


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The Total War Strategy Through the Improvement of the Role of National Shipyard in Supporting Main Weapon System of Indonesian Navy

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Abstract

The national shipyard industry is an important component in realizing the independence of national defense. The independence of the countermeasures with the state's ability to make and prepare its own defense equipment needs without guaranteeing defense equipment products from other countries. In order to discuss the problem of efforts to increase the capability of the national shipyard industry, theories that support the strategy theory, the theory of capacity building and the theory of policy implementation are used. The method used in qualitative analysis is qualitative analysis, namely the existing phenomena regarding the national shipbuilding industry and qualitatively explains the data obtained from literature studies to gain an understanding of the strategies for dealing with them. The results of the analysis found that to ensure the implementation of policies to increase the capacity of the national ship industry, the formulation of defense policies needs to be guided by the principles, namely: integrated between all existing national resources (integrative), interactive communication between related entities (interactive), commitment a special transparency system in order to avoid leakage (transparency), requires an entity as the driver's authority to regulate authority (control), a special system to measure the performance accountability that has been implemented (accountability). So that the resulting strategy can produce a total war strategy by increasing the role of the national shipyard industry in supporting the needs of the Indonesian Navy's defense equipment.

Keywords: Defense Industry, National Shipbuilding Industry, Capability

1. Introduction

In accordance with Republic of Indonesia Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense, it is stated that national defense is all efforts to defend the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the

nation and state, carried out through efforts to develop fostering the capability, deterrence of the state and nation, and overcoming any threats by placing the Indonesian National Army as the main component supported by the reserve and supporting components in facing military threats and placing government agencies outside the field of defense as the main element, in accordance with the form and nature the threats faced are supported by other elements of the nation's strength in the face of non-military threats.

The national defense system is a comprehensive defense system that involves all citizens, territories and other national resources, and is prepared early by the government and is carried out in a total, integrated, directed and continuous way to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety the whole nation from all threats that are implied through the total war strategy.

To protect the entire Indonesian nation and all of Indonesia's blood, as well as to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, it requires the availability of defense and security equipment and is supported by the ability of an independent domestic defense industry to achieve national goals. In order to realize the availability of defense and security equipment independently supported by the ability of the domestic defense industry to create the independence of the domestic Defense Industry in supporting the TNI's strength development program so that it can produce deterrence and power to overcome any threats.

The availability of defense and security equipment so far has not been supported by the ability of the defense industry optimally, causing dependence on foreign defense and security equipment products. Based on Presidential Regulation Number 18 of 2020 concerning the National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2020-2024, it is stated that until 2019, the level of the Defense Industry's contribution to the fulfillment of Primary weapon system has only reached 35.9% of the target of 49%. This concludes that the defense industry's contribution to the provision of defense and security equipment is still minimal and indicates that the activity parameters to assess the ability, role and contribution of the defense industry in the provision of defense and security equipment have not been running well so far, so that they must be further improved.

Posture development of the Indonesian Navy as the main component of state defense at sea is part of the development of the state defense system in order to ensure the upholding of sovereignty at sea and maintain territorial integrity and protect national interests in the sea of national jurisdiction. The strength structure of the Indonesian Navy is built and directed towards the realization of the appearance of the existence of the Integrated Fleet Weapon System (SSAT) which is an integration of strength and synergy of capabilities from its components, namely KRI, Aircraft, Marines and Naval Base.

One of the efforts to improve national defense and security requires an independent defense industry to meet the needs of the National Primary weapon system. The defense industry is one of the national interests to improve the economy foreign exchange and national welfare, as well as providing deterrence effect and bargaining power in making policies and protecting national interests abroad. Indonesia is predicted to become the new giant of the world economy in 2030, so that it has the potential to have a strong national defense industry without relying on foreign defense equipment. To prove this prediction, the national defense industry must be prepared as early as possible to build the independence of the National Primary weapon system. Law Number 16 of 2012 concerning the Defense Industry places the defense industry as a strategic industry protected by the state and is expected to meet the needs of defense equipment and reduce dependence on defense equipment from other countries.

If Indonesia does not immediately develop sea power capabilities, it will result in the inability of the state to protect and control Indonesia's marine waters, it will cause problems that are detrimental to Indonesia's national interests such as the threat of maritime border disputes, maritime security disturbances, violation of maritime law, seizure of resources. nature and minerals. So that in order to guarantee the national interest in the maritime sector, it is necessary to develop sea power in a structured and systematic manner by involving all components of the nation. Indonesia must take advantage of the role of the domestic maritime industry, especially the shipping industry, as an effort to improve maritime defense and security. The large number of defense equipment needed by the

Indonesian Navy until 2024 as well as agencies and law enforcement agencies at sea, provide opportunities for the national shipping industry to meet these needs

In building the shipping industry, it requires a lot of roles from various agencies and institutions or national bodies that have the competence to fix problems that exist in the world of national shipping, especially in meeting the needs of Primary weapon system for national defense and security. One of them is the role of the government as the regulator that manages the domestic shipping industry. The role of the shipping industry entrepreneurs as service providers in producing quality Primary weapon system products. As well as the role of prospective ship users who give confidence to the national shipping industry to produce products that are equivalent to foreign ships. The many obstacles faced by the national shipping industry prove that there is something wrong with the current management of the shipping industry or the government's lack of attention to develop the shipping industry as one of the main industries driving the national economy. The problems faced by the national shipping industry can be classified into two groups, namely internal problems and external problems. The problems faced by the shipping industry are dilemmas faced by the government and prospective ship users. Products produced in particular ships for the Indonesian Navy are required to have sophisticated specifications with high quality in supporting marine security operations in Indonesia, while on the other hand the national shipping industry is not prepared to meet the needs of defense equipment from the request of the ministry of defense.

2. Method

Types and approaches of the study using a phenomenological qualitative descriptive method. The problems that are being faced are related to the existing phenomena in detail and the efforts to solve them are described in detail. Data collection techniques using document and literature study techniques. Document studies are carried out by reviewing documents related to research topics. These documents can be in the form of letters, photo archives, meeting minutes, journals and others. According to M. Nazir in his book entitled 'Research Methods' states that what is meant by literature study is a technique of collecting data by conducting study studies of books, literature, notes, and reports related to problem solved (Nazir, 1988: 111). Literature study, namely conducting research by studying and reading literature that is related to the problem that is the object of research.

3. Results

Shipyard is an industry that is oriented to produce products in the form of ships, offshore buildings, floating buildings and others for customer needs. For the most part, production is carried out based on the specifications required by the customer or buyer. While a ship is a structure with a complex combination of various components, ships are classified based on their main size, weight, carrying capacity and service use. Several more specific definitions are based on the type or purpose of use (Munawar, 2009).

Defense Industry is a national industry consisting of state-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises, either individually or in groups, which are determined by the government to partially or wholly produce defense and security equipment, maintenance services to fulfill strategic interests in the defense and security sector located in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The national shipbuilding industry is one part of the national strategic defense industry in the field of building the Indonesian Navy's defense equipment.

According to data from the Ministry of Industry, there are 250 shipyard companies in Indonesia. The shipyard in question is a company that focuses on docking services, new ship building, ship repair, ship maintenance, and ship conversion. Of these, 23 shipyard companies are located in Batam, and the rest are scattered in 14 other locations. Based on the company's status, shipyards in Indonesia include four state-owned company (BUMN) shipbuilding companies, namely, PT. PAL Indonesia (Persero) in Surabaya, PT. Doc and Shipping Surabaya (DPS) in Surabaya, PT. Dok and Koja Bahari Shipping (DKB) in Jakarta, PT. Indonesian Ship Industry (IKI) in Makassar. Private shipyard companies, consisting of, PMA companies (Foreign Investment), PMDN companies (Domestic Investment), joint venture companies (cooperation between foreign companies and domestic companies).

Currently, a number of production needs for the maritime industry that are already controlled by the domestic industry include landing ship tanks (LST), fast patrol boats, missile destroyers and Corvette class ship components. Indonesian BUMNs are also currently submitting plans for cooperation with a number of developed countries, in the production of corvettes, frigates and submarines. Meanwhile, production that has started at this time is for the procurement of aircraft in the water, medium-range missiles and anti-radar patrol boats.

For the capacity and utility of the national shipyard, currently the number of shipyards is 250 units with an output of 12,000,000 DWT / per year. The annual production rate is 85% with an absorption rate of 70% by the domestic market. Meanwhile, the installed capacity for national ship repair is 12,000,000 DWT (8,500,000 GT). The number of commercial ships with the Indonesian flag has approached 20,000 units, equivalent to 18,000,000 GT. The need for dock space for ship repairs per year is around $60\% \times 18,000,000 = 10,800,000$ GT from the availability of 8,500,000 GT. Lack of dock space per 2,300,000 GT per year. 65% of the national shipyard material needs are still imported from abroad, such as for machinery and navigation equipment and radio communication systems, while the remaining 35% in the form of materials and raw materials can be met from within the country. For the field of design and engineering and construction, 100% can be done by yourself. The biggest market for national shipyards is currently the construction of new ships. Still sourced from State Expenditures

BUMN, while the national private sector does not fully trust domestic shipyards, only in the types of tugs and barges. The future market potential is to meet the needs of Indonesian Navy ships in the form of non-combatant ships such as swam boats, tugboats, lifeboats and Kombatant ships in the form of LPD, KCR 60, Light Frigate, OPV, Mine hunter, Submarine (Over haul and construction of new ships).

Currently, local shipyards are working on various orders from the Ministry of Defense. PT Dok dan Perkapalan Kodja Bahari (DKB), Jakarta - as one of the State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) - is building three ships. Namely, one Liquid Oil Assistance Ship (BCM) and two Landing Ship Tank (LST) warships, worth IDR 320 billion, assisted by Bank Mandiri. This tanker with a capacity of 5,500 m³, is 122.40 meters long, 16.50 meters wide, with a maximum speed of 18 knots. Meanwhile, the LST ship is 117 meters long, 16.40 meters wide, with maximum speed of 16 knots. This ship is capable of carrying BMP 3F tanks and Leopard tanks. Orders will be submitted in December 2013, with local content reaching 30 percent, while 97 percent of steel plates use domestic products. Meanwhile, the Batam shipyard, PT Palindo Marine Shipyard, also did not remain silent in fulfilling the Ministry of Defense's request, namely working on four units of Fast Missile Boat (KCR) 40 meters long.

Currently, most of the potential shipyards in Indonesia are small-scale shipyards and 4 government-owned shipyards, namely: PT Dok & Perkapalan Kodja Bahari, PT PAL Indonesia, PT Dok & Perkapalan Surabaya and PT Industri Kapal Indonesia. Domestic shipyard companies are spread across Indonesia, 37% are in Java, 26% in Sumatra, 25% in Kalimantan and 12% in eastern Indonesia, with a ship building capacity of 140,000 GT per year. However, the average ship production per year is 85,000 GT, while the average ship repair rate is only 65,000 GT per year (Aulia, 2009). Fulfilling the needs of domestic vessels and maintenance of 429 offshore platforms that cost maintenance costs ranging from US \$ 1 million to US \$ 1.5 million per platform as well as making new means of exploitation, exploration and production of wells is a very challenging homework. In this case, a very objective, awareness and comprehensive study of the factors causing the inability of domestic shipyards to meet domestic needs is needed (Andri, 2012).

The Law on Defense Industry is believed to be able to accelerate the growth of the national shipping industry going forward. This is because the Law provides fresh air for the empowerment of this capital-intensive, labor-intensive and technology-intensive industry. Especially to meet various requests for procurement of warships as the main tool of the weapon system (primary weapon system) of the Ministry of Defense (Kemenhan) and the National Police. Moreover, Article 43 Paragraph 1 mandates the obligation to use domestic products. If it has to be imported - because it has not been produced domestically - it must meet the requirements that it must be Government to Government (G to G). Involving the domestic defense industry, technology transfer, which in the long run will be a joint production involving the domestic defense industry. Thus, dependence on foreign defense equipment can be reduced, and the domestic industry will grow. The Ministry of Industry (Kemenperin)

encourages the empowerment of the local shipyard industry, especially for the procurement of defense equipment for warships, through domestic banking support. The procurement of defense equipment cannot depend on overseas, the local shipbuilding industry needs to be given the opportunity to develop its capabilities. As has been done in Japan, Korea, China and Europe. The Indonesian Navy must empower and play a role in developing the local shipyard industry.

4. Discussion

The role and potential of the national shipyard in supporting the development of the TNI's defense equipment as a sea power is very large. Mastery of technology and independence of the defense industry can have a high deterrent effect. For this reason, the national shipbuilding industry as part of national resources and supporting components in national defense must be prepared early by the government and carried out in a total, integrated, directed, and continuous manner to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire nation from all threats. which is implemented through a universal war strategy as mandated by law. Alfred Thayer Mahan put forward the theory that sea power is the most important element for the progress and glory of a country, which if these sea powers are empowered, it will improve the welfare and security of a country. Conversely, if these sea powers are neglected, it will result in losses for a country or even collapse the country.

Efforts to develop national shipyards are carried out by increasing their ability to produce quality products so that they can meet the operational requirements of the Navy in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness of delivery. According to the Big Indonesian Dictionary, improvement means increasing. Raising means that any effort is made to lift something from a low position to a higher position. According to Moeliono as quoted by Sawiwati, improvement is a way or an effort to regain skills or abilities for the better. While Adi S. (2003) the increase comes from the word level. Which means layers or layers of something which then forms an arrangement. Level can also mean rank, level and class. Meanwhile, a significant increase. In general, an increase in efforts to increase the degree, level and quality of quantity quantities. The word increase can also mean to describe a change from a state or trait that changes to a positive. Meanwhile, the result of an increase can be in the form of quality and quantity. Quality describes the value of an object due to events. Quantity is the sum of the results of a process or with the aim of improvement.

For this reason, increasing the capacity of the national shipyard industry is carried out through the making of various national policies in a total and directed manner to ensure cohesiveness and sustainability of development. Until now, the government has issued various national policies to support the development and progress of the defense industry including the national private shipbuilding industry in the form of laws and other government regulations such as: Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense; Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 17 of 2008 concerning Shipping; Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2014 concerning Industry; Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 16 of 2012 concerning the Defense Industry; Government Regulation No. 5 of 2011 concerning Bonded Zone; Presidential Instruction Number 5 of 2005 concerning Empowerment of the National Shipping Industry Regulation of the Minister of Trade Number 82 of 2017 concerning Provisions for the Use of Sea Transportation and National Insurance for the Export and Import of Certain Goods and many others.

However, even though the government has issued various policies in the context of empowering national shipyards, in reality there are still several problems that cause efforts to increase the capacity and role of the national shipbuilding industry have not been optimal. This shows that various policies in the field of empowerment of the national shipbuilding industry have not been running effectively and optimally.

To protect the entire Indonesian nation and all of Indonesia's blood, as well as to defend the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the state defense and security system requires the availability of main equipment supported by domestic industrial capabilities, ownership of advanced technology and appropriate technology, mastery. economic resources, and accelerating the achievement of national goals. So far, the availability of the Defense and Security Equipment Tool has not been supported by the ability of the Defense Industry in an optimal and independent manner, which has resulted in dependence from abroad. Having a strong defense and security is a fundamental requirement for a nation and a country. Defense and security

capabilities are not only important in maintaining the safety of the nation and state, but are also a symbol of strength and means to achieve national ideals, goals and interests, both in the economic aspect (economic well-being) and even creating a favorable world order.

Currently, domestically-made vessels are relatively more expensive between 10-30 percent compared to foreign-made (imported) vessels. Production time is relatively longer due to the lack of support from the component and other supporting industries. It is relatively difficult to obtain shipbuilding capital at domestic shipyards from domestic financial institutions. Interest rates are relatively high compared to those of overseas banks / financing institutions. Support industry / components have not grown so that 60% -70% of ship components are still imported.

As a maritime country, Indonesia has declared itself as the world's maritime axis. This should increase the prospect of the national shipbuilding industry as a form of contribution to the world maritime axis program. The maritime industry that is currently rapidly developing includes ship repair which allows ships to carry out repairs and routine maintenance. This potential should be able to provide economic value for the progress of the shipyard business in Indonesia. However, the shipyards scattered throughout Indonesia are still underdeveloped (Yoga, 2014). Apart from the lack of optimization from the shipyard, it is also due to a lack of government attention so that developments in this business sector are very lacking. The government is expected to provide support by carrying out professional management and good promotion of shipyards, so that the shipyard business can provide maximum value to the country's economy.

The role of shipbuilding capabilities in Indonesia has not been utilized optimally because shipping and shipping companies in Indonesia are still dominated by imported ship products. According to the records of the Ministry of Industry, of the total ships operating in Indonesian waters at this time, 90 percent are imported product vessels and only 10 percent are self-shipyard products. This condition is due to the fact that the price of foreign production vessels is 30 percent cheaper than the price of domestic production vessels. Meanwhile, according to data from the Directorate General of High Technology-Based Leading Industry (IUBTT) of the Ministry of Industry, in 2014, Indonesia only produced 72 vessels of various types and sizes. This production figure is much smaller than the number of shipyard companies in existence. The ratio of the number of shipyards to production is only 1: 0.8. This means that, on average, in 2014 there were 20 percent of shipyard companies that did not build new ships.

The existence of government policies, especially the defense industry law, should be able to increase the capacity of the national shipbuilding industry because in the process of procuring main weapon system it will maximize the ability of the domestic industry to meet defense needs. Even if the procurement of main weapon system that cannot be produced by the domestic industry is allowed to import but using the ToT and offset systems by involving the domestic industry. However, there are still inconsistencies in priorities in the selection or procurement of domestic defense equipment. For the Indonesian Navy itself as the user it is a dilemma, because the requirements of the military specification require them to use sophisticated defense equipment. On the other hand, the ability of the defense industry is still unable to produce products that meet the demands of main weapon system users.

To find out the extent of success and the obstacles faced by the government in efforts to empower the national shipbuilding industry to support the needs of the Indonesian Navy's defense equipment through the formulation of various policies, an analysis is needed. The analysis uses the theory of Defense Policy Implementation Lukman Yudho Prakoso (2016), with the success factors of IITCA defense policy (Integrative, Interactive, Transparency, Controlling, Accountability). Where in the formulation of defense policy it is necessary to adhere to the principles, namely: integrated among all existing national resources (integrative), the existence of interactive communication between related entities (interactive), commitment in formulating a special transparency system in order to avoid leakage (transparency), it is necessary to have entities as driver force to avoid abuse of authority (controlling), a special system to measure the performance accountability that has been implemented (accountability).

a. Integrative. Integration between all existing national resources

The lack of comprehensive defense policies and strategies is also a problem. Defense policies and strategies are not yet fully comprehensive in nature and are more focused on aspects of the core strength of defense. The potential for defense support, which is an important aspect of universal defense, has not been optimally utilized as a result of relatively partial defense policies and strategies. Comprehensive national defense policies and strategies cannot yet be realized in a blueprint which subsequently becomes a reference in the implementation and development of national defense capabilities. Likewise, policies to empower the domestic defense industry are still difficult to implement because they have not been supported by an integrated implementation policy from various related parties.

There are two regulations that cause the national shipbuilding industry to be unable to compete with industries from abroad. The two regulations are the Batam free trade area and the rules for importing used vessels. Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Association of National Shipbuilding Industry Companies and Offshore Building Indonesia (Iperindo) Tjahjono Roesdianto said, by making Batam a free trade area, shipments from Batam to other parts of Indonesia are subject to tax. Meanwhile, the ease of importing used vessels makes consumers prefer to buy used vessels from abroad. As a result, many shipyard companies in Batam then make certificates in Singapore for the products they make as used heads. In fact, these ships are new ships produced in Batam. This step is taken so that the ships produced are recorded as used-imported vessels so that they are not subject to tax. This will make the competition unfair because ships that want to be used domestically must be taxed first.

Regulations concerning Amendments to the Regulation of the Minister of Trade Number 118 of 2018 concerning Provisions for Import of Capital Goods in a Not New Condition are reaping polemics in the maritime world because they are considered a policy that can kill the national shipbuilding industry and are not in accordance with the commitment to build a competitive national maritime industry. One of the points of change in the Permen is related to the provisions on the import of used vessels. In the new regulation, the ship imports faucets former wide opened. Used vessels can be imported with a maximum age limit of 30 years for all types. Whereas on the other hand the government through the Ministry of Industry is trying to increase the Domestic Component Level (TKDN). Supposedly, ships that are over 30 years old under the technical provisions have entered a special survey period, meaning that all elements of the ship need to be re-examined because they have passed the technical capability period.

From the description above, it can be concluded that the policy to increase the capability of the shipbuilding industry has not been integrative. There are still policies that overlap and even conflict with one another so that they have a negative impact and create obstacles in efforts to optimize the improvement of the shipbuilding industry's capacity.

b. Interactive. to see whether the policy has established interactive communication with related K / L entities. According to Quade (1984: 310), in the process of implementing an ideal policy there will be interactions and reactions from the implementing organization, target groups and environmental factors that cause pressure to emerge and are followed by bargaining or transactions. From this transaction, feedback is obtained that can be used by policy makers as input in further policy formulation. Quade illustrates that there are four variables that must be examined in the analysis of the implementation of public policies, namely: (1) Dreamed policy, which is the dream pattern of interaction so that people who set policies try to make things happen; (2) The target group, namely subjects who are expected to adopt new patterns of interaction through policies and subjects that must change to meet their needs; (3) Implementing organizations, namely usually in the form of government bureaucratic units responsible for implementing policies; and (4) environmental factors, namely elements in the environment that influence policy implementation.

Jan Pieter Ate, Daily Chairperson of the National Private Defense Industry Association (Pinhantanas), assessed that currently, policies that favor the domestic defense industry, especially in the absorption of domestic products, are still lacking where the government has obliged the military to buy domestic products through the Defense Industry Law, but there are no derivative rules that clearly regulate the implementation of the law. Currently the national defense industry is capable of producing a lot of defense products and tools, but if there is no firm policy,

the absorption of domestic products will not be optimal, for example due to quality reasons still less than other more developed countries. Apart from absorption of domestic products, the challenge faced by the domestic defense industry is the mastery of technology so that it is able to compete with foreign products. According to him, there is no other choice for Indonesia to become a big country other than by developing defense industrial technology. The hope is that the government will spur the development of domestic industries and focus on directing the national defense industry to technology that is more affordable and more quickly controlled by the industry.

Based on this, the national policy on the empowerment of the national shipyard industry is concluded not yet interactive. Defense industry players, including the national shipbuilding industry, still face obstacles in the absorption of their products due to the absence of a derivative regulation of the defense industry law regarding military obligations to purchase domestic products. This is feedback that policy makers can use as input in further policy formulation.

c. Transparency. Commitment in formulating a special transparency system in order to avoid leakage (transparency).

According to Connie Rahakundini, the absence of a technology auditor who assesses the quality of the national defense industry is the main cause of the continuing polemic regarding defense equipment. So far, the public has only received one-way information about the progress of the Indonesian defense industry, without having the ability to verify the truth. Therefore, our defense industry requires technology auditors to be more transparent, scalable and not based on unilateral claims.

Apart from that, the issue of transparency in the procurement of defense equipment is one of the challenges amid the limited defense budget. The defense sector has long been a sector prone to corruption, marked by rampant corruption cases in the procurement of defense equipment in Indonesia. For example, in the procurement of Agusta Westland helicopters for the Indonesian Air Force in 2017 (kompas.com, 12 July 2017), and the arrest of the president director of PT PAL for corruption in the sale of the Strategic Seality Vessel to the Philippines (tempo.co, 14 August 2017). This happened because the KPK's room was closed to investigate corruption cases, especially those involving elements of the TNI. Then, the involvement of third parties in the procurement of defense equipment and the lack of transparency and accountability in the defense equipment procurement process also contributed to the occurrence of corruption in this sector.

The issue of transparency is still a problem in efforts to empower the national shipbuilding industry. Broadly speaking, this transparency consists of two aspects, namely transparency of the capability of the shipbuilding industry and transparency in budget management. From the aspect of capability, the current constraint of the shipyard industry in fulfilling the needs of the Navy's defense equipment is that there is still a gap between the operational requirements for defense equipment and the national shipbuilding industry's capability in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness of product delivery so that not all needs for defense equipment can be met. national shipbuilding industry, so they have to buy from abroad. Meanwhile, from the aspect of budget management, the potential for budget leakage due to corruption cases resulted in a high cost economy so that the defense equipment procurement process was inefficient.

d. An entity is needed as a driver force to avoid abuse of authority (controlling),

In Law Number 16 of 2012 concerning the Defense Industry in Article 64 Supervision states that the implementation of the Defense Industry is carried out by the DPR's apparatus in charge of defense matters in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations. Whereas Article 65 states that the Supervision and security of the implementation of the Defense Industry by the Government is carried out on: a. implementation of policies, work programs, and use of budgets; and b. technology that has been controlled and intellectual property rights owned. Meanwhile, at the Ministry / Institution level, monitoring activities are carried out by the respective Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP)

e. Accountability. There is a special system to measure the performance accountability that has been implemented.

Accountability for the performance of government agencies is a form of media to report the success or failure of a government agency on the implementation of organizational goals and objectives. Performance accountability is based on Presidential Regulation No. 29/2014 concerning the Performance Accountability System for Government Agencies, which requires each government agency to measure its respective performance accountability as a form of accountability in achieving organizational goals in accordance with its main duties and functions in the form of a Performance Report.

Based on this, the performance accountability measurement system for various empowerment policies in order to improve the capability of the national shipbuilding industry is carried out partially by each The relevant ministries / agencies are embodied in the form of performance reports on the Performance Accountability Report of Government Agencies of Ministries / Agencies which are compiled annually which contain the realization of the achievements of the targets that have been set.

Based on the analysis above, in order to optimize the activities to increase the capacity of the national shipyard industry, the government must immediately evaluate various existing policies and take strategic steps and formulate strategies to synchronize and harmonize these policies so that their implementation can be carried out well and produce output in the form of increased the ability of the national shipbuilding industry to support the needs of the Indonesian Navy's defense equipment from the perspective of a universal war strategy as expected.

The first is that the government integrates various national policies in the defense industry including the national shipbuilding industry by optimizing the role of KKIP as the leading sector and involving various related parties such as Ministries / Institutions, defense industry, TNI / Navy as users and research institutions to evaluate various policies there is so that there is no overlapping and conflicting policies in order to create a national policy in the defense industry sector that is harmonious, integrated and sustainable.

The second is that the government establishes interactive communication with all defense industry stakeholders involving defense industry players and the Indonesian Navy as users of various related parties with the aim of ensuring a common mindset and pattern of action in an effort to improve the defense industry in meeting needs. Indonesian Navy defense equipment and to get various inputs in the formulation of further policies.

Third, the government together with policy makers involve defense industry players and the Indonesian Navy as users to increase transparency in defense capabilities and budgets through capability and budget audits with the aim of increasing the defense industry's ability to meet the required standard operational requirements and attain efficiency budget.

The fourth is to increase monitoring and security activities for the implementation of the Defense Industry by the Government on the aspects of implementing policies, work programs and use of budgets and technology that has been mastered and intellectual property rights that are owned by the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP) Respective institutions as well as by external auditors.

The fifth is to carry out performance accountability reports on various empowerment policies in order to improve the capability of the national shipbuilding industry carried out by each related party to find out and measure the realization of the achievements of the targets that have been set as a form of transparency and accountability.

5. Conclusion

Shipyard is an industry that is oriented to produce products in the form of ships, offshore buildings, floating buildings and others for customer needs. The national shipbuilding industry is one part of the strategic defense industry and as a national resource that needs to be continuously fostered to improve its existence and capabilities in a total, integrated and sustainable direction through the formulation of various government policies and regulations in order to produce quality products to support the needs of TNI's defense equipment. Navy to be able to carry out its duties.

To ensure the successful implementation of policies to increase the capacity of the national shipyard industry, the formulation of defense policies needs to be guided by the following principles, namely: integration between all existing national resources (integrative), interactive communication between related entities (interactive), commitment to formulating a special transparency system. In order to avoid leakage (transparency), it is necessary to have an entity as a driver force to avoid abuse of authority (controlling), a special system to measure the performance accountability that has been implemented (accountability).

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The State of the Art of Barriers to Exclusive Breastfeeding among Working Mothers in Developing Countries

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Abstract

According to the WHO, the global standard for infant nutrition is exclusive breastfeeding (EBF). However, the level of EBF has been identified to remain low in developing countries. This is quite ironical as one could expect that breastfeeding mothers in developing countries will find EBF attractive as a better alternative to infant food considering the high level of food insecurity in the region. Adopting a qualitative approach, this paper dived into the literature and identified key factors which act as impediments to EBF among working mothers in this region - insufficient breastfeeding breaks in the workplace, lack of breastfeeding spaces and short maternity leaves, birth by caesarean section, poor lactation, poor maternal health, and poor spousal and societal support.

Keywords: Exclusive Breastfeeding, Infant Nutrition, Working Mothers, Public Policy, Workplace, Developing Countries

Introduction

Globally, exclusive breastfeeding has been endorsed as the recommended feeding practice for the first six months of a human's life (Danso, 2014). It is the process of feeding an infant with breast milk only except for vitamins, minerals, medicine and oral rehydration solution (WHO, 2020). Arguably, this is attributable to the numerous benefits associated with breast milk (Dhakal, et al., 2017). According to Dhakal, et. al (2017) breast milk is perfect for infant because it contains carbohydrates, proteins, essential fats, minerals, and immunological factors for nourishment. As a result, it is beneficial in building strong immunity and improved cognitive ability for the breastfed child (WHO, 2011). Additionally, it protects the child against childhood diseases such as diarrhoea and pneumonia. Aside from this, it promotes mother-to-child bonding, reduces the risk of cancer in nursing mothers – such that it provides psychological, economic and even environmental benefits to the family and the nation at large (Office of the Surgeon General, 2011).

Despite these numerous benefits, exclusive breastfeeding rate has remained low in developing countries especially among working mothers (Gebrekidan et al., 2020). Previous studies have shown that as more mothers in developing countries participate in the labour market, it becomes increasingly difficult to improve the exclusive breastfeeding rate within the region (Olufunlayo, et al., 2019). This has been attributable to the demanding nature of exclusive breastfeeding (Ogbo et al., 2015) combined with short maternity leaves, lack of breastfeeding spaces, insufficient breastfeeding breaks (Ahmadi & Moosavi, 2013; Sulaiman et al., 2016; Riaz & Condon, 2019). However, it is imperative to ascertain if working mothers are deterred by common factors such as their poor knowledge and attitude towards EBF (Mohamed et al., 2018) or spousal and societal influence (Ohaeri & Bello, 2016). Furthermore, identifying how returning to work, or their workplace has become a major barrier to their EBF practice will be beneficial in policy formulation. Through the aforementioned, policymakers in developing countries can provide targeted interventions to improve EBF among working mothers without undermining their decision to work.

Exclusive Breastfeeding in Developing Countries: The State of the Literature

The review of the literature has become increasingly relevant because it allows researchers to build on and make reference to existing evidence (Snyder, 2019). By integrating findings from other empirical data, this method can explore research questions or objectives more critically than a single study (Snyder, 2019). Before the commencement of the formal literature search, a scoping review was done on Google and Google Scholar to determine the type of literature available within the subject area.

The academic literature review for this paper utilized a two-step search strategy using electronic journal databases. MEDLINE, PUBMED, SCOPUS and Web of Science were identified based on similar research conducted by Gebrekidan et.al (2020) and their relevance to the scope of the topic. The initial search string was undertaken in May 2020 using the search term, date and language which resulted in 29,349 hits (see Table I). Articles were later screened based on the relevance of their abstract and study location which resulted in 215 articles.

Table I: Table showing the initial scoping of the literature

Databases	Returned by search terms, publication date and language	Filtered by country of study and abstract
MEDLINE	358	41
PUBMED	28,009	132
SCOPUS	72	21
Web of Science	910	21
Total	29,349	215

This was followed by the removal of 112 duplicates leaving 103 articles. Of the 103 articles, 56 unrelated articles which acknowledged the barriers to EBF among working mothers in their abstract without fully exploring them were removed – leaving a total of 47 articles. After conducting a full-text reading on the 47 articles, 32 articles with either unclear design or poor reporting were then removed leaving only 15 eligible articles with a clear design and unambiguous reporting. Snowballing technique was further used to search the 533 reference lists of these 15 eligible articles and 7 more articles were found for the qualitative synthesis of this research. These search strategies, screening process and snowballing resulted in a total of 22 peer-reviewed journals as shown in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1: PRISMA flow chart

Due to the potential benefits of breastfeeding to health, it has remained a widely researched topic (Cassidy & Tom, 2020:11). Therefore, it was imperative to use appropriate search terms to ensure that only relevant literature was included. The specific search string used for this study is “*exclusive breastfeeding OR breastfeeding OR breastfeeding AND barriers OR obstacles OR factors OR challenges OR limitations AND working mothers OR employed mothers OR maternal work*” for all 4 databases. Despite the first objective’s focus on the barriers to EBF among working mothers, literature that assessed the barriers to breastfeeding among working mothers were also considered – because factors that affect breastfeeding were most likely to deter EBF practise adversely. In other words, factors that hinder a mother from breastfeeding her child were likely to have prevented her from practising EBF within the first 6 months. Also, the word ‘barriers’ has several synonyms which were considered. The word “factors” was also included because factors that influence EBF practices may be positive or negative (in terms of barriers). During the scoping, it was also observed that ‘working mothers’, ‘maternal work’ and ‘employed mothers’ were often used interchangeably to refer to working mothers in both formal and informal occupation.

Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

Given the objective addressed by the literature review, only studies that explored in detail the barriers to EBF among working mothers were included. The Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding which promotes EBF was first developed in 2003 (WHO & UNICEF, 2003). Therefore, it is expected that only publication from 2003 onwards will be included in this study like the recent study by Gebrekidan et al. (2020). However, publications between 2000 and 2020 were included due to limited evidence available. Also, the broad publication date allowed comparison between the difference in barrier to EBF faced by working mothers before and after the introduction of the Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding.

This study used a secondary method of data collection – a literature review. Hence, only studies that utilize primary qualitative and quantitative methods (such as interviews, observation, focus group discussions and questionnaires) and were included in the study – to gain first-hand insight into the evidence. Due to the limited evidence on the topic, studies that reported working mothers’ and employers’ perspectives on the topic were included. The employer’s perspective is important because they are also knowledgeable of workplace activities and work-life balance of working mothers (Soomro et al., 2016). Although, Lakati, et al. (2002) reported that only maternal recall of EBF collected within 18 months postpartum is accurate. However, studies that recruited mothers with children up to 24 months were included. This is due to the limited evidence available and Danso (2014) confirmation that maternal recall of EBF was valid and reliable if the child is within 24 months old. Only studies published in English and evidence from developing countries – using gross national income per capita as defined by the United Nations (UN) (United Nations, 2018) were included in this study.

Studies that neither meet the above inclusion criteria nor account explicitly for barriers to EBF affecting working mothers in developing countries were excluded from the study.

Data Synthesis

Due to the heterogeneity of the methodology and outcome of the included studies, thematic analysis was considered the most appropriate method of reporting the data. Hence, the findings from the literature review were analysed in a narrative manner using themes – because themes are flexible and useful for handling large data sets (Nowell et al., 2017: 2). Also, it allows for a well-structured approach which produces a clear and easily understood report. Therefore, readers can easily see the result at a glance. Information such as the study type, the study limitation, the number of participants, inclusion and exclusion criteria, main findings (that is the barriers), maternity leave duration and maternity leave pay were extracted from each study and used when relevant in the thematic analysis. Based on previous evidence, the result was categorized into three major themes namely maternal, social and work-related factors (Gebrekidan et al., 2020). Each major theme was further categorised into 2 sub-themes based on available evidence. The maternal factors were categorised into physiological and psychological factors while the social factors were categorised into family and societal factors. Similarly, the work-

related factors were categorised into structural and attitudinal factors. Effectively, these sub-themes further simplified the literature review evidence.

Result

This section discusses the findings of included studies obtained from the literature search – that is the many barriers to EBF faced by working mothers in developing countries. It presents an overview of the included studies, followed by a thematic analysis of the evidence – using themes such as maternal factors, social factors and work-related factors. It also discusses the limitations of the evidence and concluded with a case for the evidence.

Overview of the Included Studies

A total of 22 peer-reviewed journals conducted in developing countries were included due to limited evidence available. Only 3 of them were conducted in a low-income country (Ethiopia) and 14 were conducted in a lower middle-income-countries.

Two of the twenty-two articles were published before 2010 while the rest were published between 2010 and 2020. This implies that before 2010 very few studies were conducted to identify the barriers to EBF among working mothers in developing countries. However, as more women in developing countries opt for paid work, researchers and policymakers have seen an increasing need to explore this topic – to formulate policies aimed at supporting EBF among these working mothers (Danso, 2014).

The majority of the studies used a cross-sectional design and 16 of them used a quantitative approach (Boralingiah et al., 2016, Sabin et al., 2017, Chhetri, et al., 2018). Only one study reported employers' perspective of the barriers to EBF among working mothers (Soomro, et al., 2016) while others had working mothers with children aged 1-24 months as participants. All the articles reported work-related factor as a major barrier to EBF among working mothers, with the most common being short maternity leave. Despite these, 9 studies did not report the maternal leave duration in their country of investigation. Also, when compared there was no significant difference in the barriers to EBF among working mothers before and after the development of the Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding in 2003 (WHO & UNICEF, 2003).

The included studies offer some valuable insights for researchers and policymakers in planning complex public health interventions to promote EBF. However, both the evidence and study methodology have limitations which will be discussed later. The factors that act as barriers to EBF among working mothers are discussed below in themes and sub-themes.

The Evidence

Maternal Factors

Several studies reported that maternal factor is a barrier to EBF among working mothers (Hirani & Karmaliani, 2013; Sulaiman, et al., 2016; Tadesse et al., 2019). Therefore, aside from work, these women have other barriers that have hindered them from practising EBF. These maternal factors are categorized into physiological and psychological factors.

Physiological Factors

Insufficient breast milk resulting from poor lactation (Lakati et al., 2002), birth by caesarean section (CS) (Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016, Abou-ElWafa & El-Gilany, 2019), and poor maternal health (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014) were reported as physiological factors that negatively affect EBF practice among working mothers. In 2002, insufficient breast milk was the most common barrier to EBF reported by 54.53% of working mothers attending public and private clinics in Nairobi, Kenya (Lakati, et al., 2002). Although Okwy-Nweke et al. (2014) reported that this poor lactation in Nigeria was caused by the effect of drugs taken by the mothers during EBF, most mothers argued that

this condition which caused their infant to detest feeding was work-induced. Due to poor lactation, nursing mothers in a qualitative study in Karachi, Pakistan reported that they ate food they disliked such as goat's lungs, "*punjari*", high protein diet, and herbal medicine to increase the milk flow (Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino., 2008).

In recent times, working mothers aged 24 years and above in Wa, the capital of the Upper West Region, in the north-west of Ghana women admitted that birth by caesarean section (CS) hindered them from practising EBF (Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016). Such that working mothers who had a vaginal delivery (popularly referred to as normal delivery) were almost ten times likely to exclusively breastfeed than those who had CS – due to the delayed lactation associated with CS. In Ghana where the maternity leave is three months, the government proactively ensures that the leave is extended by two weeks for working mothers who had CS to promote EBF.

Some studies also outlined poor maternal health as a barrier to EBF among working mothers (Danso, 2014; Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014; Tadesse et al., 2019). Although, it appears this was not a common barrier to EBF among working mothers for two reasons. First, only 3 out of the 22 studies reported this as a barrier to EBF among workers mothers. Second, when the number of ill working mothers in Ethiopia who stopped EBF was compared to their unemployed counterpart, it was observed that working mothers were less likely to experience poor health (Tadesse et al., 2019). This is attributable to the formal education and quality healthcare received by most working mothers in Ethiopia (Chekol, et al., 2017). Although, Ethiopia is an exceptional case as opposed to many developing countries because female workers are entitled to 3 months fully paid maternity (1 month during antenatal and 2 months during postnatal) on the recommendation of a medical doctor. Therefore, poor maternal health may be considered as a barrier to EBF among working mothers. Further studies to investigate specific illnesses that deter these mothers from practising EBF will be useful to the field of global health.

Psychological Factors

This section discusses how an unhealthy perception of EBF and emotions by working mothers' have hindered them from practising EBF. Particularly, it emphasizes that working mothers require all the necessary support to enable them to practice EBF like their non-working counterparts.

Although insufficient breast milk is a barrier to EBF among working mothers (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014), a quantitative comparative study in Ethiopia by Tadesse et al (2019) posited that sometimes these are mere perceptions by the working mothers. In the study conducted in Ethiopia, 9.6% of working mothers with infants aged 3–5 months, living in five districts had the perception that their breast milk was inadequate. A result which turned out to be statistically significant. Similarly, qualitative research conducted by Sulaiman, et al (2016) which involved 40 working mothers aged 18 years and above who had at least one child aged 6–24 months reported that some working mothers perceived infant formula as more beneficial than breast milk due to their poor knowledge of EBF (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014). Hence, these mothers had to quit EBF to commence complementary feeding. It unlikely that the evidence is false because working mothers attending the Infant Welfare Clinic of the Institute of Child Health at the University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital, Nigeria admitted that they also disliked EBF. Therefore, despite the age-long belief in breastfeeding in developing countries, some working mothers still find it difficult to embrace EBF – due to their perception that breast milk is insufficient or not beneficial as infant formula. In a country like Iran, working mothers reported that emotional trauma and feeling of guilty due to work-related stress have hindered them from practising EBF (Valizadeh et al., 2017). According to Hirani & Karmaliani (2013) when working mothers are confronted with lack of breastfeeding space and criticism from their employers and colleagues – like in the case of the respondents at the urban healthcare facility in Karachi Pakistan – they often feel shy to breastfeed their babies especially in the presence of their male colleagues. By depriving their infants of the best care, these working mothers become affected psychologically resulting in depression and dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, this emotional stress forces them to quit and give up on EBF. Hence, limiting the number of working mothers who are willing to adhere to EBF practices.

Social Factors

Despite a mother's major role in EBF, it has remained a social issue that involves the support of others – particularly the family, health workers and caregivers. Sabin et al (2017) revealed that even when a mother is healthy, willing and receives workplace support, she may still be confronted with other social factors capable of discouraging her from practising EBF. This section discusses all factors, other than maternal and work-related factors that negatively affect EBF practice among working. In simple terms, these social factors are barriers caused by either the family or the society at large that has hindered working mothers from practising EBF.

Family Factors

In developing countries, families put so much domestic responsibility on women (Omer-Salim et al., 2015). This culture to a large extent overburdens nursing mothers with the care of the husband and in-laws even after childbirth coupled with the demanding nature of EBF. Mothers especially working mothers require adequate family support to adhere to the WHO's guidelines on EBF within the first six months of birth (Sabin et al., 2017). For example, some mothers were able to breastfeed for over eight times daily because of their husband support and bed-sharing practice in Efutu Municipal in the Central Region of Ghana (Nkrumah, 2016). However, some working mothers in countries like Ethiopia and Iran respectively reported that they lacked this support especially from their spouse (Taddele et al., 2014; Valizadeh et al., 2017) – which negatively influenced their EBF practice. Chhetri, et al. (2018) posits that this poor spousal support is attributable to the husband's poor educational background and demanding nature of his occupation – and these results were statistically significant.

Aside from poor spousal support, working mothers also reported that they witnessed poor support from the extended family particularly the grandmothers (Nkrumah, 2016; Sabin et al., 2017). It is alarming that working mothers are confronted with challenges to EBF in their own homes which ought to be their safe space. These working mothers are even discouraged from practising EBF by their mothers-in-law (Danso., 2014). A study in Nigeria reported that 38.3% of mothers-in-law did not believe in EBF (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014). Hence, they showed no support to their daughters-in-law decision to practice it. This lack of physical and emotional support from family members poses a threat to the woman's decision to practice EBF and in most cases, they had to quit to save their families.

Societal Factors

Working mothers are integral parts of the larger society, therefore the society largely influences their decision and practices (Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016). Unfortunately, societies in developing countries have not proactively promoted EBF practice among working mothers. When healthcare workers lack adequate Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) training, they transfer little or no knowledge to the working mothers resulting in poor EBF practise. A study conducted in Wa in Northwest Ghana revealed that inadequate IYCF training by the healthcare workers negatively affected the EBF practice of employed mothers.

Similarly, in Nairobi, Kenya, 16% of working mothers reported that advice of health professionals affected their EBF practice (Lakati, et al., 2002). Such that mothers using government health facilities for their ante-natal care had better knowledge and subsequently better EBF practice than those using private health facilities. Inadequate training of the mothers often leads to late initiation of breastfeeding which in turn leads to the introduction of pre-lacteal (Taddele et al., 2014). Two studies conducted in Mumbai, India showed that pre-lacteal feeding rates were 33.5% and 31.6% – due to poor knowledge by healthcare personnel which negatively influence the mothers' EBF practice (Boralingiah et al., 2016). Some working mothers are also poorly trained at hospitals that they lack the skills to express their milk at the workplace when necessary (Ahmadi & Moosavi, 2013). Effectively, this limited knowledge of expressing breast milk hinders EBF practice among working mothers who choose to strictly adhere to the WHO's EBF guidelines.

Working women are inclined to seek advice from other members of society regarding their children's health and act on them. For example, working mothers advised by their well-wishers to introduce infant formula to their babies were less likely to practice EBF (Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016). Conversely, working mothers who were encouraged by their religious heads to exclusively breastfeed were 2.7 times more likely to breastfeed exclusively than those who were not encouraged (Ahmadi & Moosavi, 2013). This suggests working mothers were likely to either practice or refrain from EBF based on societal influence.

Day-care facilities are major caregivers for children below 5 years (Hirani & Karmaliani, 2013). However, working mothers in Pakistan reported that day-care facilities prohibited them from breastfeeding within the centre. This was a major barrier to EBF for these working mothers couple with the lack of breastfeeding spaces at their workplace. Effectively, this lack of alternative forced them to introduce complementary feeding to their infants within the first six months.

Work-related Factors

This is a known barrier to EBF and the most common among working mothers, such that it was outlined by all included studies. If all mothers have positive knowledge and attitude towards EBF, those employed were 32% times less likely to exclusively breastfeed than their unemployed counterparts – attributable to work-related pressure (Taddele et al., 2014). Also, a study conducted in Ghana showed that 90.5% of the mothers stated that the major factor preventing them from practising EBF is their working status (Danso, 2014). These barriers were either structural or attitudinal factors, with the structural barrier being the most reported.

Structural Factors

This refers to all factors inherent within the workplace due to poor government policies, work cultures or environment which prevents working mothers from exclusively breastfeeding. Structural factors that negatively affect EBF practice among working mothers include short maternity leave, inflexible work hours, lack of breastfeeding space and facilities and increased workload were reported by several studies (Chekol, et al., 2017; Tadesse et al., 2019; Sulaiman, et al., 2016).

