Wiyung	14	2.3	46.0
	Wonocolo	17	2.8	48.8
	Wonokromo	33	5.5	54.3
	Gubeng	28	4.7	59.0
	Gunung Anyar	9	1.5	60.5
	Mulyorejo	17	2.8	63.3
	Rungkut	22	3.7	67.0
	Sukolilo	22	3.7	70.7
	Tambaksari	46	7.7	78.3
	Tenggilis Mejoyo	12	2.0	80.3
	Bulak	9	1.5	81.8
	Kenjeran	32	5.3	87.2
	Krembangan	24	4.0	91.2
	Pabean Cantikan	18	3.0	94.2
	Semampir	35	5.8	100.0
	Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the above table it can be seen that the number of respondents 600 people have spread across all districts in Surabaya. It can be seen that the highest number of respondents is from Tambaksari Subdistrict, which is 46 people or as much as 7.7% while the smallest number of respondents are respondents from Bulak District, Gunung Anyar District, Gayungan District, and Asemrowo District which are 9 respondents or as many as 1.5%.

3.1.5 Length of Stay
The following are the results of the distribution of questionnaires to respondents based on their length of stay in Surabaya, as follows:

Table 3.1.5 Distribution of Respondents by Length of Stay in the City of Surabaya

Length of Stay	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1-10 Tahun	58	9.7	9.7
11-20 Tahun	235	39.2	48.8
21-30 Tahun	136	22.7	71.5
31-40 Tahun	85	14.2	85.7
41-50 Tahun	54	9.0	94.7
51-60 Tahun	21	3.5	98.2
>60 Tahun	11	1.8	100.0
Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from 600 respondents there shows that the distribution of respondents' length of stay in the city of Surabaya is between 11 years and 20 years, 235 people or 39.2% and the least respondents live in the city of Surabaya is over 60 years that is 11 people or as much as 1.8% of the total number of respondents. It can be said that respondents, in general, have lived in Surabaya for quite a long time*3.2*

3.2 Data Finding

3.2.1 Awareness City Branding Surabaya
The following are the findings data from the distribution of questionnaires based on the awareness city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" according to residents of Surabaya, as follows:

Table 3.2.1 Surabaya City Branding by Surabaya Population

	City Branding	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Surabaya the Smart City	146	24.3	24.3
	Sparkling Surabaya	234	39.0	63.3
	Surabaya Kota Maritim	48	8.0	71.3
	Surabaya Indahmardi	34	5.7	77.0
	Bangga Surabaya	138	23.0	100.0
	Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the data table above, it can be seen that from 600 respondents there shows that the most awereness respondents about city branding in Surabaya City are "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding, which is 234 people or 39% of the total respondents while respondents with the least awareness is about the city branding "Surabaya Indahmardi" which is 34 people or 5.7%. This shows that respondents, in general, have an awareness of the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya."

3.2.2 Figures of Understanding of Sparkling Surabaya
The following are findings data from the distribution of questionnaires based on the respondents' understanding of the Surabaya community on the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding, as follows:

Table 3.2.2.a Figures for Respondents' Understanding

Figures of Understanding of Sparkling Surabaya	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Never Seen or Hear Sparkling Surabaya	166	27.7	27.7
At Least Ever See Logo or Have Heard Sparkling Surabaya	156	26.0	53.7
have seen and heard of "Sparkling Surabaya"	278	46.3	100.0
Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from 600 respondents there are 278 people or 46.3% have seen and heard of "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding, while respondents with 156 people or 26% at least have see the logo or have heard of city branding "Sparkling Surabaya." This shows that based on the number of understanding of the existence of city branding "Sparkling Surabaya," respondents, in general, are quite understanding.

The following will also be explained in the data findings based on the level of understanding of the city branding respondents "Sparkling Surabaya" in the table below:

Table 3.2.2.b Level of Understanding of Sparkling City Branding Surabaya

	Level of Understanding	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Do Not Understand	304	50.7	50.7
	Understand	296	49.3	100.0
	Total	600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from 600 respondents, there show 304 respondents or as many as 50.7% do not understand about city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" while the other 296 respondents namely 49.3% have understood about city branding "Sparkling Surabaya." So it can be seen that the level of understanding of respondents, in general, has never heard or seen about the term Sparkling Surabaya. But the respondents did not understand the purpose and objectives of Surabaya Sparkling City Branding.

3.2.3 City Branding Popularity in Indonesia Following are the findings data from the distribution of questionnaires Based on the popularity of city branding in Indonesia as follows:

Table 3.2.3 Most Familiar City Branding in Indonesia

City Branding in Indonesia	Frequency	Valid Percent
Sparkling Surabaya	318	18.9
Bali the Island of Gods/Pulau Dewata	252	15.0
Beautiful Malang	216	12.8
Shining Batu	192	11.4
Jogja Never Ending Asia	132	7.8
Kediri Lagi	136	8.1
Banyuwangi The Sunrise of Java	116	6.9
Enjoy Jakarta	74	4.4
Impressive Probolinggo City	22	1.3

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from the total number of respondents, there are 318 respondents or 18.9% most familiar with Sparkling Surabaya. Whereas the most unfamiliar city branding among respondents is the city branding about Impressive Probolinggo City, which is 22 people or 1.3% of the total number of respondents. Then it can be seen that city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" is the best known or most familiar city branding in other cities/regencies in Indonesia. This can describe that as city branding, "Sparkling Surabaya" has succeeded in introducing the city of Surabaya among the people.

3.2.4 Sparkling City Branding Association Surabaya
The following are the data findings from the distribution of questionnaires based on the thoughts that crossed the respondents when they heard the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" as follows:

Table 3.2.4 Thoughts That Come to Respondents When Listening the Sparkling Surabaya branding

Thoughts That Crossed	Frequency	Valid Percent
Hotel	18	3.1
Business	42	7.2
Performance / Festival / Folk Party	98	16.8
Tourism	254	43.6
A sparkling, bustling and lively city	168	28.9
Total	600	100.0

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from the 600 respondents there show that that crossed the mind of 254 or as many as 43.6% of respondents when they heard the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" was to consider Surabaya as a tourism city, then 168 or around 28.9% respondents answered Surabaya as a city that was sparkling, lively and lively. Whereas only 18 or around 3.1% of respondents thought that "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding was related to the world of hospitality. This shows that most respondents when they heard and saw about "Sparkling Surabaya" then what crossed their mind was about Surabaya City as a tourist destination, so it can be said that the purpose of using the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" has had an impact on society in the introduction of the City Surabaya as a tourist destination.

3.2.5 Knowledge Figures of Sparkling Surabaya Logo
The following are the findings data from the distribution of questionnaires to respondents based on the knowledge figures of the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo in the table below:

Table 3.2.5 Knowledge Figuers About Sparkling Logo Surabaya

Knowledge Figures	Frequency	Valid Percent
UnFamiliar	184	30.8
Familiar	414	68.9
Total	600	100.0

Source: Primary Data

From the table data above, it can be seen that from 600 respondents there are 414 respondents or around 68.9% claiming to be familiar with the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo, while 184 or around 30.8% of respondents are unaware or unfamiliar with the "Sparkling logo" Surabaya." So it can be said that in general, the people of Surabaya City have known of the existence of the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo.

3.2.6 Last Time Knowing / Seeing the Sparkling Surabaya Logo
The following are the findings data from the distribution of questionnaires to respondents based on the knowledge number of the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo in the table below:

Table 3.2.6 Last Knowing / Seeing the Surabaya Sparkling Logo

Last Time Knowing	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The Past 1 Year	292	69.5	69.5
The Past 1-3 Year	108	25.7	95.2
Over The Past 3 Year	20	4.8	100.0
Total	420	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the data table above it can be seen that from the 600 total respondents, 292 or around 69.5% said that the last time they knew or saw the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo was within the past 1 year, then 108 people or around 25.7% of respondents said that they knew or saw the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo for the past 1-3 years while 20 respondents had known or seen the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo over the past three years. This shows that the intensity of the community in knowing or seeing the "Sparkling Surabaya" logo is already quite high, as evidenced by their time period in knowing or seeing the logo.

3.2.7 Media for popularizing Sparkling Surabaya
The following are the data findings from the results of the distribution of respondents questionnaire based on the media to popularize "Sparkling Surabaya" in the table below:

Table 3.2.7 Media City Branding Sparkling Surabaya

	Media	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Print Mass Media	62	14.7	14.7
	Billboards	212	50.2	64.9
	Radio / Television / Internet	28	6.6	71.6
	Government Office / Public Service	120	28.4	100.0
	Total		100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the data table above it can be seen that of the 600 existing respondents, 212 respondents or around 64.9% answered that the media used to popularize the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" was through billboards or billboards, then 120 respondents answered that media were used to popularize city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" was popularized through government offices / public services. Furthermore, 62 respondents or around 14.7% said that the effort to popularize the city branding was carried out through print media. While only 28 respondents said that the effort to popularize was done through radio, television or the internet. So that it can be said that the effort to popularize city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" is generally done using billboards or billboards.

3.2.8 Public Service and Sparkling Surabaya
The following are the data findings from the results of the distribution of respondent questionnaires based on the level of interrelation between public services and "Sparkling Surabaya" in the table below:

Table 3.2.8 Relationship between Public Service and Sparkling Surabaya

	Statement		Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Reflect Surabaya"	"Sparkling	116	24.6	24.6
	Reflected Surabaya	Sparkling	356	75.4	100.0
	Total		600	100.0	

Source: Primary Data

From the data table above, it can be seen that out of 600 respondents, 356 respondents or around 75.4% said that public services reflected "Sparkling Surabaya" and 116 respondents or around 24.6% said that public services did not reflect "Sparkling Surabaya." So it can be concluded that the existence of the city branding has provided a view to the wider community, especially the people of Surabaya City, on every public service provided by the Surabaya city government on various aspects, for example services in terms of tourism activities.

4. Discussion

Based on the above research, a discussion of research on the evaluation of the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding public policy will be elaborated. Edward III (1980) in Subarsono (2006) holds that in evaluating a policy implementation there are four influential variables namely communication, resources (resources), disposition, and bureaucratic structure. City Sparking Surabaya's branding efforts by the city of Surabaya, in general, tend to maximize the use of communication and resources. Communication as a way of informing the "Sparkling Surabaya" branding is as easy as possible so that it can be recognized and understood by the people of Surabaya City as the object of the purpose and objectives of the policy taken. While the resources (resources) as a support of efforts to popularize the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" to the community. The resources referred to in this case for example concerning the availability of financial resources, adequate resources and infrastructure facilities. Sufficient facilities and infrastructure resources, for example, are media facilities used to communicate "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding to the public using billboards or billboards, television, radio, internet and other facilities and infrastructure. So that with these resources can realize the effectiveness of policy communication that has been carried out to realize the success of the Surabaya City branding development.

Furthermore, the discussion in this study will be based on analysis using the results of data processing and the theoretical approach used as follows:

a. Awareness city branding "Sparkling Surabaya"
Brand Awareness or Brand Awareness is the main thing where companies compete to get a good impression of the products they produce. By reflecting a good impression of its products, consumers will always remember the brand of the product used, as well as brand awareness about "Sparkling Surabaya" that has been made by the Surabaya City government as an effort to reflect a good impression on the wider community for what is in City of Surabaya. If you see from the results of data processing, then it is in accordance with what was stated by respondents that 234 people or as many as 39% of the total respondents had awareness of city branding in the city of Surabaya while only a few of the respondents had awareness about the city branding "Surabaya Indahmardi" namely a number of 34 people or 5.7%. This shows that the efforts of the Surabaya City government to build brand awareness to the community are quite successful because the brand awareness in this city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" has illustrated the existence of the brand in the minds of the people. In addition awareness is considered very important to build public perception and behavior in consuming a product produced by the City of Surabaya.

b. Figure of understanding of city branding "Sparkling Surabaya"
The number of understanding of a city branding can be measured through measurement of brand awareness. According to David A. Aaker in (Sianturi, 2010) measurement of brand awareness is based on levels of brand awareness, namely Top Of Mind, Brand Recall, Brand recognition, Unaware of Brand. If you see from the results

of data processing, it shows that respondents numbered 278 people or as many as 46.3% had seen and heard of "Sparkling Surabaya," while 156 respondents or 26% had at least seen a logo or had heard of "Sparkling Surabaya." So it can be stated that the understanding of city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" in general is sufficient to understand, but the respondents do not understand the intent and purpose of the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya." This can be seen from the level of measurement of brand awareness, that the presence of city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" is at the level of top mind which is a condition where "Sparkling Surabaya" has described the brand that was first remembered by the public or first called when the concerned (community) was asked about a product category related to the city of Surabaya.

c. "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding association
The city branding association ", Sparkling Surabaya" in this case, saw what thoughts crossed the minds of the people of Surabaya (in this case as research respondents) when hearing the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya." Because what has emerged so far in the minds of the people of Surabaya City are many things, for example, Surabaya as a tourism city, a business city, performances/festivals/ public parties, and the world of hospitality as well as a sparkling, bustling and lively city. If you look at the results of data processing, it shows that that crossed the mind of 254 people or as many as 43.6% of respondents when they heard the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" was to consider the city of Surabaya as a tourism city, some other respondents then considered the city of Surabaya as a city sparkling, lively and lively and only 18 people or about 3.1% of respondents who heard the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" is to consider the city of Surabaya related to the world of hospitality. This shows that the majority of respondents named the Surabaya community when hearing and seeing about "Sparkling Surabaya" then what crossed their mind was about Surabaya City as a tourist destination, so it can be said that the purpose of using the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" has had an impact on the public at the introduction of the City of Surabaya as a tourist destination.

d. Media to popularize "Sparkling Surabaya"
Muktiali (2012) cites Chaniago's opinion that city branding is a process or effort to form a brand of a city to make it easier for city owners to introduce their city to the target market (investors, tourists, talent, events) of the city by using positioning sentences, slogans, icons, exhibitions and various other media. The City Government of Surabaya, in this case, has carried out promotion as an effort to popularize the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding through various media. If you see from the results of data analysis that 212 of the 600 respondents or around 64.9% answered that the Surabaya City government tends to use billboards or billboards to popularize the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" then the effort to introduce is also done through government offices / public services. While only 28 respondents said that the effort to popularize was done through radio, television or the internet. So it can be said that to popularize the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding, the Surabaya City government generally uses billboards or billboards. It can be seen that promotional activities that can be carried out, mainly through advertising to cause consumer responses, namely the community towards the city branding owned by the City of Surabaya. These responses include awareness (brand awareness), comprehend (understanding the contents of advertising messages by consumers), interest (interest in products), intentions (interest in buying), and finally action (actual buying action).

e. Public services and "Sparkling Surabaya"
Citi branding "Sparkling Surabaya" is a public policy product owned by the Surabaya City government. With the "Sparkling Surabaya" is expected to give a good impression in the public's memory about the city of Surabaya. Neither with public service as an effort to provide services to the general public as consumers or service users who have the aim to realize public satisfaction. Services consist of various types of services, for example in administrative services, education services, economic services, tourism services and other fields. When viewed from the results of data processing it can be stated that 356 respondents or around 75.4% said that public services had reflected "Sparkling Surabaya" and 116 respondents or around 24.6% said that public services did not reflect "Sparkling Surabaya." So that it can be concluded that the existence of the city branding has provided a view to the wider community, especially the people of the City of Surabaya to every public service provided by the government of the City of Surabaya on various aspects, for example, services in terms of tourism activities.

5. Conclusion

From the results of the data analysis and discussion above, it can be concluded that the city branding efforts of "Sparkling Surabaya" carried out by the Surabaya city government generally tend to maximize the use of communication and resources. Communication as a way to inform the "Sparkling Surabaya" branding is as easy as possible. This was done in order to be able to be understood by the people of Surabaya about the purpose and objectives of the policy taken.

The communication carried out by the Surabaya City government to introduce the "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding generally uses billboards or billboards, in addition they also communicate through government offices and other public services. This can be seen where "Sparkling Surabaya" has become a brand that is first remembered by the public or first called when the concerned (community) is asked about a product category related to the City of Surabaya. So that the efforts of the Surabaya City government to build a brand to the community are quite successful because this brand awareness about the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" has illustrated the existence of the brand in the minds of the people.

While the resources (resources) as a support of efforts to popularize the city branding "Sparkling Surabaya" to the community. The intended resource is, for example, about financial resources, adequate infrastructure and resources. Sufficient facilities and infrastructure resources, for example, are media facilities used to communicate "Sparkling Surabaya" city branding to the public using television, radio, internet and other facilities and infrastructure. So that with these resources can realize the effectiveness of policy communication that has been carried out to realize the success of the Surabaya City branding development. Because without the support of resources, the implementation of the city branding policy "Sparkling Surabaya" even though it has been well communicated to the target group but still will not run effectively.

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Implementation of Maternity Waiting Home in Wonogiri, Indonesia

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Abstract

The high maternal mortality rate in developing countries like Indonesia is a health challenge that needs to be addressed immediately. Indonesia has the highest maternal deaths amounted to 305 / 100,000 live births among ASEAN countries. To overcome these problems, the government implemented a program of maternity waiting home in some areas in Indonesia. One of the areas in Indonesia to implement programs of maternity waiting home are in Wonogiri district. This study describes the implementation of the program along with the supporting and inhibiting factors. The method used in this research is a descriptive qualitative method. Informants in this study are related to program stakeholders, such as health authorities, midwives, community users of the facility, and non-governmental organizations. Results from this study are the discovery of various supporting factors and obstacles in implementing the program. Also, this study uses the AGIL approach in explaining the program implementation maternity waiting home studied.

Keywords: Maternity Waiting Home, Indonesia, Maternal Mortality Rate

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduce the Problem

The high maternal mortality rate is one of the indicators in the health sector that need to be taken seriously by developing countries in the world such as Indonesia. Indonesia faces a high maternal mortality rate, which is 305 / 100,000 live births (SUPAS, 2015). The maternal mortality rate in Indonesia is the highest among ASEAN countries.

Maternal deaths in Indonesia most of the deaths occur in the home or on the road, maternal deaths occur after delivery by 60% and maternal deaths occur in the postpartum period by 50%. In general, maternal deaths occur without the help of professionals. Also, delays in access to quality services are factors cause maternal deaths. Other factors are the lack of understanding of family to danger signs for mothers and infants, lack of access to transportation and resources associated with the delay of medical treatment (Kusmiran, 2011).

1.2 Explore Importance of the Problem

A health facility that can be utilized to reduce maternal mortality is maternity waiting home. The study of the utilization of maternity waiting home has been conducted in various countries, especially in developing countries. In Zambia, the waiting home birth service is considered able to make a significant contribution to overcoming the problems of labor (Scott et al., 2018). In Malawi, the maternity waiting home can reduce maternal mortality (Singh et al., 2016). In Ethiopia, the maternity waiting home can reduce more than 80% of maternal mortality rate in the country (Dadi et al., 2018). Maternity waiting home also has potential benefits and effectiveness in Liberia (Lori et al., 2014).

In the case of Guatemala, the implementation of maternity waiting home have several obstacles, including the lack of knowledge related to their homes and wait for the birth of a shortage of funds in the management of maternity waiting home (Ruiz et al., 2013). In Tanzania, maternity waiting home more attractive to poor people (Fogliati et al., 2017). The study explained that placing the maternity waiting home close to hospitals to overcome the inequities between the rich and poor in access to maternal health facilities. Another case with Zambia, home care wait births in the country should be improved in the aspect of human resources and facilities attached to them, so that management and the maternity waiting home decent facilities for the community (Sialubanje et al., 2015).

1.3 Describe Relevant Scholarship

Implementation of maternity waiting home in Indonesia still has many challenges that need to be addressed. There was one case, where the implementation is going well, the maternity waiting home in the district of Semarang (Sujana et al., 2018). But in many cases, there are still many challenges that need to be addressed. In areas such as Attack, Alor, Gorontalo, and Merangin come from the public and inadequate. While the amount of effort and skill of health workers who administer maternity waiting homes are still lacking. Likewise, the maternity waiting home facilities such as toilets, kitchen, water and electricity still require special attention. The policies that take advantage of technological advances in some districts such as Alor and Gorontalo is quite good, but still need improvement and support (Sukoco, 2018).

In particular, maternal mortality in Wonogiri district in 2015 was 129 / 100,000 Birth (Wonogiri District Health Profile of 2015, 2016). In Wonogiri district alone there were five births were waiting homes in five different sub-districts. The location in the district of Pracimantoro, Wuryantoro, Purwantoro, Wonogiri, and Baturetno. Implementation maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district based on several reasons, including the factor of Wonogiri district topographically uneven. Thus, the necessary medical facilities and close to the community response to address labor especially those with a high risk. It is an effort to reduce maternal mortality. But in its implementation, maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district has a variety of challenges.

1.4 State Hypotheses and Their Correspondence to Research Design

Based on these considerations, the authors do further research to find out the implementation of maternity waiting home in the city of Wonogiri, Indonesia. The study focused on the factors supporting and hindering the implementation of maternity waiting home in the area. The theory used is the structural-functional theory by Talcott Parsons. Thus, the mainframe of this study is implementation maternity waiting home can not be separated from social institutions or the relevant stakeholders. The main objective of this study is to describe the implementation of maternity waiting home in the district of Wonogiri, Indonesia. Also, this study aims to identify the contributing factors and factors inhibiting the implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district.

2. Method

2.1 Study design and area

The main objective of this study is to describe the implementation of maternity waiting home in the district of Wonogiri, Indonesia. Also, this study aims to identify the contributing factors and factors inhibiting the implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district.

2.2 Data Sources
Primary data in this study consists of nine informants. The informant was four people of the midwife in maternity waiting home, doctor amounted to two people, waiting home birth service users totaled two people and informants are derived from non-governmental organizations amounted to one person.
Secondary data was taken from a document obtained from the health department and the relevant literature to this study.

2.3 The Technique of Collecting Data
Data collection techniques used in this study consisted of in-depth interviews with key informants, observation, study of relevant documents, and focus group discussions with stakeholders. Moreover, it has held discussions with the targeted community that use facilities of maternity waiting home

2.4 Data Validity and Reliability
The validity of the data used in this study is triangulation. Triangulation is the source of the data validation process by clarifying the different informants (Carter et al., 2014).

2.5 Data Analysis
This study uses a model of interactive data analysis. The data collected is described with the theoretical framework used.

2.6 Research Ethics
Researcher has confirmed that the collection of data with related informants done consciously and approval participation.

3. Results

3.1 Supporting factors of the maternity waiting home implementation in Wonogiri
Implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri has various supporting factors. Factors supporting of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri include the availability of Jampersal insurance facilities provided by the government, good support among stakeholders to maximize socialization maternity waiting home in Wonogiri districts and their regular communication between midwives sustainable manner. Supporting factors such as efforts to help reduce maternal mortality by maximizing the waiting house facility service delivery.

The government supports the implementation of the waiting home birth with Jampersal insurance. According to Syafrawati (2015), insurance Jampersal helps pregnant women who experience financial problems to access health services by making it easier for the financing of all pregnant women who do not have health insurance. But insurance-related socialization is still less based on interviews with informants.

The relationships formed between stakeholders already exist but are not maximized in related socialization Wait Birth House. Stakeholders consist of the house waiting for the birth of the government, as the user community, and nongovernmental organizations. In supporting the implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri, stakeholders started with regular meetings that need to be maximized. But it needs to be improved to revive implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri dwindling community participation against him.

Communication that is formed between the midwife already exist but has not been up in support of the implementation of maternity waiting home. The network has been formed between the midwife on a specific area in Wonogiri Regency can be used to support the maternity waiting home that can be further optimized. Midwives have a separate forum among midwives who have regular meetings. The problem is still a lack of socialization related to the intensity of the importance of maternity waiting home facilities for pregnant women to reduce the number of maternal deaths.

3.2 Inhibiting factors of the maternity waiting home implementation in Wonogiri

Implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri has many obstacles that need to be addressed. Lack of community participation in using the facilities of maternity waiting home can be seen from several factors. Inhibiting factor in the service of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri is as follows.

According to informants Tutik, as midwives, mother's confidence is still strong with the midwives not to maternity waiting homes. Many people still put their trust midwives practice independently rather than waiting for the birth of house facilities. It can come from a lack of socialization maternity waiting home facilities in Wonogiri district. "[Maternity waiting home] is not effective, so if here on midwives. Midwives existing private rooms, it could be for the family, so maybe waiting homes in rural communities that here it is not necessary. Home waiting for the birth as possible to the people here still do not know so it did not matter really" (Tutik).

According to Dwi Cahyo, as an informant, There is no rule of law in the district or city governing maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district. Regulation at the national level concerning maternity waiting home listed in the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia Number 82 of 2015. Although at the national level exists, but the law at the district / city is not in Wonogiri. This is a limiting factor for the maternity waiting home facilitation in Wonogiri. Legal framework necessary for the implementation of this maternity waiting home runs optimally. Forced power possessed by the rule of law can encourage stakeholders to implement the mandate of the regulation, which is relevant regulations maternity waiting home as quickly as possible if it has no legal basis.

Still a lack of support from relatives and families of pregnant women waiting to use the facilities is also an inhibiting factor. The public awareless of the importance of maternity waiting home facilities sidelined with matters that are household and cultural. It can hinder implementation maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district. The families are sometimes concerned with domestic matters rather than follow the advices of maternity waiting home that are considered a waste of time. Geographical access is also one of the causes of families prefer home deliveries or midwife waiting nearby than home births.

People who are in the service area of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district are confused about the use of insurance Jampersal and amenities Wait Birth House. Jampersal insurance is specialized insurance to give birth. The lack of public knowledge regarding this matter can be one of the obstacles for the implementation of Jampersal insurance and maternity waiting home facilities. To overcome this, the need for intensification of socialization related maternity waiting home facilities and urgency to reduce maternal mortality and the use of Jampersal insurance.

4. Discussion

This study uses the AGIL perspective in explaining the implementation of maternity waiting home in the Wonogiri district. AGIL concept is the development of structural functionalism theory to put forward four absolute prerequisites that must be satisfied by any society, group or organization. Elements of the basic functions of AGIL is Adaptation, Achievement, Integration, and latency (Ritzer, 1975).

In the context of adaptation, each system must be capable of performing the functions of adjustment to the external environment and reduction of external emergencies. maternity waiting home is clear evidence of the functioning of the adaptation because the house waiting for the birth comes from the external issues that need to be resolved is still relatively high rates of maternal mortality in Indonesia, especially if they see potential in Wonogiri district. Access to the region in Wonogiri is tortuous and who are not crowded housing residents as much forest. This is the urgency of the need for the implementation of maternity waiting home.

On the other hand, the adaptations made to the needs of the community were in the service using a single type of insurance is not. Communities in Wonogiri district who want to take advantage of maternity waiting home can use Jampersal insurance, insurance BPJS, or independently. Ideally, maternity waiting home is intended for pregnant

women who have Jampersal insurance. However, due to the insurance-related socialization less than the maximum, so that people who do not know Wonogiri such insurance. Socialization can improve public participation in the house waiting for the birth (From et al., 2019).

Goal Attaintment functions are functions that exist on a system to achieve the objectives previously planned. In this case, the house waiting for the birth and stakeholders in Wonogiri district strives to achieve a primary goal, which is to reduce maternal mortality during childbirth by providing maternity facilities for pregnant women. Maternity waiting home facilities intended for pregnant women, in particular, have a high risk in childbirth. Geographic factors in Wonogiri district adds to the urgency of implementation of maternity waiting home.

Achievement of the objectives in the implementation of the waiting home birth is not maximized because there is no legal basis. The absence of a legal basis at the district level related maternity waiting home becomes one of the factors inhibiting the achievement of objectives. The legal basis is important because to encourage the implementation of maternity waiting home more successful as in other areas in Indonesia.

Function integration ensures that a system can manage and maintain the relationship between the parts into components. In this context, the function of integration in the implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district has the primary purpose of ensuring stakeholders to house facilities services wait births communicate and relate well. The relationship among stakeholders is an important factor in maintaining integration in the implementation of maternity waiting home.

System integration functions in the implementation of this maternity waiting home have not run optimally. The regular meetings between stakeholders routinely held every month. However, the discussion on the implementation of maternity waiting home is still sidelined and less be a priority. Factors the functioning of other integration is trust between the community midwife or officers who are at home waiting for the birth. Communities in Wonogiri district lacks confidence in the midwife who was at home waiting for the birth because people have been using a midwife private or outside the house waiting for the birth of the facility so that it reduces the integration in the implementation of maternity waiting home. The distance covered towards the house waiting for the birth also affects the family so corpulent that want to deliver at home or the nearest midwife if any. This is consistent with research Sukoco and Suparmi (2017) that the travel time and distance associated with the use of maternity waiting home.

Function latency ensure a system and its elements running consistently based on their respective functions. The system should be capable of functioning as a custodian of the pattern. A system must maintain and improve the motivation patterns of individuals and cultural.

Latency function in the context of the implementation of house waiting for birth is the passage of socialization and activities associated with it so that the public and stakeholders increase the awareness about the urgency of the implementation of house waiting for the birth. Socialization latency function that the implementation of maternity waiting home run optimally. In the case of the implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri district, it has not been implemented optimally dissemination to the public. This case is similar to the study of maternity waiting home in Guatemala that has not been up to socialize (Ruiz et al., 2013). In studies in Wonogiri, found that community participation in using the facilities of maternity waiting home have not been as expected. People need to understand the birth process to avoid the risk of pregnancy (Pujihartati, 2019). For that, it needs to be improved and if necessary change the pattern and how to disseminate to the public so that information related to this pending home facility known by the public.

Conclusion

Implementation of maternity waiting home in Wonogiri needs to be improved. This study found the factors supporting and inhibiting factors in the implementation of the maternity waiting home. Supporting factor is the

Jampersal insurance that facilitate access to finance in the use of this facility for the underprivileged, communication between midwives who are already established but needs to be maximized in the socialization of the house waiting for the birth, and relationships between stakeholders that need to be improved to make the house waiting for the birth as a top priority discussion on each occasion. While the inhibiting factor is the trustless the maternity waiting home facilities, no rule of law in the district or city governing Maternity waiting home, and lack of social and family support for using this facilities to pregnant mom.

Acknowledgments

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The Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in South and Southeast Asia

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Abstract

China has undertaken a historic task to expand its economic influence across half of the world through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is willing to pursue economic advances under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which are seen as beneficial by China's partners. For China, the Belt and Road Initiative provides a platform to develop ties with neighboring Asian countries while fostering the development of its own extensive high-speed rail network as a means to export high-end technology and services. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has set the tone for cross-regional connectivity, fostering bilateral and multilateral cooperation, creates a platform for better understanding and awareness of the Chinese culture and creates a channel for the ease of better communication, between China and its Asian neighbors in South and Southeast Asia.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China South, Southeast, Asia, Fostering, Regional Cooperation, Connectivity

Introduction

Initiated at the end of 2013, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an infrastructure project financed by Beijing, and it aims at developing China's trade routes through Central and South Asia, all the way into Europe and Africa. 68 countries are along the way, and China is spending approximately $150 billion a year to develop railways, ports, and other industrial complexes, which are to contribute to these member countries' economies and to the dynamism of this new Silk Road. One Belt—One Road seeks to create a wide network of land roads and maritime belts which modernizes existing trade routes while consecrating new works that ultimately creates manifold and interlocking trading routes covering East Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Eurasia, East Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. While One Belt—One Road is initially focused on creating and refining infrastructure, the initiative also seeks to ultimately harmonize the process of commerce between borders, without forcing participating countries to develop any particular kind of governance.

The paper is discussing the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in the South and Southeast Asian Region from sub-regional perspectives. In Southeast Asia, the implementation of the "One Belt, One Road" agenda requires a high level of cooperation and understanding between China and ASEAN and among its member states. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may lead to bolstered economic development and linkages between Southeast Asia and China. In the region of South Asia, it is argued that China can play a constructive role by balancing Belt and Road

Initiative with the national interests of South Asian countries in order to minimize the adverse impact of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The new shape of global governance in a multipolar world

The G20 and the BRICS are parallel processes operating in an informal space outside of the post-Second World War global governance framework. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a coordinated strategy of extensive multilateral and bilateral cooperation and diplomacy, extending from the development sphere to security, the digital economy, media, and culture. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) emphasizes on the multipolar nature of the international system. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is as a platform that promotes peace, security, prosperity, and development in a multipolar, interconnected, and globalised world.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Shanghai Cooperation Forum, and Eurasian Economic Union strategies converge, creating a new development dynamic in Asia. China is promoting extensive geo-economic strategies with other regions – Africa, Latin America, the Middle East – linked to its own structural transformation, moving beyond traditional South-South modalities to inject major financial flows from its policy banks and investors.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a Chinese initiative ensures more effective global governance, global development, and cooperation as well as recognizes that a political and cultural diversity in a multipolar global governance system is essential elements towards a world of strategic cooperation and away from the strategic competition.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Asia

In Asia, China has established mutual relations with neighboring countries for security stability, regional, economic integration. Therefore, China promotes its image, and cultural awareness in the region has been and participates in regional organizations such as ASEAN, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, East Asian Summit, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), etc. In this way, China's soft power increases in the Asian region with the Belt and Road Initiative and likewise increases cultural awareness of China's cultural values. Southeast Asia and South Asia involve important economic interests in China, where China plays a guiding role. In effect, institutionalizing its regional engagements remains a priority of China's contemporary thinking as a strategy towards global issues (Qi Huaigao 2009, p.130).

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is intended to change the landscape of Asia over the coming years through its economic ties, traditional and cultural appeal, diplomatic relationship, infrastructural partnership, multilateralism. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) bolsters China's relations with neighboring countries in South and Southeast East Asia.

The Belt and Road Initiative is China's contemporary most prominent foreign policy project and may impose China as the superpower in the Asian continent. The infrastructure projects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) seek to spur growth in China's most underdeveloped regions and to open new markets for Beijing to export the country's excess products, as well as its technological and engineering capabilities (Cai 2017).

Belt and Road Initiative and Southeast Asia

For Southeast Asia, the Belt and Road Initiative is not a new policy initiative. China and ASEAN states have enjoyed extensive economic cooperation in past decades and had previously worked together on many large-scale projects. Almost all regional states are supportive of the Belt and Road Initiative because the projects promise to meet their infrastructure and economic needs. China's financial commitments have a significant impact across Southeast Asia. China's Belt and Road initiative is ambitious, setting out a vision for China's investment in the coming years.

China has played an important role in the process of regionalization in the region. More specifically, the development of China-ASEAN relations is a case that demonstrates how China deals with multilateral regionalism in Asia. The China-ASEAN relationship has improved since both started to engage with each other more than ten years ago. Many scholars suggest that China-ASEAN is China's most successful story in practicing multilateralism since China has expanded its influence in the region through ASEAN as a regional organization (Gung and Yongian 2008, p.5).

The increasing acceptance of China's role in the region has much to do with Beijing's decision to work within ASEAN-led processes. Since 2009, China has been ASEAN's largest trading partner, and since 2011 ASEAN has been China's third-largest trading partner. Given the vitality and the economic stability of ASEAN and considering the geographical proximity of the region, a key priority of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is ASEAN's burgeoning economies. ASEAN is a prominent developing economic partner for China and is the priority destination for Chinese businesses and companies.

The Belt and Road Initiative has an essential role in bridging ASEAN and China by strengthening economic connections. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) helps the growing ASEAN region improve its connectivity among the 10 member states by continuously developing their economic zones in Asia and beyond.

The initiative improves infrastructure and supports industrial development. Belt and Road Initiative also includes projects of developing rail networks to deliver technology and services regionally. This initiative has already seen achievements in railway construction in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Indonesia. For ASEAN member states, the initiative addresses an infrastructure deficit and industrial development. While the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 is bringing Southeast Asian economies together as a single market and production base, the belt and road initiative offers further integration by developing physical infrastructure and a robust trade regime.

With more than 20,000km of track laid, China has a more high-speed railway than the rest of the world combined (Wong 2017). Among the countries of ASEAN, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Indonesia have joint projects with China, mainly in railway construction. The Asian Development Bank estimates that US$750 billion a year need to be invested in Asia up to 2020 as developing nations strive to raise their economic productivity and deal with rising urbanization.

Implementing the Belt and Road initiative, a high level of mutual cooperation, understanding, and trust are necessary. Therefore the Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to provide long-lasting economic growth in Southeast Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative is considered to be a successful example of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia; while China's regional policy is successful.

It is significant that during the Second Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing (April 2019), top leaders from most of ASEAN member states have attended to applaud Chinese investments in Southeast Asia despite the concerns over the debt of Belt and Road projects and the South China Sea issue.

There has been significant growth of Chinese investment in Southeast Asia – not just in infrastructure, but also in areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, and services. If China's growing economic importance for the region under the umbrella of Belt and Road Initiative has led to an increase of China's soft power and influence in the region of Southeast Asia.

Belt and Road Initiative and South Asia

In South Asia, the Belt and Road Initiative provides an ideal platform to develop ties with neighboring Asian countries while fostering the development of the high-speed rail network as a means to export high-end technology and services.

South Asian countries share common interests with China, in developing their economies and improving the livelihoods of their people. In 2014-15, President Xi Jinping visited key regional states and stressed on 'creative cooperation model,' 'joint building,' and 'regional large scale cooperation.'

South Asian states perceive that the joint building of the Belt and Road is not a zero-sum game but a mutually beneficial plan. The implementation of the initiative effectively improves the infrastructures of the countries along the Belt and Road, promotes the facilitation of trade and investment, and improves the industrial competitiveness of these countries.

However, China's involvement in South Asian regional institutions has been one of its more limited successful attempts at peripheral diplomacy. It is true that China and India are also competitors for regional power in South Asia, therefore, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised serious security and strategic concerns in India. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an investment scheme that India has formally objected to on the grounds that the route passes through disputed territory (Shah 2015). The "corridor" terminology and ambitious claims from the Pakistan side about future railways and pipelines deepened India's long-standing anxieties over Sino-Pakistani relations, which have, for decades, been built around the common security goal of counterbalancing India (Shah 2015). Indo-Pak border issues remain real as ever therefore, implementing the Belt and Road Initiative projects, China has a complex equation to face in the region of South Asia.

Implementing Belt and Road Initiative: Challenges

The implementation of Belt and Road Initiative in the neighboring countries has several challenges. More specifically, in the region of South Asia, to counter China's initiative, India recently proposed the 'Cotton Route' so as to strengthen the diplomatic and economic relations between India and other countries of the Indian Ocean rim. Beyond South Asia, India has been notably effective in influencing the debate over Belt and Road Initiative by raising its concerns at the highest political levels to countries with plenty of reservations of their own. Moreover, India, alongside Japan, has reinforced the Trump administration's competitive stance toward China and encouraged the adoption of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy that is partly intended as a counterpoint to Belt and Road Initiative. However, China and India can reach to an informal agreement over the scope of Belt and Road Initiative, given that there is considerable room for negotiation, even over Indian sensitivities about CPEC.

Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia demonstrates the barriers that China faces, however, China remains on the focus on trade and investments that bring development, stability and a more integrated region. The Belt and Road Initiative pursues the revival of old Silk Road adhering to the principles of joint consultation, joint building, and joint sharing. According to the economist Zheng Yongnian, "the main objective of China's going out action through the initiative of Belt and Road is not the Chinese government, but capital, and the government only plays a role of facilitating" (Mahar 2016).

It is notable that during the Second Belt and Road Forum, top leaders from the South Asia region were absent. India continues to raise concerns over the security issues and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Kashmir (territory occupied by Pakistan, but claimed by India). However, from SAARC member states, only Pakistan and Nepal had top-level representation at the summit (Tiezzi 2019).

In the South Asia region, the competition continues. Dynamics in South Asia are increasingly taking on a zero-sum quality. And with improving U.S.-Indian and Chinese-Pakistani relations set against a decline in U.S.-Pakistani and Chinese-Indian relations, such dynamics are becoming mutually reinforcing. Moreover, shared concerns towards China's influence have led Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to agree on free and open Indo Pacific (FOIP) concept coupled with the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The

growing interests of other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), are unlikely to be ignored by China.

China's strategic purposes using its economic leverage in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative have led to rising concerns in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian states are concerned about the wider implications the Belt and Road Initiative may have for the region. Firstly, the Belt and Road Initiative could undermine the centrality and unity of ASEAN. Given that most of the BRI-linked projects in Southeast Asia are organized on a bilateral basis, it could weaken the current mode of ASEAN-led regionalism and over time, lead to China-centric regional economic integration. Secondly, a shared sentiment is emerging across the region that Chinese investment in strategically significant projects may lead to "debt-trap diplomacy." China has been accused of using economic development as a precursor to seeking naval base rights in maritime countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean region. Third, many regional states, especially those that have territorial and maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, are concerned about the national security implications of relying on Chinese funding for major infrastructure projects. China's territorialization of the disputed South China Sea has impeded its plans for launching large-scale maritime infrastructure projects under the Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Despite China's repeated attempts to downplay the strategic implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), regional states understand the initiative greatly enhance Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and hence guard against any emergence of a China-centered regional order. However, for many of the countries of the ASEAN region, these rivalries may bring great benefits, as interconnectivity will receive a major boost. For instance, if competition remains on the level of business and finance, producers in the Philippines, or Myanmar, could see a near future in which their products can more easily shipped around the globe, bringing further investment and prosperity.

The impact of Belt and Road Initiative is differed in Southeast and in South Asia. On the one hand, in South Asia, China's role is limited because of the increased role of India in the area, as an important regional actor as well as because of the weakness of SAARC to be a consistent regional organization. On the other hand, in Southeast Asia, China's role is more increased principally due to the economic benefits as well as to historical reasons.

Future Prospects

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiative pursues revival of old Silk Road adhering to the principles of joint consultation, joint building and joint sharing. Contemporarily, in international cooperation, politics and economy are two closely related inter-dependent and mutually promoting aspects. Misinterpretation about the Belt and Road Initiative would only cause some countries' misunderstanding. Whereas for regional peace, there is a need to recognize that countries have more to gain through regional cooperation. In this framework, a possible way to reduce the growing geopolitical competition between China and other major powers is to significantly transform the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from a China-centric initiative into a multilateral platform that also incorporates the participation of other major players.

Given complex global political and economic relations, there is a need to establish pan-regional and cross-regional cooperation mechanism based on historical experiences. In this regard, the ASEAN "10 + 3" cooperation model provides a successful example. Through this model, China, Japan, and South Korea have established an in-depth cooperation with ASEAN. It would not be difficult to bring about similar mechanism between China and South Asia or SAARC states as most of them already welcome China's regional involvement for both economic and political reasons.

In this context, it is vital to focus on level of economic openness and trade relations between neighboring countries and China (Li 2016). Low achievements in terms of China-South and Southeast Asia economic potential pertains to global slowdown in economic growth, decline in global trade and economic status, imbalances in regional development, and a gap in the development of economic and trade cooperation with China.

The recent quest for resources and markets in South Asia, along with China's willingness and ability to invest in infrastructure projects necessary to facilitate trade, has made China a desirable economic partner for other South

Asian states. Pakistan and China have already taken the lead by starting the work on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC, a project under Belt and Road Initiative, has increased economic significance, as it provides a transit route for energy and other resources destined for China.

With the progress and prospects of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), mutual consensus has emerged within South and Southeast Asian states that China's investments' will bring benefits not only to China, but also will provide income, jobs, and multifunctional infrastructure benefits to the recipient countries. Therefore, there is the need for more collaboration; China is willing to improve relations with its neighbors, to secure investments along the Belt and Road and to contribute for region's stability.

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Engagement to Rivalry: American Relations With China Since the End of the Cold War

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Abstract

American relations with China is one of the most important bilateral relations in the world today. It will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, which will, ultimately, affect the peace and prosperity of the globe. Rising China, with its authoritarian ambition to become the main global player, is considered a fundamental challenge to liberal world order and American leadership in the twenty-first century. This paper, using qualitative analysis, firstly explores the change of global balance of power and its developments after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, it investigates American foreign policy towards China and its implications for Chinese foreign policymaking. At the same time, it covers the economic development of both countries as well as their different approach towards global issues. Lastly, current trends of world economic-political systems, the emergence of liberal and authoritarian blocks which are representing two global superpowers, and its significance to future international relations, stability, and opulence of the world are scrutinized.

Keywords: America, China, Liberal World Order, Authoritarianism, International Relations

Introduction

Since Richard Nixon built bilateral relations with China in 1972, interaction and engagement with Beijing have been considered Washington's interests (Bader, 2018). The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 in which America and Chinese cooperation played an important role. During the post-Cold War era, America, considered as a successor and leader of the liberal democratic world, has emerged as a sole global superpower on the planet. Washington continued its engagement policy towards China. She supported and helped the Chinese open market policy and joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

For almost two decades, the U.S enjoyed unprecedented power and influence in international affairs without peer competitors, which any great power had been able to share in world history. In recent decades, the fast economic rise of China and other developing world, the emergence of multinational organizations, further integrations of the European Union, and re-emergence of Russia greatly challenge the American hegemonic position in the globe. Especially, the unprecedented rise of China as one of the economic, diplomatic, and military powerhouses of the region and its global aspiration has become a main concern in current U.S relations with China (Mifune, 2007).

