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Asian Institute of Research, Journal Publication, Journal Academics, Education Journal, Asian Institute
Asian Institute of Research, Journal Publication, Journal Academics, Education Journal, Asian Institute

Economics and Business

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asian institute research, jeb, journal of economics and business, economics journal, accunting journal, business journal, managemet journal
asian institute research, jeb, journal of economics and business, economics journal, accunting journal, business journal, managemet journal
asian institute research, jeb, journal of economics and business, economics journal, accunting journal, business journal, managemet journal
asian institute research, jeb, journal of economics and business, economics journal, accunting journal, business journal, managemet journal
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Published: 10 February 2023

The Debate on Reforms of the WTO Appellate Process: A Proxy for a More Serious Discussion of the Future of the WTO

Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Héctor R. Lozada, John H. Shannon

The University of Tulsa (USA), Seton Hall University (USA)

asian institute research, jeb, journal of economics and business, economics journal, accunting journal, business journal, management journal

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doi

10.31014/aior.1992.06.01.489

Pages: 86-105

Keywords: GATT, WTO, ITO, Dispute Settlement, Consensus, Panels, Appellate Body

Abstract

Thirty years after its founding, the WTO is experiencing unprecedented turmoil and uncertainty, as the United States has raised questions relating to its national sovereignty and expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness of multilateralism. Perhaps more importantly, United States representatives have questioned the fairness of Appellate procedures that appear to run counter to the interests of the United States. A recent dispute between Hong Kong and the United States over the question of the “branding” of goods emanating from the customs territory of Hong Kong has served as a “crisis point” or proxy to the larger dispute between the United States and China relating to needed reforms in the organization. How this dispute is resolved may go a long way in determining both the future of multilateralism and the participation of the United States in the World Trade Organization itself.

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