In 2016, a study conducted among 369 mothers (aged 24 years and above) employed in Ghana's formal sector showed that 99% of the mothers knew that a child should be fed with breast milk only for the first six months of life. Additionally, 94% were aware of EBF benefits to the breastfed child and the mother. Despite these, EBF practice was still low attributable to their working status – such that only 10.3 % had exclusively breastfed their infants for six months (Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016).

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), working mothers should be entitled to 14 weeks of maternity leave with pay (Aikawa, et al., 2015). However, most countries are yet to adopt this recommendation. Furthermore, those that have attempted to adopt it have consistently failed in its implementation (Riaz & Condon, 2019) – due to regulatory obstacles such as leave refusal, complex bureaucracy and sudden maternity leave termination attributable to poor social policies (Omer-Salim, et al., 2015). Working mothers are often denied their maternity leave (Riaz & Condon, 2019) or forced to return to work before their maternity leave ends (Ahmadi & Moosavi, 2013). Due to the lack of job security, these women are left to choose between their jobs and the breastfed child – and in most cases, they chose their jobs for the instant economic gratification (Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino, 2008). For example, in a study conducted by Dun-Dery & Laar (2016) among 369 working mothers in Ghana's informal sector, 91% of working mothers who initiated breastfeeding within the first hour of delivery as recommended had to quit EBF due to the need to return to work. Invariably, the lack or limited maternity leave forces these working mothers to introduce complementary feeding (Tadesse et al., 2019). Additionally, increased workload upon returning to work often discourages working mothers from taking their infant to the workplace (Danso, 2014).

The sector of employment and nature of the job also acts as a barrier to EBF among working mothers (Nkrumah, 2016). This is because the majority of mothers working in the informal sector of employment practised EBF compared to their counterparts in the formal sector. Similarly, there is a disparity in maternal leave duration depending on the type of organization (Aikawa, et al., 2015). For example, in Thailand, private workers are entitled to a maternity leave of fewer than 3 months while government workers had up to 3 months of maternity leave. Hence, EBF was practised mostly by government and semi-government workers (88%) followed by the private workers (79.5%) and self-employed mothers (70%) in Thailand – due to the inequality in maternity leave. Thus, necessitating working mothers to seek breastfeeding breaks to enable them to meet up with the huge demand of EBF (Chhetri, et al., 2018).

In a quantitative community-based study, it was observed that working mothers who got breastfeeding breaks practised EBF (53.3%) as opposed to those who did not (Chhetri, et al., 2018). A result that was found to be statistically significant (P -value <0.001). This suggests that in the absence of optimal maternal leave, adequate breastfeeding breaks can serve as facilitators to EBF practice among working mothers. For instance, breastfeeding breaks allow mothers in Ghana to go to work with their infants which potentially improved EBF practice (Nkrumah, 2016). Unfortunately, several pieces of evidence reported that breastfeeding breaks were either unavailable or inadequate to meet the demand of the breastfed child (Chhetri, et al., 2018; Danso, 2014; Aikawa, et al., 2015). Even when the breaks exist, these mothers had inflexible work hours (Danso, 2014) and limited or no breastfeeding spaces and facilities such as refrigerator to enable them to breastfeed (Chhetri, et al., 2018).

Inflexible working hours is often characterized by long working hours (Boralingiah et al., 2016) and the nature of the job (Boralingiah et al., 2016). Sabin et al. (2017) reported that 64.45% of mothers who worked above 6 hours did not practice EBF and this result was statistically significant (p -value <0.001). Similarly, shift work prevented mothers from planning their time (Lakati, et al., 2002) and night work was also considered a barrier to EBF among working mothers (Riaz & Condon, 2019). Additionally, most mothers who were sedentary workers admitted that they did not practice EBF due to the nature of their jobs (Boralingiah et al., 2016).

It is evident that working mothers in Developing countries are confronted with numerous work-related pressures, despite their constant efforts to practice EBF (Chhetri, et al., 2018). For example, in a community-based quantitative study conducted in India, 11% of the mothers who reported to receiving breastfeeding breaks during working hours stated that there was no provision for workplace crèches for them which ultimately undermined their efforts to exclusively breastfeeding. Besides from the lack of workplace spaces such as crèches, it has also been reported that available crèches were either unkempt (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014) or void of facilities to promote EBF such as breastfeeding pumps and refrigerators (Amin et al., 2011; Soomro, et al., 2016) – which would have encouraged these mothers to express their milk. Furthermore, these facilities were only available in public workplaces such as the government-owned organizations. These structural inequalities between public and private organizations lead to health inequality because the nutritional status of a breastfed child whose mother works in a private organization is compromised. Additionally, mothers who found themselves in informal employment such as agriculture complained that occupational risk on the baby prevented them from taking the baby to their workplace (Nkrumah, 2016). This is coupled with the lack of breastfeeding spaces in such places. From the report above, it is obvious that short maternity leaves, inflexible working hours and lack of breastfeeding breaks and spaces are major barriers to EBF among working mothers. Therefore, it is imperative to ensure that policies and enabling environment are provided for working mothers to promote EBF.

Attitudinal Factors

Unfortunately, working mothers are confronted with attitudinal barriers within the workplace which hinder them from practising EBF. Often, mothers face political tension and poor workplace relation due to gender bias – which discourages them from seeking their maternity leave (Omer-Salim, A. et al., 2015). Sadly, working mothers reported that this lack of empathy is often promoted by their female colleagues who never had the opportunity to receive maternity leave.

Employers have also admitted to overestimating non-structural breastfeeding support system within the workplace which often discourages working mothers from practising EBF (Soomro, et al., 2016). According to Valizadeh et al (2017), this poor attitude of employers and co-workers affects the working mothers causing them to question the efficacy and importance of EBF. One would argue that this may be due to lack of knowledge by their employers and co-workers. However, 7 full-time Pakistani nurses reported that not only did they witness lack of empathy from their colleagues, they also faced criticism from the senior nurses at their workplace – a tertiary healthcare institution whose role is pivotal to promoting EBF (Riaz & Condon, 2019). One of the nurses reported that a matron told her that nurses do not breastfeed. Effectively, the poor attitude of workers towards EBF often discourages working mothers from exclusively breastfeeding their babies (Dun-Dery & Laar., 2016) – even when structural facilities are made available.

Therefore, to promote EBF among working mothers, it is important to provide an enabling environment that encompasses structural measures but also includes the positive attitude of employers and fellow employees.

Table II: Table showing the maternal leave duration and pay, and the main thematic findings

Author(s)/ Year/ Country	Duration of Maternal Leave (in months)							Pay during maternity leave (in percentage)						Main Thematic Findings (Barriers)						
	0		< 3		3		6		0		50		100		Maternal Factors		Social Factors		Work-related Factors	
	0	< 3	3	6	0	50	100	Psy	Pch	F	S	St	At							
Lakati, et al., 2002 Kenya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X				X	X		
Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino, 2008 Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X					X		
Amin et al., 2011 Malaysia			X		-	-	-	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	X	N/A				X		N/A	
Ahmadi & Moosavi, 2013 Iran				X	-	-	-					X	X				X	X		
Hirani & Karmaliani, 2013 Pakistan			X		-	-	-	X	X			X	X				X	X	X	

Danso, 2014 Ghana	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X		X		X	
Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014 Nigeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X	X	X	X	
Taddele et al., 2014 Ethiopia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			X	X	X	
Aikawa, et al., 2015 Thailand		X ^P	X ^G		-	-	-					X	
Omer-Salim, et al., 2015 India				X			X			X		X	X
Boralingiah et al., 2016 India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					X	
Dun-Dery & Laar, 2016 Ghana			X ^C				X	X			X	X	X
Nkrumah, 2016 Ghana			X				X					X	
Soomro, et al., 2016 Pakistan			X			X						X	X
Sulaiman, et al., 2016 Malaysia		X			-	-	-	X	X			X	
Chekol, et al., 2017 Ethiopia		X			-	-	-	X	X		X	X	
Sabin et al., 2017 Pakistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			X		X	
Valizadeh et al., 2017 Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	X	X			X	X
Chhetri, et al., 2018 India	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			X		X	

Abou-ElWafa & El-Gilany, 2019 Egypt			X ^A				X	X				X	
Riaz & Condon, 2019 Pakistan		X			-	-	-					X	X
Tadesse et al., 2019 Ethiopia			X ^B				X	X	X			X	

X^A – Maternity leave is 90 days and it is granted after at least 10 months of service. The paid leave is not deductible from the basic annual leave. Mothers are also entitled to unpaid maternal leave for up to 2 years

X^B – working mothers are entitled to fully paid maternity leave of 90 days (30 days antenatal and 60 days postnatal) on the recommendation of a medical doctor

X^C – can be extended by two additional weeks in case of a caesarean or abnormal delivery

X^G – Maternity leave for government officials

fX^P – Maternity leave for private-sector workers

The Limitation of the Evidence

Like many studies, some included studies had notable limitations that may have affected the study validity. The bias which refers to any systematic error in study design, conduct, or analysis was a major limitation to the evidence (Althubaiti, 2016). Although this occurs in all research, it is particularly common in qualitative research (Smith & Nobel, 2014). Due to its potential to affect the study validity (Althubaiti, 2016), every research must minimize any form of bias (Smith & Nobel, 2014). To minimize response bias, Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino (2008) ensured that the study setting was chosen by the participants. They also used a combination of unstructured interview and observational study. However, Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino (2008)'s use of purposive sampling is prone to researcher bias (Sharma, 2017). Hence, the representativeness of their sample is questionable.

Misclassification bias – which occurs when data or respondents are misclassified – may have also affected these evidence especially for included comparative studies that compared barriers to EBF among employed mothers and unemployed mothers (Taddele et al., 2014; Chekol, et al., 2017). Studies originally conducted in other languages before being published in the English language are generally confronted with researcher bias (Sharma, 2017). Hence, studies conducted in Ghana, Pakistan and Malaysia that had part or all their data collected in *Fante*, *Urdu* and *Malay* respectively (Nkrumah, 2016; Riaz & Condon, 2019; Amin et al., 2011) were prone to this bias during reporting and data transcribing. Also, four of the included studies had less than 20 respondents (Hirani & Karmaliani, 2013; Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino, 2008; Valizadeh et al., 2017) – which is relatively low when considering the reliability of their evidence (Kaplan, et al., 2014).

Conclusion

Despite these limitations, evidence from the included studies is as strong they can be because the researcher(s) made reasonable efforts to minimize potential sources of error. For example, a considerable number of the study conducted pilot studies by pre-testing their questionnaires before the formal data collection (Okwy-Nweke et al., 2014, Boralingjah et al., 2016; Soomro, et al., 2016). Also, Danso (2014) recruited a large sample size (1,000 professional working mothers) to increase the study accuracy and reliability (Kaplan, et al., 2014). He also ensured

that questionnaires were completed confidentially to minimize interviewer bias. Interviewer bias occurs when an interviewer influences participants response (Smith & Nobel, 2014). Due to an interviewer's preconceptions and expectations, the interviewer may approve or disapprove a participant's response through verbal and non-verbal communication thereby affecting the study outcome.

Effectively, the overall outcome of the evidence was not influenced by interviewer bias because very limited qualitative studies (prone to such bias) were included in the study. Of all the 22 included studies, only 6 used qualitative design – such as in-depth interviews and FGDs (Zafar & Bustamante-Gavino, 2008; Hirani & Karmaliani, 2013; Omer-Salim, A. et al., 2015; Riaz & Condon, 2019; Sulaiman, et al., 2016; Valizadeh et al., 2017). Hence, it is unlikely that the study outcome was altered due to interviewer bias. Furthermore, Chekol, et al (2017) used multistage sampling technique which ultimately reduced selection bias.

Although there may have been researcher bias while eliminating unrelated articles with poor design and reporting, efforts were taken to minimize other forms of bias in the methodology. During the search, several databases were explored and attention to detail was observed such that the date and hits from all the databases were recorded. Through the eligibility process, recall bias common to the included studies – given that mothers were expected to recount their experiences – was greatly minimized. This was done by ensuring that only studies whose respondents are mothers with infants less than 24 months were included. This is because maternal recall on IYCF is only valid within the first 2 years of child's delivery (Lakati, et al., 2002).

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Women's Empowerment in Manipur

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Abstract

Manipur is a state situated in North-Eastern corner of India. Two-thirds of the population comprise the Meiteis, majority ethnic community in Manipur. Meitei women are renowned for their unique role and status in history. Women in Manipur are particularly noted for their active economic participation and are renowned for their collective empowerment and strong force as depicted in the two Nupilans (women's wars, or uprisings) against the British when the state was under colonial rule. They are also renowned for their activism against liquor consumption as Nisha Bandhis which later evolved into their powerful role as Meira Paibis (Women torch bearers), a collective of women that are actively involved in civil society movements for justice and human rights. The study seeks to find out whether this legacy of women's collective strength has translated into greater decision-making power at home and in political representation. The paper uses secondary data to depict the myriad roles that women play in Manipur society, contradictory at times, visible on one hand in high economic participation, powerful as a collective in their role as Meira Paibis, and yet individually still constrained by patriarchy and not prominent when it comes to real decision-making power. It argues that a movement towards tangible actual empowerment is a must.

Keywords: Status, Empowerment, Economic Participation, Meira Paibi, Decision Making Power, Collective Strength, Patriarchy

1. Introduction

Women comprise half of humanity. The level of advancement of the whole society could be measured through the status of women as all social and economic inequalities find their reflection in the status of women. The status of women has thus become an indicator of development of every country and on a global scale. The only way to win the struggle against poverty, hunger and demographic problems is through the fullest involvement of women as participants and beneficiaries of development. Hence, the empowerment of women enabling them to enjoy higher status becomes an important development goal (Arambam, 2013).

An important indicator of women's empowerment is their involvement in decision-making processes, at home or in society. In this context political empowerment assumes an important role. The process of political empowerment has to do with power or influences which can make others behave in line with one's wishes; and women's political

empowerment has to do with women's political influence and the institutionalisation of their participation in political decision-making processes (Gangmei, 2016).

Globally, women are underrepresented in decision-making positions worldwide. Only 24.3 percent of all national parliamentarians were women as of February 2019, a slow increase from 11.3 percent in 1995 (UNWomen, 2020). In India too, women's representation in decision-making process are also extremely low. As on August 2020, only 13% of the Parliamentarians in India are women.

In Manipur, women's agency in terms of involvement in social issues is high in Manipur. Hence an attempt is made to study whether that active involvement in issues of polity and society has translated into greater decision-making power at home and society.

The State of Manipur is situated on the North-eastern border of India. Its population is about 27.2 lakhs according to 2011 census, of which the Meiteis comprise above two-thirds. The other one-third of the population is comprised mainly of the scheduled tribes (mostly Christians) and a minority are the Manipuri Muslims. The Naga and Kuki-Chin groups constitute the hill people or Scheduled tribes of Manipur. There are many sub-tribes within these groups. More than 90% of them follow Christianity though some retain their old religion. Both the tribes and their subgroups follow patriarchal system.

The land is surrounded by nine ranges of mountains and the heartland of this state is the valley which is the homeland of the Meiteis. The Meiteis have a highly developed culture with an extensive written literature in the ancient Meitei script dating back a thousand years or more (Parratt and Parratt, 2011: 39).

Women in Manipur enjoy a unique status in society. The high social and economic status of women in Meitei society was frequently remarked upon by British colonial officers.¹ Despite the dominance of Hinduism in the plains of Manipur, Meitei women suffered none of the humiliating oppression of their sisters elsewhere on the subcontinent. Above all, the women controlled the food supplies and the markets, and were therefore a dominant economic force. From the beginning of the British period, they had showed themselves capable and organized enough to take mass action when occasion demanded (Parratt and Parratt, 2001).

Women's empowerment is seen in the high economic participation rate of women, physically manifested in the myriad activities carried out in the economic sphere as evidenced in the Ima keithel, a market run almost exclusively by women. They are also in a better position as compared to that of women in the rest of India in the fact that there are no official figures of female foeticide, female infanticide, no dowry-related harassment, bride burning, etc.

In the words of Thokchom (2010), "*What are considered to be the social handicaps that make women completely voiceless and powerless... are absent in Manipur. This genuine aspect in the Manipuri culture where the girl child is so well-placed unlike other patrilineal society is something which all of us should be proud of*"

2. Objectives, Methodology, Scope and Limitations of the Paper

The paper provides a brief overview of the issues regarding women's empowerment in Manipur. It tries to depict the myriad roles that women play in Manipur society, considering their high economic participation and powerful social role as Meira Paibis². It seeks to study their participation in actual decision-making processes in Manipur, whether at home or in the political arena and to find out whether they are really empowered in the true sense of the word. The paper is a review paper using secondary sources of data from books, theses, government publications, reports, etc. It is constrained only by lack of updated government data.

¹ Among others, by W. McCulloch, *An Account of the Valley of Munnipore and the Hill Tribes* (Calcutta, 1859); R. Brown, *Annual Report on the Munnipore Political Agency* (Calcutta, 1874); and J. Shakespear, 'The Religion of Manipur', in *Folk Lore* 24 (1913), PP- 409-55(cited in Parratt and Parratt 2001)

² Women torch bearers

Women's agency seen in terms of active participation in society and polity is unique in the World. The paper seeks to highlight that aspect. Women in Manipur comprise an aggregate of different groups like the Meitei women (majority ethnic community) mainly following Hinduism, Manipuri Muslim women and tribal women (mostly following Christianity). Data on women of Manipur from secondary data sources constitute aggregate of women, including Meiteis, the Manipuri Muslims and scheduled tribes. But the brief information on ancient history and religion are mainly concerned with Meitei Women mainly because of availability of literature and written script of the Meiteis from ancient times.

3. Literature Review:

Empowerment is the power of gaining freedom and power to do what you want or to control what happens to you (Cambridge Dictionary).

Empowerment is a word which brings up the question of personal agency, one that links action to needs, and one that results in making significant collective change. It is also a concept that does not merely concern personal identity but brings out a broader analysis of human rights and social justice. Applied to gender issues, the discussion of empowerment brings women into the political sphere, both private and public. In this context, empowerment is a process to change the distribution of power between men and women, both in interpersonal relations and in institutions throughout society (Tandon, 2016).

The Human Development Report relates empowerment to participation. It says that since development is for the people, they must participate fully in the decisions and processes that affect their lives (UNDP, 1995).

Rowlands sees empowerment as a bottom-up process that cannot be formulated from top-down. To Rowlands, empowerment does not only mean to have access to decision making but also being able and entitled to occupy the decision-making space (Rowlands, 1995).

The issue of women empowerment is relatively a new term. Its popularity spread all over the world in the late 20th century. The Cairo conference in 1994 organised by UN on population and Development (UNDP) called attention to women empowerment and UNDP development and Gender Empowerment measure (GEM) which focuses on three variables that reflect women participation in society, political power or decision making, education and health (Chakrabarty, 2012).

Gender equality and empowerment of women is now recognized globally as a key element to achieve progress in all areas. To promote development of women, many countries along with various international associations have adopted a number of laws and conventions. In this regard, the UN adopted a convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women on 18th December 1979, which came into force on 3rd September 1981. Despite such conventions and time-bound measurable goals, world statistics tell the deplorable condition of women. They are marginalized from enjoying the fruits and benefits of equality and independent status (Singha 2016: 116).

Ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls is not only a basic human right but it is also crucial to accelerating sustainable development as studies have proved that empowering women and girls has a multiplier effect driving up economic growth and development. Goal 5 of the Sustainable development goals aims to ensure gender equality and to empower all women and girls. The Sustainable Development Goals are a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet and improve the lives and prospects of everyone, everywhere. The 17 Goals were adopted by all UN Member States in 2015, as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which set out a 15-year plan to achieve the Goals (United Nations, 2019).

One of the main indicators of women's empowerment is participation in decision making processes and equitable representation in such processes, whether at home or in society as elected representatives in electoral exercises or political representation.

Hanna Pitkin's book *The Concept of Representation* (1967) is a seminal work that legitimized the quest for increased representation for women. Pitkin's assertion that minorities should be fairly represented in government paved the way for future theories on women's representation (Colman, 2014).

"Women's participation in decision-making is essential for women's interests to be incorporated into governance. It has been widely experienced that governance structures which do not provide for adequate participation of women, often suffer from state interventions which are neither inclusive nor democratic. Including women, especially in local governments is an essential step towards creating gender equal opportunities and gender-sensitive policies. Since women have different needs and perspectives on social and political issues, it is important to involve women in governments to incorporate all the societal viewpoints in policy and decision-making processes. Women are actively involved in household and community work and hence aware of real issues faced by common people. This gives them insight and perspective which can be instrumental in sustainable overall development" (Nisha and Vezhaventhan, 2018: 4724).

Women's leadership in political spheres is shown to be socially beneficial (World Economic Forum, 2017), and is a matter of women's right to equal opportunity and access (ESCAP, 2019).

Women's participation in politics is said to be socially transformative. Research shows that women in politics raise issues that others overlook, pass bills that others oppose, invest in projects that others dismiss and seek to end abuse that others ignore; if they participate in peace processes, the chances of reaching an agreement at all improve, and the peace is likely to last at least 15 years. Yet women face many barriers to their political participation. At current rates of progress, political parity will not be reached until 2080, making equality in politics the highest hurdle women face (National Democratic Institute, 2019).

Women in India, at both the socio-economic and political levels do not enjoy the same level of powers as the men. Gender disparities were evident in employment, health, education, and political participation. The new wave of decentralization in 1990's, through 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments gave 33.33% representation for women in local governments. This paved a route to political empowerment and gender equity by giving opportunity for a large number of women to enter into local governments and to be a part of decision-making bodies (Pandey 2013).

On August 27, 2009, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved 50% reservation for women in Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI). The Indian states Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, West Bengal and Uttarakhand have implemented 50% reservation for women in PRIs. The majority of candidates in these Panchayats are women. Currently 100% of elected members in Kodassery Panchayat in Kerala are women. Kerala is the real success story of Panchayats in India.

4. Women in Manipur

4.1: Some Data

The two tables below give an indicative picture of Manipuri women's favourable position compared to women in mainland India.

Table 1: Sex Ratio (India and Manipur)

State/Country	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	% improvement over last 10 years
Manipur	1036	1015	980	971	958	974	992	1.88
India	946	941	930	934	927	933	943	1.07

Source: Women and Men in India 2018, CSO (2019)

The figures in the above table indicate that sex ratio in Manipur is better compared to that in mainland India.

Table 2: Gender Disparity Index, India and Manipur

State/Country	1981	1991
Manipur	0.802	0.815
India	0.620	0.676

Source: National Human Development Report 2001

Higher the gender disparity index, lower is the gender inequality. Table 2 shows that gender disparity index is higher in Manipur indicating lower gender inequality, compared to all India figures.

4.2 Women and Economic Participation:

A distinct feature of Manipuri women is their predominance in economic activity. On the streets, roads, lanes and by lanes of Manipur we see women working with fervour; selling fruits, vegetables, fish, clothes etc. In Manipur, the work participation rate is quite high for women, as compared to the rest of India. Before COVID-19 related lockdowns, we see the main market, the Ima Market, located in the capital city Imphal, which is the main preserve of women, humming with trade and selling activities. Though the bazaar is now in monitored shut down, women vendors still throng the roads, lanes etc. of the localities of the capital, selling their wares. They actively participate in trade, as also in agriculture, manufacture, and construction activities (Arambam, 2020). Women's work participation rates are much higher for Manipur compared to that of India as a whole. Female WPR for rural areas according to 2011 census is 41.2 % for females in Manipur, 30 % for all India. In urban areas, the figures are 33.2% for females in Manipur, 15.4 % for all India respectively.

The prominent economic role of women has its historical roots in the lallup system of Manipur, where the men folk were obliged to serve the king at times of need, for instance, as state forces in times of war, or by rendering free labour in road construction, digging and clearing riverbeds, or any other service for the king, for which they were not paid, and which left the women to fend for themselves in their husband's or men folks' prolonged absence. They had to shoulder immense economic and social responsibility in the absence of their husbands. They took up farming, tending cattle, weaving, blacksmith, fishing, agriculture, kitchen gardening, etc. Under the implicit burdens on women in Manipur under the lallup system, they had to come on par, if not more than men in the discharge of their economic and social responsibilities (Arunkumar and Arun 2009).

4.3 Women in History (Meitei women):

Written and oral traditions trace the settlement of the various subgroups which now constitute the Meiteis into Manipur back into the beginning of the Christian era. They brought with them a complex religious system. By the middle of the 18th century, enforced Hinduization took place during the reign of Maharaja Garib Niwaz. Yet, there was never a complete takeover of Meitei beliefs and ritual. Significantly Hindu restrictions on women were never adopted. Conflict between the indigenous religion and Hinduism continued until a synthesized form of religion emerged (Parratt and Parratt 2011:38-39).

*“Meitei religion focuses on the worship of the lai (deities, divinities). Though there is a high God (Atingkok) he is almost a *dues otiosus* and his spouse Leirmaren (Supreme Goddess) is far more important. She is the source of creation and of the sacred word. This word is mediated through the maibis (priestesses), who function as charismatic proclaimers of the word of the lais for public and private good. This reflects the importance given to the female in Manipur” (Parratt and Parratt 2011: 39, 44).*

In ancient Manipur, women participated positively in production activities, polity, organization and conduct of civilization for the society. They enjoyed high individuality as exemplified in the lores of the divine female deities, for example, ‘Panthoibi’³ and ‘Phouoibi’⁴, and the mythical (some claim to be a real woman who lived) princess of Moirang, ‘Thoibi’⁵ (Arambam, 2016: 66). Laisna, the wife of the first historical king of Manipur Nongda Lairen Pakhangba who ascended the throne in 33AD had authority almost equal to that of the king, and played an important role in the social, cultural and religious activities of the court. In fact, Queen Laisna was the head of the Pacha Loishang (a women’s court)⁶ and the wives of 10 noblemen assisted her. The wives of keirungbas, keepers of barns, also assisted her (The Pacha Loishang was later formalized during the reign of king Paihomba (1666-1697) (Takhellambam, 2000-01). Then there is the story of the Manipuri queen, ‘Linthoingambi’ (15th century, a queen who donned the garb of her husband King Ningthoukhomba (1432-1467) in his absence and went to battle, and thus defeated the rebels); of Kuranganayani (a Meitei princess who was married to an Ahom king in the 18th century and was responsible for the saving of the Ahom dynasty during the Mao Maria rebellion in the 18th century), etc.

The traditional puya⁷, the Leimaren laihui,⁸ narrates the manifestation of mother deity Leimaren in three categories of womanhood reflecting her incarnations, namely (1) Yumjao Lairembi, the mother deity of the house (2) Nongthangleima, the female deity of war and sexuality and (3) laikhurembi, the clan mother of polity organization (Arambam 2016:66).

The mother goddess as represented by these three sterling ladies reflects the essential qualities of womanhood. In the first house, the motherly figure in family and society who cares for children, husband, and relatives and is maintainer of peace and sanity in the family and society is reflected in Yumjao Lairembi with 23 other female deities incorporated into this first house. In the second house led by Nongthangleima, the entire reproductive activities of society, the continuity of the race and the vigour and energy of the female in an aggressive form is represented by the goddess of romance and war as Nongthangleima, and there are 33 female deities in this category (Panthoibi etc are included in this). In the third house, led by Laikhurembi, nine (two were later merged and the total became seven in later periods) historical clan mothers only were mentioned in which Laisna the wife of Nongda Lairen Pakhangba and 8 other clan mothers are categorised as representative of the power of woman as polity organizers with the same status as their husbands. The mother goddess Leimaren therefore manifested in these three houses identifies the character of Manipuri woman as mother, lover and social organizer (Ibid: 66). Meitei society was most likely matriarchal in ancient times. In fact, Nongda Lairen Pakhangba, the first historical rule of Manipur who ascended the throne in AD 33 had no knowledge of his father but his mother’s lineage was well known, indicating that up to that time the society had been matriarchal (Takhellambam 2000).

Ancient Manipuri woman were major economic contributors, both in subsistence and trade, and also had a considerable voice in the political sphere. Until the colonial period, there was even a women’s court with formal jural authority vested in women (The Pacha Loishang as mentioned earlier) (Manjusri Chaki Sircar, 1984: 7).

³ Pre-Christian era, daughter of a Meitei chieftain, married to a Khaba chieftain who developed amorous love relationship with a tribal Angom chieftain Nongpok Ningthou and eloped with him. The two were later deified.

⁴ Goddess of paddy, who travelled through the state spreading the art of cultivation, marrying different men and leaving them behind. She is one of a group of seven virgin deities known collectively as heloi taret.

⁵ A princess who resisted the dictates of her father the king of Moirang and married her lover, a poor orphan.

⁶ The court dealt with rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, wife beating, polygamy, divorce and other crimes against women.

⁷ Ancient and sacred texts of the Meiteis of Manipur

⁸ (ancient puya author anonymous)

The myths and mores of Manipuri women extol their high status in ancient times. Yet with the advent of patriarchy, we see that their social status has denigrated somewhat, and we see many beliefs which sustain the superiority of the male over the female.

4.4 Advent of Patriarchy and Meitei Women:

Patriarchal values were introduced amongst the clan settlements when the principles of masculine labour were being introduced in production. The taming of wild animals, the harnessing of animal labour in cultivation and the excessive occurrences of violence and war necessitated more prominence of the male in the organization of human life. The father became the absolute figure on whose values the worldview of the Manipuri society was consolidated. Patriarchy was enhanced with the introduction of Hinduism (Arambam, 2013: 68).

Maharaja Garibniwaz(1709-1748) was instrumental for the spread of the Ramanandi cult of Hinduism in Manipur. He, along with Shantidas Gosain, burnt the sacred texts (puyas) of Manipur and exiled those who refused to embrace the new religion. The excommunicated people were called as lois and treated as outcastes; today these groups form the Scheduled castes of Manipur. Maharaja Garibniwaj was responsible for introducing the caste system in Manipur and his conversion seriously eroded the status of women. Under the new religion, the amaibi-a priestess that had been indispensable in religious affairs was relegated to the background as Hinduism did not encourage female priests (Takhellambam 2000-01).

“Women in myth and legends enjoyed a lot of freedom because their actions were sanctioned by the traditions of that time. Society was open and men and women could have more than one spouse as exemplified by the myth of Phouoibi. With the advent of organised Hinduism in the 18th century, women started to lose their power. So that women today are caught between the liberal traditions of pre-hinduisation and conservative traditions of post-sanskritization. The submissiveness of mythical Hindu women like Sita and Savitri is idealized in society as a conservative tradition of Vaishnavite Hinduism was imposed on the traditionally independent women. So, it is hard for women to find inspiration from the females of myths and legends and to assert their traditional liberty and independence especially their role in the administration of the state. But in the public domain, the inheritance of the pre-Hindu women of myths and legends is still very strong as the numerous women’s uprisings indicate” (Takhellamba 2000-01).

In Manipur, *“Like in the rest of India, her socialization begins from childhood. She is taught domestic chores while her brothers play, and she is made to sacrifice all good things for her brothers.... A girl is considered good if she is adept at household chores, is shy and obedient and devotes her spare time to weaving. Marriage is the goal of all women. In motherhood, the first preference is a son”* (Irengbam, 2000).

In patriarchal Meitei society, a woman who bears sons attains higher social respectability. For instance, if she has a son as her first born, she is chosen to lead the ceremonial procession in social and religious functions related to birth and marriage. Inheritance rights of daughters are still not practically implemented. A son is the one to carry on the lineage, and he means prestige, position, and protection (Arambam, 2016: 69).

Women too perpetuate the existing patriarchal tradition by shaping their children in line with traditional values; it is women who mock husbands that help their wives by calling them adha mora⁹ meaning hen-pecked. They do not question the traditional role of women as natural homemakers- the one who must cook, clean etc. Women themselves minimize the drudgery of housework by saying, ‘It is nothing’ but something to be performed only by women. But this supposedly ‘nothing’ work requires hour after hour of monotonous, repetitive, and tiresome chores (Ibid: 71). Work done unpaid in the home which involves a variety of jobs, are masked under terms such as “housework”, “domestic work” and “family duties”; but any one of these activities conceals the intensive exercise of a wide range of skills, often more than one carried out at the same time, and according to Lewenhak,

⁹ Half-stool, literary meaning.

women who accept such verbal compressions thus connive at their own inequality (Lewenhak 1992: 6).The unequal sharing of the burden of household work can constrain women's ability to excel in her profession.

4.5 Women and Social and Political Movements:

(A) Nupilan's (Women's wars against the British:

It was the Ima Keithel(women's market in the heart of Imphal), which was the launching pad of the epoch making two Nupilan's(women's war) against the British. It is not only an economic base of the *Imas*, but also their political base. This Nupilan (an exclusive women's movement) also marked the first people's organised protest against the British (Brara 2017: 75).

The first Nupilan(women's war) was in 1904(women organized a collective protest against the imposition by the British of requiring male members to rebuild the Bungalow of British officials which was burnt down by unidentified miscreants, leading ultimately to the government withdrawing its order) and the second Nupilan in 1939(this was directed against the artificial scarcity of rice created by colonial policies and Marwari traders, and the government ultimately had to ban the export of rice from the State). To this day, 12 December is celebrated as Nupilan day to mark women's uprising of 1939.

In 1954 and 1959, women played an active part in every movement demanding responsible government in Manipur, by which they implied the government of a full-fledged state instead of the dependent government of a Union territory in line with the Statehood movement of the 1950s and 1960s (Asem, 2016: 35).

After attaining Statehood in 1972, the first government, a coalition one led by the Manipur People's Party was toppled in 1973 due to defection and women agitated against it, even going to the residences of the defectors shouting anti-defection slogans. Thus, women were joining in a struggle for basic political rights of the people. (Ibid, 2016: 36).

(B) Nisha Bandhi and Meira Paibi Movements:

The Nisha Bandi women's movement developed in the late 1970s in the aftermath of increasing phenomenon of alcoholism and its evil effects on society in the years after attaining statehood on January 21, 1972.

The catalyst for the movement of women for stopping the consumption of liquor was the beating up of a woman at a liquor vendor's shop at a place called Turel Awang Leikai on December 30, 1975. She had gone there to stop her husband from drinking and the annoyed shop owner beat her up. On hearing the news, a large group of women assembled there to stop the beating and decided to form Nisha Bandhi Associations all over Manipur. The movement began in Kakching and spread to other areas of Manipur. The women raided liquor vendors; burned alcohol supplies, caught drunks and paraded them all over the neighbourhoods. Nisha Bandhi associations from all over Manipur formed the All-Manipur Women's Social Reformation and Development Samaj (AMWSRDS) (Takhellambam 2000-01)

The actions of the Nisha Bandhi movement led to the introduction of prohibition laws in the state. *"This is one of the best examples of a successful collective action in Manipur in particular and India in general in contemporary history"* (Asem, 2016: 36).

The Nisha Bandhi movement was later transformed into the Meira Paibi movement in response to the changing socio-political and economic situation of the State. When conflict situation intensified in Manipur with the fight between the state forces and the underground insurgent groups, armed as the state forces were with the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958, resulting in the capture, arrest and subsequent torture and even killings of men picked up from their residences, women rose up at this critical juncture transforming from

the earlier collective Nisha Bandhi Movement to the Meira Paibi movement. Meira Paibi, literally meaning ‘women torch bearers’ (meira- a torch made of bamboo with tip wrapped with a piece of cloth which is used as a wick, and which is soaked with kerosene; paibi-holder) where women patrol the streets and neighbourhood at night to protect their sons and husbands from being picked up in unwarranted arrests by security forces; to guard their neighbourhood against any surprise search operations by security forces, etc, and nowadays actively involved in civil society movements. “*The lit torch gives Meira Paibis a sense of security and is a symbol of their dignity and moral strength*” (Takhellambam, 2000-01: 38).

The catalyst for the movement was the atrocities committed by the Central reserve Police Force (CRPF) in April 1980 in Langjing. In retaliation to an attack by insurgents, CRPF personnel went on a rampage, torturing villagers and even raping and killing women. Protests were organized by women against such violations. Despite protests, rallies and memorandums, the casualties of counter insurgency operations increased, so women started patrolling the streets at night with flaming torches in their hands to guard their neighbourhoods against any surprise search operations by security forces. Today all neighbourhoods have Meira Paibi organizations and almost every neighbourhood has its Meira Shang (Hut) (Ibid: 40-41). Till today, whenever any social or political issue is confronting the state, women come together as Meira Paibis and hold dharnas, go on night marches etc to protest against any injustice and seek recourse for any burning issue. The Meira Paibis represent the strength of women’s collective in Manipur.

With this more recent activism of the Meira paibis, they have now emerged into active protagonists for a new social order (Asem, 2016: 37).

In June 2001 when there was a mass movement in the State for the protection of territorial integrity of Manipur, women played an active part. In 2004, women made history, by stripped themselves naked in front of Kangla gate and extorted the Indian army to rape them; a protest against the arrest, rape and brutal killing of a young girl, Thangjam Manorama Devi, by the armed forces on the night of June 11, 2004. The state security forces ultimately had to leave Kangla.

So, we see the strength of women as a collective which takes part in any movement related to prominent social and political issues.

4.6 Women in Decision Making

An important aspect in the empowerment of women is the extent of their involvement in the process of decision making whether at the household level or at the level of the community or society, that is, in the government.

For all India, in the 16th Lok Sabha Election, out of the total of 543 seats, 62 women were elected as MPs (Only 11% of Lok Sabha MPs were women) (Central Statistics Office, 2019: 95). In the case of Manipur, till date, there has been only one women MP, that too from ST community.

According to the Government of India statistics, for elections held during 2013 to 2017 for various State Legislative Assemblies, percentage of women representation is only as high as 14% (in Bihar, Haryana & Rajasthan). On an average, at all India level, as of 2017, 9% of the State Assembly members and 5% of the State Council members were women. Mizoram, Nagaland and Pondicherry have zero women MLAs (CSO, 2019).

In Manipur, as in the rest of India, the percentage of women in decision-making positions, as elected representatives in the legislature and in parliament and as officers in the bureaucracy are quite low as compared to men, despite the strength of women in collective action.

The representation of women in premier services- such as IAS/IPS/IFS accounted for 7.5 percent only in 1991 (Yumnam, 2000). In Manipur, as on 21st April 2010, the percentage of female MPS officers is only 11%, while that of male is 89%. As on 26th June 2010, the percentage of female MCS officers is only 21% while that of male

is 79 % (Civil list, Government of Manipur). As on 12th April 2018, female IAS officers of Manipur cadre were just 22% of total, while male percentage is 78%. Regarding IPS officers, the percentage of female is just 12% while that of male was 88%.

As on 30.1.2018, there were 171 MPS officers of which 141 were male (82.5%) and 30 only were female (17.5%). As on 7th April 2018, there were 179 MCS officers, of which 136 are male and 43 are female (76% and 24% respectively) (Civil List, Government of Manipur).

Table 3: No. of Women Elected M.L.A in State Assembly Elections (2012& 2017) Manipur

Years	Women	Men	Total	% of Women to total
2012	3	57	60	5%
2017	2	58	60	3.4%

Source: Men and Women in India, CSO (2016), New Delhi.

The representation of women in formal electoral politics is quite low as is evident from the results of two assembly elections. Only 3 women MLS were elected in 2012(5% of total) out of a 60-member assembly. In 2017, only 2 women were elected (3.4% of total).

A study by Kulabidhu(2009) elucidates in detail the continuous defeat of women in elections in Manipur, from the first Manipur Assembly elections in 1972 upto the 9th Assembly elections in 2007.

For 18 long years that is from 1972 till 1990/91 Manipur had to wait for her first woman MLA, the late Hangmila Shaiza(wife of late Yangmasho Shaiza, the fourth Chief Minister of Manipur.) from Ukhrul Assembly Constituency in 1990/91. Then, K. Apabi Devi from Oinam AC and later W Leima Devi from Naoriya Pakhanglakpa AC . W Leima Devi went on to become a Minister of State.

In the 10th Legislative Assembly elections, 2012, the Congress made history by winning 42 seats in the 60-member Assembly. It also saw three women MLAs at the same time, O Landhoni (Khangabok Assembly AC), AK Mirabai (Patsoi AC) and Nemcha Kipgen (Kangpokpi AC).

In the 11th Assembly elections, with a strength of 9,68,312, women voters outnumbered men, (9,21,435), and there were 10 women nominees in the fray of which only 2 won, AC Mirabai patsoi and Nemcha kipgen (Kangpokpi) (Oinam, 2017).

Thus, Manipur had just 6 MLAs (Hangmila Shaiza, K Apabi Devi, W Leima Devi, Okram Landhoni, AK Mirabai, Nemcha Kipgen) and one-woman MP (Kim Gangte) in some 40 years of elective exercise.

Hence, we see that despite their prominent role in the State and despite the huger percentage of women voters, women are still not able to contribute significantly in the decision making of the state through electoral politics. It is as if, as Brara(2017: 83) writes, “*there is a glass ceiling where women are told their limits.*”..”*The glass ceiling comes in the form of customary laws, revolving around ownership issues, inheritance laws, land ownership and the exclusion from all kinds of decision making bodies in the village level, barring the states which has Panchayat*”.

4.7 Women in Panchayats:

The representation of women in Panchayats overall is quite high for Manipur, sometimes crossing the one-third mark. For instance, in the 2007 Panchayat elections, out of 165 Gram Pradhans, there were 110(66.7%) men and 55(33.3%) women. Out of 1511 GP members, 962(63.7%) were men and 539(35.7%) were women. Out of 4 Zilla Adhyakshas, 2 were men and 2 were women. And out of 61 ZP members, 39(63.9%) were men and 22(36.1%) were women.

Table 4: Female Zilla Parishad members 2012 and 2017

Years	Gender	Total (%)
2012	female	31(51.7)
	male	29(48.3)
2017	female	26(43.3)
	male	34(56.7)

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India

Percentage of women Zilla Parishad members was 51.7% while that of male was 48.3% in 2012. The percentage has gone down to 43.3% females in 2017; that of male has gone up to 56.7% in 2017.

Table 5: Status of Women in Panchayati Raj Institutions (as on 15-11-2016)

State/ Country	Elected Representatives		
	Total	Total Women	% of Women
Manipur	1784	868	49
India	2911961	1345990	46

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India, cited in Central Statistics Office 2019: 100.

The question that arises is whether they really participate in decision making. As the Draft Manipur State Development writes: *'their capacity to exercise political influence is restricted because their husbands act on their behalf'* (IHD 2006: 240).

Despite their better representation in the Panchayat bodies, the question arises whether we really have good women leaders in the Panchayats. Three studies, by Madam Brara (2001), Tikoo(2000) and Oinam and Singh (2014) point out that women elected representatives do not really exercise real power, Almost all the women who represent a 'gram panchayat' remain a puppet of her house or deny taking strong decisions. They follow the dictates of their husbands/male members of the family, or of their political parties, and in many meetings women's presence was not considered necessary and their thumb impressions were taken after meetings was over; many women have no idea about local issues or decisions taken in the meetings and might not really be sensitive to the issues of the common people. Even when some become involved or vocal, such women are not encouraged because of the bias towards the sense of supremacy and privilege of male members based on the prevailing patriarchal ideology of the society.

For overall India too, though the number of women participating in panchayats has increased, the elected women are facing a number of problems starting from their decision to contest elections to performing their development duties. An evaluation on women's participation in various places reported that they were sometimes not informed or rarely invited to the meetings in panchayats headed by male members. In other cases, husbands accompanying the elected women select members to attend the meetings. Various studies on women's participation in panchayats have found that they agreed to contest elections either due to family pressure or the decision of their community and not because they were keen to do so. In short, the provision of reservation coerced them to participate in decision-making process in local bodies (Singha, 2016:116).

4.8 Decision Making in the Household

Another important domain of decision making is that of the household. The table below gives the extent of currently married women's participation in household decision making.

Table 6: Participation of Currently Married Women in Household Decision (%)

State /Country	Urban	Rural	Total	Total (2015-16)
Manipur	96.4	96.0	96.2	94.4
India	85.8	83.0	84	76.0

Source: NFHS 4 (2015-16), Manipur & India.

The participation of women in household decision-making is quite high in Manipur. But this does not get translated into greater decision-making power at state level.

4.9 Violence against Women:

Women also suffer from domestic violence like their sisters in the rest of India as the data from National Family Health surveys of the Indian Institute of Population Sciences illustrate.

Table 7: Domestic Violence

Forms of Violence	State/Country	NFHS-4 (2015-16)	NFHS-3 (2005-06)
Ever-married women who have ever experienced spousal violence (%)	Manipur	53.1	43.8
	India	28.8	37.2
Ever-married women who have experienced violence during any pregnancy (%)	Manipur	3.4	na
	India	3.3	na

Source: NFHS-3 and 4(2005-06 & 2015-16).

The percentage of ever-married women who have ever experienced spousal violence (%) was 43.8 in 2005-06, NFHS 3, it is 53.1 in 2015-16, NFHS 4.

Thus, Manipuri women are not free from violence and abuse in their lives, despite their economic independence. Evidently, if there is greater decision-making power, it should imply more power, and hence less violence. It could be interpreted that woman, have greater access to decision-making power because of greater economic independence. This the man of the house could resent leading to incidents of violence. On the one hand, women of Manipur have greater economic independence; on the other hand, they are still not free from drudgery and abuse in their lives (Arambam, 2013).

4.10 Women and the burden of Unpaid Household labour

Women perform three roles: productive, reproductive and community managing. In the household they must play a dual role; they have to do paid work, come home and spend hours on unpaid household labour which is also one of the constraining factors of their lives often ignored in policy discourses and academic literature. This burden of invisible but 'productive' household work is the main area of contention for feminists who have been seeking to incorporate such work in the national income accounts, though now, their inclusion in satellite accounts is all that has been achieved in some countries. But the fact is much of women's work remains unrecognized and undervalued in the system of National Accounts.

Time use studies are often undertaken to bring out the immense time burden of women. In India, the Central Statistical Organization carried out a time-use survey in 1998-99 -pilot on an experimental basis in six selected states, namely, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Meghalaya. The average Indian male spent about 42 hours a week, (or 6 hours a day in SNA¹⁰ activities as compared to only about 19 hours a week, (or

¹⁰ Economic and productive activities according to the UN system of national accounts.

about 2.7 hours a day) by females in SNA activities. In extended SNA¹¹ (Unpaid productive work, which consists of Household chores and Care work, which are dubbed extended SNA activities also in Indian classification of Time Use activities as in UN System of National Accounts) activities-Men spend only about 3.6 hours (3 hours 39 minutes a week, or 31 minutes a day) as compared to 34.6 hours (34 hours and 38 minutes a week or 4 hours and 57 minutes a day) by females on domestic work. Women thus devote about ten times more time than men to extended SNA activities (CSO 2000: 57). More such surveys are now routine. Regarding Manipur, at present there are only two studies on unpaid work for women, both by Mayanglambam(2010, 2016), one on tribal women and another on valley women. The figures she calculated are as given below.