China is now the second major economy, second biggest military spender in the world after the USA, and has assumed that it will surpass the United States in the coming decades. China's rise is comprehensive in economics, politics, military, trade, diplomacy, ideology, and so on. Its aggressive actions in the international arena have created anxieties in the region, and it defied international law and norms, as well as failed to both liberalize the political system and commit market-based development at home and abroad (Bader, 2018). That's why Americans began to believe that China will be a more adversary to the United States than Russia ever was (Maher, 2018). White House senior director Evan Medeiros also has said that the world has entered a new normal that is defined by a period of persistent and consistent tension (Bermingham and Wu, 2019).

In this paper, ample analysis is given on the economic and political developments of the world since the end of the Cold War. In addition, structural change in world politics and its strategic significance to great powers is analyzed. Then, the cause of the structural change in bilateral relations between America and China from engagement to competition and its effects on developments of the international order is assessed. In the end, the Trump factor, as well as the rise and cause of anti-democratic uprisings in the west, are examined. Moreover, the emergence of authoritarian regimes around the world and deepening cooperation among them as an alternative or rival to the liberal world order and its effects on the international order is evaluated.

1. Changing Balance of Power after the End of Cold War

The democratic world, especially the United States and the EU, are unquestionably primarily leading force of shaping world politics, economics, and international affairs after the Cold War. But it does not mean that western influences are the same strong in all corners of the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a rough balance of power in Eurasia. If either Russia or China begins to build up their military power, there are plenty of wealthy and capable states at either end of Eurasia to contain them. Indeed, Russia and China help to contain one another (R. Posen and L. Ross, 1996).

As the largest continent, Eurasia is considered fulcrum of the world. Most of the world's largest, dynamic, influential, and populous countries are there. These states possess formidable economic, military, and political assets due to which they want to build their own independent rules and sphere of influence in a different way. If not globally, at least regionally in the Eurasian subcontinent with different agendas from the west.

China's role in global governance is one of the defining questions for world politics in the 21st century. China's rapid growing economy, military power, and nationalism, and its gradual emergence as a global player over the last decade have primarily been the driving force behind her aggressive foreign policy, and iron fist authoritarian domestic policy. China's economic liberalization and growth are not at loggerheads in political liberalization and development towards western norms as she was attracted much by authoritarian leaders in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East. China has also taken an active approach to sub-regional and regional institution building in Asia, thereby providing an alternative to the western dominated international organizations (Hill and Smith, 2011).

It's crystal clear that China has already become a leading member of a number of regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and so on. It began to accelerate to project her economic power, interest, and political influence around the world. Recently, Beijing lambasted U.S global leadership, calling for emerging economies to forge a new world order that is less dependent on the volatilities of American domestic politics (Kimball, 2013). In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch made regarding U.S Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. Even the U.S navy chief declared that the focus of this department in the future in the Asia-Pacific region (O'Rourke, 2012).

Most researchers focused on Chinese eye-catching economic performance, trade, security, and infrastructure developments and ignored to explore crucial trends going on very silently and smoothly, which is, in the end, gradually breaking off the current world economic and political system dominated by U.S. and EU. China's grand strategy to world domination has not been explicitly articulated in a formal declaration. But observing China's international behaviour in recent years might explain its strategic logic. Over the past several decades, China introduced open market and technology for its development. China's unprecedented economic expansion now exerts a gravitational pull on the world economy, gathering emerging markets in its orbit. Bolstered by its commercial heft, China's global ambition is increasingly built on ports, highways, and pipelines in the expansion of its supply chain empire. More than this, China's grand strategy is built on developing new markets for advanced Chinese technology (Araya, 2019).

China already became a second economic power in the world and the biggest manufacturing powerhouse on the globe. Besides this, its economy is very rapidly and steadily growing, unlike the EU in which we have seen stagnation or very little growth rate, even some member countries experiencing negative growth. The American economy is also growing at a smaller rate than China. This gives China more advantages over the EU and America to expanding its economic strength over time, which may force to change the global balance of power on the benefits to China. Unlike the EU and U.S, in the process of cutting their defense budget or showing very slow growth, China, on the contrary, is on the way to the rapid increase in its defense spending and modernization of the army. In this regard, China is not alone. Other global or regional players such as India and Russia following the similar steps of China due to which they are considered the competitors and even one day may become potential rivals to the West.

Since the end of the Cold War, bipolar world order had vanished. America emerged sole superpower on the globe both economically and politically. Further integrations of the EU, recovering from Russia, rapid economic growth in China and India after economic reforms in recent decades, hugely affect the global balance of power. In recent years, American led unipolar world order has been brought under question and Americans feeling their status threated by newly emerging powers, especially by China.

American policymakers began to believe China as the revisionist power and that it is economic, political, and military rise is of the defining elements of the 21st century. Peoples Republic of China (PRC), under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), undermines the international system from within by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously eroding the values and principles of the rules-based order (The Department of Defence, 2019). Russia, closely cooperating with China against balancing American influence and in recent years, has been implementing more aggressive and expansionist foreign policy wishing to regain its great power status, which she lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Parallel to the fast growth of emerging economies and their influence around the world, the American relative share of power is under steady decline in recent decades both in the economic and diplomatic sphere. Especially, the Trump presidency opened more room for other big and regional powers to play an active role in the international arena and weakened American positions. In comparison to China's ascent, there is an America in retreat. President Trump's national populism and protectionist trade policies have effectively undermined the very liberal order that once justified US leadership (Araya, 2019).

2. American Foreign Policy towards China: Strategic Cooperation to Competition

As an existing superpower, the American grand strategy towards the globe is unquestionable to protect the leading American role in the world and to curb the rival power wherever it emerges. These range from a narrow commitment to the basic safety of the United States to an ambitious effort to secure permanent U.S. global pre-eminence (R. Posen and L. Ross, 1996). Two factors characterize the rising great powers during the industrial era: the first is the accumulation of power and wealth; the second is the use of this power and wealth either to obtain a dominant position or to reshape the international order (Cheng, 2011). This is the same logic for the post-Cold War era. With the dissolving of the Soviet Union, there was no single power that accumulated wealth and strength to get strong enough to rival against the U.S. Even European Union was not considered to be an alternative to the

United States despite economic and technological advantages because of lack of political unity among member states. Japan was economically strong but militarily weak, Russia had been struggling to recover its economy, China was neither rich nor strong enough to rival, and she needed to buy time to prosper. On the other hand, other parts of the world, such as India, Africa, Latin America, and the Islamic world, had no ability to become competitors, because most of them were struggling for survival and getting out of economic hardships.

America enjoyed unprecedented power during the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. American decision-makers faced almost no strong opposition in the international arena during that period of time. America waged Gulf War and again started a war against Afghanistan and Iraq and so on under the banner of the war on terror. But these endless wars cost America a lot and exhausted its economy, restricted her from paying enough attention to developments in other parts of the world. As Brzezinski says, "Invasion of Iraq has galvanized a lot of hostility in the Islamic world towards the United States. American insensitive and ambiguous posture in the Israel-Palestinian conflict is also a very important reason for the hostility towards us. All this helps terrorism" (Brzezinski, 2006). American involvement in the long-lasting war in South Asia and the Middle East gives precious opportunity to countries like China and Russia etc. to develop their economy modernize defense, increase business, and diplomatic influence around the world without strong international pressure.

Post-1945, American led Liberal International Order is different from the authoritarian world view. It favors democratic forms of government, protection of human rights, and promotion of national self-determination. It emphasizes written and unwritten rules — freedom of navigation, nonaggression, peaceful settlement of disputes — meant to foster a relatively cooperative global environment (Brands, 2018). International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are playing an important role in liberal international order via promoting relatively open trade and global finance.

Since the Second World War, America used to share power at the multilateral level and became a strong defender of international order, which she created. But Trump administration turned the table. His rhetoric put America first and pursuing a policy, which emphasizing narrow-minded national interest only focusing on short term economic benefits ignored the core value of liberal international order such as human rights, fairness, democratic rules in international affairs, etc. America has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and is renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), leaving its allies and partners in the lurch (Biscop, 2017).

Most important of all, pursuing short term self-interest in the Trump administration greatly damaged American reputation around the world. Punishment of adversaries and allies alike with imposing tariffs and threats has shaken the trust of allies and potential friends towards Washington. These, in the end, worked towards strengthening the position of rival powers and influence around the world while weakening America's significance and damaging allies' interest.

America and Europe are considered to be building blocks of liberal international order. Close ties and cooperation between them have been the main guarantor of surviving the current international system. But Trump's policy towards the EU has damaged bilateral relations. And, liberal world order facing a great challenge within itself while facing external threats from growing adversarial powers such as China, Russia, and Iran, etc. Although trade and investment links between the US and the EU are deep and extensive, the imposition of US tariffs – and retaliatory tariffs by the EU – threatens to diminish economic prospects on both sides of the Atlantic, damages transatlantic political ties, and undermines the rules-based international trading system (Schneider-Petsinger, 2019). Major areas of tension in bilateral relations have included the Iran nuclear deal, trade, burden-sharing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and differing perceptions of the multilateral order (Lazarou and Harte, 2018).

Close allies in the Middle East also began to hesitate to American guarantee for their security and started searching alternatives around the world. Saudi Arabiya, one of the most important close allies of America, has been pursuing close relations with China and exposed willingness to cooperation even with Russia for diversifying its own

security dimensions. Turkey, America's only NATO ally, in the Middle East since Cold War feeling threated by America and its NATO alliance. Ankara is turning its attention away from west to east and on the way to ending its alliance with the authoritarian camp, which is represented by China, Russia, and Iran that are against the western liberal international order. Ties between Turkey and America was deteriorated when Trump is imposing heavy tariffs on Turkish goods, blocking the sale of F-35 and crisis of S-400 missile defense agreement with Russia. Even traditional allies such as Egypt and Pakistan have been deepening close ties with China. Trump's anti-Islamic rhetoric, recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and cutting defense aid for Pakistan was the main supporting factor of this trend.

China is considered to be a pragmatic example of globalization in the world. Since the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, it has grown very quickly and became one of the successful economies in the globe:

 "Its 20-year plan is to become like the United States today. The Chinese have been straightforwardly copying everything that has worked in the developed world: 19th-century railroads, 20th-century air conditioning, and even entire cities. They might skip a few steps along the way going straight to wireless without installing landlines, for instance-but they're copying all the same" (Thiel, 2014)*.*

Rise of China not coming from the miracle but employing western technology and investment, using Russian military equipment and experience as well as easiness for reaching the international market and gaining an advantage by exploiting its own vast majority of the cheap labor force. China, in the past, was not successful in innovation but mastered scaling productions of existing technologies that are innovated in the developed world and copied by China. Unlike America, China focused its long term ambition to become a dominant global power and to work very hard and systematically to strengthen its comprehensive national power. China is rising steadily, if more slowly as of late, as America's eventual coequal and likely rival, but for the time being, it is careful not to pose an outright challenge to America (Brzezinski, 2016).

Since the opening up to the world economic crisis in 2008, China's rapid economic development and accumulations of wealth considered to be beneficial for U.S. interests. But this kind of thinking began to change over time in recent years when China is becoming more assertive and aggressive in its foreign policy and becoming more authoritarian in domestic policy, which was against most of the western thinkers and policymakers' opinions. What they think was that economic prosperity and trade liberalization also lead to democratization. And American foreign relations with China after Mao administration built on the basis of economic cooperation and trade development between two countries. While there was American criticism on China's human rights abuse and so on, but that was mostly symbolic in nature.

In recent years, Americans began to fear and feel threatened by their national interest from China's rise in the economy. And most important of all, the technologic advancements as well as military build-ups and pursuing an independent foreign policy with global agenda make America worried. Trump administration sees America as a loser in bilateral trade with China. According to one of the top adviser of Trump:

Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and falsely promised to end its mercantilist and protectionist practices, America's apparel, textile, and wood furniture industries have shrunk to half their size—with textile jobs alone beaten down by 70%. Other critical industries like chemicals, paper, steel, and tires are under similar siege, while employment in our high-tech computer and electronics manufacturing industries has plummeted by more than 40%.

China's newly modernized Navy and Air Force feature everything from virtually undetectable nuclear submarines and the latest Russian-designed fighter jets to ballistic missiles that can precisely target America's aircraft carriers on the high seas. China's own "Pentagon" is confidently developing advanced weapons systems—many of which have been stolen from us by Chinese hackers and spies!—to shoot down our satellite and GPS systems and send nuclear warheads deep into the American heartland (Navarro: 2011).

China already became the world's largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP) and the second-largest in the gross domestic product (GDP). And its economy is rising at the fastest speed than advanced economies such as the U.S., Europe, and Japan, etc. If consumerism grows, China's GDP will grow dramatically and will become the largest economy in the world (Heilbrum, 2014). This means that China will have more capability and advantage over the developed world to invest its own technologic research and development, modernize the defense industry, and gaining cutting edge military equipment, buying diplomatic influence around the world. Rising comprehensive national power, increasing nationalism, and weakness of the American government's ability to respond and tackle international problems, as well as lack of cooperation among weak neighboring countries to safeguard their own national interest, emboldened Beijing to implement more assertive and expansionist foreign policy. Beijing no longer wants to be subordinate power to the United States. China's grand ambition is struggling to become a global player exposing the alternative political and developmental models to the world.

3. America-China Factor to Shape Future International Order

World politics have been dominated by western liberal democratic countries over several decades. Western ideas and values are the primary norms of international systems today. The vast majority of people around the world who are representing various different civilizations and cultures have no voice in current world politics, such as Hindus, Muslims, Africans, Latin Americans, and Asians. Even countries like China and Russia are members of the United Nations Security Council, showing dissatisfaction towards the current international order. Moscow and Beijing both seek to weaken, if not yet to overthrow, prevailing rules and existing international institutions and, at least within the areas over which each hopes to exert a preponderant influence, to put new ones in their place (L. Friedberg, 2017).

The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power (Mearsheimer, 2001). It's difficult to avoid competition, sometimes even wars between great powers, to some extent. Because everyone wants to safeguard its national security and interest within and beyond its borders as possible as they can reach and maximize it. There is no limit to drawing a line for aspirations and ambitions of great powers. But they need to face reality to compete in the sizeable boundaries of the world. That's why sometimes their national interest is overlapping one another in different parts of the globe.

Every state doesn't want to retreat its core national interest in relations with other states. But they are forced to compromise under strong pressure and strong opposition, which she assumes or convinced that she has no ability or enough strength to tackle it. As countries gain strength economically, militarily, technologically, and so on, their ambitions and aspirations to power and influence also follow suit. Since economic reform in 1978, China has been rising at a very fast speed, which is very rarely seen in world history. They'll radiate more influence around the world. Certainly, they're exploring that in the South China Sea, along with Japan, and in the islands with Japan. Therefore, America is going to be tested (Heilbrum, 2014) because this region is one of the world's busiest trading lines and considered America's vital interesting area, which encompasses some of its closest alliances such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Protecting alliance and their national interest as well as checking on emerging rival powers has the main strategic significance to safeguard American leadership in the world. It should make sure it remains the most powerful country on the planet, which means making sure a rising China does not dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere (Mearsheimer, 2014).

When America was conducting costly and unrealistic war from Afghanistan to Iraq to Libya, it piled up a great amount of debt. If this money had been spent on improving infrastructure, education, research, and development, America could have been in a more advantageous position than rivals, and its leadership would be more stable and robust. Wars are not only costing lives and money for America but also damaging U.S. reputation worldwide. On the contrary to the United States, countries like Russia, China, India, and some others held the opportunity and made great progress in their own development.

Russia re-emerged as a strong player shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and considered herself as to its successor. It has strong defense capability, and its nuclear arsenal can be matched to the United States. But its economy, industry, and technologic base in other areas can't support its ambition to become a global superpower. India is different from Russia. It has a large population comparable to China. Its defense capability, economy, industry, and technologic developments are rising very fast. She is also pursuing an independent policy to cement its position in the region and increasing its own influence globally. India is still a very poor country, and its military does not match the United States, Russia, and not even comparable with China. That's why India, in the near future, is considered to be regional power; in the long run, it has the potential to become a global superpower.

The wider Islamic world is divided, and there is a lack of consensus among them. They are mostly poor and lack of modern industrial base to become a competitor to the world powers. Possibly in the foreseeable future Muslim world will not become a strong voice in international politics. Even from Europe, Africa and Latin America may not be able to produce strong global powers, at least in the first half of the 21st century. While in Asia, Japan has a strong economy and technological advantage, it is only considered as a regional power. Because its demography and military capability cannot afford it, and it has political hardship to develop independent foreign policy.

In this world today, only China can become a reliable rival or peer competitor to the United States. Since the opening up its economy China worked very hard and systematically to gathering great extent of strength in every sphere in which every great power needed. Its economy, industry, technology, business and trade, military, culture, values, and institutions, etc. can be rival to the U.S. Increasing comprehensive national power and global influence made China already emerged world power and Peking come to very close to become as a true global power. American's thinking of curbing China's rise seems incompatible to reality. China already has risen up, and it can be seen and felt in every corner of the world. The path of China, which she chooses to rise is different from other countries:

"*The rise of all the major powers in the world to date has been nothing but the possession of resource markets and consumer markets, or the use of the military to win or use of company to control the resource. We do not choose the rise of force, the use of commercial means is the only choice. Foreign exchange and a strategic head, the international financial team with an experienced operational brain should, therefore, be regarded as a new force for China's future rise"* (Xu, 2010).

In international politics, it seems that in the future, the main actors and competitors will be the United States and China, following with regional powers in Europe, Russia, India, Japan, and less extent medium-sized countries like Indonesia, Brazil, and Iran and so on. The rapid economic growth of the non-Western World, such as China, India, etc. over the past several decades has weakened western dominance in the international order. At the same time, it has created a high demand for energy and mineral resources. In 2011 alone, the increase in China's oil demand represented nearly half of the world's total increase. Given that nearly one-third of the world's civil wars taken place in oil-producing countries, any state that needs to import oil is likely to find its companies were operating in conflict-ridden states (Country Report, 2012).

China, in the past, pursued Deng's strategy of "hide your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible" policy. Nevertheless, there has been a major shift from a "small-country" mentality to a "big country" mentality in Chinese leaders' strategic thinking after the leadership change in 2012 (Li, 2017). China began to shape international rules via using its led international institutions such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), and one of the grand strategy and ambitious project Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and so on. Especially BRI, which aims at linking Eurasia to China's mainland and cementing China's dominant leadership in these regions, is reminding Chinese philosophical thinking of world order "Tian Xia" in which China is the center and other countries considered to be the periphery of the globe. China's BRI is the most ambitious project in the world today. And it consists of both land and sea routes to connect China to Eurasian landmass, even broader to Africa. Examining the significance and geographical coverage of the project reminds that as if this is the combination of Mackinder and Mahan in a single framework.

This exposes Chinese ambition and determination to become a truly global superpower in both lands and by the sea, which any great power never succeeded before.

Asia's rise is fundamental, which would open the way to change the balance of power in the world. And there is a related set of economic and political challenges in how the West reacts to the changing geopolitical landscape in the Eurasian landmass and in Asia Pacific regions. This reaction includes everything from the Western belief that liberal democracy is the end result of history to the increasingly fierce competition over markets and natural resources in the Middle East and Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America (B. MacDonald and Lemco, 2011).

Americans believe that:
"If China is democratic and enmeshed in the global capitalist system, it will not act aggressively; instead, it will be content with the status quo in Northeast Asia. According to this logic, the United States should engage China in order to promote the latter's integration into the world economy, a policy that also seeks to encourage China's transition to democracy. If engagement succeeds, the United States can work with a wealthy and democratic China to promote peace around the globe.

Unfortunately, a policy of engagement is doomed to fail. If China becomes an economic powerhouse, it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia. Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival" (Mearsheimer, 2001).

China's growing naval capability enables it to effectively deal with vast waters around the South China Sea (SCS). But the growing military presence of China's strategic rivals, specifically the US and India around the SCS, is accelerating China's perception that its sovereignty around the SCS is significantly threatened (Kwon, 2019). China's emergence and rising comprehensive national power itself considered as a threat to U.S. hegemony on the planet. Because history tells us that as countries become richer and stronger, their dependence on other countries will be weakened. At the same time, their position to pursue independent policy and ambitions to become a hegemon in their own way will be naturally strengthening.

Realist politicians in both countries know this logic very well. That's why America advocated pivot to Asia policy during the Obama administration, and now they developed Indo-Pacific strategy in Trump administration. Whatever the name of the strategy, its specific aim is to counter potential rivals such as China and Russia. China and Russia had the alliance to counter against the United States during the Cold War period. Now, once again, they are cooperating with each other. This is not considered a political alliance but a necessity to safeguard the geostrategic interest of both countries (Xu, 2010). China feels threatened by American military presence in East Asia, SCS, and South Asia, as well as by strengthening U.S. military alliance in these regions. Russia also feels threatened by NATO expansion in East Europe and by economic pressure from the United States. Although, in some areas, there is mistrust and rivalry between Russia and China, but they have a common interest to counter against American hegemony.

Since most of the global powers possess nuclear weapons, direct military confrontation between them is considered dangerous and costly. That's why competition game among them is mostly on economic and diplomatic lines which aim at weakening rival and wining over it without direct military confrontation. Controlling the international market and global resource is the most common norm. Buying alliance and attracting like-minded states and using periphery against rival powers is considered the safest and effective way to win over it. China and Russia are supporting some countries like Iran, Central Asian states, Venezuela, and so on. Most of them are authoritarian and have a strong enmity to the United States. This will help to enforce their influence in these regions and weakening American hegemony. Even some American alliance such as Turkey, Pakistan and some Middle Eastern countries which are feeling threated from liberal global order and becoming more economically dependent on China going away from the west and seeking a new alliance with China and Russia.

Every country pursues its own policy in a different manner. Russian strategy is to keep its hegemonic position in the old Soviet sphere, and its ambition is not global but regional. Iran's aim is mostly survival of the current regime and being a hegemon in its surrounding area. Pakistan, North Korea, Turkey, and some Middle Eastern and Latin American countries desire merely the survival of the current authoritarian government from the western-style democratic uprising. Most of them have no regional or global ambitions, and if so, they neither have the ability nor capability to do so.

China's rivalry with the United States is far beyond the mere survival of the regime and state. Its strategy is long term and global. Its strategic ambition is realizations of China's dream and turns China into a prosperous, strong, and most advanced country. By 2021, China would bring per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) up to the level of moderately developed countries and realize modernization in 2049 (Norton, 2015). There is an estimation of China's surpass the United States in total GDP by 2025 and even GDP per capita sometime after mid-century. This is considered a form of the bedrock foundation of aggressive, confidence foreign policy establishment in the immense of a China-dominated world system (Babones, 2017).

With the growing economic might, China's military budget and technological investment are increasing significantly. Cutting-edge weaponry has been developed endogenously or purchased from foreign countries. China's growing economic, military, and political influences on the international scene, and its position as a global power, and its assertiveness in sea territorial disputes could have significant impacts on both the regional and international orders (Kwon, 2019). China's steady rise would cause fear among its neighbors. United States' leading position in Asia-Pacific would be shattering. In order to prevent these phenomena, they would seek to contain China, probably by trying to form a balancing coalition. The result would be an intense security competition between China and its rivals, with the ever-present danger of great-power war hanging over them. In short, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave America an ample opportunity to emerge as a sole global power without peer competitors. It enjoyed a short period of unprecedented power and influence in the international arena during the eve and the first decade of the 21st century. But this trend had come to an end when the great changes happened in the structure of the global balance of power. Mainly because with the re-emergence of Russia, unprecedented rise of China, and fast developments of major countries around the world, while America is making a grave strategic mistake and struggling with endless and costly wars around the globe, especially in South Asia and in the Middle East.

China's emergence has much more great significance comparing to other emerging countries because of its size, technological might, different ideology, culture, and political system, which is rival to the west. American engagement policy towards China, which assumed close cooperation and helping economic opening up, which would ultimately lead China to embrace the free market and democratization, has utterly failed. And it gave China precious opportunity to rise up. Now, when China has become more prosperous and powerful, its foreign policy is also getting more assertive. And she transformed economic wealth into military might. America began to feel threatened, its presence in Asia-Pacific, from China's increasing influence in this region. China's pursuing aggressive foreign policies to her neighboring countries by unilaterally claiming territorial sovereignty on the East and Southeast Asia, territorial disputes with India and other neighboring countries are also the main concern. Russia's occupation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimean was challenged for the legitimacy of the current international system. In response to these developments, America declared a rebalancing strategy toward Asia and later developed the Indo-Pacific strategy curbing the increasing influence of mainly China and Russia and to a lesser extent, Iran.

Countries such as Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, North Korea, and so on, which are feeling threatened by America and western led democratic world order began to make more close cooperation with China. While there are some

differences among them but they have a common interest against western hegemony. Nowadays, the American position as a sole global power to dominate international politics has begun to question. More and more countries around the world, which are mostly undemocratic, began to see China's model as an alternative to the U.S. led a liberal democratic order. Along with that, increasing anti-democratic uprisings in the west and authoritarian upheaval around the world is the main concern and menace to the future stability of the international system. There are strong assumptions that the world, in the long run, is going towards multi-polarity which will be dominated by countries such as America, China, and India, and so on. But in the near future, it's possible to say that the world system and strategic competition will be dominated by two global powers i.e., U.S. and China and to less extent by some regional players around them.

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Interventions for Occupational Stress Management in Air Traffic Providers

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Abstract
Last decade, the aviation industry was fast-growing, and air traffic providers are under pressure to manage and accommodate demands for more flights. Therefore, aerospace capacity management is anticipated by the air traffic controller's performance, and it's a key success factor towards air transport industry resilience productivity. On the other hand, air traffic controller tasks are very complicated and high demand, resulting in occupation stress affecting air transport providers employees. This paper deals with the challenges to identify occupational health in the work environment of air traffic providers, focusing on traffic controllers. According to a system of system approach, the key resources of stress are reviewed, and the interventions to manage occupational stress upon the quality of services and human resources performance are highlighted. The paper outputs provide key messages to managers and decision-makers upon stress management to high demanded workplaces and especially regarding air traffic controllers, providing the framework for comparisons with other high demanded occupational conditions.

Keywords: Stress Management, Occupational Health, Occupational Safety, Human Capital Management, Air Transport Providers.

1. Introduction

Worldwide, Air Traffic Services (ATS) are under huge pressure due to the continuing growth of air traffic. According to ATAG (2018), if aviation were a country, it would rank 20th in size by GDP (like Switzerland or Argentina). Aviation provides the only rapid worldwide transportation network, which makes it essential for global business and tourism. It plays a vital role in facilitating economic growth, particularly in developing countries. Airlines transport over four billion passengers annually, with revenue passenger kilometers approaching nearly 8 trillion in 2017. Aviation's global economic impact (direct, indirect, induced, and tourism catalytic) is estimated at $2.7 trillion, equivalent to 3.6% of world gross domestic product (GDP), play a vital role for economies heavily depended on market accessibility, (Dimitriou and Sartzetaki; 2018a).

Furthermore, air transport contributes to socioeconomic development, (Dimitriou and Sartzetaki; 2018b). By facilitating tourism and trade, it generates economic growth, provides jobs, improves living standards, alleviates

poverty, and increases revenues from taxes, (Sartzetaki 2019a). ACI (2017) traffic forecasts highlight that air passenger traffic in Europe will increase by up to 26.0% by 2040, while in Asia-Pacific, this increase will reach 38.8%. UNWTO (2018) recognize the linkage of aviation and tourism and estimate that international tourist arrivals by air will reach 900 million by 2030, far exceeding other modes of transport. Therefore, air transport industry personnel is a key factor in meeting future needs and challenges (Sartzetaki 2019b).

The high demand for additional routes and air transport network expansion, resulting in key challenges to airspace capacity management routing considering the fragmented route planning, the existing regulatory framework, and the technology limitations and adaptation cost. Last year, airspace fragmentation was affecting emerging markets in Asia because of the rapid development of the air transport sector in the East and especially in China. Therefore, air traffic control performance by air navigation providers constitute a key issue towards air transport eco-system sustainable development.

The improvement of aerospace management is a key driver towards efficiency, service quality, and productivity of the aviation industry. Public and private air traffic services providers are committed to developing their operations' competitiveness through the implementation of Quality Management Systems (QMS) to improve the quality of service and to prevent occupational stress of their personnel. European Commission has launched a program entitled the Single European Sky (SES) initiative, which seeks to promote a more efficient way of handling the air traffic over Europe. A reorganization of air traffic management will be introduced during this process, and Air Traffic Control (ATC) centers in Europe will be merged. New technology will further be implemented, and the air space will be rationalized.

The process and the nature of the services delivered by air traffic controllers (ATCO) are under consideration, related directly to air transport safety and occupational health (Eurocontrol, 2004). The subject of workload and stress among ATCO is becoming extremely important, and, unfortunately, innovation and changes are not easy to be implemented, mainly because of the occupational nature, tasks, demands, and timeframe. Controllers stress management and the impact on the quality of service and performance are under question.

This paper deals with the occupational stress management in ATC. By a system of system analysis, the key stress resources are identified, promoting the key areas needs to be acting to improve working conditions and personnel performance. The analysis highlights the consequences of stress on health and well-being, promoting key interventions that should be taken into consideration towards effective air traffic management. The paper is organized in five sections: firstly, the introduction illustrates the of ATC in air transport industry; secondly, the sources of ATC is presented; in third section the stress consequences are mentioned; in next section the interventions to air traffic management is discussed; afterward concluding remarks are given; and finally, the reference list is situated.

2. Stress sources in ATC

In a systematic manner, the human condition with the term stress was introduced by Selye (1956), following his work with animals and the finding of a generalized response to a variety of harmful physical stimuli. This response-based approach is, however, not particularly appropriate for explaining human stress, as it assumes that the response to a stressor will always take the same course. Recent theories of human stress focus instead on transactional models in which appraisal, auditing, and self-assessment are central features (ICAO; 2006). The crucial point is that stress is not simply a dimension of the physical or social environment, in terms of demands or events, nor simply the responses associated with the consequences of stress, (ICAO; 2008).

Stress occurs when there is some imbalance between the perceived demands on an individual and the resources available for dealing with those demands (Costa; 1995). The effects of environmental changes are moderated by individual interpretive and evaluative processes. This notion of a mismatch is seen in models of occupational stress, such as the person-environment fit model, which illustrates that a mismatch between work demands and

opportunities, and individual needs and resources, is associated with job strain. Factors which are important in such a model include the nature, intensity, duration, and predictability of "stressors" and the availability and selection of individual resources such as styles of behavior in response to an event, personality, previous experience of similar events, perception of control, and social support. Potential stressors include heavy work demands, role ambiguity, role conflict, job loss, shift work, noise, pollution, poor relations between workers and supervisors, and lack of participation in decision-making and control over work processes (Costa; 2001).

Stress is a part of everyone's life and not necessarily a negative phenomenon, being a physiological stimulus usually connected with human activities and interactions of them with the relevant environment (Iqbal, 2013). Stress can sometimes become a harmful risk factor for health when it is perceived as an imbalance between an excess of demands and the individual ability to meet them. This causes a perturbation of the psychophysical equilibrium, taxing physical, psychic, and behavioral responses aimed at coping with it. If this coping fails, stress can have harmful consequences on physical, mental, and social well-being, with high costs both for the individual and society. Stress at work can be generated by job demands, environmental conditions, work organization and human relations; its impact on job satisfaction, performance efficiency, and health can vary widely depending on the psychophysical characteristics and coping resources of individuals, as well as on the social support received, (Iqbal, 2013; Pylvas et al., 2015).

Generally, Air Traffic Controllers (ATCOs) are considered a group of professionals having to deal with highly demanding and risky tasks. In fact, ATC as a work encompasses a set of various tasks requiring very high levels of knowledge, language proficiency, experience and expertise, as well as the practical application of specific skills pertaining to cognitive domains (e.g. spatial perception, information processing, logic reasoning, decision making), communicative aspects and human relations. Analysis of ATC operations shows that the cognitive and operational processes of an ATCO vary not only according to the number of aircraft under control but also with the number and complexity of problems to be solved. ATCO must constantly reorganize his or her system of processing flight information by changing operating methods (in particular, cognitive processes, conversation, coordinating with assistants, anticipation, and solving problems) as they arise and interact with each other. This is carried out by means of the precise and effective application of rules and procedures that, however, need flexible adjustments according to differing circumstances, often under time pressure (Costa, 1995; 2001).

At the same time, the job includes high levels of responsibility, not only with regard to risking lives but also for the high economic costs of aeronautical activities. According to several surveys, the main sources of stress reported by ATCOs are connected both to operative aspects and to organizational structures. For the former, the most important are peaks of traffic load, time pressure, having to bend the rules, limitations, and the reliability of equipment. The latter is mainly concerned with shift schedules (night work in particular), role conflicts, unfavorable working conditions, and the lack of control over work (FAA, 2014).

As the workload increases, the ATC tends to employ more procedures in less time is growing, along with a reduction to the pre-given flight information and the relaxation of certain self-imposed qualitative criteria. It is evident that the number of decisions becomes complex resulting in stressful conditions while the controller's attention is stretched to the maximum. As a result, it is frequently reported many errors even during low traffic. This is due to the great effort required to regulate the psychophysical reactions, maintaining a high level of arousal and vigilance even in conditions of "underload" (Iqbal, 2013; Pylvas et al., 2015).

3. Stress consequences on ATCO health and welfare

ATCOs are widely recognized as an occupational group which has to cope with a highly demanding job that involves a complex series of tasks, requiring high levels of knowledge and expertise, combined with high levels of responsibility, not only with regard to risking lives, but also the high economic costs of aeronautical activities. The International Labor Organization (ILO) commissioned a manual on Occupational stress and stress prevention in air traffic control (CONDI/T/WP.6/1995), Which reviews the sources and consequences of stress in air traffic

control and the measures which have been taken in a number of countries to prevent and reduce stress in the occupation. Conclusively, the ATCO key stress sources are depicted in the following figure.

Sources of Stress

- Work demands
- Operating procedures
- Working times
- Working tools
- Work environment
- Work organization

Short-Term Effects

- Brain and cardiac activity
- Hormonal excretion
- Performance efficiency
- Mental processes
- Operative behavior

Long-Term Effects

- Hypertension
- Ischemic heart disease
- Diabetes
- Peptic ulcers
- Psychoneurotic disorders

Influenced by:

- Personality traits
- Skill
- Aptitude
- Motivation
- Experience
- Operating behavior
- Coping strategies
- Social support

Figure 2. Main consequences of stress for ATCOs (Costa, 2001).

Stress for air traffic controllers is connected, on the one hand, with the intrinsic characteristics of the job and, on the other hand, with the work organization and conditions in the workplace. It is important to bear in mind that the psychophysical responses of individuals also depend on their personal characteristics and coping strategies. For the profession of ATC, it is evident that the job entails generally high psychological demands while being subjected to a considerable degree of external control. ATCOs often complain that they have a feeling of lack of personal influence, and this can play the role of a powerful stressor, also considering that the job requires high levels of responsibility.

Actually, "demand" and "control," as well as "social support," can vary widely according to several factors dealing with different working situations, e.g., work environment, equipment, work planning and procedures, workload distribution, team composition, working hours, rest pauses, shift schedules and human relations. The consequences on an ATC's performance and well-being may differ widely among individuals in relation to many factors dealing with age, lifestyles, life events, work experience, personality traits (introversion, anxiety, type A), behavioral characteristics (mood, sleeping habits, morningness), attitudes, motivation, and physical and mental health.

Moreover, many other factors related to social conditions can play an important role in this respect, e.g., socioeconomic status, housing conditions, commuting, family attitudes, social support, and integration. Therefore, all these aspects can have an influence on an ATCO's job satisfaction health and well-being according to different circumstances (see Fig. 2). They can interact and interfere with each other, giving rise to not only possible additive or multiplicative, but also subtractive effects, so that it is often very difficult to evaluate and compare the effective

stress and strain in different groups and individuals. This is the reason why many studies on the stress of air traffic controllers reported apparently contradictory findings.

About the short-term effects, can be categorized in terms of changes in hormonal secretion (e.g., adrenaline, non-adrenaline), heart rate, blood pressure, muscular activity, cerebral waves, work performance (errors) and behavior (sleeping, smoking, eating and drinking habits). These responses can indicate a normal, physiological adaptation of the individual to external stimulation, as well as an excessive strain due to an imbalance between demands and resources. A great number of research results indicate that the above responses are related to the workload, which can be assessed in terms of the number of aircraft under control or expected to come under control, peak traffic counts, duration and type of communications, tight work schedules, and number and complexity of problems to be solved. However, big differences among air control centers can be recorded, mainly in relation to air traffic density. On the other hand, they appear to be greatly influenced by subjective factors, such as personality traits (anxiety, introversion), aptitude, skill, ability, motivation, experience, and operating behavior.

Demanding occupational activity may be a risk factor for stress-related symptoms, such as headaches, chronic fatigue, heartburn, indigestion, and chest pain, as well as for serious illnesses, such as hypertension, coronary heart disease, diabetes, peptic ulcers and psychoneurotic disorders. It is quite easy to foresee the high costs from both the existential and the economic point of view that these negative consequences of stress can have, not only for the single person, but also for companies and society. Therefore, prevention and control of stress becomes a compulsory target for employees, in order to safeguard their physical, mental and social health; for companies, in order to improve the efficiency and reliability of the service; as well as for society as a whole, in order to guarantee the highest levels of safety and comfort for all included and affected by this very important work activity.

4. Interventions for the Occupational Stress Management

The analysis case study is Greece. Briefly, Greece attracts a high number of tourists because of the warm weather, the excellent climate, the 16.000-km of coast along the Mediterranean, the spatial allocation of Greek islands in the Mediterranean. Since tourism destinations are a long distance from the tourist home residences, (highest share Germany, France, Holland, UK), air transportation becomes very important, and the aviation industry fulfills the task for over 70% of the international tourist arrivals in Greece. In terms of passengers, 62 million passengers arrive or depart from Greek airports in 2018. The five largest airports in Greece are Athens, Heraklion, Thessaloniki, Rhodes, and Chania, which handle almost 28 million passengers. It is noteworthy that for Heraklion, Rhodes, and Chania, almost 90% of the passengers are leisure travelers during the summer, and almost 65% of the traffic in Athens and Thessaloniki accommodated during the summer season, (Sartzetaki et al. 2019).

According to the FAA (2014) and Eurocontrol (2004) analysis framework, a survey of ATCO serving a sample of 35 out of 40 Greek airports is contacted. The survey structure includes a questionnaire focusing on ATCO stress management comprehensive and the proposed interventions to improve stress management. The structure of intervention is following those presented by Costa (1995; 2001) and highlighted by Eurocontrol (2004) and FAA (2014). The following paragraphs breakdown the key findings, and the questionnaire results upon ATCOs' occupational stress management.

4.1. External Socio-Economic Environment

A very important parameter in stress management is social support. According to many researchers, it is one of the three factors that concur in determining stress conditions. It can be seen in two main aspects: a) the availability of social services for ATCOs' needs and b) the recognition at a social level of the importance of ATCOs' activities and, consequently, c) its appreciation by the general population.

The first stage to active external support is to understand deeply how stress impacts daily life, and this may impact totally different for any employee. Self-assessment is, therefore, indispensable for maintaining the will to work, and to work well. This is probably due to scarcity of information and therefore, the ATC services providers should

increase their activities in the field of public relations in order to give people proper understanding and formal information about the ATCOS' activities and more specifically, about the complexity of such activities, so that people can better appreciate and understand the importance the ATCOs' profession and its role in our modern world.

4.2. Interventions on the used technology

The procedures of ATC services equipment upgrade such as total radar coverage of air space, is the main factor which enables the requested shift in quality, not only in terms of work efficiency, but also in terms of stress levels, by reducing cognitive, memory and communicative loads as well as uncertainty and unforeseen ability of the situations (that are, in most cases, the main sources of strain). Technological development towards to operating under "multi-radar" assistance permits a further increase in levels of reliability and safety as well as a decrease in stress levels.

The improvement in coordinating the information flow among the air traffic control centers in order to assure an increasingly safe, regular, and expeditious air traffic flow is the other milestone that allows ATCOs to operate safely and quietly. This can be achieved by implementing modern telecommunication and radio assistance systems and by improving the efficiency and reliability of equipment, as well as by the progressive automation of the aeronautical information service, flight data processing, and air traffic management. These allow for better planning of air traffic and, consequently, a more balanced workload among centers, sectors, and individual ATCOs. These improvements may also subsequently reduce the possibility or the seriousness of many unforeseen situations, by allowing for more reliable information and more time for solving problems and making decisions, while eliminating many stressful and risky traffic peaks.

It is widely accepted that the introduction of advanced automated systems in ATC activities can radically change job demands and content; therefore, it has to be carried with the proper scientific assistance. The goal of progressive automation is to maximize system safety and efficiency by reducing human workload and error. However, it can also increase some problems related to both cognitive processes and operative procedures. There is a justifiable concern for increased human boredom, decreased motivation, loss of situational awareness, over-reliance on and misuse of automated systems, and deterioration of skill.

4.3. Interventions in Working Place and Task Structure

It is very important to give particular attention to assure that environmental conditions in the ATC workplaces are suitable and comfortable as concerns, in particular, lighting, noise, and microclimatic conditions. Key areas of interest are:

Lighting: ATCOs' task is performed almost exclusively in front of a visual display unit, so particular attention should be paid to providing lighting conditions that favor an optimal visual performance. Lighting conditions are completely different inside the control centers and the towers. In radar centers, dim light (under 200 lux) is usually used to favor the visual contrast on the screen. It has to be considered that the introduction of modern screens are brighter and in color, allows an increase of the illumination levels in the control room (up to 500 lux), thus avoiding excessive (and troublesome) luminance contrasts between central and lateral visual fields, making the environment more stimulating, thus increasing vigilance and alertness. The lighting should be indirect, obtained preferably by mixing natural and artificial light directed onto the ceiling and the walls and thus reflecting into the room. This gives diffuse lighting in the work environment without shadows and glare. Each artificial lighting unit should contain two or more phase-shifted tubes to avoid flickering, which is extremely annoying, causes visual discomfort, and makes the reading of the different traces on the screen more difficult. In the control towers, it is important to avoid excessive illumination levels due to external bright light using both anti-reflection glass and curtains; it is also necessary to have the possibility of positioning and to shield the visual display units to avoid indirect glare due to bright reflections on the screen.

Noise: the levels of noise inside ATC workplaces are usually under the risk level for loss of hearing but can have significant effects in terms of interference with speech communication, the disturbance of mental concentration, and annoyance. We have to underline the peculiarity of verbal communication, carried out in a foreign language for most of the pilots and ATCOs, and containing many unfamiliar, technical, and cipher words that are used in the radiotelephony language.

Indoor air quality: the proper temperature of the workplace is another important factor supporting the maximum efficiency of performance. It is well-documented that conditions of thermal discomfort favor loss of concentration and efficiency of mental tasks with a consequent increase of errors and irritability. Microclimatic conditions must be maintained within the range of thermal comfort that is air temperature between 20 and 24oC, humidity between 30% and 70%, and air velocity between 0.05 and 0.5 m/sec. To ensure these conditions, it is necessary to install adequate air conditioning systems which must be maintained efficiently to guarantee a good indoor air quality. Indoor air, in fact, can be polluted both from human activities (odors, exhaled carbon dioxide, smoking, etc.) and by environmental contaminants (chemical substances, microbes, etc.). So it is obvious that indoor air must be periodically changed (at least three times per hour) and purified (passing through adequate filters) in order to avoid people complaining of symptoms related to the so-called "sick building syndrome" (lethargy, tiredness, headache, blocked nose, dry eyes, sore throat, wheeziness, cough, general itchiness) that can disturb not only work performance, but also cause sickness and absenteeism.

Workstation design: the configuration of the workstation, along with standardization of the panel layout, is required. Practice has many times proved that an appropriate use of colors, symbols, line shaping, windows, and figures facilitates and hastens data recognition and extraction. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that drastic changes in workstation design and man/machine interfaces, often made possible by technological improvements, should be adopted very carefully, as they can cause excessive stress and decreased performance due to difficulties in the adaptation of mental processes and operating procedures.

Visual display units: the interaction between the ATCO and a visual display terminal is mainly characterized in terms of data acquisition and interactive communication. The ATCO has a continuous dialogue with the radar-computer system by calling up information, scanning traces, inputting, reading, and deleting data. The ATCO concentrates mainly on the radar screen and periodically glances at the side displays and keyboard. The radar screen should be placed in the centre of the visual field and should be adjustable in height, distance and angle to give the operator the possibility of arranging the best working position in order to avoid, on the one hand, prolonged contraction of the neck muscles and, on the other hand, an excessive effort of visual adjustment with consequent visual discomfort and fatigue.
Therefore, it is recommended that the screen be placed within a viewing angle of 5° above and 30° below the horizontal plane of sight and that the eye-screen distance is between 50 and 70 cm to facilitate the visual adjustment. To give the operator the possibility of coming closer to the screen in order to focus better on traces in moments requiring particular attention, it is necessary that the table-top be not overly large but, at the same time, able to support the arms without interference with the keyboard.