Table 8: Average Time spent on household, paid and unpaid work per day by sex, Manipur (in hrs)

Type of work	Valley District		Hill District		Total	
	F	M	F	M	F	M
Household chores(Non-SNA)	7.4	2.3	8.6	2.7	8	2.5
Unpaid work(Non-SNA+Care)	7.7	4.6	7.5	6.6	7.6	5.6
Total Unpaid work	15.1	6.9	16.1	9.3	15.6	8.1
Paid work(SNA)	7.3	8.4	7.5	8.2	7.4	8.3

Source: Mayanglambam (2010, 2016). Personal Time use Survey, Manipur.

Here household chores and care work are extended SNA activities (Those activities which can be delegated to a third person who can be paid for the activity) and hence can be imputed a value which the author has attempted. The study on time-use studies for women in Manipur show how women bear more of the burden of unpaid work as compared to men.

5. Conclusion

We see that women in Manipur have a rich legacy of being empowered in the sense of being active in productive economic activities from ancient times and for active participation in collective action against social injustices. They also take part in decision-making in the household, but at the same time they are not in major decision-making positions in society and they do not play a powerful role as leaders and decision makers. Though resistance to oppression is on the high agenda of the Meira Paibi's (bearer of torches), and their political consciousness and participation in public affairs as a collective force are quite visible, at the individual level, they seem to be constrained by patriarchy like their sisters in mainland India. They also suffer from domestic violence like their peers elsewhere.

It is the tradition of patriarchy, with its divisions of work, as women's work and men's work which also contribute to the inability of women to balance all and come out as powerful women leaders except for a few. Patriarchy has got a strong hold over the society so that men do not believe in the power of women, and women themselves consider women inefficient. Here cultural norms and traditions play an important role, and the constraints on women regarding the work they must do in the household, their roles as both caretaker of the family, and bread earner also, the difficulty of managing their triple role, their productive, reproductive, and community managing role creates tremendous time constraints on women. They need superhuman abilities to be able to manage all roles efficiently and effectively. Time, family, cultural constraints all handicap women in their ability to participate fully in polity and even to grow to higher levels in their professions. They struggle to walk the tightrope between essential household labour and career needs, thus limiting their ability to participate fully in public affairs and from rising to the top in their professions, except for a select few.

A change in societal attitude is required to recognize that women are also human, not superhuman machines, who also need rest, and help from their other halves- their mates; (If they are married, that is) and from their other family members (if they are single). As more and more women aspire to take their rightful place within governance

¹¹ Productive but non-economic but which can be imputed a value like child care, and other household labour.

bodies, it is important for all institutions (state, family, and community) to respond to women's specific needs. Strategic gender needs¹² should be placed at the core of government processes. There is need for tangible empowerment of women in Manipur by giving them more opportunities for growth and participation in all development processes of society.

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¹² Strategic gender needs are the needs of women identify because of their subordinate position in society. They vary according to particular contexts, related to gender division of labor, power and control, and may include issues such as legal rights, domestic violence, equal wages and women's control over their bodies(Moser 1993).

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The Uniqueness of Architecture and Bamboo House Environment in Pengotan Traditional Village, Bali, Indonesia

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Abstract

Pengotan Village is a traditional village known as a tourism village in which it has unique architectures of bamboo house settlements and its natural beauty. These resources have led to an increase in tourist visits. However, the increase has led to the growth of tourist facilities such as accommodations and restaurants. The construction of tourist facilities has transformed agricultural and plantation lands' functions to support tourism and new settlements. This transformation has caused changes in traditional architecture even though these cultural productions are interesting for tourists. This phenomenon is an architectural challenge for the people to maintain the cultural productions, but at the same time, they can accommodate tourist activities in the village. Therefore, this paper aims to identify the traditional settlement and architecture of the bamboo, including socio-cultural conditions, village morphology, building typology, and problems faced. Using fieldwork investigations and interviews, this paper's output identifies and documents data conditions, problems, analysis, concepts, and strategies for future village architectural conservation. This activity's technical implementation includes preparation, survey, a compilation of data and analysis, formulation of concepts and structuring strategies, design, and socialization.

Keywords: Uniqueness, Architecture, Bamboo, House, Environment, Traditional, Village

1. Introduction

Bali is an island that has the uniqueness of nature, people's culture, and cultural artifacts. The uniqueness of Bali's nature is an inspiration for life that brings prosperity to the community. Balinese culture, which mostly comes from Hinduism, is the soul, spirit, breath, and is a big magnet for tourists to visit Bali.

Pengotan, a tourist village with unique bamboo house architecture and distinctive traditions, has led to an increase in tourist visits because tourists want to see, feel, and enjoy firsthand the natural environment and the socio-cultural nature of the village. In addition to natural tours, tourists also enjoy residential areas that are thick with Balinese culture.

Pengotan is closely related to its cultural philosophy and the Balinese cultural landscape related to the cultural system that governs it and the structural form of the village and environment. This village has several cultural philosophies manifested in the spatial concept of the village cultural preservation areas, so at macro and micro levels, it can be a harmonious and balanced spatial concept approach with its designation elements, cultural philosophies based on the concept of *Tri Hita Karana*.

The increase of tourist visits has caused various phenomena in Pengotan, such as restaurants' existence along the village coastline, land conversion for tourism, and new settlements, which can change the architectural and settlement order and pattern.

Pengotan has unique architecture and settlement patterns that are still preserved. Seeing the change in settlement arrangements and the occurrence of land use changes due to the surge in tourism like other tourism destinations in Bali (Putra, Lozanovska & Fuller, 2017 & 2019), there has been concern and awareness of the community to maintain their traditional village order. Community concern and awareness are the main factors in the preservation of the village. The uniqueness of the village architecture, the natural beauty of the rice fields, the beautiful environment, and the village structure's preservation are the main attractions that make it a cultural tourism object. One form of awareness is identifying the uniqueness of Pengotan. However, this village does not have sufficient documents and human resources to formulate a precise and accurate identification concept, strategy, and plan to do this. The paper to produce comprehensive strategy and plans that can be used and empower the community. From the abovementioned background, it can be argued that the problems faced by Pengotan, Bangli Regency, are what the conditions of the building architecture, village patterns, and social culture of the existing and the village development trend are? Moreover, what are the recommendations for the future development of Pengotan architecture?

Furthermore, this paper is to give service to the community that is expected to provide great benefits and contributions to both the government and the community. The first benefit is that it can contribute to the community and implementers of tourism development policies, which are one of the priority programs for national development. The second benefit is that it can be used to determine the direction of developing a conservation program for the traditional residential pattern of the world cultural heritage of Pengotan, particularly Bali and Indonesia in general.

2. Research Method

The Pengotan management plan data collection activity was carried out through observation, observation, measurement, and documentation. The observation was a data collection tool that must be carried out systematically. The observations were recorded according to certain procedures and rules so that other researchers could repeat them. In general, observation is divided into two types, namely the participant and non-participation types. In the first type, the researcher is part of the natural state in which the observation is carried out. In the second type, the researcher observes other people's behavior in natural conditions, but the researcher does not become or is not part of the natural state (Nasution, 2004). So that, researchers collect data by seeing, observing, and taking documentation directly into the field. This paper's data collection was classified as a non-participant

type because the researcher was not part of the Penguin population.

The observation carried out was to fill in the checklist with real conditions. In this study, residents' activities were observed and recorded as data from physical and non-physical components. Field Research was a method that was used to document. In-person field visits were carried out four times. During this visit, measurements and photographs were carried out. Measurements were made to obtain accurate data regarding the area of the area so that the village's current development could be observed. The researchers were also looking for additional data from written documents that can support research, for example, from literature books on the village.

3. Results and Discussion

3.1. Social System

Pengotan is one of Bali's traditional villages in the mountains area that a characteristic linear village pattern and mostly uses bamboo material obtained from the surrounding environment. This village is around 17 kilometers from Bangli and 57 kilometers from Denpasar, the capital city of Bali Province. Based on the national administration system, this traditional village belongs to the Pengotan National Administration Village called *desa dinas* Pengotan. In this national system, Pengotan consists of 6 (six) traditional hamlet associations called *banjar adat* and 8 (eight) national hamlet associations called *banjar dinas*.

As some traditional villages in Bali's highland, the community structure of the Pengotan is a horizontal community structure without recognizing the existence of the clan membership system called *catur warna* that distinguishes the social status of the community. This society's structure is very different from the structure of society in other villages in Bali, which generally applies *catur warna* system.

In their daily lives and traditional lives, the community is divided into two groups: *krama pengayah* and *bala angkep (roban)*. Of the 862 households in Pengotan, only 204 households are the *krama pengayah* while the rest are *bala angkep (Roban)*. The *krama pengayah* is a family that has privilege to heritage their traditional house. This family is the oldest married son in a traditional house. On the other hand, the *bala angkep (roban)* is the married younger son. According to the traditional custom of Pengotan, only one family in a kinship group has the right to live in the traditional house. If other sons are married, they make a house called *pondok* in their family fields. The *krama pengayah* have traditional manners obliged for all forms of ceremonies at the three main village temple called *pura kahyangan tiga*. If there is a ceremony at the temple, all the families related to a household system gather in the main village in their traditional houses. After the ceremony was finished, *krama bala angkep* return to their house (*pondok*) and only the *pengayah* manners remained. Still, there were also those whose houses were empty because the *pengayah* manners also live in *pondok*.

In the traditional village structures, the village is managed by *prajuru desa*. The composition of the *prajuru* consists of *pamuncuk*, *pasek*, *penyarikan* and *pemangku*. *Pamuncuk* are the *prajuru* who hold the highest power in the village. Everything related to customary matters must receive consideration and approval from *pamuncuk*, and in consultation with other *prajuru*. *Pamuncuk* decides on the matter. The system of determining *pamuncuk* is based on election by the village, so it can be said that a *pamuncuk* has extensive knowledge and is wise in terms of customs and religion. A *pamuncuk* will be replaced when he dies or is unable to carry out his duties. *Pasek* is a traditional *prajuru* who is in charge of leadership in every customary meeting held regularly. *Pasek* also serves as the representative of *pamuncuk*. *Penyarikan* is a customary officer who serves as a coordinator in every customary activity. This *penyarikan* has a similar position with the *sinoman*, which is commonly known in other villages in Bali. It is similar with public relations. *Pemangku* are traditional *prajuru* who serve as leaders in every religious ceremony.

3.2. Cultural Uniqueness

Upacara Kawin Massal. It is a mass wedding ceremony usually performed, based on Balinese calendar, in *Sasih*

Kedasa (April) and *Sasih Kapat* (October). This ceremony is held at the village temple and usually involves more than 10 pairs of brides. This ceremony is unique from the first to the final marriage processions, which is different from the marriage processions in other villages. This mass wedding ceremony is carried out by local community members simultaneously at that time. The ceremonial offerings used are very simple, made by each family of the bride and groom to be used at the village temple. There is also a ceremonial offering issued in groups or cooperation by the entire bride family to be handed over to *prajuru desa* as a ceremony to be held at the village temple. A cow is a part of offerings that are used in this ceremony.

Upacara Kematian (Penguburan) and Ngaben. This ceremony is a death ceremony or burial ceremony (*penguburan*) and the cremation ceremony called *ngaben*. These ceremonies are unique in terms of the procedures, tools and processes for performing the ceremony. The unique way here is when bringing the corpse to the grave called *setra* done using one bamboo stick, and then the corpse is tied to a bamboo stick using three pieces of rope that have been prepared and previously the corpse was already wrapped in cloth and mat. The bamboo and the corpse were wrapped in a white cloth covering the corpse and the bamboo. Another uniqueness that can be found at this ceremony is that when the corpse is already in the grave, at that time after the hole has been prepared, the corpse is lifted by his family members around the hole three times and after that, the body is opened until it is naked and then inserted into the hole. With the head position facing southwest, the meaning of this position is that when awakened the corpse's spirit can be illuminated by the sun. At the same time, with the scratched fingernails, it is intended that the spirit can know that it is dead.

Kesenian Daerah (Traditional Arts). Pengotan has many types of traditional arts that are still considered sacred by its people. Besides, the people's lives cannot be separated from the local cultural arts to be seen in every religious ceremony. Aspects of arts are still upheld by the community, especially the sacred dances. Pengotan has several kinds of sacred dances staged at the temple at the time of the *Dewa Yadnya* ceremonies, including *Baris Dance*, *Wayang Wong* and Traditional Rejang Dance. Other dance arts were also developed by art groups in Pengotan, such as the *Calon Arang Dance*, and the *Joged Dance*. Regarding the *Baris Dance* in Pengotan, it consists of several types, namely: *Baris Jangkang* and *Jojo Dance* (which is specifically performed by cadets), *Baris Dadab*, *Baris Presi*, *Baris Belongsong*, *Baris Bajra*, and the most sacred to the local community is *Baris Babwang* using a banana leaf staple weapon which is often called the *Perang Papah Dance*.

3.3. The Pattern of the Village

Bali's settlement patterns are generally influenced by several factors, namely, factors of ritual values, natural conditions and potential factors, and economic factors (Puja, 1982: 12). Conceptually, the physical environment of the Pengotan uses a linear pattern extending from north to south. The village orientation is towards the north/*kaja*/upstream (Mount Batur) and south/*Kelod/Teben* (sea). The main village road that extends to the north and south is a core that functions as a public circulation and functions as a plaza or open space, which increases the relationship between paths/alleys/pedestrians leading to each yard of the house (Figure 1). Thus, the "core" is the center of spatial orientation and population movement orientation in every activity.




Figure 1: Village Pattern of Pengotan

3.4. Land Use

Land use in Pengotan is based on the *Tri Hita Karana* philosophy with the *Hulu-Teben* value system and the environment in the form of a linear pattern. The land use is implemented, namely: (1) *Upstream Zone* (northern part), where the facilities for village spiritual activities are placed, namely: *Pura Desa/Puseh* and *Pura Dalem*, (2) *Zone Antara* (middle part), is a residential area with buildings residential houses which are broadly divided into 24 plots (units) of yards with an arrangement of 12 units to the left of the core and 12 units to the right of the core and in this zone there are also various public service facilities and (3) *Teben Zone* (south part), this zone is the lowest part (physically and philosophically) with its use as a grave area/*setra* (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Land Use in Pengotan

3.5. Building Layout

The yard's pattern in the Pengotan has a very different pattern from the house patterns commonly known in Bali. The pattern of yards in Bali generally uses the *sanga mandala* concept which divides the yard into 9 (nine) parts, with values ranging from *utamaning utama*, the most sacred zone to *nistaning nista*, the most profane zone. Meanwhile, zoning for buildings within the yard in Pengotan is very simple, namely based on the concept of the *hulu-teben* value system. *Hulu* means upper part and *teben* means below.

The concept of placing a building unit in the yard depends on the function and sacred value of the building unit. The arrangements are as follows: (1) upstream zone for sacred buildings/objections, (2) central zone for *meten* and bale *sakanem* buildings (ceremonial buildings) and (3) *teben* zone for *angkul-angkul* (entrances) and sometimes added the granary building (Figure 3).




Figure 3: The Layout of the traditional house of Pengotan

Upper zoning for sacred buildings (sanggah). The buildings' function is as a holy place or worship to God and to the spirits of the ancestors who have been purified. In this sacred building unit, there are several buildings with their respective functions and the number of these buildings varies greatly depending on the owner's status. However, what is absolutely contained in one sacred building unit consists of (1) *Pesimpangan Bhetara Gunung Agung* and *Bhetara Tuluk Biu*. The two buildings have the characteristic of having to use fibres from the palm tree and (2) *Persimpangan Bhetara Majapahit* and *the Bhetara Maospahit*. These shrines and several other complementary buildings generally use bamboo roofs (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Buildings in Sacred Zone

The forms of these sacred buildings are elementary with the entire building consisting of wood and bamboo construction and materials. The difference in physical values is regulated by distinguishing the height of the courtyard of the *sanggah* (sacred building) from the courtyard of the house.

The middle Zone is for Residential Buildings. The middle Zone is for Residential Buildings. There are some pavilions in this zone, including *bale meten* and *bale sakenem*, where the occupants perform domestic and some socio-cultural activities. *Bale meten* is located in the northern part of the courtyard called *natah* or south direction of the sacred zone, often called *bale daja*. The function of this *Bale Meten* is for a bedroom and functions as a kitchen (*paon*). The *bale meten* consists of 2 bales located on the left and right and a furnace located in the middle between the bales and docked at the northern wall (Figure 5). The shape of the *Bale Meten* building is a rectangular

shape using 8 pillars made of woods. As other Balinese buildings, the floor of the *bale meten* in Pengotan is high enough from the ground that is around 75-100 cm), to avoid groundwater infiltration. The *bale meten* is closed from four directions with woven bamboo walls so that the room inside is very dark without sufficient lighting (the only light is from the entrance).




Figure 5: The *bale meten*

Bale sakenem is located in the southern part of the courtyard, opposite the *bale meten*. The *bale meten* and *sakenem* are like husband and wife (must be in pairs) or often referred to as *purusa* (male) and *pradana* (woman). As the name implies, *bale sakenem* is a rectangular shape with six poles (*saka*). This bale's function is a place to perform *manusa yadnya* ceremonies, and when there is no ceremony, it is used as a bed for men. With this function, *bale sakenem* has a *bale* that connects to the six pillars/*saka*. Following the function's demands as a ceremony venue, the walls of the building are only closed on two sides (east and south sides) to provide freedom of movement in ceremonial activities (Figure 6). However, because the *bale sakenem* also functions as a bed, a temporary wall (woven bamboo) is prepared on the open wall, easy to install and remove quickly. As *bale meten*, the high of *bale sakenem* is around 50-75 cm from the ground.




Figure 6: The *bale sakanem*

The traditional gate called *angkul-angkul* functions as the entrance of the house. In Pengotan, there are two types of *angkul-angkul*, namely *angkul-angkul* as the entrance from the core/neighborhood road to the *rurung* (alley) and *angkul-angkul* as the entrance from the *rurung* to the yard of the house. Each residential unit has a very simple *angkul-angkul* in which the building made from soil called *popolan* and the roof made from bamboo (Figure 7).



Figure 7: The *angkul-angkul*

The orientation of the buildings in Pengotan Traditional Village faces the courtyard called *natah* that is interpreted as a living room. This implies a meaning because in the living room a mixture of *purusa*/male elements in the form of empty spaces called *akasa* is created with *pradana* (female) elements, which is interpreted as the earth called *pratiwi*. *Bale meten* takes a south orientation, while *bale sakanem* is oriented to the north. The two-building units cross to the center/*natah* as the center yard for residential activities (Figure 8). The orientation of the entrance to the family holy place is to the south.




Figure 8: The orientation of the pavilions

The circulation pattern and the way to reach each building in the courtyard are straightforward, starting from *angkul-angkul* directly to *natah* and from *natah* to each building (Figure 9). Thus, conceptually the yard layout hierarchy only uses the *hulu-teben* system where the circulation starts from below value called *teben* to the upstream called *hulu*.




Figure 9: The circulation of the House

3.6. Structural Systems and Building Construction

The use of structural systems and building construction in Pengotan is not much different from traditional Balinese buildings' structural systems and construction. Only some parts of the structure and construction system in Pengotan are simpler, especially after the construction. This is related to the use of materials and technical implementation. Systematically, the discussion of structural systems and building construction can be described below.

Roof Structure. The forms of roofs of buildings, especially traditional residential buildings, generally use pyramid and saddle forms. The technical principle of such a roof structure system is a multi-faceted principle with even distribution in all directions. Then through the column/pillar/saka it will be channeled to the ground. In this traditional system, the construction components are known: *pemade* (big rafter in the middle of the roof structure), *pemucu* (a big rafter in every corner of the roof structure), and rafter called *iga-iga* which are joined together utilizing clamp called *apit-apit* and roof cover called *raab*. All building is done with a peg called *pasak* and tie system.

Wall Structure. Basically, the Balinese traditional building structural system of the walls is more accurately described as a pillar structure, because technically the pillar is a structural element. In contrast, the building wall is only a space dividing element. Technically, the pillar/saka supports the roof structure, transmitting the horizontal load to the ground through the pedestal called *sendi*. Adjustment to the vertical force is carried out using the traditional elements of beams called *lambang* that consists of *lambang sineb*, *canggah wang*, and *sunduk*. Thus, it can be said that the system is a portal system.

Foundation Structure called batur. Basically, traditional buildings in Pengotan do not recognize the use of a foundation system as a building foundation. The building can already stand/be erected on the ground without a special foundation as the traditional Balinese building principle. This is due to the pole structure system's use as the main structure and because in general Balinese traditional buildings, especially residential houses, have relatively small span dimensions. Thus, the horizontal bonding with the use of pillars called *saka*, the system of beams called *lambang*, *canggah wang*, and bales have guaranteed the building structure's rigidity.

But even so, concerning the principle of structure, the connection or transmission of the building's load to the

ground is also carried out by placing the building on the joints with the pedestal system's connection. Then these joints are placed on the floor called *bebaturan*. Technically, these rules are made with a certain height between 50 - 100 cm to avoid infiltration of groundwater, so that the floor height is made different from the demands of the space function.

Building materials. The discussion of building materials is basically related to the structural system applied to the building. Regarding building materials, the buildings in Pengotan, especially the traditional type buildings, fully use local materials found around the village environment. Meanwhile, transitional and modern types of buildings no longer use local materials. The patterns of using building materials for each building element are as follows:

Roof Element. The roof frame structure generally uses wood, and coconut sticks called *seseh* and bamboo for the rafter elements called *usuk* connected by a peg and tie system. In sacred buildings, the roof frame structure uses wood. Bamboo is used as a roof covering material, which is shaped like a shingle shape. Besides bamboo, the sacred buildings (*Pesimpenen Bethara Gunung Agung* and *Tuluk Biu*) use palm *fiber*. In some buildings, the roof covering material is replaced with tile and zinc, especially in residential buildings.

Walls. The room dividing walls (in traditional residential buildings) uses woven bamboo with large matting dimensions so that there are pores that allow air circulation (although relatively small). Structural buildings are made of jackfruit wood called *kwarditan*, which is not too difficult to find in the village. The pillar structure's supporting elements, such as *lambang sineb*, *canggih wang* and *bale-bale*, also use wood and *seseh* (coconut stem).

Floor called Bebaturan. Building floors generally still use the earth floor, especially in traditional buildings. Non-traditional buildings have switched to the use of cement and tiles. Batur walls use river stone (in traditional buildings) while masonry/plastering is used in non-traditional buildings. Joints, which are a medium for conveying building loads (concerning poles/pillars), are made of solid stone, and some of them use river stone.

As mentioned above, building material technology has provided convenience in technical implementation and economic value so that there has been a tendency to switch to the use of non-traditional materials. In fact, this has happened to several buildings in Pengotan.

3.7. Aesthetic Elements

As is the case with other traditional Balinese buildings, traditional buildings in the Pengotan also apply ornaments as a form of building art. When viewed as a whole, the use of this ornament art is not too common for the people of Pengotan. There are not many houses and holy buildings applying the art of ornament. Even the use of the ornament is found in several buildings, especially sacred buildings.

The forms of ornament widely used are the forms of *pepalihan*, especially in sacred buildings and *angkul-angkul*. The form of this *pepalihan* is straightforward, not too complicated like the shape of the *pepalihan* in other villages of Bali such as the villages of Gianyar, Klungkung and Badung style. Other forms of ornament are forms of *pepatran* (the ornament that copies much vegetation), *kekarangan* (the ornaments that copy the forms of the animal) and *keketusan* (the ornaments that copy the form of objects such as stone, water, sand, and seed) (Satria & Putra 2020). However, these forms are limited to use in sacred buildings, and even have simpler stylistic forms with those in general (Gianyar style). This is very much influenced by the workforce, which comes from the village with distinctive skills and styles.

4. Conclusions

The Pengotan Traditional Village Pattern is closely related to its cultural philosophy, which is related to the cultural system that governs it and the structural form of the Pekraman Village. Pengotan Traditional Village has several cultural philosophies, manifested in the spatial concept of village cultural preservation areas, so at macro and micro

levels it can be a harmonious and balanced spatial concept approach with its designation elements, cultural philosophies based on the concept of *Tri Hita Karana*.

Pengotan as a tourist village with unique bamboo house architecture and unique customs traditions has led to an increase in tourist visits to Pengotan, because tourists want to see, feel, and enjoy firsthand the natural existence of the socio-cultural nature of the village community. Besides natural tours, tourists also enjoy residential areas that are thick with Balinese culture in Pengotan Traditional Village. This increase in tourist visits causes various phenomena in Pengotan, such as restaurants and land conversion for tourism and new settlements, which can change the architectural order.

Pengotan has unique architecture and settlement patterns that are still preserved. Seeing the change in settlement structure and the occurrence of land use change due to the surge in tourism, there has been concern and awareness of the community to maintain their traditional village order. Community concern and awareness are the main factors in the preservation of the village. The uniqueness of the architecture, the natural beauty of the rice fields, and the village structure's preservation are the main attractions that make it a cultural tourism object.

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Contemporary Irregular Warfare: Defense Strategy

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Abstract

Globalization influenced by the development of science and technology has brought the world into the era of industrial revolution 4.0. It led to an unstable and confusing situation, which implies the emergence of VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) conditions. VUCA created the term Irregular Warfare as a new form of war, which is defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain legitimate influence on the people relevant in the form of terrorist attacks, subversion, and rebellion or separatism. Irregular Warfare in Indonesia is known as a non-military threat, which must be faced by state institutions outside the defense sector as the main element. This study aims to develop a non-military defense strategy in dealing with non-military threats through the collaboration between the ministry of defense with ministries/agencies and local governments as the main elements under the mandate of the defense law. This study used qualitative research methods and phenomenological descriptive-analytical design and supported by relevant theories such as; strategy theory and synergy theory. This study indicates that the synergy of the ministry of defense with the ministries/agencies and local governments is significant in realizing a reliable national defense system.

Keywords: Non-Military Defense Strategy, Irregular Warfare, Synergy

1. Introduction

The development of a strategic environment at the global level has shown the globalization phenomenon that led to a concept called VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity), explaining the nature of future challenges and the nature of the changes that are being and will be faced. This condition is known as the Industrial Revolution 4.0, a condition in which advances in information technology, such as artificial intelligence, supercomputer technology, autonomous vehicles, and the internet, are integrated and affect all aspects of human life. For example, VUCA at the global level, when people are anxiously waiting for the open military friction between America and China in the South China Sea conflict, but unexpectedly what happens suddenly is the battle between Chinese and Indian troops on the border of the two countries (Khair, 2017). At the national level, when all components of the Indonesian nation are busy overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic, the Omnibuslaw Law on labor was published without notification and clear reasons. It has made all the nation elements agitated due to some impartial articles for workers/labor and small people. Even at the recent national case, the return of Habib Riziq Sihab to the homeland amid the Covid 19 pandemic has presented new problems that can disrupt the stability of national security. Some of the examples above represent how the conditions of VUCA and the industrial revolution 4.0 significantly affect human life, which means that this will also affect the presence of various contemporary threats faced by every country globally, including Indonesia.

The Indonesian nation defines state defense as all efforts to defend the country's sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation from threats and disturbances towards the wholeness of the nation and state. The management of the national defense system is a government function. Therefore, as the organizer of the government function, the President determines the General Policy for State Defense as a reference for planning, implementing, and supervising the national defense system. This general policy accommodates every government effort to build, maintain, and develop in a directed and integrated manner for national defense components. The General Policy for National Defense is formulated based on government and state policies as a guideline for the ministry of defense and other ministries/agencies following their duties and functions related to national security by involving local governments and other elements of the nation's power (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). As a follow-up to the general national defense policy, the ministry of defense, as the leading sector in the defense sector, describes a national defense strategy that becomes the direction and guidance for all parties in carrying out defense strategies military and non-military defense.

In the state defense strategy, threats to the state are classified into three types of threats: military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid threats. Fourth-generation wars with patterns similar to each other, hybrid, gray zone, asymmetric proxies, irregular warfare have become a world threat and are called contemporary modern wars (Djoko, 2014). Likewise, Indonesia has stated that the threat of Irregular warfare is known as a non-military threat. According to the mandate of the law, a non-military defense strategy is needed to overcome it that non-military threats must be faced by ministries and institutions outside the defense sector as the main element. In 2020 state defense policy issued by the Ministry of Defense explained that the actual threats that are developing and will continue for the next few years include those classified as non-military threats. Those can be separatism and armed rebellion, terrorism and radicalism, cyber threats, intelligence threats/espionage, biological weapons threats, disease epidemics, and the distribution and misuse of narcotics. The killing of a family in Lemba Toga Village, Sigi Regency, Central Sulawesi, on Friday, November 27, 2020 which was allegedly carried out by the Poso East Indonesia Mujahidin Group (MIT) (Puji, 2020) has shown that the threat of terrorism in Indonesia is still a serious threat to safety citizen. In addition, in Papua, the Free Papua Organization activities or now often referred to as KKB (armed criminal groups), are still ongoing even though in August 2020, the TNI and Polri shot dead Hengky Wanmang during the Nemangkawi operation (Detiknews, 2020). Hengky Wanmang is the leader of an armed criminal group (KKB), which has a bad reputation in Papua.

This research was conducted to examine non-military defense strategies in the face of irregular warfare by building a synergy between ministries and institutions with the ministry of defense in creating a non-military defense system.

2. Method

This study used a qualitative research method, using a phenomenological analytical descriptive research design. This method and design were chosen to describe or provide an overview of the object under study through secondary data in the form of evidence, notes, or reports compiled in the documentary data archive without analyzing and making general conclusions. Therefore, the author can describe the phenomena accurately regarding the synergy of building a non-military defense system in facing irregular wars.

3. Research Result and Discussion

As a result of globalization, that led to the era of the industrial revolution 4.0, which impacted the presence of VUCA conditions in human life. The emergence of irregular warfare as a non-military threat results from the complexity and ambiguity that VUCA brings to human life. Non-military threats increasingly dominate the form of threats that attack Indonesia in the next few years with dimensions of ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, national safety, and legislation. Facing this form of threat requires a non-military defense strategy formulated and implemented by ministries outside the defense sector. However, of all the strategic products issued by the ministry of defense, both national defense strategy, state defense doctrine, and national defense strategy guidelines, which

are mentioned as non-military defense doctrine, do not yet explain what strategies the ministries and institutions are implementing as the main elements in dealing with non-military threats.

3.1. Theory of strategy

Thomson in Oliver (Islamy & Alaydrus, 2019) explains that strategy is a way to achieve an end result. The result concerns the goals and objectives of the organization that have been set. There are three levels of strategy in the company, a broad strategy that applies to the entire organization, a competitive strategy for each activity, and a functional strategy that directly drives the competitive strategy.

The strategy is a plan about what will be achieved or what an organization will become in the future (direction) and how to achieve the desired condition (route) (Nazarudin, 2020). In other words, a strategy is defined as a large-scale plan, long-term oriented, and determined to enable the organization to interact effectively with the environment in overall competitive conditions that are directed at optimizing the achievement of goals and various objectives.

A theory of strategy, according to Wee in Alamsyah (2017), in the book 36 (thirty-six) of the 18th classical Chinese strategy: "Destroying a group of criminals by arresting their leader. The entire enemy organization will be destroyed if the leader can be captured in an attack, and the enemy force base destroyed.

From prehistoric times to modern times today, human life is inseparable from conflict or war that is carried out to fulfill its interests. Clausewitz (1831) argued that strategy is knowledge about the use of battle in winning wars. Meanwhile, the war itself was a continuation of politics. The formulation of the right strategy is necessary to win a war or conflict. In line with the dynamics of the global development of the world, the concept of strategy is interpreted more broadly, which talks about military capabilities and begins to penetrate all areas of human life. A strategy is closely related to politics in the context of the state.

The relationship between strategy and politics is then being explained. If politics reveal goals and state opponents, then the strategy will formulate its goals and what is needed to achieve these goals. The explanation above reflects that it can be concluded that strategy is the entire intellectual and physical operation that is prepared to respond to and control any collective activity amid conflict.

Furthermore, according to Liddell Hart in Marsono and Tri (2020), it defines that strategy is the art or skill of distributing and using military means to achieve policy ends. Thus the system can be interpreted as the art or science of determining ends, formulating ways, and determining the means used to achieve goals. So that in compiling a strategy, it must contain goals (ends), ways to be taken (ways), and means of infrastructure (means) used.

From the definitions that have been previously presented, it can be concluded that strategy is a tool to achieve competitive goals or advantages by considering external and internal factors of an organization. In this study, the theory of strategy is used to reveal the means and methods of the Indonesian government to deal with the threat of irregular warfare by developing a non-military defense strategy through the synergy of ministries and institutions outside the defense sector.

3.2. Theory of Synergy

Synergy is a word that is easy to say but difficult to apply. It is a form of mutually beneficial cooperation achieved through a collaboration of each party without any feelings of defeat. According to Stephen Covey in his book entitled *7 Habits of Highly Effective People*, if $1 + 1 = 3$, then it is called "Synergy." In the word of synergy the differences appear only to complete and fulfill each other to achieve a greater result than the Number of parts per part. Through synergy, the collaboration of different paradigms (Mindsets) will create greater and more effective results related to the process being undertaken, showing the same goals and agreement for positive results. Synergy

is a process that each party must go through, which requires time and consistency. Some points that must be done to build mutual trust so that synergy is created as a creative collaboration include: (1) avoiding bad judgment on other parties, (2) If you are not sure you can be right, don't give promises, (3) Do as you want to be treated by other people (4) Do not disappoint others (Intermedia, 2017). Creating synergy is mutual success built through habits. Creating synergy does not mean compromising in the middle, but rather looking for a third alternative and reaching the top. Synergy is dealing with a difference, not similarity. Synergy will build creative collaborations by respecting differences, building strengths, and compensating for weaknesses.

3.3. Non-military threats as a trend

The fourth-generation war is a modern war without formal military involvement, or it can also be called a civil war. Radical changes have occurred again in this war toward norms of war which return to the past war culture involving not only the state (state actor) but ethnicity, religious followers, families, and the business world through the use of all kinds of means in the conflict to achieve its goals (Darmono, 2015). The post-cold war security environment changed and had six dimensions. First, the source of the threat began to change, which initially came from the external environment, changed from the domestic environment. Second, the nature of threats to the state is changing from military to non-military threats. Third, the response to threats has also begun to shift from military to non-military. Fourth, the state was initially responsible for security, and it changed to a collective one. Fifth, the shift in the core value of security to the individual from the state and national to global security. The sixth policy of developing military instruments leads to a security policy that focuses on sustainable human development (Indrawan, 2017). Threats to the state can be defined as a series of events that can pose a series of threats to two dimensions simultaneously, namely directly or indirectly endangering people's lives; and limiting government policy options. Reflecting on what has been described, analysis of threats can be carried out in two methods, namely (1) based on threat (threat-based assessment) analysis of the calculation of threats faced; and (2) based on capability (capability-based assessment) analysis of the ability to carry out a military action (Indrawan, 2017).


Law number 3 of 2020 concerning State Defense in article 7 paragraph 3 explained that the state defense system in facing non-military threats places government agencies outside the defense field as the main element based on the form and nature of the threats faced supported by other aspects of the nation's power. The national defense system that is being built is a defense and security system that supports all national potentials as a whole. Security within the scope of national resilience should be established as an environment based on peace, namely the realization of dynamic stability in the political, economic, social, cultural and defense and security sectors that are capable of creating a sense of security for the community, free from fear, intimidation, and riots (Kurnia, 2014). According to Anggoro (2016), the national defense must become the main pillar for deterrence and assurance for that sovereignty. One example, in the era of globalization, threats to economic sovereignty have emerged. This threat can be explained as the weakening of state authorities' ability and strength to manage the national economy to create people's prosperity and guarantee national interests. Economic globalization is one of the external and internal economic threats, namely inflation and uneven infrastructure development. The economic threats experienced by Indonesia were further exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Non-military threats to the entire nation's safety can be in the form of food and water crises, disease outbreaks (including the COVID-19 pandemic), natural disasters, and energy crises.

3.4. Irregular Warfare as a Contemporary Issue

Contemporary global issues emerged when the Cold War ended and/or when the modern international system took a unipolar form (Amaritasari, 2017). Current and future wars are predicted to shift from conventional warfare (military versus military) to unconventional/irregular (Arif Mustofa, Pujo widodo, 2020). The military, which is the most fully equipped and uses the most advanced technology, does not guarantee victory. This phenomenon is then referred to as irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is defined as a way of warfare or tactics that are determined not as conventional warfare tactics and focus on the relevant population, where each operation must consider the enemy and the relevant population (Kelly in Asral Efendi, Pujo Widodo, 2020)

Irregular Warfare is also defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over the relevant population/people (Doctrine, 2011). It does not lead to military power or to control territory. Irregular Warfare is more directed at political struggles with violent and nonviolent components illustrated as follows:

Figure 1: Comparison of traditional warfare with irregular warfare



Source: Air Force Doctrine Document 3-2 15 March 2013

The term "Irregular Warfare" is defined to illustrate the deflection of classic conventional forms of war by the enemy using non-traditional methods such as guerrilla warfare, terroristic attacks, subversion, and rebellion to control the local population. Its implementation can use various kinds of content and capabilities, both military capabilities and other capabilities, to erode the power, influence, and hope of the legitimate government. Irregular Warfare is carried out on a protracted basis and uses hidden or not overt tactics. It is different from conventional, which focuses on defeating the enemy's military by minimizing the population/people's involvement. Thus, it can be said that future wars are very likely to occur in non-conventional forms or called Irregular Warfare. The use of non-military means is directed at destroying the people's psychology to reduce the government's credibility, which will ultimately disrupt the stability of national defense.

According to (Kiras, 2015) there are four key factors to the success of irregular warfare, namely: First is time. Having sufficient time, rebel/separatist/terrorist groups can consolidate, reorganize, plan, and build conventional forces capable of seizing control of the state. The second is space. The empowerment will withdraw if in an area it is considered under the supervision of the authorities, and will carry out attacks if the enemy is weak and careless and then controls the area. The third is support. Terrorist and rebel groups fighting in an irregular warfare pattern need help, either internal or external, in their struggle. Rebels and terrorists will eventually surrender and lose without support. Fourth is legitimacy. To gain sympathy and support, the terrorist and rebel groups will make statements/narratives, which are then published to get legitimacy/recognition of what they have done.

The conflict in the African continent is an example of how Irregular warfare can destroy a country. The wars in Africa currently happening are the Somali crisis, the Darfur conflict, and the prolonged conflict in the DRC. The northern regions of the DRC, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Northern Uganda, are seen as one protracted conflict. African conflicts are mostly waged by a mixture of groups such as actors from state organizations, military, non-state and informal groups. Conflicts in Africa are generally driven by economic motivations based on greed models, and disputes over natural resources such as gold, diamonds, and cobalt often lead to armed conflicts that develop into guerrilla wars (Ferreira, 2011).

Suppose we look at the African conflict from the internal conflict. In that case, war is limited to the scope of a country throughout the history of maintaining the Republic of Indonesia's independence to date. The Republic of Indonesia has recorded several wars in a row, starting with the rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in Madiun in 1948, DI / TII year 1948-1962 until the Fretilin Rebellion in East Timor 1974-1999 and GAM in

1976-2005. And at this time, the Free Papua Organization (OPM) 's disintegration effort is still a challenge in itself in the attempt to defend the independence of the Republic of Indonesia at a fixed price (Rizqa Noor Abdi, 2020).

3.5. Non-military defense in national defense

This paper will briefly mention the relationship of non-military threats and national security to the national defense system. State defense is part of the state's main elements related to the matter of protecting the territory, citizens, and their political system from other countries' threats. It is not an easy matter in implementing national defense, but it is a very complicated matter. In its implementation, state defense always involves all citizens and regions, natural resources, the existence of science and technology, national geopolitical mapping, human resources, and the national defense industry. Law on National Defense explains that the national defense system is a comprehensive defense system that involves all citizens, territories, and other national resources. It is prepared early by the government and is carried out in a total, integrated, directed, and continuous manner of enforcing sovereignty state, territorial integrity, and the entire nation's safety from all threats. According to the national defense system model, the involvement of citizens, territories, and other national resources is an input in the entire national defense process.

The implementation of the state defense system is not only aimed at dealing with various military threats but also non-military threats that have recently increasingly threatened the Indonesian nation. The 2014-2019 general state defense policy explains that the development of an integrated state defense system consisting of military defense and non-military defense is directed at synergizing and generating the effectiveness and efficiency of coordination in national security implementation. Furthermore, the state defense policy also explains that in terms of empowering non-military defense, it is carried out through the capacity building, synergy, and ministries/institutions' role as the main elements in dealing with non-military threats. It is also supported by other ministries/agencies with their respective duties and functions and other elements of the nation's strength. The TNI is prepared as another element of the nation's power in an integrated manner to support ministries/institutions and local governments in non-military defense. In the general policy of national defense for 2014-2019 that has been implemented so far, it is clear that non-military defense is also included in the national defense system, which needs to be developed and empowered. However, in implementing the state defense system so far, the non-military defense has not been developed and maximally empowered both at the ministerial and institutional level. Moreover, regional governments become the main elements in dealing with non-military threats.

As a follow-up to Law No.3 of 2002 on national defense, the Ministry of Defense issued Regulation of the Minister of Defense regulation No.19 of 2016 concerning strategic guidelines for non-military defense. In an effort to overcome and eliminate non-military threats, a non-military defense strategy guideline has been prepared, which contains the threat estimation, essence, implementation, and guidance of all national resources. The strategic guide for non-military defense is a derivative rule from the non-military aspect of state defense doctrine. The strategic guidelines for non-military defense are defined as non-military defense doctrine. It becomes the main doctrine for implementing non-military defense, which serves as a reference for ministries and institutions outside the defense sector to develop strategies and postures for non-military defense in their respective sectors according to their respective duties and functions.

Furthermore, it is described in the form of implementation guidelines and regular operational procedures and compiling contingency plans under non-military threats that are predicted to threaten Indonesia. This guideline describes the non-military defense's objective of safeguarding and protecting state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and all communities' safety from non-military threats. According to the non-military defense strategy guidebook (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016) issued by the Ministry of Defense, the non-military defense system has placed government agencies outside the defense sector are being the main elements adjusted to the threats faced and receive support from other elements of the nation's power. In other words, the implementation of non-military defense is an effort to optimize the role of ministries/institutions outside the field of defense and local governments as well as other elements of the nation's power to face threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, public safety and legislation dimensions. The non-military

defense strategy aims to safeguard government sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity, and protect citizens according to its resilient nature. The non-military defense strategy is implemented through a strategy of deterrence, repression, and recovery. In the non-military defense strategy guideline issued by the ministry of defense, the ministries / agencies and regional governments' strategy in dealing with non-military threats has currently become the actual threats that attack this nation.

3.6. Non-military Defense Strategy against Irregular Warfare

Facing non-military threats in the context of irregular warfare requires a non-military defense strategy that involves all elements of the nation's power. By still paying attention to national defense interests, each ministry/agency (K / L) elaborative needs to create derivative policies according to their respective functions and roles. A response is needed to follow up on this with strategic, integrated, and comprehensive efforts formulated in a strategic national defense policy that is synergized between the ministries/agencies (Risman et al., 2018). This strategy can be realized through synergy between ministries and institutions, with the ministry of defense as the ministry responsible for all matters concerning defense in this country. The Ministry of Defense is tasked with compiling national security doctrine and strategy, which includes determining the forms of military and non-military threats that are predicted to attack Indonesia in the next five years. In compiling strategic products, the Ministry of Defense should have involved ministries/agencies outside the defense and local governments to understand the strategic product preparation process and understand each ministry/agency and local government's responsibility in the national defense system.

As an effort to strengthen vertical and horizontal synergy in dealing with non-military threats, it is necessary to develop a securitization framework based on the thoughts of Mely Caballero-Anthony and Alistair D.B. Cook in "Non-Traditional Security in Asia" (Alfajri et al., 2019). The government should carry out five stages in determining the status of non-military threats that are predicted to attack Indonesia until it reaches the policy formulation process, namely the "State Defense General Policy," which is valid for five years and becomes a guideline in implementing national defense.

First is the Issue Area. It is a process of identifying problems and testing the vulnerability level that can become a non-military threat. This process is carried out by each ministry following their respective fields and in each region by the local government. Then it is summarized by BIN to become a product of strategic environmental development. It is then submitted to the Ministry of Defense as the basis for formulating general state defense policy and other strategic products.

The second is Securitizing Actor. After the development of the strategic environment compiled by BIN has been submitted, the Ministry of Defense and ministries/agencies, as well as local governments, synergize to formulate a State Defense General Policy. It includes a priority for future threats and the main actor in carrying out defense and security efforts. Herein lies the role of ministries/agencies and local governments as the main elements in overcoming non-military threats.

The third is Security Concepts. This stage is related to the strategy formulation process carried out by ministries/agencies and local governments to overcome non-military threats that have been determined in the general policy on state defense. In the drafted strategy concept, it is necessary to prioritize the synergy of all ministries and institutions as well as local governments in the use of national resources which are transformed into defense resources and the utilization of regional spatial planning into defense territory spatial planning.

Fourth is Process. This stage is where the non-military defense strategy formulated by ministries/agencies is implemented and socialized to all parties involved. It is including the community about the total people's defense system, which places all citizens as elements of the nation's strength in facing every threat through the state defense program.

The fifth is the evaluation. In this stage, an evaluation of all strategies that have been implemented in dealing with non-military threats is carried out for three years running. In this process, it is hoped that any deficiencies in any strategies implemented by ministries and institutions and local governments can be completed in the next five years.

The synergy of non-military defense between ministries/agencies and local governments is needed to encourage more effective and efficient handling of non-military threats. In implementing the non-military defense strategy, the ministry of defense plays a very vital role. According to the mandate of the law, the state defense system is managed by the government, the defense ministry. Therefore, the ministry of defense always monitors and controls ministries and institutions and local governments in implementing non-military defense strategies in the corridors of their respective duties and functions. Also, what has been mandated by the defense law in article 7 paragraph 3, which reads, "The state defense system in facing non-military threats places government institutions outside the defense sector as the main element, in accordance with the form and nature of the threats faced supported by other elements of the nation strength." It could not be implemented optimally by ministries/agencies as the main element in dealing with the threat of Irregular warfare, which is increasingly multidimensional in shape and type and directly attacks the joints of people's lives.

4. Conclusion

From what has been previously described, regarding non-military defense strategies through the synergy of ministries and institutions in dealing with Irregular warfare, it can be concluded that the non-military defense strategy in dealing with Irregular warfare requires synergy from the ministry of defense as the manager of the state defense system and strategy with ministries/agencies and local governments as the main element in dealing with non-military threats. This synergy began when drafting the general policy concept for national defense was carried out at the ministry of defense. The synergy between all stakeholders involved in the national defense system is necessary to achieve a strong national defense in facing non-military threats. The non-military defense strategy that has been formulated and legalized needs to be disseminated to all ministries/agencies and regional governments. Therefore, the common perception will be achieved in managing and implementing the state defense strategy in each region. It is necessary to formulate a regulation that is higher than the ministerial code on non-military defense strategies that can be used as guidelines by ministries/agencies and local governments in the management and implementation of the national defense system, especially the non-military defense strategy, so that there is no overlapping in its execution.

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Tourism Activities in the Traditional Balinese House: The Challenges of Designing a Homestay in Gianyar Bali

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Abstract

The development of the tourism sector has had various effects on Balinese people's traditional practices, including the traditional Balinese house. Since the increase of Bali's tourist activities, the traditional houses for the Balinese that demonstrated not only a way of shelter but also complex cultural links have become objects of transformation. This transformation tended to fade its meanings and values, even though the Balinese have tried to maintain their culture as tourism resources. This phenomenon is an architectural challenge for the people to produce an innovative design of the transformed house. A descriptive exploratory approach with qualitative methods was used in this paper. Using interviews, field works and architectural examination in Taro, Kendran, and Ubud, this paper explores innovative designs that not only can accommodate traditional functions of the houses but also address the new demands of tourists. Some alternative models of pavilions have been built in many parts of the house, such as in the backyard, adjacent to old pavilions, or by demolishing the old pavilions.

Keywords: Balinese Traditional House, Transformation, Tourism Village

1. Introduction

Tourist activities in a traditional Balinese house have faded the traditional house's meaning and values that are tourism development resources (Putra, et al., 2019). Maintaining traditional elements of the house is significant to develop a cultural tourist area. However, the design should address the new demand for people and visitors. Therefore, an innovative design in the transformation process is significant to avoid the pollution of the house's traditional values. As a part of Balinese culture, traditional Balinese houses are an inseparable part of Balinese life. Balinese traditional house has a basic philosophy inspired by the concept of *tri hita karana* (Wastika, 2005). This philosophy is manifested in physical forms, including spatial arrangement, layout arrangement, shape, proportion, and use of materials.

The house has essential functions as a shelter giving a safe feeling, as a starting point for traveling and endpoint after returning from a long day. A traditional Balinese house is where residents can get autonomy and carry out other daily routines (Wikstrom, 1995). The house has also cultural functions since many cultural activities, followed by dance, music, and traditional songs to support the ceremony, are performed in many spaces of the houses, including the *pemerajan* or *sanggah* (the family temple), *paon* (kitchen), *teba* (backyard), *natah* (middle yard), and other pavilions (Putra, et al., 2013). Ritual practices are closely related to the implementation of the *panca yadnya* ceremonies. The *panca yadnya* are five holy sacrifices based on the teachings of the Balinese Hindu religion (Hobart, et al., 2001). These cultural elements have become the resources of tourism development in Bali. Bali's tourism activities began in 1924 when the Dutch colonial government launched a weekly boat service connecting Batavia, Surabaya, Bali and Makassar. (Picard, 1995). The prospect of economic development and growth from the tourism sector, according to the World Tourism Organization (WTO) in 2020 was 1.602 million people (Sutawa, 2012). The opportunity to develop cultural tourism has been an option for the development of tourism in Bali. However, since the opening of tourist visits to Bali until now, the development of tourism activities has influenced on traditional Balinese house layouts.

The development of tourism in Bali, including Gianyar, is parallel to government programs to increase the rural communities, role in the tourism sector. These conditions allow tourists to see, feel, and enjoy the Balinese villages traditional settlement environment. Besides natural tours, tourists also enjoy settlement areas, including the traditional houses, which are thick with Balinese culture. Since tourists enjoy staying in traditional houses, the people have constructed or transformed their houses for tourist accommodations. In this case, tourism development must be supported by all aspects and other supporting facilities such as accommodation (accommodation facilities such as hotels and villas), restaurants, travel agents, money changers, transportation, and infrastructure (Sirtha & Sunarta, 2012).

Tourist accommodations in traditional Balinese houses are one problem in designing and keep up a traditional Balinese house. Community's ability to maintain culture is a criterion for assessing tourism's cultural integrity (Picard, 2006). The limitation of public knowledge about the traditional Balinese houses and the unavailability of innovative, contextual, and integrated design models have caused problems in the houses' transformation process of. The emergence of tourist accommodation in traditional Balinese houses is a challenge for the community and designers in maintaining natural conditions, culture and community traditions.

The phenomenon that occurs is contradictory in the development of cultural tourism areas. In one side, the development of cultural tourism focuses on maintaining the authenticity, including housing to attract the attention of visitors. However, the development of traditional houses for tourist accommodations tends to adjust many parts of the house to address the tourists' demands. An investigative process is needed to explore the conflict between the authenticity of the traditional house and the tourism demands. Therefore, this paper focuses on the transformation of the morphological types of traditional dwellings. The transformation is associated with demographic changes and lifestyle changes. The transformation of housing morphology is a process of change (as a differentiating element), as well as existence (as a permanent element) that occurs in traditional houses (Putra et al., 2019).

2. The Traditional Balinese House and It's Transformation

A traditional Balinese house accommodates not only domestic activities but also socio-cultural activities. As a residential area, a house functions as a place of shelter and self-protection (Wikstrom, 1995). As a part of cultural artifacts, the traditional Balinese houses are composed of a framework of ritual activities and movements that have complex significance (Hobart et al., 2001). The spaces, arranged in a traditional Balinese house, illustrate the relationship between cultural and ritual activities. Ritual activities in traditional Balinese houses are closely related to implementing the five sacred sacrifices called *panca yadnya*, namely ceremonies dedicated to the gods (*dewa yadnya*); offerings and honors to the *sulinggih* or priests (*resi yadnya*); rituals offered to the ancestors (*pitra yadnya*); rituals related to the human life cycle (*manusa yadnya*); and rituals dedicated to other creatures (*butha yadnya*) (Wartayasa, 2018).

Based on the cosmological philosophy, humans and nature are a unity; therefore, the traditional Balinese house is likened to a world with opposite axes (Putra et al., 2019). The house is a compound house containing the *tri hita karana* philosophy and is one of the Balinese identities that continue to be preserved (Prajnawrdhi, 2018). There are various models and typical traditional Balinese house. The stratification and difference in traditional Balinese houses' space values are based on nine space zoning on the house footprint, which is often called *sanga mandala* (Gelebet, 1985). A typical house is based on several things, including size, function, ornament, and material. The house layout is centered on an open space in the middle called *natah* (Rajendra, 2012). As a manifestation of harmony in nature, Balinese people recognize three important points in life, namely philosophy, ethics, and rituals. All of those points are applied when the Balinese people build their houses. The houses have many spaces with ritual values that cannot be eliminated physically. Every space has a philosophy and value (Nurjani et al., 2019). Architectural productions are cultural products that express a tradition and culture among the members of a society and an otherness, or sharp distinctiveness, from non-members. The hierarchy of cultural activities is one of the elements in the spaces forming the traditional Balinese architecture (Satria & Putra, 2020). Before entering the house, someone will be welcomed by the presence of *angkul-angkul* and *aling-aling*; then, passing through a kitchen, then continue to other areas. This hierarchy of activities is structured from activities in the profane space towards the most sacred areas (Ferschin & Gramelhofer, 2004). The changes of activities, jobs, and lifestyle have certainly affected the development of traditional Balinese houses. Since the traditional house architecture is a concrete manifestation of the transformation and development of culture, the changes of culture in a community can be reflected in traditional architecture (Sardjono & Iswanto, 2012).

The architectural changes, especially housing, in the early 20th century, have occurred in developing countries. Local architectural styles were replaced by modern architectural styles (Mirmoghtadaee, 2009), including layout, facades, and circulation. The transformation of a traditional house is a gradual process in which the transformation involves all family members. Several factors influence the transformation of a traditional house:

- Technology, technological developments and innovations involve various aspects of life.
- Lifestyle, affecting changes and job classification, age, and level of status.
- Politics, influenced by the policies of the power holder.
- Economy, influenced by conditions and developments in the field of business and community income.

The abovementioned factors are derived based on several aspects (Malik & Hassan, 2019), including globalization, international style, social trend and customization. Globalization, including technological advances in the economy, social processes, and architectural trends, has an inspiration on society and an important role in influencing daily lifestyles. This globalization movement has also brought the exposure of international architectural style into local style. In this phenomenon, the expansion of the internet and telecommunications has made people recognize western design trends. This recognition has changed the traditional house design idea and changed the original design of the traditional house. The advanced telecommunication has been a way of the people to the transformation of social trends in which society has inspired the others and then influenced, among others, the design of the house. In this case, the social trends have also influenced customization to accommodate people's new lifestyle. This tendency has led to the owners' demand to make their house more modern to address the tourists' demands and lifestyle. Three factors transform an original traditional house into a modern house: material changes, shape changes, and spatial changes (Dwijendra, 2019).

In order to enjoy tourists, many traditional Balinese houses in Bali have been transformed. In the transformation process, there are three categories of the traditional house transformation in tourism areas (Vitasurya et al., 2018). The first category is called non-residential traditional house. In this category, most of the spaces are used for tourist activities so that there is no residential space for the owner again in the house. The second category is called residential and tourist attractions. The owner in this category is still living in the house, but most of the spaces are for tourist facilities. In the first and second category, the house's materials of the have already changed to be more modern materials, and some traditional exterior and interior elements have also been transformed to be more modern styles. On the other hand, in the third category called communal living pace and other functions, most of the house's traditional function is still maintained. The owner has just transformed few rooms for tourist facilities (Vitasurya et al., 2018).

As with other traditional houses, Balinese traditional house transformation in tourist areas can be visually assessed from the construction of various tourism facilities in the pavilions, open spaces and at the front part of the house. As a part of the front of the house, the open space between the front wall and road called the *telajakan* area has experienced many changes (Putra et al., 2019). Many tourist facilities have been built in *telajakan* by attaching new buildings to the plot wall called *tembok penyengker* and *angkul-angkul* (the traditional gate). The other transformation model is the change of the backyard's traditional function that was a small forest into tourist accommodations. Many backyards called *teba* have already transformed for tourist facilities or accommodate the increase of the family members (Putra et al., 2019).

The transformation of the traditional Balinese house has also been experienced in the dwelling area, including the pavilions, kitchen and granary. The layout setting of a Balinese traditional house places the kitchen at *kelod-kauh*/southeast zone, which is the first pavilion before people enter the *natah* (Figure 1A) However, the kitchen is considered as a service room that tends to be dirty. It visually pollutes the house's atmosphere so that in many traditional houses, the kitchen tends to be relocated to a more hidden area and is visually invisible to visitors (Figure 1B) (Putra et al., 2013).



Figure 1: Traditional house layout before and after the transformation

3. Method

This article used a descriptive exploratory approach in which the investigation and evaluation were categorized as a non-experimental phenomenon. This approach was used to investigate the transformation model of traditional houses as tourist facilities for architectural practices, settlements, and cultural spaces. The description of each object links the settlement pattern with the traditional house layout setting. This phenomenon is closely related to the context of the place (Groat & Wang, 2013). In this study, an exploration of activities, rituals, and cultural phenomena was carried out on the formation of spaces in traditional housing units.

The data collection began with tracing basic maps of settlements and housing. Based on this basic data, an inventory of the traditional houses' textures was carried out. This texture was an essential part of determining the sample of the houses that were investigated for an architectural examination of the houses. The forms and types of data collected can become architectural documentation (maps, layouts, views, and photos). These architectural documents were used to trace the relationship between architectural narratives and its inhabitants' spatial activities (Lozanovska, 2002). Investigating physical conditions and cultural activities in the house was carried out by interviewing the occupants about historical transformations that occur in the houses.

Traditional houses in three tourism villages in Gianyar consisting of Ubud, Kendran and Taro were investigated. These three villages have different levels of tourism activity. Ubud was known as the most popular tourist destinations in Gianyar. It is a village in the hinterland of Bali surrounded by rice fields and rivers. Historical, Ubud was inseparable related to the sacred journey of Resi Markandeya, a high priest from Mount Raung in East Java (Dharmayudha, 1995) to Bali. The evidence of his holy journey is marked by the existence of the Gunung Lebah Temple in Ubud. Ubud was well known as a tourist destination since the royal family of Ubud Palace invited Walter Spies, a Germany painter and musician, to come and live in Ubud in 1925 (Picard, 2006).

The second tourism village, Taro, was not developed as tourist activities in which there were some restaurant and adventure activities in the village's outskirts. Taro is located forty kilometers from Denpasar, the major city of Bali. Like Ubud Village, the development of Taro Village is closely related to the holy journey of Resi Markandeya. It can be seen from the Gunung Raung Temple that is dedicated to Resi Markandeya. Apart from Gunung Raung Temple, there is also a holy animal of Taro, namely the albino ox called *lembu putih*. This animal is believed to be a legacy of Resi Markandeya. Like a traditional village, the settlement is divided into several traditional residences called *karang* (Lazmi & Natalia, 2017). Since the village was introduced as a tourism destination, many tourist facilities have been built, such as the Elephant Tourism Park and some restaurants.

The third village was Kendran. This village has many tourist facilities such as restaurant, hotels, villas and spiritual tourism in the village and around the traditional settlement. Kendran is located in Tegalalang District, Gianyar Regency. Kendran Village is flanked by two large rivers, which give a beautiful topography. Besides, Kendran Village has a wide expanse of rice fields. The existence of nature, settlement conditions, and the heritage's uniqueness from the past are the main tourist attractions in this village. The settlements that have developed in Kendran are traditional settlements that have developed with various patterns. These traditional settlements are inseparable from the long history of the kingdom and population activities during the fourth-century in the Kendran. The existence of *puri* and *jero* around Kendran is an inseparable part of housing in the past.

4. The Transformation of the Traditional Balinese House for Tourist Facilities

The existence of traditional Balinese houses in tourist areas has its challenges and dynamics. There has been a conflict between maintaining the traditional identity and fulfilling the demands of tourists. Authenticity and identity of the traditional house is a way for the people to show people's pride. However, demands to change existing conditions have been a means to accommodate tourist and modern lifestyle. This paradoxical phenomenon was investigated in this paper by inventorying the traditional house's transformation to determine the extent of the physical changes of spaces and buildings.

The backyard of the traditional house has already experienced massive transformation since most of the backyard called *teba* has been transformed into tourist facilities, such as in Ubud, or the pavilions for the increase of the family members, including in Kendran and Taro. In this transformation, the existing setting has been maintained in which the family temple (*merajan/sanggah*), granary called *jineng*, kitchen called *paon* and traditional pavilions such as *bale daja*, *bale dauh*, and *bale dangin*, are still in original setting and functions (Figure 2). The courtyard called *natah* is still an orientation of the pavilions and a place for performing domestic and socio-cultural activities. Front the road, the house still has traditional plot walls, the open space between front walls and road called *telajakan* and the traditional gate called *angkul-angkul*. Front *angkul-angkul*, the people can enter the house and find courtyard next to the granary (Figure 3) and kitchen. The courtyard called *natah* is the orientation of the pavilions in the compound spaces of the house. At the back of the house was a *rompok* that is a small temporary building to keep agricultural tools and chicken cages.




Figure 2: Traditional house layout case 1

In the existing condition, the *teba/teben* was a small forest. In this space, many vegetation was planted for food the materials. Various kinds of vegetation were found in the *teba/teben*, including coconut, moringa, mango, and various vegetation for ceremonial purposes. In the existing condition, almost half of the site was *teba*.



Figure 3: The granary of the house

The development of tourism in the village has encouraged the owners to build an accommodation facility for tourists in their house. This accommodation was located next to the kitchen. The building has two rooms equipped with bathroom and terrace facilities. This homestay model was constructed next to the kitchen, so that tourist can witness the occupants' activities in the compound space. The homestay was designed to adapt to the conditions of the surrounding conditions. This setting was to prevent the homestay from becoming isolated from the courtyard of the house. Therefore, the homestay's basic concept was to get closer to the conditions and life of the community in the house.




Figure 4: The transformation of the setting

The increase of the tourist numbers has encouraged the owner to build more buildings for tourist facility. The *teba* was converted to a place for the new three homestay buildings. In order to apply the traditional style in the buildings, the owner used traditional style in the new buildings. The homestay appearance was expected to show

the condition of the local architectural image. The characteristic of Balinese architecture was expected to be able to animate the appearance of the homestay building. Striving for the choice of materials and building finishing colors was not conspicuous so that it can blend with the surrounding conditions. The appearance of the building still used traditional Balinese architectural principles, namely the *tri angga* concept. The head element was shown by the pyramid roof, the body element was presented from the pillars and building walls, and the legs were demonstrated from the based part of the buildings (Figure 5).




Figure 5: The façade of the building using the *tri angga* concept

The buildings for tourist facilities have also been built in the compound spaces by demolishing the traditional pavilions or adjacent to the existing pavilions. The traditional Balinese house setting consisting of *merajan/sanggah*, *bale dauh*, *bale daja*, *bale dangin*, *jineng*, and *paon* (Figure 6), has experienced a massive transformation in the domestic spaces.




Figure 6: Traditional house layout case 2

In this case, the *bale dangin*, the pavilion for performing ceremonial activities, and the *bale daja*, the building for keeping heirloom and sleeping place for elderly and girl are still maintained. The *natah* as a place for socio-cultural spaces are also still maintained. On the other hand, the *bale dauh* and the kitchen were demolished and then built the new buildings for homestay. The new buildings were just built around the *natah*. In this house, the development of homestay carried out in the domestic space so that the spaces around *natah* are no longer a family-owned domestic space but also a public zone through the presence of the homestay. The homestay takes the private zone from the owner. Besides, a new function is created as a merchant/shop kiosk facing the direct road area by utilizing the road access in front of it.




Figure 7: The transformation of the compound spaces

4. Conclusions

The traditional Balinese houses in the three tourist villages have experienced transformation. The transformation was caused by not only the increase of family numbers, but also the demands and interactions of tourists in traditional villages. Ubud Village is recorded as the largest transformation of its traditional houses, while Taro is the lowest since most of the tourist activities in Ubud are in the center of Ubud, while tourist activities in Taro is mostly in the village's outskirts.

Since there was no transformation in the family temple, the design of the family temple is still using the traditional style. However, many new designs have been produced by people to accommodate the new activities in the house, namely tourist activities. Domestic activity spaces have experienced massive transform by demolishing many pavilions. The transformation has also been experienced by the backyard called *teba/teben* in which this open space was used by the people to be a homestay. The people built many pavilions to maintain the style of traditional architecture by applying the concept *tri angga* and using color and material that similar to the natural material.

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Praja Muda Karana (Pramuka) Indonesia in the Indonesian State Defense System

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Abstract

The current dynamics of globalization resulted in a change in the social, political, economic, and national security stability dimensions. In the stabilizing dimension of state security, it can potentially cause a threat to the defense of the country. Furthermore, Indonesia's universal defense system allows the community as a supporting component to actively participate, especially in the rights and obligations in carrying out state defense and assisting the national defense. Scouting is one form of state defense organized in an official organization container, structured and clearly the legal umbrella. This study analyzes how the scout movement and the application of the values of state defense in the defense of the state? and how does the Indonesian Scout Movement function in the Indonesian state defense system?. The method in this research is descriptive qualitative by using primary data and secondary data through legislation approach, conceptual approach, and previous research findings approach. The results of the research that has been done show that the values contained in the Scout Movement and the concept of state defense have the same goal of strengthening the defense of the country. In accordance with the concept of state defense in Law No. 3 of 2003 and in Article 1 of Law No. 23 of 2019, and in accordance with Article 4 of Law No. 12 of 2010. In addition, the function of the Scout Movement in the Indonesian defense system is as a supporting component, it can be found in Article 9 of Law No. 23 of 2019 on the management of national resources that explains Article 7 paragraph (2) letter (b) that the development of state defense awareness is one of which is given to cadres of community organizations, in this case, is scout organizations.

Keywords: Indonesian Scouts, State Defense, State Defense, Supporting Components

1. INTRODUCTION

At this time, the dynamics of globalization that apply the principle of openness makes it easier for foreign capitalists to control the wealth of the earth and nature, especially Indonesia. Openness between countries due to modernization makes foreigners know the natural potentials of Indonesia that have not been processed to the maximum. With the control of Indonesia's natural resources by foreign private parties increasingly confirm that the role of the state becomes minimal. In the constitution it is clearly stated that the state is tasked to cultivate Indonesia's natural resources for the benefit of the people. The shift of the function of the state to the extent of guarding order and security is fading nationalism and slowly replaced with the understanding of globalism. (Hendrastomo, 2007).

The birth of the World Scout Movement began in 1907 when Robert Baden – Powell, a Lieutenant General of the British Armed Forces, and William Alexander Smith, founder of the Boy's Brigade, held the first Scouting camp in the Brownsea Islands, England. The idea of holding the movement came about when Baden-Powell and his troops fought to defend Mafeking City, South Africa, from boer army attacks. The word "scout" is only used in Indonesia while in the world scouts are called Scout. The movement, also called scouting, aims to develop youth mentally, spiritually and physically. Furthermore, Robert Baden – Powell held a camp as a way of fostering young people in England who were involved in violence and crime, he applied intensive scouting to 21 young men by camping on the island of Brownsea. then in 1908 Powel wrote a book on the basic principles of scouting with the title Scouting for Boys (Kurniawan, 2020).

In 1912 with the help of Agnes (her younger sister) a girl scout organization was formed under the name "Girls Guides". Then in 1916, a scout group was founded with the name CUB (wolf boy). The guidelines for his activities refer to a book by Rudyard Kipling titled "The Jungle Book". In 1918 Powell re-formed Rover Scout, a scouting organization aimed at 17-year-olds. four years later in 1922 Powel published a book called "Rovering To Succes". Meanwhile, in 1920 was a crucial year in the history of scouts where for the first time held jamboree in the world. In 1920 the International Council of Scouts was formed with a 9-member bureau and a central bureau in London. The Girl Scout Bureau has five secretariat headquarters in London and regional bureau offices in Arabia, Latin America, Europe and Asia Pacific. while the World Boy Scout Bureau has five regional offices namely the Philippines, Nigeria, Egypt, Switzerland and Costa Rica (Kurniawan, 2020).

Scouting movement in Indonesia has been started since 1923 which was marked by the establishment of Nationale Padvinderij Organisatie (NPO) in Bandung. Meanwhile, in Jakarta, Jong Indonesische Padvinderij Organisatie (JIPO) was established in the same year. The two forerunners of scouting in Indonesia merged into one, named Indonesische Nationale Padvinderij Organisatie (INPO) in Bandung in 1926 (sitasi). Outside Java, students of West Sumatra religious schools established El-Hilaal scouting in 1928 (Museum Sumpah Pemuda Handbook, 2009).

On October 26, 2010, the House of Representatives passed Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement. Based on this Law, Scouts are no longer the only organization that can organize scouting education. Professional organizations are also allowed to hold scouting activities (Mestika Zed, Emizal Amri, 2002. p, 22).

In Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement was drafted with the intention to revive and re-mobilize the spirit of struggle imbued with the values of Pancasila in the life of a diverse and democratic society. This law becomes the legal basis for all components of the nation in the implementation of scouting education that is independent, voluntary, and nonpolitical with the spirit of Bhineka Tunggal Ika to maintain the unity and unity of the nation in the container of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Jogloabang, 2019).

Meanwhile, in Law No. 23 of 2019 issued and approved in October 2019 related to The Management of National Human Resources for National Defense, it is explained that Indonesia's defense system is universal, which means that every effort made in maintaining state sovereignty upholds state sovereignty, maintains territorial integrity, and the safety of all nations from all forms of threats, will involve all national resources prepared early by the Government and organized in total , integrated, targeted through support by Backup Components and Supporting Components. Persimmon means that all national resources and infrastructure are utilized for defense efforts. Regional means that the title of defense force is carried out thoroughly in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with the geographical conditions of Indonesia as an archipelago as well as a maritime country owned by the Indonesian nation. (Permenhan No.38, 2015).

The defense of the state itself is a concept drawn up by the legal devices and officials of a country about the patriotism of a person, a group or all components of a country in the interest of maintaining the existence of the country. Physically, this can be interpreted as a defense effort to deal with physical attacks or aggression from parties that threaten the existence of the country while non-physical this concept is interpreted as an effort to

participate actively in advancing the nation and state, both through education, morals, social and improving the welfare of the people who make up the nation (Ilham, 2020).

Based on both laws and concepts of state defense that have been described above, then faced with the dynamics of globalization in the dimension of national security stability in the natural resources sector that could potentially be a threat to the defense of the country, it is very basic to be a formulation of problems related to how the scout movement and the application of values - the value of state defense in the defense of the state? and how is the function of scouts in Indonesia in the country's defense system?.

As a democratic country, Indonesia regulates in full and fairly the role of citizens in carrying out national and state life, including how the rights of a citizen and obligations must be fulfilled by citizens. In Article 2 paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution, it is explained that every citizen has the right and is obliged to participate in the defense of the state, this is why the concept of State Defense is relevant to be applied in the life of the nation and state.

2. RESEARCH METHODS

The research method used in this research is qualitative with a descriptive approach where researchers will analyze the laws and regulations written or materials of previous research findings (Yin & Robert, 2011). This type of statute approach and conceptual approach that refers to legislation and legislation is intended that researchers use laws and regulations as the initial basis for conducting analysis. Meanwhile, the approach of previous research findings are some of the research findings that were examined to be used as a basic reference for comparative materials in the study (Yin & Robert, 2011).

The data sources used in this study are Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement, Law No. 23 of 2019 on National Resource Management, Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense, laws and regulations related to this research, as well as previous studies related to the values of state defense and the Scout Movement. In addition, predetermined data sources are then analyzed aimed at making it easier for researchers to draw conclusions on research.

3. RESEARCH FINDINGS

In the general explanation of law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement, it is explained that, one of the state objectives stated in the Preagent of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 is to educate the life of the nation. Efforts to educate the life of the nation can be done through education. Scouting education is one of the non-formal education that becomes a forum for self-potential development and has noble character, self-control, and life skills to give birth to the successor cadre of the struggle of the nation and state (Jogloabang, 2019).

Meanwhile, the concept of Bela Negara is defined as an attitude and behavior of citizens imbued by his love for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in establishing the survival of the nation and the country as a whole is also regulated in the provisions of huklum policies such as the Tap MPR No.VI Year 1973 on the concept of Nusantara Insights and National Security; Law No.29 of 1954 on the Principles of Popular Resistance; Law No.20 of 1982 on the Basic Provisions of the State Hankam RI. Amended by Law No. 1 of 1988; Tap MPR No.VI 2000 on The Separation of TNI with POLRI; Tap MPR No.VII Year 2000 on the Role of TNI and POLRI; Amendment to the Constitution '45 Article 30 paragraphs 1-5 and article 27 paragraph 3; Law No.3 of 2002 on State Defense; Law No.56 of 1999 on Trained People.

Furthermore, in article 30 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution it is also explained that citizens are entitled and obliged to participate in efforts to maintain national security and defense. Here we can understand that in the context of national security and incumbents, a citizen has the right to be involved in suggesting appropriate policies related to national efforts and security, but must comply with other provisions and remain within clear ethic mechanisms and corridors. The role of citizens is also regulated in Law No. 23 of 2019 issued and confirmed in

October 2019 related to the Management of National Human Resources for National Defense explaining that the Indonesian state defense system is universal, which means that every effort made in defending state sovereignty upholds state sovereignty, maintains territorial integrity, and the safety of all nations from all forms of threats, will involve all national resources that are prepared early by the Government and organized in a total, integrated, directed.




Figure 1: State Defense Components

The exit of Law No. 23 of 2019 is also a further development of Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense which mandates related to state defense efforts, spare components, and supporting components in national defense strategies. In the main regulation, the rules on Supporting Components are stated in CHAPTER IV of Law No.2 of 2019, where in Article 17 it is explained that the Supporting Component consists of: a. Citizen; b. Natural Resources; c. Artificial Resources; and d. National Facilities and Infrastructure. Supporting components are defined as national resources that can be used to increase the strength and capability of key components and spare components. Supporting components do not form a real force for physical resistance but can be mobilized and demobilized which includes a variety of strategic material reserves, geographic and environmental factors, facilities and infrastructure on land, in the water and in the air with all elements of its equipment with or without modification.

4. DISCUSSION

Background of the Birth of the Scout Movement in Indonesia

The Scout Movement was born in 1961 where the initial regulation that was present at this pioneering period was the Decree of MPRS Number II / MPRS / 1960, dated December 3, 1960 on the plan to build the National Universe Plan. In this statute can be found Article 330. C. which states that the basis of education in the field of scouting is Pancasila. Furthermore, control of scouting (Article 741) and scouting education in order to intensify and approve the Government's plan to establish Scouts (Article 349 Paragraph 30). Then scouting to be freed from the remains of Lord Baden Powellism (Att. C Verse 8).

The decree, gives the obligation for the Government to implement the points stated in the decree and this is also the reason presiden / Mandataris MPRS on March 9, 1961 gathered figures and leaders of the Indonesian Scout movement, located at the State Palace. At the official meeting of the Scout Movement, the President said that existing scouting must be renewed, methods and educational activities must be changed, the entire scouting organization is melted down into one called The Scouts. The President also appointed a committee consisting of Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Minister P and K Prof. Prijono, Minister of Agriculture Dr. A. Azis Saleh and Minister of Transmigration, Cooperatives and Village Community Development, Achmadi.

This committee certainly needs a clear legal umbrella so that then the Presidential Decree No.112 of 1961 dated April 5, 1961, on the Executive Committee for the Formation of Movements. Members of this Committee

consisted of Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Prof. Prijono, Dr. A. Azis Saleh, Achmadi and Muljadi Djojo Martono (Minister of Social Affairs). This committee then processed the Articles of Association of the Scout Movement, as an Attachment to presidential decree No. 238 of 1961, dated May 20, 1961 on the Scout Movement.

Furthermore, Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement (Scout Movement Law) is the legal umbrella for the scout movement. The Scout Movement in Indonesia has been carried out based on Presidential Decree No. 238 of 1961 concerning the Scout Movement which was amended by Presidential Decree No. 57 of 1988 concerning ratification of the Articles of Association of the Scout Movement, Presidential Decree No. 34 of 1999 concerning ratification of the Articles of Association of the Scout Movement, and Presidential Decree No. 104 of 2004 on ratification of the Articles of Association of the Scout Movement. The President's decision made some Scout movements such as Hizbul Wathon under Muhammadiyah should merge into the Scout Movement. Participle scouting was forced to land and only resumed when the Reformation rolled in 1998. This regulation is not contained in the hierarchy of laws and regulations in Indonesia, because it is based on Article 7 paragraph (1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations. The lack of a legal basis for the scout movement is one of the considerations of the establishment of the Scout Movement Law (Pramuka, 2012)

Scout Movement and Implementation of State Defense Values

According to (Ilham, 2020), scouting is an ideal organization to be an integrated development organization for state defense, considering that the Scout Law has been systematically regulated regarding Scout education at several levels; The level of education "standby" emphasizes the formation of personality, and skills in the family environment through play and learning activities; The level of education "fundraiser" emphasizes the formation of personality and skills in order to prepare for the plunge in community activities through learning activities while doing; The level of education "enforcer" emphasizes the formation of personality and skills in order to participate in building the community through learning activities, doing, group work, and competence; The level of education "pandega" emphasizes the formation of personality and skills in order to participate in building the community through activities to the community.

Meanwhile, according to Budiwibowo, (2016) scouting is a form of attitude and implementation of citizens imbued by a love for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in living the life of the nation and state by guided by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. Awareness to foster the spirit of State Defense through Scout activities needs to be increased because of the emergence of the influence of globalization that threatens the lives of Indonesian people in the life of the nation and state.

This is in line with the purpose of the establishment of the Scout movement, where in Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement, Article 4 explained that the Scout Movement aims to form an attitude that upholds the noble values of the nation, and has the ability to live as a cadre of the nation in maintaining and building the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, practicing Pancasila, and preserving the environment. Pramuka itself is a manifestation of the application of the values of state defense, where the defense of the state is interpreted as the determination, attitude, and behavior and actions of citizens, both individually and collectively in maintaining the sovereignty of the state, territorial integrity, and the safety of the nation and state imbued by its love for the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945 in ensuring the survival of the Indonesian nation and the State of various Threats.

In addition, the scout movement aims to form a personality that is faithful, godly, noble in character, patriotic, law-abiding, disciplined, upholds the noble values of the nation, has the ability to live, be healthy physically, and spiritually; Being a citizen who is Pancasila spirited, loyal, and obedient to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and become a good, and useful member of society, who can establish himself independently and jointly responsible for the development of the nation, and the state, has concern for others, and the environment (Sofyan, 2020).

Furthermore, the application of the values of state defense can be implemented based on the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 Year 2002 on State Defense. Every citizen has the right and mandatory to participate in state defense efforts organized through citizenship education, mandatory basic military training, service as a soldier of the Indonesian National Army, and service in accordance with the profession.

Meanwhile, in Article 1 of Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning The Management of National Resources for State Defense (PSDN Law) which implicitly explains that The Development of State Defense Awareness is all efforts, actions, and activities carried out in order to provide knowledge, education, and /or training to citizens in order to develop attitudes and behaviors and instill the basic values of State Defense.

According to (Tuahunse, 2009), the basic values in carrying out the defense of the state are: Love of the homeland, National and state awareness, Belief in Pancasila as the ideology of the state, Willing to sacrifice for the nation and state, Have the initial ability to defend the state. This is in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia Number 32 of 2016 concerning Guidelines for The Development of State Defense Awareness. The values of state defense that have been formulated consist of: 1) Love of the Fatherland, 2) National and State Awareness, 3) Sure of Pancasila as the ideology of the state, 4) Willing to sacrifice for the Nation and State and 5) Having the initial Ability to Defend the State.

Thus, basically the Scout Movement and the implementation of state defense have the same goal of strengthening the defense of the country. It can be known through the concept of state defense in Law No. 3 of 2003 on state defense that explains the rights and obligations of every citizen in following the state defense efforts, in Law No. 23 of 2019 on National Resource Management in Article 1 which explains related to the Development of State Defense Awareness, and in Law No. 12 Year 2010 on Scout Movement in Article 4 which describes related to the purpose of the Scout Movement.

Scouts in the Indonesian State Defense System

The period before the independence of Indonesia the formation of the character of the Indonesian nation has been formed through the lifestyle of mutual cooperation, tolerance, togetherness, mutual respect and respect. These noble values as the times fade. Currently Pancasila, the details of Pancasila, the Opening of the 1945 Constitution, the Text of the Proclamation of Independence, and the story of the nation's history are not so memorized by some Indonesians (Wartini et al., 2019). In addition, the influence of foreign cultures that come to invade the Indonesian nation is increasingly fading the love of the Indonesian people's homeland. This is a threat to the defense of the country where the character of the nation will be eroded due to cultural influences from abroad.

Furthermore, Indonesia is one of the countries in the world that is very vulnerable to natural disasters. Climate change is increasingly extreme globally, and Indonesia's position in the ring of fire (The Ring of Fire), is one of the triggers of frequent maritime disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and this becomes a security threat considering Indonesia is a maritime country that geographically consists of 2/3 of the sea area and island clusters.




Figure 2: Disaster Event Trends of the Last 10 Years

Source: National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB)

It should be understood that with Indonesia's vulnerability in terms of disasters, it has an impact on national stability, thus allowing for weakening of the country's defense system if not through appropriate prevention and handling mechanisms.

As a description of the constitution on the aspects of defense, the Indonesian nation has drafted Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense which stipulates that the Indonesian State Defense System is a universal defense system involving all citizens, territories, and other national resources. This is an effort to synergize the performance of military and non-military components in order to maintain, protect and maintain Indonesia's national interests. The Universal Defense System combines military defense and the nonmilitary defense that support each other in upholding state sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of all nations from all threats. In Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense, it is affirmed that as a manifestation of the persimmon, the involvement of all citizens in the efforts to defend the state is an obligation as well as a right.

In Law No. 23 of 2019 regulated on the role of citizens in Article 6 (1) that "Every Citizen has the right and obligation to participate in the efforts of The State Defense manifested in the implementation of State Defense" so that the defense of the state is also one of the efforts that must be carried out as an obligation and rights that must be obtained by the Indonesian Scouts. The participation of Pramuka Indonesia as an Organization and non-formal Education can also be found in Article 9 of Law No. 23 of 2019 concerning the management of national resources related to the Development of State Defense Awareness of the community as referred to in Article 7 paragraph (2) letter b aimed at citizens who include: religious leaders; community leaders; indigenous leaders; cadres of community organizations; cadres of community organizations; cadres of professional organizations; cadres of political parties; and other community groups.

In Article 15 of Law No. 23 of 2019 on the management of national resources there is an explanation of the role of citizens who must serve in accordance with their respective professions for the benefit of national defense that are prepared early to face military threats, nonmilitary threats, and hybrid threats through membership of reserve components and / or supporting components. The role of the community itself is directly coordinated by ministries / non-ministerial government institutions in accordance with the field of profession related to the duties and functions of ministries of non-ministerial government institutions.

We can understand that through Scout organizations, citizens can take a big role in efforts to strengthen national defense from potential military threats, nonmilitary threats, and hybrid threats. Pramuka Indonesia is actually one form of efforts to educate the nation's cadres in permeating the value of nationalism and able to prove in a patriotic attitude. The potential for increasingly complex threats makes It necessary for Indonesia to understand that many

sources of state power can be empowered in an effort to maintain national stability, such as Pramuka Indonesia. As a supporting component, Pramuka Indonesia is an organization that has a different unit called The Scout Work Unit (Saka) or is a forum for education to channel interest, develop talent, improve the knowledge, ability, skills and experience of Scouts in various vocational fields and motivate them to carry out real and productive activities.

This value can provide provision for his life and his devotion to the People of the Nation and State in accordance with the aspirations of Indonesian youth and the demands of development development in order to increase national defense. The Work Unit is intended for Scout Enforcers and Scouts Pandega or youth aged between 16-25 years with special conditions. Each Unit of Work has several krida, each of which specializes in a particular sub-field of science. Each Krida has a Special Proficiency Requirement to obtain a Special Proficiency Mark of the Karya Unity Group that can be obtained by Scouts who join certain Krida in the Saka.

The Scout Work Unit also has a special activity called The Scout Work Unit Bakti Camp abbreviated pertisaka which is carried out by each saka, while the activities carried out jointly more than one saka called Inter Unit Scout Work Camp abbreviated Peransaka. Peransaka activities include transferring the scientific fields of each Unit of Work. In practice, Pramuka Indonesia has a series of activities and skills training, this becomes the capital for the country in increasing the role of Scouts in the Indonesian state defense system.

5. CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion above, the author can draw some conclusions, namely first, related to the Scout Movement and the implementation of the values of state defense in the values of the Scout Movement and state defense has essentially the same meaning and purpose that is to strengthen the defense of the country. This is in accordance with the concept of state defense in Law No. 3 of 2003 on state defense, in Article 1 of Law No. 23 of 2019 on National Resource Management, and in accordance with Law No. 12 of 2010 on the Scout Movement in Article 4 which explains the purpose of the Scout movement. Second, the Scout Movement in the country's defense system serves as a supporting compound. It can be known on the purpose of scout organizations through non-formal education which contains elements of state defense and in accordance with Article 9 of Law No. 23 of 2019 on the management of national resources for the defense of the state that explains Article 7 paragraph (2) letter b that, Fostering Awareness of State Defense community scope is given to religious leaders; community leaders; indigenous leaders; cadres of community organizations; cadres of community organizations; cadres of professional organizations; cadres of political parties; and other community groups. In the context of this research, the guidance was given to a cadre of community organizations, namely scout organizations.

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The Driving Factor for Stability of Voter Turnout in Southeast Asia: The Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Elections

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Abstract

The objective of the study was to describe voter participation (turnout) in South East Asia, particularly in Indonesian and Malaysian elections from 2004–2019, and the factors that cause stable participation. The participation of voters (turnout) in Malaysia's elections from 2004–2018 is 73.90–84%. The participation of voters in Indonesia's elections from 2004–2019 is 70.99–84.09%. This means that voter participation in the last three election periods was stable in both countries. This study shows that four factors cause stable participation: political awareness, rationality, political perceptions, and electoral orientation that is candidate-oriented. The theoretical implication of this study was to strengthen Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni, and John G. Matsusaka's theory about voter political participation or voter behaviour on election day. The originality of this study is that there are special characteristics behind stable political participation in Indonesia and Malaysia. Methods of data collection in this study is based on literature study and analytical method uses the descriptive analysis method. This study also uses a political comparison approach to analyse data.

Keywords: General Election, Voter Participation, Civic Duty, Rational Behaviour, Candidate Orientation, Democracy

Introduction

A general election is a mechanism in choosing representatives of the people or political leaders in the political system of democracy. This mechanism is applied in many countries, including Southeast Asia. However, when it is applied, there is a difference in the results of voter participation: a 40–90% variation (See Table 1). This study shows an interesting phenomenon. It turns out that the participation of voters can be potentially “strength” as well as a democracy's weakness if the leadership process evaluation turns into a process of evaluating the political system.

Table 1: Percentage of Election Participation in Southeast Asia (2013–2017)

Country	Election Years	Participation in Election
Thailand	2014	46.79%
Cambodia	2013	68.49% / 69,5*
Singapore	2015	93.56%
Indonesia	2014	75.11%
Laos	2016	97.94%
Malaysia	2013	84.84%
Myanmar	2015	69.72%
Philippines	2016	81.95%
Timur Leste	2017	76.74%
Vietnam	2016	99.26%

Sources: (Thailand Saphaphuthan Ratsadon (House of Representatives), 2014) (Final Election Observation Report on Cambodia's 2013 National Election, 2013, p. 18)* (Kok, 2015) (Press Release Polling Day Voter Turnout – Singapore General Election 2015, 2015) (Aritonang, 2014) (Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2020) (Croissant & Lorenz, 2018, p. 127) (Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections July 22, 2017, 2017, p. 40) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020).

General election participation in Southeast Asian democratic countries shows that it is still above 40%. The results signify the last three periods of election data. In Thailand, for example, the participation of voters in 2014 is 46.79%, whereas Cambodia has 68.49% of participation (See Table 1). The result of the two countries in each election demonstrates a decrease in the amount of participation from the last election. Participation in those countries indicates that a range of the public has an interest in exercising their rights in general elections, the results of which are increasingly visible when paired with voter participation in Singapore. Singapore, in 2015, has 90% participation in their election, and this took place in the last ten elections (Political Parties in Singapore, 2018). Consequently, some countries have remarkably high and medium results of voter participants.

Critics of this data show that voter participation is not the only indicator in a democracy. It can also be argued that the stable participation of voters can illustrate that neither the public nor the electorate is saturated with the political system. It is because voter participation is not requested daily, but once every few years. Moreover, the government spends a substantial amount of money in order for the election to take place. Thus, it has become an anomaly that voter participation is an interesting challenge in democracy. This system provides freedom in choosing politically, although political rights that have been granted are not always used by citizens.

What about the participation of voters in the Indonesian and Malaysian elections? Indonesia and Malaysia have interesting election experiences. This study compares voter participation in these two countries and analyses the driving factors of participation of voters as well. There are three reasons for choosing these two countries. First, they have a multi-party system. Second, the government is formed based on a coalition of political parties. Third, voters are comprised of various ethnicities (Hai, 2002).

Singapore is a country with stable political participation, but it has different characteristics from its neighbour's in Southeast Asia. One of them includes economic power. Additionally, the percentage of voter political participation is very high compared to Indonesia and Malaysia, which is the reason why Singapore was not analysed in this comparative study.

Literature Review

General elections and political participation are issues that have received much attention from political researchers (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 21) (Quiroga, & Cabello, 2018). The discussion about the first election (Alapuro, 2006) is an important aspect of understanding voter behavior in a country. Party identification is an important aspect of the 2009 election in South Africa (Kersting, 2009). Another study attempts to establish whether or not rainfall has a negative impact on voters (Ščepka et al., 2016). Research conducted in 2019 by Piotr Michalak (Michalak, 2019) uses the cartographic method to predict turnout by using demographic data. Mircea Comșa (Comșa, 2017) revealed

that the reduction in turnout by around 0.4% was caused by an increase in the migration rate of 1%. Pitri Yandri (Yandri, 2017) explains that there is a spatial correlation between a voter's vote and political participation.

Niels Nørgaard Kristensen and Trond Solhaug's research (Kristensen & Solhaug, 2016) concludes that there is a relationship between political identity and participation. The existence of political identity has consequences for the emergence of participation. Ivanenko KA's article (Ivanenko, 2013) analyses voter behavior models, which, according to him, require a new conceptual framework including a component of public opinion. Other studies (Acuña-Duarte, 2017) discuss that there is a relationship between the level of voter registration and economic background.

Thomas Tozer (Tozer, 2016) stated that incentives in the form of money are one alternative solution to increase the participation of young people to vote in elections. This method is better than the method of requiring the use of votes because this method does not interfere with freedom in elections. The right to vote or not remains protected without coercion. Iván M. Durán's study (Durán, 2018) illustrates television as a medium that can increase voter turnout. Víctor A. Hernández-Huerta (Hernández-Huerta, 2016) found that negative advertising did not affect turnout, especially in the case of Mexico in 2006. Elzbieta Bilska-Wodecka and Roman Matykowski (Bilska-Wodecka & Matykowski, 2015) have revealed that the Catholic Church influences turnout as well.

There are many other studies about participation in elections. Jeronimo Cortina and Brandon Rottinghaus examined the relationship between voting centers and voter participation (Cortina & Rottinghaus, 2019). Johanna M.M. Goertz and Kirill Chernomaz (Goertz & Chernomaz, 2019) conducted an experiment to test how constituents voted. Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit (Holliday & Pacuit, 2019) attempted to find a combination of electoral methods. Abbas Nargesian, Dariush Tahmasebi Aghbolaghi, and Yashar Dindar (Nargesian et al., 2014) analyzed political marketing (traditional or modern tools) on voter participation. Robert Bonifácio and Rafael Paulino (Bonifácio & Paulino, 2015) discuss whether there is a relationship between corruption and increasing voter participation in elections.

Kevin Curran (Curran, 2018) introduced an application for voting—a blockchain application. Micha Germann and Uwe Serdült (Germann & Serdült, 2014) analysed the application of internet voting in Switzerland, especially for expatriates. Adam Bonica (Bonica, 2016) initiated a scalable strategy whose focus was on providing information about the US political elite as a candidate in the election. If we analyse the description of the study of participation, we can conclude that the development of the study of political participation covers diverse scientific disciplines. This means that it is not limited to political science disciplines. Some innovations are working on being developed regarding the study of voter behaviour, although according to Simon HA (Stadelmann & Torgler, 2013), voter trust in political institutions is important.

Method

Methods of data collection in this study are based on the literature study (internet source, news, documents, report, book, academic journal) and presentation likewise analysis of data uses descriptive analysis method. The idea of this study is about the similarity of phenomena driven by different factors in each country. Theoretically, there are some explanations about the factors that can cause it. According to Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (Feddersen & Sandroni, 2006), one of the factors is voter consciousness. According to Feddersen and Sandroni, "Participation in large democratic elections is influenced by voters' sense of civic duty" (Feddersen & Sandroni, 2006, p. 1282). A comparative political approach, which is used in this study, is a way to study a foreign country based on its comparative politics approach (T. Lim, 2010, p. 3).