Sitting postures: ATCO usually remains seated in front of the console, changing position slightly according to the working conditions. ATCO normally sits in the middle of or forward on the chair with his or her arms on the table-top when he or she is actively operating and needs precise control of the radar screen and leaning on the backrest when he or she is on stand-by. A prolonged, constrained sitting posture causes muscular-skeletal discomfort and pain, particularly at the level of the neck, the shoulders, and the lumbar tract. To avoid or alleviate such disturbances, it is important to use suitable chairs which allow a comfortable sitting posture while working, as well as useful muscle relaxation while on stand-by or resting in front of the screen. A good chair should be designed for a forward and reclining sitting posture, adjustable in height and angle, rotating on a five-legged base. It should also have user-friendly controls; have wide arms and a high backrest, a pad for lumbar support and a headrest. The seat should be made of a sufficiently resistant padding of foam rubber covered with non-slip and permeable

material, and it should also have a slight hollow, and a rounded front edge turned upwards about 4 to 6 degrees above the horizontal plane. The break periods between operational duties should also be used as "postural pauses," the controller should stand and walk around, stretching his body. Moreover, a program for improving physical fitness should be planned, aimed at preventing lower-back pain by providing gymnasiums to be used by the ATCOs during their relief periods. There should also be technical guidance aimed at showing the most appropriate exercises that should be done for the most effective "postural pause."

4.4. Interventions to personality and behavior

The proper and adequate management of occupational stress requires that the individual learn how to deal with it effectively through the adoption of certain personal lifestyles and behaviors. People should avoid ineffective ways of reducing occupational stress, which can have an apparent short-term positive effect but, in the long run, can cause further problems in health and well-being. Examples of these are smoking, alcohol drinking, and drug consumption. To stay in satisfactory condition, people should pay particular attention to physical exercise, eating habits, sleeping patterns, relaxation techniques, and leisure activities. There is no doubt that physical exercise, if carried out regularly and in a non-competitive way, is beneficial for all the body functions improving both physical and psychological wellbeing.

Training is of crucial importance for the education of ATCOs in terms of stress management. A custom-made training program aiming at understanding the needs and capacities of the individual, and balancing individual needs with organizational needs, is able to improve not only technical learning but also motivation, job satisfaction, and human relations. Training should also aim, in particular, at teaching occupational and specific coping strategies in order to improve the capacity of event appraisal and problem-solving. Additionally, ATCOs should be trained to develop action-oriented and problem-focused coping abilities. Positive acceptance and reappraisal of stress situations, active coping, and seeking social support for instrumental and emotional reasons must be strengthened, while inclination towards restraint coping, behavioral, and mental disengagement should be restricted.

An important part of the training should also be devoted to improving the interaction between ATCOs and pilots, promoting meetings aimed at increasing a mutual understanding of each other's work tasks, problems, and operational behaviors. Refresher courses on the proficiency of the English language for non-native speaking people are very important for improving self-confidence and avoiding stressful and risky misunderstandings while communicating on radio frequencies and on the telephone.

5. Concluding remarks

Psycho-organizational aspects can be identified as affecting quality and safety outcomes in high-risk organizations with highly reliable operations. Occupational stress is affecting the workplace across industries. This fact, coupled with its rising cost to the individual, to industry and to society - as a whole - has greatly heightened awareness of the need for effective and innovative ways of tackling stress. Occupational stress is related to cost rising of services and human capital management for organizations, providers, and enterprises. Therefore, its widely recognized the greatly heightened awareness of the need for effective and innovative ways of tackling stress.

The implementation of QMS and stress prevention plans at the ATC workplace has proved particularly effective in combating stress, by unknowledge the stress sources and causes, rather than merely treating its effects. According to a system of system approach, this paper provides compact and coherent directions to prevent stress in specific occupations, particularly exposed to stress. This paper indicates several preventive measures targeted to stress management in ATS providers, rather than the stress treatment of its effects. The paper promotes key drivers for action that ATC managers should be taken into consideration and promotes measures that can become an integral part of the necessary organizational development of an air transport enterprise.

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Between Values and Power; Ideological Orientation of *Santri-Based Parties in Indonesia*

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Abstract

Political parties in Indonesia have evolved from time to time, including *santri*-based political parties. The management board changes, constituent demands, and the impact of power relation are the factors that influence the political parties' changes. The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between values and power in the *santri*-based parties, in relation with the consistency of the parties and the politicians in a struggle for supporting ideology practices. The methods of this study are literature review and participant observation by using content analysis, discourse analysis and self-reflective. The findings indicate that the *santri*-based parties face a dilemma and burden in practicing Islamic values when they had been elected for house representative or executive position. As a result, the elected politicians often act pragmatically beyond the platform of the party. This study classifies the *santri*-based parties into two groups: out-of-the-law party and disorientation party. The former means that the party neglecting and not comply with the principles, values, and norm that stated in the party constitution in obtaining power. PKB, PAN and PKS are examples. While the latter means the party actions and program has developed beyond the party goals and constitution. PPP is an example. The major cause is the internal vulnerable condition the party encountering that triggered by conflict in gaining mass basis support. Furthermore, the Islamic parties also experience external competition with nationalist religious party in gaining votes. However, even though the Islamic parties have internal and external challenges, *santri*-based parties remain acknowledged as a significant political force. This is because the Islamic party has significant and real social support from Muslim voters and strong bargaining power in the political arena in Indonesia.

Keywords: *santri*-based parties, values, power, pragmatism, ideological orientation

Introduction

Rapid political development in Indonesia after Suharto's administration make the political parties experiencing structural and strategy changes in gaining public support and winning the election, maintaining power, including *santri* (devoted Muslim scholar)-based party (Nurhasim, 2016). *Santri* politics defines as a party movement that develops their ideology and constitution based on Islamic values. The parties categorized as *Santri*-based are PPP (*The United Development Party*), PKB (*The National Awakening Party*), PAN (*The National Mandate Party*), PBB (*The Crescent Star Party*) and PKS (*The Prosperous Justice Party*) (Yunanto, 2013). Three indicators identified that the *santri*-based parties orientation has changed. First, the support from PPP and PKB

for Ahok (Basuki Tjahya Purnama) as a candidate for Governor of Jakarta as well as the support from PPP for the Vice Governor of North Sumatra in 2018, Sihar Sitorus, without considering the background of religion and behaviors that are considered contrary to the values shared by the community. Second, the parties are incapacity in controlling corruption practices committed by their members both in the executive and legislative. Third, the inconsistency of parties in policy formulation and practice.

In Indonesian political history, the political role of *santri* is significant and continues until nowadays. The political role of *santri* is in line with the expectations of the people who need political channels as well as antithesis of the role of nationalist parties in the political arena. However, being dominant and the leading party is far from the reality due to intense competitiveness of the political arena and thus make the holistic implementation of the Islamic value is not easily practiced when the Muslim politician was elected. Many political intrigues and personal interests determine the role.

Relations between Islam and state has provided area research that investigates the involvement of *santri* in politics. The study of politics and political Islam in Indonesia always involves entities of *santri*. Even though both are on two different positions, but the relations is interlinked. *Santri* is identified as a pious and obedient Muslim, particularly in conducting five times prayers (Geertz, 1960). Politics is a media of movement for the implementation of Islamic values in the nation-state practice. The role of *santri* in politics is associated with the belief that Islam and the state are entities that need each other.

The study of *santri* politics has progressed, particularly after the Soeharto's "New Order" administration fell down. The study of *santri* politics can be classified into three models. *First,* the philosophical and fundamental study of the relations between Islam and state in the relation to the position of Islam as the source of value in the nation-state practice and the way to attaching Islam and democracy. There are several recent studies about this issue raised by Effendy (Effendy, 1998), Abdullah (2011), and Woodward (2015).

Second, the study of Islamic practice in practical politics. This study deals with the concept of Islamic practice in Indonesian political life. The emergence of political terms in political Islam that manifests in party and religious organizations' symbols becomes part of this study. Haris (2008), Baswedan (2004), Amir (2003), Romli (2014), Thantowi (2005), and Carnegie (2008) are the scholars who explored the issue.

Third, the internal and external dynamics of *santri*-based parties. Internal dynamics are related to power struggles and conflict management, while the external dynamics are related to the integration model of power and power struggle with the nationalist parties. There are several studies conducted by Assaukanie (2004), Yunanto and Hamid (2013), Hamayatsu (2011), Mahmudi (2008), Umam and Junaidi (2017), Wanto (2012), and Nurhasim (2016).

This study has different specifications compared to previous studies. This study has three aims. *First,* it analyzes the power relations and the role of *santri*-based parties in struggling for Islamic values in political life. *Second,* it investigates the reconciliation process of Islamic values with democracy under political parties' platform. *Third,* it observes the consistency of *santri*-based parties struggle for a political ideology based on religious values and democracy. This study plays significant role in evaluating religious ideological domain of *santri*-based parties, regardless religious ideology as a booster, a reinforcement or simply used as a tool to reach a political acknowledgement. Further, the study also aims to identify the difference between Islamic and nationalist parties, and how their future in Indonesian political stage.

This paper also discuss some subtopics related to the core issue studied. First, portray the relations between political party and power. Second, reveal the dilemma between values and power. Third, discuss political pragmatism. Final parts of this paper are conclusion and suggestion regarding possibility of further study.

Various Perspectives on Political Party Ideology

Ideology (Springer, et.al, 2009), of political party in Indonesia is divided into two categories: secular-Islamic ideology and democracy-pro market (Sugiono, Muhadi, Mas'udi, 2008). While Evans (2003) made left-right categories that lead to the "Islamic-secular" and "socialist-liberal." Pratikno (2006), on the other hand, uses the category "elitist-populist" and "Islam-Western/secular". These theories are not really shifting from the old theories, between the "Islam-secular," "traditional-conservative" or "Java-non Java" (Feith, Castles, 1970).

Based on this categorisation, politics in Indonesia leads to the three strong categories; "Islamist," "nationalists" and "secular nationalists." Aminudin and Masykuri (2015), divide the ideology of *santri*-based parties into two categories: "Transnational Islam" ideology (Hilmy, 2011) that adapts the model of the Middle East parties such as PKS, and "National Islam" ideology which was divided into "conservative" and "moderate." Conservative is represented by PPP and PBB (Gjorshoski, 2015), while moderate is represented by PKB and PAN (Amir, 2003). While Pepinsky, Liddle and Mujani (2018) used term "Islamic parties" refer to PKB and PAN, and "islamist parties" refer to PPP and PBB.

The ideological orientation is often obscured by the interests of the party or the behavior of the elites and political party's members. According to Bettcher (2005), there are two dimensions attached in political parties, (i) ideology (principle) or/and (ii) pragmatism (interest). Within the dimensions, politics are always embedded to management boards and parties' constituent as political actors. Strom (1990) explained three goals of politician: (1) to be elected (re-election) in the parliament, as intended by all political parties (seek vote party); (2) To obtain status and power as executive position; (3) To promote the policy and ideology of the party in order to obtain a power bargain. Generally, politics is often understood as politics is all about power (Heywood, 2004). Politics is about what, how and when powers were obtained.

Meanwhile, the relations between political parties and powers are divided into two major groups; namely balance of power and dominant of power. According to Boucek (2009), in the balance of power relation, there are competitions, cooperation, and even conflict at the intra-level of political parties. Those conditions occur from the political factions.

The theories of rational change and network exchange are used to discuss the role and orientation of organizations and actors. According to Coleman (1992), the actions of someone in the organization leads to one purpose, and that purpose was (and action) is determined by the value and preference. Human actions are conducted based on rational choice. According to Peter M. Blau, understanding the social structure should be based on social processes that affect the relationship between individuals and groups. The relationship is based on those choices (Cohen, 1969).

Based on the theories of rational change and network exchange, the individual actors in politics are essential. As a rational actor, individuals are always goal-oriented that reflects what they consider of self-interest. To determine the efficient attitude and action, they have to choose between several options and determine which alternative will bring the most benefit and maximum use.

Coleman (1992) theory is originated from the network exchange theory or known as NET. This theory emphasizes on power. The premise is that the greater chance of the actors to exchange, the greater power of the actor. As a result of their position in the network, the actors (politician) will have various chances in seizing the opportunity to exchange, control and accumulate profit.

Methods

This study used a qualitative approach in understanding and developing propositions or explaining the meanings behind the events. Researchers are grounded in empirical facts about the behavior and obsession of *santri*-based parties in gaining and competing for power. This approach is presented naturally and then interpreted based on the views of researchers. Creswell (2013) called this approach as naturalistic-interpretative.

Data collection. The data of this research data are from books, journals, the organizational documents, and print and online media, such as Kompas, Tempo, Jawa Post and CNN. The media is a group of the mainstream media that is often referred to and read by Indonesian people. The media report daily the dynamics of Jakarta governor election between the ends of 2016 until May 2017. This research also conducted a participant observation. Researchers had interacted and engaged in discussions and meetings with the leaders of the parties.

Analysis. The researchers employ the content analysis technique to analyze the data. The analysis starts with setting goals, organizing categories, revising categories, making conclusions and interpretations (Marying, 2000). In addition, the analysis methods discourse is used as well. The analysis method discourse in politics conducted through set up a context, preparing materials, examining the text structure, identifying the divergent text, and interpreting the data and findings (Glynos, et. al., 2009). While the 'self-reflective" technique (Higgins and Johnson, 1998) is used to observe and understand the political events as researchers maintain close tie to some political actors.

Dilemma between Value and Power

Santri-based parties face a dilemma in the political constellation in Indonesia. As the representation of Muslim constituency, the party has an obligation to fulfill the political promises as a moral responsibility. This dilemma makes the party face an ignorant models that often ignore the principle of civility. What is more, the parties also have to adhere a holistic principles, values and religious norm. These principles and values are embedded through party symbols or implicitly developed by political preferences. The value is the standard norm of party that is transcripted in their constitution which stated the vision, missions, purposes and basis of the party movement and programs. The nomination processes of legislative and executive candidate as the party's main objectives must refer to organisation constitution.

Santri-based parties have two responsibilities: the guidance of religion values as well as the centre back of nationality values. These responsibilities are an obligation in servicing the mighty God and the community. The responsibilities of *santri*-based parties possess three aspects: theological, historical and sociological.

"Theological" responsibility is about the belief that politics is part of religion. Islam without sharia, politics is very difficult to implement (Syarif, 2013). In that context, the involvement in politics or the election of a leader is a necessity. The intellectuals with this traditionalist political thinking are Abu Hasan 'Ali ibn Habib al-Mawardi (975-1059), Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Sayyid Quthub (1906- 1966), and Abu 'Ala al-Maududi (1903-1979). Al Mawardi insisted that leadership is a part of politics, has aims to maintain and preserve the religion, and manage the world affairs. As al-Mawardi, Sayyid Quthub, Khalid Ahmad Syantut also confirmed the link between religion and politics. He said, "it is impossible to proselytize in goodness without the existence of the king (leader) in government because the commands and prohibitions basically cannot be realized without their leader" (Syarif, 2013). On this basis, *santri* and politics are one in separable unit.

"Historical responsibility" is the past history when the Prophet, companions and the scholars' (ulama') practiced Islam in the nation-state practice. The ways of the Prophet in integrating Islam and society both in Mecca and Medina were able to perform a new civilization through the model of *ummah.* The Prophet tradition was continued by *Khulafa 'al-Rashidin* so the term "*khilafah" or "khalifah"* in English known as caliph exist as the title of community leader (Khaldūn, 1993; Ridā, 1341 H; al-Sa'idî, 1977; Mulyani, 1997; Crone, Hinds, 1990). The title continued until the 20th century marked with the end of Turkey Uthmani leadership.

"Sociological responsibility" lies on the fact that 87% of Indonesia's population is Muslim, which requires a protection and political acknowledgment in the state constitution (Bruinessen, 1994; Haidar, 1994). The emergence of Islamic parties is a part of being protected and acknowledged in the nation-state practice. The strength of Islamic parties is quite dominant in the electoral history that gain between 30% to 43% of the national votes. The votes are very fluctuates, following the political trend in Indonesia. Those three responsibilities have always been the "shadow" of *santri*-based parties and demanded by constituents.

As a political party, the tasks of *santri*-based parties are supporting the Islamic values to become the principal and foundation on the nation-state practice in order to full fill the constituent expectations. The Islamic values as foundation of the party movement and campaign promise are two hard responsibilities to be practiced. The inability to interpret the two aspects lead to political elites conducting "wrong" decisions. One of the consequences of such misconduct is corruption or the authority misuse. Several party leaders went to jail within the last five years. They were Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (PKS) and Surya Dharma Ali (PPP). In the past two years, two governors of PAN party figures (Zumi Zola, Governor of Jambi and Nur Alam, Governor of Southeast Sulawesi) are suspects of corruption. The same thing happened to Anas Urbaningrum, Chairman of the Democratic Party known as genuine *santri* and the president of The Islamic Students Association (HMI). There was also *Kyai* Fuad Amin Imron, the Regent of Bangkalan, who was also jailed.[1] Some leaders of *santri*-based parties at the Provincial or District/City also experienced the same problem.

Some leader names of *santri*-based parties are the second generation after the independence of Indonesia. Most of them are *new santri* -a term for the generation of *santri* who take secular education both at home country and abroad. This generation enlives the modern Indonesian politics. The majority of Islamic parties activist are come from educated group of *new santri*. The combination of religion and knowledge as well as extensive network affects on the image and platform of the party. *New santri* is grouped into three types; convergent, radical and global. Convergent *santri* is the traditionalist or modernist Islamic activists who decided to coalesce with each other (Effendy, 2003). Radical santri feel pessimistic with the models of Islamic movement carried out by the traditionalists and modernists. They offer a radical change in Indonesia instead. Its main agenda is, *"the establishment of an Islamic state-would be the main agenda to replace the existing* state" (Machmudi, 2008). Global *santri* is a group of traditionalists and modernists that has been influenced by trans-national movements in the Middle East (Bruinessen, 2002). They joined the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Jamaah Tabligh (JT) and the Salafi groups.

The existence of *new santri* in the bureaucracy, professional world, academic., mass organizations and political organizations in one and half decades are the evidence of the *santri* role in national arena. In short, *santri contribute* in the middle layer of the new social strata. Therefore, they acknowledge as middle-class society. The upper-middle-class of this social group consists of members of parliament, general director, directors, heads of agencies, and the chair and key positions holder in various government agencies.

The examples of *new santri* figures are Mukti Ali, Nurcholish Madjid, Shafi'i Maarif, Dawam Rahardjo, and Abdurrahman Wahid. The factual impact of *new santri* role in nation-state arena is the public acceptance, especially Java to Islam. Islam has become a middle-class identity and a bureaucracy symbol in the New Order era. In the early 1990s, the relationship between Islam and the state reach its peak position. At this era, the relationship between Islam and the state becomes "complete." State (Soeharto) has a honeymoon period with Islam when *santri* join the bureaucracy and support the administration. Ricklefs acknowledge this era as the "completeness" of Islamization in Java with the presence of *new santri* groups in the national political stage (Ricklefs, 2013).

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[1] The mainstream media reported corruption practices of party leaders, such as Kompas, Jawa Pos, Detik, and Tempo. News about Lutfi Hasan Ishaq (PKS) can be seen between October to December 2013, news about Muhaimin Iskandar can be seen in May-July 2015, Surya Dharma Ali (PPP) news can be seen between May-July 20016, and news about PAN leaders involved in corruption can be viewed on news pages between April-September 2017.

The emergence of *santri* figures in elite bureaucracy occurs simultaneously through the government's accommodative policy, especially the New Order with the Islamic group. *Santri* groups enter the middle class as the result of this policy. There are countless groups of *santri* who become politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and even the military. However, even though many educated *santri* has involved in bureaucratic hierarchy in government administration, the values as the party standard norm are not completely run by *santri*-based parties. Referring to the Deliar Noer postulate, there are four groups of Muslims in Indonesia; (1) Muslims with commitment to Islam; (2) Muslims who cooperate with the government; (3) Muslims who simply believe Islam is just "teaching"; and (4) Muslims who integrate religion and politics (Noer, 1998). *New santri* were in all groups mentioned above.

The emergence of *new santri* is not proportional to the practice Islamic value in the society. Some views believe that *new santri* is just an hyperbolic myth (Romli, 2014), but in fact, it has no significant impact in politics-or even considered fail, the evidence of this opinion is develop based on the result of the election time to time. Since the 1955 election, the santri based parties just gaining 43% of voters and become just 30% in average during the Reform Era. The electoral result affects the political power of *santri* who become subordinate over the Nationalist Party.

Political Pragmatism

The poor result of *Santri*-based parties in election makes the parties pragmatic. Pragmatic party would eliminate the role of the party's ideology in every action. The party's decision is no longer based on the standing point of ideology, but rather to consider the logic of profit and loss (Mahadi, 2011). Political pragmatism of *santri*-based parties is motivated by the *"dynamic"* and "relaxed" atmosphere of the parties go towards political pragmatism. By definition, it can be called as pragmatic if the parties give priority to short-term interests by setting aside the normative values of the party. In other words, the pragmatic parties put the interests of a practical way or the results more important than other things as long as they win.

Dynamic means that politics cannot be separated from the internal tension and conflict among political factions. The emergence of faction occurs from the ambiguous relationship between political parties and mass organizations as the political patron. At this case, PKB, PKNU (The Ulama National Awakening Party) and PPP are the right example. Those three parties have the same history because they are established or facilitated by the leaders of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the biggest muslim organization) and *pesantren* (Islamic bording school). They claimed as part of NU. As the consequence, they experienced intervention and mixture of political interest with NU as mass organizations. In many cases in some areas, the board of the party also becomes the board of NU. For nearly a decade, those three parties are trapped with severe internal conflict.

Relaxed atmosphere means that *santri*-based parties are moderate and open minded. At this term ideology is not much revealed. It has been shown from the involvement of non-Muslim groups and non-*santri* in the management board of the party. They start having much closer relations with the other groups and parties because of they are moderate and open minded.

In the last few elections, it is revealed the relaxed atmosphere of *santri* politics phenomena. Firstly, there is the emergence of a new spirit of change in the nationalist parties to become "nationalist-religious" party. The evidence of this new spirit is when PDIP (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), the Democratic Party, the National Democratic (Nasdem Party), and the Golongan Karya Party proclaimed themselves as a nationalist-religious party. Some of them accommodated Muslim activists and leaders in their religious affiliation organisation. Secondly, there is no internal conflict management model that reflects the behavior of *santri*. Their internal conflict often more vulnerable than the nationalist parties. The terrible internal conflict had happened in 2000 to 2009 in PKB, PKNU and PBR (The Star Reform Party), and PPP in 2014 - 2015. The internal conflicts often involved well-known and influential *kiai* (ulama'), which can reduce their authority.

Thirdly, there is a trend of Islamic parties to become more moderate. PKB and PKS are the example. These two political parties have strong traditional stance in implementing Islamic norm and value in nation-state arena but recently both parties become more moderate and shifted to the middle. They adapt to the external changes and dynamics outside the party (Hamayotsu, 2011). Meanwhile, PPP with its Islamic ideology, board, and representatives of Islamic groups started to lose their political orientation. The recent example was that when PPP support Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) in Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2016. Despite the dualism gubernatorial support of PPP, both PPP led by Romahurmuzy and PPP led by Djan Farid support Ahok. The same thing happened in the nomination of the Deputy Governor of North Sumatra, Sihar Sitorus, paired with Jarot Saiful Hidayat (2018). It is very questionable that PPP shows uncommon support to those leaders because PPP is usually embedded with Islamic voice and interests of the Muslims. The *branding* of PPP as the "house of Muslims" become empirically opposite with the facts.

Political rationality aspects become one of the options as the result of those situation. Political rationality develop based on the profit and loss consideration, therefore the process of political transactions cannot be ignored (Coleman, 1992). They consider the profit in making decisions. The bidding process in the party decision-making process has reciprocal agreement that is not solely erected based on the value and norm consideration. The rational values develop through the calculation, how much political investment should be spent and how much political gains could be earned (Cohen, 1969).

The political rationality identified through two indicators. First, the number of *santri* politicians switching their membership from one party to another party. It is very easy to find the former Islamic party activists change their membership and support nationalist parties[2]. Several cases in the 2014 election can be found in Islamic parties. PKB politicians switch their membership to the NasDem Party, such as Effendi Choirie, Hj. Lily Wahid, Hasan Aminuddin, and Hermawi Taslim. The transfer previously happened when Chotibul Umam Wiranu moved to the Democratic Party, AS Hikam became the Hanura politician, and Choirul Anam moved to Gerindra. The membership changes of PKS politicians also occurred in the same year, such as Misbakhun to the Golkar Party and Yusuf Supendi to the Hanura Party. Zainal Maarif is also another example. He changed his membership from PPP/PBR (2004) to the Democratic Party. The membership change dynamic also happened at the level of the management of provincial[3] and district/city. Many reason behind those political party membership changes, most of them stated that they has been reach their saturation point and seeking another challenge, but some of the change their membership because they had lose in the internal competition. This is because they are always looking for an efficient way to achieve the goal (Coleman, 1992).

Second, there is the political segmentations of *santri* in rural area and lower-middle-class that has high emotional politicial embeddedship. Some *santri*-based parties like PKB and PPP still rely on rural area based-especially in Java-, which less concerned about the political developments. Their political preferences are caused by a common religious outlook and political gifts and campaign promises during the general election.

Ideological disorientation?

The discourses above demonstrate the Islamic parties' ideological reduction process. Referring to the Haris (2016) postulate, Islamic parties are not only "nervous" but also experiencing disorientation. It is based on Islamic parties' incapacity to formulate clear, comprehensive and implementable strategies. Voters are difficult to distinguish any difference between the *santri*-based parties with each other except the symbol and color differentiation. Ambardi (2009) underlined that ideology consideration stops at the time of the election. Ideology can only be seen when they fight for gaining the votes during elections (Ambardi, 2009; Wanto, 2012).

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[2]. For example, Gus Ipul (Syaefullah Yusuf, Deputy Governor of East Java), initially took charge of the PDI-P, and then moved to the PPP, moved again to the PKB. After losing in the competition with Muhaimin Iskandar, he resigned from PKB. The same case happened to Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Effendy Choirie, Chotibul Umam Wiranu, Bursah Zarnubi, etc.

[3] For example, in East Java in 2014 until now, some politicians of *santri* move to the nationalist party. Such as Anwar Sadat of PKB/PKNU moved to Gerindra. Hasan Aminuddin and some board of NasDem in East Java come from PKB. Mohammad Mirdas' previous career was in the PPP, but now has moved to Perindo.

In addition, *santri*-based parties are also trapped with the tendency of pragmatism similar to nationalist party. Therefore, the Islamic characteristics either formally shown by PPP and PKS or informally shown by PKB and PAN do not own the "market share" electorally. The voters cannot understand clearly the quality of Islamic parties, compare to nationalist parties. In fact, the *santri*-based parties often perform a coalition with any party and support anyone who becomes a governor or regent/mayor regardless of religious background or *track record of* the candidates, as long as they have political advantageous.

The relation between s*antri*-based parties and voters described above shows that ideological consideration in not the only consideration in giving vote in the election. The voters' preference is also determined by the voter's interest. The voters' interest is the closeness of voters with the selected parties. This closeness is developed based on the proximity of the interests with party, through media campaign. Mujani and Liddle (2010) argue "Voters were influenced in addition by the media campaigns of parties and presidential candidates, by their perceptions of the state of the national economy and by their evaluations of governmental performance." Within this voters' behavior, Hamayotsu (2011) indicates that the voters' pragmatism behavior potentially create a disaster for the *santri*-based parties and will make them losing their public role if it is not managed properly. This view is quite reasonable because several nationalist parties also demonstrate their Islamic spirit in a various level of policies has been set up. Further, many nationalist party, support some *santri* politicians in local election as Governor and Regent/Mayor.

However, the facts that have been discussed above cannot be generalized to all *santri*-based parties. Referring to Haris' postulate in distinguishing between the Islamic political party with nationalist parties classify are difficult to be determined. But this condition is not applied for all *santri*-based parties. For example, PPP, which clearly and firmly has known as Islamic party, but in fact it experienced disorientation of purposes in the policies of the party. While PKB, PAN and PKS experienced inconsistency in applying parties' policies. These inconsistencies are caused by both internal and external conflicts of interest which lead to utilise all means to develop relationships with ruling administration. This view is more accurately described as out-of-the-law (Boucek, 2005). While the assumption of "national Islam" remains as ideological trend of *santri*-based parties although they have fluctuate relationships with the power.

Parties that are inconsistent in building relationships with ruling power are mostly caused by internal and external conflicts. A conflict is created by the internal faction competition in reaching party domination. The government's recognition through the Minister of Law and Human Rights (KumHAM) for certain faction, led to other factions to think pragmatically by setting up a new party or switching their membership to another party, even though they are different in ideology. It seems that real faction (Boucek, 2005) is stronger than the personal faction. Real faction is usually constructed by the different of political principles, objectives and attitudes that lead to each member take a different stance with the general principles of the party. The political party faction acted pragmatically in seeking government recognition. It seems as effort in seeking profit (incentives) especially in selective incentives (Storm, 1990), short-term profit--rather than the collective incentives.

In regards to the discussion above, there are two political roles of *santri*-based parties in the future. First, *santri* politicians are getting narrow in the national stage. This is because *santri*-based parties faces difficulties to compete with nationalist parties due some considerations; (1) It is difficult to find a figure to support in national politics in electoral competitions of President and Vice President. Not many second-tier party figures emerged after the era of Gus Dur and Amien Rais that is acceptable among *santri* as well as the nationalist elite. Meanwhile, the second-tier groups of nationalists continue to emerge with the birth of young competitive cadres. Political scape in the next ten or twenty years is estimated to range from the fight between the nationalists vs nationalists. It is estimated that Jokowi vs Prabowo is still a central issue in the next decade. Furthermore, the next period will continue between Puan Maharani (the daughter of Megawati) vs Agus Harimurti (the son of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) as the chidren of the former presidents, or other young leaders of the nationalists and the military. Meanwhile, the figures of *santri* have not appeared with promising strength and charisma. The

political power of *santri* is expected to be subordinate of nationalist political that has been established; (2) It is vulnerable as the party's internal conflicts will interfere the organization consolidation. Political parties do not have a strong management in managing internal conflicts, so that any political difference is always accompanied by internal conflict; (3) Some Islamic political parties still show their image as the "elite party," or "gentry party." There is contention in selection and pointing process of party management board at the national, provincial or district/city level which still considering the *dynasty* of the family especially the one who has title as *kiai, nyai* and *gus*.

Second, *santri*-based parties will have stronger bargain due to the growth of Muslim population in Indonesia. In the recent era, there are new detrimental movement to Muslims. In this context, the Islamic party must take advantage by displaying a solid, professional, and comprehensive image and portraying modern and peaceful organisation compare to the radical Islamic political movements which weaken the position of Islam in the national political atmosphere. The negative image of radical Islamic political movements that displays as stiff, extreme and undemocratic should be changed by the *santri* leaders by displaying the exact opposite behavior. They should show Islam as a peaceful religion, not extreme and accommodate democratic value. When the *santri*-based parties fails in convincing the voters and provide a significant evidence of the elite behavior in represent Islamic value in nation development process, the *santri*-based parties will getting smaller.

Discussion about the *santri*-based parties political ideology, above, have shown that *santri* politics is merely "symbolic." *Santri* politics is only a symbols represented by the political parties in the name of s*antri*-. The *santri*-based parties labelling has shown through the organization constitution, the logo, and the utilisation of religious symbols such as caps, turbans, heads carves, mosques and *madrasah* (Islamic school) for gathering voters support. Furthermore, in order to maximizing the support, the claim of having some mass base organisation support, and the support from other proponent religious organisation must be declared in advance. In this context, *santri* become "tools" instead of "goal." A tool for gaining short-term political interests in accessing political power in legislative and executive position. Therefore, the substantive of *santri* politics are not deliberated clearly. *Santri* politics is the politics of struggle in practicing Islamic values in the life of the nation. The values are demonstrated through honesty, discipline, work ethic and hard work. The values are not just jargon but need to be practiced in daily life of the actors and their environment.

Conclusion

Politics of pragmatic consideration (rational choice) is more prominent than the politics of value, as it is reflected in the theological principles (monotheism) of s*antri*-based parties. It can be justified that the aspect of theological value is not solely the goal as well as the use of Islamic symbols that attribute their performance. *Santri* politics faces many challenges during the last one and half decades. The challenges occur from both internal and external aspects. The internal challenge is the failure of *santri* practicing the values of *santri* in politics because of their normative, historical and sociological responsibilities. The external challenge is the nationalist parties pressure that campaigning religious character of their parties' platform. Practically, s*antri*-based parties just perform symbolically, not substantively. The ideologies, rules and spirit are not proportional to the performance and behavior of the party' leaders. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between *santri*-based and non-*santri*-based parties, or between the behaviors of *santri* and non-*santri* politicians. They have no difference in behaviours.

Resuming this discussion, *santri* politics can be grouped into two groups. *First,* the parties that conduct any means to gain power and neglecting the principles, values, and norm that stated in the party constitution. These parties are PKB, PAN and PKS. *Second,* the party that experiencing obscurity of direction and objectives of the struggle, or even have misled over their existing goals. The example of a party who experiences disoriented ideology is PPP.

Nonetheless, the study of *santri* politics remains an interesting issue in the next decades. The Islamic political party continues to modernize both the platform and program. What is more, the nationalist parties continue to need support and political legitimacy of religious groups. In the era of President Jokowi, even afterwards, the political power of *santri* continues to be an alternative power in supporting the nationalist political forces.

In relation with this issue *santri* must be able to translate the doctrine of Islam and used for strengthening, tightening, and enlightening public life. Moreover, it must be demonstrated by the santri's ability in enhancing their livelihood. There are two old proverb that should be considerate by santri in their involvement in politic; "organized badness has better chance to gain a victory than unorganized goodness" and "the voice of people is the voice of God". This two proverbs may be regarded as a theological clue for s*antri* to take side into the majority voters, included *abangan* (disobedient adherents) group. It is a part of the efforts to hear and pick up "the voice of God".

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China Embraces Capitalism and the Prospect of Bankruptcy of State-Owned and Private Companies: Can Provisions for Individual Bankruptcy Be Far Behind?

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Abstract

As part of its economic transformation, China has adopted several of the core elements of capitalism, and in the process, has recognized the possibility of bankruptcy for both state-owned-enterprises and private companies. Part I of this paper outlines the main characteristics of the Chinese economy, especially focusing on export and import activities. Part II of the paper outlines in detail the procedures identified as part of the Chinese bankruptcy regulatory environment in order to understand the role that bankruptcy plays in the capitalist model in assuring that decision-making will be conducted on the basis of financial data and will not based on political considerations. At the same time, however, the paper underscores that the prospect of bankruptcy must also be viewed from the prism of internal Chinese politics and traditions relating to socialism. The Chinese government must take into account the prospect of social unrest that the possible bankruptcy of an enterprise would have on Chinese workers, perhaps further weakening the role of the Communist Party in Chinese society. Information is provided regarding bankruptcies that have taken place under the new law. Finally, the paper discusses the possibility of creating a system of bankruptcy for individuals in China which was not a part of the original legislative scheme.

Keywords: Bankruptcy, Reorganization, Liquidation, Exports, Imports, State-owned-enterprises, Belt and Road Initiative

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, China has occupied a unique position in international finance. In pursuit of its policy of creating a "socialist market economy" or "socialism with Chinese characteristics" (Lim, 2013), China has taken significant steps modernize and enhance its economic performance. As a part of evolving a strategy to achieve economic growth, China has opened its economy to the world, engaging in substantial import and export

activities and has adopted several of the core elements of capitalism, including accepting the possibility of bankruptcy for both state-owned-enterprises and private companies.

This paper will first outline the main characteristics of the Chinese economy, especially focusing on export and import activities because many of the companies inclined to take part in a bankruptcy proceeding—either *reorganization* or *liquidation*—are involved in the export and import sectors. The paper then outlines the procedures of the Chinese bankruptcy regulatory environment in order to understand the key role that the prospect of bankruptcy plays in the capitalist model, assuring that decision-making will be conducted on the basis of sound financial data and not based on political considerations. At the same time, the paper underscores the fact that the prospect of bankruptcy must be viewed from the prism of internal Chinese politics and traditions relating to socialism, where the Chinese government must take into account the social disruption that the bankruptcy of an enterprise would have on Chinese citizens, perhaps further weakening the role of the Chinese Communist Party in Chinese society (see Kelly-Meyrick, 2017).

PART I

2. The Chinese Economy (data adapted from Amadeo, 2019)

China's economy produced $25.3 trillion in 2018, based on purchasing power parity (e.g., Zhang & He, 2019), which takes into account the effect of exchange rates. China today is the largest economy in world, the European Union (EU) is in second position, at $22 trillion, and the United States is now third, producing $20.5 trillion (World Bank, 2019). In terms of its standard of living, China is still a relatively poor country occupying 73rd place in the world economy. China produces $18,120 in per capita income. In comparison, the U.S. gross domestic product per capita is $62,518.

Reflecting China's comparative advantage relative to labor (see Coxhead, 2007), China's standard of living permits companies to pay workers far less than American workers. Products made in China attract many overseas manufacturers to outsource jobs to China (Bartash, 2018; Osadchiy & Seshadri, 2019). These companies often ship the finished goods to the United States or to other markets around the world.

A key indicator of a country's economic performance is its unemployment rate. According to Trading Economics (2019), China's unemployment rate was 3.61% as of June 2019, down from 3.9% in January 2018. Statista.com (2019b) reports that there are 139.52 million Chinese workers employed in private enterprises; 57.4 million in state-owned units; and 3.47 million employed in collective- owned units. Chinese workers have become accustomed to full employment, slowly growing wages, and a rising standard of living.

2.1 Components of China's Economy

China built its economic growth, which until 2013, surpassed 10% on an annual basis, on low-cost exports of machinery and equipment. The Chinese government invested heavily in state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) (generally, Jia, Huang, & Zhang, 2019) to fuel its export economy. Many of these state-owned-enterprises proved less profitable than private firms, returning only 4.9% on assets compared to 13.2% for private companies. Harrison, Meyer, Wang, Zhao, and Zhao (2019) note that "Moreover, both SOEs and privatized SOEs significantly underperform in profitability compared to private firms." SOEs still dominate their sectors, including the "big three" energy companies: PetroChina, Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation.

In addition, because of limited available housing (Chen, Yang, & Wang, 2014), plans called for developing cities around factories in order to attract workers. Yeung and Howes (2006, p. 343) noted:

> "Along with economic achievement, housing problems in major cities in China have remained
> largely unsolved. Under the traditional planned economy since 1949, all housing production

was the responsibility of the State. Due to the lack of finance, new housing production has not been able to keep up with the increasing urban population. Urban housing reform introduced in 1988 proposed a strategy of developing affordable housing for the ordinary households through the private housing market. However the implementation of such a strategy has encountered a number of obstacles including the lack of a second hand housing market, an undeveloped real estate profession, unclear land and property legislation and an absence of proper property management support."

Man (2011, p. 20) commented:

"The rapidly rising housing prices and lack of affordable housing for low- and middle income urban households in China, particularly in big cities, have posed risks and challenges for a stable and harmonious society as sought by the Chinese central government. The current issues and challenges in the affordable housing system warrant attention and support from the Chinese government and the entire country to search for cost-effective and equitable public policies to deal with affordable housing needs to ensure sustainable development and a harmonious society in the future. The government needs to redouble efforts…."

Apparently, the crisis has not been completely alleviated (McCormack, 2018). As a result, *one-fourth* of China's economy is involved in real estate and real estate-related activities (see Li, Ji, Guo, & Chen, 2018). The government has also funded construction of railways, highways, roadways, and other infrastructure to support planned growth, amounting to approximately 9% of China's GDP (Wang, 2016). In order to meet these objectives, China imported massive amounts of building-related commodities, like aluminum and copper. Commodity.com (2019) reported that imports for mineral fuels, including oil, were $116.2 billion; iron ore, $57.1 billion; and copper and copper ore, $53.2 billion.

2.2 The "One Belt, One Road Initiative": The Centerpiece of the Chinese Economy and Influence

2013 also saw China's launch its "One Belt, One Road Initiative" with two developing countries, Kazakhstan and Indonesia (Johnston, 2018)—the largest global infrastructure project in history. According to Zhou (2018, p. 163), Chinese international expansion can be characterized into three aspects:

- "First, in terms of trade, China started exports (see Wang, Qiu, & Choi, 2018) mainly since its adoption of the open-door policy in the late 1970s (Bertinelli, 2018), and became the largest trading nation in 2012";
- "Second, is construction; China has become a major player in the global construction community";
- "Third, is investment; China has become the second largest nation of outbound direct investment in 2016" (see also Caesar, HaiBo, Udimal, & Osei-Agyemang, 2018). [In fact, China recorded $139 billion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2018. Since 1982, China has attracted approximately $3,362,941,779 in foreign investment (World Bank, 2019). According to the 2019 UNCTAD World Investment Report (2019), China was ranked as the world's second largest FDI recipient after the United States and before Hong Kong. According to Nordea Trade.com (2019), China's economy "was ranked the second most attractive to multinational companies for 2017-2019, only behind the U.S.].

China has committed itself to spending $150 billion annually to link 68 countries along the old *Silk Road* with Europe. Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch (2019) report, there were "a total of 1,974 Chinese loans and 2,947 Chinese grants to 152 countries from 1949 to 2017." China will construct ports, railways, pipelines, and even hotels (Liu & Lin, 2018). China intends to extend its influence throughout Eurasia (Cheng, Chen, Degterev, & Zhao, 2019) and even into Latin America through "technology-intensive exports" (Narins, 2018), rivaling the American-dominated transatlantic trading area. The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans Pacific Partnership, from which China had been excluded, has facilitated China's expansion plans (Neppalli & Hunter, 2018).

The "One Belt, One Road Initiative" was designed to accomplish four core objectives:

1. *Provide investments for China's extensive foreign exchange reserves* (generally, Horn, Reinhart, & Trebesch, 2019). At present, most of China's reserves are invested in U.S. Treasury Bills (see Fang & Liu, 2018; Chavez-Dreyfuss, 2019; Mayeda, 2019). Yet, as Cox (2019) notes, China had "reduced its holdings of U.S. debt in March 2019 by about $20.5 billion, bringing its overall ownership to $1.12 trillion. The holdings are at their lowest level in two years and come amid escalating trade tensions. There's worry that China might use its status as the world's No. 1 U.S. debt holder as leverage in trade negotiations."
2. *Provide new markets for China's high-speed rail firms, and for cement, steel, and metal exports.*
3. *Stabilize countries on China's western border* (Huang, Nie, Zhu, & Du, 2019).
4. *Increase China's claims in the South China Sea* (SCMP Reporter, 2019; Bodeen, 2019). Dutton (2011, p. 2) outlined the basis of the disputes in these three categories resulting "in recurring flashes of tension and conflict for approximately forty years. Notable incidents over sovereignty include the Chinese attack on the forces of the Republic of Vietnam in the Paracel Islands in 1974, China's attack on Vietnamese forces near Fiery Cross Reef in 1988, and China's military ouster of Philippines forces from Mischief Reef in 1995." Dutton (2011, pp. 43-44) continued:

> "A flare-up in tensions in the South China Sea began when China pressured Vietnam and several oil companies in connection with oil exploration and drilling off the Vietnamese coasts…. Disputes over sovereignty center on questions of which coastal states have the right to exercise the full measure of state authority over the physical territory of the islands in the South China Sea. They involve Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and perhaps Brunei, as well as China and Taiwan."

3. China's Exports

World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) (2019) reported that China's exports in *goods* amounted to $2.263 trillion in 2017. The European Union (EU) briefly assumed the first position in 2016. It now is second, exporting $1.9 trillion. The United States is third, exporting $1.6 trillion. Workman (2019b) noted that in 2018, "China's most valuable exported products were phone system devices including smartphones, computers including optical readers, integrated circuits or micro-assemblies, computer parts or accessories, processed petroleum oils, automobile parts or accessories, TV receivers, monitors and projectors, lamps and lighting including illuminated signs, solar power diodes or semi-conductors then miscellaneous furniture."

Statista.com (2019a) reported that in 2018, China shipped US$2.494 trillion worth of *goods* around the globe, representing a 6.5% gain since 2014 and a 10.2% increase from 2017 to 2018.

3.1 China's Top 10 Exports

Workman (2019b) provides the following export product groups which categorize the highest dollar value in Chinese global shipments during 2018. [Also shown is the percentage share each export category represents in terms of overall exports from China.]

1. Electrical machinery, equipment: US$664.4 billion (26.6% of total exports)
2. Machinery including computers: $430 billion (17.2%)
3. Furniture, bedding, lighting, signs, prefab buildings: $96.4 billion (3.9%)
4. Plastics, plastic articles: $80.1 billion (3.2%)
5. Vehicles: $75.1 billion (3%)
6. Knit or crochet clothing, accessories: $73.5 billion (2.9%)
7. Clothing, accessories (not knit or crochet): $71.4 billion (2.9%) (Baiadi & Bianchi, 2019)
8. Optical, technical, medical apparatus: $71.4 billion (2.9%)
9. Articles of iron or steel: $65.6 billion (2.6%)
10. Organic chemicals: $59.8 billion (2.4%)

Workman (2019a) notes that China's top 10 exports accounted for approximately two-thirds (67.7%) of the overall value of its exports. Organic chemicals represented the fastest-growing sector among China's top 10 export categories from 2017 to 2018, thanks to a 20.2% gain. In second place for improving export sales was the 15.6% increase for the articles made from iron or steel category.

Country-specific data shows that 62.3% of products exported from China were bought by importers from:

- United States (19.2%)
- Hong Kong (12.1%)
- Japan (5.9%)
- South Korea (4.4%)
- Vietnam (3.4%)
- Germany (3.1%)
- India (3.1%)
- Netherlands (2.9%)
- United Kingdom (2.3%)
- Singapore (2%)
- Taiwan (2%)
- Russia (1.9%).

3.2 China's Export Services by Category (Workman, 2019a)

Workman (2019) noted that "China provided US$228.1 billion worth of export *services* to clients around the globe during 2017. That dollar amount is 4.3% of the global total for services, and represents about one-tenth (10.1%) of the $2.263 trillion in exported products China shipped over the same timeframe." China's exported services increased in value by 10.8% since 2013 and appreciated 8.9% from 2016 to 2017.

The following are services exported by China in 2017. Eleven of these categories are considered *commercial services* and are worth 99.3% of all exported services from China. Government goods and services account for the remainder. [Also shown is the percentage share each export category represents in terms of overall exports of services from China.]

1. Miscellaneous business services: US$61.5 billion (27% of China's total)
2. Travel: $38.8 billion (17%)
3. Transport: $37.1 billion (16.3%)
4. Telecom/computer/information services: $27.8 billion (12.2%)
5. Construction: $23.9 billion (10.5%)
6. Manufacturing services on other's inputs: $18.1 billion (7.9%)
7. Maintenance/repair services: $5.9 billion (2.6%)
8. Intellectual property use: $4.8 billion (2.1%)
9. Insurance/pension services: $4 billion (1.8%)
10. Financial services: $3.7 billion (1.6%)
11. Government goods, services: $1.7 billion (0.7%)
12. Personal, cultural, recreational services: $759.3 million (0.3%)

In 2018, China furnished an estimated $266.8 billion worth of international services, encompassing about $42.3 billion from transport-related and $39.5 billion for travel-related services.

3.3 China's Imports

On the import side, China is the world's second largest importer. WITS (2019) reported that in 2017, it imported $1.843 trillion. By way of comparison, the United States, the world's largest, imported $2.3 trillion. China mainly imports raw commodities from Latin America and Africa. These include oil and other fuels, metal ores, plastics, and organic chemicals. China is the world's largest importer of aluminum and copper. In 2018, China imported US$2.135 trillion worth of goods from around the globe in 2018, reflecting a 9% increase since 2014 and a 15.8% increase from 2017 to 2018.

Workman (2019b) writes that "55.9% of China's total imports in 2018 were purchased from Asian countries. European trade partners accounted for 17.7% of imported goods bought by China. Smaller percentage of overall Chinese imports came from suppliers in North America (9.3%), Latin America (6.7%) (excluding Mexico but including the Caribbean region), Australia and other Oceanian sources (5.7%) and Africa (4.6%)."

The following product groups represent China's imports during 2018 by both dollar value and percentage share in terms of overall imports into China (Workman, 2019b):
1. Electrical machinery, equipment: US$521.5 billion (24.4% of total imports)
2. Mineral fuels including oil: $347.8 billion (16.3%)
3. Machinery including computers: $202.3 billion (9.5%)
4. Ores, slag, ash: $135.9 billion (6.4%)
5. Optical, technical, medical apparatus: $102.5 billion (4.8%)
6. Vehicles: $81.5 billion (3.8%)
7. Plastics, plastic articles: $74.9 billion (3.5%)
8. Organic chemicals: $67.4 billion (3.2%)
9. Gems, precious metals: $62 billion (2.9%)
10. Copper: $47.6 billion (2.2%)

Workman (2019b) notes that China's top 10 imports account for over three-quarters (77%) of the overall value of its product purchases from other countries. Imported mineral fuels, including oil, had the fastest-growing increase in value among the top 10 import categories, up 39.3% from 2017 to 2018. In second place was the organic chemicals category, showing a 20.7% increase, trailed by Chinese imports of machinery, including computers, which showed a 19.3% gain, and a 15.4% boost in copper imports. The sole decline shown among China's top import categories was gems and precious metals, with a 5.1% year-over-year decline. That decline was mostly caused by smaller imports of gold on international markets (Workman, 2019b).

PART II – BANKRUPTCY IN CHINA

4. The Chinese Economy and Bankruptcy

The twin facets of rapid industrial expansion, with its heavy emphasis on export related activities, and China's success in exporting services as indicated in Part I of this study, coupled with heavy borrowing, have not changed the economic reality that China's economy is slowing (Wei, 2019). As China's economy has continued to recede (Bermingham & Wang, 2019) and debt has piled up, the Chinese government made a decision to continue to pursue, perhaps now more seriously, one of the more controversial aspects of the capitalist systems: the real prospect of further enterprise bankruptcy.

Bendapudi (2008, pp. 206-207) provides a fitting context to the discussion of the evolution of bankruptcy in China:

> "Generous subsidies from the state, coupled with lack of competition from the private sector, meant that Chinese SOEs could never go bankrupt. As a result, China's business law framework was virtually non-existent until the late 1970s. Bankruptcy as a concept and the laws to govern the system were also non-existent in communist China. The 1986 Chinese

Enterprise Bankruptcy Law In the late 1970s under the leadership of late Premier Deng Xiaoping, China began to abandon the Soviet/Communist economic model and started to introduce market reforms. In response, the National People's Congress introduced the first Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1986. However, the 1986 bankruptcy law did not adequately address the complexities of insolvency in the transitioning Chinese economy, and it was also weakened by major discrepancies in enforcement."

The possibility of bankruptcy for many companies has confused many creditors and has required the Chinese judicial system to embrace one of the basic tenets of capitalism that had not been a part of the Chinese system before the onset of "socialism with Chinese characteristics," as China makes its transition from a system of state central planning to a market-based economy (see Hunter & Ryan, 1998, pp. 86-87). In this sense, notes Booth (2004, p. 94), "an effective bankruptcy law is an integral part of the institutional framework necessary for this transition." Wei (2019), however, notes that this possibility has left creditors concerned, "debtors fighting to save their businesses and judges on a mission to promote the benefits of bankruptcy."

The numbers relating to China's debt appear staggering. Wei & Ng (2010) report in the *Wall Street Journal* that at present, there are more than $17 trillion in outstanding bank loans in China. Chinese regulators have insisted that banks should recognize any loans more than *90 days past due as nonperforming*. Official data has found nonperforming loan ratios at 1.81%, ominously reflecting a total unpaid principal balance of about *$319 billion*. However, many analysts report that "the low ratio is widely thought to severely understate the level of bad debt on banks' balance sheets." On a macro level, as of October 2018, the national debt of China stood at approximately $5.2 trillion, equivalent to about 46.6% of Chinese GDP. In addition, Standard and Poor's Global Ratings (2019) indicated that Chinese local governments had amassed an additional $5.8 trillion in "off balance sheet debt."

Parry and Long (2019) noted that "The slow transformation of China, which is indeed ongoing, inevitably impacted upon efforts to introduce a modern bankruptcy law" which was accomplished in 1986. They continue: "Over time, pressures to enact a new bankruptcy law grew, including external pressures. Upon joining the WTO in December 2001 China was expected to transition to a more market-based economy."

The situation is complicated because of the dominance of state-owned-industries and companies heavily subsidized by the Chinese "mono banking" system. Turner, Tan, & Sadeghian (2012, p. 53) point out that the five largest banks in China are, in order of decreasing size, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and the Bank of Communications (BCOM). "Together these banks account for around one half of Chinese banking system assets and deposits. These banks are majority-owned by the Chinese state, but have private sector shareholders through their listings on the Hong Kong stock exchange."

In this circumstance, it had been commonplace for the government simply to continue to offer financial support to "favored industries or enterprises" in order to keep the economy functioning at the targeted range of an 8-10 percent increase in GDP. Decisions were often taken in favor of one group or another as a result of their political connections with the Chinese Communist Party, which "assisted distressed firms in gaining increments to debt financing and contributed to a higher likelihood of recovery" (He, XU, & McIver, 2019, p. 2770)—but at an economic cost. Parry and Long (2019) commented that:

> "At the time when the law was going through the reform process the state was rightly concerned about the potential impact of an unrestrained application of a new bankruptcy law to liquidate large numbers of uneconomic state-owned enterprises. This was a society of vastly differing levels of economic advancement in different regions and which lacked a developed social security infrastructure, with SOEs providing equivalent lifelong benefits to employees. If SOEs were simply liquidated there would be no social safety net. Significant numbers of market-driven bankruptcies could therefore have been disastrous in terms of social costs and there were fears of unrest."

5. An Introduction to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy

The *Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China* (PRC) was first enacted in 1986 (see Zheng, 1986; Chang, 1987; Harmer, 1996). Tomasic (2009, p. 211) writes that "The 1986 law had limited application and there was widespread recognition in China of the need for a more broadly based insolvency statute which served to facilitate both the reorganization and the winding up of companies and other business entities." On June 1, 2007, the new *Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the PRC,* which had been enacted in August of 2006, came into force (see Jiang, 2014).

To a large extent, China modeled its efforts to U.S. bankruptcy provisions found in U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy provisions (Jiang, 2013/2014) relating to reorganization, which are designed to allow Chinese companies to *restructure their debts* under court protection in order to keep businesses in operation, pay creditors over time, and to assuage the fears of Chinese workers who otherwise might lose their jobs when a debtor company collapsed. In effect, China transformed its bankruptcy from "inactive" to "active" status (Jiang, 2013/2014). Parry and Long (2019, p.) noted: "Reorganization, along the lines of the US Chapter 11 approach, can potentially preserve value by enabling jobs to be saved, while also bringing potential benefits of ongoing business relationships and higher returns to creditors through the negotiation and approval of a plan of reorganization."

However, there are major differences. China's system does not completely track the US system in that Chinese bankruptcy courts are inclined to protect the interests of shareholders over debtholders (Wei, 2019)—perhaps with the clear aim of averting social unrest and any potential challenge to the closed political system dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. Cheung (2019) of the law firm of Baker McKenzie also notes that "A significant feature of the legislation relates to the protection of workers' right. The regime ranks employees ahead of other unsecured creditors but behind secured creditors, who retain their priority over secured creditors." One other feature of Chinese bankruptcy law is that *it did not contain any provisions for personal bankruptcy protection*.

The 2006/2007 law contains 136 articles. Parry and Long (2019) provide an overview of the Chinese law:

> "The new law adopted a greatly reformed system of governance, reflecting a reduced role for the state. In insolvency systems, governance structures tend to involve a blend of controls by insolvency practitioners; the courts; the debtor, under supervision; and creditors. The Chinese law fits in with this pattern but it is notable that its blend is changing in accordance with the transition to a market-based system. State direction was ostensibly stripped away and a new role of administrator was created to oversee cases upon being appointed by the court. The use of a liquidation group remained possible in some instances, however, in particular to resolve labour related issues and to handle the bankruptcies of SOEs. Indeed the use of liquidation groups has tended to be common in reorganization cases, with only 12% of reorganization cases being managed by a wholly private administrator."

The following is a summary of the provisions of the 2006/2007 law:

> Chapter 1 General Provisions
> Chapter 2 Application and Acceptance
> > Section 1 Application
> > Section 2 Acceptance
> Chapter 3 Administrator
> Chapter 4 Debtor's Property
> Chapter 5 Expenses for Bankruptcy Proceedings and Debts of Common
> > Benefits
> Chapter 6 Declaration of Credits
> Chapter 7 Creditors' Meeting
> > Section 1 General Provisions

[An outline of bankruptcy law in the United States is provided in Appendix I for comparison purposes.]

Sun (2019) describes the current bankruptcy law:

"China completely amended its bankruptcy law in 2007, which introduced the option of reorganization, as opposed to only liquidation. The new law was adopted with the support of foreign bankruptcy specialists and generally modeled after Western legal principles. Since its promulgation in 2007, bankruptcy cases steadily increased. SOE bankruptcy filings have focused on heavy industries, such as steel and coal production, as opposed to high-tech firms or firms in pillar industry sectors."

"In addition to the development of the law, by the end of 2017, 97 courts throughout China had established liquidation and bankruptcy divisions to facilitate the trial and settlement of bankruptcy cases. In early 2015, only five courts in China had such tribunals."
"The current available data released by the SPC in 2018 indicates an increase in bankruptcy court filings of 68.4% compared with the previous year." [See Appendix II.]

5.1. A Detailed Summary of the 2006/2007 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law

The following is a summary of the *Enterprise Bankruptcy Law*, adapted from and found on the website of *Baker McKenzie* (Cheung, 2019; see also generally Hoppe, 2009; Bufford, 2017):

PURPOSES: "This Law is formulated for purposes of regulating the procedures for enterprise bankruptcy, fairly resolving the settlement of debts and credits, safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of creditors and debtors, and maintaining the market order of the socialist economy." [Article 1]

GROUNDS FOR BANKRUPTCY: As a threshold, a Chinese enterprise will qualify for bankruptcy, restructuring, or settlement (liquidation) (Yu & He, 2018) if the enterprise "is not able to meet its financial obligations to repay its debts and its assets are less than its liabilities or it is obviously incapable of paying off its debts." [Article 2]

APPLICATION TO COURT: Bankruptcy proceedings are commenced in the People's Court where the enterprise is domiciled by filing an *application*. [Article 3] Bankruptcy proceedings can be initiated by either the debtor or its creditors. However, if the debtor is a financial institution, the application shall be filed by the relevant Chinese regulatory or supervisory authorities.

The following matters shall be stipulated in the Application for Bankruptcy:
(1) Basic introduction to the applicant and respondent;
(2) Purpose of application;
(3) Facts and grounds of the application; and
(4) Any other matter that the people's court deems necessary to be stipulated. [Article 8]

APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR: Upon acceptance of the bankruptcy application, the court will appoint a bankruptcy administrator [Article 13] who may be a member of recognized legal, accounting, or specialist bankruptcy firm, or an individual who possesses relevant professional expertise and qualifications. [Article 24] The mode of selecting an administrator and his remuneration is determined by the Supreme People's Court. [Article 22; Article 28]

"The administrator reports to the People's Court and is supervised by the creditors' meeting and the creditors' committee. The creditors' meeting has the ability to replace the administrator or to seek his removal should he fail in performing his duties in a lawful and impartial manner, or if the creditors' meeting deems there are circumstances that prevent him from performing his duties competently" (Cheung, 2019).

"The administrator's powers and duties include: taking control of the debtor's property, company seals, accounting records, documents and other such materials; investigating and reporting on the debtor's financial status; making decisions in relation to the debtor's internal management and daily expenditures; deciding whether to continue or suspend the debtor's business operations prior to the first creditors' meeting; managing and disposing of the debtor's property; representing the debtor in litigation, arbitration or other proceedings; proposing the holding of creditors' meetings; and performing other functions that may be required by the court" [Article 24] (Cheung, 2019; see also Yang, 2008, pp. 545-546).

An administrator who fails to act with *due diligence* and *reasonable care* in faithfully performing his or duties [Article 27] is subject to a fine or the imposition of personal liability if the administrator is found to have caused a loss to a creditor, the debtor or a third party in breach of that fiduciary duty (see also Patel, 2009, pp. 118-119).

Parry and Long (2019) underscore the vital role the administrator plays in Chinese bankruptcy (see also Yu & He, 2018).

> "The role of administrator was a new one requiring the development of new skills and competencies for law and accountancy firms and it offered the prospect of management of insolvency proceedings in an independent manner in the interests of creditors and free from state control. Other new governance institutions were the creditors' meeting and creditors' committee. The institutions that might be expected under a market-based bankruptcy framework are therefore present but progress is to be made in the development of these institutions in place of state influence."

BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS: Creditors are required to file their claims within a time period stipulated by the People's Court. Such period commences from the date of publication by the People's Court of the announcement of its acceptance of the bankruptcy petition and runs for a minimum of *30 days and a maximum of three months*.

Eligible claims include: debts that exist at the time of the court's acceptance of the application for bankruptcy; certain un-matured debts; conditional debts or debts subject to time limits; claims pending litigation or arbitration; debts owed to joint creditors; indemnity obligations owed to a guarantor of the debtor or to another joint debtor who has discharged a debt on the behalf of the debtor; and damages under a contract terminated by the administrator or the debtor under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Law.

CREDITORS' MEETINGS: The meeting of creditors is a critical part of the bankruptcy proceedings. An individual creditor may participate in the bankruptcy process through creditors' meetings and by participating in a creditors' committee. A creditor who has submitted a claim is entitled to attend and vote at the creditors' meeting. However, a *secured creditor* with priority rights over specific property cannot vote on the adoption of a settlement plan or distribution plan of the debtor's assets unless they have waived their right to their priority position. A creditor whose claim has not been determined to be valid may not exercise voting rights, except that the People's Court can provisionally determine the amount of his or her claim for the purpose of allowing him or her to vote. Generally, a *resolution* of the creditors' meeting is passed by a simple majority of the creditors with

voting rights present at the meeting and a majority representing 50% or more of the value of the debtor's unsecured debt (see also Arsenault, 2008. [Article 59]

"The creditors' meeting may: verify creditors' claims; apply with the court to replace or remove the administrator; supervise the administrator; select members of the creditors' committee; determine whether to continue or suspend the debtor's business operations; approve restructuring plans and settlement agreements; approve plans to manage, realize and distribute the debtor's property; or perform other functions that the court requires" (Cheung, 2019). [Article 68]

CREDITORS' COMMITTEE: [Article 67] The creditors' meeting may establish a creditors' committee that comprises creditor representatives elected at the creditors' meeting. "The composition of the creditors' committee, which totals not more than nine people and must include a representative of the debtor's *employees* or a representative of its *trade union*, is subject to the approval of the People's Court in writing" (Cheung, 2019). The creditors' committee is responsible for "supervising the management, disposal and distribution of the debtor's property, proposing the convening of creditors' meetings and such other duties as may be delegated by the creditors' meeting" (Cheung, 2019). The inclusion of employees and trade union representatives may be seen as a concession to the traditional roles played by workers in Chinese society.

CREDITORS' RIGHT TO SET-OFF OF CLAIMS: A creditor who incurred debts to the debtor *prior* to the court's acceptance of the bankruptcy application may request the administrator to "set off" their debts against their claims. "However, set-off is not permitted if the creditor incurred the debt with knowledge of the debtor's inability to repay its debts unless the debt was incurred more than one year prior to the application for bankruptcy or is due by operation of law" (Cheung, 2019). The burden is on the creditor to prove any lack of knowledge of the debtor's inability to repay its debts.

COUNTERPARTIES (THIRD PARTIES) TO CONTRACTS: Any contracts entered into *before* the acceptance of the bankruptcy application, but which have not yet been fully performed, can be *terminated or continued* (essentially ratified) by the administrator. [Article 18] The administrator is required to notify the counterparty of his or her decision within two months of the acceptance of the bankruptcy application or 30 days after receiving a reminder from the counterparty. *Failure to do so deems the contract to be terminated*. If the administrator decides to continue, ratify, or honor a contract, the counterparty is entitled to request the administrator to provide a *guarantee*. A failure to provide the guarantee by the administrator also deems the contract to be terminated or rescinded.

PRIORITY AND RANKING OF DEBTS: The Bankruptcy Law sets out a hierarchy or priority position of debts to determine priority of payment, which must be made in the following order:
- Bankruptcy expenses (see LawyersChina.net, 2018); [Article 41]
- Common interest debts (i.e. certain debts incurred after the court accepts the bankruptcy petition);
- Employee claims, including unpaid salaries, medical and disability subsidies, basic old-age and medical insurance premiums, and compensation in accordance with PRC law (Weiguo, 2006);
- Social insurance premiums and outstanding tax; and
- Common (*unsecured*) claims in bankruptcy.

If the property subject to bankruptcy is insufficient to satisfy the discharge requirements of a certain categories or ranks of debts, the distribution to such category or rank shall be paid on a *pro rata* basis. Secured creditors generally have priority to the extent of the value of their secured interests, while any shortfall is to be treated as an unsecured claim.

RESTRUCTURING AND SETTLEMENT: Perhaps the most important feature of the bankruptcy system is the ability of a company to *restructure or rehabilitate* a viable business. Although the court may have accepted a bankruptcy application, the Bankruptcy Law allows a debtor or its creditors the opportunity—prior to an

enterprise being declared bankrupt—to *apply with the court for restructuring or reorganization of its business*. The law describes this as a "Plan of Rectification." [Article 79] The legislation also allows a debtor to apply for a "compromise or settlement" of its debts with its creditors.

RESTRUCTURING PROCEDURE: The debtor or bankruptcy administrator must submit a draft restructuring plan to the court and the creditors' meeting *within six months* (with an extension of three months if approved by the court) of the court's approval of restructuring. "During the restructuring period, *the debtor can apply for court approval to continue to manage its properties and business under the administrator's supervision*" (Cheung, 2019).

A draft of rectification plan shall include the following contents:

(1) A business plan of a debtor;
(2) Classification of the creditor's rights;
(3) An adjustment plan of the creditor's rights;
(4) A repayment plan of the creditor's rights;
(5) Term for implementing the rectification plan;
(6) Term for supervising the performance of the rectification plan; and
(7) Any other plan conducive to the debtor's rectification [Article 81] (see also
 Zu, 2008)

CREDITOR GROUPS: Similar to priority and ranking of debts, creditors are classified into the following voting groups:
- Creditors with *secured claims* over specific properties of the debtor;
- *Certain employees* with claims on salaries, medical and disability subsidies, basic old-age and medical insurance premiums, and compensation payable into the individual accounts of employees in accordance with PRC law;
- Claims for outstanding *taxes*; and
- *Common* (unsecured) claims.

Upon receipt of the draft restructuring plan, the court will convene a creditors' meeting within 30 days in order to vote on the draft plan. [Article 84] "The draft plan must be approved by a majority of the number of creditors in each voting group, and the amount of claims they represent must account for at least two-thirds of the total amount of claims in that group. If the draft restructuring plan is not approved by all of the voting groups, the debtor or the administrator can still apply with the court for approval if certain conditions are satisfied. If the restructuring plan is not approved, the court terminates the restructuring and declares the debtor bankrupt" (Cheung, 2019). The debtor is responsible for the implementation of the restructuring plan. An appropriate supervision period is imposed by the court, during which time the administrator is required to supervise the implementation process. If the debtor is unable or fails to implement the restructuring plan, the court will terminate the restructuring plan and will declare the debtor bankrupt upon petition from the administrator or a "materially interested party."

The survival of a debtor is not guaranteed. During the restructuring period, the court has additional powers to terminate the restructuring plan and declare the debtor bankrupt if:
- The debtor's business operation or financial status continues to deteriorate and cannot be salvaged;
- The debtor has acted fraudulently, diminishes its assets in bad faith, or has acted in a way adverse to the interests of creditors; or
- The administrator is unable to perform his or her duties and functions as a result of actions undertaken by the debtor.

"Secured creditors' rights over pledged assets are suspended during the restructuring period. If there is a risk of damage to the secured asset or of significant diminution in its value such that the secured creditors' rights are

prejudiced, the secured creditor may apply with the People's Court to enforce its rights. *Once the restructuring plan is approved by the court, it is binding on the debtor and all of the creditors*" (Cheung, 2019).

SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A *settlement* of claims allows the debtor to compromise (settle) its debts directly with its creditors after the bankruptcy proceedings have commenced. The settlement process requires an application by the debtor to the court accompanied by a draft settlement agreement. Cheung (201) writes:

> "If the court approves the settlement application, it will make an announcement and convene a creditors' meeting. Secured creditors may exercise their security rights from the date the court approves the settlement. Once the settlement plan is approved by the creditors' meeting and the court, the administrator is obliged to transfer the business and assets to the debtor. For the plan to become effective, it must be approved by more than half of the creditors with voting rights present at the meeting. The claims represented by such creditors must account for at least two-thirds of the total amount of unsecured claims. If the settlement plan is rejected at the creditors' meeting or by the court, the court will declare the debtor bankrupt. A settlement agreement that has been approved is binding upon the debtor and the creditors covered by the settlement, i.e. the creditors who held an unsecured claim against the debtor at the time the court accepted the bankruptcy petition. If the debtor is unable or fails to implement the settlement agreement, the court, upon the request of a creditor covered by the settlement, terminates the implementation of the settlement agreement and declares the debtor bankrupt."

ASSET RECOVERY MORATORIUM (AUTOMATIC STAY): A *moratorium* or a *stay* is imposed on actions brought against the debtor's assets upon acceptance of the bankruptcy application by the court (see Bufford, 2017, pp. 23-24). "Upon acceptance of the bankruptcy application, all preservation measures against the debtor's property are lifted and all enforcement actions suspended." Any civil actions or arbitration procedures that had been commenced against the debtor, but which were not yet completed, are "stayed" (Cheung, 2019). Any repayment of debts to an individual creditor during this period is deemed invalid and would be considered as an impermissible preference.

COLLECTION AND REALIZATION OF ASSETS: The chief duty of the administrator is to gather ("marshal") together all of the assets of a debtor in a process termed asset *realization*. "The debtor is obliged to deliver up its property to the administrator after the court accepts the bankruptcy application" (Cheung, 2019). The administrator has a duty to gather all of the property of the debtor and to prepare a list of such property and to create a distribution plan that will be submitted at the creditors' meeting for approval. "Unless resolved otherwise at the creditors' meeting, the administrator is obliged to dispose of the debtor's property in the bankruptcy by way of auction" (Cheung, 2019). Other property that cannot be auctioned or whose transfer may be restricted by regulations imposed by the state will be disposed of under the terms of any state regulations.

VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS: The administrator has the power to investigate and then "claw back" any questionable or improper transactions. The administrator is able to petition the People's Court to revoke transactions entered into within *one year preceding the court's acceptance of the bankruptcy application*. The following are examples of possible "claw back" actions that may be undertaken by the administrator*:*

- Transfers of property for no consideration;
- Transactions carried out at clearly unreasonable prices;
- Provision of security for unsecured debts;
- Premature settlement of debts not yet due; and
- Renouncement of creditors' claims. [Article 31]

Likewise, the administrator can recover any debts that have been *repaid* to an individual creditor within *six months* prior to the acceptance of the bankruptcy petition as an impermissible preference, except where the debtor can demonstrate that it benefitted from such a repayment.

RECOVERY FROM DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: [Article 125] The administrator is able to recover any "irregular income" or assets misappropriated from the debtor by its directors, supervisors, or senior management.

A director or an officer may also face civil liability if a breach of their fiduciary duty of "honesty and due diligence" has occurred which resulted in the debtor's bankruptcy. If after bankruptcy proceedings are completed, a director or officer is found to be liable, they will be disqualified from being an officer of any enterprise for three years.

OUT-OF-COURT PROCEDURES FOR DEBT SETTLEMENT OR COMPROMISE: [Article 95] It is still possible for entities to adopt "informal measures" for resolving debt issues outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings under the jurisdiction of the courts. "Informal work-outs or similar options may be an alternative to those parties seeking greater control of the restructuring process and not wishing to be restricted by the requirements under the legislation" (Cheung, 2019). One other possibility might be a "debt-to-equity" swap as a strategy employed by Chinese bank creditors for "corporate rescues" (Wei & Chen, 2018).

The 2007 legislation makes it possible to engage in "cross-border insolvency proceedings" commenced in the PRC pursuant to the bankruptcy law which "cover not only the debtor's assets in the PRC but also extend to its overseas assets" (Cheung, 2019; see also Guo, 2019a; Wang, 2018). The legislation also recognizes the validity of foreign bankruptcy proceedings involving assets in the PRC so as to allow execution of any legitimate foreign judgment in the PRC provided "there are *reciprocal treaties* between the PRC and the foreign country; the foreign bankruptcy proceedings do not contravene the laws, sovereignty, security, social and public interests of the PRC; and if the legal interests of creditors in the PRC are not prejudiced" (Cheung, 2019).

6. Some Notable Chinese Bankruptcies: Is the System Working?

Sun (2019) provides ten examples of notable bankruptcies that have occurred in China and the commentaries provided by the Supreme People's Court (SPC). We cite them as broad examples of bankruptcy actions relating to both private companies and state-owned-enterprises:

- **"Bankruptcy Liquidation Filed by Zhejiang Nanfang Petrochemical Industry Co., Ltd., et al. (Private Firm)**
  "The SPC (Supreme People's Court) comments that this case is a good example of how the bankruptcy court, in a liquidation proceeding, can help the debtor enterprise maintain its productivity, save employees' jobs, achieve regional industrial integration and upgrade with supportive industrial policies from the local government."
- **Transfer of Enforcement Action for Bankruptcy Review filed by Songhui Industry (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. (Private Firm)**
  "The SPC comments that this case is typical as it provides guidance on handling competing employee claims against the employer in civil enforcement actions. In particular, the court had a hard time balancing the employees' interests in the enforcement actions filed by the 459 unpaid employees; thus, transferring the enforcement actions for bankruptcy review was an efficient way to ensure the employees were fairly paid and to further avoid employee protest."
- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Chongqing Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (SOE)**
  "The SPC comments that this case has significant value in that it is the first restructuring case in the country related to a dual-listed SOE (both A Stock–listed and H Stock–listed) in the steel and iron industry. The local court used the bankruptcy reorganization mechanism to spin off bad assets of the company and introduced industrial structure adjustment funds through the capital market channel."
- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Jiangsu Textile Industry (Group) Import and Export Co., Ltd., et al. (SOE)**
  "The SPC comments that this case shows the local court's exploration of joint review of bankruptcy reorganization cases filed by six affiliated SOEs. Specifically, the local court consolidated six bankruptcy reorganization proceedings into one, given that the debtors share similar assets and debts as well as resources, to ensure a successful reorganization. This case highlights the bankruptcy court's function in providing social value and offering helpful assistance to the ongoing SOE reform."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Yunnan Coal Chemical Industry Group Co., Ltd., et al. (SOE)**
  "The SPC comments that in the context of cutting excessive industrial capacity and making structural adjustments, this is a typical case where the local court, through the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, shut down 18 unprofitable coal mines within the debtor's group, reduced excessive coal capacity in the amount of 3.57 million tons per year and settled employment claims with 14,552 laid-off workers."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Beijing Technology Zhongxing Science and Technology Co., Ltd. (SOE)**
  "The SPC comments that this is the first bankruptcy reorganization case filed by a non-listed public company on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations. The local court, through the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, helped the debtor introduce investments and financings. The local court creatively took the pre-reorganization method through holding hearings to discuss reorganization plans among creditors and investors."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Zhuangji Group Co., Ltd. (Private Firm)**
  "The SPC comments that this case shows how the local court can exercise its mandatory right of approval on a draft reorganization plan when the creditor's group cannot reach a consensus. Even though the court proceeding ended after the local court issued its order of approval, the local court took further steps to help the debtor restore its credit to enjoy tax benefits. After the successful bankruptcy reorganization, the debtor became the top tax payer in the local city."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Fujian Anxi Tieguanyin Group Co., Ltd. and Affiliates (SOE)**
  "The SPC comments that this is a typical case showing how the bankruptcy reorganization proceeding promoted a traditional agricultural enterprise to upgrade its production. In particular, the Chinese traditional tea brand "Anxi Tieguanyin" survived and the investors brought in an internet-based business model."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Zhongshun Automobile Holding Co., Ltd. (Private Firm)**
  "The SPC comments that the significance of this case is that it shows how the local court can make sound business judgments in carefully selecting competent investors suiting the debtor's business model in the automobile industry. The local court worked efficiently to assist relevant government agencies in issuing licenses for the debtor and helped achieve the goal of revitalizing an old industrial base in northeast China."

- **Bankruptcy Reorganization Filed by Guilin Guangwei Wenhua Tourism Culture Industry Co., Ltd. (Private Firm)**
  "The SPC comments that this is the first bankruptcy reorganization case accepted by the higher people's court. Given the significance of the debtor running the world's largest natural theater, "Impression Sanjie Liu," the Guangxi Higher People's Court allowed the debtor to independently run the theater without interference by the court proceedings and was able to help the debtor turn losses into profits and boost the local tourism industry."

7. Issues Relating to Personal Bankruptcy

"On 9 October 2019, a court in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, delivered the first judgment regarding personal bankruptcy in China. In this case, a debtor with over 2 million RMB (approximately 250,000 euros) in debts reached a settlement with four creditors. This resulted in a first-time repayment of around 32,000 RMB (approximately 4,000 euros) within 18 months, and, within six years upon the completion of the first repayment plan, the debtor will have to pay 50% of his household income exceeding 120,000 RMB (approximately 15,000 euros)" (Guo, 2019b).

The significance of this case cannot be overstated. Shujun (2019) notes that "The case is the pilot exploration of a personal banking system and it will play a demonstration role in the establishment of China's natural person

bankruptcy   system."

However, there was one problem: There is no personal bankruptcy law in China (Gehlen-Dabbs, 2019). The 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, discussed above, only applied to enterprises, including legal persons and unincorporated organizations, but excluded natural persons. As noted by Guo (2019, p. 1) "Such legislation would rather go against the long-held Chinese tradition that a debt must be repaid; particularly, the debt of a father must be repaid by his son."

Zhang (2019) provides a proper context to the discussion, writing: "In fact, personal bankruptcy should be the footstone of group bankruptcy (e.g. enterprise liability) which can be used as an effective tool in state regulation, especially when the country is in the process of reform and recovery." Yang (2019) supports the creation of a personal bankruptcy system and writes: "Establishing a personal bankruptcy system, where an individual may be declared bankrupt, can encourage entrepreneurial innovation, and help people who took debt in good faith to start over again."

Wei and Menglu (2019) cite the following potential benefits in support of creation of a personal bankruptcy system which would:

- Result in a simplification of social claim-debt relationships, which are conducive to maintaining a good economic order;
- Be conducive to the efficient use of judicial resources and stability of social order;
- Be more conducive to realizing the principles of fairness and equality, and the recovery of debt claims;
- Give the debtor a chance at a new beginning, and manifests the values of humanism; and
- Keep with the trends of internationalization and uniformity in legislation.

What was the legal basis for extending bankruptcy to individuals? In June 2019, the Chinese Supreme Court issued *The Guidelines for People's Courts on Enforcement Work (2019-2023)* confirming the move to establish a personal bankruptcy system. In July 2019, the National Development and Reform Committee under the State Council, together with 13 other government departments, jointly issued *The Reform Plan for Accelerating the Improvement of Market Entity Exit System*, which related to the establishment of a personal bankruptcy system. Wenzhou became the first Chinese city to deal with the possibility of personal bankruptcy. The Intermediate Court in Wenzhou published *The Implementing Opinions on the Centralized Clean-up of Personal Debt* which only have legal effect within the municipality of Wenzhou, but may be an indication of creating rules for resolving other cases involving individual debtors in the future.

According to the *Implementing Opinions*, personal bankruptcy proceedings can only be initiated when the debtor cannot fulfill a monetary obligation imposed by a valid judgment, and he or she does not have enough assets to repay the debt in full, or where a debtor "clearly lacks the ability for repayment."

One of the following circumstances must also occur: (i) an enterprise has entered into insolvency proceedings or has been declared bankrupt, and the debtor is associated with a *joint guarantee responsibility*; (ii) the debtor is responsible for the debt of a company because of *piercing the corporate veil*; (iii) the debtor is responsible for the debt of unincorporated organizations; (iv) the debtor cannot repay the debt because of "life difficulties"; or (v) the debtor has voluntarily proposed a repayment plan and obtained the consent of all the creditors.

According to the Wenzhou Intermediate People's Court and the Pinyang County People's Court, an administrator will be appointed to administer any personal bankruptcy case, or the debtor and creditors can jointly agree on a representative creditor selected by the creditors' meeting to act as an administrator. The administrator will be required to inform all the creditors in writing within 20 days from the moment the court accepts a petition to open proceedings and make public announcements. The announcement period should be within the range of 30 days to 3 months.

The court can refuse to approve a repayment plan offered by or on behalf of an individual when one of the following conditions occurs: (i) the plan violates statutory rules, prohibition rules or "public order" and cannot be amended; (ii) the plan is reached through unjust methods; (iii) there is no possibility to implement the plan; (iv) the debtor privately satisfies the interest of one or more creditors and severely infringes the interest of other creditors; (v) other circumstances decided by the court.

Since one of the core purposes of establishing a personal bankruptcy regime includes the restoration of a debtor's credit position, a debtor will be barred from engaging in the following activities before his or her credit is restored:

  i.   conducting high consumption activities and spending unnecessary expenses other than for life and work, except for economy class flights or second class for the high speed train;
  ii. taking on positions as a legal representative or being a shareholder in profitable companies;
  iii. taking on positions as a legal representative or director or supervisor of state-owned enterprises;
  iv. other circumstances decided by the court.

Interestingly, in return for permitting the debtor to avail him or herself of personal bankruptcy protection, the debtor will be required to meet all the following conditions:(i) there are no other cases involving monetary payment outside Wenzhou, unless a creditor outside Wenzhou agrees to participate in the proceedings voluntarily; (ii) the debtor and his or her spouse will be required to both declare their assets fully and faithfully; (iii) the spouse should agree to accept investigation by a court, including an investigation on his or her bank account; other family members should also agree to an asset investigation if necessary; (iv) the debtor must agree not to conduct "high consumption activities" nor to spend unnecessary expenses other than for life and work. In addition, "going abroad" for work reasons should be approved by the court, in advance.

In the case of the "*Whenzou debtor*", the court appointed an accountant as the custodian of his property in order to avoid any concealment of assets; the court issued a "behavior restraining order," which restrained his "high end consumption" and prohibited the debtor from holding a management post at any enterprise; and the court set a 6-year bankruptcy transitional period" during which a significant portion of the debtor's household income is to be used for the benefit of creditor. The court also ruled that his "personal credit" could be "recovered" three years after the plan is fulfilled (Shujun, 2019).

8. Conclusions and Observations

In February of 2019, Nagumo (2019), reporting on information provided by trade insurer Euler Hermes, which suggested that insolvencies would rise 20% in 2019, "far exceeding the global rate of 6%." This increase would follow the 60% jump in bankruptcies in China in 2018. Data indicated that "some 30% of China's roughly 3,600 listed companies suffered a fall in net earnings during 2018. About 400 are expected to book a net loss." Coupled with the high levels of personal debt in China (Mandra, 2019), these data underscore the importance of a functioning and "perceived as fair" bankruptcy system in attempting to modernize and regularize the Chinese economy.

The authors of this study concur with Parry and Long (2019) that "There is no doubt the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 remains a remarkable achievement but the enactment of formal rules with features of a market-based system was never going to be sufficient in itself to bring about a transformation to a market-based system in practice." Wei & Ng (2019) note that "The country now has more than 90 U.S.-style specialized bankruptcy courts to help sort through a morass of corporate debt that, until recently, would have been swallowed by state banks and other creditors." Li & Ponticelli (2019, p. 1) add: "Specialized courts are run by more experienced and better trained judges that are less likely to be under the influence of local politicians."

Kam, Citron, and Muradoglu (2008. P. 567), however, cautioned that "government ownership has an adverse impact on the distress-resolution process as it distorts resource allocation, management incentives and investment decisions in a liberalized and competitive environment"—a position that must be considered in light of the number of state-owned-enterprises in China (see Garnaut, Song, & Yao, 2006) which still number over 150,000—50,000 of which are owned by the central government and the rest by local governments (Export.gov, 2019). Fortune (2015) pointed out that the number of Chinese companies on the *Fortune Global 500* list, 98 were located in China—*the top 12 companies were all state-owned,* including "massive banks and oil companies that the central government controls through the State-Owned assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the ruling State Council, which appoints CEO's and makes decisions on large investments." Of the 98 Chinese companies on the list, only 22 were private. [See Appendix III for a listing of the top 12 Chinese companies that appeared on the Forbes Global 500 list.]

Tomasic (2009, p. 211) added that "… the key to an effective insolvency administration will be the creation of an effective legal and administrative infrastructure which will ensure that insolvency administrations are undertaken economically, expeditiously, and fairly."

Much depends on the path China will take in decades to come.

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APPENDIX I

United States Code: Title 11 - Bankruptcy:
- Chapter 1—General Provisions (§§ 101–112)
- Chapter 3—Case Administration (§§ 301–366)
- Chapter 5—Creditors, the Debtor, and the Estate (§§ 501–562)
- Chapter 7—Liquidation (§§ 701–784)
- Chapter 9—Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality (§§ 901–946)
- Chapter 11—Reorganization (§§ 1101–1174)
- Chapter 12—Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman With Regular Annual Income (§§ 1201–1231)
- Chapter 13—Adjustment of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income (§§ 1301–1330)
- Chapter 15—Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases (§§ 1501–1532)

APPENDIX II

According to the Supreme Court of China, in March 2018, the number of bankruptcy filings accepted was 1,521 in 2012; 1,919 in 2013; 2,031 in 2014; 3,568 in 2015; 5,665 in 2016; and 9,542 in 2017, with an average growth rate of 47%. The number of cases closed also experienced an increasing trend: 1,521 in 2012; 1,919 in 2013; 2,031 in 2014; 3,568 in 2015; 5,665 in 2016; and 6,257 in 2017, at an average growth rate of 28% (Sun, J., 2019).

APPENDIX III

Leading Chinese Companies – All of which rank in the world's largest companies by revenue and all of which are state-owned
1. Synopec Group – oil refining (Global 500 Ranking # 2)
2. China National Petroleum – oil producing (Global 500 Ranking # 4)
3. State Grid – utility (Global 500 Ranking # 7)
4. Industrial & Commercial Bank of China - banking [The world's largest bank] (Global 500 Ranking # 18)
5. China Construction Bank – banking (Global 500 Ranking # 29)
6. Agricultural Bank of China – banking (Global 500 Ranking # 36)
7. China State Construction Engineering – construction and real estate conglomerate (Global 500 Ranking # 37)
8. Bank of China – banking (Global 500 Ranking # 45)
9. China Mobile Communications – wireless phone provider [Largest wireless provider in the world] (Global 500 Ranking # 55)
10. SAIC Motor – auto manufacturing (Global 500 Ranking # 60)
11. China Railway Engineering – railway infrastructure projects (Global 500 Ranking # 71)
12. Chinese National Offshore Oil – oil production (Global 500 Ranking # 72)

Appraisal of the *Then* Belief's Preservation in Vietnam Through a *Pang Then* Ritual of the *Tày* People in Lào Cai Province

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Abstract

Vietnam has fifty-four distinct groups. Religious beliefs have always played a significant role in every Vietnamese ethnic group. **Then**[1] is a form of ritual belief system of Tày, Nùng, and Thái ethnic groups in Northern Vietnam's mountainous provinces. Then ritual practices can take place with different purposes. Each Then ritual is identified with a unique integration of music, dance, fine arts and language. In this paper, we would like to describe a Pang Then ceremony, which celebrates rank advancement of a Then master. During 3 days, the Then master sings and plays Tính Tẩu (a long-necked lute with a gourd body and two or three silk strings) at the same time. The lyric of song is narrating the path to the Realm of Heaven of the Then master and his spirited Then soldiers. At the end of the third day, all participants take part in the festivities: singing, dancing and drinking. Not only are the rituals preserved, but also the unique art of Then belief is separated. Then music and dance has eventually become a form of entertainment art in daily life. Every 2 years, a national festival of Then singing with Tính Tẩu has been organized. Some new works based on the Then original tunes is performed in these festivals.

Keywords: Then Ritual, Vietnamese Culture, Intangible Cultural Heritage, the *Tày* People

Vietnam is a multi-ethnic country with fifty-four distinct groups. Each of them has their own typical traditional culture and, of course, their own folk religion. Religious beliefs have always played a significant role in every Vietnamese ethnic community, hence they have strong influence in their daily matters. In this paper, we would like to present our study on *Then*, which is a form of ritual from *Then* the belief system of *Tày*, *Nùng*, and *Thái* ethnic groups in Northern Vietnam's mountainous provinces.

According to the people from the mentioned ethnic groups, it is an incomplete spiritual life for each community and for each family without the *Then* rituals. *Then* ritual practices can take place with different purposes, such as celebrating a marriage or a newly built house, praying for good crops, for good health or for pregnancy, performing a medical treatment, seeking quiet, etc. The ritual performances require the appearance of those

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[1] *Then* is pronounced like "ten" in English.

called *Then masters*, who are believed to have a special ability to communicate with deities and make prayers come true.

In addition to the common *Then* rituals, there are also special *Then* rituals performed for the *Then masters*. These ceremonies remark major stages during their career, for instance, an official acknowledgement of a *Then apprentice*, after which he/she is allowed to practice the *Then* profession, a *Then master's* promotion from a lower rank to a higher rank and an announce of *Then master's* retirement (due to old age). They are considered the uppermost large-scale *Then* celebrations, and also great festive occasions of a whole village. The rituals usually last from three to five days with the participation and witness of the *Then practitioners* and the community.

Each *Then* ritual is identified with a unique integration of music, dance, fine arts and language. By these elements, we could understand, to some extent, the outlook on life, the worldview and the aesthetics of the *Tày*, *Nùng* and *Thái* people in Vietnam. For more details, we would like to introduce a case of the great Then ritual, called *Pang Then*, which celebrates rank advancement of a *Then master*. The following description is the result of our experience with the *Pang nó – a subtype of the Pang Then –* for a young master from Van Ban, Lao Cai, Vietnam, whose name is Chu Hồng Phương.

Then master Chu Hồng Phương was born on July 19th, 1994 and was destined to be a *Then master* (following the ethnic cultural belief). Chu Hồng Phương then became a *Then master* in 2011. By 2017, he had 338 "willing children" (followers) who before had recovered from their illness by his treatment ritual and, since then, assisted him on demand, and nearly 2000 believers who invited him to hold *Then* rituals in their private houses. With these numbers of believers and followers, *Then* master Chu Hồng Phương was qualified to perform the *Pang nó* ritual, after which a *Then* master is believed to become more powerful, and the number of spirited *Then* soldiers and horses would increase to support his/her *Then* professional practices.