Another theory suggests that voters use their rights in politics because of the who they believe in. John G. Matsusaka states that voters will decide to use their rights because of what they believe in and the advantage that will be given in return. John G. Matsusaka states, "The key link is that a person's expected benefit from casting a decisive vote is increasing in her certainty that she is supporting the best candidate. As a result, the person is more

likely to vote as she/he is sure about which way to vote” (Matsusaka, 1995, p. 112). Therefore, the decision is very rational. The political choice is made based on the calculation of profit or loss, or what will be obtained. In other words, it is not just about going to the polls and utilizing the right to vote.

Elections in Southeast Asia

Elections in Southeast Asia have a unique dynamic. Every country has an electoral experience. Some countries are not democratic, but they still hold elections. The only country that does not hold elections is Brunei Darussalam (see Table 2) (Brunei Darussalam, 2020) (“Brunei Darussalam: Constitution and Politics,” 2020). Vietnam has held regular elections. In the 20th century, Vietnam held elections four times: in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2016 (see Table 3). Political participation data shows voter participation in Vietnam is very high. According to Phil Robertson (Deputy Asia Director at Human Rights Watch), the general election in Vietnam is related to the strength of the Communist Party there (Lewis, 2016).

Table 2: Lowest Percentage of Election Participation in Southeast Asia in Last 20 Years (2000–2020)

Country	Election	Participation in Election
Thailand	2014	46.79%
Cambodia	2013	68.49%
Singapore	2011	93.18%
Indonesia	2009	70.99%
Laos	2016	97.94%
Malaysia	2004	73.90%
Myanmar	2015	69.72%
Philippines	2007	63.68%
Timur Leste	2017	76.74%
Vietnam	2002	98.85%
Brunei Darussalam	No Election	No Election

Source: (Thailand Saphaphuthan Ratsadon (House of Representatives), 2014) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020) (Timor-Leste Parliamentary Elections July 22, 2017, 2017) (“Brunei Darussalam: Constitution and Politics,” 2020) (Brunei Darussalam, 2020)

If we look at the data in Table 3, it can be seen that elections in Vietnam are held every five years. According to Martin Petty, in the 2016 general election, there were around 69 million registered voters (Petty, 2016). According to data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the number of registered voters is about 67.5 million. Voters who use their voting rights amount to 67 million (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020). According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) data, the number of registered voters is less than 67.5 million (Election for Vietnamese National Assembly, 2016). The 2016 general election was held on May 22 (Hong, 2016).

Table 3: Percentage of Election Participation in Vietnam in Last 20 Years (2000–2020)

State	Election Years	Participation in Election
Vietnam	2016	99.26%
Vietnam	2011	99.51%
Vietnam	2007	99.64%
Vietnam	2002	98.85%

Source: (South-Eastern Asia, 2020) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020)

Laos is a country with one political party (Stuart-Fox, 2007). This country is a communist social country. Elections in Laos show the phenomenon of a country with high political participation. Participation in this country is 95% more. Only Vietnam can match the turnout in the general election in Laos. Another country that can almost compete with Vietnam and Laos is Singapore (See Table 3 and 4). Participation in elections in Singapore is always above 90% (except in 1972) (See Table 4). The difference between Singapore and Vietnam and Laos is that Singapore has many political parties. Examples are the People’s Action Party, Workers’ Party, Justice Party; in

Singapore, they include the National Solidarity Party, People's Power Party, Peoples Voice, and other political parties (Political Parties in Singapore, 2018) (Lim, 2020) (Huat, 2007).

Cambodia is a country that is experiencing a young democracy (Strengthening Electoral Processes and Democratic Practices in Cambodia: Report on Forums on Elections and Democratic Space, 2011) (Roberts, 2002). The country held six general elections (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018). Political participation in elections in this country fluctuates. The lowest voter turnout data is under 70% (2013). The highest voter turnout is more than 90% (1998). Timor-Leste is also a young democracy in Southeast Asia. The first parliamentary elections in the country were held in 2001, the second election in 2007, the third election in 2017, and the fourth in 2018 (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020). Elections in Timor-Leste are also held to elect a president every five years.

Table 4: Lowest Percentage of Election Participation in Vietnam, Laos, & Singapore in Last 20 Years (2000–2020)

Country	Election Years	Participation of Election
Vietnam	2002	98.85%
Laos	2016	97.94%
Singapore	2011	93.18%

Sources: (South-Eastern Asia, 2020) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020)

A very real test of democracy is in Myanmar. The data shows that elections have been conducted since 1956, but after that, there was a coup in 1962. The 2015 election was the one that received the most attention because it had offered hope of democratization in Myanmar when Aung San Suu Kyi had won. However, the military shadow in politics still remains (Aktar, 2020) (Ghoshal, 2013). Voter participation in 2015 is below 70%. Elections in Thailand in 2014 (February 2) show complex election cases (Searight, 2019) (Chalermphanupap, 2019) (Kongkirati, 2016) (Head, 2014). This general election was reported to take place in an atmosphere after the 2014 military coup (Editorial Staff, 2019a) (Editorial Staff, 2019b). Elections in the Philippines also experienced challenges (Manikas, 2004). Still, political participation in the 2016 and 2019 general elections is above 70%, likewise, in the presidential election.

Elections in Malaysia and Indonesia

General elections in Indonesia and Malaysia were held in different years. However, in 2004, both countries held elections in the same year. The last three elections in Malaysia were held in 2013, 2008, and 2004, while in Indonesia, they were held in 2014, 2009, and 2004. Malaysia held its election on May 5, 2013, and in Indonesia on April 9. Malaysia also held an election on May 9, 2018 (GE14) (Funston, 2018) (Nadzri, 2018) (GE 14 Results Overview, 2020). In 2019 (Lane, 2019) (Stott, 2019) (Fionna & Hutchinson, 2019), Indonesia held an election on April 17.

The election of Malaysia is known as Pilihan Raya Umum Malaysia (PRU). In Indonesia, it is known as legislative elections (*Pemilihan Umum Legislatif*), and in 2019 turn into Concurrently Legislative and Presidential Election 2019 (*Pemilihan Umum Serentak Legislatif dan Presiden 2019*). This activity is carried out by an election organizer named Indonesia General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia*) (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), 2020). While in Malaysia, it is named Election Commission of Malaysia (*Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia*) (Official Portal of Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (SPR), 2020). The election in Malaysia was held during 8:00 am–5:00 pm, and in Indonesia, 7:00 am–1:00 pm. The duration of the election in Malaysia is longer than the election in Indonesia (See Table 5).

Table 5: General Information about the General Elections in Malaysia (2013) and Indonesia (2014)

Information Identification	Malaysia	Indonesia
Name of the Election	Pilihan Raya Umum Malaysia (PRU13)	Pemilihan Umum Legislatif
Date of Election	May 5, 2013	April 9, 2014
Number of Voters	13,268,002	185,826,024
Participation of Voters	11,257,147	139,573,927
Voting Place	8,245	545,803
Voting Room	25,337	2,160,000
Time of Election	8:00 am–5:00 pm	7:00 am–1:00 pm
Carried Out by	Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia	Komisi Pemilihan Umum RI
Number of Parties	23 political parties	15 political parties
Cost of Election	RM. 460.000.000	Rp. 15,62 Triliun (Billion)

Sources: (Portal Rasmi Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (SPR), 2020) (Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU), 2020) (Mohd Sani, 2014) (Werdiningsih, 2013) (Humas, 2019)

The number of voters in Indonesia is greater than the number of voters in Malaysia. In 2014, the number of voters in Indonesia was over 185 million. In Malaysia, there are 13 million voters with more than 25,000 voting rooms. These data were based on the election from 2013. Indonesia had more than two million voting rooms in 2014. With 15 political parties, the cost of an election in Indonesia is more or less 15,62 Trillion Rupiah (Humas, 2019).

Different Factors with The Same Impact

The participation of voters in Southeast Asian countries is more than 40%; some even reach 90%. Hence, it is likely that there is very high or medium participation in those countries. All of the above is dependent on voters' interest to use or not to use their rights in general elections. In Malaysia, in 2004, the participation of voters was 73.90%; in 2008, 75.99%; and in 2013, it reached 84.84%. It can be said that from 2004 to 2013, there was a rapid increase of about 2–8% (see Table 6 and Chart 1).

Table 6: Percentage of Voter Participation During 2004–2019 (Indonesia & Malaysia) in Last 20 Years (2000–2020)


Election Year	Indonesia	Malaysia
2004	84.09%	73.90% 73,92%*
2008	-	75.99%
2009	70.99%	-
2013	-	84.84%
2014	75.11%	-
2018	-	84.+++%
2019	80.90%	-

Sources: (Moten & Mokhtar, 2006, p. 332)* (Aritonang, 2014) (Suth-Eastern Asia, 2020) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020)

The participation of voters in Indonesia's election in 2004 is 84.09%. In 2009, the amount decreased to 70.99%, which means there was a 12% reduction. In 2014, the amount of participation of voters increased to 75.11% (Editorial Staff, 2014). There was a 3.5% increase. So, the pattern of participation of voters in the last three elections is stable. In 2019, voter participation rose to 80.90%.

In general, the participation of voters in Indonesia and Malaysia's elections show a high interest of voters; the number of voters is stable and above 60%. This amount shows that there are times when voters do not want to exercise their rights in political choice, especially with the changes related to voters' interest in using suffrage. In other words, there is a driving factor for voters to use their suffrage.

Chart 1: Percentage of Voter Turnout During 2004–2019 (Indonesia & Malaysia)



Sources: (Moten & Mokhtar, 2006) (Aritonang, 2014) (South-Eastern Asia, 2020) (South-Eastern Asia Voter Turnout Database - Parliamentary Data for 11 Countries, 2020)

Typically, the first driving factor is the awareness of a citizen who thinks that choosing in elections is important in the political or democratic process. It is almost impossible for a voter to use his suffrage without awareness as a citizen who has suffrage. To choose a leader or a representative in a parliament democracy, voters should know that the election is a political mechanism. According to Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (Feddersen & Sandroni, 2006), there is a sense of civic duty. In Indonesia, these conditions are affected by political socialization, especially the message about the importance of participation of citizenship as voters in the general election. The government named Komisi Pemilihan Umum as an organizer of the election. In Indonesia and Malaysia, there is not a formal penalty if voters do not use their suffrage. As a result, voters are given the freedom to use or not to use their suffrage.

The second factor is the behaviour of voters' rational choice. Voters believe that their choice and the result of the election will provide an impact on their future lives, especially regarding development and economic interest. Theoretically, John G. Matsusaka (Matsusaka, 1995) explains that voters will decide to use their rights as voters because they believe in their choice and the benefits they will receive. This rational choice appears to be the characteristic of elections in Malaysia. Some studies show voters' behaviour in Malaysia to be the rational choice. For example, studies have been conducted by Junaidi Awang Besar, showing that "voting behaviour in the constituency of Pasir Mas, that the rational choice theory approach is more dominant than party identification theory and the model of sociology" (Besar, 2017, p. 97).

The third factor is the beliefs of political parties. Political parties are considered capable of instilling confidence in voters to carry out their campaign promises. Among the options of existing political parties, most political parties are considered capable of fulfilling their promises. A good track record of the party in several periods has dispelled doubts among voters that they will not be deceived by the promises of campaigns and programs that were already presented to them. In other words, perceptions of political parties have influenced political participation.

In PRU 13, Malay voters in Kedah (Malaysia) decided to choose UMNO-BN. It happened because UMNO-BN is considered to be more capable of providing better hope in the future (Mohd Nizar Sudin et al., 2016, p. 83) (Fionna, 2008). Thus, in Malaysia, the attitude of distrust of other parties has no impact on the emergence of voter apathy. Instead, voters are trying to improve their choices during the election; the voters go against political parties that

are incapable of fulfilling their promises and programs by choosing another party. The voters do not disapprove of the system by being apathetic and not using their voting rights in the election.

The fourth factor is the change of voter orientation that is based on their choice of the candidate's orientation. This phenomenon especially happens in Indonesia. This analysis is based on the result of the representative's election. Most voters have selected candidates, and some choose a party but not as many choices of candidates. This is the impact of voters who have the freedom to vote for parties or candidates on ballots. As a result of the proportional system with an open candidate list, the changes of selection in elections are not always identical to the changes of party choices, but there may also be a choice of candidates in the same party.

Conclusion

Most country in Southeast Asia has an electoral experience (Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines), including non-democratic countries (Laos, Vietnam), except Brunei Darussalam. General elections in Indonesia and Malaysia are interesting to observe because there are similarities among those countries. Those similarities are related to the participation of voters. The participation of voters in the Indonesian and Malaysian elections demonstrates the phenomenon of stable participation. In the last three elections, there was 70% of the participation of voters. The participation in Malaysia in 2018, 2013, 2008, and 2004 is 84.4%, 84.84%, 75.99%, and 73.90%. Meanwhile, the participation in Indonesia in 2019, 2014, 2009, and 2004 is 80.90%, 75.11%, 70.99%, and 84.09%. It can even reach up to the highest level at about 84%. These similarities are followed by driving factors: awareness as a citizen who thinks that participation in the political process is important in a democracy. In addition, Malaysia is the main driving factor that was influenced by rationality and political perspectives. In Indonesia, the main driving factor was influenced by changes in voter orientation that are based on the choice of the candidate's orientation.

Limitation and Further Studies

Studies have limitations on several things. First, the limitations of the scope of the state. Most Southeast Asian countries are democratic countries, but this study is limited to only two countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, local elections in Indonesia and Malaysia are not analysed in this study. Third, the explanation of why people do not exercise their right to vote in elections is also not analysed in this study. As an implication of the limitations of this study, there are some interesting questions to be investigated going forward. Are there differences in the number of voters participating in local and national elections? Is the difference significant? Why do these differences occur? If there is no difference in the number of voters participating in local and national elections, then the question is: Why is there no difference in participation among local and national elections?

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Sustainable Development: Factors Influencing Public Intention towards Vertical Farming in China and Moderating Role of Awareness

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Abstract

Vertical farming brings an innovation in agriculture sector by improving production of food in optimized space within controlled environment without wastage of natural resources by using an automated technological system. It acquiring prominence around the world however incapable to accomplish goals, reason was lack of awareness, lack of public intention and participation towards vertical farming. This study filled the gap in prior literature and adding more creativity to influence public intention. The research used TPB to investigate the factors influencing public intention toward vertical farming and a moderating role of awareness. Data collected from Chinese consumers by convenience sampling technique, total 335 responses obtained and analyzed by using Structural Equation Model. The result of the study demonstrated that food safety and environmental concern are the best predictors of public intention towards vertical farming. Further awareness significantly strengthened the relationship between food safety concern and public intention. In the conclusion, study proposed appropriate recommendations to local government, stakeholders, urban planners, and food companies for the best practices to facilitate the successful implementation of vertical farming as sustainable for environment and health, which is also profitable business as public intention concurs.

Keywords: Vertical Farming, Environmental Concern, Food Safety Concern, Awareness, Public Intention

1. Introduction

World population increase up to 29% by 2050, arable lands will only increase with less than 5% over the same period. According to report of UN the growth of world population will reach to 8.3 billion in 2050 (*World Population Prospects*, 2013). With the rapid growth of universe, many disputes escalating. A major issue occurs is to feed the ever-growing population as a conventional way of food production is inadequate. With ever-growing population urbanization is the biggest challenge that world facing; great shift from rural to urban areas. Studies revealed that many developing countries promoting urban agriculture in response to occurring issues due

to urbanization but the problems still exists. With this rapid growth of population around the world, China is having world biggest population of 1.43 billion. A total land area of China is 9388271 km² and 60.8% population is urban with median age of 38.4 years ("China Population ", 2020). According to the UN reported that urban population of China would increase 350 million by 2050 and 219 cities have more than one million populations compare to 35 cities in Europe (*World Population Prospects*, 2013). With this ever-growing urban population China facing various challenges of urbanization, food insecurity and food safety issues, environmental degradation, land deterioration and agriculture pollution, unemployment rate wastage of natural resources, natural disaster and increasing demand of fresh and healthy food and agricultural labor aging problems as young people are not interested to engage with the farming practices and the rest of the farmer are above 60 age (Al-Kodmany, 2018; Dubbeling et al., 2011; Tiraieyari et al., 2019). Urban designer and planner realize the significance of urban agriculture as it is an important urban element which is sustainable development as a global trend towards sustainability (Bailey, 1915), but the conventional way of farming in urban areas is inadequate; its development is not compatible with sustainability and also become reasons of environmental pollution and food safety issues in China. These issues bring policy makers, urban planner and researcher think about innovation in agriculture sector to conquer the surging problems and make sustainable cities, one such innovation is known as Vertical Farming.

According to Despommier Vertical farming is sustainable development in a city level, which increase the growth of food and response positively toward environmental pollution, food safety, urbanization and land deterioration (Despommier, 2010). Vertical Farming grows crops inside tall buildings within controlled environment by the use of an automated system. It also increases the growth of food without the use of chemical spray or pesticides and has no adverse effect of climate changes. Vertical Farming is a new form of sustainable development in a city level which has the ability to perform as an alternative model to conventional farming (Bailey, 1915). It can develop in any part of the world without any limitation of climate changes because plants grow indoor within controlled-environment without any adverse effect of climate variability, which means food grows much faster than conventional farming. The key objective of VF is to improve food security in developing countries or low income countries (Cicekli et al., 2014). An author reported that CF fed 12.5 people per day by one acre whereas VF fed 97 per day with the same space area (Ankri, 2010). VF can strengthen the local economy by reducing the energy cost, save the cost of fertilizers, preserving the cost of long distance transportation and fuels used to supply food (Safikhani et al., 2014).

Various plant factories also known as vertical farms in China are; Agricultural S&T park in Xiaoshan, Zhejiang with an area of 40,000m², Agricultural S&T park in Sunqiao, Shanghai with an area of 50,000m² and vertical farms in Shunde, Guangdong with an entire space of 50,000m², using both artificial and solar lights. The 250m² vertical farm in Fuzhou, Fujian produces head 260,000 lettuces. Dr. Yang concluded that "China will develop more indoor Vertical Farms than any other nations, VF improving growth of food uses automated system within controlled environment and less adverse of climate changes are all benefits of vertical farms" (Dr. Qichang Yang, 2015). Vertical farming gain popularity all around the world and China has massive population insides cities because of a great shift from rural to urban areas (Kan, 2009). In China existing vertical farms marketed as sustainable development, but few has not achieved goals, reasons are lack of financial and infrastructure support by a government, lack of public participation and a failure of implementation, lack of public awareness and intentions. People are more concern about environmental protection, food safety, locally food production, the price of food, naturalness, an absence of pesticides, ethics and norms. However, these are important drivers while supporting urban agriculture or purchase of food, agricultural innovation in the developing countries depends on the concern of public (Carola et al., 2013; Corinna et al., 2015; G.Grunerta et al., 2008). This subject is essential because vertical farming is gaining popularity in many countries and views as feeding a growing population, produced food in any region without adverse effect of climate changes, protect the environment and a make city sustainable.

Different researches have been conducted to examine motivating factors that have been found to be substantial in formation of consumer attitude, behavioral intentions and acceptance of urban agriculture, aquaculture, purchasing organic food or systems (Asif et al., 2018; Bilal et al., 2015; Michaelidou et al., 2007; Mingyan Yang

et al., 2015). To best of author understanding some motivating factors in formation of public intention in the context of Vertical Farming as sustainable development was lacking and has not been sufficiently examined. In earlier studies, Lack of awareness among the consumer became obstacles in acceptance and implementation of vertical farming system as sustainable development, but in a various framework, their presence found as best predictors or moderators on behavioral intention (Asif et al., 2018; Jürkenbeck et al., 2019). Prior researches have exposed relationship among influential factors with purchase intention of consumer towards aquaculture, green and organic products.

In the perspective of previous literature, this study aim was to identify the role of motivating factors that are Food safety concern and Environmental concern in predicting Public Intention towards Vertical farming by uses existing *Theory of Planned Behavior*. Factors adopted from the previous theoretical framework are the best predictors in the formation of public intention. Further Awareness was missing in a previous literature play a vital role as moderator in this study to strengthen the relation between factors and public intention intentions towards VF as shown in figure 1.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Theoretical Background

Previous researches related to attitude and behavioral intentions towards organic farming, urban agriculture, aquaculture, organic food among consumers, farmers, agricultural professional and juvenile (Bilal et al., 2015; Gotschi et al., 2007; Krøvel et al., 2019; Stobbelaar et al., 2007). Fewer quantitative researches that identify the public behavioral intention toward vertical farming and purchase of its products have done in China. People recognize naturalness, food safety, environmental protection, an absence of pesticides and price value are important drivers of their food choices and in developing countries agricultural innovation based on the concern of the public. Role of public towards the support of sustainable development is very important. In prior researches, influential factors play a vital role in formation of behavioral intentions toward organic farming, acceptance of vertical farming systems or purchase of food by using various models based on "*Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior, Model of Pro-Environmental Behavior, and Technological Acceptance Model*" (Bilal et al., 2015; Gotschi et al., 2007; Jürkenbeck et al., 2019). The author suggested TPB for future studies as it is the most appropriate and powerful mechanism in predicting behavioral intention by examining interaction between social, individual and environment factor (Koshkaki et al., 2018). In this study Public intention represented the actual behavior of a public and whole concept depends on the theory of planned behavior to examined influential factors on public intentions towards Vertical farming as sustainable development and use of its products in China. Further Role of awareness of VF has been established that missing in previous literature to enhance the relation between factors and public intentions.

2.2. Research Hypothesis

Influential factors play a vital role in this study to positively affect intentions. External factors added in this proposed model adopted from various studies. According to author behavioral intention is the best predictor of actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991).

2.2.1. Environmental Concern [ENC]

Environmental concern defined as public concern about environmental deterioration and willing to solve those issues. An individual's concern for environmental problems has positive intentions towards any subject or system that makes an environment sustainable. People are becoming more environmental conscious and willing to play their role in any way to protect it (Bilal et al., 2015). Researchers recommended that environmental concern, general attitude towards an environment and perceived environmental responsibility are all emotions that support public to have positive an attitude and intentions towards sustainable agriculture activities that help

or make an environment sustainable (Stobbelaar et al., 2007; Storstad, 2003). Many prior studies showed a strong relationship between ENC and BI. Study-related to a green product indicated that ENC positively affect the behavior intention of consumers (Aman, 2012). ENC is one of the strong motivating factors to formed behavior intention in a related study of purchase of organic food and green products (Davies et al., 1995; Hutchins et al., 1997). Environmental protection or concern is one of the important influence behavioral intentions towards the purchase of any product or accept or support of any system. ENC play a critical role influencing the behavior intention of the public toward support of VF and use of its product. People have positive behavioral intention towards support of innovation in urban agriculture which makes a friendly environment. Based on above-mentioned literature following hypotheses developed as;

Hypothesis 1: Environmental Concern significantly influence public intention towards the Vertical Farming

2.2.2. Food safety concern [FSC]

Food safety and hygiene are top priority among people. Food safety concern defined as public concern about food-related issues or diseases. People are concern about food safety and have the ability to overcome food-related issues like food poisoning by the use of healthy and safe food. Prior study's author revealed that the consumer's willing to pay for the value linked with safety of food (Henson, 1996). Consumer more concern about health and food safety has positive behavioral intention toward innovation in food production. An author revealed in study that FSC is the most important factor of attitude and intention (Michaelidou et al., 2007). study that FSC is the most important factor of attitude and intention (Michaelidou et al., 2008). In the light of study related to organic food, food safety was a major reason behind the purchase of organic food (Henson, 1996). Food Safety in vertical farming is top priority as food grown organically within controlled environment without the use of the chemical spray or pesticides which greatly lower the risk of diseases in plants (Despommier, 2008). Based on above-mentioned literature following hypotheses developed as;

Hypothesis 2: Food Safety Concern significantly influence public intentions toward the Vertical Farming

2.2.3. Moderating Effect of Awareness of VF

Lack of awareness of vertical farming among consumers become obstacles in the acceptance of vertical farming systems and lack of support by the government become a failure of its implementation in city level (Jürkenbeck et al., 2019). Awareness is an individual's perception, knowledge about something or facts of anything. Many people know about conventional farming, urban farming, organic food, but fewer aware of vertical farming as a sustainable development in city level. More people aware about an object the more positive intention they have toward it. Some theoretically established the role of awareness as moderator to strengthen the relation between attitude and intention, it moderate significantly among attitude and intention to purchase. Awareness was a major factor that significantly influence consumer intention toward the purchase of organic food (Kapuge, 2016). In this study awareness act as moderator indicates awareness of vertical farming. It means people more aware of product or benefits have more behavioral intention towards it. The result of study concluded that awareness moderate positively on behavioral intention (Asif et al., 2018).

Hypothesis 3: Influence of Environmental Concern on Public Intention towards Vertical Farming is moderated by Awareness

Hypothesis 4: Influence of Food Safety Concern on Public Intention towards Vertical Farming is moderated by Awareness

2.3. Research Model




Figure 1: Proposed Research Framework

3. Research Methods and Material

3.1. Data Collection and Sampling

The present study conducted online with the used the method of convenience sampling that gave opportunity to collect a large number of data in limited time and resources. Before data collection questionnaires first translated with the help of experts into Chinese to collect data from Chinese consumers in China, then again translated back into English for analysis. The data collected from Chinese consumers living in Hefei, a city of China. A Chinese citizen had been chosen because China has the biggest population in the world and Chinese people have more capability to reflect their choices about eco-friendly products. The data collected between Septembers to October, 2020. A total 500 questionnaires were circulated among Chinese consumers through online software via email, weChat and QQ. A total 359 questionnaires returned from respondents with high rate, i.e. 72%. Finally, 335 questionnaires used for further analysis after excluded 24 questionnaires due to invalidity. Demographic characteristics of the study were summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Demographic Statistics

	Description	Frequency	Percentage
Gender	Male	121	36.1
	Female	214	63.9
Age	18-25	188	56.1
	26-35	78	23.3
	36-45	50	14.9
	46-55	16	4.8
	56-65	3	9
	Income Level	Less than or equal to 1000	139

1001-3000	55	16.4
3001-6000	65	19.4
6001-9000	38	11.3
9001-12000	20	6.0
12001-15000	6	1.8
15001 or above	12	3.6
Total	335	100.0

3.2. Measurement Items

In the present study, the total four constructs that measured by using five Likert scale ranging from [Strongly Agree = 5] to [Strongly Disagree = 1]. The author stated that Likert scale examines the respondent to specify how much they strongly agree or disagree with statements (Malhotra, 2006). In the present study, measurement variables reflected each of the constructs adapted from previous researches. Food Safety Concern has 3-items adapted from (Michaelidou et al., 2007; Nguyen et al., 2019), Environmental Concern has 3-items adapted from (Kilbourne et al., 2008; Paul et al., 2016). Awareness as moderator with 4-items adapted from (Ambali et al., 2014) and Behavioral Intention contains 5-items adapted from (Mostafa, 2009; Paul et al., 2016).

3.3. Tools for Research Analysis

A research analysis was done by the use of IBM SPSS Statistics version 23 and AMOS version 24. A two-step approach was applied to test a measurement model for validity and reliability through different practices as CFA etc. Then a structural model scrutinized to test model fit and hypothesis testing with the help of standardized regression coefficient β and *p-value*. Initially, data was screened through EFA (exploratory factor analysis) and deleted the cross-loading item.

4. Result

4.1. Measurement Model, testing of reliability and validity

CFA was performed to examine the validity of constructs. Before a measurement model item has removed to make a model fitness, the CFA presented good model fit and values were chi-square CMIN: 146.519, DF: 71, CMIN/DF: 2.064, (good of fit index) GFI: 0.943, (adjusted good of fit index) AGFI: 0.916, (Tucker-Lewis index) TLI: 0.957, (comparative fit index) CFI: 0.966 and (root mean square error of approximation) RMSEA: 0.056. All model fit value as AGFI: 0.916 cut of level of .80 (Chau et al., 2001), CFI were 0.966 and all values were well higher than the suggested criteria (Bagozzi et al., 1988). The RMSEA were 0.056, less than 0.08 recommended by (Browne et al., 1993).

Chronbach alpha coefficient is the most common technique to explore the internal consistency of indicators of each construct. Values of chronbach alpha coefficient ranged from 0.741 to 0.893, which were above the suggested value of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2006); Composite Reliability ranged from 0.753 to 0.896 which shows all constructs met the accepted standard of 0.60 or higher (Bagozzi et al., 1988). The values of AVE (Average Variance Extracted) ranged from 0.506 to 0.717 which were above the accepted value of 0.50 (Hair et al., 2006). Factor loadings of each measurement items fall in ranged from 0.645 to 0.894, which exceeding threshold level of 0.50 (Kline, 2011).

Table 2: Measurement Model; Result of Reliability and CFA Analysis

Constructs	Measurement Items	Cronbach's α	Standardized Factor Loading	CR	AVE
Public Intention towards Vertical Farming	BI1	0.893	0.819	0.896	0.634
	BI2		0.748		
	BI3		0.660		
	BI4		0.862		
	BI5		0.872		
Awareness	AW1	0.881	0.894	0.883	0.717
	AW2		0.830		
	AW3		0.814		
Environmental Concern	ENC1	0.769	0.668	0.775	0.535
	ENC2		0.776		
	ENC3		0.747		
Food Safety Concern	FSC1	0.741	0.645	0.753	0.506
	FSC2		0.680		
	FSC3		0.799		

Note: FSC: Food Safety Concern, ENC: Environmental Concern, AW: Awareness, PI: Public Intention

Discriminant Validity calculated as were confirmed adequate validity. As table 3 \sqrt{AVE} greater than the correlation among constructs, which shown values of Discriminant validity larger than a correlation between constructs.

Table 3: Discriminant Validity

	PI	AW	ENC	FSC
PI	0.796			
AW	0.504***	0.847		
ENC	0.348***	0.199**	0.732	
FSC	0.435	0.282	0.319	0.711

Note: Bold values represent [Discriminant Validity], others are the correlation among constructs. PI: Public Intention, AW: Awareness, ENC, Environmental Concern, FSC: Food Safety Concern.

4.2. Hypothesis Testing and Structural Model Analysis

Structural Model Analysis used after reliability and validity to examine model fit and hypothesis testing. For structural model fit, the most commonly used measured are CFI, GFI, AGFI, TLI and RMSEA as mentioned in table 4.

Table 4: Result of Structural Model Fit; Indices

Model Fit Indices	Structural Model Fit	Reference Values
Chi-square CMIN	189.600	N/A
CMIN/DF	2.562	>1 & <5 ^a
CFI	0.948	$\geq 0.90^a$
GFI	0.926	$\geq 0.90^a$
AGFI	0.895	$\geq 0.80^d$
TLI	0.937	$\geq 0.90^c$
RMSEA	0.068	$\leq 0.08^b$

Note: a Source: (Bagozzi et al., 1988), b. Source: (Browne et al., 1993), c. Source: (Bryne, 2013), d. Source: (Chau et al., 2001)

Further standardized regression coefficient (β -value and p-value) examined to test hypothesis statements of conceptual model. The outcomes of hypothesis testing demonstrated in table 5, outcomes of hypothesis testing supported H1, H2, and H3 excludes H4. Hence evidence proved that the environmental concern with ($\beta = 0.197$,

$p \leq 0.001$) positively significant influence a public intention toward Vertical farming and supported *Hypothesis H1*. Food Safety Concern with evidence ($\beta = 0.298, p \leq 0.001$) also strong predictor of Public intention and supported *Hypothesis H2*. To investigate the moderation effect, an interaction term was established by multiplying exogenous composite construct (environmental concern and food safety concern) with a moderator composite construct (awareness). The interaction term of environmental concern was not significant on public intention which showed that awareness was not moderating the relationship between them. Awareness as moderator had a strong effect between food safety concern and public intention toward vertical farming with evidence ($\beta = 0.095, p \leq 0.050$). It proved that awareness enhance the relationship between food safety concern and public intention towards the vertical farming. TPB provided theoretical framework to examine a motivating factor that influence public intention. A proposed model explained well squared multiple correlation (Adjusted $R^2 = .460$) in measuring public intention towards the purchase of vertical farming products.

Table 5: Result of Structural Model Fit; Indices

Hypothesis	Statements	Estimates (β -value)	Significance (p -value)	Result
H1	<i>Environmental Concern significantly influence public intention towards the Vertical Farming</i>	0.197	$p \leq 0.001$	Supported
H2	<i>Food Safety Concern significantly influence public intention towards the Vertical Farming</i>	0.298	$p \leq 0.001$	Supported
H3	<i>Influence of Environmental Concern on Public Intention towards Vertical Farming is moderated by Awareness</i>	-0.038	$p \geq 0.001$	Not Supported
H4	<i>Influence of Food Safety Concern on Public Intention towards Vertical Farming is moderated by Awareness</i>	0.095	$p \leq 0.050$	Supported

5. Discussion and Conclusion

The present study aim was to investigate the motivating factors that affect public intention towards the vertical farming with a moderating role of awareness. Prior studies conducted to investigate factors influence behavioral intention towards organic farming, organic products, organic food, and aquaculture. The present study filled the gap in literature by investigating factors (Environmental concern and Food safety concern). The outcomes of this study revealed that Environmental concern was a positively significant predictor of public intention towards the vertical farming, which leads towards supporting the finding of previous studies (Bilal et al., 2015; Hutchins et al., 1997). In this study Environmental concern play crucial role and indicated as a strong predictor of public intention, which is aligned with (Aman, 2012; Davies et al., 1995) who found ENC as egoistic motive. The reason behind this is people concern about environment protection supported sustainable development in city level. Vertical Farming is sustainable development in which food growing in a vertical stack insides tall building within a control environment. Consumers who are more environmentally conscious supported the vertical farming production and use of its products.

Secondly, the findings of present study concluded that food safety concern significantly influence intention of public towards vertical farming. Increasing consumer concern about food safety, give chances to policy maker and food industries to understand the intention of public towards vertical farming. Today's world food safety is very important factor people more concern about food safety will not compromise on safety measures and in vertical farming food safety is top priority as food grow in a tall building without the use of chemical spray and pesticides. The result of this study supported the fact and findings of previous research which revealed that food safety concern significantly influence behavioral intention (Henson, 1996; Michaelidou et al., 2007). Further

awareness moderates positively, the estimate of an interaction term of food safety concern was significantly positive with public intention. Food safety concern significantly influence on public intention and its interaction term increase impact on public intention. Awareness as moderator strengthens the relationship among food safety concern and public intention towards vertical farming. Public more concern of food safety has enough awareness about vertical farming supported the purchase of vertical farming products and its development. In case of environmental concern, there is no moderation effect. Environmental concern has significant impact on intention, and the interaction term of environmental concern was negatively non-significant with public intention. Hence, the relation between environmental concern and public intention non-significantly moderated by awareness. The reason was consumers have insufficient awareness about the environmental benefits of vertical farming. A conceptual model developed in this study to examine the public behavioral intention by using **TPB** (Theory of planned behavior). The author suggested a *theory of planned behavior* as the strongest mechanism to inspect behavioral intention, prior studies has used TPB, examined consumers purchase intention in the perspective of organic food (Asif et al., 2018; Paul et al., 2016).

In this study environmental concern and food safety concern found to be the best indicators of public intention towards the vertical farming. Present investigation recommended policy makers, urban planners, food companies and local government to support the successful implementation of vertical farming in city level. People more concern about environment and food safety supported the vertical farming as sustainable development. China has the biggest population in the world and Chinese are more concern about environment protection and food safety. Government should support development of vertical farms by providing funds and subsidies to food companies for the successful implementation of vertical farming without any hurdles. Policy maker and urban planners should provide vacant spaces e.g. a warehouse, unused buildings, shipping containers for the establishment of vertical farming in city level. Chinese supported the development of vertical farming as it grows food within controlled environment and food safety is first priority. Government should implement policy to increase knowledge and endorse benefits of vertical farming, increase the consciousness about risk factors of conventional farming. In this study, where the relationship between food safety concern and intention significantly moderates by awareness, it also not significantly moderates between environmental concern and public intention towards vertical farming. Hence, there is need of more awareness of the benefits of vertical farming, so that it will gain more popularity and make a city sustainable.

Limitation of this study provides route to future researches. Firstly, in this study generalization of a result restricted due to specific target population and sample size. A larger sample size can lead to the meticulous findings of hypothesis testing in future researches. Secondly, in future studies, researchers could investigate more predictors that affect behavioral intention in the context of vertical farming. Further, quantitative studies are essential insight of vertical farming.

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Implementation of Law No. 23 of 2004 Concerning Elimination of Domestic Violence (PDKDRT) in Upholding of Women's Rights (Case Study: In the City of Makassar)

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Abstract

This study aims to determine the implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Upholding Women's Rights, as well as supporting factors and inhibiting factors in Makassar City. This research is a qualitative research with data collection techniques using observation, in-depth interviews, document studies, and descriptive data analysis techniques. The research informants were 11 female victims of violence in the Makassar City area P2TP2A consultants, P2TP2A officers, citizen shelters, and female activists who provide assistance against Cases of Domestic Violence. The results of the data analysis show that the informants experienced complex problems due to the violence they experienced, there was a misunderstanding from the informants regarding the concept of domestic violence, informants were reluctant to use the PKDRT Law in handling their cases because of the assumption that the domestic violence problem was in the Domestic area and became taboo to bring to court.

Keywords: Implementation, Domestic Violence, Woman's Right (HAP)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence against Women divides the scopes for violence against women into 3 areas, namely in the family (domestic), in the community (public domain) and carried out by the state (state). This division of scopes then revealed many crimes that have been hidden and protected from outside intervention to help victims of various forms of violence in the family. This is known as domestic violence. One of the important things that have received serious attention by the government in the reform era is the issue of violence.

Domestic violence, including violence committed by husband and wife or violence by parents against children, to be regulated by a law. This is because domestic violence is a form of violation of human rights and crimes against humanity, it is also an act of discrimination.


There are a number of reasons why domestic violence that occurs in Indonesia should be called a crime. Broadly speaking, these reasons can be categorized into three basic reasons, namely:

- (1) Reasons based on facts;
- (2) Reasons based on state commitments; and
- (3) Reasons based on the experiences of other countries.

Indonesian women in general, until now, still experience various forms of discrimination and violence in their lives, both in the household and in their families. This is a fact that is difficult to deny, especially when we also include the violence they experienced in certain spheres of life at the community and state levels. A collection of facts shows the occurrence of various forms of violence in household. Most of the victims are women and children. Various impacts of life threatening violence. These women are a legal fact that must be the main consideration in declaring these acts as a crime against humanity.

In the context of Makassar City, which is the location of the research, it can be seen from the data that the issue of violence against women needs the attention of all stakeholders because from the description of the case in Makassar City based on the data entered in Integrated Service Center for the Empowerment of Women and Children (P2TP2A), it can be seen in the graph below that this figure is quite high, this is what was reported to P2TP2A service provider, what about the unreported?

Figure 1: Data from the Integrated Service Center for the Empowerment of Women and Children in Makassar City



Observing from the scope of acts of domestic violence, it is an act against someone, especially women, which results in physical, sexual, psychological trauma, and / or neglect of the household, including threats to commit acts of coercion or illegal deprivation of liberty within the scope of the household. Most of the victims of domestic violence are women (wives) and the perpetrators are husbands, although there are also victims who are on the contrary, or people who are subordinated in the household. Perpetrators or victims of domestic violence are people who are related by blood, marriage, breastfeeding, caregiving, guardianship with husbands and children and even household helpers who live in a household. Not all acts of domestic violence can be handled completely because victims often cover up on the grounds that they are tied to cultural, religious structures, and do not yet understand the applicable legal system. Whereas protection by the state and society aims to provide a sense of security to victims and to take action against the perpetrators.

Several factors that cause domestic violence are:

- Men and women are not in an equal position
- Society considers men by instilling the notion that men must be strong, brave, and merciless
- Domestic violence is considered not as a social problem, but a personal problem in the relationship between husband and wife.

1.2. Formulation of the Problem

The existence of the PKDRT Law has been running for sixteen years. Satjipto Rahardjo (2009) analyzes that the existence of a law or regulation does not necessarily provide justice, considering that the law enforcement process itself is a very complex process. Thus, the existence of a law will not necessarily guarantee protection in society and therefore it is necessary to conduct a separate study on the extent to which a law is implemented. Likewise for the PKDRT Law, this Law needs to be examined to what extent its implementation so far has had an impact on the protection of victims of domestic violence as mandated by the PKDRT Law.

The importance of examining the implementation of the PKDRT Law is related to the need to review the state's responsibility for the protection of victims of violence as a manifestation of the state's obligation to protect women's rights as stated in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Convention of Elimination of All Form of Discrimination Against Women -CEDAW). Indonesia has ratified CEDAW since the existence of Law no. 7 of 1984 concerning the Ratification of CEDAW and therefore bound to carry out the obligations as stipulated in CEDAW.

Several studies on the implementation of the PKDRT Law are linked to the protection of the rights of women as victims of violence, illustrating that the PKDRT Law has not been maximally implemented, and the rights of victims to get justice are not yet in accordance with the enforcement of women's human rights. Therefore, it becomes interesting to see whether the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City is the inhibiting and supporting factor for the implementation of the PKDRT Law.

1.3. Previous Studies

There are several previous studies that can be used as a reference in this study. Hamidah Abdurrachman (2010) with the title Legal Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence in District Court Decisions as the Implementation of Victims' Rights. Her research illustrates that the PKDRT Law has not accommodated victims' rights to receive material compensation for the suffering they have experienced, either in the form of restitution or compensation. In the Court Decision, the Judge still ruled based only on "what is written" in the PKDRT Law and did not include the rights of the victims as a substitute for the suffering they experienced.

Dewi Mutiara, SH., MT and Hasmonel SH., M.Hum. (2013) entitled Fundamentals of the Implementation of Law Number 23 Year 2004 concerning the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Protecting Victim Witnesses. Her research illustrates that the implementation of the PKDRT Law in general has not provided protection for victims of Domestic Violence Cases, especially when reporting their cases to law enforcement officials. The victims who report their cases to law enforcement officials tend to be apathetic about getting justice.

Emilda Firdaus (2014), with the title Implementation of Law Number 23 Year 2004 regarding the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Batam City. Her research illustrates that the implementation of Law Number 23 of 2004 in Batam City has not been optimal, this is due to the limited understanding of Gender Perspectives by both the community and APH, which results in a lack of protection of the human rights of women victims of domestic violence.

Joint Study between Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection of the Republic of Indonesia. The National Commission on Violence Against Women (2018), Urgency to Speed Up the Optimization of the Implementation of Law Number 23 of 2004 concerning the Elimination of Domestic Violence. The results of the research illustrate that there are still multiple interpretations. So there is a view that the definition of Article 2,

Article 6, Article 7, Article 8, Article 9, Article 44 paragraph (4) is unclear. The existing decisions also show that there is an operational definition that can be used by law enforcement officials to implement the PKDRT Law but this still requires the willingness and ability of Law Enforcement Officials, it must also be supported by institutional support from law enforcers. Various understandings related to domestic violence create uncertainty in the implementation of Law no. 23 of 2004 both in law enforcement, community support and governance so that the handling of domestic violence cases tends to harm the rights of victims.

Based on previous research, this study aims to obtain information on the implementation of Law No. 23 of 2004 on the Elimination of Domestic Violence (PKDRT) in Enforcement of Women's Human Rights in Case Studies in Makassar City. As well as seeing what the Inhibiting and Supporting Factors for the Implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City.

1.4. Literature Review

In various international accords, Conventions and declarations on Human Rights, the content regarding the obligation to eliminate discrimination on sex differences has become one of the inherent missions in the pursuit of gender equality, including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

In order to fight for women's rights and gender equality, the CEDAW Convention is based on three main principles, namely:

- 1) Principle of Substantive Equality;
- 2) Principle of Non - Discrimination;
- 3) Principle of State Obligations.

Within these three Principles lies the "prism of women's human rights", which becomes the lens for examining, correcting, and eliminating all forms of gender discrimination.

In the context of the application of the PKDRT Law as part of Respect, Protection and Fulfillment of Human Rights (HAM) is a guarantee that must be provided by the State to its citizens. The elimination of all forms of violence is a form of protection of human rights, including violence against women. This guarantee has generally been agreed internationally as outlined in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1999) and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (1993).

As a UN member country that has approved, signed, and ratified these conventions, the Government of Indonesia is obliged to embody the points of implementation of the convention. The commitment of States participating in the convention at the level of implementation in their country is very important so that the convention is not just a commitment on paper. Therefore, in 1992, CEDAW issued General Recommendation No.19 which obliges States which have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to include the issue of violence against women in their reports. This recommendation also emphasizes that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously prevents women from enjoying their freedom and rights equal to that of men. Although existing human rights aim to protect all human beings, men and women, in practice human rights have not been applied equally. The understanding of how human rights can or should protect women remains underdeveloped.

In the context of the PKDRT Law, women who are victims of domestic violence receive protection as stated in Article 10 that victims are entitled to:

- a. Protection from the family, police, prosecutors, courts, advocates, social institutions, or other parties either temporarily or based on the stipulation of a protection order from the court;
- b. Health services according to medical needs;

- c. Special treatment relates to confidentiality;
- d. Assistance by social workers and legal aid at every level of the examination process in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations;
- e. Spiritual guidance services.

2. METHOD

The method in this case is defined as a way that must be done to achieve goals by using certain tools. Meanwhile, research is an attempt to find, develop, and test knowledge using certain methods. A research method will describe technically the methods used in research (Sutrisno Hadi, 1997: 3). This research is a qualitative research that uses a case study format by making groups an object to be studied intensively, in-depth, in detail and comprehensively (Sanapiah, 2008). This type of research also uses gender studies as a perspective and analysis to explore gender inequality in seeing the behavior and products produced by the research object.

2.1. Data Sources and Data Collection Techniques

The data collected in the study consisted of:

1. Primary data is data obtained from direct interviews with 11 victims of domestic violence (from P2TP2A, Citizen Shelter, Makassar LBH, LBH APIK Makassar), as well as 5 victim assistants (3 from P2TP2A and 2 from resident shelters), 2 the person of the Women's Activist.
2. Secondary Data, namely data obtained by researchers from related institutions or agencies, such as Women's NGOs, as well as data on research reports and library materials in the form of books, journals, and print or online media.

The analysis model used in this study consists of two in accordance with the formulation of the problem, namely:

1. Data analysis in this study was carried out in a descriptive qualitative manner, namely the presentation of data and information used to answer the first problem formulation regarding the implementation of the PKDRT Law as a form of upholding women's human rights, as well as the formulation of the second problem concerning the Inhibiting Factors for the Implementation of the PKDRT Law and the formulation the third problem concerns the supporting factors for the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City.
2. Data analysis also uses gender analysis to understand social reality in providing meaning, conceptions, assumptions, ideologies and practices of relationships between men and women and their implications for wider social life (Fakih, 2003).