Then master Chu Hồng Phương - Photo by Nguyễn Danh Long

A day before the main ritual, people set up and decorated the *Xằng bjoóc* tree in the *Then master*'s house. As traditional faith, this tree is the symbol of a link between the dead and the living. Under the tree, farming products were presented, and then offered to the Realm of Heaven by the *Then master*.The main ritual proceeded in three days with the support from a *Mật* master[2] and his assistants, Then master's assistants, Mo master, a

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[2] Since there are no *Then masters* who have enough power to perform the *Pang nó*, the ritual will call for a *Mật master*, who is from a different belief system, but fulfils the necessary requirements.

dance group and an ensemble. The assistants of this master involved three people: a *pí*[3] *player* and two *Náng Mật*, who are female supporters of the master. The assistants of the *Then* master were ladies, called *Nàng Then*. Besides the *Mật* and the *Then masters* and their assistants, the participants of the ritual also included dance group and an ensemble. The music ensemble in this Then ritual consisted of members of percussion family as *bằng bu*[4], *đuống*[5], *ma hính*[6] and drum.

The first day of the *Pang nó* started with several worshipping rites: to the God of the Area *"Thổ địa"* (Tudigong/Tudishen/Tudi), to the Tutelary of the Village *"Thành Hoàng làng/Thần Thành Hoàng"* (Chenghuangshen) and to the ancestors of the *Then master*. They were performed outdoors by a Mo master, asking for permission to let the *Then master* hold a *Pang Then* ritual. After that, the crucial part of the *Pang nó* began. It was a storytelling song, narrating a march to the Deities of the *Then master* and his spirited *Then* soldiers with their offerings. Their path to the Realm of Heaven was comprised of the following sections, each of which was played as the night wore on:

       * *1st section: The Then master with his soldiers arrived at the Realm of Heaven and met "Quan Hành khiển"[7]. The Then master informed him about the Then rank promotion, and then, was permitted to wear his new-ranked (mandarin) surcoat.*

       * *2nd section: The Then master with his soldiers reported on the Pang nó to the Father of Then at his palace in the Realm of Heaven.*

       * *3rd section: The Then masters with his soldiers, finally, got an approval from the "Nam Tào"[8] to upgrade to a higher Then rank in the Realm of Heaven.*

It is a religious notion that on the way to the Realm of Heaven the dance group would go first and pave the way for the master and his soldiers to have things gone swimmingly. At the end of the main ceremony, the *Pang nó* participants and the villagers, altogether, took part in the festivities: singing, dancing and drinking *Cần* wine[9] around the *Xằng bjoóc* tree.

Scarf dancing around Xằng bjooc tree
Photo by Nguyễn Danh Long

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[3] *Pí* is a kind of bamboo reed flute of the *Thái*.
[4] Bằng bu is a bamboo percussion performed by striking on the ground
[5] Đuống is a kind of wooden percussions consisting of a large boat-shaped mortar and pestles, which originally is *Thái* rice pounding equipment
[6] Ma hính is a kind of shaken idiophones
[7] "Quan Hành Khiển" is a mandarin who has the role as a scholar-bureaucrat of the Jade Emperor.
[8] "Nam Tào" is Vietnamese name of Southern Cross constellation, who records all human births for the Jade Emperor, in Chinese conception.
[9] Cần wine a kind of wine contained in a big jar, and is consumed through a small long bamboo straw.

Everybody joyfully danced, re-performed their daily activities and played their traditional games, for example, tilling the soil, selling goods, picking bamboo sprouts, throwing *"còn"[10]* through a ring. Afterwards, people took down the offerings around the *Xằng bjoóc*, vied for ornaments hung on the tree, and threw eggs and flowers to each other for good fortune. The great *Pang nó* ritual then ended.

The Then master and people dance and re-perform work in daily life
Photo by Nguyễn Danh Long

Nowadays, the *Then* rituals are maintained spontaneously in the *Tày*, *Nùng*, and *Thái* communities. In order to perform the *Pang nó* successfully, as previously explained, the neighbours and the villagers gathered at the *Then* master's house and helped him prepare for the ritual some months earlier. The *Then* master's family had paid for this ritual a huge expense on the offerings and the public feast, approximately 10,000 US dollars. However, it is not a matter for them, because their community is brought closer together after each time Then ritual is performed.

Not only are the rituals preserved, but also the unique art of *Then* belief is separated. *Then* music and dance has eventually become a form of entertainment art in daily life, so-called the Art of *Then* singing with *Đàn Tính* (a long-necked lute with a gourd body and two or three silk strings used by the *Tày*, *Nùng*, and *Thái* ethnic groups). From 2005 to 2018, six national festivals of *Then* singing with *Đàn Tính* have been organized. The festivals are opened for both amateur and professional artists, especially *Then* masters. In the festivals, these artists put in their best performance of beautiful musical pieces and dances, which can be original or adapted, from the *Then* rituals. Additionally, some new works based on the *Then* original tunes were performed in these festivals.

According to the general inventory of *Then* heritage practices in 2017, there are total 802 *Then* folk artists, including 221 males and 581 females, in Vietnam. Besides this number, there are 127 groups or clubs with more than 3000 amateurs and professionals, who perform the Art of *Then* singing with *Đàn Tính*. This proves the undeniable vitality of the *Then* among *Tày*, *Nùng*, and *Thái* communities of Vietnam. Hopefully, the *Then* art of the *Tày*, *Nùng*, and *Thái* ethnic groups would soon be recognized by UNESCO in their Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritages of Humanity.

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[10] *Còn* is a sacred ball made from cloth, stuffed with seeds and decorated with colorful fringes on its four corners.

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Comparative Case Study on Institutionalization of Ruling Parties Under Military Authoritarianism: Democratic Republican Party Under Park Chung-Hee Regime in South Korea (1961-1979) and GOLKAR Under Suharto Regime in Indonesia (1966-1998)

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Abstract

South Korea and Indonesia have experienced similar military political interventions and coups which brought a long military authoritarian regime. Strong military authoritarian regime with their own ruling parties could last for 18 years in South Korea and 32 years in Indonesia. In South Korea, Park Chung-hee Regime ended in 1979 when he was murdered by his subordinates, which was followed by the dissolution of the ruling party, Democratic Republican Party (Jeong, 2009, p. 29). Whereas in Indonesia, the reform movement with socio-political instability by the economic crisis in 1997 resulted the collapse of Suharto's hegemony and authoritarian regime in 1998 while the ruling party, Golkar still exists today. This study aims to find answers to why there have been differences in the end of both parties, related with the political party institutionalization. And this study would like to show that the Democratic Republican Party failed to be institutionalized while the Golkar Party could survive and win the election again. Thus, this study would like to say that the level of institutionalization must be different in the Democratic Republican Party and the Golkar Party.

Keywords: Democratic Republican Party, GOLKAR, Indonesia, Institutionalization of Political Party, Military Authoritarian Regime, Ruling Party, South Korea

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Problem

After World War II, a common phenomenon found in many newly independent Asian countries was military political intervention such as a coup. Due to a lack of democratic political experience and social instability,

almost all newly independent countries in Asia have experienced direct political intervention and enormous political influence by the military, and military political dominance has continued in several countries so far (Handelman, 1996, p. 186). South Korea in Northeast Asia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia have very different environments such as language, religion and race, but both countries have very similar historical backgrounds. In addition to similar experiences in economic development and democratization, these two countries have experienced similar military interventions and military coups that have brought long authoritarian regime. President Park Chung-hee carried out a military coup in 1961 in South Korea and was elected as the 2nd president in 1963. President Suharto, Indonesia's 2nd president, took supreme political power in 1966 by Supersemar (Eleventh March Order: Sequence Eleventh March), and became president of Indonesia in 1968. The time gap between the two regimes was about five years apart from the start, but there was homogeneity which led to a long authoritarian regime with a strong military background. Through their direct or indirect military coup, General Park Chung-hee ruled for 18 years and General Suharto ruled for 32 years. Even if military political intervention in political parties in two countries looked very similar, each ruling party finally had a big difference at the end. When there was a new military coup after the death of Park Chung-hee in South Korea in 1979, the Democratic Republican Party was dismissed by a new military elite group (Woo, 2011). However, in Indonesia, President Suharto was able to hand over his presidency to Vice President Habibie in 1998 without collisions between elite groups in the military or massive bloodshed on the streets. Indeed, Golkar could return to normal political party and has survived so far.

1.2 Importance of the Problem

From historical background and the problems that have been presented, the research question is why the military needed political parties after taking power, and how did they institutionalize Democratic Republicans in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia? And when facing the crisis of the regime, how did the political party institutionalization affect ends of the Democratic Republic Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia?

1.3 Relevant Scholarship

Huntington saw the party system develops in four stages. The first step is stage of factionalism, the second one is the stage of the polarization, the expansion phase is the third stage, and the fourth stage is political institutionalization with acquiring the value and stability of the party organization (Huntington, 1968, p. 217).

Table 1. Progress of political institutionalization

Step	Stage	Characteristics
Step 1	Factionalism	* Political participation and institutionalization is very low. * The absence of detailed modern political organizations. * Lack of homogeneity, very low bonding, lack of permanence. * a small number of people in organizations compete. * Focusing on a group interests like the level of family or relatives.
Step 2	Polarization	* Political participation begins to develop. * Polarization in existing factions by emergence of new socio-political forces, and polarization in new forces as well. * Formation of political parties, which means conversion of traditional factionalism into social forces. * Polarization is a signal and the starting point of party politics.
Step 3	Enhancement	* Formed political parties attract popularity and public support through effective party composition. * Strong political motivation including regime control and reorganization of the social order. Expansion of political participation through internal political struggles. * By a typical pattern of party development in the West, small faction groups developed into larger factions and attracted new supporters into politics. * Expansion of formation of political parties and political participation through new strength and support.
Step 4	Institutionaliz ation	* Completion of a party system for growing. * Formation and completion of political party systems into three types: the dominant system by one party, the two-party system, and the multi-party system.

		* From the dominant system of one party, it develops into a multi-party system that can bring alternatives and control the system together. This can replace government policy and private leadership from the dominant one-party system. * Not relying on personal leadership by certain leaders but have several generation replacement candidates in various organizations. * Political stability and political vitality can be secured for a long time.

Huntington defines institutionalization as the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. Institutionalization is necessary for political parties to acquire and sustain value and stability. Huntington argues that the degree of institutionalization of all political systems can be judged by adaptability, complexity, autonomy, coherence of its organizations and procedures. It means if these elements can be identified and measured, the political system can be described as institutionalized systems. It is also possible to measure level of institutionalization of a political party as well (Huntingner, 1968, pp. 13-24).

Table 1. Factors of political institutionalization

Criteria	Non-institutionalized party	Institutionalized party
Adaptability-Rigidity	* Institutional and organizational permanence is short. * Little or no case of generation replacement, and the history of generation replacement is short. * The purpose and function of party existence is simple, and it is difficult to adapt to change.	* Institutional and organizational permanence is long. * Generational replacement is common, and generational replacement has a long history. * The purpose and function of party existence vary, and adaptation to change is fast.
Complexity-Simplicity	* The organization is simple, there is no functional differentiation, and there is no subdivided subsystem.	* Organizations are complex, hierarchical and functionally divided and have subdivided subsystems.
Autonomy-Subordination	* Non-autonomously, very vulnerable to external influences. * Lack of development of autonomous political organizations and institutions. * Represents interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * Lack of verification about new political forces.	* Autonomous organization characteristics are not influenced by external factors. * Highly developed political organizations and institutions. * Well separated from interests of certain social groups such as families, tribes, and classes. * Enough verification steps about new candidates and political powers.
Coherence-Disunity	* Not integrated but fragmented. * Weak with external impacts. * Organizational discipline is unclear.	* Integrated and strong. * Strong from external impacts. * Organizational discipline is unclear like a military.

1.4 Research Design

This study aims to study differences in political party institutionalization under military authoritarian regime in South Korea and Indonesia and will examine in more detail how these differences in institutionalization affected the sustainability of each political party. The reason for choosing two countries is the military authoritarian regime which began with the same historical background, causing the two ruling political parties, Democratic Republican Parties in South Korea and GOLKAR in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2011, p. 12). In order to achieve this purpose, I will first examine establishment background and purpose of two parties. Moreover, I would like to compare and analyze the leadership of each party, the organizational structure, the autonomy level, party policy operation, campaign funding, election strategy and legislative activities in the National Assembly, and the relationship and cooperation structure with the military. The institutionalization of each party is measured based on flexibility, complexity, autonomy and coherence factors of the party which are the basic elements of the measure of party institutionalization argued by Samuel P. Huntington.

2. Method

This research will be conducted using a type of analytic descriptive research that seeks to describe complex social realities through simplification and classification by utilizing concepts to explain an analytic political phenomenon. In terms of simplifying the complexity of political reality, a qualitative approach in this study is carried out without going through hypothesis testing such as ordinary quantitative research. However, to facilitate understanding and relatively accurate analysis, a general assumption is needed to explain the relationship of the influential variables in this study. Furthermore, this research will be effective when carried out by relying on official data such as statistics and political indicators that are recognized in South Korea and Indonesia. This study is a literature study that collects, classifies, and analyzes data and other materials related to the above problems both in the form of documents, books, journals, periodical scientific magazines, newspapers, magazines, pages on websites and field research.

3. Result

In South Korea and Indonesia, political involvement of the military took place through similar processes at similar times. As a result, the military authoritarian regime came into being, and the president from the military took long term power. The military authoritarian regime actively utilized political parties to justify their ruling. South Korea launched the Democratic Republican Party and Indonesia used the functional group "Golongan Karya: Golkar" as a rulling party. Despite establishing political parties for similar purposes, the institutionalization of the two parties differed significantly, and this difference in institutionalization resulted in quite different results for the duration of the two parties.

3.1 The Process of Taking Over Power by the Military

Of the ways in which the military intervenes in politics, the most obvious and effective method is to intervene in the state's political institution. The military intervention in this political institution appears to be more aggressive in countries where democracy is not firmly established. The military usually likes to place military personnel in the executive, legislative and judicial branches, or establish special military institutions which can intervene in elections and control the government (Mietzner, 2011, p. 4). The military of South Korea and Indonesia had same form of political intervention, too. The military of South Korean which took power in 1961 and the military of Indonesia who took power by suppression against Indonesia Communist Party in 1965 succeeded in legitimizing themselves and establishing a long-term regime by winning elections through political parties. In this chapter, we will look into process of seizing power by the military and establishing ruling parties, the Democratic Republican Party in South Korea and Golkar in Indonesia.

3.1.1 May 16 coup and military government in South Korea

Early on the morning of May 16, 1961, more than 3,500 military forces captured all broadcasting stations, power plants, police stations and major government offices. At 5 o'clock in the morning, there was an announcement of the coup on behalf of the Army Chief of Staff Chang Do-yong. The soldiers who succeeded in carrying out the coup without resistance were the 8th graduates of the Korean Military Academy. Park Chung-hee's coup represents the ruler type of the political intervention model by Eric. A. Nordlinger (Nordlinger, 1977: pp. 22-27). They asked for two years for the military government. They stated that they would surrender political power to the civilian government within two years after correcting corruption and the inability of society and the state. However, several officers, including Colonel Kim Jong-pil, secretly planned to establish a ruling party to keep the military authoritarian regime and take power through general elections. However, their coup was not a military coup as a national institution, but as one faction in the military, and the first priority task was to expel opposition from the military first. This shows that factionalism and internal confrontation within the Korean military have played a leading role in the May 16 Military coup.

3.1.2 Suharto's Takeover of Sukarno's Power

The end of the Old Order power which was identified with the Soekarno government could not be separated from the G30S(Gerakan 30 September: 30 September Movement) by PKI(Partai Komunis Indonesia: Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1965. This event not only made the fall of the Soekarno power regime, but also this was done by Suharto to purge the PKI movement and its mass organizations. According to Harold Crouch, Suharto's massive actions following the G30S / PKI were motivated by two things (Crouch, 1978, pp. 158-178). The first motive was to reverse unfavorable political situation and destroy the PKI forces who were strong and close to President Sukarno. The second motive was more strategic and political. With the presence of Suharto as Kamtibmas in handling the G30S / PKI events, it will attract attention from various groups, which can create a sense of solidarity and increase Suharto's legitimacy. Finally, this motivation and political purpose succeeded to make Soekarno to sign the March 11 (Supersemar) Order (Notosusanto, Saleh, 1991, pp. 16-23). On 12 March 1966, the Kostrad(Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat: Army Strategic Command) / Kopkamtib(Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban: Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) Commander Maj. Gen. Suharto received a Letter Order 11 March from President Soekarno. The contents of the warrant were giving Suharto mandate to control the government and maintain the safety of the president. One of the implementations of Supersemar was that Suharto immediately dissolved the PKI and its mass organizations. Suharto's actions received broad support from anticommunist civil forces outside and within parliament. The prohibition and dissolution of the PKI and its mass organizations was then legitimized through the law of MPRS TAP No. XXV / MPRS / 1966 which was issued on July 5, 1966. In addition, the MPRS also gave Suharto authority to form a cabinet on July 5, 1966. That day, the MPRS revoked Sukarno's title as a lifetime president. Then on February 20, 1967, Suharto tried to convince President Sukarno and his supporters that the power of the Sukarno regime was over and would be replaced by a new regime, the Suharto regime. Finally, President Sukarno gave Suharto executive power on February 22, 1966. After surrender of Sukarno's political power, the MPRS(Majelis Permusaywaratan Rakyat Sementara: Temporary People's Consultative Assembly) revoked President Soekarno's power and appointed Suharto as an acting president. This action was stated in the TAP MPRS No. XXXIII in 1967. John Roosa said in his book "Pretext for Mass Murder" that Suharto used G30S as a pretext to delegitimize Sukarno's power and push himself into the presidency. According to Roosa, Suharto's takeover of state power could be called a creeping coup d'état. He argued Suharto finished taking over state power from Sukarno behind the veil of legal procedures, which disguised the coup as an effort supported by Sukarno with pretext of preventing a coup by the PKI (Roosa, 2006, p. 32).

3.2 Strengthening Ruling Ideologies to Keep Power

The military in South Korea which took control of the state through a coup tried to strengthen its ideology with an anti-communism ideology aimed at national security and developmentalism. The military in Korea at that time wanted to institutionalize the ideology with following reasons. First reason was to secure the legitimacy of the military coup and military government in terms of the security crisis and anti-communism under the structure of the armistice. The Park Chung-Hee regime also tried to strengthen anti-communism education, its relationship with the United States and push forward with the modernization of the army by anti-communism as its basic ideology. Second reason was to create good relations between the United States and South Korea, which needs an anti-communist ideology to consolidate an alliance with the United States. Besides that, like the military regimes around the world in general, the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea tried to use developmentalism as a basic ideology and actively used it to keep the regime. Of course, the main purpose of using developmentalism was to secure the legitimacy of the coup and government (Jeong, 2009, pp. 133-141). In Indonesia, ideology tends to be developed as a comprehensive doctrine. The dominant view by the New Order government was Pancasila is the norm and value. Pancasila is a belief system or ideology that determines how things should be. The type of political system and the structure of dominance were also developed from understanding the ideology of Pancasila as this comprehensive doctrine. In Langenberg's words, the New Order was a state system combined together with executive, military, police, parliament, bureaucracy and court, which built a hegemony with the formulation of ideology as its pillar since 1965/1966 (Van Langenberg, 1990, p. 123). By formulation of the Pancasila ideology as an organic totality, all social and political organizations were led by

law to accept Pancasila as the only philosophical basis since 1985, and every citizen who ignores the Pancasila or any social organization which rejects Pancasila as a single principle will be labeled as a traitor or agitator. Pancasila by crystallization of the Indonesian cultural values, continued its existence in the New Order era by the government (Jaya, 2012, p. 8) Hence, the government formally also socialized the values of Pancasila through rule of the TAP MPR NO II / MPR / 1978 concerning Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4: Guidelines for Living Up and Practicing Pancasila) for schools and in the community. Students, social organizations, and state institutions were required to carry out upgrading P4 (Maftuh, 2008, p. 134).

3.3 Military in Parties and the National Assembly

To secure the legitimacy and stabilize governance in South Korea, Park Chung-hee Regime provided a systematic political recruitment for military officers to enter parliament. In 1963, in the 6th general election, 31 retired generals were elected as 17.7% of the total members of the National Assembly, and those reached up to 21.1% of the total members of the National Assembly from the 7th general election in 1967. In the 4th Republic was formed through amendments to the Constitution in 1972, members of the National Assembly including many military officers were appointed by the president, and members of the National Assembly from the military numbered were 37 people, 16% of the total members of the National Assembly opened after the 10th general election in 1978. Among 172 ministers of the 3rd Republic, 73 people were from the military as many as 42.4%. Next in the 4th Republic, 45 people came from the military, which was 31.7% of 142 ministers. The Deputy Minister, 23 of 145 people came from the military as many as 15.9% in the 3rd Republic, and 20 from 121 people from the military as many as 16.5% in the 4th Republic (Jeong, 2009, pp. 174-178). On the other hand, in Indonesia, during the Old Order Era, Indonesian military had showed disappointment towards political elites who were considered to have weakened the country. Thus, the concept of "Middle Road Concept" was born by General A.H. Nasution in 1958, which became known as the "Dual Function," justifying the military to intervene politics (Suryadinata, 1971, p. 1). Military dominance in Indonesian politics since 1965 has been changed by the relationship between the military and civilians, and between the military, scholars and students. This relationship also affected the Indonesian political system at the same time and got results from 1971 election. It could be happened by existence of dual function in important positions like governors, regents and village heads in people's lives. The military also had a hierarchical network from province to district. The military didn't need to compete in elections with other candidates, but they just could order people to choose a party or organization by its dominant power in local area (Said, 2002, p. 55). The role of the bureaucracy and ABRI(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia: Indonesian military including the police) in Golkar can be seen in how they worked in decision- making procedures at all levels. This mechanism is known as the "three lane" semi-formal mechanism, namely A / ABRI, B / Bureaucracy, and G / Golkar, reducing diversity in Golkar (Haris, 1998, pp. 189-190). ABRI also entered various government structures, BUMN(Badan Usaha Milik Negara: State-owned company), and villages with various organizational forms and positions. The bureaucracy was used by the New Order regime to help Golkar win in elections. It can be said ABRI and the bureaucracy were political machines for political mobilization in the Suharto regime as well as the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea.

3.4 Weakening Parliament to Keep Power

In the 1960s in South Korea, the Park Chung-hee Regime tried to strengthen the executive branch for stronger power of the president. Since the 3rd Republic in 1963, the military authoritarian regime had strengthened structure of the executive brand, and they filled government with people based on personal relationships or the same geographical place as a hometown. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Security Command had been mobilized to gather information about the entire community and reinforce the president's power. President Park Chung-hee and the government took control of these forces and strengthened for political purpose, keeping the regime. To achieve political purpose, the regime exercised huge control over elections, the media, interest groups, the National Assembly, and the judiciary by force, authority and laws. As a result, although the National Assembly could monitor and control dictatorship of the government with legislative powers by supervising authority and structure of government, there was no way to regulate power when the parliament was weakened, and the government became stronger (Jeong, 2009, p. 209). In Indonesia,

DPR(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: People's Representative Council) was under control of the executive branch. Democratization of Indonesia could not be achieved as well during the Suharto regime because the president's power became stronger and weakened function and capability of the DPR. The DPR as a legislative branch for checks and balances was only a decorator of the constitutional structure, which worked only to strengthen Suharto's position as president (Gaffar, 1999, p. 293). During the Suharto regime, the DPR and MPR(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat: People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia) carried out their duties under shadow of the executive branch, or only became a spokesperson of the executive branch and then abandoned legislative roles. The executive branch during the era of Suharto regime have a strategic role to strengthen power of the president as like South Korea. The Indonesian parliament, the DPR-MPR, despite having constitutional authority to co-operate with the executive and the judiciary, failed to implement a check and balance mechanism because the legislature and the judiciary were "forced" to support any executive decision (Legowo, 2005, p. 32). In other words, the division of power during the New Order with the concept of "Trias Politica" could not go accordingly.

3.5 Weakening of Regimes and Ideological Failures
The military authoritarian regime which had been in power for a long time also faced a crisis. In South Korea and Indonesia, what factors brought crisis situation to the military authoritarian regime and how did it make the regime to be weakened and declined?

3.5.1 Security, economic and political crises in Korea
The move by the United States to withdraw US troops from South Korea was huge security crisis to South Korea. President Nixon of the United States declared his intention to limit US forces stationed in Asia as part of a policy to reduce Congress pressure and defense spending after the Vietnam War. President Nixon has announced "Asia by the Asians Policy," his decision as part of new Asian policy in July 1969. The point of Nixon's policy was to comply with the defense agreement with allies and provide a nuclear umbrella, but in the end emphasized responsibility of each Asian country's own defense first and South Korea must defend itself against invasion threat from North Korea. There was strong opposition from the South Korean government and the United States parliament against withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, President Park Chung-hee of South Korea warned they would withdraw South Korean troops from the Vietnam War as well. However, President Nixon finally made the 7th US military division to withdraw from the Korean peninsula (Moon, 1994, p. 116). In the process of securing power by creating the Democratic Republican Party for the Park Chung-hee regime, the government and the Democratic Republican Party as the ruling party, planned economic growth and development for their main target to achieve. Because severe poverty was continued even after the independence, this policy of economic growth efforts was certainly fully supported by the community. The ongoing economic development efforts from the 1960s to the death of President Park Chung-hee initially achieved extraordinary unprecedented achievements. But as development continued, imbalances in growth, inequality, and accumulation of foreign debt occurred. The characteristic of industrialization in Korea was a government-intensive & labor-intensive industry that prioritized exports and focused on supplying capital on large conglomerates (Y.-H. Kim, Y.-H. Jung, 1981, p. 160). In terms of politics, long-term seizure of power by the Park Chung-hee's regime failed to exercise power in accordance with the constitution. After the military coup, various political policies emerged, which reduced democratization with controlling the mass media, declaration of martial law, formation of the Military Revolution Committee and the Supreme Council, and social purification measures to eliminate democracy through repression and violence. In the end, failure of developmentalism also led to crisis of the Park Chung-hee regime and the Democratic Republican Party. Moreover, the Democratic Republican Party which used bureaucrats and civilian politicians as instruments of power, could not be developed and institutionalized by itself while the military authoritarian regime exercised overall control.

3.5.2 Economic, Political and Legal Crises in Indonesia
The Indonesian economic crisis reached its peak in 1998, which was marked as -13.1% contraction in economic growth rate. One of main impacts by economic crisis in Indonesia was many fundamental changes in the

economic, social, political and cultural order that could determine direction of the state. This multidimensional crisis was an anticlimax after long success of the Indonesian economy during the New Order era since launch of the First Repelita: 5-year economic development plan in 1969 (Karmeli, 2008, p. 166). In addition, the political crisis that occurred in 1998 was mounting due to various political policies issued by the New Order regime based on implementation of Pancasila democracy for keeping the regime. During the New Order era, political atmosphere was very repressive, namely the existence of strong pressure from the government against the opposition or people who think critically (Fatah, 1998). Facing economic crisis, people demanded to reform in politics as well as economy (Habibie, 2006). In political life, people assume that government pressure on the opposition is very strong, especially seen in harsh treatment against a person or group who oppose or give criticism on policies of the government. In the legal field, the government intervened laws as well, which were often used as a means of justifying the ruler. This fact was contrary to the provisions of Article 24 of the 1945 Constitution which states that the judiciary must be independent to the authority of the government (executive). The implementation of the law during the New Order government had many injustices and was not in accordance with the 1945 Constitution because the power of the judiciary was under executive branch. The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) stated that the event was categorized as a gross violation of Human Rights (HAM) committed by Suharto and the New Order regime. These human rights violations were Cases of Buru Island 1965-1966, Mysterious Shooting 1981-1985, Tanjung Priok 1984-1987, Talangsari 1984-1987, Military Operations Area (DOM) in Aceh (1989-1998), Papua DOM (1963 -2003), July 27, 1996, Forced Kidnappings and Disappearances 1997-1998, Trisakti Events May 12, 1998 and Riots on May 13-15, 1998.

3.6 Political Challenges and Shifting Power
Many of the social and political changes and crises discussed previously led to great political challenges for governments and ruling parties and it resulted in changes in political power in both countries. Even if the two regimes faced challenges from civil society similarly, political power shifts were different by institutionalization level of two ruling parties.

3.6.1 Challenges from Opposition Parties and Civil Groups in South Korea
The Democratic Republican Party, which had been solid for 10 years, faced big challenge in the 8th general election in 1971. Although the Democratic Republican Party has made every effort to maintain its long-term regime, the opposition party got a lot of votes by issues of Park Chung-hee regime's long-term power and undue corruption. Another factor in the crisis which the Democratic Republican Party and the government met was civil society which became core of democratization movement along with opposition parties. In the mid-1970s, the Park Chung-hee Regime actively launched security issues to maintain power. As mentioned, the Park Chung-hee Regime faced various civil society and student resistance at the end of the leadership. The government considered to mobilize the military to suppress resistance even if it could cause a lot of sacrifice by suppression. However, when democratization demonstrations became severe and civil society with opposition parties resisted strongly, the Park Chung-hee regime and the ruling party, the Democratic Republican Party gradually collapsed.

3.6.2 Suharto's Leadership Weakness in Indonesia
The political crisis that occurred at the end of the New Order regime was caused by long authoritarian regime and economic crisis. Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia had stated that "Sovereignty is in hands of the people and fully implemented by the MPR." Basically, de jure (legally) the people's sovereignty was carried out by the MPR as representatives of the people, but de facto (in reality) majority of MPR members were appointed based on nepotism. These situation and structure resulted emergence of disbelief on government institutions, the DPR and the MPR, which led reformation movement. The reformation movement demanded to reform in all fields including the membership of the parliament. The demand that President Suharto step down was increasingly voiced by students in various places, and students' movements resulted clashes with security forces. On May 12, 1998, thousands of Trisakti students held a demonstration for Suharto's resignation and re-election for new president. They also demanded the economic recovery which had been hit by a crisis since 1997. Suharto was further shocked when his ministers, led by Akbar Tanjung and Ginandjar Kartasasmita, held a meeting and compiled a statement that they were unwilling to take office in the new cabinet and urged the

President to step down. President Suharto ordered Saadillah Mursjid, Minister of State Secretary, to immediately prepare for process of presidency resignation in a constitutional manner. President Suharto also ordered that his resignation would be carried out at the Merdeka Palace. On Thursday, May 21 in 1998, President Suharto read out his resignation letter, which was followed by Vice President Habibie's succession for presidency (Forrester, 2002, p. 174).

3.7 Changes in Politics and Government Party
The crisis at the end of the military authoritarian regime weakened the ruling party and brought a decisive moment. In particular, changes in political power and role of the ruling party have made it difficult for the ruling party to survive.

3.7.1 Collapse of the Democratic Republican Party
On October 26, 1979, President Park Chung-hee completed his business trip and held a dinner party with Cha Ji-cheol, President's Guards Chief, Kim Ki-hyun, Chief Secretary, and Kim Jae-gyu, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. During the meal, the debate began between Cha Ji-cheol and Kim Jae-kyu, which eventually led to the end of the regime when Kim Jae-kyu killed President Park Chung-hee with unexpected shooting in the middle of the meal. President Park Chung-hee's sudden death brought political chaos to the Democratic Republican Party and the regime. In Huntington's theory of political party institutionalization, institutionalized political parties have regular succession procedures, and there are succession plans at certain times through a systematic selection and successor training process (Huntington, 1968, p. 13). However, Park Chung-hee and the Democratic Republican Party showed the most difficulty in choosing a successor as one of institutionalization. After the general election on June 8, 1967, the main internal issue in the Democratic Republican Party was the internal struggle over successors after the Park Chung-hee era. After Park Chung-hee's political vacuum, civil society and political parties showed confrontations about democratization. When new military officers took over military power after the 1212 incident, Choi Gyu-ha, the acting president, was paralyzed by the military. This situation was immediately followed by expansion of martial law on May 17 in 1980, which led to a military authoritarian regime again. As a result, the internal divisions of the Democratic Republican Party and the leadership crisis have given the military elite officers new reasons for political intervention (Huntington, 1968, pp. 17-18). The Democratic Republican Party was not autonomous from the government as well. New military officers led by General Chun Doo-hwan arrested former regime officials for corruption of Park Chung-hee 's regime. After Kim Jong-pil was arrested, including high-ranking officials, he was released after resignation with dedicating his wealth to the country. Kim Jong-pil left the Party on June 14, 1980 and resigned from the chairman of the party. In this way, the Democratic Republican Party accelerated decline facing the party's internal and external crises. It failed to overcome the power struggle with the new military elites, and finally was dissolved.

3.7.2 Golkar in the era of democratic transition
The challenge arose after the end of the New Order power. There were a lot of encouragement from the public and interest groups to dissolve Golkar, and they pointed Golkar was not suitable party with the trend of reform in all societies (Noer, 2014). Golkar was considered part of the New Order regime, and many people thought Golkar had to be dissolved to make reformation proceed correctly. The insistence on dissolution of Golkar was stated from the grassroots level, and clashes often occurred in masses from organizations to other political parties. Golkar's flags were burned by parties on behalf of reformist groups, and several Regional Representative Council (DPD) offices were burned by the mob. Events held by Golkar were not protected from mass attacks. Facing huge crisis of the party, Golkar tried to change people's concept that Golkar was the same body with the New Order regime, trying to make itself as more public political party. With a new flag indicating Golkar as the public party, although the pressure for dissolution was still high, the Golkar Party could become a participant in the 1999 elections. The leadership of the transitional Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung tried to adjust itself to changes, then the party proclaimed new Golkar which was in same ideals of reformation. The party tried to convince the public that this new Golkar would fight with ideals of reformation and would not restore glory of the previous New Order era. According to Aulia Rachman, Golkar turned into a political party to

prove that new Golkar is not like old Golkar, and new Golkar became more reformative and had new visions: 1. Open, 2. Independent, 3. Democratic, 4. Moderate , 5. Solid, 6. Rooted and Responsive. In an effort to realize its vision and platform, Golkar made missions: First is reinforcing the commitment to absorb, integrate, articulate, and fight for the aspirations & interests of the people, especially those in marginal positions that have received little attention and have been often victims of development. Second is recruiting qualified cadres whom people chose through a system for political or public positions. Third is improving process of education and political communication, which is dialogic and participatory, namely opening to various thoughts, aspirations and criticisms of the public (Rachman, 2006). Under pressure to dissolve Golkar, finally in the 1999 election which was the 1st democratic election after the fall of Suharto, many people predicted that Golkar would lose a lot of votes because Golkar have received help to get votes from the bureaucracy and ABRI's assistance in mobilizing the community to vote for Golkar in previous elections. But reformation made bureaucrats and ABRI unable to support Golkar back in the election. With unexpected results, in the 1999 elections Golkar was in second place under PDI-P which was always in the last rank during previous elections. PDI-P won 35,689,073 votes or 33.74 percent with 153 seats while Golkar won 23,741,758 votes or 22.44 percent with 120 seats. With a large vote and second place even without support from bureaucrats and the military, this showed that Golkar was still rooted and had fanatical voters who continued to vote for Golkar. In the next election in 5 years, Golkar proved that it was still a major party by winning elections in 2004 with 24,480,757 (21.58%) votes or 128 (23.27%) seats in the DPR-RI. The Golkar Party became the only major party which experienced increase in votes among all parties in the election: the Golkar Party's vote increased by 719,355 votes. The victory of the Golkar Party could not be separated from the leadership in the transitional era, which succeeded to get glory again like the Suharto era. The modern Golkar Party does not use power of the government or military for its victory, but Golkar uses party structures and working programs that can steal people's hearts to win the election (Fauzi , 2015, p. 2). While a lot of ruling parties in other countries had difficulty in surviving from decline or dissolution when the authoritarian government collapsed, survival of the Golkar Party from pressures on dissolution and winning votes were an extraordinary achievement. The Golkar in Indonesia showed different adaptability with the Democratic Republican Party in South Korea.

4. Conclusion

In South Korea, President Park Chung-hee's sudden death caused collapse of the government and ruling party: The Democratic Republican Party. In this sense, the party's organization and political position were maintained only by President Park Chung-hee's leadership. The failure to institutionalize the Democratic Republican Party was caused by the will of the supreme ruler who obsessed maintaining long-term regime only. Chaos in the party happened due to sudden death of the president who always pressured opposition parties, civil society groups and civilian politicians who insisted change of power, which led to the collapse of the Democratic Republican Party. The reason for this phenomenon can be explained by loss of legitimacy of the military authoritarian regime, lack of institutionalization and ideological failure of the ruling party. Meanwhile, in the leadership of the Golkar Party, the era of transition emerged a new political culture. The Golkar Party under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung underwent a transformation from an organization that relied on power with the help of bureaucrats and Indonesian military to a modern organization that relied on institutionalized party structures and new visions to win in elections. We must note it is not easy to change an organization from the ruling party of the military authoritarian regime into an independent public party (Tanjung , 2008). Regarding institutionalization of political parties, Samuel P. Huntington argued that institutionalization is the process to have value and stability of the party. Facing similar crises of leaders' absence, Golkar showed outstanding adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to survive from collapse of the Suharto regime while the Democratic Republican Party must be dismissed due to insufficient institutionalization in adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence after Park Chung-hee's sudden death.

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Sustainable Development and Social Responsibility from an Islamic Perspective

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Abstract

Businesses aim to generate profits and long term wealth for the owners. However, that does not mean they can do whatever it takes to get the maximum profits. Businesses have other secondary purposes including providing goods and services, creating employment and gain maximum profits for its stakeholders including employees, customers, and the community at large. To examine the problems associated with balancing profit-motivated activities and meeting needs and expectations of stakeholders, the current study aims at explaining the concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development from an Islamic perspective. The paper employs a grounded theory approach to phenomenological investigation based upon review of published literature in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and sustainable development from Islamic perspectives. Qur'anic quotes and *Ahadith* (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad PBUH) are heavily used to describe best and explain the concepts. In addition, Muslim scholars and Imams have been consulted on some issues for better definitions of Islamic terms and concepts.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Islam, Ethics, Sustainable Development, Quran

Introduction

The concept of corporate social responsibility is easy to understand: It means distinguishing right from wrong and doing right. It means being good corporate citizen (Daft, 2006). Corporate social responsibility is a business intention, beyond its legal and economic obligations, to do the right things and act in ways that are good for society (Robbins and Coulter, 2009). Social responsibility refers to what the business does, above statutory requirement, for the benefit of society. Social responsibility has to do with the goodness and welfare of the public (Robbins *et al*., 2011).

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been described in different ways. It has been called "profit-making only, "going beyond profit-making" "any discretionary corporate activity intended to further social welfare" and "improving social and environmental conditions" (Barnett, 2007). Since the 1950s, there has been a growing international awareness of the need for business organizations to commit to a social role that goes beyond the sole objective of profit maximization. The term "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR) refers to strategies

whereby corporations or firms conduct their business in a way that is ethical, friendly, eco-friendly and beneficial to communities' development. According to Carroll (1979), whose definition has been widely accepted, CSR can be defined in terms of four expectations, framed based on economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities.

Corporate social responsibility is the process by which businesses negotiate their roles in society (Kotler and Armstrong,2010). It is about how companies manage the business process to produce an overall positive impact on society. It is an obligation to act in a way that serves both its own interests and the interests of society at large. Social responsibility is going beyond what is required by law. Businesses need to be socially responsible; they should be proactive and promote positive changes.

Although ethics and corporate social responsibility are linked in most firms, CSR activities are no guarantee of ethical behavior and social involvement is not a cause for higher economic performance. It could simply mean that high profits can help companies become more luxurious and being more socially involved (Seifert et al., 2004). For example, large global corporations lower their costs by outsourcing to countries where human rights are not a high priority and justify this by saying they are bringing in jobs and helping strengthen the local economies (Robbins and Coulter, 2011).

In order for any firm to succeed, its internal marketing activities must be matched by a strong sense of social responsibility (Wilkie and Moore, 2002) It is no longer acceptable to accept the traditional view of social responsibility which argues that the purpose of business is profit maximization or the prime purpose of business is business. Companies need to evaluate whether they are truly practicing ethical and social responsible marketing. Company's practice of higher level of corporate governance is driven by rising customer expectations, changing employee expectations, government legislation and pressure, investor's interest in social criteria, and changing business procurement practices (Kotler and Keller, 2012). It is widely agreed that the most admired companies in the world abide by a code of serving people's interests, not only their own (Kotler and Keller, 2012).

There is a growing interest in corporate social responsibility in the Muslim world. In fact, many managers in Muslim countries are becoming increasingly aware of CSR and its benefits. For example, the Kuwait project company (KIOCO) which won an award in Kuwait first CSR awards event. The environment is the general framework that affects and is affected by economic activities. The environment is also affected by the behavior of the members of society and affects their health and their various activities (Shakkour, et al., 2018). According to Carroll (1979), whose definition has been widely accepted, CSR can be defined in terms of four expectations, framed based on economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities Carroll (1979).

A successful program for sustainable development must, therefore, achieve consistency and harmony among three elements (economy, society, and the environment) to improve the quality of those elements together, that is, to achieve economic growth and meet the demands of society members, and to ensure environmental safety, while preserving the rights of future generations of natural resources and the enjoyment of a clean environment. The relationship between sustainable development and environmental protection is strong. Thus, environment protection is the main concern for many sustainable development and corporate social responsibility programs.

Religious faith of the Muslim is the real motive for his protection of the environment and his adoption of sustainable development programs and its consolidation of corporate social responsibility principles.

Islam has been in the forefront of exposure to the issues of environmental protection, sustainable development and social responsibility. However, it did not take its needed attention from an Islamic perspective and it needs enrichment and further research. This is what is expected of Islamic jurists and economists who realize that texts on Islamic law do not detract from ideal social values because eternal law is compatible with the requirements of all human life at all of its stages and developments, and it is certainly compatible with the needs of human life in this era, in accordance with the words of Allah Subhanahu wa ta'ala (swt). The Quran says, "And We have made

the night and day two signs, and We erased the sign of the night and made the sign of the day visible that you may seek bounty from your Lord and may know the number of years and the account [of time]. And everything We have set out in detail" (Al Isra, 12).

Problem statement

The subjects of the environment, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility from an Islamic perspective still have not received sufficient legal and scientific study, despite the entrenchment of its concepts in the teachings of Islamic law, this discussion is a contribution to avoid this scientific deficiency and to demonstrate the Islamic originality of this concept, In an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What are the conventional view about the environment, corporate social responsibility, and sustainable development?
2. What are the Islamic *Shari'ah* view about environment, corporate social responsibility, and sustainable development?
3. How can we protect the environment using the concepts of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development?

Objectives

Many research have been published for decades on Western philosophy of CSR but only few attempts have been made to explore the concept of CSR from Islamic perspective. This study not only tries to fill the research gap by delineating the phenomenon of "Corporate Social Responsibility" in the light of Islamic teachings but also provide the reason of clear demarcation among the western and Islamic perspective on CSRC (Usman Riaz Mir,2016).

Islamic Perspective of Corporate Social Responsibility

The research is an attempt to study one of the topics that are directly related to the global economy and environmental sciences, and the various legislations, including Islamic legislation, which is the subject of sustainable development and social responsibility as the best way to achieve civilized progress in all its forms while preserving the resources and natural resources of attrition and pollution, so that the planet remains capable of meeting development needs and ensuring its sustainability for future generations (Shakkour, et al., 2018).

CSR would seem to fit well with basic principles operating in Islamic-based economies like that of Sudan. Banning interest, shunning unlawful business investments, staying away from unclear or suspicious transactions, and above all, being oriented towards social justice and economic equality which are the main principles which underlie the claims of such economies to being distinctively Islamic (Ahmed Elhassab et, al).

Sustainable development and social responsibility are at the same time one of the cultural values associated with the ethics of dealing with the environment and the rational handling of its elements, systems and resources. Islam provides a holistic view, derived from the divine commandments of the Holy Quran.The divine revelations provide strong moral and ethical principles that are more eternal, absolute and enduring. Islam encouraged Muslims to perform socially responsible activities just for the sake of Allah and do not look for any kind of monetary, economic or strategic benefits in response to welfare activities. The Quran says "Those who spend their wealth in Allah's way and thereafter do not express favour nor cause injury (hurt the recipient's feelings), their reward is with their Lord; there shall be no fear upon them nor shall they grieve."(Saba', 33).

The paper is divided into four sections. The first part covers sustainable development from both Islamic and conventional perspectives, the second is dedicated to the environment from Islamic point view, the third part covers corporate social responsibility from both Islamic and conventional views, and the last part is allocated to environment protection through sustainable development and corporate social responsibility.

The concept of CSR should not be confused with charity and philanthropy. It should go beyond that to engage in economics, social aspects, and environment objectives to in order to achieve sustainable growth. Ernst and Young (2013) suggested that the Islamic banking sector should incorporate the ethical elements as well. The engagement of CSR activities will create awareness about the banking operations and will increase the stakeholder's loyalty, confidence, good reputation, and improvement in the investments and deposits of the bank (Tuhin, 2014).

Methodology

To achieve its objectives the research is based on the comparative, using an inductive scientific method, in which the concepts of environment, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility will be presented. The concept will then be compared with the Islamic teachings of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development as presented in the Quran and sunnah. Quranic quotes and *Ahadiths* (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad) are heavily used to describe best and explain Muslim consumers behavior. The paper employs a grounded theory approach to phenomenological investigation based upon reviews of published literature in the fields of corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. In addition, Muslim scholars and Imams have been consulted on some issues for better definitions of Islamic terms of the concepts.