The substances analyzed are as follows:

1. The implementation of the PKDRT Law is a form of upholding women's human rights in Makassar City. At this stage we will analyze the extent of the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City, whether in Makassar City there is already a policy that supports the implementation of the PKDRT Law, besides that it will see whether services are available for victims of domestic violence both in a referral and institutional system.
2. Factors that become obstacles to the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City, at this stage we will analyze what are the inhibiting factors both externally and internally so that the PKDRT Law cannot be implemented.

3. The factors that support the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City, at this stage it will analyze what are the supporting factors both externally and internally so that the PKDRT Law cannot be implemented.

2.2 Characteristics of Participants

1. Informants 1 to 11 are victims of domestic violence
2. Head of the Makassar City Women's Empowerment and Child Protection Agency.
3. Consultants and Officers of the Integrated Service Center for the Empowerment of Women and Children (P2TP2A) who provide assistance to the Victims (2 participants).
4. Management and Members of the Citizen Shelter who provide assistance to the Victims (3 participants).
5. The Founding Board of 'Dewi Keadilan' who is also a Women Activist and actively provides assistance for women victims of domestic violence.
6. The Director of LBH APIK Makassar who is also a Women Activist and actively provides assistance for women victims of domestic violence.

Table 1: Results of Direct Interview with Victims

No	Name of Informant	Level of Education	Occupation	Relationship after marriage	Range of time experienced	Form of violece			
						Physical	Psychological	Sexual	Economic
1	AR	Bachelors	Consultant	Dating	5 Years		1		1
2	RR	Bachelors	Private Employee	Dating	13 Years	1	1	1	1
3	AT	Bachelors	Civil servant	Dating	6 Years		1		1
4	NR	Bachelors	Entrepreneur	Dating	13 Years	1	1		1
5	WY	Bachelors	Civil Servant	Dating	2 Years		1		1
6	NU	High School	Housewife	Match-made	3Years		1		1
7	AN	High School	Housewife	Match-made	10 Years	1	1		1
8	HS	High School	Private Employee	Dating	1 Year	1	1		1
9	NN	Bachelors	Entrepreneur	Dating	3 Years	1	1		1
10	AD	High School	Honorary	Dating	3 Years		1		1
11	LS	Bachelors	Consultant	Dating	12 Years	1	1		1

2.3. Sampling Procedure

Data collection techniques are methods used to obtain data and information needed in research. Researchers collect data and are equipped with various information through Field Research which is a way to obtain primary data that directly involves informants and is used as a sample in the study. The data collection techniques used by researchers were as follows:

1. Observation

At this stage a discussion was held with the leadership, the Regional Apparatus Organizations involved in this case the Makassar City Women Empowerment and Child Protection Office, P2TP2A Consultants, P2TP2A Managers and Women Activists who actively provide assistance for women who experience Domestic Violence, to get an overview of the cases of violence that occur within the scope of the family in Makassar City, and discussing what is the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City.

2. In-Depth Interview

Data collection was carried out by conducting direct conversations in the nature of question and answer with research informants or resource persons. To get information from informants as data that researchers will analyze further.

In conducting interviews, researchers use the interview guide to make it easier for researchers to communicate with informants, interviews are conducted openly and in a structured manner and questions will focus on the problem so that the information collected is sufficiently complete and in-depth. To further refine the results of the data, unstructured interviews were also used. The researcher asked questions more freely and comfortably, without being bound by the arrangement of questions that had been made previously.

3. Official and Personal Documentation

Documentation is collecting data by observing, recording, and collecting documents, as well as other data related to the problem. This technique or method is used with the intention that researchers can obtain secondary data that is closely related to the research focus and will add completeness in analyzing research data.


The data obtained through in-depth interviews are reduced and put into patterns, categories, focuses, or themes to be understood. Collecting data, displaying data, and drawing conclusions are not something that takes place linearly, but are an interactive cycle. (Sanapia, 2008).

4. RESULTS

Based on the analysis of the implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Makassar City, the results show that:

- a. The implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City does not run optimally in general. A number of cases of Violence against Women and Children in Makassar City is still high, based on the data in P2TP2A Makassar City.


Figure 2 : Data on Cases of Violence against Women and Children



To find out the extent of the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City in this study, the researcher selected 11 informants (victims) who would be interviewed in-depth regarding the violence that has been experienced in the household.

The results of interviews with informants regarding the forms of violence experienced can be seen in the diagram below:


Figure 3: Forms of Violence Experienced



Based on the forms of violence that occurred, out of 11 respondents, data were obtained that about 45% experienced physical violence, 9% experienced sexual violence and 100% experienced economic and psychological violence. The results of the analysis of the data show that overall respondents who experienced physical violence also experienced psychological and economic violence. This shows that the perpetrators of violence in addition to having power over the body of the victims, also hold economic assets. This situation makes victims tend to endure the violence they have experienced, so that their economic and family needs can be fulfilled.

Meanwhile, data on informants who experienced violence based on the type of work can be seen in the diagram below:


Figure 4: Victims of Violence by Sector of Occupation



From the results of interviews with 11 informants, 82% of victims were women who worked in the public sector. This illustrates that even though women have their own income, they are still vulnerable to experiencing violence.

For informants who experience domestic violence based on education level, it can be seen in the diagram below:


Figure 5: Victims of Violence by Education Level



Another fact that the level of education does not guarantee women to avoid violence. Based on the data above, it is found that of the 11 informants, 64% of them have Bachelor background, and 36% of them have secondary school background.

Data on informants who experience domestic violence based on relationships before marriage are shown in the diagram below:

Figure 6: Victims of Violence by Pre-Marriage Relationships



Based on the results of the interview, data was obtained that women who are dating and arranged marriage are still vulnerable to experiencing violence after marriage. This is in accordance with the data shown in the diagram above that 82% of victims of violence were women who were married through a dating process and only 18% of victims were women who had married through a matchmaking process.

Based on the conditions described above, the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar City has not been running optimally. Another thing that happens is that most of the victims of domestic violence do not use this rule if they experience violence, the victims choose to settle by divorce through Religious Court. This can be seen from an interview with one of the informants (Rr) who revealed that:

"During domestic violence occurring, I never thought to report my husband, even though I knew that it was a crime. I just chose to divorce, so that the suffering I was experiencing was the most important consideration was my children, of course he would be devastated if his father would deal with the police. Therefore I believed that divorce is the right choice".

- b. Obstacle Factors for the Implementation of the PKDRT Law Policy in Makassar City.

Domestic violence is violence that is very complex and requires comprehensive handling, starting with the occurrence of violence in dating relationships, where most victims do not realize that violence has occurred, and often the violence does not stop even though it ends in divorce. Post-divorce violence by ex-husbands and their families continues to occur, for example, cases of child custody, neglect of children's rights, deduction or neglect of the rights of ex-wives, and other violence. Victims of domestic violence rarely get recovery.

As an effort to implement Law Number 23 of 2004 concerning the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Makassar City, there are several obstacle factors the implementation of Law Number 23 of 2004 concerning the Elimination of Domestic Violence in Makassar City. This can be seen from 2 factors, namely:

1. External Obstacle Factors

To see how the PKDRT Law experienced obstacles in its implementation in terms of external obstacles, it can be seen from several things:

- a. Socio-Cultural Studies (KDRT is a domestic channel).
- b. The social burden of victim on violent behavior.
- c. Society stigma against victims and their families.
- d. Limited service facilities and infrastructure.

2. Internal Obstacle Factors

Internal Obstacle factors of the PKDRT Law can be seen from several things:

- a. Victim
- b. Family (Children, Parents, Siblings,)
- c. Economic Dependence
- d. Interpretation of religion.

The victim factor itself contributed more so that the PKDRT Law experienced obstacles in its implementation as conveyed by Rosmiati Sain, the Director of LBH APIK Makassar, as she said in the interview:

"The dependence of the victim on the perpetrator from an economic point of view makes the victim halfhearted and does not dare to report the perpetrator, or even the victim sometimes withdraws the report in the course of the legal process".

Furthermore, consultant for the Integrated Service Center for the Empowerment of Women and Children in the City of Makassar Andi Yudha Yunus explained that:

"Victims survive the cycle of violence and choose to remain silent, only to protect the good name of the family, protect the feelings of the children and also survive because from the beginning, the man who is her life companion is her own choice so she doesn't want to be married. It was known by her family that her choice was a male perpetrator of violence."

c. Supporting factors for the implementation of the PKDRT Law Policy in Makassar City.

To see the factors that support the implementation of the PKDRT Law, it can be seen from two factors:

1. External Supporting Factors.

So far, women victims of domestic violence need support both psychologically, physical assistance and legal assistance in an effort to overcome the violence they experience. There are several institutions that have been working to provide services for women victims of domestic violence, including:

- a. Institutional Center for Integrated Services for Women Empowerment and Child Protection (P2TP2A)
- b. Availability of skilled paralegals in assisting cases of violence against women.

- c. Availability of community shelter institutions and community shelter administrators that provide assistance to women victims of violence.
 - d. Establishment of networks between service institutions in the field of health, psychologists and legal aid agencies.
2. Internal Supporting Factors.
- In interviews with informants it was found that the supporting factors for the implementation of the PKDRT Law internally were:
1. There is family support
 2. There is support from trusted people other than family,
 3. Availability of victim companions, paralegal staff and community shelter administrators.

5. DISCUSSION

An analysis of the implementation of the PKDRT Law in Makassar can be concluded that **First:** the implementation of Law No. 23 on the Elimination of Domestic Violence has not been maximally implemented, this can be seen from the understanding that still makes the issue of domestic violence a personal family problem and to talk about it is something taboo, in addition, the courage of the victim to report is still faced with a dilemma, the victims are more likely to allow violence to continue and persist for a long period of time just to maintain family dignity, **Second:** Understanding of patriarchy which positions women as a subordinate group which results in irregular relationships balance between husband and wife in the household.

As a suggestion in this research:

1. The Makassar City Government, in this case the Women and Children Protection Department, must try to prevent violence against women to occur, including domestic violence, it needs optimal efforts to prevent domestic violence through Critical Legal Education, ongoing paralegal training, training for survivors so that it becomes an arena for strengthening among fellow victims.
2. Strengthening a more comprehensive network between fellow service providers, building service facilities to strengthen the health and rights of victims as well as increasing the capacity of community shelter administrators, especially in handling domestic violence.
3. Strengthen the existence of formal local institutions such as RT and RW and non-formal institutions such as community leaders in order to carry out prevention of Violence against Women in the Family Sphere in a sustainable manner.
4. Conducting a simultaneous domestic violence prevention campaign by optimizing community meetings, for example the Woman Council for Quran recitation, RT / RW meetings, and women social gathering at the sub-district level.

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The CCP's Development of Artificial Intelligence: Impact on Future Operations

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Abstract

The development of artificial intelligence and related technologies has a potential serious impact on the industrial development and the military operations. The Chinese Communist Party has also classified this area as a key direction of the future development, hoping that in this new wave of military affairs innovation, under the absolute superiority of economic and military affairs, China could surpass the United States in one fell swoop, changing the world situation in which the United States is the only military superpower since the end of the Cold War. In the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping clearly stated that it should accelerate the development of military intelligence and strengthen the joint combat capability of the network information system, including the R&D of the innovative weapons and equipment. As Xi Jinping took over the presidency of China in 2013, he initiated the "dream of strong army". In the future, artificial intelligence is bound to be an important part of the CCP's military modernization, and it is also a foresighted preparation for winning the next war. At present, most of the CCP's research on military development in terms of artificial intelligence tends to be on hardware devices, such as automated combat vehicles, autonomous drones and remote-controlled submarines. These related technologies rely heavily on the mechanical engineering and traditional R&D. The CCP intends to combine the development of military science and technology with the advanced weapons as a means of "killer" conception for future regional wars against the United States and other major powers. In this concept, the Communist Army will carry out paralytic asymmetrical attacks to its potential enemies. In the past, the "killer" weapons may be the attack missiles that attack large ships, but now they may include a new generation of artificial intelligence weapons that use the big data, the Internet of Things, or the cloud computing. In the face of the development of the CCP's artificial intelligence militarization, not only we must concern about its current major developments, but also have to analyze the motives behind it, so that we can make correct judgments in the future operations to block the CCP's media campaign and arms deterrent. This is the focus worthy of our urgent attention.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Dream of Strong Army, Asymmetric Combat

1. Introduction

In recent years, many military conflicts have broken out in the Middle East, especially in the countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Although they are small countries in the region, they may have serious impacts on regional security. Their main means to achieve the goal is to use technology and invest a lot of

resources within the scope of ability. For example, the anti-Qatar coalition accused Qatar of using media such as Al-Jazeera Network to provoke hatred among Middle Eastern countries and undermine regional stability, resulting in an endless stream of terrorist attacks and ethnic antagonisms in the Middle East. Not only are there conflicts continued in the region, but also are there been continuation of terrorist attacks around the world. On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates can project its military power to distant countries such as Libya through mercenaries and a small amount of advanced technology assets. From these examples, we can see that when resources, technological capabilities, and political will are integrated, even a small country with few people can become an influencer in regional affairs.

The latest U.S. national security strategy clearly states that the CCP's growing technological strength has gradually played an important role in the key emerging technology fields, which has seriously threatened the U.S.'s economy and military power. The United States regards the CCP's technological development as the center of China's national defense strategy, because the technology can be applied interactively to both the military and people's livelihood, and it is likely to change the status of world power. The growing technological strength of the CCP has gradually narrowed the gap between the United States and China. Especially five years ago, the U.S. generally believed that the CCP was just a technology imitator, but now it has become an innovator in many fields. In particular, artificial intelligence will be the main key player in the competition between the two countries in the future.

The emergence of artificial intelligence has even more far-reaching impact on humans than other important technologies such as thermal power generation, because the technology can be applied to both the military and the people's livelihood, just like the technologies of aviation, aerospace and Internet, which can be used for space exploration. Artificial intelligence can also be a lethal weapon with a commanding height in outer space. Moreover, artificial intelligence can make subversive changes for both the military and the people's livelihood. As military facilities hid in the civilian population, it is usually used to facilitate people's lives and maximize economic benefits; meanwhile, it can be transformed into a key military force to protect people's lives, property, and safety.

2. The Development of Artificial Intelligence

The term "Artificial Intelligence (AI)" was first proposed in a seminar held in Dartmouth in 1956 by John McCarthy, the father of computer high-level language LISP, who organized the meeting. Artificial intelligence originally belonged to part of the field of computer science. Later, due to its application level, it became more popular, and the disciplines such as psychology and philosophy were added to allow machines to have the same thinking, logic capabilities and behavior patterns as humans. Artificial intelligence includes a very wide range of sciences, which is composed of different fields. The development processes include learning, perception, reasoning, self-correction, and how to manipulate or move objects. Artificial intelligence is a new technological science related to the theories, methods, and application systems used to simulate, extend and expand human wisdom. In other words, it attempts to understand the essence of wisdom. The development of artificial intelligence includes speech recognition, computer vision, expert systems, etc. Generally speaking, one of the main goals of artificial intelligence research is to make machines capable of some complex works usually required human intelligence. But different times and different people have different understandings of this "complex work".

Artificial intelligence is changing our lives step by step. The future will be a world in which humans and machines coexist. Looking back at the origin of artificial intelligence, it has a history of more than 70 years. Artificial intelligence can be classified as a branch of computer science, while it is diversified in various academic fields, where the controversial definitions between "science fiction" and "reality" are often argued. As early as the 1950s, scientists began to study artificial intelligence, which can be traced back to philosophy, fiction and imagination, mainly focusing on the solution of academic problems or chess games. By the 1970s, scientists began to study theoretical concepts and incline to practical application issues. Modern machine functions that are usually classified as artificial intelligence include: successful interpretation of human voice,

face recognition systems, military simulation war games in strategic systems, and unmanned vehicles. (Allen and Husain, 2018)

General speaking, artificial intelligence can be divided into two types. The artificial intelligence that performs specific tasks belongs to “weak artificial intelligence”; the other type is “strong artificial intelligence”, also known as “artificial general intelligence (AGI)”, capable of imitating human thinking, decision-making, self-consciousness, autonomous action, etc. At present, this category mainly appears in science fiction movies and film collections and has not yet become a scientific fact, but this is also the goal that scientists are trying to achieve.

There have been three “booming periods” in the history of artificial intelligence. Since mankind invented the first computer, the development of artificial intelligence has begun. It has been more than half a century, and there are certain technical obstacles that cannot be broken through, and every boom has its reasons and difficulties encountered. The history of various development stages of artificial intelligence are briefly described in the following three sections.

2.1 The First Boom (1950~1960)

Alan Turing—a British computer wizard, cryptographer, and logician, also the father of computer and artificial intelligence—proposed the idea of “Turing Machine” in 1936, which was a kind of mathematical logic machine. His invention successfully cracked the Enigma Code of German army during World War II. In addition, in 1950, Turing published “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, focusing on the systematic discussion and in-depth thinking of the machine in imitating human intelligence, and the machines that can behave the same as human beings in thinking and making decision. This famous experiment on judging whether a machine can think or not was the so-called “Turing Test.”

Artificial intelligence mainly began to develop in the 1950s, mainly through the use of computers to deal with complex problems and further search for data and infer results. The term “Artificial Intelligence” was introduced at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire on August 31, 1956 in a summer meeting of artificial intelligence research project, of which the proposal was written by John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude Shannon. The participants in the seminar agreed that artificial intelligence could be used as an independent subject, so this year might be said to be the first year of artificial intelligence. People were eager to use computers to solve problems, but computers were built through mathematical logic. With computing power at the time, complex problems often could not be solved. Therefore, the application was mainly oriented to algebraic problems and mathematics proof. However, since 1974, artificial intelligence had not made important breakthroughs, mainly because computer was trapped in the limited data access and the slow processing speed. Moreover, the actual application level was not as wide as imagined such as to answer human-specific questions, for the lack of software, hardware, and data information, so it gradually tends to ebb.

2.2 The Second Boom (1980~1990)

Beginning in the 1980s, statistical thinking had brought artificial intelligence to life, mainly by inputting a large amount of expert knowledge into the computer. The accumulation of data and knowledge promoted the progress of computer learning algorithms, so that the machine could use its own experience to automatically adjust programming, resulting that the application of artificial intelligence was advancing by leaps and bounds, such as fingerprint and voice recognitions. The computer judged the answer according to the user's question. The dualism that originally judged whether something was true or false had added the concept of quantification. In 1984, Hopfield—professor of Princeton University, physicist, molecular biologist, and neuroscientist—used analog integrated circuits to successfully propose a neural network model, which enabled further breakthroughs and progress in deep learning. The first expert system DENDRAL was also born in this era. For example, it was used in disease diagnosis and discrimination. If the system made a mistake in judging a continuous problem, it would get a wrong result. Therefore, the expert system was composed of a large number of knowledge data and reasoning rules stacked to simulate complex problems that could only be solved by domain experts, but its application scope still had limitations, coupled with the discontinuous advancement of computers, the expert

system was gradually going downhill. Because knowledge is endless, it is impossible to input all knowledge into the computer and find out the sequence of all knowledge, so expert system became impractical in the end. Since 1987, artificial intelligence had reached another low point. Because artificial intelligence cannot endlessly pursue ideals, it must be made more practical otherwise it will eventually become a bubble.

2.3 The Third Boom (2000 ~Present)

After entering the 21st century, due to the advancement of semiconductor technology and the improvement of computing power, many artificial intelligence capabilities even have exceeded the work that humans can do; and because of the decline in semiconductor costs, the use of cloud storage has become cheaper and more common. The cloud server collects "big data" from all over the world. Among them, machine learning is to train and memorize computer's "learned" data through "big data", while deep learning is further through "big data" to train the computer to "understand" the data on its own to establish a good foundation for the development of artificial intelligence.

Due to the advancement of semiconductor technology and the decline in costs, the storage and calculation of large amounts of data have become easier, and an excellent environment for the development of artificial intelligence has been provided. Therefore, all countries are pursuing the fruitful goals that the artificial intelligence can bring; on the contrary, will the excessive development of artificial intelligence have a negative impact on us one day? Or just like nuclear energy can generate convenient and abundant electricity to people, but if it misused to become a bargaining chip for rogue countries or terrorists, a nuclear crisis might happen at any time.

3. The Development of Artificial Intelligence in CCP

On July 20, 2017, the State Council of the Communist Party of China announced the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan", which stated its ambition to become an artificial intelligence leader in the world by 2030. The plan proposed the guiding ideology, strategic goals, key tasks, and guarantees for the development of the CCP's new generation of artificial intelligence. It is hoped that the CCP will have an absolute advantage in the development of artificial intelligence in the future. According to this plan, the CCP will invest 150 billion U.S. dollars (1 trillion RMB) in the next few years to build up CCP's artificial intelligence industry, including brain neural network architecture and quantum machine learning. It hopes to use national resources to promote internal innovation and continuous improvement, including big data, group intelligence, human-machine hybrid intelligence, etc. In addition, the plan also lists education and recruitment of top talents as well as hardware innovation as key development items.

The leaderships of the Chinese Communist Party believe that this plan can help it grasp the "significant strategic opportunity" for the development of artificial intelligence, and ultimately achieve its goal of surpassing the United States. The expected application range of the next generation of artificial intelligence technology in the future also includes command and decision support in national defense, military games, and military equipment development. This plan is expected to promote the next generation of artificial intelligence with disruptive and remarkable effects, thereby accelerating the CCP to become an innovative country and a world technological power.

3.1 Four Major Advantages for the CCP in the Development of Artificial Intelligence

3.1.1 Policy Advantages

The CCP positioned artificial intelligence as a national strategic goal in 2017, and it has become a policy task, to which the government and private enterprises pay a great attention. The "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" announced by the State Council of the Communist Party of China in July 2017 can be divided into three stages. The first stage will be ended by 2020, the overall artificial intelligence technology and

application will be synchronized with the world's advanced level, and the artificial intelligence industry will become a new important economic growth point for China, while the application of artificial intelligence technology has being become a new way to improve people's livelihood; the second stage is to achieve the major breakthrough in the basic theory of artificial intelligence by 2025, and some technologies and applications will reach the world's leading level. Artificial intelligence then will become a main driving force for upgrading industry and transforming economy, whereby the smart society will make positive progress on building a global high-end value chain. In the final third stage, it is estimated that by 2030, artificial intelligence theory, technology and application will surpass the United States, lead the world, and become the world's major artificial intelligence innovation center in military, governance, medicine, and agricultural application technologies.

3.1.2 Investment Advantages

According to a survey of CB Insights, the global financing for artificial intelligence startups reached 15.2 billion US dollars in 2017, of which Chinese companies accounted for 48%, surpassing the US's 38%. The CCP once invested a lot of money in "Sense Time," an AI startup that focused on image recognition. In July of that year, it raised US\$410 million, setting a record for a single round of financing investment in the global market of artificial intelligence. This is the first time that the CCP surpasses the United States in terms of the startup financing investment, and it has grown substantially from the CCP's 11.6% share in 2016. This has to be attributed to the CCP's use of the entire national power. The CCP government has the power to manipulate the market and the financial budget that is not supervised by taxpayers. It uses hundreds of millions of dollars to finance CCP's artificial intelligence enterprises, and strongly supports the development of face recognition technology and artificial intelligence processor. In addition, Xinhua News Agency reported that in 2018, the CCP's defense budget approved by the two sessions would increase 8.1% to more than 1 trillion RMB, part of which would be invested in artificial intelligence and other military technologies.

3.1.3 Data Advantage

Mainland China has the largest population in the world, about 1.4 billion. The massive big data collection system enables the Chinese Communist government to closely monitor the online activities of hundreds of millions of net citizens, holding the detailed files and data of more than a billion people, and recording every move of the people from time to time through countless surveillance camera lenses. Data is a key element on operating artificial intelligence. These huge amounts of data can be utilized, analyzed, and applied by artificial intelligence companies. Artificial intelligence is to train and test algorithms through data, enabling the adaptation of a new environment or learning the new skills independently without being driven by human will. (Galliot et al., 2018)

Moreover, most large cities in mainland China have established artificial intelligence research institutes, which can share data with each other. Therefore, the CCP can easily collect data for any application scenario it needs. These data are strictly controlled by the Chinese government, so it is easy to obtain the information and the cost is low. The CCP's artificial intelligence can make amazing progress under the leadership of the government.

3.1.4 Technical Talent

From the perspective of competitiveness, mainland China is embarking on a battle for artificial intelligence talents. It not only involves the global leadership in artificial intelligence, but also the right to control the future of the world. From the perspective of talents, experts argue that mainland China has a large population of hardworking talents. It is estimated that nearly half of the promising opportunities for the global investment of artificial intelligence are in the mainland China. The CCP urgently needs about 5 million high-quality artificial intelligence talents. In order to gain the leading position in artificial intelligence, the CCP not only spent 13.8 billion RMB to set up an artificial intelligence industrial park in Mentougou, Beijing, the State Council also planned a route map of artificial intelligence, appealing the strengthening of artificial intelligence education in primary and secondary schools, and hoping to become a world hub of artificial intelligence.

From the progressive view point of the key technology of artificial intelligence, the CCP has gradually gained some advantages. For example, the number of research papers related to "deep learning" had surpassed the United States in 2014. As of 2016, the number of artificial intelligence patent application had reached 15,745, placed second in the world. In order to snatch artificial intelligence talents, mainland China not only recruits experts and scholars from well-known domestic universities, but also focuses the Silicon Valley of the United States, Toronto of Canada, and other hot spots where artificial intelligence talents gather. Microsoft has established a research institute in Beijing, and Google has also placed an artificial intelligence research center therein, actively planning the recruitment of artificial intelligence talents, hoping to find the top talents from the CCP and all over the world. Although there are many obstacles in the recruitment of talents, major countries around the world have fully enforced the battle plans to grab excellent talents. However, the CCP has already achieved initial fruitful results for the future development of artificial intelligence under the vigorously efforts made by the state machinery. Among the top 30 patent applicants, there are four academic institutions, of which China owns three, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences has more than 2,500 patents, ranking 17th. Seventeen of the top 20 academic institutions for artificial intelligence patent applications are from mainland China, and 10 of the top 20 scientific publications related to artificial intelligence are from mainland China. These fruitful results can never be accumulated in one or two days. It is the fact that the CCP is making every effort to take the lead in artificial intelligence issues, and then to have the dominant power.

3.2 The CCP's Purpose and Attempt to Pursue the Development of Artificial Intelligence

3.2.1 Hope to Use AI to Enhance Economic Competitiveness and Military Capabilities

The CCP hopes to lead other countries in artificial intelligence and use it to gain more economic and military advantages than its competitors. By 2030, artificial intelligence is expected to contribute US\$13 trillion to US\$15 trillion in the global economy. At the same time, artificial intelligence can accelerate the speed of scientific development. In 2019, the performance of artificial neural networks had been significantly superior to that of the key task of biological research; namely, the existing methods of protein folding.

Artificial intelligence will also thoroughly change the patterns of warfare. It can improve the visibility of soldiers on the battlefield and become the commander's best intermediary to make decision and communicate order. Artificial intelligence systems can process more information and execute faster than humans, so they are the best tools for real-time assessment in chaotic battle conditions. On the battlefield, machines move faster than humans, and have better accuracy and coordination.

There is a real-time strategic game called "AlphaStar", which deploys artificial intelligence and humans as two sides of competition. During the game, the AlphaStar artificial intelligence system can quickly process a large amount of information with accurate coordination, and quickly dispatch the units to show its superior ability to humans'. These advantages will enable artificial intelligence systems to manipulate swarmed robots more effectively than humans. Human beings will maintain their advantage at a higher strategic level, while artificial intelligence will dominate practical applications.

3.2.2 List Artificial Intelligence as the Highest Priority of National Power and Combat Power

President Xi Jinping of the Communist Party of China requires the army to win in future wars. For the Chinese Communist Army, it seeks to increase the authenticity and complexity of actual combat drills and adopt new technologies in exercises and training, including the use of virtual reality technology and the creation of actual combat mentality. The Chinese Communist Army is exploring the virgin land of military innovation. Specifically, artificial intelligence is regarded as a key strategic technology, and the information-based warfare will be transformed into intelligent warfare in the future. The importance of artificial intelligence can be seen from its inclusion in the work report of the Chinese Communist Party Premier Li Keqiang in 2017. Future warfare requires rapid, decisive, and continuous cycles of execution in all aspects, from intelligent analysis to

artificial intelligence operations and decision-making support, and finally it may involve human decision-making. Artificial intelligence will speed up the process of detection, decision-making, and action infinitely. This process will even involve human control systems and semi-autonomous systems. Therefore, no matter which field a country develops in the future, it is inseparable from the high-efficiency development brought about by artificial intelligence to achieve the goal of maximum successful calculation.

3.2.3 Become the World's Leader of Artificial Intelligence in 2030

The CCP has the largest population in the world. In order to push this giant ship ahead, it must rely on the revolutionary progress brought about by artificial intelligence. Accordingly, the CCP's investment in artificial intelligence could be said to be sparing no effort. Five of the ten artificial intelligence startups with the strongest capital in the world in 2017 were from mainland China. The Chinese mainland technology giants Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent are just on par with Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, ranked amid the world's leading artificial intelligence companies. The CCP's pledge to become the world's leader in artificial intelligence by 2030 is approaching to the realization step by step.

3.2.4 Xi Jinping Consolidates Internal Power

In the beginning of 2018, the CCP used a monitoring system combined with big data analysis technology to trace each mainlander's Internet activities, shopping patterns, protest participation, business and legal behaviors, as well as other personal information to ultimately establish a "social credit" scoring system or standard. The purpose is to evaluate the people's loyalty to the country. If the "social credit" score were below the standard, then punishment would be executed directly. For example, these people will be punished by refusing loans or banning domestic and foreign flights, which directly cause inconvenience in their lives.

Because the surveillance system for the comprehensive monitoring of 1.4 billion people requires the analyses of extremely large amounts of data, it is impossible for humans to take the tasks of surveillance, collection, interpretation, and evaluation. Instead, they must rely on autonomous operations processed through artificial intelligence algorithms. The CCP intends to export dual-use products that fulfill the both military and civilian purposes to the foreign countries. In order to consolidate the stability of their regimes, some governments hope to obtain a similar system that can monitor people's activities to detect signs of suspicious activities and prevent the emergence of anti-government events.

The National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China passed the constitutional amendment proposal with a high vote rate, and Xi Jinping's term of office could thus be re-elected indefinitely. And the CCP's monitoring of the people has gradually increased. The CCP uses artificial intelligence to monitor people's activities and also begins to export related technologies. In 2018, Zimbabwe signed a contract with a Chinese mainland cloud technology company to establish a national face recognition database. The face recognition surveillance systems are set up at airports, railway stations, and bus stations. The content of the contract is not only about money, Zimbabwe has even agreed that Yunsong Technology may send millions of facial data back to mainland China to help the company build files and improve the face recognition technology of dark-skinned people. The CCP also plans to sell surveillance technology in Malaysia, Mongolia and Singapore.

4. The Military Development of The CCP's Artificial Intelligence

In the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping clearly proposed to accelerate the development of military intelligence, strengthen the joint combat capabilities of the network information system, the global combat capabilities, innovative military theories, and develop new weapons and equipment. He regarded artificial intelligence as the future element of national military capability. As Xi Jinping put forward when he took over the presidency, the goal of "Dream of Strong Army" aimed to build a powerful People's Liberation Army into a world-class army to prepare ahead of time for winning the next war, while artificial intelligence is bound to be the most important part in CCP's active promotion of military modernization. In the military environment, information technology and weapon systems with artificial

intelligence are the key factors of victory on the battlefield. Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a speech to one million Russian students on September 1, 2017, believing that countries leading in the development of artificial intelligence will dominate the world, and boldly pointing out "AI leaders will become the rulers of the future world". This viewpoint is a global consensus, and more than a dozen governments have announced artificial intelligence initiatives. The State Council of the Communist Party of China announced the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" on July 20, 2017, clearly stating its ambition to become a leader of artificial intelligence in the world by 2030. The United States also announced an artificial intelligence initiative, and the Department of Defense subsequently launched an artificial intelligence strategy. Regarding the CCP's application of artificial intelligence to the military level, we will discuss the following aspects.

4.1 Maintaining Domestic Political Stability

In 2013, the State Council of the Communist Party of China released the "Outline of the Social Credit System Construction Plan (2014-2020)". And following the first announcement of the "Social Credit Plan" in 2014, the State Council launched the plan to comprehensively implement the "Social Credit Score System" by 2020, in which the behaviors and credibility of 1.4 billion Chinese people will be observed, recorded, and analyzed. Through the system, the people's criminal records, financial information, Internet dialogues and other transactions are recorded and scored, aiming to achieve the purpose of overall monitoring. Those with low credit scores in the system will be punished and restricted in a variety of degrees.

In 2017, the CCP's budget for maintaining political stability in the country reached US\$196 billion, a 12% increase compared to 2016. This budget growth mainly lies in the preparation of new data platforms, such as high-end computers and high-definition camera lenses to analyze the potential dangers of people, so as to quickly grasp and accurately control the relevant information. Through minimizing the dangerous activities, the absolute prestige of the Chinese Communist Party over the country is then secured.

In order to achieve a comprehensive and constant surveillance, it must rely on various expertise of artificial intelligence. The CCP uses artificial intelligence as a tool for maintaining the stability of its internal regime. It can use deep forgery to slander those who disagree with the regime. The facial recognition system can perform all-weather large-scale surveillance. The predictive analysis can further identify potential troublemakers. For example, the CCP's large-scale repression to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang often uses surveillance systems to closely monitor the activities of Uyghur Muslims. Currently, nearly 80 cities in mainland China use smart camera surveillance systems. They are also beginning to use data analysis, facial recognition systems, and predictive systems to predict the criminal activities. The CCP uses an extensive network of surveillance cameras linked with algorithms to detect abnormal public behaviors. According to statistics, about 6,000 incidents related to "social governance" were discovered. Those who were deemed unsafe by the system were forced to be unable to participate in daily activities, and many were even sent to re-education camps.

4.2 A New Wave of Arms Race

The Communist Army delves into the development of artificial intelligence to strengthen its future combat capabilities. At the beginning of 2017, the CCP established the Central Military-civilian Integration Development Committee to promote the "Military-civilian Integration Strategy". The results obtained from the civilian industry are used at military operational level. The high-tech development is recognized as a new wave of military affairs innovation, and it is asserted that the future high-tech applications of related artificial intelligence will impact the current military power layout. Artificial intelligence will become an indispensable part of "information war". At the same time, it will shift the form of war to the direction of "intelligence." The CCP believes that "intelligence" has brought a new wave of information revolution. In the future, artificial intelligence will completely change the economic and military affairs in the existing world.

For each country, whether artificial intelligence becomes a new wave of arms race and brings major risks is not the main point, but the perception of the arms race brought up by that artificial intelligence lags behind

competitors will prompt countries rushing to use unsafe artificial intelligence systems. Basically, the risk faced by each country is the same as that of its opponents.

The CCP hopes that it can compete with the United States in terms of military innovation in the future, and artificial intelligence is its weapon for future development, and it is a necessary development direction. For the future, not only does China worry that it will form another "generational gap" with the US military in terms of combat power, but also does it hope that it will be able to win further battles with the US military. Therefore, when understanding the importance of grasping today's technological trends, China makes up his mind to reduce the gap between the United States as soon as possible by "actively promoting military affairs innovation", aiming at the existing U.S. military innovation plans to achieve own goals of "mechanization" and "informatization" necessary for the modern warfare. These are the things that the Communist Army is most concerned about and most necessary to do.

4.3 "Smart" Operations

At present, most of the CCP's research on military development in terms of artificial intelligence tends to be on hardware devices, such as automated combat vehicles, autonomous drones and remote-controlled submarines. These related technologies rely heavily on mechanical engineering and traditional research and development. The CCP intends to combine the development of military science and technology with advanced weapons as a means of "killer" conception for future regional wars against the United States and other major powers. In this concept, the Communist Army will carry out paralytic asymmetrical attacks to its potential enemies.(Bruzdzinski, 2004) In the past, the "killer" weapons might have been attack missiles that attack large ships, but now they may include a new generation of artificial intelligence weapons that use big data, the Internet of Things, or cloud computing (Scharre, 2019).

While the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences is carrying out reforms, another forward-looking action is to integrate the new technologies of the Communist Army, i.e., the so-called "intelligent operation". Although the concept is still in the development stage, an article from the official Chinese media Xinhuanet has defined "intelligence operation" as follows: in a battlefield environment, "intelligent operation" is a high-tech integrated with artificial intelligence as the core, where science and technology can penetrate into combat command, equipment, tactics and other fields. The core concepts can be understood and grasped from the quotation of "intelligence is essential, ubiquitous cloud connection, multi-domain integration, brain-computer integration, intelligent autonomy, and no one competes."

It predicts that the emergence of "intelligent operation" will have a huge impact, and we may point out that this new type of warfare will "break through the limits of traditional time and space cognition", "reconstruct the relationship among people, weapons and equipment," and "incubate a new command and control method." The future decision-making method will shift from the traditional "human brain decision-making" to the "intelligent decision-making" dominated by artificial intelligence. The future "intelligent operation" will be a three-dimensional, full-field warfare. Unmanned systems that rely heavily on will greatly reduce the military's combat cycle of "observation, judgment, determination, and execution".(Wang and Dotson, 2019)

4.4 The Development of Traditional Weapons Combined with Artificial Intelligence

For many years, the Communist Army has converted the J-6 and J-7 jet fighters of the 1950s and 1960s into UAVs. By combining the outdated equipment, upgraded sensors, autonomous systems with artificial intelligence algorithms, these fighters fly through the enemy's airspace to be taken as the "first wave" of troops to waste the enemy's air defense missiles in a saturated attack mode, increasing the tactical success rate. For the U.S. Air Force, adding sensors and controllers to traditional weapon systems, such as Boeing's Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) components to the unguided bombs, will making them become smart, accurate and GPS guided ammunition. The joint direct attack ammunition was very effective in the Second Gulf War.

The research results have been proved that machine learning can effectively integrate sensor data to improve the detective accuracy and the range of traditional weapon systems such as sonar. The integration of machine learning algorithms and data has greatly improved the capabilities of the old system resulted in a rapid, cheap upgrade operation. Moreover, because the software can be quickly improved, adapted and developed, the traditional system can be further improved without a long working period. But it also indirectly allows rogue countries or terrorists to acquire new capabilities/acceleration to upgrade existing weapon systems, and directly threaten neighboring countries and even hostile countries.

4.5 Future Development of 5G Technology

The CCP is also committed to making breakthroughs in 5G technology. It hopes that its 5G technology would lead the world and the information network based on 5G technology would be able to transmit large amounts of data at a significantly faster speed. Similarly, the aforementioned quantum science that strengthens military sensors will also change the communication and computer computing capabilities. Quantum computing—using the anomalous properties of subatomic particles to increase the processing power at an exponential rate—may make encryption methods unbreakable, and enable the military to process large amounts of data and solve problems beyond the capabilities of traditional computers. Even more incredible is that the so-called brain-computer interface (BCI) technology has enabled humans to use neural signals to control complex systems, such as robotic prostheses and even drones.

4.6 Future Tactics and Guidelines Revision

In terms of the future direction of the Communist Army's weapons development, in addition to science and technology, there are more factors that need to be considered. For example, what are the tactics and guidelines that accompany science and technology? Are the military thinkers and academic institutions of the CCP solving the complex problems of integrating new technologies into combat operations? The most notable example is the Chinese Communist Academy of Military Sciences, which is the Communist Army's primary standard development organization. It is currently focusing on major reforms and academic promotion programs to enable the Communist Army to be more appropriately integrated with the artificial intelligence, robotics and smart manufacture (Eastwood, 2019).

5. Conclusions

Science and technology are changing with each passing day. In the era of knowledge explosion, people are constantly seeking innovation in energy, computing and robotics technologies. The advanced technologies of many countries in the world have already changed the composition of entire defense industry. The development of artificial intelligence has been set as national strategic goal, and it has become an irresistible trend. After foreseeing the application prospects of artificial intelligence technology, the CCP believes that the future arms race will be an intelligent race.

5.1 "Military-civilian Integration" Creates the Greatest Advantage

The State Council of the Communist Party of China issued the "New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan" in July 2017. The purpose is to create the advanced advantages of the Chinese Communist Party's artificial intelligence. The goal is to promote the CCP's artificial intelligence capabilities to a world-leading position by 2030, and use the opportunity of "military-civilian integration" to pursue the military development, especially strengthening the communications with related private enterprises, positioning artificial intelligence development as national strategy, and encouraging the United States to fully invest the most cutting-edge technology research in artificial intelligence. The competition of artificial intelligence between the United States and China has indirectly accelerated the development of military intelligence.

The CCP has successively planned to invest 60 billion U.S. dollars in a form of fiscal budget before 2025 to develop artificial intelligence technology in military security. Because artificial intelligence can analyze a large amount of data to propose a calculation model for decision-making and execution, Goldman Sachs predicts that the CCP can master a quarter of world's big data involving military security by 2020. "China National Defense News", a military newspaper, mentioned that The People's Liberation Army intended to use artificial intelligence extensively in the areas such as combat command, decision-making, exercises, and weaponry.(Kania, 2019)

The CCP has even attempted to use artificial intelligence weapons to attack US aircraft carriers. These plans have brought an urgent sense of crisis for the United States to focus the military affairs on the artificial intelligence R&D.

5.2 Artificial Intelligence Is Included in the National Defense and Military Field

Today, major military powers have incorporated the development of artificial intelligence into the national defense policy. Future military conflicts are no longer based on human intelligence to think about strategies and man-made operating systems. Instead, both offensive and defensive parties are trained in advance, so the both sides can conduct computer offensive and defensive exercises to acquire an optimum solution. However, in addition to the improvement of weapon software and hardware, the R&D of cloud computing and various artificial intelligence involving military should also be accelerated. In the era of digitalization, the traditional weapons are inferior to the unmanned weapons.(Brose, 2019)

It is a crucial issue for a country to apply artificial intelligence as resources to effectively respond to a wide range of domestic security tasks, including protecting infrastructure from terrorist attacks, performing border patrols, and even "against Internet rumors that may threaten social stability." Discussions on "intelligent" warfare are not started just now, but the Communist Army has been discussing this aspect more frequently in recent years, for example, how to integrate artificial intelligence into future military operations to allow the Communist Army to acquire information and command advantages in the battlefield, how to effectively implement conflict escalation management in future armed conflicts, and how to effectively achieve "war control" when there is a military conflict with another power or an important regional opponent.

5.3 "Smart" War

In a military environment, information technology and weapon systems with artificial intelligence are the key factors on the battlefield. In recent years, information warfare has been the main axis discussed in various writings of the Communist Army; however, this main axis will be replaced by the new main axis of "smart" warfare. Certain military decision-making will tend to be automated, changing decision-making methods from "human brain decision-making" to "intelligent decision-making". In the future wars, artificial intelligence can quickly predict the battlefield situation accurately, innovate the best combat strategy, and even achieve the war goal of "winning without a fight".

In an authoritative strategic thinking publication "Strategy" issued in 2013, the Communist Academy of Military Sciences mentioned "war control is the ability to accurately control the intensity and range of combat in order to achieve the desired national goal of war". In this military policy, the prediction and the management of the opponent's reaction are crucial. The Communist Army describes the development of successful combat operations control as a transition from single-oriented control to dual-oriented control. That is, the Communist commander not only controls his troops, but also attacks the enemy's weapons and information systems, resulting in a restrict on the enemy's choice of combat to exert a certain degree of control over the enemy. Therefore, the Communist Army has begun to discuss the need for dynamic combat operation control in response to the evolution of battlefield conditions in real time, in other words, using various information systems to synchronize combat operations to achieve "instant integration" of the battlefield decision-making process to effectively manage the geographically diffused forces switched between the offense and the defense to disperse the fog of war. For any commander, these are extremely difficult challenges. In the war under the conditions of

information technology, both parties are trying to exercise such control. The Communist Army believes that the party with the superior technological foundation will win the battle.

The concept of communist war control relies on a premise that the communists can achieve the desired results by raising conflicts within the acceptable costs to reach the point where the world has "safe for war". However, this is exactly what the Communist Army expects to be achieved through superior technology. The exploitation of advanced artificial intelligence technology can achieve two-way and dynamic control.

5.4 "Artificial Intelligence" Creates the Next Wave of Military Affairs Innovation

The U.S. Department of Defense defines "military affairs innovation" as "new technologies combined with combat concepts and organizational adjustments are integrated into the military system, fundamentally changing the characteristics of military operations." Since the Gulf War, military affairs innovation has opened a new chapter, and now it has entered a transitional period. The next wave of military affairs innovation is in its infancy, because the current technological development of big data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, and robots is undergoing. In the future, the type of warfare will begin to change, and the assumptions of intelligent warfare have gradually become in line with reality, rather than the unconstrained imagination as previously thought.

Emerging technologies will change the strategies and characteristics of warfare in the future, but the nature of war will remain the same, which is full of violence, chaos and uncertainties, and which is driven by human conflictive will and political factors. The picture of future warfare has begun to take shape, and the future battlefield will have the characteristics of winning by quantity, because technology has created many machines that are operated in a low-cost manner, and more weapon systems can be autonomously moved and deployed around the battlefield. As for the original tonnage weakness in logistics, it will become more flexible and efficient with the assistance of technology.

With the continuous improvement of science and technology, huge amounts of data are collected and analyzed, while machine deep learning and artificial intelligence have become an important part of modern joint warfare. The key force for decisive battles today is the degree of integration of a nation's science and technology with the military affairs. Currently, major countries are paying more and more attentions to apply artificial intelligence in national defense systems, such as real-time evaluation, analysis and identification, with an overall aim to surpass the enemy through the enhancement of battlefield advantages.

Therefore, looking forward to the future military affairs innovation, the country can only understand this development trend of high-tech, and then use it in the professional field of national military information and intelligence. Moreover, we must always understand the strategic conflicts between international powers. Currently, on facing the future development of the CCP's artificial intelligence militarization, we must not only pay attention to its current major developments, but also thoroughly understand the motives behind it, so that we can make correct judgments and create new ideas for military building and war preparations in the future to block the CCP's media propaganda and military attack. This is the focus worthy of our urgent attention.

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Retweeting Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill Number 10 of 2019: Support and Outrage

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Abstract

At least to the majority of tweets, the Zambian Constitution of Zambian Amendment Bill number 10 if successfully passed into law could have greatly created uneven impacts on key sectors of society within Zambia. In trying to review the support and outrage of Bill 10 on Twitter, this article uses thematic analysis to investigate 600 Bill 10-related tweets from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020 that were retweeted at least 500. The statistical cybermetrics and thematic approaches used generated quick insights into widely resonating subjects of Bill 10 related issues at the time of debate in Zambia. The findings in this article are highly suggestive of the value of *Twitter* for disseminating information and in this case more especially about understandings, contents and contexts of governance issues of Bill 10. *Twitter* also offered or requested for support, the ability of many citizens with divergent views and different political affiliations to adjust to the process of the amendment of Bill 10, and information about the contents of the Bill in Zambia. This article highlights, that as gathered from *Twitter*, it is key to entrench fundamental principles in constitution amendment processes and such principles in a constitutional text, the idea is to firmly embed them, making them very difficult for any governing body to change for their own advantage. Bill 10 retweets shows that amendment procedures are vital for the protection of the underlying constitutional principles, and are generally considered to have a somewhat unassailable status. As shown by many tweets analysed, a government supporting amendment to the constitutional amendment procedure, could in itself be considered an abuse of power.