Discussions and findings

Sustainable development: Conventional and Islamic perspectives

The conventional approach to sustainable development

The word development in Arabic is a source of the verb (Nami), it is said: the thing is revived and its development: it is developed. Development refers to prosperity, reproduction, increase and well-being. Development is a dynamic context that leads to a transition from an unsatisfactory past to a later state that responds satisfactorily to the needs and aspirations of the individual and the community. In principle, satisfying needs is a means to achieving moral well-being (Shakkour, et al., 2018). The ultimate aim of development is to open up the person who leads to the progress of society, suggesting positive change, progress and prosperity. The term itself is intended to increase resources, capacities and productivity. This term, despite its novelty, is used to denote different types of human activities, such as: economic development, social development, human development, etc. (Alasrag, 2014).

In terms of economic development, the optimal use of natural and human resources is used to achieve continuous increase in income above population growth rates. Social development is intended to bridge the basic needs of human groups and seek to increase their quality constantly, as well as the well-being of people and the improvement of their quality of life through adequate housing, adequate and suitable nutrition and provision of services in the areas of energy, water, health, education and employment. Human development; on the other hand, means empowering people to choose their own choices, in terms of earning resources, personal security, and political status. It is noted that there is an overlap between all these patterns of development, each of which is closely related to the other, in terms of mutual influence (Alasrag, 2014; Shakkour, et al., 2018). Cultural development means improving the intellectual level of human groups through internationalization of education, promoting arts, media and communication. Therefore, we have found that all these different types of development are grouped under the single term of 'integrated development.'

Since integrated development is limited to conventional processes that currently take place only to meet the needs of existing members of society, without taking into account the needs of future generations, the authors of the Brundtland Commission Report (Our Common Future) in 1987 explained sustainable development so as to reflect development that meets the needs of the present without affecting the ability of future generations to meet their needs. Sustainable development has thus been defined as: "Actions aimed at investing environmental resources to the extent that it achieves development, reduces pollution, conserves and develops natural resources,

rather than depleting them and attempting to control them. It is a development that takes into account the right of future generations to the natural resources of the earth's vital sphere. It also places the basic needs of the human being first. Its priorities are to meet one's needs for food, housing, clothing, labor, education, access to health services and everything related to improving the quality of its material and social life (Alasrag, 2014). A development that requires that we do not take more than the land, which requires solidarity between the present generation and the future generation; and guarantees the rights of future generations to environmental resources (Shakkour, et al, 2018). The objectives of sustainable development are to improve the living conditions of all the world's people and to provide the causes of well-being, health and stability for everyone (Bettina, 2012).

Shari'ah approach to sustainable development

The concept of corporate social responsibility has a vast history in the Muslim world. Despite the recent emergence of the term sustainable development, the concept is not new to Islam and Muslims.

The *Quran* and *Sunnah* have been blessed with many texts that represent the basic pillars of sustainable development. They regulate the relationship between man and the environment in order to ensure that it is viable until the order of Allah comes. It is worth noting that the concept of sustainable development in Islam is more comprehensive and more binding than the corresponding concept adopted on the agenda of the Twenty-first Century of the Rio Summit. The comprehensive Islamic view of sustainable development requires that this development not be carried out in isolation from religious and moral disciplines, because these controls prevent any problems that undermine sustainable development and justify their continuation (Hussain, et al., 2016). At the same time, the overall Islamic view of sustainable development is concerned with the material aspects, along with the spiritual and moral aspects. Sustainable development is not limited to activities related to life alone, but extends to the afterlife, the real-life that continues unceasingly and without any agitation.

Thus, the task of sustainable development in the Islamic perspective is to provide the present and future demands of humankind, whether material or spiritual, including the human right of every age to have a share of moral, cultural and social development. This is an important dimension in which sustainable development in the Islamic perspective differs from sustainable development in other systems, because it depends on the principle of balance and moderation in achieving the requirements of the human race in a manner consistent with the nature of the divine creation of this organism.

Sustainable development in the Islamic perspective does not make the human an enemy of nature and does not control it, but make him honest and seek to improve it, a companion to the elements of nature, take from them as much as the need and the need of dependents, without extravagance, and without excessive use, and not negligent of what Allah said ' and eat and drink, but be not excessive (Shakkour, et al., 2018). Indeed, He likes not those who commit excess'. The Quran says "O children of Adam, take your adornment at every masjid, and eat and drink, but be not excessive. Indeed, He likes not those who commit excess" (Al-A'raf, 31). In this perspective, sustainable development requires rich people to help the poor ' Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend out of that in which He has made you successors. For those who have believed among you and spent, there will be a great reward. The Quran says: "Believe in Allah and His Messenger and spend out of that in which He has made you successors. For those who have believed among you and spent, there will be a great reward. (AL-Hadid, 7). And that the rich, if they do not, may force the poor to put pressure on natural resources and drain them in order to obtain their needs. Poor land-use by poor countries and the establishment of environmentally polluting industries are an example of what environmental poverty can do. The achievement of development objectives depends on the environment and the resources it provides, where there is no room for the first without the second. This means that the relationship between them is firm and its balance continues to call for rationality and consideration of practices and behavior of all mankind.

1. **Evidence of the environment in science and the Quran**

1.1 **Environment from a human perspective**

The environment before the Stockholm and Tbilisi Conferences is defined as a group of non-living physical components, living components and the relationships between these components (Alasrag, 2014). The same concept was clearly developed as a result of the enormous changes that humans have made to ecological balances. In other words, the environment cannot be seen in isolation from the pressures exerted by man (Hussain, et al, 2016). The Human Environment Conference in Stockholm and Tbilisi outlined the following definition of the environment: "A set of natural, social and cultural systems in which humans and other beings live and derive their sustenance, Where their activity" (Bettina, 2012). Indeed, the concept of environment is meaningless if one of its most fundamental dimensions is erased: the human dimension of economic, social, cultural, technological, ethical, and religious…etc. Man by virtue of his intelligence and his continuous aspiration to living standards from good to better, especially on the material level, neglected the impact of his actions on environment (Shakkour, et al., 2018).

As a result, the concept of the environment must be understood as a concept of inclusiveness and indivisibility, where every biological dimension, whether material or human, interacts with other dimensions and plays a vital role in balancing all of this, especially in understanding environmental problems. When we talk about the human dimension, it is about human activities and activities within the environment for development (Bettina, 2012). Therefore, the quality and suitability of these practices and activities with the environment are either destructive, or protecting and conserving their resources. In other words, the integrity and balance of the environment depend on the reconciliation between the latter and development (Moi et al., 2016).

Thus, we can say that the environment in its general context is "all that is outside the human body" and affects it, and is influenced by the activities practiced by man himself, i.e., the framework in which he lives, which contains soil, water, air and what each of these three components contains as life beings. It is also known as "the center or spatial area in which man lives, including the nature where he is impacted and affect its existence." All of which is guaranteed by this spatial area of elements and creations whether they are created by Allah (swt) as rocks and minerals, sources of fuel, soil, water resources and elements of the climate like heat and pressure and wind and rain in addition to natural plant and wild animals or man-made things from the corridors and ways and means of transport communication, farms, factories, dams and others (Bettina, 2012).

Therefore, according to this concept, there is a natural environment, which contains both living and non-living elements, and man has no relation to their existence and a constructed environment by man through his interaction with the environment of nature. The nature of the environment depends on the nature of the relationship between man and his environment (Bettina, 2012), The way in which societies organized their lives and which the natural environment was unable to serve human needs.

1.2 **Environment in Quran**

Voluntarily feeling the responsibility of securing the environment is another important dimension in social responsibility. Islam has provided clear guidelines for such issues. Wasting or contamination of water is strictly prohibited in Islam. In Quran, Allah has provided the Muslims a general rule for wasting. The Quran says "Indeed those who needlessly waste are brothers of the devils; and the devil is very ungrateful to his Lord (Saba:34). Since the Quran is an integrated book in its spiritual and material aspects, it refers to the environment, whether the environment in which the humans lived or other environment or to which the future is not certain. Allah referred to this by saying "To Him belongs what is in the heavens and what is on the earth and what is between them and what is under the soil" (Taha, 6) (Gada, 2014). Between the heavens and the earth, the natural environment, which includes sun, heat, wind, humidity, cloud and rain, is said to mean "underground," which means the components of the earth, be it geological components or ores. Minerals or natural resources that can be extracted and economically exploited or groundwater that can be extracted for agriculture and settlement

purposes. The previous verse limited the components and elements of the environment with complete accuracy and comprehensiveness, and then came many Quranic verses to explain and detail the sources of natural resources and their diversity and factors affecting them. With regard to water resources, Allah said: "Have those who disbelieved not considered that the heavens and the earth were a joined entity, and We separated them and made from water every living thing? Then will they not believe? *(Al-Anbiyaa':* 30) (Gada, 2014; Hussain, et al., 2016).

This water wealth consists of water areas such as oceans, seas and freshwater areas such as rivers and lakes. Rainwater and groundwater can also be attached as a source of freshwater (Said et al., 2018). Allah emphasized the importance of water resources mentioned in Quran: "It is He who sends down rain from the sky: from it ye drink, and out of it (grows) the vegetation on which ye feed your cattle, with it He produces for you corn, olives, date-palms, grapes and every kind of fruit: verily in this is a sign for those who give thought" (Al lanam: 99).

The animal wealth and its benefits came in the Quran as saying: 'And cattle He has created for you (men): from them ye derive warmth, and numerous benefits, and of their (meat) ye eat. (5) And ye have a sense of pride and beauty in them as ye drive them home in the evening, and as ye lead them forth to pasture in the morning (6) And they carry your heavy loads to lands that ye could not (otherwise) reach except with souls distressed: for your Lord is indeed Most Kind, Most Merciful (7) And (He has created) horses, mules, and donkeys, for you to ride and use for show; and He has created (other) things of which ye have no knowledge.(8)' (Alnahl, 5-8) (Aburounia & Sexton, 2006; Gada, 2014).

There are also many references to climate elements such as wind, rain and some weather phenomena such as lightning, thunder and other elements of the environment. The *Hadith* shows that wastage of water is not acceptable in Islam but the content of *Hadith* and Quran mentioned above regarding wastage signifies that every kind of wastage is disliked and prohibited (*Haram*) in Islam. Therefore, Muslims are advised to secure and use the natural resources with proper care.

Regarding the contamination of environment, which is a very crucial issue now days, Islam provides general but clear instructions. It is mentioned in *Hadith*: "Jabir reported: The Messenger of Allah (May Peace Be Upon Him) forbade to urinate in stagnant water." Muslim, H. (875). Sahih Muslim. Translated by Siddiqui, A.H. Thus, the environment in the Quranic perception means the whole range of things that surround the human being, from the ground that leads him up to the sky and what is between them, these all are various factors and indicators as they deepen into the human psyche, which are controlling the instincts of evil, and even seeks to refine it (Moi et al., 2016). The environment in which man lived was balanced because it has the ability to absorb human activities because all things are created and estimated by Allah, who said: "Verily, all things have We created in proportion and measure. 'Indeed, all things We created with predestination" (Al-Qamar, 49) (Shakkour, et al., 2018).

But when man grew up and dealt with his environment in an unorganized way, it caused an imbalance in its natural components and the most recent so-called imbalance in its system, which is known as the "matrix of integrative relations within a particular environment unit and between its natural components inorganic (non-living) and organic components living through a precise and balanced system and through a self-controlled dynamic, that controls their movement and interaction, giving the system the ability to support life (Said et, al, 2018). The Holy Quran in the balance of the environment indicated clear signs, Allah said: "And the earth We have spread out (like a carpet); set thereon mountains firm and immovable; and produced therein all kinds of things in due balance. 'And the earth - We have spread it and cast therein firmly set mountains and caused to grow therein [something] of every well-balanced thing" (Al-Hijir, 19). As well as the evidence mentioned above, which confirms that the environment in which we live in which the Earth and its atmosphere and what is in them and inside of the jungle and plant and animal, which form interrelated rings affect each other so that the disruption of the system of any creation adversely affects the rest and imbalances and thus upset the balance of the environment as a whole.

1.3 Relationship between environment and sustainable development:

Whatever the nature, direction, and purpose of development, and where it is found, it needs to become a reality of environmental resources. This means that the person who aspires to growth acts as a catalyst for those resources and thus creates a system of relations between the environment and development (Bettina, 2012). Sustainable development has three basic components: the economy, society and the environment. The environment is the general framework that affects and is affected by economic activities. The environment is also affected by the behavior of the members of society and affects their health conditions and activities (Shakkour, et al., 2018). Therefore, any successful program for sustainable development must harmonize these three elements and combine them all in a single action aimed at improving the quality of these elements together i.e. achieving economic growth, meeting the requirements of the members of the community, ensuring environmental safety, while preserving the time Itself to the rights of future generations of natural resources and to enjoy a clean environment (Aburounia & Sexton, 2006; Said et, al, 2018).

It follows from all this that development in general and economic and social development, in particular, is restricted by the natural resources provided by the environment. Thus, the relationship between environment and development is self-evident, but the problem lies in the direction that man draws for this relationship in order to realize its developmental aspirations (Shakkour, et al., 2018). The relationship between development and the environment goes in one direction, from the environment to the human, where the environment is the provider, and the human takes, cuts, exploits, transforms and causes imbalance, to the extent that the reverse is rarely observed (Azila, et al., 2016). Moreover, the environment, because of the prevailing system and interaction between its various components, is able to absorb the imbalance that a person does, unless this imbalance exceeds a certain limit. If this limit is exceeded and this is what human behavior is currently, development, in the long run, becomes a non-destructive one, which may have irreversible effects on the environment (Aburounia & Sexton, 2006).

It should be noted in this connection that primitive societies were easily self-sufficient, by relying only on natural factors outside the ecosystem and earth, namely the sun and the rain (Said et al., 2018). Such societies have now disappeared, and the entry of man into the age of industry has had a major impact on the environment that was once a natural environment and is now an updated environment (Hussain, et al, 2016). It exploits it for resources and for energy and housing and exposes its domestic and industrial waste, in other words, pollutes it. Human beings have been exerting great pressure on the environment, which has led to the emergence of environmental problems of different size and impact depending on the degrees of growth and development reached by nations (Bettina, 2012).

There is no doubt that most of these problems are the result of human mismanagement of the environment so that it no longer has a limited local character, but it has become an international concern. Thus, the problems of the environment have become of concern not only to limited States but also to human society as a whole, given their impact on life in all its forms (Shakkour et al., 2018). Above mentioned *Hadiths* clearly emphasized the securing of natural environment in Islam and it is a mandatory duty of every Muslim (including businessmen) to take care of their natural environment. Moreover, the Holy Prophet (PBUH) emphasized on planting which is a major source of environmental purification in this world. According to a *Hadith*: "The Prophet said: If the Hour is about to be established and one of you was holding a palm shoot, let him take advantage of even one second before the Hour is established to plant it." If countries have borders, the problems resulting from the human exploitation of the environment penetrate these boundaries and may spread throughout the globe in several ways (Said et, al, 2018). Here, for example, the problems arising from the pollution of interstate rivers should be noted, since any damage they may have will affect on all or some of them. In addition to the atmosphere above all continents so that imbalances may spread beyond the scope of these limits (Bettina, 2012). Human beings, therefore, have made huge and rapid changes to ecosystems, breaking into cities and industries of all kinds, leading to the consumption of natural resources and the destruction of certain environmental systems (Said et al, 2018).

In short, the world today is living under the weight of huge environmental problems that are global in nature, especially the climate changes resulting from global warming, which in turn result from the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere resulting from various human activities, both industrial and social. In addition, human development has become synonymous with unlimited consumption and growth, as immediate profit, especially selfishness, made humans forget that an important part of this growth is consumption at the expense of the environment. Environmental protection requires special controls for sustainable development programs so that these controls ensure that natural ecosystems do not deteriorate. These controls include the following:

1. Protecting environment elements (water, soil, plants, clean air, ...etc.)
2. Conservation of genetic resources of animal and plant life, and reduction of loss of biodiversity
3. To rationalize the continued use of natural resources (especially plant and animal resources) so that consumption is not greater than the capacity of these resources to reproduce.

Sustainable development requires that human beings take account of these controls, take into account the importance of conserving ecosystems, plan their consumption rates so as to maintain a balance between their needs and their capacity to sustain resources.

3. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) from a conventional and an Islamic perspectives

Al-Shafa'i defined CSR as the innate readiness on which Allah has made man fit to perform the care of those entrusted by Allah with regard to matters related to his life and his religion, and for this care he receives reward (Said et, al, 2018).

3.1 CSR from conventional perspective

The increasing role of economic globalization during the 1990s led to the emergence of companies that played a role in reducing poverty and worked towards realizing the principle of the right to ownership as well as ensuring the safety of the environment. These also considered the financial part of society by looking for ways to raise positive gains, and used several terms including: corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility, and corporate accountability (Jones, 2010; Said et al., 2018). The various definitions of social responsibility have been discussed in terms of the number of areas it has addressed. As a result, we will examine these views presented in the JACOBY model, as well as the (HAY-GRAY) model, and the public model presented by (WILLIAMS). Their social responsibility is not confined to the organization and not exclusively to the market, but extends to various parties and categories of society. This was clearly discussed by (JOHN K. GALBRAITH) and (RALPH NADER). If we want to link social responsibility with the concept of sustainable development, the World Bank explained that it is the commitment of economic actors to contribute to sustainable development by working with the local community to improve the standards of living in a way that serves both the economy and development (Hussain, et al., 2016). The developmental role of the private sector must be an internal initiative and a self-propelling force from within the decision-makers in the corporate (Moi et al., 2016). The American Management Association (AMA) defines it as a corporate management response to changing consumer expectations and public interest in society and continuing to make unique contributions to business activities aimed at creating economic wealth (Said et al., 2018). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development defined it as the continuing commitment of business to ethical conduct, to contribute to economic development, and to improve the quality of living conditions of the workforce, their families, the community and society as a whole (Azila, et al., 2016).

In order to be a good citizen, it must seek not only the financial interest of the shareholders but also the interests of all other stakeholders (consumers, employees, managers, the environment in which they operate, and the media and society at large). In order to be socially responsible, it means that it is beyond charitable donations to go beyond active participation in educational programs and commitment to environmental protection, as well as to corporate citizenship as a business strategy that defines principles of transparency and accountability (Said et,

al, 2018). The Boston Center for Corporate Citizenship (BCCC) defines the values on which the company based its tasks and choices each day by executives, managers and employees to engage in the community (Jones, 2010).

In the exercise of its social responsibility, the company aims to increase its contribution to sustainable development and thus to protect the environment. To achieve this, the company should work on a set of principles, including: accountability, transparency, moral behavior, respect of stakeholders' interests, abiding laws, abiding international behavior conduct, respect human rights (Aburounia & Sexton, 2006; Said et, al, 2018).

3.2 CSR from Islamic perspective

Islam provides a basis and guideline for living one's life. Within this, there is a very detailed concept of ethical and social behavior which allows us to deduce that the concept of social responsibility automatically has a role in Islam (Alasrag, 2016). Allah created the human being in the best form, created him to worship and commissioned him to be a successor (Khalifah) in this land. He defined this as: "Allah's empowerment to mankind in general and to some of them in particular by replacing them with ownership of land and money." Through which his responsibilities, and the commissioning indicates that each individual is responsible for what he does, because Muslim view the money as an agent by the real owner (Allah), and will be replaced by the successor after him, and then he has to do right by this disposition entrusted to him, it is an agent who must manage to the benefit of the whole nation. In this sense, businessmen must exercise corporate social responsibility, and companies are human institutions and they are part of the Islamic nation (Azila, et al., 2016).
In the light of the sound doctrine and the pure unification of Allah, the relationship between man and his Lord, and the relationship of man to other people, and the relationship of man with the environment and the environment, the relationship of the Muslim with Allah is dominated by love and obedience, and his desire to get his satisfaction and avoid anger and indignation and every Muslim to abide by Islamic law finally seek the blessing in paradise (Aljannah) (Musaji, 2012; Said et, al, 2018). The relationship between Muslims and others should be based on Islamic moral values, such as trust, honesty, firmness, justice, respect for law, compassion and tolerance (Daud, et al., 2015; Gada, 2014). Every Muslim should be socially conscious, provide those who are under his responsibility with no extravagance, and corporate should respect the legitimate right of all parties involved with them, such as shareholders, employees and suppliers, as well as the environment (Moi et al., 2016). Based on all the above, Islam determine three important parties that a Muslim should consider when conducting any action: himself, his society, and his relationship to the legal system (Shakkour, et al., 2018). Islam which gives consideration for businesses and their push towards Corporate Social Responsibility. It considers the belief system of Islam and how this belief has a significant underpinning of social behavior. (Elasrag ,2016).

Environment protection from conventional and Islamic perspectives

Islam is the seal of Allah's message to human beings. The rules and controls of human behavior and environment ensure that life continues as Allah's will. Allah does not love corruption at all, and corruption in its environmental sense, disorder, sabotage and inconsistency, can be the result of pollution, the excessive and irrational exploitation of resources, and the invasion of the natural world (Daud, et al., 2015; Moi et al., 2016). In other words, corruption results from the changes that humans make without considering the system of interdependence that guarantees life within the environment. Reform can be linked to the concept of self-regulation, which ensures continuity of balance within ecosystems (Shakkour, et al., 2018). This means that Allah has provided the environment with all the conditions that enable it to repair itself whenever changes are made to it, but within certain limits. Therefore, he recommends that humans not to corrupt the earth, especially that spreading of corruption is much easier than carrying out reform (Musaji, 2012; Said et al., 2018).

The fundamentals of Islam such as *aqidah,*(belief and faith) *ibadah* (worship) and *akhlaq* (morality and ethics) are not subject to change. Because of the human egoistic view of the environment, the nature of the universe, and

the separation of itself from the environment and his ambition to control it, he has caused major environmental problems that have affected all oceans, continents, valleys and high seas (Musaji, 2012; Gada, 2014). As a result, laws and legislation have been enacted to protect this environment. The following parts discuss how environment is protected by both conventional law systems, and Islamic laws.

With the many problems that have afflicted the environment since the industrial revolution, and with the steady increase in the size of these problems, came up the so-called green ideas, which advocate the protection of the environment in order to preserve the planet and its neighborhoods, and prevent the deterioration of the quality of water, air, and soil (Jones, 2010; Bettina, 2012, Daud, et al, 2015). Conservation of the environment has become a value of the values of contemporary civilization adopted by politicians in their electoral programs, planners in their development strategies, and media in their cultural calls. Green ideas have spread in many countries, such as those advocating nature conservation, conservation of trees, non-deforestation, conservation of biodiversity and protection of the ozone layer...etc. (Hussain, et al., 2016).

As a result of the spread of environmental corruption and the exacerbation of environmental problems (pollution, major disturbance in ecosystems, global warming, desertification and many endangered species), panic has left many people in dire straits and a dangerous slope in modern civilization if environmental issues continue to be unsolved (Jones, 2010). Many international conferences went on discussing the importance of safekeeping the environment through issuing global initiatives and codes of conduct when dealing with environmental issues, including: Stockholm conference (1974), Rio de Janeiro conference (1992), Bonn Conference (2001), World Summit in Johannesburg (2002), and Abu Dhabi conference (2005)…etc. (Said et, al, 2018) The voices of advocacy for green values and a re-examination of the human relationship to the environment rose, and many NGO's and non-governmental organizations advocating for the preservation of the environment were active (Musaji, 2012). In the past two decades, the environmental tide has reached a great extent. Green policy literature has captured new insights that place humans on an equal footing with all other living organisms (Bettina, 2012).

All laws agreed on the prohibition of corruption in the land, and the word of corruption in general includes all that is true to this great meaning such as cutting harmless trees or killing birds in vain and other types of corruption, Allah said 'So fulfill the measure and weight and do not deprive people of their due and do not cause corruption upon the earth after its reformation (Azila, et al, 2016) and says "And to the people of Madyan We sent their brother Shu'ayb. He said, "O my people, worship Allah; you have no deity other than Him. There has come to you clear evidence from your Lord. So fulfill the measure and weight and do not deprive people of their due and cause not corruption upon the earth after its reformation. That is better for you, if you should be believers' (Al-A'raf, 85). Islam denies all causes of corruption, including polluting the environment, protecting it and protecting the human right from the damage caused by the elements of the environment on which he lives (Shakkour, et al., 2018, Hussain, et al., 2016). Such damage is prohibited by Islam, including the damage to human life and other objects that the Shari'ah intended to protect; because this type of corruption is a genocide of the human race or of some living things, 'whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely 'Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And our messengers had certainly come to them with clear proofs. Then indeed many of them, [even] after that, throughout the land, were transgressors." (Al-Ma'idah: 32) (Daud, et al., 2015).

Islam emphasized man because he is corrupting his environment by exploiting his environment for irrational exploitation. Allah mentioned this subject by saying "Corruption has appeared throughout the land and sea by [reason of] what the hands of people have earned so He may let them taste part of [the consequence of] what they have done that perhaps they will return [to righteousness.[(Ar-Rum, 41) (Gada, 2014). Despite the difference between the jurists in the interpretation of the word (corruption), it includes all the material and moral meanings that result from the behavior of the human subversive to himself and his environment (Moi et al.,

2016). The word land came before sea as the fact that human activity began on land, especially the Arabs in the middle of the Arabian Island, and then spread corruption to the sea (Daud, et al., 2015).

The connection of the Arabs with the desert is greater than their connection to the sea, they feared the sea and then corruption came, which is done or collected by the hands of people as a result of the tremendous development such as factories, laboratories, power plants and other means of life development until this development is the result of Irrational exploitation of environmental resources and pollution (Azila, et al., 2016). Allah explained this by stating, "And when he goes away, he strives throughout the land to cause corruption therein and destroy crops and animals. And Allah does not like corruption" (Al-Baqarah, 205) (Hussain, et al., 2016).

The Holy Quran has established a general principle whereby a person must avoid the dangers that he may be exposed to this principle is manifested in Allah saying "And spend in the way of Allah and do not throw [yourselves] with your own hands into destruction by refraining. And do good; indeed, Allah loves the doers of good (Al-Baqarah, 195) (Azila, et al., 2016). This applies exactly to what we are. If we want to protect ourselves from the dangers that prey on man if he is to pollute the water that is the basis of his life, he must follow the teachings of Islam and its guidance, and the safety of the environment is due to human action (Daud, et al., 2015). That what leads to pollution is not a coincidence or the birth of nature, but the product of human action (Moi et al., 2016).

Islam calls for reclaiming the environment and preserving it for what can be reclaimed from it and its use, such as agriculture and livestock, which the Prophet (PBUH) urged upon it to the last moment of life (Musaji, 2012). Our environment, which Allah has rewarded us, must be protected and preserved to fulfill its role as Allah has desired. He warned that anyone who harms or corrupts it will suffer severe punishment, he said ' And do not cause corruption upon the earth after its reformation' (*Al-A'raf, 56*) (Gada, 2014). The individual's responsibility for the community in Islamic societies and conversely, the community's responsibility for the individual are of primary magnitude, constituting a trust of life and the highest of its responsibilities (Hussein Elasrag, 2015).

Muslim scholars have devised general jurisprudential rules from the Holy Quran and the Sunnah, which are a source of pride for Muslims, as they preceded and surpassed contemporary environmental legislation (Daud, et al., 2015). We must seek to activate them in the field of payment of damage in all its forms and colors, including damage to the environment caused by human behavior. We must also revitalize and embrace them to resolve the environmental conflicts currently facing humankind, at the international, regional or individual levels (Gada, 2014; Azila et al., 2016).

Conclusion, recommendations and implication

From the above discussion, it is apparent that Islam was the first religion in establishing rules and values for achieving sustainable development, enhancing social responsibility and protecting the environment, and emphasizing the importance of the environment and working to preserve and maintain its balance. Islam worked to protect the creatures that live on the earth and do charity to it, including the protection of man from the evils of himself and the injustice of his brother human, with the benefit of the land's resources and capabilities in accordance with special controls without excessive use. This was not limited to determining the methods of reward for environmentalists and punishment for the abusers, but rather to make the ethics of dealing with the environment a benign behavior that the Muslim must adhere to and observe in the performance of his Lord.

People are agents not owners of the environment and its resources. Therefore, they cannot act on it away from Allah's control. People are the guardians of environmental resources and not owners. They are responsible for management and investment of the environment in which they live. Environment need to be maintained and preserved from any destruction or damage to humans or other creatures. The environment with its natural resources is not considered to be the exclusive property of a certain generation to act as if it's their property and permanent inheritance. No generation can claim to be the holder of this right. To make the concept of Islamic

CSR more understandable, there is a need for continuous trainings so that people better recognize the importance of CSR in Islam. The subject of Zakat as a major pillar in Islam is confused with corporate social responsibility. Some businessmen think that Zakat is the same as CSR. Therefore, a comparative study is needed in this regard.

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Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a Turning Point on China's Infrastructure Interconnection and Talent Exchange: Case of High-Speed Railway

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Abstract
The introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided new opportunities for the development of China's manufacturing export trade. By strengthening policy communication and economic cooperation with the countries along the road, it helps to exert the potential of trade between the "One Belt and One Road" countries, promote the output of traditional Chinese industries and lead the development of new manufacturing industries. Trade frictions between the United States and China are frequent and growing, and trade protectionism may pose a threat worldwide. Based on the perspective of BRI, this paper taking the development of international trade as the background expounds on the importance of the BRI to the high-speed railway (HSR) talent exchange between China and the countries along the silk road. In view of how to carry out talent exchange with other countries along the road, this article puts forward relevant suggestions, so as to expand the exchange and cultivation of international talents in China so as to meet the new challenges and demands of the construction of talents along the way and enhance the international cooperation and cultural exchange with the countries along the road.

Keywords: BRI, HSR, Infrastructure Interconnection, International Trade, Silk Road, Talent Exchange

1. Introduction and Review of Literature

"One Belt and One Road" is the abbreviation of the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "maritime Silk Road twenty-first Century." In September 2013 and October, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the strategic conception of building the new Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road. The Silk Road was a land trade channel opened by Zhang Qian in the Western Han Dynasty when he was sent to central and Western Asia. It started in Chang'an and connected Asia, Africa, and Europe. It can be divided into

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land Silk Road and sea Silk Road. "One Belt and One Road" is not an entity, but a cooperative development initiative. It aims to borrow the historical symbols of the ancient Silk Road, hold high the banner of peaceful development, actively develop economic partnerships with countries along the Silk Road, and jointly build a community of interests, destiny, and responsibility with political mutual trust, economic integration, and cultural inclusion. The "One Belt and One Road" initiative will not only focus on the investment and profits of the world, but more importantly, it can bring a new trend to the world, so that equal cooperation, cultural exchanges, and economic prosperity, rather than military hegemony, will become another main axis of the future world order.

One Belt and One Road initiative is a major strategic measure for China to deepen opening-up and promote economic transformation. It is also a great cause to strengthen strategic links among Asian, African, and European countries and promote the common prosperity of countries along the belt and road. The "One Belt and One Road" emphasizes the interconnection among countries, including the hard power of road link, smooth trade and industrial cooperation, including soft power such as policy communication, cultural exchange, and talent exchange. Talents are the basis and core elements of strategy implementation.

The grand strategy of a country alludes to its all-told planning and macroscopic arrangements within a special period, targeting to realize the interest of that country. The grand strategy is long-term, full-on, stable, macroscopic, and oriented, while its tactics are temporary, focused, interchangeable, flexible, and confidential (Li & Wang, 2015). "Silk Road Economic Belt" initiative is a grand strategy of China confronting the future, alluding to a broader area and more meaningful content instead of simply a revival or duplication of the Silk Road (Wu, 2014).

The key to building a "One Belt and One Road" is interconnection. "Interconnection" focuses on the linkages of infrastructure in countries along the route, which are the basis for interoperability and the prerequisite for cooperation. While "Interchange" focuses on the high-speed (HSR) circulation of commodities, funds, technology, and personnel (Xi Jin ping, April 2019). With the development of society, the progress of science and technology, and the improvement of technology, China's transportation is becoming more and more convenient; especially the high-speed rail has brought China great benefits. It is high-speed and safe, which brings convenience and convenience to people's lives, and also promotes economic development (Fang Xin). And in terms of its practical implementation, the BRI revolves around the construction of an efficient infrastructure and transportation system which enhances interconnectivity between China and all its neighboring countries and regions, eradicates bottlenecks in cross-border trade, facilitates effective logistics systems and services and promotes greater demand for the carriage of freight. Much of the investment that is linked to the BRI is aligned to the development of the rail network, both within Asia and connecting Asia to Europe. (EIU, 2016).

Moreover, the export of high-speed rail is called "high-speed rail diplomacy" in the contemporary era. This is not only a new business card of China's diplomacy but also a good opportunity for China to establish a new international image. Therefore, the potential impact of high-speed rail on China's economy is revolutionary. It makes China start to get rid of local protectionist thinking and rationally think about regional economy with the urban division of labor as the core. It is making this ideal economic model from theory to reality (High-speed rail network, April 2019).

Furthermore, industrial development and talent support are mutually reinforcing and interdependent at all times. The implementation of international HSR construction projects urgently needs a large number of export-oriented high-speed technical talents who can adapt to the production, construction, management, and service frontline to ensure the survey, design, construction, and operation of HSR projects. Talents demand management and service (Hu Bangyao, 2016). However, the "One Belt and One Road" infrastructure construction have also put forward many new requirements for engineering personnel training, engineering education and even the entire education reform (Gongke, 2016). Moreover, the "One Belt and One Road" initiatives have been shifted from "freehand brushwork" to "meticulous painting." Only by cultivating a high level of professional talents that are urgently

needed in the construction of "One Belt and One Road" can we support the "sustainable development" of "One Belt and One Road" initiative and draw a blueprint for "One Belt and One Road" leading to a better tomorrow (Zhang Shuibo, 2019). There are opportunities, but also difficult challenges.

Besides, in the literature concept, Yang et al. (2018) compared the spatial configurations of the Chinese national urban system in both HSR and airline networks by using the 2013 origin/destination (O/D) passenger flow data instead of commonly used scheduled data. Qin & Gao (2017) reviewed development in the construction technologies of multi-function combined bridges in China, including highway and railway bridges and multi-track railway bridges, and also presented the outlook of the future expansion of long-span HSR bridges. In China, under the Belt and Road Initiative, the researchers analyzed the hinterland patterns of the CHINA RAILWAY Express (CR Express) (Jiang et al., 2018). Shoa et al. (2018) suggested a method for the choices of the urgent needs of transnational HSR construction in the B&R area. Researchers believed that HSR is not just a faster transport way but poses remarkable impacts on regional issues and transform spatial structures (Vickerman, 2017; Ureña et al., 2009). Jiang et al. (2020) mentioned that the inauguration of HSR significantly had positive impacts on regional economies, which are often considering as serious factors in planning and decision-making for policymakers.

This paper is mainly to analyze the current situation of talent exchanges with the countries along the road under the background of "One Belt and One Road," and to integrate relevant literature collected, and to put forward relevant suggestions based on this. Moreover, this paper also aims to:
- Present Current measures in talent exchange;
- Identify the challenges and opportunities in talent exchange;
- Suggest the various strategies to enhance talent exchange.

2. Research Methodology

Methods employed in this paper include documentation and theoretical analysis. This paper is mainly based on secondary data collection through various literature. We extract data and information from the official website and the report. Moreover, data based on OBOR, trade and talent exchange has been collected from various articles, magazines, conferences and websites and other online sources for research. By collecting data in recent years, the main actions of training HSR international talents are analyzed.

3. Results

3.1. China's trade with countries along the Silk Road

Overall, China's import and export trade with the "Belt and Road" countries has increased rapidly, and import growth has outstripped exports. In 2016, Chinese enterprises directly invested 14 billion and 530 million US dollars in the "one belt and one way" countries, and the new contract amount for foreign contracted projects amounted to the US $126 billion and 30 million, accounting for 51.6% of the total contracted projects in China over the same period. Total turnover was 75 billion US dollars, accounting for 47.7% of total turnover in the same period. Several international capacity cooperation and infrastructure interconnection projects such as the Bamu Railway and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor have been successfully implemented. As a carrier of regional interconnection, the HSR is expected to benefit from the new demands of infrastructure along the belt. In 2017, the total import and export volume of China and the countries along the silk road reached US $1 trillion, 13.4% more than the same period last year, higher than China's total growth in foreign trade by 5.9 percentage, accounting for 36.2% of China's total import and export trade. The trade volume between China and the countries along the silk road was 7 trillion and 400 billion Yuan, up 17.8% over the same period last year, and the growth rate was higher than the national growth rate by 3.6 percentage points. Among them, exports of 4.3 trillion CNY, an increase of 12.1%, imports of 3.1 trillion CNY, an increase of 26.8%; direct investment by Chinese enterprises in countries along the road was US$14.4 billion, and newly contracted projects in countries

of BRI was US$144.3 billion, an increase of 14.5% over the same period of last year. In 2018, the total import and export volume of goods trade between China and the countries along the belt has an increase of 16.3% over the same period last year, an increase of 3.7 percentage points over the same period in China's foreign trade and 27.4% of the total foreign trade (The regular press conference of the Ministry of Chin's Commerce, 2019). Trade cooperation between relevant countries and regions has been deepening. China's trade growth rate is higher than the overall growth rate of foreign trade, accelerating the recovery of foreign trade. It has not only become a highlight of China's foreign trade but also injected new impetus into China's high-quality economic development. At the same time, it also brings tremendous opportunities for the economic development of countries along the line.

Overseas high-speed rail market has broad prospects. By 2018, the global railway equipment market will reach 148.9 billion euros, of which the HSR market will reach 19 billion euros. The railway equipment market in Europe and Asia is the largest; except Central and South America, the railway equipment market in other regions have maintained growth, with the fastest growth rates in Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

An important measure of regional economic impacts is the effect of transport-induced density on business productivity. According to the World Bank (2014), which is mentioned by Jiang et al. (2019), the evaluated density results of HSR on different second-tier and third-tier cities are substantial. As it is explained in Table 1, they grab 0.55% of total gross domestic product (GDP) in Jinan per year, 1.03% in Dezhou, and 0.64% in Jilin. Although economic elements are definite to the decision on whether the government should invest in HSR projects, the argument for the investment goes far beyond them. It is the mixture of political and strategic factors, generally related to regional development goals, that determine the feasibility of building an HSR network. The development of the High-speed rail network in China is an outstanding example to show the influence of the government initiative on spatial transformation, as many previous studies have discussed. A list of literature on the forces of HSR on spatial transformation is illustrated in Table 1.

TABLE 1 Regional economic impacts of HSR on cities.		
	Agglomeration effects Increase	
	Increase in GDP	**Benefits (RMB in billions)**
City		
Jinan (Beijing-Shanghai HSR) Dezhou	0.55%	3.65
Dezhou (Beijing-Shanghai HSR)	1.03%	3.59
Jilin (Changchun-Jilin HSR)	0.64%	2.39

Source: Data from World Bank, 2014. Regional Economic Impact Analysis of High-Speed Rail in China. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/China/high_ speed-rail-%20in-china-en.pdf.

3.2. Internationalized Infrastructure Construction

The connotation of "One Belt and One Road" is summed up as "five links and three similarities." "Five links" refer to policy communication, facilities communication, trade unimpeded, capital financing, and people's hearts. The "five links" are unity and indispensable. "Three Communities" means the community of interests, destiny, and responsibility. The three are also an integral whole, indivisible and win-win situation.

China has always attached great importance to the development and construction of infrastructure. In 2015, the Chinese government promulgated *Vision and Action for Promoting the Co-construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Marine Silk Road in the 21st Century*, pointing out that infrastructure interconnection is the priority development area of the "One Belt and One Road" initiative. The high-speed rail industry is the leader of the infrastructure interconnection and will play a very important role in building the "One Belt and One Road" initiative. In recent years, the HSR has been a transport means worth to advocate around the world, under its advantages of energy saving ability, economy promotion potential, comfortability, high-speed, comfortable, and clean transport services (Ureña et al., 2009). Under the background of the "One Belt and One Road" initiative, China's high-speed rail has become the trend of the world. In 2016, it is the first year of the outbreak of "going out" of HSR, which was called by the media. China's HSR has gradually matured, and its territory has expanded to dozens of countries. To compete with Japan and other old railway powers, Chinese engineering cooperation enterprises have also explored a more localized way (CHINA CONSTRUCTION NEWS WEB, 2016). China's overseas high-speed rail projects include the China-Pakistan Railway, the Iran HSR, the Two-Ocean Railway, the Indonesian HSR, and the African Railway, and so on. The cost of high-speed rail construction in China is about two-thirds of that in other countries, while ticket prices are only one-fourth to one-fifth that in other countries. (World Bank, 2014) The reason why China's high-speed rail can flourish is not only the political and economic factors that cannot be bypassed but also its virtue. The achievements of China's HSR come from the ideas and concepts of introducing, absorbing and re-innovating, and the prospects of integration, customization, interconnection, intellectualization, humanization, and diversification of China's HSR technology. Innovation is the source of HSR development. Innovation will give HSR a new round of life (Wang Jun, Vice President of China National Automobile Corporation, 2018). After years of rapid development, China's high-speed rail can no longer be underestimated. By the end of 2015, China operates about 121 thousand kilometers (km) of railway in track length, out of which 19 thousand km are HSR track (NDRC, 2016). China's HSR network will continue to expand as program in the country's new Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development. According to the plan, an additional ten thousand km of HSR track will be built by 2030 (NDRC, 2016).

3.3. Talent Internationalization in HSR

However, the "going out" of China's high-speed rail is not so smooth, there are still geopolitical changes, economic development endurance, compatibility of technical standards system and other constraints, especially the international talent team in quantity and quality cannot meet the needs of rapid expansion of enterprises' overseas business, which has become a "bottleneck" restricting the further development of enterprises' international business (Wang Hong, 2015). China's railway internationalization business involves more than 80 countries and regions. Overseas HSR projects are nearly 6,000 kilometers. The demand for talents related to rail transit has increased dramatically. At present, the rail transit industry is in urgent need of compound talents with both professional knowledge and international vision, who can not only understand international business but also communicate with foreign humanities. Simon Iwnick, Professor of Railway Engineering, Huddersfield University, UK, A.A. Akintola, Nigerian scholar, and reports from Australia and South Africa have pointed out the predicament of the "railway renaissance" development and the shortage of skilled personnel facing their countries. LinkedIn, a professional social networking site published the white paper on "one belt and one road" talent. It shows that the talent challenge of Chinese enterprises "going out" is focused on quality, and 66% of enterprises say it was difficult to find high-level talents in 2018. Although the investment, construction, and operation of "one belt and one road" infrastructure is the key to the interconnection of facilities, the construction of infrastructure requires a large number of funds, low short-term returns, complex construction process, and the impact of changes in the social environment. Its long-term operation will also be affected by the interests of the following political, economic, cultural and religious factions. This process of "investment, construction, and operation" is ten. It is complex and involves technical, economic, financial, legal and cross-cultural expertise. Therefore, to build these infrastructures well, high-level professionals with international vision and national feelings are the necessary conditions for this work (Zhang Shuibo, 2018). So, how to cultivate talents to adapt to it? Higher education undertakes the important responsibilities of personnel training, scientific research, social

services, cultural heritage and innovation, international exchanges and cooperation, and the important mission of educating talents for the implementation of national strategy and the healthy development of economy and society.

Training international talents for HSR going abroad is the unshirkable responsibility for Railway colleges and universities (Wang Hong, 2018). In the face of opportunities and challenges, railway colleges and universities have taken measures to train internationalized HSR talents.

Talents are the basis of promoting China's high-speed rail "going out." The construction of high-speed rail personnel needs to put forward higher requirements following new technologies and new development directions. Colleges and universities also actively seize opportunities and make progress. As the leader of the high-speed rail personnel team construction plan, they should establish joint mechanism with enterprises, training institutions, and foreign universities, strengthen collaborative training, and jointly integrate resources and build up. The platform, strive to build an international HSR talent education brand.

4. Conclusion and Suggestion

To go global, Chinese railways need internationalized talents. However, it is not enough to rely solely on the cultivation of domestic educational resources for internationalized talents. China must cooperate with foreign countries and make full use of superior resources at home and abroad to cultivate nationalized higher talents. In 2010, the Central State Council issued the Outline of the National Medium and Long Term Talent Development Plan (2010-2020) and the Decision on Accelerating the Development of Modern Vocational Education issued by the State Council in 2014, it clearly pointed out that in order to meet the needs of social and enterprise development, the joint school-enterprise cooperation model must be vigorously developed. China can cultivate internationalized HSR talents by strengthening the links with foreign universities, constructing the model of School-School cooperation, or the mode of School-School exchange of students along the silk road countries. In recent years, to promote the high-speed rail "going out" process, the state and enterprises have made efforts and contributions. However, there are still some problems in training international hot talents.

1) HSR talent reserve and training speed cannot meet the rapid growth of demand.
2) The quality and professional level of HSR employees cannot meet the international HSR personnel level and standard.
3) Insufficient cooperation with enterprises, universities, and governments in countries along the "One Belt and One Road."

Besides, colleges and universities should not only pay attention to English teaching but also to the cultivation of minority languages, to lay a solid foundation for promoting exchanges with countries along the Belt and Road. Therefore, because of the current development trend of high-speed rail in China, the state, enterprises, and universities should fully recognize the importance of high-speed rail internationalization personnel training for the future development of high-speed rail and national economic development. It will be the cornerstone of the development of Chinese railways in the coming decades to strengthen the training of internationalized HSR talents.

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Social Analysis of the Impact of Money Marriage on Psycho-Emotional State of Female Children in Becheve, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State Nigeria

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Abstract

The study was focused on social analysis of the impact of money marriage on psycho-emotional state of female children in Becheve, Obanliku Local government Area of Cross River State. The study adopted the survey research design. Well, structured questionnaire was administered to 400 randomly sampled respondents consisting of families and dwellers in Utanga, Ugbakoko, Amana, Keyi and Imale, in Becheve. Data generated was analysed using descriptive statistics. Results revealed that money marriage is a serious problem and has a greater tendency of enhancing psychological and/or emotional abuse, physical abuse and sexual abuse of the female children. It was recommended that state and local governments should mobilize families and the wider community to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of child marriage can change attitudes and reduce the acceptance among those who make the decision to marry girls as children; and religious and traditional leaders, too, have the potential to play a key role in speaking out against child marriage and changing community attitudes towards money marriage.

Keywords: Money Marriage, Psycho-Emotional State, Female Children, Becheve, Nigeria

Introduction

Essentially, there are three most pivotal days in the life of a man: the day he is born, the day he gets married and the day he dies. In any case, it is by and large accepted that man has a full learning of just one of these three days, which is the day of his marriage as he doesn't have an inkling what occurs during his introduction to the world and his post-demise occasions. This makes marriage the very beginning of the most significant days in the life of a man and now and again considered the best and most joyful day in a man's life being multi-day of euphoria and decision. Sadly, the threat encompassing marriages makes this day the saddest in the lives of young girls, particularly the child brides; a number of them are offered to their spouses by their folks out of their desire or assent. This is the reason it is, at some point, alluded to as forced marriage or Money Marriage. A significant number of such helpless little youngsters or ladies must choose between limited options about the planning of their marriage or legitimate information of their partner as some are forced into it, while others are too youthful to even think about making an informed choice. A critical case which this study tends to investigate is that of Becheve Community of Obanliku Local Government Area of Cross River State where the practice of Money Marriage: An act of modern day's slavery still holds sway, in Nigeria.

Money marriage is an act of modern day girls' slavery. Money marriages have increased the level of girls molestation among men, trading girls for-profit and gains to the extent that young girls who are supposed to be giving formal education are out there undergoing hard labour to meet the demand of their 'money men.' These incidences could never have been possible if the parental consent is absent. The parent of the 'money women' play significant role in the sales of the children or wards which may be directly or indirectly linked to the socio-economical condition's prevalence at the time. Some of the practitioners are also of the argument that money marriage is a long-aged traditional practice that cannot be eradicated. Many believed the practice serves both marital and economic benefits to the people, hence the sustenance of the practice.

According to the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being (NSCAW, 2004), more than one-quarter of children who had been in foster care for longer than 12 months and are maltreated had some lasting or recurring health problem which however has a direct effect on their educational pursuit. Shaking a baby girl is a common form of girl child abuse. The injuries caused by shaking a baby girl may not be immediately noticeable and may include bleeding in the eye or brain, damage to the spinal cord and neck, and rib or bone fractures. A girl child who suffers from brain injury or has eye problem cannot read or write in the school, which by implication, will affect the academic performance of the girl child in school.

De Bellis and Thomas (2003) assert that girl child abuse causes important regions of the brain to fail to form or grow properly, resulting in impaired development. These alterations in brain maturation have long-term consequences for cognitive, language, and academic abilities. Flaherty (2006) added that several studies have shown that a teenage who experienced abuse or neglect during childhood is more likely to suffer from physical ailments such as allergies, arthritis, asthma, bronchitis, and ulcers.

Johnson, Rew & Sternglanz (2006) also stated that abused and neglected children are 25 percent more likely to experience problems such as delinquency, teenage pregnancy, low academic achievement, drug use, and mental health problems. Other studies like Springer, Sheridan, Kuo, & Carnes (2007) suggest that abused or neglected children are more likely to engage in sexual risk-taking as they reach adolescence, thereby increasing their chances of contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Dube, Anda, Felitti, Chapman, Williamson, & Giles (2001) relate that there is likelihood that abused and neglected girl child will prostitute, smoke cigarettes, abuse alcohol, or take illicit drugs during her lifetime. While Garvelf (2007) relates that depression is a common element in the lives of every abused girl child. Pupils who are often sexually or physically abused have been shown to possess a unique set of depression which can affect their daily experience.

There have been many research findings that show relationship between depression and students' academic performance. Depression affects memory retention. When a child abused victim is depressed, the more likelihood she forgets the facts and figures presented in class, and he will not be able to successfully recall the information on test, and on real life applications. Obviously, this is a problem for anyone who wants to do well in the school. Equally, girl child abuse causes anxiety. Female students/pupils who face a tremendous amount of abuse may suffer from anxiety ranging from mild cases of worry to severe cases of nerve problems. If a girl child is suffering from anxiety at any level, she will find it difficult to cope with school activities, including that of extra – curricular. Researches such as Springer, Sheridan, Kuo, & Carnes (2007) found that abused child experienced financial problems, rejection from loved ones, and feelings of low self–esteem. Neglect, physical, sexual and emotional abuse can turn an ambition driven girl child into one who is nervous and a failure. It is easy to feel sad when a child who supposed to resume early to school is made to wait at home to wash clothes, fetch water and do other odds kinds of work at home. This ill-treatment may affect the girl's drive for success in her life.

Despite the wake of globalization and the several human right proclamations which Nigeria is a signatory to, this odious practice is still seen in Nigeria. From the foregoing, the study was designed to investigate the effects of money marriage on psychological/emotional state of the girl child in Becheve Community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

Study objective

To investigate the relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve Community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

Study hypothesis

There is no significant relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve Community Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State, Nigeria.

Literature review

Money marriage and child emotional abuse

There is no single cause of emotional abuse. Instead, there are usually multiple and interacting contributors at the levels of the child, parent, family, community and society. Examples of contributors include a child with a disability, a parent struggling with depression or substance abuse, intimate partner violence, a father who is not involved in their child's life, a lack of community supports (e.g., affordable child care), the burdens associated with poverty, and inadequate policies to support families and parents. These characteristics greatly contribute to the intractability of the problem. Combinations of such problems may impair a parent's ability to ensure his or her child's needs are adequately met. It is apparent that other forms of maltreatment, physical and sexual abuse, as well as neglect, may, in different ways be emotionally abusive. Indeed, long after bruises have faded and fractures healed, the emotional scars may be long lasting.

Consequences of emotional abuse

The consequences of child emotional abuse can be devastating and long-lasting, and include: increased risk for a lifelong pattern of depression, estrangement, anxiety, low self-esteem, inappropriate or troubled relationships, or a lack of empathy. During their childhood, victims may experience a delay in their developmental progress. Research also indicates that emotional abuse may be a stronger predictor of psychological, emotional, and behavioral impairments and trauma than accompanying physical abuse. It is clear that the consequences of child emotional abuse extend far beyond the affected children and families. Enormous societal costs are involved. Prevent Child Abuse America estimated the economic impact of child abuse and neglect at $104 billion in 2007; and this was likely a conservative estimate. Thus, in addition to the compelling human argument to help optimize children's development, health and safety, there is also a financial impetus to help prevent the neglect of children. The aphorism that "our children are our nation's most valuable resource" should be more than a slogan. Finally, at the heart of child neglect is a concern with their basic rights, their human rights. The costs associated with the pervasive and long-lasting effects of child abuse and neglect are as undeniable as our obligation to prevent – not just respond to – this problem. In 2007, $33 billion in direct costs for foster care services, hospitalization, mental health treatment, and law enforcement were supplemented by over $70 billion in indirect costs like loss of individual productivity, chronic health problems, special education, and delinquent and criminal justice services. As with physical abuse, the consequences of emotional abuse or deprivation are severe and can often last into adulthood. Emotional abuse is likely to be interpreted by a child that she is unloved or unwanted or responsible for the abuse.

Again, there are several effects of emotional abuse on girl children. These include the following:
- Difficulty maintaining healthy relationships: Emotional abuse can interfere with a child's ability to form healthy attachments to adults. Attachment issues in early childhood have been linked to insecure attachments in adulthood. That may lead to a higher risk of poor peer relations, trouble with intimacy, difficulty with conflict resolution, and relational aggression.

- Increased risk of mental health issues: Adolescents who experienced emotional abuse are more likely to have at least one mental illness. Depression, anxiety, or other mental illnesses may last into adulthood. People with a history of emotional abuse are also more likely to attempt suicide.
- Increased social problems: Emotional abuse has been linked to delinquency and aggression in adolescents.
- Greater risk of repeating the cycle of abuse: Without appropriate intervention, children who were abused are more likely to abuse their own children when they grow up.

Not everyone who has a history of emotional abuse experiences lifelong scars, however. The duration, severity, and age of onset all play a role. Boys who experience abuse prior to the age of 12 are more likely to exhibit behavior problems, for example. They are more likely to be arrested or exhibit serious delinquency if the abuse began at a younger age. Having a positive relationship with an adult, however, can be a protective factor. A loving, nurturing parent, grandparent, or other individual, for example, can help buffer some of the negative effects of emotional abuse. Emotional abuse also strains society as a whole. It places a burden on the health and social care systems, and is costly in terms of the increased educational failure, crime, and need for mental health services.

Method of study

Research design

Survey research design was adopted for this study. Data for the study was collected through a well-developed research questionnaire instrument which was divided into two major segments, part A and B. Part "A" was comprised of the demographic data of the respondents which included the sex, age, religion, marital status and educational attainment. Part "B" consisted of the questionnaire items which were divided into three sections. For easy coding, the items were systematically arranged under the variable sub-headings respectively just as enunciated in the literature review.

The population of the study comprises of selected villages in Becheve which include: Utanga, Ugbakoko, Amana, Keyi and Imale, in Obanliku Local Government Area of Cross River State. The selected villages were five in number including men and women from the five (5) selected villages in Becheve Community. In order to obtain a representative sample for the study, the researcher employed the simple random sampling in determining the sample size. Simple random sampling is a probability sampling procedure that gives all the elements an equal chance of being selected in the research work (Ndiyo, 2005).

In selecting the element for the study, respondents in each of the five (5) villages randomly selected out of Becheve community to actually ascertain the described sample so that no one feels bias by the entire exercise. By this process, 80 community members were selected from each of the five (5) villages giving a sample of 200 community members. The 400 respondents (men and women) selected to serve as subject for the study are shown below on the table.

Table 1: Distribution of sample among men and women of communities in Becheve Community in Obanliku Local Government Area of Cross River State

S/N	Names of Communities	No. of Men	No. of Women	Total
1	Utanga	40	40	80
2	Ugbakoko	40	40	80
3	Amana	40	40	80
4	Keyi	40	40	80
5	Imale	40	40	80
	Total	200	200	400

A sample of 400 respondents was used for this study. Respondents were selected based on researcher's judgment of their competence to handle the issues under investigation. The selection consists of families and dwellers in Utanga, Ugbakoko, Amana, Keyi and Imale, in Becheve Community in Obanliku Local Government Area of Cross River State. The researcher used random sampling techniques to select 400 people (men and women) from the five (5) selected communities. This was made possible because the heterogeneous nature of the population in question. A total of 80 people (40 men and 40 women) were randomly selected from each of the community making a total sample of two hundred (400) people for the study.

Results and discussion

Table 2 shows the demographic characteristics of respondents. The distribution of respondent's responses by their sex segregation shows that out of the sample population of 375, 203 responses representing 54.1 percent are males while 172 responses representing 45.9 percent are females making a total of 100 percent. This indicates that there male response were more in the course of this study.

From distribution of responses according to their age assortment/segregation shows that out of the sample population of 375, 111 responses representing 29.6 percent falls within the age bracket/range of 20-30 years, 97 responses which represent 25.8 percent falls within the age bracket of 31-40 while 85 responses representing 22.7 percent falls within the age range of 41-50 years and 82 responses representing 21.9 percent falls within the age range of 51 and above thereby making a total of 100 percent. This shows that those within the age range of 20-30 years had more responses than others in the course of this study.

Items on the distribution of respondent's responses base on their marital status shows that out of the sample population of 375, 116 responses representing 39.9 percent are single while 203 responses representing 54.2 percent are married and 56 responses representing 14.9 percent are divorced constituting a total of 100 percent. This shows that respondents who are married responded more during the study.

The data on distribution of respondent's responses according to their educational status revealed that out of a sample population of 375, 152 responses which represent 40.5 percent have FSLC, 126 responses representing 33.6 percent have WASSCE and 97 responses which represent 25.9 percent are holders of Ph.D./M.Sc/M.Ed/PGD/B.Sc/B.Ed/HND/NCE, respectively. It signifies that FSLC holders' responses were more in the course of study.

Analysis of the distribution of respondent's responses in accordance with their Religious affinity shows that out of the sample population of 375, 283 responses representing 75.5 percent are Christian religion adherents while 11 responses representing 2.9 percent are adherents of Islam, and 81 responses representing 21.6 percent are adherents of African Traditional Religion. This indicates that responses from Christian religion adherents were more during the course of study.

In terms of the distribution of respondent's responses by their Occupation it is revealed that out of the sample population of 375, 108 responses representing 28.8 percent are students, 79 responses representing 21.1 percent are Civil servants, whereas 107 responses which represents 28.5 percent are Traders/Farmers and 11 responses representing 2.9 percent falls under the category of other occupations which constitute a total of 100.

Table 2: Demographic distribution of respondents

Variables	Group	No. of respondents	Percentage
Sex	Male	203	54.1
	Female	172	45.9
	Total	**375**	**100**
	"20-30 years"	111	29.6

Age			
	"31-40 years"	97	25.8
	"41-50 years"	85	22.7
	"51years and above"	82	21.9
	Total	**375**	**100**
Marital status	Single	116	30.9
	Married	203	54.2
	Divorced	56	14.9
	Total	**375**	**100**
Educational qualification/status	Primary(FSLC)	152	40.5
	Secondary(WASSCE)	126	33.6
	Tertiary	97	25.9
	Total	**375**	**100**
Religious Affinity	Christianity	283	75.5
	Islam	11	2.9
	African Traditional Religion (ATR)	81	21.6
	Total	**375**	**100**
Occupation	Student	108	28.8
	Civil servant	79	21.1
	Trader/Farmer	107	28.5
	Teacher	70	18.7
	Others	11	2.9
	Total	**375**	**100**

Source: Field work, 2019.

Money Marriage and Psychological/Emotional abuse of girl children

The independent variable is money marriage while psychological/emotional abuse is the dependent variable. To answer this research question, descriptive statistics of simple percentages were used and the result is shown in table 4.2. The responses were graded on four likert scale (A, SA, D, SD), but for the purpose of convenience; agree and strongly agree were collapsed into agree, while disagree and strongly disagree were collapsed into disagree for percentage calculation, analysis and interpretation.

Table 3: Percentages analysis for money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse in Becheve, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

Questionnaire items	No of respondents			
	Agree	**%**	**Disagree**	**%**
Girls who are victims of Money Marriage always experience some level of emotional/psychological abuse	269	(71.7)	106	(28.3)
Most girls are sent into money marriage at a tender age or as teens and have little or no experience to fight through hard times and thus, they end up being psychologically/emotionally derailed	205	(54.7)	170	(45.3)
The knowledge of being sold out into money marriage	260	(69.3)	115	(30.7)

or exchanged for whatever commodity it may be by her parents leave the girl child with a long lasting emotional scar				
The emotional/psychological wellbeing of the girl child is not really considered in money marriage	245	(65.3)	130	(34.7)
Total	979	(65.3)	521	(34.7)

Source: field work, 2019

Results in Table 3 revealed the distribution of respondents' responses of all the four questions that measured Money Marriage and Psychological/Emotional abuse in Becheve, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State. The distribution of respondent's responses of questionnaire question one on "Girls who are victims of money marriage always experience some level of emotional/psychological abuse?" out of 375 responses (respondents), 269 respondents representing 71.7 percent agreed (positive) to the statement above and 106 respondents representing 28.3 percent disagree (negative) to the statement above which constitute a total of 100 percent. From the above indication, it clearly shows that Girls who are victims of money marriage always experience some level of emotional/psychological abuse.

Items 2 shows the distribution of respondent's responses of questionnaire statement on "Most girls are sent into money marriage at a tender age or as teens and have little or no experience to fight through hard times and thus, they end up being psychologically/emotionally derailed" out of the 375 respondents which the questionnaires were administered to, 205 respondents representing 54.7 percent agreed (positive) while 170 respondents representing 45.3 percent disagreed (negative) making a total of 100 percent. Therefore, it clearly portrays that most girls are sent into money marriage at a tender age or as teens and have little or no experience to fight through hard times and thus, they end up being psychologically/emotionally derailed. Questionnaire item 3 shows the allocation of respondent's responses of questionnaire on "The knowledge of being sold out into money marriage or exchanged for whatever commodity it may be by her parents leave the girl child with a long lasting emotional scar" from the above statement, out of the 375 respondents, 260 respondents representing 69.3 percent agreed (positive) whereas 115 respondents representing 30.7 percent disagreed (negative) it therefore means that the knowledge of being sold out into money marriage or exchanged for whatever commodity it may be by her parents leave the girl child with a long lasting emotional scar.

Item 4 shows the distribution of respondent's responses of the questionnaire on "The emotional/psychological wellbeing of the girl child is not really considered in money marriage" out of the 375 respondents, 245 representing 65.3 agreed (positive) while 130 respondents representing 34.7 percent disagreed (negative) totaling 100 percent. From the above description, it however shows that the emotional/psychological wellbeing of the girl child is not really considered in money marriage.

H_i: There is a significant relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve Community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

The independent variable of this hypothesis is Money marriage while the dependent variable is psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve Community. The statistical tool is Pearson Product Moment Correlation analysis. The result is presented in table 4.6 below.

This hypothesis was guided by the four questions under item on sub-scale 1, Money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse Becheve community.

Table 4: Pearson Product Moment Correlation analysis of the relationship between Money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State. (N = 375)

	ΣX	ΣX^2			
			ΣXY	rxy	Sig.
Variables	ΣY	ΣY^2			
Money marriage (X)	4,743	61,131			
			62,440	0.47*	.000
Psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community (Y)	4,895	65,013			
*p<.05; df = 373; critical r = 0.113					

Table 4 shows that at .05 level of significance and degrees of freedom 373, the critical r-value is 0.113. The calculated r-value obtained in establishing the relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community is 0.47 (p<.05). The calculated r-value is seen to be greater than the critical r-value with the obtained significant value less than .05 level of significance used in the study. With these results the null hypothesis which stated that there is a negative relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State was rejected. It was alternately accepted that there is a positive relationship between money marriage and psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State. The obtained correlation coefficient was positive indicating positive correlation between the independent and the dependent variable; meaning that increase in variable X will bring about increase in variable Y. This showed that increase in money marriage will bring about increase in psychological/emotional abuse of the girl child in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

Conclusion

Findings from the study revealed that money marriage is a serious problem and has a greater tendency of enhancing psychological and/or emotional abuse, physical abuse and sexual abuse of the girl child. Resolving it requires the involvement of many sectors working together at community, national and international levels. At each level, responses must include empowering women and girls, reaching out to men, providing for the needs of victims and increasing the penalties for abusers. The progress made in each of these areas will be the key to achieving global reductions in violence against women/girls.

This research study has carefully examined the impact of money marriage and modern day slavery in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State: Nonetheless, findings from this study have copiously proven that girls are pivotal for the functionality of any society and as such should be freed from any form of modern day slavery and be given the best treatment they can receive.

Recommendations

In accordance with the findings of the study, some recommendations were brought to the fore towards the elimination of money marriage and modern day slavery in Becheve community, Obanliku Local Government Area, Cross River State.

A. Government should mobilize families and the wider community to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of child marriage can change attitudes and reduce the acceptance among those who make the decision to marry girls as children.

B. *Religious and traditional leaders, too, have the potential to play a key role in speaking out against child marriage and changing community attitudes. In communities where religious and traditional leaders play a prominent role in decision-making or influencing the prevailing norms, targeted interventions can support them to become positive advocates for change who fully understand the implications of child marriage for girls and their families.*

C. Child protection services need to be accessible via a number of channels, including education, healthcare providers, community workers and the police. Working with service providers to build their capacity can help to ensure that cases of child marriage in the community are responded to effectively.

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Studies on Trans-generational Rearing in Chinese Families from 2013-2019: A Systematic Literature Review

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Abstract

As China opened up and reformed, China has experienced a rapid change in urbanization and economic growth. Therefore, more and more young couples try to find their fortune in the cities, leaving their young children behind in rural areas or under the rearing of their older generations. In such a case, trans-generational rearing and education have become a very common phenomenon in China. In the past seven years, quite a lot of Chinese scholars have looked into the problems and related aspects of trans-generational rearing in China. This article has reviewed forty-four articles related to the topic from CNKI database and found that the study trend of this topic has changed from previous cause and effect study to the strategical exploration on how to improve the quality of trans-generational rearing.

Keywords: Trans-generational Rearing, Chinese Families, 2012-2019, Literature Review

1. Introduction

According to the decision of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2015, "in order to promote balanced population development, adhere to the basic state policy of family planning, improve population development strategy, we need to fully implement the policy of having two children for a couple, and actively carry out actions to address the aging of the population." This decision marks the formal implementation of the "comprehensive two-child" policy and the end of the 36-year one-child policy. The "comprehensive two-child" policy will have great influences on all aspects of the society, with family education bearing the brunt. "Grandparent education," also known as "trans-generational rearing or education," refers to the practices that grandparents share the rearing and education duties with their children for their grandchildren. This pattern of "trans-generational rearing" is an important part of family education.

In China, due to the intensified urbanization process, most of the young couples are under great work pressure and busy with professional life. Therefore, there is an increasing number of the elderly who have to share the rearing and education responsibilities with them and take care of their grandchildren. According to relevant statistics, about 40 percent of children in the country are mainly reared and supervised by their grandparents. The

younger the grandchildren are, the more their parents will entrust them to their grandparents to take care. Especially after China's opening up of the "second child" policy, the trans-generational participation in the upbringing of young grandchildren is even higher. To improve the quality of family education, it is quite important to improve the quality of grandparents' raising and rearing of their grandchildren.

2. Data Source and Basic Categories of Related Papers

Based on the domestic CNKI academic papers database, this paper retrieves the related research papers through the keywords of "grandparent education," "trans-generational education," "generational education," "trans-generational parenting" and so on from the years of 2013-2019, and obtains 44 academic papers related to the topic. According to the analysis and evaluation of the content of the articles, it is found that in the past 5 years, domestic scholars mainly studied the impacts of trans-generational education both on the children and their grandparents. Some of the scholars looked into the current situation of trans-generational education in some regions in China, exploring the regional differences for trans-generational parenting. Particular attention was paid to the problems of trans-generational education of children left behind in rural areas, and devotion was committed to finding improvement strategies. There was also a lot of micro-level research on how kindergartens can make good use of the advantages of the elderly to help their education of young children. The corresponding numbers and proportion of articles for each topic are as follows in Table 1.

Table 1. Numbers and Proportion of Articles for Each Topic

Topic	Impacts	Improving Strategies	Current Situation Investigation	Rural Left-behind Children	Causes	Advantages and Disadvantages	inter-generational differences on Rearing	Others	In Total
Number of Article Published	11	11	6	5	3	1	2	5	44
Proportion	25%	25%	14%	11%	7%	2%	5%	11%	100%

The overall trend of papers published on related topics in the past 5 years is shown in Figure 1. Basically, researches on trans-generational rearing have remained relatively stable in the first six years, with an average of 4-5 research papers published each year, but in 2019 there was a blowout in papers on related topics, with 14 research articles produced.


Figure 1. Number of Published Paper on Trans-generational Rearing from 2013-2019

3. The Studies on the Impacts of Trans-generational Rearing

The research on the impacts of trans-generational rearing and education on young children and their grandparents is the most extensive, of which the quality of the study is relatively high. Yu Pan and Xiong Feng (2016) study the effects of trans-generational education on the psychological and behavioral aspects of the elderly. They point out that the elderly need to adapt to the role of rearing grandchildren and most of them are able to accept their new roles. Though in the process of raising their grandchildren, they can obtain emotional satisfaction, they are lack of confidence in educating their grandchildren for they can not keep up with the time. In terms of parenting behaviors, grandparents tend to take their grandchildren as their daily center, so most of their grandchildren get spoiled, being selfish and self-centered (Pan & Feng, 2016).

He Yin and Zhao Jiaxu (2016) had interviewed 19 retirees between the ages of 60 and 75 who spend more than eight hours with their children before their grandchildren went to kindergarten. Using interview content analysis, they find that the learning attitudes of the grandparents can be divided into three types: proactive, passive, and negative. More than half of the elderly are passive in learning how to rear and raise children, but those elderly who were engaged in administrative, teaching and other occupations before retirement are more proactive and active in learning new things and changing their own rearing patterns. Those grandparents who were self-employed or worked as farmers are generally more passive and negative in learning how to educate their grandchildren. Therefore, most of the elderly have adapted lying, compromising, and other negative ways to solve the plight of raising young children because they think the young children sometimes are very troublesome, and this is the fastest way to solve the problem. Some of them feel powerless in dealing with naughty children (Yin & Jiaxu, 2016).

With the focus on the lives of the elderly in the countryside in a new era, Wu Qi (2017) finds that the elderly who have to take care of their grandchildren tend to be younger on average, and enjoy a more stable financial life. trans-generational rearing has a positive impact on the life of the elderly for they have received spiritual satisfaction with family unity and more financial support from their children because they have taken good care of their grandchildren. Meanwhile, negative effects also work in their life due to the fact that they are more responsible for the quality of raising the grandchildren and some of them can not afford it physically and psychologically (Qi, 2017).

Li Xiaoqing (2019) proposes a generational exchange model between grandparents and grandchildren. She believes that trans-generational education impacts are not always negative. The grandparents and the grandchildren are inter-dependent, taking care for each other, finding emotional fulfillment from each other (Xiaoqing, 2019).

4. Current Situation Survey of Trans-generational Education

The current situation survey is very important for understanding the phenomenon of trans-generational education, so many scholars in China have conducted related survey of different regions and cities. Among them, Malik Abezi (2014) took the grandparents rearing young children who were respectively studying in five kindergartens in Urumqi City as the study group, and randomly selected 500 grandparents for further investigation. The study points out that young children spend much more time with their grandparents than their parents. More than 60% of the grandparents are very willing and happy to support their children by sharing the nurturing responsibilities. Generally speaking, the grandparents have admitted that their rearing patterns sometimes were not suitable in helping young children to form good habits. It is suggested that the grandparents should pay attention to the emotional and psychological needs of the young children (Abezi, 2014).

Yan Hongbo (2014) has taken 156 children aged 3-6 years from kindergarten in Wangqing County, Jilin Province for the survey. He discovers that the grandparents have a strong desire to learn how to education their grandchildren better, but they find no support in doing so. It is suggested that kindergarten should help

grandparents in rearing and educating young children. Yan suggests that the first thing grandparents can do was to play games with young children using home resources. Second, kindergartens can open up for grandparents for 2-3 days per month, therefore their grandparents can observe how teachers organize their children's daily life and study, so as they will be able to maintain consistency in educating the children. The third way is to open courses for both grandparents and grandchildren to learn and play together. Fourth, concerning the characteristics of the elderly, we can rely on the elderly university, the association of the elderly and other local groups to share knowledge for raising grandchildren among them (Hongbo, 2014).

Luo Feng et al. (2014) pay attention to the situation of urban trans-generational education, because the city has distinct characteristics in its social life environment, family organization form, and so on. In particular, more young parents in cities are the only children for their families, and the family structure is gradually transformed into the 4-2-1 model, which consists of three generations under the same roof. Such a family structure, on the one hand, is conducive to promoting the integration of parent-child education and trans-generational education, but such a model also makes the burden of the young couple heavier and heavier. The author suggests looking for effective ways for society, government and schools, as well as families to work together to solve problems, starting from the unique advantages and disadvantages of urban trans-generational education (Feng, Yuanfang& Guangwen, 2014).

Drawing conclusions from their empirical survey in Guangzhou, Luo Feng and Yu Yanhua (2014) pointed out that though the age gap between the elderly and their grandchildren is large, and the elderly' educational ideas are quite old, as long as they are willing to learn, trans-generational education can still be healthy and productive. They suggest that the grandparents should coordinate with the young parents--their children--to share the responsibility of family education, and it is better for them to take the lead in promoting the traditional Chinese family virtues in order to build a harmonious family (Feng & Yanhua, 2014).

Using empirical data from four junior high schools in Guangdong since 2013, Luo Feng and Cai Jinhua (2015) analyze the education background, lifestyle, interpersonal relationship, and rearing ideology of family members from the sample cases. They argue that trans-generational education has become the "new normal" of family life for urban and rural residents in Guangdong, and it is urgent for the government to provide support and guidance to make sure that the trans-generational rearing can be healthy for growth of young children (Feng & Jinhua, 2015).

5. Studies on the Strategies for Improving Trans-generational Education

A number of scholars in recent years try to find out the best ways for kindergarten to optimize the trans-generational education in particular. Because most young kids spend most of their time with their grandparents before they enter the compulsory education stage. Grandparents involve highly in caring and upbringing the children during their childhood. Among the scholars, Wang Huiying (2013) believes that teaching staffs in the kindergarten should build up good relationship with the grandparents of the children so that they can feel being respected and honored. She argues that grandparents can do better in learning new things if they feel respected and honored. Kindergartens also need to mobilize the grandparents in display their advantages and provide opportunities for them to help teaching the children (Huiying, 2013).

Wang Lei (2015) believes that kindergartens can try to set up a "trans-generational education information station," which can regularly update new information and rearing tips for the grandparents and provide counseling for those families in need. Kindergartens can also help to organize parents' associations, where families can help each other mutually (Lei, 2015).

Ma Lan (2015) observes that there is an inconsistency between the educational ideas of kindergarten and the rearing patterns of grandparents. There is a lack of effective communication, and efficient cooperation between

the two, so he suggests that kindergartens should understand the inconsistency and try all means to make the two become more consistent in rearing and teaching children (Lan, 2015).

Cao Wen (2019) thinks that the basic strategies for kindergartens to help more grandparents to improve their rearing of children include targeted strategies, emotional strategies, local strategies and indirect communication strategies. The guiding methods for them should be varied, including menu-based guidance, off-level interactive guidance, parent-child interaction guidance and so on (Wen, 2019).

Tang Chunhua (2019) believes that schools should provide a platform for grandparents to participate in the practice of school education, including inviting some experienced grandparents to serve as teaching assistants, course counselors, campus security guard and so on. Schools can carry out some home-based curriculum with the help of the grandparents, including traditional handcraft making, folk games playing, etc., so that the trans-generational education at home can be consistent with the teaching activities at school (Chunhua, 2019).

Chen Ling (2019) also thinks that inviting grandparents to be teaching assistants for kindergartens is a very practical way to improve trans-generational education. In order to maintain good effects, certain regulations and supporting facilities are needed. It is recommended that the kindergartens can enforce a selective and evaluation system to ensure the quality of the grandparents' performance (Ling, 2019).

6. Analysis of the Trans-generational Education for Rural Left-behind Children

By the end of August 2018, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has conducted another mapping survey of children left behind in rural areas across the country. It was found that the total number of rural left-behind children reached 6.97 million in 2018. According to the survey, 96% of the rural left-behind children are in the custody of their grandparents or relatives, so the trans-generational education in the rural areas has become the research focus of many scholars.

Duan Qiaoyu (2017) holds the opinion that the new generation of rural left-behind children is facing the dilemma of parent-child separation, family education disorder, the weakening of parental authority, the serious phenomenon of irrational indulgence and so on. And the grandparents, who share the rearing and teaching responsibilities, often feel powerless and insufficient in dealing with the problems of left-behind children. The author suggests that "left-behind" children should be transformed into "mobile" children, which means that young children should follow their parents to migration from the countryside into town. But this can only be done with the modification of the Chinese household system (Qianyu, 2017).

Zhang Yue and Zhang Aiqin (2019) look into the problems of trans-generational education in the background of China's new policy of "targeted measures in poverty alleviation." They suggest that the situation of the rural left-behind children should be accurately identified, and that "emotional poverty alleviation," "moral poverty alleviation" and "economic poverty alleviation" should be realized. To this end, they suggest that the government should set up observers, who are responsible for dealing with the problems of rural left-behind children and organizing communities to help those children in need (Yue & Aiqin, 2019).

Studying 365 rural left-behind and non-left-behind children in Guangxi Autonomous Region with the Zhuang minority group living there, Hou Limin et al. (2019) find that the behavioral problems of left-behind children are more prominent than that of non-left-behind children, and that the behavioral problems of the left-behind children in the countryside has a strong correlation with the style of their grandparents' rearing and educational patterns. The study shows that democratic practice in parenting behavior is the protective factor for the left-behind children, and verbally hostile parenting behavior is the risk factor for the left-behind children. The increase in the intimacy of kindergarten teacher-child relationship will improve the behavior of young children, and the positive teacher-student relationship will enhance the child's sense of security and self-confidence (Limin, Lanlan & Huiyuan, 2019).

Xiong Xiulan and Liu Zhaoyang (2019), taking Huning County in Anhui Province as an example, find that grandparents are more concerned with the physically needs of their grandparents than other needs, particularly overlooking their emotional and psychological needs. Based on the strategic opportunity of "rural revitalization" in China, the author puts forward the composite education model of "grandparents- exotic helps- schools," in which "exotic helps" refer to the state-supported teaching volunteers and resources (Xiulan & Xhaoyang, 2019).

7. The Studies on the Inter-generational Differences of Rearing Children

Compared with the previous decade's research on trans-generational education, the research in the last seven years is less about the cause and effects or type study, but more about the differences of rearing beliefs and behaviors between grandparents and parents.

Regarding the inter-generational differences in rearing children, Luo Feng (2015) conducts a survey on the parent-child education and trans-generational education of students in four primary secondary schools in Henan and Guangdong provinces. The study finds young parents score higher on kinship relations, educational concepts, educational content and educational methods, and are better than their older generation on the whole. However, for the aspect of the educational goals, they are quite close. The existence of educational differences between parents and grandparents is inevitable, so it is suggested that we had better coordinate these two and carry forward the excellent family virtues of the Chinese nation (Feng, 2015).

Chen Hong et al. (2019) believe that the parents and grandparents differ greatly in their ideas about rearing and education, but they are quite the same in performance of controlling their emotions and dealing with conflicts. Therefore, it is suggested that both these two rearing generations should learn how to control their emotions and increase their capabilities in dealing with interpersonal conflicts (Hong & Ting, 2019).

8. Other Topics

Other studies are more microscopic, focusing on a particular aspect of young children related to trans-generational education. Wu Xiaofei (2013) is interested in the role of Chinese traditional folk games in helping grandparents to rear the young children. The author believes that some traditional folk games, such as "itching," "scratching bag game," "chicken fighting game" and so on, can reduce the burden of the grandparents to look after the children, enhance the physical quality of both young children and grandparents, and moderate the relationship between the grandparents and the grandchildren (Xiaofei, 2013).

Agreeing with Wu's conclusion, Qian Xiaohong (2013) also thinks some traditional Chinese art forms and handcrafts, taking paper-cutting as the example, if introduced into the trans-generational rearing and education , can achieve the goals of training young children to be more creative, more curious for knowledge and more agile (Xiaohong, 2013).

Hong Jiajia (2013) holds the opinion that in early childhood education, it is a very effective educational strategy to provide children pastoral life experiences. The author thinks that most of the grandparents in the countryside have rich experiences in pastoral life and they can help the young children to honor nature and build up a sense of awe for nature, which is important in building up their character of humility (Jiajia, 2013).

Zhang Lan (2015) specially studies the problem of feeding young children in trans-generational rearing families. She believes that feeding is an very important part of a young child's daily life. The feeding directly affects the physical development of young children; however, most children under the care of grandparents have the problem of weak hands-on ability and high reliance on their grandparents in eating. The author suggests that schools and communities should help the elderly to teach children how to sit and use spoon for food properly so that they can cultivate a good eating habit, which will have a life-long impact on them (Lan, 2015).

9. Conclusion

According to the literature review done by Duan Feiyan et al. (2012), the research on trans-generational education during the years of 2002 to 2012 was mainly about the causes and effects of trans-generational education, the different types and expressions of trans-generational education, and the pros and cons of trans-generational education. (Feiyan & Jing, 2012) Quite different from the previous research and studies, the trans-generational rearing and education research for the past 7 years are centralized on the strategies and methods to improve the quality of trans-generational rearing and education. More attention is also attached to the left-behind children from rural areas. But from the above review, we can see that more detailed and practical studies on dealing with the problems of trans-generational rearing and education are needed in the coming future.

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China's Military Foreign Policy toward Sri Lanka

(2005-2019)

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Abstract

Military foreign policy is an important component of China's foreign policy toward Sri Lanka. Since China and Sri Lanka announced to establish "all-round cooperative partnership" in 2005, China has pushed forward its closer relations with Sri Lanka through its shifting military foreign policy. In this period, China's "national defense policy of active defense" in the new era outlines the principle for China's military foreign policy toward Sri Lanka. China's military foreign policy toward Sri Lanka aims at three major objectives: to raise China's military soft power in Sri Lanka, to make preliminary prepare for potential further development of Sri Lanka to be an important oversea military of China, and to develop Sri Lanka into a stable and growing consumer of China's arms trade. In diplomatic practice, China has depended on military exchange, military trade and military assistance to further develop the China-Sri Lanka military diplomatic relations in this period. On the whole, China has carried out a friendly and pushy military foreign policy to make a significant contribution for the all-round and deep development and enhancement of the China-Sri Lanka relations in this period.

Keywords: Military Foreign Policy, Military Diplomacy, China-Sri Lanka Relations, China's Foreign Policy toward Sri Lanka

1. Introduction

In the past decades of the China-Sri Lanka diplomatic relations, China's military policy toward Sri Lanka has long been an important part of China's foreign policy toward Sri Lanka. Entering the 21st century, China has shifted its foreign policy to a kind of strategy-expansionary foreign policy for its forming global development strategy. In the process, Sri Lanka has significantly risen its strategic significance on China's diplomacy. In 2005, China and Sri Lanka announced to establish "all-round cooperative partnership." And in 2013, China and Sri Lanka upgraded their relationship to "strategic cooperative partnership." Military diplomacy has been an important developmental direction for "all-round" and "strategic." From the following three main aspects, this study aims to discuss and outline China's military, foreign policy toward Sri Lanka in this period from 2005 to 2019.

2. China's "National Defense Policy of Active Defense" in the New Era

Benefiting from the various experiences and lessons from the five-thousand-year history of the Chinese Civilization, contemporary Chinese profoundly recognizes, "even if a country may become strong, bellicosity

will lead to its ruin" and "considering peace and harmony as fundamentals," thus contemporary Chinese has essentially disagreed such a logic of "strong power must be seeking hegemony" (Xi, 2015). Since the establishment of New China in 1949, China has long pursued a kind of "national defense policy of active defense"– "adherence to the unity of strategic defense and tactical offense" (State Council Information Office of China, 2015). China's national defense policy of active defense reflects in the following four aspects.

First, it reflects in China's commitment on national defense. As a great power with powerful national strength, China solemnly announced "never seeking hegemony" as early as the Mao Zedong era. By 2019, China further promised "never seeking hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence" (State Council Information Office of China, 2019) on its white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era*. In addition, China solemnly pledged "No First Use" of nuclear weapons at any time and any circumstances at its first explosion of atomic bomb in 1964. Until today, China has still been the only one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to carry out "No First Use" of nuclear weapons policy.

Second, it reflects in China's military strategic guidance. China has adhered the military strategic guidance of "the principles of defense, self-defense and post-strike response" (State Council Information Office of China, 2000). Another more familiar expression of the military strategic guidance is "we will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked" (State Council Information Office of China, 2015). This famous political slogan was first put forward by Mao Zedong in 1939. This is a reasonable explanation why new China defined its only four wars (Note 1) after 1949 as "war of counterattack in self-defense."

Third, it reflects in China's "new security conception." With the end of the Cold War, since 1996, China has frequently advocated to cultivate new security concept instead of demoded security conception based on the idea of "zero-sum." In *China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept* submitted to the foreign ministers' meeting of the ASEAN Area Forum in 31st July 2002, China formally put forward its "new security conception" which has the core of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2002) Based on new security conception, China has made efforts to "build a new-model security partnership featuring equality, mutual trust and win-win cooperation" (State Council Information Office of China, 2019) in China's military diplomacy. Thus the new-model security partnership demands China to "continue to develop military-to-military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party" (State Council Information Office of China, 2015).

Fourth, it reflects in China's self-defining "global significance" for its military forces. China has long self-defined its military force as an important balance force to maintain world peace and anti-hegemony. With the fast development of China's national strength including military strength, China found the fast growing possibility to shift from "to think global significance according to China's understand" to "to design global significance according to China's understanding." On the Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, China formally put forward its new "global mission" - "build a community of shared future for mankind." Later, the new "global mission" quickly became the highest-ranking mission of China's foreign policy including military foreign policy. In the white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era* issued in July 2019, China formally put forward "in the service of building of a community with a shared future for mankind" is "the global significance of China's national defense in the new era" (State Council Information Office of China, 2019). The global significance of China's national defense demands China's military forces to "fulfill their international responsibilities and obligations, and provide more public security goods to the international community to the best of their capacity" (State Council Information Office of China, 2019).

Entering the 21st century, under the confluence of "growing global economic and political interests, rapid technology-driven changes in modern warfare and perceptions of increased strategic-level external threats" (Defense Intelligence Agency of the US, 2019), China has gradually and profoundly shown more "active" contents of its "national defense policy of active defense." Since 2000, China's military forces have gradually shifted "from 'offshore waters defense' to the combination of 'offshore waters defense' with 'open seas

protection'" (State Council Information Office of China, 2015). In its white paper *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* in 2013, China first put forward, "protect the security of strategic Sea Lines of Communication and overseas interests" (State Council Information Office of China, 2013). In its white paper *China's Military Strategy* in 2015, China first put forward: "China's armed forces will strengthen international security cooperation in areas crucially related to China's overseas interests, to ensure the security of such interests" (State Council Information Office of China, 2015).

3. Main Objectives of China's Military Policy toward Sri Lanka

Due to far geographic distance and limited national strength (particularly military strength), China had long holistically maintained a friendly but not very close military relationship with Sri Lanka since the establishment of the diplomatic relations in 1957. By the 1980s, the China-Sri Lanka military ties began to substantially "warm up" by continuous light-arms trades. Entering the new century, particular after the establishment of "all-round cooperative partnership" in 2005, the bilateral military relations have "suddenly" become growingly close. Behind the closeness, what are the main objectives of China's military policy toward Sri Lanka?

China clearly defines its fundamental goal of national defense in the new era as "resolutely safeguarding China's sovereignty, security and development interests" (State Council Information Office of China, 2019). China's military policy toward Sri Lanka naturally follows the fundamental goal. Since 2005, China has aimed to build to an all-round cooperative partnership with Sri Lanka. Thus in its military policy toward Sri Lanka, China's core objective was to develop Sri Lanka into China's military cooperative partner. The core objective can be further divided into at least three specific objectives of China's military policy toward Sri Lanka.

For the first specific objective, China has aimed to raise China's "military soft power" in Sri Lanka through military policy. In 2014, Chinese scholar Huang Jianguo created the conception of "military soft power" in his article "Military Soft Power Theory" published on *Journal of National Defense University* (China) (Chen, 2012). After the chairman of the Military Commission Hu Jintao specially made an instructor to strengthen the PLA soft-power-building work on 20 May 2006, "military soft power became a major research topic of the PLA and is regarded as an important component of China's holistic national soft power strategy" (Yang & Liu, 2008: 3). Since then on, the PLA has drawn more attention to China's military soft power – implement non-coercive measures to realize military strategic objective. In the China-Sri Lanka bilateral relations, China naturally set "praise China's military soft power" as its objective of military policy toward Sri Lanka.

For the second specific objective, China has aimed to develop Sri Lanka into an important oversea military base of China. Since the birth of new China in 1949, in the logical conception of China's national military policy of active defense, "oversea military base" has long been regarded as an obvious symbol of imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. Entering the new century, China's national interests have gradually pervaded the world. In the white paper *China's Military Strategy* published in 2015, China also formally defined "safeguard oversea interests" as a strategic task of China's military forces. China has begun to frequently provide international public security goods, such as the normalized sea escort in the Indian Ocean, oversea rescue, anti-piracy, protect oversea Chinese citizens, etc. It became an urgent objective necessity to establish China's oversea military base in China's strategic transition from near seas defense to far seas protection. Under this background, China began rethinking of its logic conception of between oversea military base and "imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism." "To establish oversea military base through legal approach will not make change the fundamental principles of China's foreign policy and defensive national defense policy" (Liu, 2018). In the first two decades of the 21st century, China has heavily invested in the construction of ports in the golden maritime line of the Indian Ocean. The Colombo Port Project and the Hambantota Port Project may be considered as a potential part of China's oversea military base plan. In consideration of Sri Lanka's political reality and international factors, the two ports in Sri Lanka have most likely only played the role of China's military replenishment node for a future time.