Keywords: Bill 10, constitution, *Twitter*, social media, retweeting, Zambia, thematic analysis

Introduction

Zambian Constitutional Amendment Bill number 10 was released for public comment on 21 June 2019. Section 79 of the Constitution of Zambia provides that a Bill which seeks to amend the Constitution must be published in the Gazette 30 days before its first reading. The Bill must be approved by two-thirds of all members of the Assembly at the second and third readings. The changes proposed include the repeal of Article 63(2)(d) & (e) of the Constitution which states: “*The National Assembly shall oversee the performance of executive functions by: (d) Approving public debt before it is contracted; and (e) Approving international agreements and treaties before these are acceded to or ratified.*” In the buildup to the Zambian Constitution Amendment Bill number 10, a forum, known as the National Dialogue Forum (NDF), was created through legislation intended to make proposals to amend the Constitution, as well as to resolve the political impasse between political parties (Ndulo, 2020). This NDF comprised of members of parliament, opposition parties, civil society organisations, churches, as well as members of other members of the public. What is concerning is that although the NDF was enacted by parliament, it only had a life span of 10 days. From the parliamentary point of battle, the release of the Zambian Constitutional Amendment Bill number 10, became the battle between the Patriotic Front (PF), a party in government and the United Party for National Development (UPND), Zambia’s current main opposition. Most of the PFs members of

parliament were in support of Bill 10, while the outrage to Bill 10 came from the main opposition UPND and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) opposition political party of Mr. Chishimba Kambwili (a former minister in the PF government). They were also a few outrageous input from the independent members of parliament who formed ties with UPND. The PF garnered much support from 3 UPND members of parliament to boost their support for the Bill (Ndulo, 2003).

This article uses *Twitter* as a social media forum to understand the support and outrage of Bill number 10 debate in Zambia. *Twitter*, a 140-character microblogging service for social networking, has garnered interest among communication researchers and practitioners due to its tremendous information dissemination capacity (Savage, 2011). The influential status of *Twitter* as a knowledge source is connected to the nature of the *Twitter* network and the functionality that enables users to retweet. *Twitter* users are linked to each other as supporters and followers. This article further made use of retweeting as an indicator of interest in Bill number 10 of Zambia. *Twitter* is a common source of news (Tandoc Jr & Johnson, 2016), information and personal sharing (Boyd, *et al.*, 2010). If a tweet is retweeted many times, then it has probably resonated on a large scale. Depending on the content of the tweet, this might reflect agreement with its content, a desire to be visible in a debate, or a need to interact with others (Boyd, *et al.*, 2010). An individual tweet is more likely to be retweeted if the tweeter has many social links especially on social media through differing platforms (Lachlan, *et al.*, 2019) and thus some potentially relevant tweets about any subject get over-looked because they originate with less well-connected people. Retweeting, as stated in Metaxas (2015), has a preeminent importance in *Twitter*, since the fact of executing such action indicates not only interest in a given tweet, but also the level of confidence deposited in the original publisher and the support of the content.

Social media have the potential to support many useful activities including governance issues for any given country, including social and informational (Ellis, Katie, Mike, 2016). Interpersonal interactions on the social web can help people understand issues that are otherwise easy to understand on your own and this can bring about a formation of identities among communities through social connections. Platforms such as *Twitter* can bring about the likemindedness of citizens or people in either support or outrage (Sweet *et al.*, 2020), to gain support against or join in an outrage and publish their own self-descriptions and narratives (Gale, Fran, Bolzan, Natalie, 2016). This can extend to online activism, coordinating and publicising through social media sites and online news platforms (Pearson, Charlotte, Trevisan, Fillipo, 2015).

This article is about gaining the insights into the perspective surrounding issues of Bill 10 and the need to understand the role of *Twitter* in support or outrage of the mentioned Bill. In order to achieve this, the study uses partly, a qualitative fast reaction method: a thematic analysis of highly retweeted tweets about Bill 10, reviewing the support and outrage to the Bill. Such a quick method like this one is needed so that the results can be published in time to inform the reaction to the citizenry but also to national leaders as well as various interest groups such as political parties and the like. This method exploits the free availability of tweets and the widespread use of *Twitter* across Zambia to the discussion of Bill 10 support versus outrage at the time of the debates.

Methods

Tweets about Bill 10 in English were collected from the *Twitter* Applications Programming Interface (API) using the queries Bill 10 from 21st June 2019 to 21st June 2020, 2020. The prior pilot testing on June 9th 2019 had found “Bill 10” as a query to be the main ways in which Bill 10 support and outrage was mentioned on *Twitter*. The tweets downloaded were processed to identify those about Bill 10 by selecting those containing the text segments, “Bill”, “Bill 10”, “amend of constitution”. These segments were identified by browsing tweets containing the terms electoral process, financial management, religion, legislature.

This produced a set of Bill 10 tweets accounting for 0.1% of the unique 954 tweets, but after eliminating duplicate tweets, such as retweets of the same original tweet, and near-duplicates, which are two tweets that are identical except for hashtags and @ usernames, only 600 tweets and 500 retweets were retained. The 954 tweets were extracted from the original set of 1,317 downloaded. Only tweets in English were analysed to give a coherent set.

Retweeted tweets were extracted from the Bill 10 tweets when the retweet count was above 5. This minimum was chosen heuristically to allow a moderate number of tweets to be analysed.

About a 150 highly retweeted Bill 10 tweets were analysed using thematic analysis. This qualitative method is appropriate because it is exploratory and so can be applied to new contexts without prior expectations about the outcomes (Braun, Virginia; Clarke, Victoria, 2016). Since Bill 10 newly emerged, there is no research about it from which to form prior expectations and so an exploratory method was appropriate. Thematic analysis is suitable because it is not theory-driven and therefore fits the exploratory goals better than other approaches, such as grounded theory.

For the thematic analysis, the author read all the tweets twice, including on *Twitter.com* to see any associated pictures or links, and assigned them initial codes reflecting their main contents. The tweets were then re-coded after reflecting on the initial codes. The tweets were then clustered by theme and recoded three times, adjusting the codes to make them more uniform and generalised to allow similar tweets to fit within common themes as much as possible. In some cases, Bill 10 was mentioned in a tweet alongside other factors, such as name of ruling part in Zambia, PF or UPND, which is the main opposition political party as earlier mentioned and the critical opposers (outrage) of Bill 10. In all cases Bill 10 was judged to be a core part of the tweet so no tweets were rejected on the basis of limited relevance. Although thematic analysis usually involves multiple coders, as a fast reaction article only a single coder was used as this study only had one author. The themes are reported in the results section.

Ethics

The topic of this study raises potential ethical issues. Nevertheless, although there is no consensus on internet-based ethics (Golder; Ahmed; Norman; Booth, 2017), the current study was exempt from formal ethical approval due to only analyzing fully public online texts. Following best practice (Wilkinson; Thelwall, 2011), the anonymity of all tweeters was preserved in this paper by not including any names or exact quotes. Exceptions were made only for tweets from prominent political individuals, non-inclined political activist and those who have shown publicly and their views are already known in the public domain (Pilato, Sishuwa Sishuwa, Elias Munshya, Bill 10, Linda Kasonde, Laurel Miti), an official organization Chapter One Foundation and the Law Association of Zambia.

Results

The data collection phrase identified 471 retweets from 1,317 tweets with at least 60 retweets each, excluding irrelevant matches. The following main themes were identified, listed in decreasing order of the total number of retweets. As mentioned above, for ethical reasons, only 'high-profile' tweeters are quoted. Because this is a qualitative study, the results are reported as a list rather than a table but associated quantitative information is also given for some theme. The number of tweets from people showing outrage for Bill 10 is also reported in some cases, some themes, based on the tweeter's profile and a *Google* or *YouTube* search for them. The total includes activist as earlier mentioned and people that describe themselves as activists like in Figure 1, showing Mr. Sangwa state council, statement on the call for members of parliament to reject Bill 10.



Figure 1: Mr. John Sangwa a critical opposer of the Bill to a point is right as a lawyer to appear before the courts of law in Zambia was revoked at one point during the Bill 10 debate period

Some of the note-worthy amendments to the Constitution proposed in the Constitutional Amendment Bill number 10 are highlighted below. There were concerns that this recent attempt to the amendment the Constitution would have reversed progressive provisions in an already existing flawed Constitution.

3.1. Some Religious Overtones

(100 tweets, 10 retweets, 44 responses in outrage to the Bill)

The Zambian current Constitution defines Zambia as a unitary, multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-party democratic State. The proposed amendments would insert “Christian” before “unitary” and delete “multi-religious”. Similarly, whilst the current Constitution states that the national values and principles include “morality and ethics”, the proposed amendment limits this to “Christian morality”. Instead of the NDF having encouraged a more tolerant society, these amendments raise concern that Zambian society will become less tolerant of the rights of minority groups. One of the tweets in support read, “WE, THE PEOPLE OF ZAMBIA: ACKNOWLEDGE the supremacy of God Almighty; • God or other deities DECLARE the Republic a Christian Nation while upholding a person’s right to freedom of conscience, belief or religion”. In figure 2, Mr. Elias Munshya had taken time to explain that; “in Bill 10, the Bill that if passed, will fundamentally alter the character of Zambian democracy by amending the constitution, several proposals touch on the declaration. First, Bill 10 wishes to remove any reference to Zambia’s multi-religious character. Second, Bill 10 proposes to enshrine what it is calling Christian morality and ethics into the Constitution of Zambia”, He further sates that. these proposals in Bill 10 are entirely unnecessary.



Figure 2: A Zambian Laywer based in Canada had indicated we have been multi-religious even before the invasion of white colonialists who brought us the great gospel of Christ

3.2. Zambia National Assembly, Parliament and the Judiciary

(3 tweets, 4 retweets in outrage, 5 responses and all of them in outrage to the Bill)

The proposed Bill would have stripped the Zambia National Assembly of many of its oversight powers and functions, for instance, when it comes to the composition of Parliament, Bill 10 is vague and leaves it to be enacted into legislation, furthermore, the Bill does not stipulate the number of judges that should constitute either the Zambia Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal, creating space for political interference in the judiciary. Further room for political interference can be seen where the Bill gives the President power to appoint a tribunal to remove a sitting judge which power previously sat with the Judicial Complaints Commission. The tweet from the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), a former ruling party in Zambia, tweeted “If Bill 10 passes it will be more like Zambia will be a one-part state because the opposition will be weakened, they'll be no proper checks and balances to the executive either from legislature, judiciary or opposition parties.”

3.3. Financial Management and Accountability

(27 tweets, 63 retweets in outrage and mostly from financial institutions rather than individual tweets)

Bill 10 would have reduced the Zambia’s Government’s financial accountability by abolishing parliamentary oversight over contracting public debt. Bill 10 also went in so far as to want to repeal the clause that state that the permanent secretary is responsible and accountable for proper financial management of public monies, without stating who this responsibility is now given to. Bill 10 removes oversight from the Secretary to the Treasury of the Zambian government in the formulation and implementation of the macro-economic framework and socio-economic plans of Zambia. In line with the removal of financial responsibility, the Bill sees the creation of the Anti-Drugs, Economic and Financial Crimes Agency (FIC). The introduction of this Agency is questionable as there is already an existing FIC which is created by an act of Parliament and is responsible for investigating financial crimes. The FIC has been applauded by the public as it is known to be effective, recent reports have even implicated law firms as well as politicians in suspicious transactions. The concern is that the creation of this new Agency would have rendered the FIC redundant, facilitating corruption. Cuts Lusaka, carried out a thread of tweets around financial management issues, Figure 3 shows one of the tweets.



Figure 3: Cuts Lusaka one of the insightful Tweet on financial and debt management

https://twitter.com/CUTS_Lusaka/status/1202549458640285697

One of the tweets in outrage read “...impact Zambia’s debt management are as follows: Section 13 of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill seeks to delete paragraphs (d) and (e) of Article 63 (2) the Constitution of Zambia Act No. 2 of 2016 which seeks remove National Assembly’s ability to approve public...” Others tweeted

“At present, in addition to providing oversight, the process of submitting agreements to National Assembly allows public scrutiny through National Assembly’s consultative meetings with stakeholders” another tweet indicated” Section 26 of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill proposes to amend Article 92 (b) by making the President responsible for negotiating ratifying, acceding or withdrawing from international agreements. One of the tweets, emphasized that Bill 10 removes checks and balances when Zambia borrows money, Figure 4.

3.4. Electoral Process

(19 tweets, 51 retweets in outrage and only 3 in outrage)

Bill 10 proposed a change to the electoral system, from a first past the post electoral system, to a mixed-member electoral system. Furthermore, the Bill also made an allowance for a coalition government. The problem is that the Bill did not define a coalition government in the Zambian context, leaving it open to be interpreted in a manner that could serve the interests of any ruling party, and leaving the voter in a position of uncertainty. This means that a presidential candidate who is not supported by 50 percent plus 1 of registered voters could still be appointed into office through a coalition. A big concern was that the Bill proposed that Parliament should not be dissolved 90 days before the general election, but instead it should remain operational until the general election. The practice of dissolving Parliament during the electoral campaigning period assists to ensure equity between candidates. In Figure 5, Diggers News tweets a news item of Dr. Sishuwa Sishuwa, an ardent critic of Bill 10 and a University of Zambia academician who through his tweets was key for the outrage against Bill 10.



Figure 5. The Diggers News tweet on Sishuwa concern on the democracy of Zambia
<https://twitter.com/DiggersOfNews/status/1268892448127934465>

In summary given the lethality of Bill 10 and the highly political inclination of thinking and the lack of critical thought for many educated people coupled with the insecurity that comes with a high level of illiteracy for many citizens, it is important to evaluate their reactions, both the support and outrage to Bill 10 and recognize the issues that are considered to be most important. Moreover, since communication is important to empower people with knowledge of national significance in order to promote understanding and decision-making based on information, it is also useful to understand the role of *Twitter*. The Minister of Justice really showed the tenacity of how not to withdraw Bill 10 despite clear outrage from activist like Ms. Linda Kasonde, Mr. John Sangwa and others, Figure 6. shows a tweet of the Diggers News of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Given Lubinda questioning the credibility of Ms. Linda Kasonde.



Figure 6. Zambia's Justice Minister (Mr. Lubinda) outrage against the opposers of the Bill

Discussion

The results have several limitations. They are subjective to the researcher as coder and limited in breadth because there may be important topics that were discussed in other places, such as forums like ones organized by the Law Association of Zambia, *WhatsApp* groups, Facebook, or mainstream news sources like Diggers News paper, Diamond TV, Muvi TV and the Mast newspaper among others. More personal topics would presumably be discussed in private environments and some people with strong political inclination but for security reasons among many reasons may prefer to avoid *Twitter*. There may also be issues widely discussed on *Twitter* without a single highly retweeted tweet. Misinformation may be largely missing from the collection due to efforts by *Twitter* to combat it.

The themes generated from the retweets do not seem surprising in the sense that they largely reverberate, but in a stronger form, many ongoing concerns of the Bill's provisions which showed that if enacted, the principles of constitutionalism and good governance would have been undermined in Zambia. In terms of the useful information retweeted, this is a positive role for *Twitter*. A retweet does not guarantee that the information was used because behaviour change is a complex process (Cugelman; Thelwall; Dawes, 2011). Nevertheless, there is some connection between information on *Twitter* and the general awareness of what the information should be about (Farhadloo; Winneg; Chan; Jamieson; Albarracin, 2018). Thus, it seems likely that the information will have successfully informed and reminded some people especially the members of parliament, helping them to either be in support or be in outrage of Bill 10 and consequently giving confidence to members of parliament to vote against the Bill.

According to most *Tweets* and *retweets* it has been found that when Zambia Constitutional Amendment of the Bill, those in support seem to have created a notion which made the government's intentions seem to appear admirable in the respect that they are seeking to protect minority groups from future abuses especially women, youths and those living with disability, but for those in outrage of the Bill, the rationale is that if the current government can change the constitutional amendment provision with relative ease, what is to stop future governments from doing the same but with less admirable intentions. In an Ideal situation, a power-hungry President could decide to reduce the majority required in Parliament to pass constitutional amendments, which in turn could lead to the easier passage of further amendment Bills for means such as increasing presidential powers and removing term limits, seriously threatening existing democratic structures.

According to various *retweets* that seemed to provide some road map of what should have been the correct way to the Zambia Constitutional Amendment Bill is that sequence of events particularly noteworthy is that the change to the constitution should have been initiated not by the countries' elected legislators, but by the public at large. It

could be argued that this is a sign of a healthy democracy, with decision making in the hands of the wider population.

One interesting phenomena in comparison to other analyses of serious issues is that highly retweeted tweets showed so much seriousness of thought. Surprising to mention is that humour is common used strategy on *Twitter* and it helps to drive retweeting the agenda of the debate (Milbrodt, Teresa 2018). Thus, on *Twitter*, Tweets on Bill 10 were serious making all the information about the Bill straightforward and to the point. This might be due to a combination of the potential for misunderstanding and the seriousness of the situation. It must be mentioned that some of the retweeted tweets denigrated either those in support or in outrage of Bill 10. Such that whenever there was a physical debate, emotions were high among the support and outrage groups.

Conclusions

The outrage that was available on *Twitter* is indicative that if Bill 10 had been passed it would have been a major threat to the process and distortion of the principles of constitutionalism in Zambia. The *Twitter* site seems to have been useful to share basic information about Bill number 10 of Zambia, including information about, or requests for, outrage against it. Such information sharing of *Twitter* is a valuable informational roles of *Twitter* and other social medial platforms and underline that social media should be useful during governance and constitutional amendment campaigns among many political debates. The tweets expressing outrage towards Bill number 10 especially among the lay people confirm the importance of these issues. Making feelings known about this on *Twitter* and elsewhere may have been important in getting Bill number 10 defeated in parliament as the Bill never attained the required third majority in its second reading in parliament of the Republic of Zambia. Thus, overall, *Twitter* seems to be a valuable part of the information and political ecosystem of constitutional amendments among other importants as already indicated. According to the tweets, If Bill number 10 had been passed some of the provisions, would have undermined important elements of the country's constitutional foundations. The Bill, if enacted, risked reversing any incremental gains scored and Zambia would have slide into autocracy. The disclaimer of this writing, just in case one may wonder about where I am drawing the power to write on this. My power actually comes from or is actually enshrined right in the Constitution of Zambia under the heading "supremacy of Constitution" and section 2 actually says "every person has the right and duty to defend this constitution and be resist or prevent a person from over throwing suspending or illegally abrogate this Constitution". The Bill being discussed was defeated in parliament on 29th October, 2020. Thanks to the role of social media such as *Twitter*.

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Between the Devil and Lying Angels: An Invitation for a New Perspective on State Interference in Local Government Fiscal Autonomy in Nigeria

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Abstract

One of the most contested issues in Nigeria's political landscape and federal structure is the debate on the fiscal autonomy of the Local Government as the third tier of government. The literature on the subject appears to zero down the issue of Local Government fiscal autonomy to a political 'devil'. The position of existing scholarship on the subject concludes that by taking advantage of Sections 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, it is common practice for the State Governors to usurp the autonomy of the Local Governments. The Governors are also accused of using the Joint Account framework to control the statutory allocations of the Local Governments. Hence, Local Governments in Nigeria lacks fiscal autonomy which is one of the main principles of the three tiers of government structure. However, the underlying politics that has played out in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria reveals that this historical and legalistic perception does not provide a complete explanation of the problem. This is because the literature does not consider the role of the political elite at the Local Government level in sustaining the shrewd nature of State and Local Governments interaction in Nigeria's Federal structure, rather the existing literature focused entirely on the governor as a 'devil' and ignores the role of the political class at the grassroots level as "lying angels". This paper is therefore an invitation for a deeper theoretical deconstruction of this phenomenon to stimulate an encompassing and interesting perceptives on what we conceptualize as State-Local Government Interactions in Nigeria (SLIN). Our primary objective is to draw attention to the role of the personalities of the political class at the grassroots level which makes up the highest cadre of the hierarchy in the Local Government in shaping SLIN. We present a case that future debates should go beyond "devil" and also focus on the profound role of "lying angels".

Keywords: Local Government, Rural Development, State-Local Government Interaction, Fiscal Autonomy, Federalism, Nigeria

Introduction

The guiding principles of local administration in post-colonial Nigeria evolved largely from the ubiquitous decentralization of administration in traditional settings in most parts of pre-colonial Nigeria. In addition to the acephalous and democratic societies in the area that later became the Protectorate of Oil Rivers, the rather feudalistic Northern Nigeria also had tiers of government that extended from the office of the Caliph to the Emirs and their emissaries. Similarly, in the West, there was a semi-decentralization of power in a structural way that stretched from the *Alaafin* of Oyo to the heads of clans known as the *Baale*. Hence, the concept of government at the grassroots level is not novel to Nigeria's political landscape. Rather, what is new is the 1976 Local Government reform which unified the local government system in Nigeria and laid the legal and historical basis of the Local Government System in the Fourth Republic as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Akinpelu 2019; Jimoh 2003; Okeke 2002; Agba et al 2014).

There is overwhelming evidence in the literature that the concept of an autonomous Local Government as the third tier of government in Nigeria's federal structure is not fully operationalized in the Fourth Republic (Mukoro 2003., Abeki 2020; Akindele et al 2002). By its constitutional composition and framework of operation, the Local Government is designed to have a high degree of autonomy with the primary purpose of providing services and political representation to people at the grassroots level (Mukoro, 2003; Adeyomo 2005). It ought to be made of representative councils with substantial control over local affairs, for the provision of services and implementation of local projects in their areas, to complement the activities of both the State and Federal governments (Awofeso, 2004; Akpan & Ekanem 2012). However, in operation, the autonomy by the Local Government appears not to exist due to interferences by the State Government (Agba et al 2013; Ikelegbe 2005). Most scholars examine this problematic from a "devilish" standpoint which focuses on the Governor of the State. To these scholars, the sole personality of the Governor of the State determines the nature of State-Local Government Interactions in Nigeria (SLIN). The argument concludes that the Local Governments are not autonomous because of the overriding powers of the State (Adeyemo 2005; Adeyemo 2010; Ewetan 2012; Alao et al 2015). This atomistic view which appears to be the orthodoxy in the literature is not conclusive in explaining SLIN, because it excludes the role of the political elite at the grassroots level in shaping what the State does or does not do in its interaction with the Local Governments.

This paper is an invitation for a deeper and more theoretically robust debate on SLIN. It calls for a departure from the "iron casted" perception of SLIN in the existing literature which creates the narrative of a sole devil figure (the State Governor) that usurps the powers, statutory allocations, and revenue sources of the Local Government for its purposes. What we intend to do here is not to downplay the role of State Governors in shaping the structurally faulty nature of SLIN. Rather, we call for a shift from the orthodoxy by proposing that future studies on the subject should incorporate the role of the grassroots political class and the hierarchy in the Local Government level in explaining the interactions between the state and local tiers of government.

The Role and Nature of the Local Government in Nigeria

The role of Local Governments in Nigeria is in some ways like those of the central government (Arua & Duru, 2009). The central government exists to provide for the security and socio-economic advancement of the citizenry. To some extent, Local governments perform such roles. They exist to transmit national developmental agenda to the grassroots level, by so doing, play the role of the bridge between the government at the centre and the people (Larson 2004; Adetiba 2017; Emezi 1979). Moreover, to enhance responsive governance, local governments serve as a two-way channel of communication between the government and the governed. Just as it transmits the decision of governments to the local people, it also conveys or channels their demands and feedbacks on policies to other tiers of government (Ekpe 2012; Doho et al 2018). Other roles of Local Government towards sustainable rural development include:

- i. Increasing the people's understanding and support of social and economic development policies through mass education (Ogbonna, 2004).

- ii. Making and implementing programmes to foster socio-economic growth in the rural areas (Lawal 2000; Abubakar 2004).
- iii. Formulation of economic planning and development schemes at the grassroots level (Gboyega, 1991)
- iv. Construction and maintenance of roads, streets lightings, drains parks, gardens, open spaces, or such public facilities as may be prescribed from time to time by the State Legislature (Adejoh & Sule, 2013).
- v. Development of the agricultural sector through the provision of financial capital, fertilizers, hoes, and other farming facilities to local farmers (Lele 2005; Adedokun 2012).
- vi. Provision of primary and vocational education at the grassroots level (Bello 2004; Ibrahim 2008; Ighodado 2012).

Understanding the Politics of Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria

The politics of local government autonomy had different outcome between the military and civilian governments in Nigeria. While the military government at the centre favoured devolution of more powers to the local governments, the civilian governments in the states preferred to usurp the powers of the local governments (Adejoh & Sule, 2013). The search for autonomy and the effort of local government to free itself from different forms of control has been one of the major problems facing local government in Nigeria to date. There has been controversy over the years on the issue of autonomy and how it affects local governments in Nigeria. The concept of autonomy and its application has been a subject of debate among scholars.

Agba et al (2013) observed that the connotations underpin of the term autonomy are a major source of confusion which scholars of local government administration have severally attempted to clarify. For Agba et al (2013) and Ikeanyibe (2010), local government autonomy means the supremacy of Byelaws made by a local body within a framework determined by the central and state government. This has to do with the degree of discretionary power assigned to it by a superior instrument of government in terms of functions, finance, administration, and political matters (Awotokun, 2005). Adeyemo (2010) opined that autonomy in a federal system means that each government enjoys a separate existence and independence from the control of another government.

On the debate of local government autonomy, three contending perspectives have emerged. The first group interprets local government autonomy to mean independence from the interference of state government in the activities of local government (Daly, 2013). The second perceives Local Government autonomy as the non-interference of the federal government in the activities of Local Governments (Onuigbo, 2015), and the third group, maintains that local government autonomy means independence from both state and federal governments interference in the activities of local councils (Akpan & Ekanem, 2013).

The important issues in local government autonomy in Nigeria started to emerge with the 1976 far-reaching local government reforms. This was the first time in the history of Nigeria that local government units were regarded as a separate arm of government with constitutional status, power and financial standing irrespective of the fact that the state governments were to ensure their existence and provide for their structure, composition, finance and functions. It was from the 1976 local government reforms that some dominant issues in local government autonomy could be easily appreciated. These include the setting up of representative councils, determination of population size of local governments, direct allocation of funds to local governments. But before 1976, local administration, rather than local government, could be said to have existed in Nigeria. This is because from the colonial era up to 1975, administration at the local level was an appendage of the Regional and later State governments. This was despite some reforms by the regional governments at the local level in the 1950s and post-independence era by the State governments up to 1975 (Ikelegbe, 2005).

In understanding local government autonomy in Nigeria, three historical perspectives will be briefly reviewed. The first will be the period from 1950-1983. The second is from 1983- 1999 and the third epoch is from mid-1999-to date. In the 1950s the colonial government recognized local governance as a mere appendage of the central government. Between 1950 and 1952, the regional governments, through their respective Houses of

Assembly enacted the local government ordinance, which formally abolished the hitherto default Native Authority System and subsequently instituted a radically different local government system in the regions (Adeyemo, 2005).

The period between 1950 and 1983 witnessed the abandonment of the promotion of local autonomy. Though local government formerly exercise limitless powers over their budgets, expenditure and personnel, within this period, the Ministry of Local Government enacted several bylaws to regulate and control their operations (Awofeso, 2004). Later, their relative autonomy was further eroded through the ruling party at the centre, which determines the membership composition of the councils. By 1966 when the military took over the reins of power, a more centralized command structure characteristic of the military further worsened the autonomy struggle of local governments until 1976 when the reforms of that year gave local governments a new lease of life (Ekpe, 2012). As noted by Bello (2004), two critical factors are responsible for this development. First, the 1976 nationwide local government reforms unequivocally recognized the tier of government as a distinct level of government with defined boundaries, clearly stated functions, and provisions for ensuring adequate human and financial resources and at the same time imposed a nation-wide uniformity for all the units of local government within practical limits. Secondly, by deciding to recognize local government as the third tier of government, it fashioned it as the political institution at the grassroots level. Therefore, the 1976 local government reforms show some dominant issues in local government autonomy. These include the setting up of representative councils, determination of population size of local governments, direct allocation of funds to local governments and review of personnel administration. However, in an operational sense, the 1976 reforms to recognize local government as a tier of government was futile; local government administration is still an appendage of state and federal governments. Despite the constitutional elasticity provided for local government system beginning with the 1979 constitution and subsequent ones that defined functions and sources of funding of the system, Local Governments have not been able to extricate themselves from the control of state and federal governments in Nigeria (Ogbonna, 2004; Ezeani 2006). It is important to note that except for the Babangida's administration, all other reforms that have been made in the local government system over the years consistently decreased local government autonomy and increased the interferences of both federal and state governments in the activities of local government. The Babangida administration as earlier stated, introduced direct federal allocation to local government, abolished the Ministry of local government and established executive and legislative arms in local government.

As asserted by Abubakar, (2004) the issue of autonomy has to do with the Local government, beyond mere constitutional provision that would be organized as the third tier of government, with power to regulate, to spend and powers to provide services". However, experience and empirical evidence have shown that the financial autonomy of local government is non-existent in Nigeria. The non-independence of the local government as the third tier of government is further buttressed by the fact no express constitutional provisions are restricting the powers of the State House of Assembly to prescribe the organizational structure of a local government in terms of its functionaries to wit: Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Supervisory Councilors etc. These officers and their offices, qualifications and tenure are not established or prescribed by the Constitution but are created by the law of the State Government.

The 1999 Constitutions of Nigeria poses a major challenge to the autonomy of local government. The double standard of the constitution made it difficult for local governments to operate as an autonomous tier of government (Adedokun, 2012). The Constitution empowers the State to scrutinize and approve Local Government budgets, and expenditure through the State House of Assembly. States here exercise arbitrary and undue control over Local government finance through the establishment of the State and Local Government Joint Account. This situation also brought to the fore the question of Local government autonomy. The experience with many Local government areas was that their states starve them of the statutory grant thus denying them of rendering essential services as required. Also, Section 7 and 8 of the constitution stated that there shall be a system of Local Government by democratically elected councils which by this constitution is guaranteed. Accordingly, the government of every state shall subject to section 8 of this constitution ensure their existence under a law which is provided for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of

the councils. The above constitutional provisions imply that local government in Nigeria cannot exercise the functions assigned to it in section 1 schedule 4 of the constitution until the state House of Assembly had passed a law (Okeke, 2002).

To facilitate their operations and development of the localities, Local Governments in Nigeria need adequate autonomy. This should emanate from institutionalized democratic process of elections for representative Local Government councils as and when due. This should be in line with what obtains at the State and Federal government levels where elections are timely conducted.

Adequate autonomy should be manifestly accorded Local Governments in other areas such as finance, revenue generation and expenditure, personnel administration, and development matters. This will forestall the current alibi that Local Governments make with inadequate Autonomy for their diminutive development impact in their areas.

Lying Angels: What Does the Data Suggest?

The overwhelming position of the literature on State-Local Government interaction in Nigeria is that the foundational problem of Local Governments is its lack of autonomy which is usurped by the State Government (Mello 2012; Awofeddo 2004; Okechukwu et al 2019). However, a study by Imhanlahimi & Ikeanyibe (2009) suggested that the Local Government has its internal problems and the blame on the State is a devil shift. This position is similar to the observation of the Dasuki Report which noted that the difficulties of the Local Governments are “arising directly from the behaviour and attitudes of the persons who operated the system” (Nigeria 1987: 120). In the content analysis of newspaper reports between 2003 and 2007, Imhanlahimi & Ikeanyibe (2009) showed that 80.9% of the related news are aimed at criticism of the Local Government internal activities independent of State Government interference.

Table 1: Content Analysis of Some Newspapers about People’s Views of Local Government Development in Nigeria (2003-2007)

S/No	Newspapers	Number of Copies Analyzed	Number of Praises	Number of Criticism
1	Independent	52	3	10
2	Mirror	15	0	5
3	Nation	49	3	8
4	Punch	60	5	12
5	Sun	35	4	10
6	The Comment	19	1	2
7	The Guardian	109	2	17
8	This Day	85	4	11
9	Tribune	66	2	18
10	Vanguard	155	6	32
	Total	645	30	127

Source: Imhanlahimi & Ikeanyibe (2009)

Based on the above line of debate, we generate the following three overarching hypotheses:

H1: A Local Government Chairman or Council member will prefer the State Government to interfere with the autonomy of the Local Government if it will enhance the personal political and financial status of that Chairman or Council member.

H0: *A Local Government Chairman or Council member will NOT prefer the State Government to interfere with the autonomy of the Local Government if it will enhance the personal political and financial status of that Chairman or Council member.*

H2: A Local Government Chairman or Council member will feel more inclined to respond to the demands of his/her constituency if that demand comes through the machinery of the State Government than directly from the grassroots citizen.

H0: A Local Government Chairman or Council member will NOT feel more inclined to respond to the demands of his/her constituency if that demand comes through the machinery of the State Government than directly from the grassroots citizens.

H3: There will be a significant increase in the performance of Local Governments if given higher fiscal autonomy.

H0: There will be no significant increase in the performance of Local Governments if given higher fiscal autonomy.

To test these three hypotheses we sent out an online survey link to elected officials of Local Governments across Nigeria. Responses representative of 274 Local Governments were pooled. To get a balanced opinion we coded the responses based on the political party ruling in the Local Government. These affiliations are zeroed down to the two major contending political parties: Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressives Congress (APC).

In the first set of questions, we asked the respondents opinion about their preferences in terms of their personal use of the funds of the Local Government; and if they will do what the State Governor ask them to do if that will enhance their prospect of getting elected into a higher public office, even if it means the State Governor will be interfering in the Local Government affairs.

Crosstab

Count

		Political Party		Total
		PDP	APC	
Variable1	YES	104	65	169
	NO	55	50	105
Total		159	115	274

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Asymp. Std. Error ^a	Approx. T ^b	Approx. Sig.
Interval by Interval Pearson's R	.321	.063	.685	.528 ^c
Ordinal by Ordinal Spearman Correlation	.332	.064	.207	.636 ^c
N of Valid Cases	274			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

DATA 1 = 274 RESPONDENT

N= 274

Variables	ΣX ΣY	X^2 Y^2	XY	r-cal	r-crit	Decision
X	6821	10221				Significant Reject Ho
Y	13574	331562	223772	0.332	0.089	

Significant at .05 alpha level; df = 272, critical-r value = .089

Based on the analysis above we reject H0 and accept H1 which states that “A Local Government Chairman or Council member will prefer the State Government to interfere with the autonomy of the Local Government if it will enhance the personal political and financial status of that Chairman or Council member”.

In the second set of questions, we asked the respondents whether a Local Government chairman or council member will feel more inclined to respond to the demands of his/her constituency if that demand comes through the machinery of the State Government than directly from the grassroots citizens.

Crosstab

Count

		Political Party		Total
		PDP	APC	
Variable2	YES	109	67	176
	NO	45	53	98
Total		154	120	274

N= 274

Variables	ΣX ΣY	X^2 Y^2	XY	r-cal	r-crit	Decision
X	8124	115234				Significant Reject Ho
Y	13574	331562	215712	0.424	0.089	

Significant at .05 alpha level; df = 272, critical-r value = .089

The statistical analysis above supports the H2 which suggest a Local Government Chairman or Council member will feel more inclined to respond to the demands of his/her constituency if that demand comes through the machinery of the State Government than directly from the grassroots citizen. In the third set of questions, we asked the respondents of their opinion about Local Government performance if given a higher level of fiscal autonomy. “YES” is a coding of the responses to indicate that Local Governments will perform better and “NO” means that Local Governments will not perform better.

Crosstab

Count

		Political Party		Total
		PDP	APC	
Variable3	YES	112	45	157
	NO	57	60	117
Total		169	105	274

N= 274

Variables	ΣX ΣY	X^2 Y^2	XY	r-cal	r-crit	Decision
X	6231	111148				Significant Reject Ho
Y	13574	331562	211201	0.361	0.089	

Significant at .05 alpha level; df = 272, critical-r value = .089

The result of the data shows that there will be a significant increase in the performance of Local Governments if given higher fiscal autonomy.

These results are quite interesting because it reveals Local Governments officials as policy “lying angels”. There is a preponderant inclination of Local Governments officials to look the other way when the State Government interferes with its autonomy if that will increase the chances of the official getting support at the State political structure in future elections. This also shapes the allegiance the officials has- which shifted to the qualms and caprice of the State Government due to individual financial and political gains. As a result, Local Governments tends to show priority to grassroots projects that synchronize with the dictates of the government at the State level and not its constituency.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic, the academics and the civil societies have paid serious attention to the practice of effective and efficient Local Government administration in Nigeria. It is observed in this study that Nigeria’s Local Governments system is dysfunctional and has been unable to play its expected role as the third tier of government. Local Governments in the Fourth Republic are functionally weak and institutionally frail owing to lack of clear financial autonomy and state interference in their revenue sources. But while the literature tends to focus on a “devil” (State Governors) that usurps the autonomy of the Local Governments only by its will, this paper followed a different trajectory to suggest that state intervention into the affairs of the Local Government is desirable by the Local Government. This study does not pretend to develop a new theoretical perception of SLIN, rather, it is an invitation for a deeper investigation into the socio-political dynamics within the Local Government itself that have played a significant role in fostering and sustaining tighter State control of Local Governments that should look beyond the State Government and look more into the personalities of the Local Government structures.

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The New Sykes-Picot: Imperial Geographies, Economic Violence and the Occupation of Northern and Eastern Syria

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Abstract

This article quantifies the socio-economic impact of Syria's territorial fragmentation, framing western efforts to partition Syria against the backdrop of a broader campaign designed to achieve regime change using economic violence. While some have attempted to quantify the impact of sanctions and trade restrictions on Syrian civilians, much of the extant literature fails to address the illegal occupation of Syrian territory north and east of the Euphrates River. Critically, the direct seizure of geographic space through the occupation of Syrian territory facilitates economic violence far more effectively than sanctions alone. In western capitals, the tacit embrace of such methods indicates a re-discovery of old-line traditional territorial imperialism and the rhetorical devices needed to promote it: advocating the illegal seizure of Syrian territory demands a reinvigorated orientalist public discourse designed to promote western saviorism and the moral necessity of western interventionism. Using a hybridized research methodology incorporating qualitative and quantitative analysis, this study appraises the tangible consequences of Syria's territorial fragmentation as experienced by Syrians while simultaneously appraising the role of orientalist, liberal-interventionist discourse in the promotion of empire.

Keywords: Syria, Occupation, Imperialism, Orientalism, Liberal-Interventionism

“My people and your people, my Syrian
Brother, are dead ... What can be
Done for those who are dying? Our
Lamentations will not satisfy their
Hunger, and our tears will not quench
Their thirst; what can we do to save
Them between the iron paws of
Hunger?”

- From Dead Are My People by Gibran Khalil Gibran (1883-1931)

Introduction

The Great Famine of Mount Lebanon, or *Maja'at al-Lubnan*, began shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. Bilad al-Sham found itself caught in the crossfire as rival poles of the colonial capitalist world system fought over “boundaries, colonies (and) spheres of influence...competing for Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East” (Zinn, 2003). In their struggle with the Ottoman Empire, the Allied Powers blockaded Beirut along with the rest of the Syrian coastline. According to the American Red Cross, the resulting famine killed nearly 250,000 people (Ghazal, 2015). More recent studies, according to Elizabeth Thompson, support far higher casualty estimates; nearly half a million deaths from starvation and disease (Thompson, 2000). Throughout Lebanon, civilians suffered from severe shortages of fuel, food, medicine, and other basic commodities. As a result, “most spent the war in cold and darkness” (Thompson, 2000).

Critically, “the Allies had full knowledge that a blockade of the Ottoman Empire’s Mediterranean coast would produce food and supply shortages to the detriment of the empire’s civilian populations; however, this reality was understood as a necessary by-product of their wartime policies” (Cummings, 2015). As part of a broader campaign to destroy the Ottoman economy, France and Britain readily condemned hundreds of thousands of human beings to death by starvation in Mount Lebanon (Thompson, 2000). Indeed, internal memos from the French foreign ministry reveal that the British viewed “...the famine as an agent that will lead the Arabs to revolt [against the Ottomans]” (Thompson, 2000). The United States -keen to uphold the veneer of neutrality- did not initially participate in the implementation of the blockade. Ironically, the USS Caesar was dispatched by the American Red Cross to deliver medical supplies and foodstuffs. But unrelenting British pressure undermined the effort, the USS Caesar never delivered its cargo, and “with America’s entry into war in April 1917 the U.S.’s tenure as a neutral humanitarian actor came to a close” (Cummings, 2015).

The lessons of the early 20th century remain instructive for our purposes, both as valuable historical context and as an investigative lens through which we may more accurately track change -or lack thereof- over time. When confronted with inconvenient personal accounts and testimony highlighting the deleterious impact of sanctions on the typical Syrian household, some western experts audaciously argue that it would be a “mistake...to view the matter only from the perspective of the average Syrian” (Adesnik, 2020). Rather than consider the points of view of Syrians themselves, self-assured arbiters of truth and justice working for American think-tanks stifle subaltern voices while outlining the various means through which politicians in the imperial metropole might accelerate the implosion of the Syrian economy. Deviations from this mode of thinking are unusual in the rarified sphere of mainstream western journalism and professionalized Syria ‘expertise.’

As was the case during the Allied blockade of the Lebanese coast nearly a century ago, proponents of economic violence -applied in the contemporary Syrian context- anticipate massive civilian casualties, chaos, and widespread starvation. While publicly supporting the Caesar Act and praising it as an “opportunity” to achieve regime change in Syria, one Syria expert recently argued that the implementation of more sanctions at this juncture of the conflict ensures “even greater levels of destitution, famine, and worsening criminality and predatory behavior” (Lister, 2020). Indeed, think-tankers, academics, and journalists living comfortably in the imperial metropole regularly highlight the strategic utility of destitution, famine, and chaos. For these individuals, the appearance of bread lines and social unrest indicate ‘policy efficacy’ rather than the symptoms of a humanitarian tragedy, insofar as these outcomes may eventually ‘hurt Asad.’ By indiscriminately inflicting pain on the Syrian people, western powers and their surrogate regimes in the region hope to apply pressure from below as a means of (eventually) winning concessions from and forcing the capitulation of the Syrian government.

One British think-tanker provided a succinct summation of this strategic vision, suggesting that the Caesar Act “headlined a series of measures intended to prevent the return of normality to regime-controlled Syria, *to foment renewed crisis*, [emphasis added] and thus to turn Syria from an asset to a burden for both Moscow and Tehran” (Spyer, 2020). He then fallaciously argues that anyone drawing attention to the “difficult humanitarian situation in regime areas and call for a softening of restrictions” must necessarily be “regime spokespeople and apologists” (Spyer, 2020). By mischaracterizing criticism of the embargo as an expression of regime apologetics and

embracing both in principle and practice the use of economic violence, the architects of the Caesar Act (and those who support it) are following in the footsteps of their early 20th century colonial-imperialist predecessors. As was the case during the Great War, blockades, sanctions, and economic violence invariably impact ordinary civilians far more than those who govern them. In Syria, these tactics have been particularly damaging due to the illegal occupation of Syrian territory by the Euro-American coalition. The multivariate consequences of the occupation work in tandem with trade restrictions and sanctions, although much of the literature tends to focus on the latter while neglecting analysis of the occupation and its impact. To test the veracity of this claim, this article quantifies the collective impact of the occupation and embargo using the available statistics alongside testimonial accounts from locals. These and other sources reveal widespread shortages throughout the country, affecting the availability of foodstuffs as well as medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other essential goods. Further research will be required, especially as macro-economic conditions within Syria continue to deteriorate under the incoming American administration, which so far shows little interest in deviating from the Syria policy promoted by Donald Trump and Barack Obama.

Beyond Sanctions: Occupying Syria & the Weaponization of Wheat

The ongoing embargo directed against the people of Syria resembles a medieval-style siege, at least in the sense that basic necessities such as wheat, gasoline, cooking oil, and meat are prohibitively expensive and difficult to come by. 'Targeted' sanctions which in practice restrict access to a broad spectrum of basic commodities work hand in hand with more overt forms of coercion, namely the occupation of Syrian territory by (mostly) American troops. At present, American-led coalition forces occupy large swaths of Syrian territory despite never having received authorization from the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), the Arab League, or the internationally recognized Syrian government to do so. Absent any legal justifications of substance, purveyors of imperial propaganda instead rely heavily on crude western saviorism as a means of mobilizing public opinion in support of sanctions, airstrikes, and the illegal seizure of Syrian territory. Observers and pundits regularly invoke America's responsibility to protect Syria's supposedly monolithic Kurdish community, the need to secure (read: steal) Syrian oil, and the importance of 'holding Asad accountable' for war crimes committed during the Syrian Civil War. Some public figures, experts and analysts embrace these arguments at face value, accepting the premise that saving Syrians is the *raison d'être* underpinning the ongoing embargo and occupation.

These examples of disingenuous moralistic grandstanding are primary concocted for public consumption in the United States; they are not, in fact, an articulation of American interests or goals in the Syrian theatre. To be sure, a rather straightforward geopolitical calculus created the impetus for an indefinite American occupation of Syrian territory: for the government of Syria, any peace dividend or outright military victory must be denied as a means of undermining Russian and Iranian interests (Sills, 2020). As it became increasingly apparent that sanctions alone would not stop the Syrian government and its allies from winning the Syrian Civil War, a more aggressive approach was quickly adopted as a means of prolonging the conflict and undermining government efforts to rebuild the country.

Since the appearance of U.S. ground troops in Syria in 2016, the number of American soldiers has ranged from several hundred to several thousand, most of whom remained stationed east of the Euphrates River. The official tally remains a secret. A 2020 budget request issued by the American Department of Defense only refers to U.S. troop deployments in Iraq and Syria collectively, with the latest report identifying "7,200 (soldiers) in Iraq and Syria" (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019). A negligible number of European soldiers, mostly British, augment the U.S. force deployment inside Syria. Most American troops are stationed in territory controlled by the breakaway 'autonomous administration,' an area nominally governed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and covering nearly 30 percent of Syria's total land area; this includes the vast majority of Syria's arable farmland and many of its largest oil and gas fields.