For the third specific objective, China has aimed to develop Sri Lanka into a stable and growing consumer of China's arms. Due to national financial limitation and geography of island state, Sri Lanka has usually prepared a very small amount of budget for national defense. Thus, Sri Lanka has never been a big market in international armed trade. But because the "time-tested close friendship" between China and Sri Lanka and China's loose arms export policy, China has always been one of a few main arms exporters of Sri Lanka since the 1980s. Entering the 21st century, with a serial of technology breakthrough in research and development of own advanced military arms and weapons, China has fast developed into a world's main arms exporter. According to *SIPRI Yearbook 2015* (2015: 16), China has also become the third largest arms supplier in the world. But as newcomer, China has still mainly paid hope on the arms market of the developing countries. Though Sri Lanka is a "mini" arms market to China, a stable and growing arms export to Sri Lanka may play a good exemplary role in attracting other developing countries to import arms from China.

4. Practice of China's Military Policy toward Sri Lanka

In order to build a military cooperative partnership between China and Sri Lanka since 2005, China has made efforts to practice its military policy toward Sri Lanka. This section focuses on China's practice in military policy toward Sri Lanka from three main aspects: military exchange, military trade and military assistance. Table 1 lists main events related to the China-Sri Lanka military relations in this period.

Table 1 Main Events of China-Sri Lanka Military Relations (2005-2019)

Year	Main Events
2005.08	In her state-visit to China, President Kumaratunga specially met with Vice Chairman of the PLA Cao Gangchuan in Beijing.
2005	Sri Lanka totally imported 28 million USD worth of military arms from China.
2006	Sri Lanka totally imported 49 million USD worth of military arms from China.
2007.02	In first his state-visit to China, President Rajapaksa specially met with Chinese Minister of National Security and military forces.
2007	Sri Lanka totally imported 48 million USD worth of military arms from China.
2008	China delivered six F-7G fighter aircraft to Sri Lanka.
2009	With China's support, Sri Lanka became the first batch "dialogue partner" of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
2010.03	China donated demining equipment to Sri Lanka (cost of 2,000,000 CNY).
2010.09	Chinese PLA Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde met visiting brother of President Rajapaksa, Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
2010.12	Chinese PLA naval destroyer took part in the 60th Anniversary Celebration of Sri Lanka Navy.
2010	Sri Lanka totally imported 4 million USD worth of military arms from China.
2012.01	President Rajapaksa met a Chinese military delegation led by Deputy Chief of Joint Staff Ma Xiaotian.
2012.03	Brother of President Rajapaksa, Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa led a military delegation to visit China. State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met the delegation.
2012.06	Sri Lankan Army Commander Jayasuriya led a military delegation to visit China. State Councilor and Defense Minister Ligang Guanlie met the military delegation.
2012.08	Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Sri Lanka.

2012.11	Brother of President Rajapaksa, secretary of the Ministry of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa led a military delegation to visit China. State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met the delegation.
2013.05	Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Liang Guanglie visited Sri Lanka.
2013.11	A Chinese military delegation of China's PLA University of Science & Technology visited Sri Lanka.
2014.02	The PLA naval vessel stopped off the Colombo Port for the task of escorting Syria's chemical weapons.
2014.05	The PLA Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang visited Sri Lanka.
2014.06	The PLA University of National Defense visited Sri Lanka.
2014.09	The PLA Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang met Secretary of Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense and Urban Development Gotabaya Rajapaksa in Beijing.
2014.09-11	Chinese naval submarine(s) has stopped off Sri Lanka for supply for some times.
2014.09.24	The First China-Sri Lanka Defense Cooperation Dialogue held in Beijing. Brother of President Rajapaksa, secretary of the Ministry of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa led a military delegation to visit China. Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Xu Qiliang met the delegation.
2015.03-04; 2015.06-07	Chinese Armed Policy Force and Sri Lankan Ground Force conducted the "Silk Road Cooperation-2015" jointly anti-terrorism training.
2015.04	At Sri Lankan governmental request, China's warship carried 45 Sri Lankan citizens evacuated from upheaval Yemen.
2015.07	Sri Lanka Navy Commander Perera visited China.
2015.10	A Chinese military delegation led by General Li Zuocheng visited Sri Lanka.
2016.01	The Second China-Sri Lanka Defense Cooperation Dialogue held in Beijing. China announced to offer military aids to help Sri Lanka purchase Chinese made military equipment.
2016.09	The PLA took part in the 2016 International Joint Special Operation Exercise Cormorant Stick VII in Sri Lanka.
2017.03	Sri Lanka President Sirisena met visiting Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan.
2017.06	The PLA far-sailing fleet visited Sri Lanka. The fleet dispatched 16 military doctors to Sri Lankan disaster district to treat 508 local patients.
2017.08	The PLA naval hospital ship "Peace Ark" first visited Sri Lanka for the "Harmonious Mission 2017" task. During the four-day visit, the military doctors on the ship provided free medical service for local people. In addition, China and Sri Lanka conducted a joint international humanitarian medical assistance exercise.
2017.11	The PLA Navy ship (Qi Jiguang) arrives at the port of Colombo for a goodwill visit.
2018.12	China handed over China's first military construction aid project to Sri Lanka - the office and auditorium complex of the Sri Lankan Military Academy. The building covers an area of 7,200 square meters.
2018.04.26	The PLA National Defense University awarded Master Degree to Sri Lanka Air Army Commend Air Marshal Kapila Jayampathy. Recently, the PLA National Defense University has annually trained 6 or 7 Sri Lankan high-ranking military officials with Brigadier General and above.
2019.06.10	China gifted a frigate "053H2G" to the Sri Lanka Navy.

2008-2019	Since 2008, China has normalized to send its escort navy fleet to the Indian Ocean. China's escort nay fleet has often docked at Sri Lanka for supply.

Source: Author according to various news and reports such as China and Sri Lanka's Ministry of National Defense website, etc.

4.1 Military Exchange

In China's military policy toward Sri Lanka, military exchange plays a positive role in enhancing mutual military and political trust and cooperation. Since 2005, under the framework of "cooperative partnership," China and Sri Lanka have strengthened the bilateral military ties. In 2013, the contents of "to strengthen friendly exchange and pragmatic cooperation between the two countries' armies" was added to the joint communique to establish "strategic cooperative partnership." On the *Action Plan of Deepening Strategic Cooperative Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka* signed in 2014, the two countries put forward to "strengthen defense cooperation, and to maintain the momentum of visits between the two defense authorities and military forces at all levels, intensify the cooperation in military training, training of personnel and to cooperate in the areas of defense-related science and technology, exchange of military academics, and provide logistic support" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2014). This section focuses on two outstanding aspects of the bilateral military exchange: high-level military personal exchange and military training exchange.

First, high-level military personal exchange. Since the establishment of the diplomatic relations in 1957, China has always laid emphasis on the bilateral high-level military personal exchange as an important part of the bilateral high-level personal exchange. Since the establishment of "all-round cooperative partnership" in 2005, although the two countries have shown an increasingly close military relations, it has obviously experienced two different stages of the China-Sri Lanka high-level personal exchange in this period. In 2005, the war in Sri Lanka broke out again after a few-year ceasefire since 2000. As to the war in Sri Lanka, China has long pursued "non-interference" and "non-participation" foreign policy. For avoiding to be accused of "China's directly military intervention in Sri Lankan civil war," China seemed to suspend to send its high-level military personal to Sri Lanka. Reviewing public news reports on the China-Sri Lanka military exchange in the period from 2005 to 2011, it hardly finds any public news report on China's high-level military delegation's visit in Sri Lanka. As the war in Sri Lanka was no more "hot news" in the international community, China has restored to send its high-level military delegations to Sri Lanka since 2012. Table 1 also supports this point.

Table 2 Sri Lanka's Arms Import (1986-2018) (USD: million)

Country/Year*	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2013	2014	2017	2018	Total
China	4	50	3	4		137	19		23	15	52		28	18	29	21	3	8	18	28	49	48	59		4						618
China Total**	1861	2605	1411	1041	941	1312	700	1436	1105	1010	768	429	353	332	299	515	525	700	413	286	668	509	644	1140	1478	1252	2047	1160	1227	1040	
Of China Total	0.21	1.92	0.21	0.38	0	10.4	2.71	0	2.08	1.49	6.77	0	7.93	5.42	9.7	4.08	0.57	1.14	4.36	9.79	7.34	9.43	9.16	0	0.27	0	0	0	0	0	
Czechia											9	2			9	18	1	6													45
India		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	10	21	11						37	37	133
Israel		16	16						5	75	12	12	29	134	35	30	18	18	30	18	19		21		11						497
Russia							20	41					28	18		63									20						190
Ukraine									6	43	63		10		54	18				21											214
UK	3	1	1		3	7							43	6																	64
USA	20	15		15								36	6		10		9	3	13			2			10					54	192
Total***	27	110	19	5	19	166	22	35	74	64	210	50	85	64	297	161	45	35	49	58	97	89	71	21	4	21	20	5	45	99	2069
China/Total	14.8	45.5	15.8	80	0	82.5	86.4	0	31.1	23.4	24.8	0	32.9	28.1	9.76	13	6.67	22.9	36.7	48.3	50.5	53.9	83.1	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	29.87

*: In 2012, 2015 and 2016, Sri Lanka did not import arms. **: China's total export amount. ***: Includes all arms exporters to Sri Lanka.
Source: Author according to the data-tables generated from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (Generated: March 10, 2019).

The records on China's high-level military delegation visiting Sri Lanka in Table 1, there are seven records after 2011 but only zero records before 2011. Particularly, it is very rare that China's Minister of National Defense consecutively visited Sri Lanka in 2012 and 2013, then higher-ranking Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission visited Sri Lanka in 2014. "The leader of the two countries have attached great importance to military-to-military ties," Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Ma Xiaotian said: "The Chinese

military is willing to strengthen pragmatic cooperation in various fields with the Sri Lankan military" (Daily News, 2014). In addition, China and Sri Lanka constructed a bilateral military cooperation negotiation mechanism. In 2014 and 2016, the two sides hold two times of the China-Sri Lanka defense cooperation dialogue in Beijing.

Second, military training exchange. In this period, China has encouraged China military forces to carry out various bilateral or multilateral military cooperative activities with Sri Lankan military forces. Firstly, in this period, China has dispatched more naval ships to visit Sri Lanka. Although Sri Lanka was the second stop of the first oversea visit of China's naval warships as early as in 1985 (Xinhua News Agency, 2017), the PLA had still occasionally appeared in the Indian Ocean due to its limited naval strength during the next twenty years. By 2008, China began to send its naval warships to participate in international joint escort action in the Indian Ocean. Since then on, China's naval warships began to normalizing visit Sri Lanka every year. Particularly in 2014, Sri Lanka approved China's naval submarine(s) to stop off in Sri Lankan port. It is a symbol of the mutual trust in military between China and Sri Lanka. Secondly, in this period, China and Sri Lanka have upgraded the bilateral military cooperation. After the first China-Sri Lank Defense Cooperation Dialogue in 2014, the two sides began planning and conducting some pragmatic military cooperation projects. For example, Chinese Armed Policy Force and Sri Lankan Ground Force conducted the "Silk Road Cooperation-2015" jointly anti-terrorism training in 2015. Chinese PLA took part in the 2016 International Joint Special Operation Exercise Cormorant Stick VII in Sri Lanka in 2016. China and Sri Lanka conducted a joint international humanitarian medical assistance exercise in Colombo in 2017.

4.2 Military Trade

Before the Reform and Opening-up, China had seldom engaged in arms export trade. Since the 1980s, China has become a major arms supplier in international military trade market. By analyzing the data on China's arms export to Sri Lanka from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, China has maintained stably exporting arms to Sri Lanka since the mid-1980s. (See Table 2) China has three main points of its military trade policy: "China does not use trade in weaponry to interfere in sovereign states" internal affairs," "the export of such weapons should help the recipient nation increase its appropriate defense capacity," and "the transfer must not impair peace, safety or stability regionally or globally" (State Council of Information Office of China, 1995). In the past decades, China has always adhered to the above military trade policy to engage its arms trade toward Sri Lanka.

In the past decades, China has become of main military trade partners of Sri Lanka. Table 2 shows the total amount of China's arms export to Sri Lanka from 1986 to 2018 has added up to 618 million USD accounted to nearly 29.87% of the total amount of Sri Lanka's arms import from 1986 to 2018. Particularly in the final three years of Sri Lankan long civil war, China's shares occupied more than half (even 83.1%) of Sri Lanka's total arms import amount. For all military trade contracts, it has rarely heard that China has made use of its military trade to threat Sri Lanka to do or not do something. In fact, China has often timely supplied necessary arms or weapons to Sri Lanka to raise its capacity of national defense as need indeed.

For instance, in 2007, the separatist force's successful air attacks toward Colombo had heavily terrified the whole country. Sri Lankan arm force was in urgent need of antiaircraft arms, but the western countries already conducted arms embargo to Sri Lanka and India also offered limited military assistance. At the beginning, China had hesitated whether supply arms to Sri Lanka because China was not willing involved Sri Lanka's internal affairs and also worried about international opinion. But the fretful Rajapaksa administration had constantly detailed explained the critical situation of Sri Lanka civil war and emotionally recalled the traditional relationship between Sri Lanka and China, Chinese leadership eventually agreed to supply a batch of arms including J7-MG fighters and JY-11 air search radar equipment (China Aviation News, 2013; Note 2) to Sri Lanka after a balancing consideration. The fact proved that the batch of arms not only fast helped the Sri Lankan government reverse the passive situation in war but also became one of the critical factors to end the war and restore national peace.

As a result, China's military trade policy successfully made the wining Rajapaksa administration regarded China as the most reliable friend of Sri Lanka. After the end of the civil war, the two countries have fast built a closer military cooperative partnership.

4.3 Military Assistance

On the white paper *China's National Defense in the New Era*, China put forward its global significance of China's national defense in the new era – "in the service of building of a community with a shared future for mankind" (State Council of Information Office of China, 2019). This actually declares Chinese military forces will commit more international responsibilities and obligations. Entering the new century, Chinese military forces have provided more and more public security goods to the international community. Sri Lanka is China's cooperative partner based on "time-tested friendship," China has also provided its public security goods to Sri Lanka in this period.

First, China has taken part in vessel protection operations (maritime escort) in the Indian Ocean since 2008. By 2019, China has also dispatched 33 batches of naval ships to perform escort tasks. Through anti-piracy and maritime rescue, China and other participating countries have powerfully and effectively safeguarded the "golden maritime route." It has made great benefits to the countries along the "golden maritime route" including Sri Lanka.

Second, China's military forces have participated in disaster relief in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is vulnerable by natural disasters meanwhile it has seriously insufficient capabilities of disaster relief, thus Sri Lanka has often urgently appealed to the international community for disaster relief. Because of the good traditional bilateral relations between the two countries, China's PLA has often taken part in urgent disaster relief at request of the Sri Lankan government. After the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the PLA rapidly delivered Chinese urgent disaster relief material to Sri Lanka on the third day of the tsunami meanwhile dispatched medical teams to Sri Lanka. After Sri Lanka was hit by natural disasters such as mega floods or landslides in 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2017, the Chinese government has ordered the PLA respectively urgently delivered 20 million CNY, 20 million CNY, 20 million CNY and 15 million CNY worth of Chinese humanitarian relief materials to Sri Lanka (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). As Sri Lanka was seriously hit by serve floods and landslides in May 2017, the visiting PLA far-sailing fleet immediately donated 1,000 kg rice, 1,000 kg flour, 300 boxes of mineral water, 10 rubber dinghies, and so on, meanwhile dispatched 16 military doctors to Sri Lankan disaster district and finally treated 508 local patients (Xinhua News Agency, 2017).

Third, China's military forces have also provided international humanitarian rescue to Sri Lanka. In April 2015, at the request of the Sri Lanka government, the PLA's warship urgently carried 45 Sri Lankan citizens to evacuate from upheaval Yemen (Liu, 2015). In January 2016, the 21st batch of Chinese naval escort fleet rescued Sri Lankan fishermen in the Bay of Bengal (Cao & Cao, 2016).

5. Conclusion

China's "national defense policy of active defense" in the new era reflects in China's commitment on national defense, China's military strategic guidance, China's "new security conception" and China's self-defining "global significance" for its military forces. It defines the peaceful and friendly keynote for China's military foreign policy toward Sri Lanka in this period. In the framework of the China-Sri Lanka "cooperative partnership" since 2005, China's military foreign policy toward Sri Lanka has aimed at the three specific objectives: to raise China's "military soft power" in Sri Lanka through military policy, to develop Sri Lanka into an important oversea military base of China, and develop Sri Lanka into a stable and growing consumer of China's arms. For the objectives, China has actively push forward the bilateral military exchange, effectively developed the bilateral military trade, and timely supplied military assistance to Sri Lanka in diplomatic practice. Generally, China's friendly and pushy military foreign policy toward Sri Lanka has made significant efforts for the growingly close bilateral relationship between China and Sri Lanka in this period.

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Notes:
Note 1. The four wars here refers to the Korean War in the 1950s, the Sino-Indian Borders War, the Sino-Soviet Borders War in the 1960s and the Sino-Vietnamese Borders War in the end of 1970s.
Note 2. The information is also from the data produced from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database in October 21, 2019, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php.

Motives of Traditional and Emerging Donors in Aid Giving: Comparative Study between China and France

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Abstract

Since the beginning of bilateral aid giving in the aftermath of the Second World War, the motives for aid giving have changed from being purely political and humanitarian to a mix of different interests. While poverty reduction is frequently stated as the goal of aid giving, it is commonplace for donors to use aid to advance their national interests. The rise of new, emerging donors is creating discussion in both the political and academic fields of aid giving. Traditional or western donors see emerging donors, such as China's efforts in aid-giving as seeking the natural resources of the recipient countries. This paper provides a historical analysis of the aid-giving motivations underlying an emerging donor, China, and a traditional donor, France. The motives for China's and France's aid giving to African countries, with special focus on Guinea, show a great number of similarities.

Keywords: Aid Giving Motives, Emerging Donor, Traditional Donor, Poverty Reduction

1. Introduction

Donor motives are defined as the reasons or the intentions (expressed or hidden) of the donor when providing aid, and have been considered as relevant for poverty reduction. However, different donors have different motives, ranging from moral and humanitarian goals to political, economic and environmental protection motives (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). The study of donors' motives is important, as the intention underlying the allocation of aid has an impact on the effectiveness of the aid they provided in relations to poverty reduction (Dreher et al. 2014).

As one of the strongest emerging powers and emerging donors, China has been widely studied by scholars who mostly claimed that the intention of China's aid giving has been as a means to secure access to natural resources and to the recipient's markets for trade and investment, as well as to maintain its soft power over recipient countries (Lum et al., 2009; Dreher & Fuchs, 2011; Sun, 2014a). These studies show that China's aid has had little impact on poverty reduction for the above reasons.

However, there are also studies supporting the claim that foreign aid and investments from China have positive impacts on poverty reduction (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016). Similarly, studies such as that conducted by the Development Assistant Committee (DAC, 2000) have also emphasized the economic and political motives underlining France's aid, which affect the aid's efforts to address poverty.

Therefore, this paper addresses in depth both China's and France's aid motivations through analysis of published data including official policy documents and declarations, and scholarly works on the two countries' aid giving to African countries, especially to Guinea, which is a former colony of France, and the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1959.

2. China's Aid for Countering Expansion of Traditional Donors

The aid giving effort of China has often been viewed as a tool to counter the influence of western donors (Ojakorotu and Whetho 2008; Bräutigam 2010). For example, in the early 1950s, aid was given to support all the non-aligned countries of the Bandung conference in 1955. The rationale behind that was to limit the expansion of the two super powers (the USA and the USSR) over China's partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This intention to counter Western and Moscow-based domination was further enforced by former Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, in Ghana in 1964 when he confirmed Beijing's support for African struggles against imperialism (which he called "the poor helping the poor") and set Africa as an ideological battleground, countering both Washington and Moscow (Ismael, 1971).

Even with the end of the cold war, China has always been engaging in limiting the imposition or expansion of the Western development model over developing countries, particularly in Africa. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China has been reiterating its desire to restrict the expansion of the West's development model, mainly the Washington consensus. In the 2000 FOCAC declaration, China and its partner countries agreed that:

> "No country or group of countries has the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under whatever pretext, in other countries' internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others. The North and the South should strengthen their dialogue and co-operation on the basis of equality." (FOCAC, 2000, para.1).

In the preamble of the FOCAC declaration, all members consider injustice and inequality in the current international system as an obstacle to the development of southern countries, including African countries, and as a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the goal of China and its African partners is to work together to establish a just and equitable new international political and economic order, exempt from unipolar or bipolar domination by the western powers. Aid is considered one of the tools to combat such unbalanced international relations. In fact, over the years, China has become one of the most dominant actors in aid giving and investments in Africa (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016).

3. China's Aid for Building Solidarity with Partner Countries

Solidarity has been a guiding principle of China's relations with African countries, as emphasized by the former Ambassador of China in Guinea, Huo Zengde, who stated in his interview with the journal *Guinean Economy* (2009, p. 11), that "the cooperation between China and Guinea is featured by the sincerity, solidarity and reciprocity." More recently, in a speech delivered by the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Li Keqiang, to the Africa Union in 2014, he reiterated the attachment of China to Africa due to their historical relationship, both having been colonized fully or partially by the West. In his own terms he pointed out that: "Over the past five decades, Chinese and African people have helped each other and fostered an unbreakable bond of friendship. As a poet once said, "You may have forgotten the person whom you laughed with; but you will never forget the one whom you wept with." [Li added that] The history of our common struggle for a common destiny will always be our precious memory and inspiration and an inexhaustible driver

for the future growth of China- Africa relations". (Li Keqiang, 2014). Thus, the solidarity between the two partners is built from their similar pasts with western colonial masters and their mutual commitment to assist each other.

In addition to historical factors, China's solidarity towards Africa is justified by China's desire to create a just, equitable and global economy with the African countries. In that regard, China has presented itself as a champion of developing countries' interests in international forums, with the expectation that this sense of solidarity will be reciprocated (Cooke, 2009).

The latest illustration of China's solidarity toward its African partners was in 2014 when three western African countries were affected by an Ebola outbreak. China's aid was delivered under the auspices of solidarity to these three countries. This aid to Guinea took the form of technical assistance (sending medical staff) which was focused on training of Guinean health workers in the prevention and control of Ebola virus. To this, was added US$50,000 provided by the China Red Cross, and a grant of US$160,000 from the Chinese government. Moreover, equipment worth over US$5 million was delivered to the three countries affected by Ebola, and food aid was provided to affected areas in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In separate messages sent to the President of Guinea, Alpha Conde; the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Koroma; and the then President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the President of PRC, Xi Jinping, expressed sympathy and solicitude for the human and economic losses caused by the Ebola outbreak and appreciated the governments' efforts to fight the epidemic. He stated in his letter that "the Chinese government and people will stand together with the governments and peoples of the three nations and are willing to offer anti- epidemic supplies to them." Calling China and Africa good brothers, friends and partners, President Xi stated that the Chinese government and people will never forget that the African people will always extend timely support and assistance whenever the Chinese people encounter difficulties (Xinhua, August 11, 2014).

This was corroborated by what Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said at the World Economic Forum on Africa in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 8 2014. He stated that "as the Ebola outbreak continues with no signs of stopping, the affected countries have already begun to experience significant economic damage, which may be worrying for Chinese companies with high stakes there" (Caulderwood, 2014). Some scholars consider the expressions of solidarity in China's support to their African partners as veiling a hidden business agenda. However, one can conclude that even if using aid to build solidarity may not be the donor's ultimate motive, it is still considered a means to an end.

4. China's Aid as Reward to Partners for Political Support

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China has been actively engaging in diplomatic relations with its neighboring countries in Asia, and with African countries such as Egypt, Guinea, and Ghana. China provides aid in the form of grants and interest-free loans (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011) as political rewards for countries supporting Beijing. China's aid was mainly given to socialist nations for building stadiums, hospitals, railroads, and other infrastructure. Technical assistance was also provided, through the sending of expert engineers, teachers, and doctors (Thompson, 2005).

In 1971, China's main diplomatic preoccupation was to take Taiwan's seat at the UN and thereby, strengthen its international position and assume political leadership in the Third World. Out of the 76 countries that voted for China's resumption of its legal seat in the UN, 26 were African countries (Luo & Zhang, 2009). Guinea was a leading country in this fight to support the PRC's accession to the United Nations with veto rights. Between 1959 and 1971, several projects were financed by China's aid as a reward to African countries including Guinea for their support of China's accession to the UN.

China' foreign aid has served as a tool to protect China's political interests, especially its 'One China Policy.' China has invited African partners not to recognize the Taiwanese government as the legitimate representative of the China (Rotberg, 2008). Beijing also committed to continue Taiwan's existing aid projects and offered loans to underwrite a set of new projects for African partners formerly receiving aids from Taiwan. Thus, African governments' political recognition of the PRC was a key driver of China's aid allocation to those countries (Taylor, 2009).

In addition to supporting China in the Taiwan case, the majority of African' countries (receiving aid from China) have also shown support for the Chinese government's efforts to prevent the sanctioning of its human rights records in international fora such as the UN Commission of Human Rights (Lammers, 2007; Lancaster, 2007). Aside from providing aid as a result of their political support, China also provided political support to their African partners, reaffirming that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will as always stand by the African countries at the United Nations and other international fora and support the proposals and positions of the African Union. To strengthen this mutual support, the 2018 Beijing Summit of the FOCAC adopted the theme "China and Africa: Toward an Even Stronger Community with Shared Future through Win-Win Cooperation." The Beijing Declaration of the Summit emphasized the deepening of the China-Africa community and enhancing their traditional friendship.

4. China's Aid as Means to Expand Influence

China has been using its aid to maintain its soft power in recipient countries in Africa. Other forms of aid included scholarship programmes, technical assistance programmes, training programmes, supplies of equipment for aid projects, and the establishment of Confucius centers for Chinese language and cultural teaching.

In the education sector training courses have been organized for the Rectors of Universities and primary school head-teachers from African countries. Other training was targeted at particular professions, such as media, culture, specialist health or agricultural fields, even acupuncture and anti-corruption efforts (King, 2013). China's training programmes can be divided into two groups and are based on the duration. They vary from three-week political tours for ministerial officials to advanced degree programmes for university administrators (Kaiman, 2013). The training programmes organized by China have played an important role in spreading China's influence. According to President Xi Jinping's announcement, during a summit in South Africa on 4 December 2015, China would establish regional vocational education centres and colleges for Africa aiming to train 200,000 African technicians. China also planned to invite 200 African scholars to visit China, and offered 500 scholarships for Africans to study in China each year. (MacGregor, 2015).

The education that African youths acquired through scholarships to China and through Confucius schools, inculcates them in Chinese philosophy, material and ideological exchanges, and creates a moral indebtedness that is difficult to totally unpick (*New African Magazine*, May 21, 2014). Haugen already pointed out in 2013, when talking about China's scholarship programme, that the soft power theory "presumes that students with pleasant first-hand experiences of life abroad will admire the host country's political system and, in turn, push politics at home in the direction desired by the country they studied in" (Haugen 2013, p. 318). The increase in China's support in education to Africa is strong evidence that development aid in the form of education is advantageous to China in terms of their influence.

China has also been nurturing its influence in African countries through several cultural activities, and through the establishments of Confucius Institutes in African countries.

In 2006, President Hu Jintao declared that "the strengthening of China and its international influence should be reflected both in a "hard power" including the economy, science and technology, and national defense, and a "soft power" such as the culture" (Hu, 2006).

In that regard, Cultural activities have been held in Africa and in China. Striking examples are: The Chinese Culture in Africa in 2004 and the first Festival of African and Chinese youth in 2004 in Beijing.

In addition, Confucius Institutes have been created in African countries to meet their needs to teaching the Chinese language.

In 2009, there were already 21 Confucius Institutes in 14 different African countries (Luo & Zhang, 2009), as of 2018, the number of Confucius Institutes has increased to 54 in 43 different African countries. These Confucius Institutes were built within the premises of the top national educational institutions which secures the spread of Chinese culture "into the minds of Africa's leaders of tomorrow in many areas, be it industry, academia and politics" (*New African Magazine*, May 21, 2014, para. 15). Aside from the Confucius Institutes, other institutions such as Chinese Embassies, TV and Radio stations have also been used as means to exert China's influence in African countries (Cabestan, 2013). Sun (2014b) confirmed in her study that Chinese diplomats are eagerly engaging African media to explain and propagate China's positions and their benefits to Africa.

In addition to cultural diplomacy, China has recently been promoting "health diplomacy" with its African partners, through the relationship between Chinese doctors and millions of ordinary Africans (Thompson, 2005 p. 2).

5. China's Aid as Tool to Ensure Economic Interests

With the opening up of China's economy at the end of the 1970s due to Deng Xiaoping's reforms, increased emphasis was placed on aid projects that serve the mutual benefit of both China and the partner country (Global Legal Research Center, 2012). This motive seeks to ensure mutual benefit at least in theory between China and its partner countries. Some scholars argue that the mutual benefit policy acts as a different ideology to conceal China's pursuit of self-interests (Mohan, Tan-Mullins, and Power, 2010). Other issues connected with this mutual benefit strategy include the tying of China's aid projects to the export of Chinese goods and the use of Chinese labor as executor of the aid project.

For China, mutual benefit means mixing aid, investment and commercial relations tools when delivering aid to its partners. This method of mixing or tying aid to other economic tools is a lesson learned from Japan, which often provided aid to China in exchange for coal and oil (Sun, 2014). This method of mixing aid is also referred as 'tied aid,' where aid is tied to trade and investment. This form of aid received official recognition when China's Ministry of Commerce asserted the role of China's aid in strengthening China's friendly relationship and trade cooperation with other developing countries (Wang, 2007).

There are two types of Chinese aid that are tied; namely grants and zero-interest loans from the Ministry of Commerce. These two instruments are tied to Chinese companies implementing aid projects and the procurement of goods from China. The Exim Bank concessional loans are also tied and require that goods for Exim bank-financed concessional aid projects should be procured from China. According to the Exim Bank' Regulation, "no less than 50 per cent of the procurements shall come from China" (China Concessional Loan Regulation, 1995).

According to Sun (2014), Africa is China's second-largest supplier of service contracts, and for every RMB 1 billion given as aid to African partners, China receives service contracts worth USD 1 billion (RMB 6 billion) from Africa. Sun added that:

> "In exchange for most Chinese financial aid to Africa, Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favor Chinese service providers: 70 percent of them go to "approved" state-owned Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups" (p. 8).

In addition to cash flow back from recipient countries to China, studies reflect the fact that China's aid has given Chinese firms' business opportunities. For instance, after the implementation of an aid project to a partner country, Chinese firms bid for commercial contracts in the same partner country (Strange et al., 2013).

Among other big state-owned enterprises taking part of China's aid projects today, there was the China Complete Plant Import and Export Corporation (China Complant) and the China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. There are also other state-owned enterprises involved in building social infrastructures such as China' Henan International Cooperation Group Co., Ltd. (CHICO), Sichuan Huanxi Group Co. Ltd., Jinya, Hunan Construction Engineering Group Corporation of China, Shanghai Construction Group General Co., Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. etc (JEG, 2009).

Westerns donors are critical in their understanding of China economic motives, which they describe as securing access to natural resources, subsidizing Chinese firms and exports, and pursuing global economic hegemony (Strange et al., 2013). Scholars like Naím (2007) characterize China's development aid as 'rogue aid' as it is not guided by the needs of developing countries, but rather by China's national interests. However, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) challenged the verdict about China's motives (resources and alliance seeking) saying it is based on selective case studies only and no empirical study exists confirming the various claims about Chinese 'rogue aid'. In their own empirical research, Dreher and Fuchs (2012) claimed that China indeed follows recipient needs when deciding on its aid allocation, favoring countries with low per capita incomes. They also pointed out that while commercial interests matter in China's aid strategy, the empirical evidence from their own research does not support the idea that China puts greater weight on giving aid to either countries with strong commercial ties to China, or to countries that are more abundant in natural resources, in comparison to other donors. This later conclusion was also pointed out by Cheung et al. study. They also found more relations between natural resource seeking and the China FDI distribution (Cheung et al., 2011).

In addition to scholarly work, the report provided by China's White Paper in 2011 pointed out that China's aid is allocated to poor countries and therefore it is a win-win approach which implies that aid satisfies China's interests but also addresses poverty in the partner countries. Following the data provided by the White Paper, 52% of China's foreign aid goes to the Least Developed Countries. Following the UN standard, these are countries where there is extreme poverty and people live with less than $1.25 a day.

From the African side, political leaders have voiced their opinion in favor of the benefits associated with China's aid. According to the former Senegalese' President Wade, China's aid can be summarized as follows: First, China's approach to the needs of Africans is better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European donors' organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The economic relations between both sides are based more on mutual needs.

6. France's Aid as A Means to Expand Its Influence

In practice, different approaches have been used by France to spread French influence. For example, through the diffusion of its culture (also referred to as "Cultural Diplomacy")[1] and know-how. The French Co-operation Minister, Charles Josselin, speaking before the National Assembly when he introduced his 1999 budget pointed out the need for France to build up its capacities for influence abroad. Among the five priorities set for France's foreign policy in a 2008 White Paper, the fifth one highlighted that: France's external actions should "ensure the presence of ideas, language and French culture while promoting cultural diversity" (France's White Paper, 2008, p. 57).

Furthermore, the part related to development aid, considered that:

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[1] The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy defines the cultural diplomacy as a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio- cultural cooperation or promote national interests. Retrieved from http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy

"France's aid is an integral component of France's foreign policy, and must contribute to its (foreign policy) main goals: promote a balanced globalization, strengthen peace and security in the fight against poverty and underdevelopment, and support our "influence strategies" (France's White Paper, 2008 p. 54).

France's Framework Document for Development (FDDC) in 2011 also reiterated the need for France to expand its influence through the promotion and exchange of know-how and culture.

According to the FDDC (2011), the first strategy laid down for such a purpose is the support of scientific research development of the partner countries and the setting up of research networks to bolster the international activities of French research institutes specializing in development, such as the Inter-Establishment Agency for Research for Development (AIRD), universities and think tanks. The second strategy is the transfer of know-how through technology transfer, capacity building for public authorities in developing countries, and hosting foreign students in France. The third strategy focuses on supporting multilingualism for cultural expansion, especially in Africa, by establishing French networks for cultural and linguistic cooperation abroad through the *Institut Français* (French Institute) (around 99 in the world as of 2019) and the *Agence pour* l'enseignement du Français à l'étranger (Agency for the French Teaching Abroad). There are also other institutions in partner countries expanding French culture and know-how such as the Lycée Français (French Higher School), Alliance Française (around 850 in the world, training about 75,070 students in Africa as of 2019), and the Espace Campus France (about 255 as of 2019) to name a few.

In France's Document de Politique Transversalle (Cross-Cutting Policy Document), the policy emphasized the role of French' know-how as a means of exercising French influence. It emphasized the development of French partner countries through French ideas and know-how in the emerging countries (DPT, 2012). The tools used by France to exert influence are based on the expansion of French culture and the transfer of know-how. This role is entrusted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Embassies are the implementing agencies of this policy in recipient countries.

Several sub-tools were identified by the OECD/DAC that France also uses to expand its culture and thus, its influence. Among these, there is technical assistance and scholarship. According to DAC (1998), these motives have nothing to do with poverty reduction as they serve only the interests of the donor rather than that of the recipient country. Nevertheless, they are reported by France as part of its development aid. In addition to technical assistance and scholarship programmes, the "Francophonie" programme has also played an important role in disseminating French culture[2]. It is considered a "the relic of the past and diplomatic tool for the future" (Mauer, 2013, p. 58). Also, the Francophonie has been constantly referred to in French foreign policy as a tool to expand and support France's cultural diplomacy (Kessler, 2013, p. 35). Besides promoting the French language, the Francophonie also supports the French vision of human rights, democracy, education and research in partner countries.

7. France's Aid as A Means of Maintaining Historical Ties and Express Solidarity with Former Colonies

Another motive of France's aid is to preserve historical ties with its former colonies (Berthelemy, 2005, p.11). After the independence of French colonies in the early 1960s, France's aid was used to maintain the relationship with former colonies. This was also a way for France to get support from these countries in international fora, reinforce its influence in international relations and enlarge its political alliances.

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[2] La Francophonie can be defined as the world community of French-speaking countries, or the collective unit formed by French-speaking people. La Francophonie was created in 1970. Its mission is to embody the active solidarity between its 80 member states and governments (57 members and 23 observers), which together represent over one-third of the United Nations' member states and account for a population of over 890 million people, including 220 million French speakers. Retrieved from http://www.francophonie.org/-Qu-est-ce-que-la-Francophonie-.html

Regarding the solidarity motive, France's aid allocation system is instrumental in that regard. In 1998, France established a Priority Solidarity Zone, composed of 54 poor countries with no access to international sources of private financing. Later, a new category was created and was called Priority Poor Countries (PPPs). France was committed to provide more than half of its aid to these PPPs, which are mainly composed of French speaking countries in Africa (FDDC, 2011). The allocation of aid to these poor countries reflects France's intention to show solidarity to these impoverished countries. A striking example of French solidarity toward the PPPs is the case of Guinea. The country was threatened by the Ebola outbreak that started in March 2014, and both traditional donors like France and emerging donors have all been at the forefront to show solidarity to Guinea. The speech of the former French President Francois Hollande during his visit to Guinea in 2014 highlighted this solidarity motive:

> "I wanted to be here in Guinea, to show the solidarity of France in the event that your country is going through. This is not the only one experiencing this situation since there is also Sierra Leone and Liberia. But the relationship between our two countries, Guinea and France require us to show solidarity."

To put this solidarity into practice, France sent human resources, established a center for the treatment of medical staff affected by Ebola and training centers for medical staff. Medical equipment worth €100 million was donated, according to report from the French Embassy in 2014.

8. France's Aid as A Means of Ensuring French Economic Interests in Partner Countries

Like other donors, France's aid has played an important role in ensuring its economic interest under the label of a win-win relationship. Alain Joyandet (Ministry of Cooperation between 2008 and 2010) pointed out that: "We want to help the Africans, but we must also get something out of it" (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p. 7). Moreover, the then French Ministry of Trade also called for taking better account of French economic interests in official development assistance (Bricq, 2012, p. 7). These statements were reiterated in the French Framework Document in 2011 and laid down in the following terms:

> "This document redefines the objectives of France's development cooperation policy, which serves the interests of France and its closest partners, as well as a general interest that transcends borders and which the international community has a shared duty to address" (FDDC, 2011, p. 9).

Among other strategies used to ensure French interests are: tied aid, the seeking of natural resources from partner countries and a brain drain through scholarship programmes (DAC 2000). In the DAC 2000 report, it was revealed that France's aid was tied to the procurement of goods and services originating from France, with only a limited number of goods obtained from the recipient countries (p.1-85). Two decades before the DAC report, the report of Berthelot and Brandt in 1980 on the impact of France's aid on French export and employment in France, considered the return rate on France's aid to be about 70%. These direct returns correspond to the amounts of aid the recipient countries spent in France such as contracts obtained by French companies, French products purchased and transfers to businesses (Guinant, 2013, p.13). However, since the DAC recommendation in 2001 about untying aid, France and other DAC donors have made efforts to untie their aid. It is also worth recalling that, although aid to the poor Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is untied, the aid provided to emerging countries or markets under the direction of the Ministry of Economy and Finances remains tied[3].

For the second strategy, the DAC 2000 report pointed out that France's aid has been used to support the efforts and projects of its big oil companies through the provision of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) or through government subsidies and guarantees for production projects in partner countries where oil is being explored. However, no companies were named by the DAC report.

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[3] The financing instruments are Emerging Countries Reserve (RPE) and the Private Sector Study and Aid Fund (FASEP). The projects financed by France under these two instruments must appeal to French industrial know-how and engineering and promote the French goods or services

For the third strategy (brain drain), scholarships are granted to partner-country students not based on that country's needs, but rather based on France's economic interests. The Foreign Minister, Fabius, requested in 2013 that university scholarships be redirected towards high-potential countries and academic disciplines that match France economic interests (DAC Peer review, 2013, p. 27). So far, there is a dearth of literature on how concretely a brain-drain has occurred because of the scholarship programmes.

The last strategy aims at assigning to the French Development Agency (AFD) group the mission of supporting development efforts in recipient countries while supporting French business communities. For example, the French Council of Investors in Africa (CIAN) has a seat on the AFD Board of Directors. Moreover, AFD Group (including Proparco) and other business institutions such as the UBIFRANCE (whose mission is to scale up the presence of French SMEs in international markets) signed a framework agreement in 2009 to coordinate their actions in partner countries. Among other agreements reached, these agencies agreed to facilitate the promotion of French expertise in partner countries through a better understanding of the financial tools provided by the AFD Group, better knowledge of the projects financed, and a wider dissemination of the bid invitations and procurement procedures that AFD sponsors. They agreed to study prospects for establishing French SMEs in the partner countries, particularly by using a range of financial tools provided by AFD Group (Framework Agreement between AFD Group and UBIFRANCE, 2009). Overall, 25% of AFD' aid is implemented by French companies (AFD, 2010). They have also benefited from aid projects of other donors thanks to the OECD requirement for untying aid. Though France has been untying its aid to poor countries in Africa as evidence of its awareness of the costs of tied aid, it is concerned about the rise of China in Africa, mainly in the French speaking African countries (*Irish,* 2019).

9. France's Aid as A Means of Seeking Strategic Alliances Against Emerging Donors in Africa

In the last decade, emerging countries (China, Brazil and India for example) have been more present in sub-Saharan countries. To some extent, emerging donors became a threat to French influence in the French speaking zone where these donors have been providing African countries with both aid and investment. Recently, France's attention has been focused on China's aid and investment in the African continent. When French companies, especially in oil and infrastructure, started to feel the heat of Chinese competition in the mid-2000s, France started to reconsider its approach, though it was not as heavily affected by the competition as other western donors (such as Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and USA). This was due to the fact that French businesses are more involved in other activities such as telecoms, shipping, port operations, railways and air transport (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.16). Nevertheless, French businesses have suffered in some other sectors including civil construction activities. This activity is under great pressure because of the lower-priced Chinese competition (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.18). This situation has also pushed AFD to redefine sectoral intervention of its aid by focusing in sectors where French expertise is competitive such as water/sanitation, new energy and innovative agricultural projects.

Besides the competition from an economic perspective, there is also political competition, vying for the best position to defend the interests of the African countries in international forums. Previously, France and the United Kingdom were taking the lead on debating African issues in international fora (such as the UN Security Council) and drafting most of the resolutions. However, since emerging countries started creating a block at the international level, this role has been diluted as emerging donors started working on the same footing with African countries in most of the international fora. Traditionally, between 15 and 20 African countries vote with France in major UN debates, but French diplomats are worried that this support might have eroded, partly as a result of the increasing involvement of new powers such as China (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p. 18). Thus, providing and increasing aid to the prior *pré-carré* countries has become a strategy for France to maintain its roots in French speaking African Countries. This has also pushed France to relinquish some of its strict conditions for aids to counter China's influence in those countries.

10. Comparison of China's and France's Aid Motives

In light of the analysis provided, there are more similarities than differences between the motives underlying their aid giving to African countries. The major difference being that China partly tends to use aid to reward political support, while France, on some level, gives aid as a mean to transfer political values such as democracy and human rights. Unlike France, China principle of non-interference prevent it from giving or transferring its political views through aid.

Generally speaking, both donors, France and China, shared similar motives in terms of reinforcing historical tie; building solidarity with partner countries; ensuring their own economic interest through strategies like tie aid; expanding their own influence through development aid; and countering the influence of other donors in recipient countries.

Though in broad terms, similarities exist between the two donors' aid motives, in practice some differences need to be pointed out. For example, regarding the solidarity motives, France focuses on a tiny group of French speaking countries which were colonized by France and this could be interpreted as a result of France guilt feelings regarding its role as a colonial master. For China, the solidarity with its partner countries came from the fact that they had the same colonial past and similar development challenges (including poverty challenges). Regarding the economic interests through the tied aid system, China ties aid but does not set any category. The status of the recipient countries (be it LDCs or not) do not matter. However, France ties its aid only to emerging countries. The aid to LDCs is 100% untied. So, although both donors tie their aid, but the implementations are different depending on the status of the recipient.

Though the international community has been advocating that donors should integrate poverty reduction as an overarching goal of their aid, it is important to point out in general that no country will provide aid in a selfless manner or with only one side benefiting. As the famous former French Président, General de Gaulle pointed out, " les États n'ont pas d'ami ; ils n'ont que des intérêt.". Literally translated, "States have no friends; they have only interest.". The equivalent terminology currently used by US leaders is "America firs.". Therefore, there is no exemption from donors looking for mutual benefit, or the win-win approach.

There is little evidence that aid provided under the so-called win-win approach can always deliver mutual benefits everywhere. Nonetheless, still many donors continue providing aid and claiming the win-win result (Girod, 2008; Steele, 2011). Recent studies have created a framework in order for donors to create a win-win strategy really benefiting the aid recipient. Gulrajani and Calleja (2019), have created what they named as Principle Aid Index (PA index) to benchmark the performance of the 29 bilateral donors' motivations for providing official development assistance against the three dimensions of 'principledness' need and vulnerability, global cooperation, and public spiretedness. Currently the index is only used to measure OECD/DAC donors' aid underlying motives, a more thorough study of aid giving motives can be analyzed if the index is extended to emerging donors, such as China, that are not currently on the OECD/DAC list of donors.

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