After Donald Trump's haphazard and incomplete withdrawal attempt in October of 2019, the mission ostensibly switched gears from fighting Daesh to 'protecting' Syrian oil fields. Syrian oil and gas reserves and the infrastructure needed to exploit them are mostly located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in the Deir Ez-

Zor and Hasakeh Governorates, although some oil wells are located elsewhere in the occupied Jazira region. American corporations and contractors, keen to exploit Syria's oil wealth, have since infiltrated the area in an effort to rob Syria blind while undermining government efforts to raise revenue for reconstruction (Petti, 2020). Only a handful of oil wells and gas fields remain in the hands of the central government. By occupying Syrian territory without UNSC authorization, U.S. forces and their European allies hope to starve the Syrian government of desperately needed revenue as a means of undermining reconstruction efforts (Stocker, 2019). Western powers hope that by illegally squatting on Syrian oil, Syria's natural resources may be used as a "bargaining chip" in future negotiations with Damascus (Diwan, 2019). While pre-war Syria was a modest oil exporter relative to its neighbors, Syrian oil reserves easily met domestic demand while accounting for nearly 20 percent of the state's annual budget revenues between 2005 and 2010 (Butter, 2015).

The loss of Syria's oil rich eastern territories to the American occupation has, alongside the ongoing sanctions regime, accelerated the precipitous collapse of the Syrian economy. While serious scholars agree that the ongoing occupation of Syrian territory constitutes an egregious violation of international law, the legality of the American occupation appears dubious even according to the domestic laws of the United States. Stephen Vladeck, a professor of national security law at the University of Texas (Austin), pointed out that "The U.S. is not at war with either Syria or Turkey, making the use of the 2001 AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force) a stretch." On the issue of occupying Syrian oil fields, he pointed out that legal arguments promoting an indefinite stay in eastern Syria may be "a bridge too far" (Baldor, 2019). Regarding the legality of the American intervention, which eventually paved the way for the seizure of Syrian territory but was carried out under the pretext of fighting Daesh, one observer argued that "Syria may have given implied consent" prior to the initiation of coalition activity inside Syrian territory. Yet in an apparent contradiction, this expert later conceded that "the theory of implied consent is not codified into international law and the theory is not widely accepted in the international legal community," while still maintaining that "the U.S. has a legal basis...to act within Syria's borders..." (Sloney, 2015). In reality, absent permission from the government of Syria or authorization from the UNSC, ongoing coalition operations taking place inside Syrian territory constitute a blatant violation of Syrian sovereignty and of international law.

In addition to the illegal Euro-American intervention in and occupation of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates River, American troops maintain a garrison at the border outpost of Al-Tanf in the Homs Governorate. This isolated pocket of occupied territory extends beyond the reaches of Al-Tanf into the surrounding desert on the Syrian side of the border, spanning a total area of 55 kilometers. The Syrian government has on several occasions asked the United States to withdraw from this area, although these requests have been ignored. In response, Syrian government troops have periodically tried to move into the Al-Tanf occupied zone -sovereign Syrian territory- as a means of persuading the squatters to pack up and leave. In one instance in May 2017, American fighter jets greeted these maneuvers with a barrage of airstrikes; dozens of Syrian soldiers were killed (Enab Biladi, 2018). The Syrian government condemned the attack, while Russia's deputy foreign ministry slammed the action as a "completely unacceptable breach of Syrian sovereignty" (Al-Jazeera, 2017). Such provocative actions beg the question: how does the occupation of Al-Tanf further American interests? There are not, after all, any large urban centers in the area filled with civilians in need of saving. Nor does Al-Tanf sit atop rich deposits of oil, gas, or other natural resources.

The value of the area lies in its geography, and its proximity to the main highway linking Damascus to Baghdad. The uninvited coalition presence at Al-Tanf has closed this highway for most trade and traffic between the two countries. Before the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, "Syria's trade with Iraq alone was valued at \$3 billion" (Esber, 2019). The loss of the Al-Walid border crossing located inside the town thus represented a devastating blow to not only the Syrian economy, but also that of Iraq (Khalel, 2021). The ongoing economic damage inflicted on Syria due to the seizure of Al-Tanf was hardly incidental, but rather a calculated strategic decision intended to complement the sanctions regime and isolate Syria from its allies, particularly Iraq and Iran.

It is important to note that in much of the western public discourse concerning the occupation, America's overt seizure of oil and gas fields tends to eclipse the de-facto theft of Syria's agricultural resources. Apologists for the sanctions regime invariably chalk up food shortages, if they acknowledge them at all, to corruption, mismanagement, or the general incompetence of the Syrian government. As a causal factor in the creation of

chronic food shortages elsewhere in Syria, the American occupation is rarely mentioned. The phenomenon of widespread food insecurity has, in other words, been decoupled from the illegal occupation of Syria's most fertile farmlands, thus absolving the imperialist coalition (and the United States in particular) of responsibility for the well-being of Syrians living in areas governed by Damascus.

Consider, for example, that over 70 percent of Syria's wheat, barley and mixed grain production depends on the efficiency of farms located in territory occupied by the United States (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2016). The occupation of Syria's breadbasket has subsequently forced the central government to buy its own wheat from the SDF (Christou, 2020). The opportunity cost of such transactions, considering their expense and the limited resources available to the Syrian Central Bank, should not be underestimated. The current state of affairs is all the more striking in light of Syria's pre-war status as a net exporter of many agricultural products, including fruits, vegetables, and cotton (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Additionally, according to a 2016 study "Syria exported the greatest quantity of cereals in the sub region (trailing only Turkey), valued at its peak in 2007 at \$240 million" (Regional Food Security Analysis Network, 2016). Underpinning Syria's impressive pre-war agricultural output was a prolonged period of state-driven capital investment steered towards the construction of grain silos, irrigation canals and hydroelectric power plants during the 1970s and 1980s (Seale, 1988). These investments in infrastructure development translated into high crop yields and the growth of the Syrian export market for agricultural products; by 2010, agricultural exports generated over 20 percent of Syria's total GDP (CIA World Fact Book, 2020). Thanks to the war, the occupation, and the resultant collapse of the Syrian pound (SYP), Syria must now import hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat just to meet domestic demand (Hamidi, 2020). The loss of Syrian farmland (first to *Daesh*, and more recently to the occupation) has crippled the agricultural sector, dealing a painful blow to Syrian farmers and consumers alike.

Agency and Popular Discontent in Occupied Syria

Among those residing in areas currently occupied by the American-led coalition, some hope to use the SDF as a vehicle for redressing grievances and preventing a return to the conditions which prevailed in Syria before 2011. On the other hand, some locals embrace the SDF and the American occupation as a means of accumulating personal wealth, power, and influence. The leader of the SDF controlled Deir Ez-Zor Military Council (DMC), for example, is emblematic of the latter phenomenon. Rashid Abu Khawla has at various times fought for the so-called Free Syrian Army as well as *Daesh*. According to Deir Ez-Zor 24, "he was frequently arrested for stealing motorcycles before 2011. After the war broke out, he allegedly started a gang that prowled the roads looking for drivers to rob" (Barfi, 2017). Protests against the SDF -and the rule of the DMC in particular- remain a persistent problem in the area, even as criminal activity and the re-emergence of *Daesh* threaten the stability of occupied territories (Faidhi, 2020). Despite these problematic partnerships the United States hopes to use SDF controlled Syrian territory as leverage in future talks with Damascus: thus a loose convergence of strategic interests links the fate of the SDF to the United States. Nevertheless, even some SDF officials have expressed concern over the Caesar Act, questioning whether it is being implemented with the best interests of the SDF in mind (Ahmado, 2020). After all, territories held by the SDF are tied to the SYP, and by extension the Syrian Central Bank (Al-Tamimi, 2020). As noted elsewhere, the SDF also depends heavily on the sale of oil, wheat, and other commodities to the Syrian government. It remains to be seen whether these and other transactions would run afoul of the Caesar Act. The knock-on effect of the sanctions regime and embargo threatens to aggravate the precarious humanitarian situation in areas under the jurisdiction of the SDF.

Such concerns are well founded. In many areas occupied by the United States, municipal services provided by the SDF fall woefully short of meeting the needs of the local population. Testimonial accounts collected from locals and SDF officials alike corroborate this appraisal of service provision and commodity prices in occupied eastern Syria, particularly in the Deir Ez-Zor governorate. For example, one official working under the auspices of the SDF-backed People's Municipal Office in Gharanij characterized the quality of service provision in the area as "very bad, for the area is not serviced at all as there is no electricity...the houses distant from the densely populated neighborhoods are completely deprived of electricity. And likewise water is present in the locality: three water stations, but they do not work well...so the people rely on buying water through its transportation in private

tankers, and they are at exorbitant prices” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). The depreciation of the SYP has contributed to rising prices in the area, “something that has struck the people with frustration and despair” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). The situation in Al-Basira –a town of around 35,000 located just south and east of Deir Ez-Zor city- resembles that of other localities in the area.

A media official affiliated with the People’s Municipal Office in al-Basira recently remarked that “the humanitarian situation was previously very good but after the rise of the dollar it has become bad.” Asked about the reverberative impact of the Caesar Act in the area, he revealed a latent “...fear (in) our areas from the impacts of the law...” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). In another interview, a spokesperson for the People’s Municipal Office of al-Dhiban painted a similar picture vis a vis service provision and infrastructure redevelopment. While pointing out that some “projects that have been submitted to the Autonomous Administration and they are under consideration,” he quickly made clear that “the area is suffering from a lack of basic services like electricity, whose delivery has been limited currently to the water stations” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). Only 35 percent of homes in the town receive piped water, and “sewage is limited to the main streets in the organizational plan for the locality” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). When asked to reflect on the impact of the Caesar Act, the official expressed anxiety and suggested that “people are currently living through difficult impacts after application of the Caesar law, while the rise of the prices and the pressing need for bigger projects are creating... [a] lack of availability of liquidity” (Al-Tamimi, 2020). As we have seen, the reverberative consequences of the Caesar Act (and the embargo more generally) have not been confined to government controlled territory alone. This is readily apparent in SDF-held northern and eastern Syria, where price hikes and stalled infrastructure projects are emblematic of a rudderless American strategy in Syria.

By using food as a weapon of war, the United States hopes to starve the Syrian people into submission as a means of pressuring Damascus. The weaponization of wheat represents a critical dimension of American policy in occupied Syria, with one think-tanker even arguing that “wheat is a weapon of great power in this next phase of the Syrian conflict...we [the U.S. and the SDF] have a significant stockpile of this wheat weapon” (France24, 2019). It is believed that by robbing Syrians of their daily bread, wheat “can be used to apply pressure on the Assad regime, and through the regime on Russia, to force concessions in the UN-led diplomatic process” (France24, 2019). In the meantime, nearly 10 million Syrians “are unable to meet their food needs, and [there are] a further 2.2 million people at risk of food insecurity” (Fleischer, 2020). This pervasive food insecurity, a crisis without precedent in Syria’s post-independence history, has already had a deleterious impact on living standards and public health.

Recent data compiled by the World Food Programme (WFP) indicates that the cost of food in Syria reached an all-time high well before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In a recent interview with The National, the head of the WFP underscored the need for a sense of urgency in the ongoing struggle to alleviate the crisis. If the current trajectory holds in the weeks and months ahead, and if “Syria continues to deteriorate and the availability of cash, availability of food and supply chain disruption on a country that’s already devastated by 10 years of war, famine could very well be knocking on that door” (McElroy, 2020). At the time of writing, testimonial evidence reveals that an “increasing number of interviewed households reported reducing the number of meals they consume, from 3 to 2 meals per day” (U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2020). It is against this backdrop that our appraisal of the sanctions regime and occupation must be contextualized. The destruction of the war, America’s seizure of Syrian farmland in the northeast, and the implementation of new sanctions collectively pose a dire threat to the health and well-being of nearly 18 million Syrians, most of whom live in areas controlled by or economically linked to Damascus. To further appreciate the gravity of the crisis, and as a means of expanding the scope of our analysis beyond the question of food insecurity, we must turn our attention to the realm of service provision and infrastructure rehabilitation.

Electricity production throughout Syria depends heavily on the output of 11 fossil-fuel power stations located (mostly) in western Syria, “while hydroelectric power is a limited source with just three dams (Tishrin, al-Thawra, and al-Ba’ath) located on the Euphrates” (Diab, 2018). According to a 2007 World Bank estimate, government subsidies ensured that “99% of the population had access to electricity” (World Bank, 2007). Despite this, “the public sector’s capacity to generate electricity was outstripped by demand. This situation generated an electrical

load shedding that increased sharply from 2006 onwards” (Diab, 2018). After the government lost control over large swaths of territory during the first few years of the war, the gap between demand and service delivery widened significantly. According to the Public Establishment for Electricity Generation (PEEG), by 2015 Syria’s electricity production peaked at 5,590 megawatts, “while the total possible capacity of Syrian power plants was 7,994 megawatts” (Diab, 2018). Aleppo, Syria’s commercial capital and largest city prior to the war, was hit especially hard: the PEEG estimate reveals a “zero-megawatt power generation capacity for three (of Syria’s 14) power plants” (Diab, 2018). Aleppo’s power station was, in 2015, among the three knocked out of service as a result of the war. Replacing damaged units remains a persistent problem, thanks in part to the sanctions regime. While American politicians and think-tankers take great pains to emphasize the inclusion of vague humanitarian exceptions for essential goods and services, the fact remains that “NGOs may well be deterred from supporting much-needed small-scale rehabilitation projects amid uncertainty as to how U.S. authorities will define “humanitarian aid” or “reconstruction”” (International Crisis Group, 2019). This ambiguity hampers reconstruction efforts while simultaneously depriving ordinary Syrians of electricity, in addition to basic medical care.

The impact of economic violence on the availability of healthcare in Syria has been studied at length elsewhere, although further study will be required as facts on the ground change over time (Al-Faisal, 2013). As we shall see, the destruction wrought by the civil war and the concurrent implementation of western economic sanctions dealt a catastrophic blow to a country that “was known for being relatively self-sufficient in domestically produced medicines” (U.N. Resident Coordinator SAR, 2016). Indeed, data gathered in a 2009 study indicates that the availability and quality of basic healthcare in Syria improved dramatically from 1970 through the first decade of the 21st century. Life expectancy improved from 56 years in 1970 to 73.1 years in 2009; the infant-mortality rate fell from 132 deaths per 1000 live births in 1970 to less than 18 per 1000 by 2009 (Kherallah, 2012). Despite great discrepancies in care quality between urban areas from the countryside, the pre-war provision of basic preventative healthcare in Syria generally met domestic demand and was widely considered to be “comparable with other middle-income countries” (UNHRC, 2018).

However, since the start of the civil war in 2011 Syria’s health care system has experienced unprecedented degradation in both quality of care and the availability of basic treatments. As cities and towns changed hands, hospital buildings and their staff were frequently caught in the cross-fire. Fighting between the government and insurgent groups turned hospitals and clinics (along with factories, homes, power stations, water treatment plants, etc.) into piles of rubble: sanctions designed to hamper reconstruction ensure that they stay that way. As domestic productive capacity collapsed during the civil war, the World Health Organization (WHO) compiled a list of prioritized medicines and supplies in conjunction with the Syrian Ministry of Health. Unfortunately, “of the thousands of items and medicines identified by the WHO, many are subject to some level of EU export control or U.S. sanctions embargo” (U.N. Resident Coordinator SAR, 2016). Testimonial evidence reveals the pervasive challenges encountered by international investors, donors, NGOs and other entities attempting to provide desperately needed medical supplies to Syrians in need. For example, one anonymous European doctor lamented that:

“even though it should be possible in theory to procure medical equipment, the indirect effects of sanctions, especially the challenges it creates for Syrians to access bank accounts, makes the import of medical instruments and other medical supplies immensely difficult, nearly impossible. It also makes it far more expensive” (U.N. Resident Coordinator SAR, 2016).

The phenomenon of over-compliance frequently undermines procurement efforts, even when sought-after goods are not explicitly banned under the current sanctions regime. In practical terms, over-compliance occurs when companies (or aid agencies, NGOs, etc.) choose to avoid punitive fines or other penalties by withholding all services and investment out of an abundance of caution, even if such measures are not covered by existing trade restrictions. The knock-on effect of over-compliance invariably spills over into the wider economy, needlessly depriving civilians of exempted goods and services along the way. Idriss Jazairy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures (in Syria) pointedly argued that “the chilling effect resulting from over-compliance with sanctions is forcing humanitarian and economic actors to find irregular payment mechanisms which increase costs, add delays, decrease transparency and in some cases make it impossible for

businesses to continue” (U.N., 2018). Testimony from one Syrian-American doctor working in Damascus underscores the extent of the crisis, pointing out that as a result of the embargo, “it becomes difficult to access medical up-grades, i.e., software updates, as these are not included on the U.S. list of allowed goods” (U.N. Resident Coordinator SAR, 2016). Elsewhere in Syria, the President of the Doctor’s Union of Aleppo bitterly expressed surprise that “the U.S. and U.K. talk about human rights but impose sanctions which deny treatment to people with cancer and other potentially fatal conditions” (Cox, 2018). Elizabeth Hoff, the WHO representative in Damascus, pointed out that “the impact of economic sanctions imposed on Syria heavily affected the procurement of some specific medicine including anti-cancer medicines” (Nehme, 2017). Crucially, sanctions prevent pharmaceutical companies from doing business with the Syrian Central Bank and its affiliates, and other government institutions (Alam, 2020). These restrictions have tightened significantly since the implementation of the Caesar Act in June 2020.

Inside government controlled territory, where the vast majority of Syrians live, the broader impact of the embargo reaches beyond the sectors of the Syrian economy explicitly targeted by the sanctions. Naturally, sanctions targeting the Syrian Central Bank have a cascading effect on the wider economic climate. Vendors are unable to do business with Syrian banks, Syrians are blocked from sending or receiving remittances, currency volatility harms consumers and producers, and investors remain unwilling to risk running afoul of new restrictions. The spillover effect of targeted sanctions leveled against Syria’s energy sector, for example, also undermines reconstruction efforts while depriving ordinary civilians of basic services. Moreover, the phenomenon of over-compliance has had and will continue to have a deleterious impact on the Syrian economy even after sanctions are eventually lifted. Investors will remain wary of Syrian markets for years to come, thus depriving Syrians of goods and services not explicitly banned under current trade restrictions.

Even in Syrian territory occupied by the Euro-American coalition, the embargo figures prominently in daily life. As we have seen, the impact of western imposed economic violence reaches far beyond the targeted territory, or those areas controlled by the Syrian government. Proponents of economic violence unconvincingly argue that the effects of the embargo can be compartmentalized or quarantined within a rigidly defined geographic space. But national and regional economies are inextricably linked; markets cannot be cancelled or closed by foreign powers without inflicting broader reverberative damage beyond the borders of the targeted polity. Thus the concept of targeted sanctions (which invariably include vague language, poorly conceived exemptions and stiff penalties) deserves to be reframed against the backdrop of real human suffering and the political realities of the post-conflict Syrian context.

Imperial Retrenchment & Contemporary Liberal-Interventionist Discourse

Several mutually reinforcing discursive devices work in tandem as a means of justifying unilateral coercive action directed against non-compliant polities in the Global South. Cosmetically, a well-positioned class of organic intellectuals (prototypical ‘true believers’ spreading the gospel of liberal-imperialism in American think-tanks, newspapers, political parties, universities, etc.) sell economic violence and military interventionism to the western masses through the weaponization of humanitarian rhetoric and the invocation of R2P (responsibility to protect). Aside from the fact that such arguments represent a nakedly orientalist reformulation of the Euro-American civilizing mission, directed exclusively against the ‘oriental despotisms’ of the Global South, we must recall that the categories of analysis used by many of these experts are irredeemably contaminated by essentialist reductionism.

As a means of justifying multivariate forms of western intervention in the Global South, think-tankers, journalists, and many academics point to the supposed existence of ‘ancient hatreds’ pitting different tribal, ethnic or sectarian groups against each other. This is particularly true of how conflict, social organization, and productive relations are understood by some studying Western Asia. The implication here is that in the face of ‘persistent hatreds’ and ‘ancient enmities,’ transcendent westerners have a moral obligation to mediate and modernize. Consequently, complex patterns of social organization and interaction are haphazardly repackaged to fit within monolithic ‘taxonomies of imperialist knowledge’ (Blumi, 2010). As a result, think-tank pieces and newspaper articles frequently reduce the identity of the subject to their religion or ethnicity. In contemporary Syria, the blind

evocation of these essentialist categories of analysis reinforce Eurocentric perspectives, obscure nuance, and silence local stakeholders.

Flawed as they are, arguments which posit western intervention as some sort of charitable, moralistic endeavor should not be accepted at face value. Among those concerning themselves with human rights compliance in Syria, many unwittingly “promote an absolutist view of human rights permeated by modern western ideas that westerners mistakenly call “universal”” (Kinzer, 2010). Nor are these intrinsically Eurocentric moral criteria applied evenly or consistently. Begging for aggressive ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Syria while simultaneously facilitating the destruction of Yemen and the ethnic cleansing of Palestine belies the notion of western sincerity insofar as human rights compliance and ‘democracy promotion’ are concerned. Tokenistic criticism of Israel’s siege of Gaza are mostly limited to Twitter handles and newspaper articles; no one suggests sanctioning the Tel Aviv regime or hitting illegal Zionist colonies in the West Bank with drone strikes. Given these hypocritical inconsistencies in application, and the epistemological pitfalls plaguing the analytical substructure of interventionist discourse, it is incumbent on serious observers to challenge the moral economy of liberal-interventionism and the language used to promote it.

Setting aside the blatant hypocrisy and orientalist essentialisms underpinning the logic of interventionist rhetoric, we must recall that attempts to frame interventionism as an altruistic endeavor serve a functional purpose in the broader promotion of empire. Moral self-assurance is, according to Edward Said, the linchpin of orientalist thought and the racist psychology of othering that nurtures it. In the case of Iraq, Libya and Syria, such arguments have also expedited the delegitimization of institutions designed to uphold international law. Wanton disregard for the principle of national sovereignty in western capitals has, unfortunately, robbed post-colonial polities of their independence and paved the road for direct neocolonial reconquest. Having failed to impose a political transition on Syria through proxy warfare, western powers have instead opted for Syria’s destruction (Massad, 2021). As discussed above, this necessitated Syria’s territorial disaggregation through direct occupation. Manifestations of this include but are not limited to the seizure of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates River, and in the southern reaches of the Homs Governorate.

For countries aligned with the North Atlantic axis of empire, it is not necessary to obtain UNSC authorization before partitioning a country, occupying its territory, or destroying its economy. It is axiomatic that continuously unchecked violations of international law by any country or countries will, inexorably, undermine the legitimacy and relevance of international law and the global institutions ostensibly there to enforce it. Consider the position of the United States and the former colonial powers that currently occupy Syrian territory. American soldiers and corporate contractors are not in Syria at the invitation of the internationally recognized Syrian government. The government of the United States did not seek or receive authorization from the UNSC or the Arab League before deploying its forces inside Syrian territory. Nor did the security council or U.N. General Assembly approve of any sanctions directed against Syria. In light of America’s problematic relationship with international law, its close alignment with serial human rights abusers elsewhere in the Middle East, and the disastrous aftermath of western misbehavior in Iraq, Libya and Yemen, we must reconsider whether the west possesses the moral or legal authority to dictate the terms of Syria’s future.

Conclusion

Attempts to cancel Syria’s sovereignty have generally been well received by western audiences. In the United States, left-liberals and conservatives alike remain ambivalent to -if not outright supportive of- the illegal occupation of Syrian territory (Pew Research, 2019). The previous Republican president boldly mocked international law by repeatedly asserting America’s right to “keep the (Syrian) oil.” (Finnegan, 2019). Far from representing a break from Trump, the Biden administration has already taken steps to reinforce the occupation. This decision, to maintain and possibly expand the size of America’s military footprint inside Syrian territory, indicates a de facto willingness to plunder Syria’s natural resources and destroy what remains of the Syrian economy. According to the legal and moral parameters of the U.S. dominated unipolar world order, sovereignty is a privilege, not a right. World leaders residing in western capitals may with the stroke of a pen authorize the

occupation of Syrian territory, the theft of Syria's natural resources, and the seizure of Syrian assets invested abroad. Countries less than a century removed from colonial exploitation and occupation have once again found themselves subjected to unrelenting pressure and interference, often emanating from the same cast of western antagonists. It is also true that some Syrian expatriates heap scorn upon those who dare scrutinize western interventionist discourse, while at the same time begging western leaders to bomb, starve and isolate what remains of their country. Remarkably on the utility of the 'native informer,' Hamid Dabashi points out that "for the American imperial project to claim global validity, it needs the support of native informers and comprador intellectuals...supported only by white men and women, the project would not have the same degree of narrative authority" (Dabashi, 2011). Therefore, when analyzing the impact of economic violence directed against Syria we must recall that "neocolonialism is not just about western agency, but also that of local collaborators and upholders of western power" (Forte, 2012).

Nevertheless, Syrians continue to rely on their own strength and resources as the reconstruction phase of the crisis gets underway. While this study prioritized in-depth analysis of the western embargo and occupation of Syrian territory, one would be remiss not to mention the agency of the Syrian masses in the face of hardship. Manifestations of Syrian self-reliance, resistance and resourcefulness are a critical piece of this narrative. At the national level, examples range from sanctions busting, seeking out alternative (read: non-western) avenues for foreign investment, reigning in corrupt stakeholders, streamlining the delivery of goods and services, and liberating occupied areas which possess economic value. It must be emphasized that Syria enjoys the legal right to liberate occupied territory and resist the illegal coalition presence by force of arms if it so chooses (ICRC, 2002).

For their part, when aid from the revenue starved central government is not forthcoming, many Syrians have taken ownership of reconstruction in their respective communities. Others rely on external arteries into the global financial system to support themselves, and their families. For those living in areas currently occupied by American soldiers, everyday acts of resistance include throwing stones at passing American convoys, and occasionally burning American flags (Al-Masdar, 2020). In other words, Syrians are not passive victims but agents of real, transformative change within their communities. Future contributions to the literature discussing sanctions, the occupation, and the impact of both on local stakeholders must highlight these stories of local resistance and grassroots ingenuity while simultaneously emphasizing the ruinous impact of economic violence imposed by western powers against the Syrian state and society.

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Challenges of Madaris Educational System in Educating the Youth in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Philippines

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Abstract

This study adopted the descriptive-evaluative design to gather information about the challenges of madaris in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. A survey questionnaire was used to collect data regarding the challenges in different traditional madaris in BARMM. The respondents who participated in this study were 293 asatidz. They were randomly selected from the selected cities in BARMM such as Marawi City, Lamitan City, and Cotabato City, and the province of Lanao del Sur. Furthermore, the results showed that: (1) the challenges on funding budget are considered serious; (2) the challenges on competency of faculty and staff are challenging but not serious; (3) the challenges on facilities are moderately serious; and (4) the curriculum is a challenge but not serious. In view of the aforementioned findings, the following recommendations were put forth for considerations: appoint qualified asatidz, trainers and consultants in every madrasah; revise the instruction materials to make them informative and updated; renovate existing facilities; regularly monitor the asatidz in terms of their performance; acquire foreign scholarship for asatidz; and the BARMM government and local government units should continually support the traditional madrasah and allocate budget thereof. It is strongly recommended that further studies be conducted to assess the need for traditional madrasah in the other areas in Mindanao, Luzon and Visayas.

Keywords: Madaris, Asatidz, Madrasah Education, Islamic Teachers

INTRODUCTION

Islamophobia is a growing scenario in most western countries associated with fear of the increasing number of world population embracing the faith of Islam. Islamophobia together with the phenomenon of the internationalization of Islamic education has attracted not only traction from the Muslim world but also suspicions from critics. This is in line with the popular view that Islamic schools or Madaris are essentially risky because they have allegedly been responsible for all sorts of ills like terrorism. They have tagged Madaris as dens of terror and hatching grounds for suicide bombers and jihadists.

There is no denying that terrorism continues to wreak havoc in the lives of people worldwide, but to associate such an inhumane act to Muslims alone, especially to their learning institution, is quite unfair. The role of the Madaris in stopping the rapid propagation of terrorism is highly significant because millions of Muslim students receive some or all their formal education in a madrasah or Madaris (plural for madrasah). Typically, a madrasah provides young Muslims with a religious foundation in Qur'anic recitation and Islamic values. For some Muslim children, the madrasah is the only source of formal education that is available; for others, it is supplementary to secular basic education provided in primary and secondary schools.

However, the Madrasah as an indigenous school, often fails to provide the practical skills and academic knowledge that parents view as important for their children's future while their counterpart secular schools provide these skills and knowledge, and this made Muslim families not comfortable with madrasah as a learning institution.

In the Philippines, the Madaris are the oldest educational institution in Mindanao and are recognized to be the single most important factor in the preservation of the Islamic faith and culture (Lamla, 2018). According to Tamano, (as cited by Rodriguez, 1974), the Philippine educational system was not responsive to the educational needs of the Muslims. The western type of education introduced into the Muslim areas was not able to answer effectively the economic, cultural, and social enrichment necessary to bring the Muslims to the standard of living attained by the Christians in Visayas and Luzon. This educational inequality could widen more the socio-economic gap existing between two groups. To solve this situation, he proposed the teaching of Islam to Muslim children, providing more educational facilities and opportunities, and improving the madaris.

The legality of this study is anchored on Letter of Instruction No.1221 issued by President Marcos directing the Minister of Education, Culture, and Sports to formulate and adopt a program for the development of the madrasah schools, at least for the improvement of their teaching staff and instructional facilities. However, priority must be given, wherever possible, to their progressive integration as a sector in the national educational system with enhanced curricula to the end that their graduates join the mainstream of Philippine education, endowing them with the capability to contribute to the modernization of their communities within the framework of their Islamic faith (Rodriquez, 1993).

Furthermore, the compelling reasons in conducting this research are to provide wise insights for *asatidz*, madrasah administrators, as well as young Muslim professionals to improve their skills and their educational management. Included also is to investigate the effectiveness of educational system among the Madaris in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Methodology

Participants

This study involved the *asatidz* (teachers) as respondents who are the primary stakeholders of the madrasah educational system. Two hundred ninety three (293) respondents made up the sample, which comprised 293 *asatidz*. The said respondents were taken from the *asatidz* throughout the select cities and provinces in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, namely Marawi City, Lamitan City, Cotabato City, and Lanao del Sur. The individual respondents were then randomly selected.

Design

This study is a descriptive-evaluative research as it attempted to describe the perception of the respondents on the challenges of madaris educational system in educating the youth in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The descriptive method of research is concerned with the procedures used to organize, describe, and summarize data. Specifically, this study adopted the cross-sectional survey research design and administered questionnaires to the respondents for the collection of necessary data needed in the study.

Research Instrument

The research instrument used in this study was a survey questionnaire. This consists of identifies the challenges encountered by Madaris in madrasah educational system which contains challenges on funding budget, challenges on competency of faculty and staff, challenges on facilities, challenges on curriculum. Furthermore, only certain respondents completed of the survey were administered to *asatidz* (teacher).

Procedure

To gather the primary data needed for the study, the researcher used a structured questionnaire that was presented and approved by the dissertation committee. The data collection set off by sending request letters to the traditional Madrasah administrators to allow the researcher to conduct the study. When the request was granted, the researcher visited the respective madrasah schools and paid personal visit to the administrators. It was intended for the setting of schedules of data collection. With their approval, the researcher immediately administered the questionnaires to the chosen respondents. It was made possible by personally collecting the data from the locales of the study, namely Marawi City, Cotabato City, Lamitan City, and Lanao del Sur.

The respondents were given sufficient time to finish answering the questionnaires to ensure that they responded properly and completely to the survey. After which, the instruments were retrieved. The data analysis then ensued after retrieving all the questionnaires.

Sampling Techniques

The respondents were purposively selected from four areas that is Lanao del Sur, Cotabato City, Lamitan City and Marawi City. These areas were selected because of the accessibility of the area. Before that, the researcher get a preliminary survey from the file of the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education under the Bureau of Madaris Education. After studying their location, the researcher decided to have a quota on the four areas. The Table below shows the distribution of the respondents.

Table 1: Distribution of the respondents of the study

Areas	Asstidz (Teachers)
Lanao del Sur	76
Marawi City	74
Cotabato City	101
Lamitan City	42
Total	293

After the quota, the researcher made used of simple random sampling using raffles to actually pick up the respondents.

Results and Discussions

Challenges in the Madaris Institution of the BARMM

A. Challenges in Funding

Table 2 illustrates the Weighted Mean Ratings of Challenges in Funding. Presented in Table 1 is the perceived evaluation of the challenges in relation to funding budget of Madaris. It reveals that all indicators are considered serious based on the mean values. Specifically, there was insufficient money to pay madrasah employees (M=4.13), to fund madrasah activities or programs (M=3.89), to purchase equipment or supplies (M=3.85), and to build classrooms (M=3.45). Basically, without funding, the operations of the schools will be difficult to accomplish

and this poses negative consequences not only to the administrators but also to the students who depend on the services of the Madaris.

Table 2: Weighted Mean Ratings of Challenges in Funding

Funding Budget	Mean	Qualitative Interpretation	Std. Deviation
1. There was no enough budget for building classroom for the madrasah.	3.45	Serious challenges	1.461
2. There was no enough money for purchasing madrasah equipment or supplies.	3.85	Serious challenges	1.248
3. There was no enough money for salary of the employee in madrasah.	4.13	Serious challenges	1.057
4. There is no enough money for other madrasah activities or programs.	3.89	Serious challenges	1.305
OVER-ALL MEAN	3.8300	Serious challenges	0.28190

*Legend: 1.00-1.80 – Never, not a challenge at all, 1.81-2.61 – A challenge but not serious
2.62- 3.42 – Moderately serious challenges, 3.43- 4.23 – Serious challenges
4.25- 5.00 – Very serious challenges*

In general, it shows that the Madaris institutions in BARMM are financially inadequate. This is attributed to the fact that Madaris in BARMM are self-sustained and privately owned and less or no support come from the government. According to the administrators, despite the small salary, they continue doing their job to teach in Madaris because they believe in the doctrine of Islam that teaching is a form worship and they do it for the sake of Allah (swt).

B. Challenges on Competence of Faculty and Staff

Table 3 depicts the Weighted Mean Ratings of the Challenges on Competence of Faculty and Staff. Table 3 data manifested the weighted mean (WM) ratings of the indicators of challenges on competence of faculty and staff with five statement indicators. The data indicated that all statement indicators were either viewed as challenge but not serious.

Table 3: Weighted Mean Ratings of the Challenges on Competence of Faculty and Staff

Statement Indicators	Mean	Qualitative Interpretation	Std. Deviation
1. The employee in madrasah are not all graduate in kuliyyah/college.	2.03	A challenge but not serious	1.261
2. The ustadz in madrasah does not have enough training and seminar for professional growth.	2.84	Moderately serious challenge	1.333
3. The ustadz does not have sufficient knowledge on the topic he/she is discussing.	1.94	A challenge but not serious	1.116
4. The ustadz is not well prepared on his/her lesson.	2.03	A challenge but not serious	1.249
5. The ustadz is not updated on concepts and ideas he/she is discussing.	1.85	A challenge but not serious	1.237
OVERALL MEAN	2.1380	A challenge but not serious	0.39946

Legend: 1.00-1.80 – Never, not a challenge at all, 1.81-2.61 – A challenge but not serious

2.62- 3.42 – Moderately serious challenge, 3.43- 4.23 – Serious challenge
4.25- 5.00 – Very serious challenge

It can be gleaned from the table that teacher and staff competency is not a serious challenge for the administrators. Particularly, these include the following indicators: employee in madrasah are not all graduate in kuliyah/college (M=2.03); ustadz does not have sufficient knowledge on the topic he/she is discussing (M=1.94); ustadz is not well-prepared on his/her lesson (M=2.03); and ustadz is not updated on concepts and ideas he/she is discussing (M=1.85). These aspects are basically important when it comes to teacher and staff competence, but the data imply that these challenges are easy to handle for the administrators. It could be through trainings and further studies, but the opportunities for these professional development activities is the actual challenge for them. They revealed that the ustadz in madrasah does not have enough training and seminar for professional growth (M=2.84).

In general, findings show that the asatidz in Madaris institutions in BARMM there are major problems regarding competence of their asatidz and staff because accordingly most of them are graduate in college and others from abroad. They believed that they are competent enough to teach even though they have less support from government. However, they need training and seminar for professional growth. This goes to show that continuing professional development remains a luxury for madaris in BARMM and not everyone is given the opportunity to avail of such privileges. Hence, concerned authorities must implement programs that would address this need.

C. Challenges in terms of Facilities

Table 4 indicates the Weighted Mean Ratings of the Indicators on Challenges in terms of Facilities.

Table 4: Weighted Mean Ratings of the Indicators on Challenges in terms of Facilities

Statement Indicators	Mean	Qualitative Interpretation	Std. Deviation
1. There is no enough classrooms to accommodate the students in madrasah.	3.07	Moderately serious challenge	1.714
2. There is no library in the madrasah.	4.05	Serious challenge	1.529
3. There is no comfort room or toilet.	2.96	Moderately serious challenge	1.601
4. There is no enough school equipment like chairs and tables.	3.27	Moderately serious challenge	1.551
5. There is no sports complex in the madrasah.	3.34	Moderately serious challenge	1.513
OVERALL MEAN	3.3380	Moderately serious challenges	0.42611

Legend:

1.00-1.80 – Never, not a challenge at all
1.81-2.61 – A challenge but not serious
2.62- 3.42 – Moderately serious challenge
3.43- 4.23 – Serious challenge
4.25- 5.00 – Very serious challenge

Table 4 presents the weighted mean (WM) ratings of the statements on the challenges in terms of facilities. As indicated in the table, facilities are a great concern among madaris in BARMM. The administrators responded it is a serious challenge that there is no library in the madrasah (M=4.07). The rest of the indicators are moderately serious challenges for them, to wit: there is not enough classrooms to accommodate the students (M=1.714); there is no comfort room or toilet (M=2.96); there is not enough school equipment like chairs and tables (M=3.27); and that there is no sports complex in the madrasah (M=3.34).

In general, the Madaris institutions in BARMM suffer from the lack of madrasah facilities such as library, sports complex, comfort room, and school equipment like chairs and tables. The administrators agreed during the survey that having poor facilities in madaris can have an impact on both teacher and student outcomes. With respect to teachers, according to them, school facilities affect teacher commitment and effort while when it comes to students, school facilities affect their health, behaviour, learning, and growth in achievement.

According to Cayamodin (2019), the traditional Madaris are vulnerable to the threat of unnoticed infiltration of radical ideology due to various challenges faced by the students and administrators. These include lack of employability of graduates, poor facilities, unstandardized curricula and learning sources, parochial pedagogy, lack of instructional development, and unstable salaries for teachers (asatidz). This scenario is partly caused by the negligence of certain government agencies for not recognizing the potential role of these institutions to develop the Muslim communities and contribute to the nation-building.

D. Challenges in terms of Curriculum

Table 5 manifests the Weighted Mean Ratings of the Indicators of Challenges in terms of Curriculum. The table below presents the perceived extent of seriousness of curriculum challenges the administrators encounter in their respective Madaris. The data revealed that the indicators are considered a challenge but not serious ones. Among them, the absence of consultation of experts from foreign madrasah before preparing the curriculum (M=2.68) got the highest mean. This is followed by the lack of updating of curriculum (M=2.47), lack of participation from parents and other stakeholders in preparing the curriculum (M=2.08), absence of a unified curriculum (M=2.05), and absence of appropriate bodies and experts' consultation in the preparation and facilitation of the curriculum (M=1.84).

Table 5: Weighted Mean Ratings of the Indicators of Challenges in terms of Curriculum

Challenges on Curriculum	Mean	Qualitative Interpretation	Std. Deviation
1. There is no unified curriculum in madrasah.	2.05	A challenge but not serious	1.009
2. There is no update curriculum in madrasah.	2.47	A challenge but not serious	1.054
3. There is no consultation of expert from foreign madrasah before preparing the curriculum.	2.68	Moderately serious challenges	1.381
4. There is no participation of parents and other stakeholders in preparation of curriculum.	2.08	A challenge but not serious	1.133
5. There are no appropriate bodies and expert's consultation in preparation and facilitation of the curriculum.	1.84	A challenge but not serious	1.003
OVERALL MEAN	2.2240	A challenge but not serious	0.34166

*Legend: 1.00-1.80 – Never, not a challenge at all, 1.81-2.61 – A challenge but not serious
2.62- 3.42 – Moderately serious challenge, 3.43- 4.23 – Serious challenge
4.25- 5.00 – Very serious challenge*

In general, based on the results, they still have a little problem with their curriculum. In the survey with different Madaris administrators, there is no standard curriculum to follow and most of the madrasah curricula are patterned or based on the foreign Muslim countries. The lack of a uniform madrasah curriculum creates a gap among Madaris because of different structures and designs.

According to Cayamodin (2019), there is a need to integrate curricula and learning contents from all types of madrasah, which will eventually make Muslim children 'good man' (insan adabi) and reach the state of being a 'full man' (insan kamil). He further proposed the curricular and learning contents under the integrated holistic

madrasah education system (IHMES). In this case, the learning contents under the traditional Arabic madrasah and madrasah toril are integrated with the existing curriculum of the integrated madrasah that are accredited by the DepEd. Values and peace education are emphasized to prevent or counter violent extremism at the earliest stage of madrasah education.

Implications

Based on the findings of the study, the following implications are advanced: The challenges of traditional madrasah in terms of funding budget is generally perceived as a serious challenges, it shows that madaris institutions in BARMM are financially inadequate. This is attributed to the fact that madaris in BARMM are self-sustained and less or no support from come from the government and competency of faculty and staff is mostly alleged as a challenge but not serious. Hence, there is still a need for urgent trainings and seminar of *asatidz* in BARMM while their challenges on facilities are described as moderately serious challenges. This finding implies that the BARMM government should provide funds intended for the improvement of facilities and providing supplies in madarais institutions in BARMM. However, the challenges on curriculum are interpreted as a challenge but not serious. This implies that there was no major challenges on curriculum. However, it suggests that harmonized and standardized curriculum should be applied. The finding, implies that madaris institutions should have continuous upgrading of facilities and instructional materials so that students are constantly provided with relevant and updated learning resources and there should conduct seminar and trainings. They should be given opportunities like scholarship for masteral degree and doctoral degree and providing enough salary to sustain their basic needs. Moreover, the government should recognize them as educational institutions and providing them financial assistance to improve their facilities, instructional materials and supplies.

Recommendations

In view of the findings drawn from this study, the following are recommended: It is strongly suggested that there is a need to appoint qualified *asatidz*, trainers, consultants in every madrasah. Likewise it is deemed necessary that a provision for sufficient salary for the *asatidz* and administrators be given. Further, it is highly suggested a revision of the instructional materials shall be work-out to make it sensible, informative and updated so that the students may become interested in attending the class. Also, to form an Islamic/Arabic textbook writing committee in the BARMM to write appropriate textbooks and references for *asatidz*. But these can be possible only if enough allocation of funds be provided for the printing, distribution and funding support to purchase needed learning materials. Another strong suggestion is that there is a dire need for the classroom building and other facilities to be renovated. Thus funding allocation must be provided for the maintenance of the building especially in making the rooms conducive to leanings. It is also highly recommended that the traditional madrasah should select applicants for teachers who have an extensive experience and or academically qualified to teach the Arabic language and are able to communicate well in delivering the content of the lesson. Also it is strongly suggested that seminars and trainings should be conducted for additional inputs and learning insights for the new methods or strategies to be used by the *asatidz* in madrasah. Trainings related to Islamic education, Arabic language and Islamic values shall also be conducted. And lastly, maybe further studies be conducted to assess the need for traditional madrasah in the other areas in Mindanao, Luzon and Visayas. Studies could be done replicating the variables of the study in another setting and for other respondents could be done to validate the findings of the study.

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Lifestyle-Related Shaming: The Significance of Reintegrative Shaming on Drug Relapse Offenders in Indonesia

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Abstract

In statistical calculations, drug abusers with the status of drug relapse in Indonesia reached 70% in 2019 (National Narcotics Agency: 2019). This condition illustrates that the social rehabilitation mechanism for drug abusers in Indonesia still has the opportunity to present shameless. Therefore, this study seeks to see the significance of Lifestyle-related shaming as an important part of the mechanism for implementing shaming for the shameless, especially drug relapse offenders in urban areas. This study was conducted based on the analysis of John Braithwaite's shaming theory which states that the public's response to perpetrators is divided into 2 (two) namely reintegrative shaming which means re-acceptance of the shameless by giving shame to them and stigmatization which means treating the shameless by giving a negative stigma permanently. The method used here was literature review by utilizing and trying to develop existing theories (grounded theory) by presenting concepts (variables) in accordance with the affordability of study data so as to produce new findings regarding the significance of Lifestyle-related shaming in its role for drug relapse offenders. Lifestyle-Related Shaming is part of a combination of reintegrative shaming theory, desistance theory and routine activity theory. In the literature study conducted, the combination of (3) three macro theories produces Lifestyle-related shaming which is closely related to urban lifestyle. It is expected that later, this study will be able to provide a broad understanding to the government to prepare the best program for solving shameless phenomenon, especially drug abuse in Indonesia. Furthermore, it is also useful in science as a basis for the application of shaming in Indonesia.

Keywords: Shaming, Reintegrative, Stigmatitive, Drug Relapse, Crime

1. Background

The 2019 Indonesia Drug Report (BNN, 2019) describes data related to the scope of drug abuse. The BNN (National Narcotics Agency) found that all provinces in Indonesia had been targeted by drugs. Provinces in the

Java region showed the highest number of abusers compared to provinces outside Java. Special Capital *Region* of *Jakarta* had the highest prevalence rate (4.73%) followed by East Kalimantan (3.20%) and South Sumatra (3.00%). In the report, Jakarta was the region in Indonesia with the most drug-prone areas, namely 117 locations (BNN, 2019). As a comparison, in the context of narcotics crimes that occurred in Indonesia, the period 2014-2018 showed an increasing trend (see Figure 1.1). The acceleration of narcotics crimes increased rapidly in 2018 with 39,588 cases (Criminal Statistics of Indonesia Statistics, 2018).




Figure 1: Diagram of Narcotics Crime in Indonesia for the 2014-2018 Period

Source: BPS Criminal Statistics (2019), reprocessed by the author.

More specifically, the data published by the National Narcotics Agency shows that every year drug cases have a relatively high trend. Furthermore, in 2013, there was a significant increase reaching 4,000 cases. Although there has been a decrease in cases until 2016, this does not show that Indonesia is free from cases of narcotics abuse. The latest data in 2019 (not recorded in the graph) showed an increase to more than 500 cases from 2018, from 990 cases to 14,010 cases (National Narcotics Agency, 2019). The National Narcotics Agency (BNN) emphasized that there was an increase in drug trafficking during 2019 from the previous year, amounting to 0.03 percent. Most drug users are aged 15 to 65 years and have exceeded the number of more than three million people (Chaniago, 2019).

In Indonesia, the causes of exposure to drug abuse can be viewed from several aspects. According to the socio-economic viewpoint, environmental factors have an effect on drug abusers. In the study conducted by Isnaini and Nitibaskara (2017) the impact of socio-economic vulnerability had a relationship to the prevalence of drug abuse. Socio-economic vulnerability can be assessed using several indicators, including education level, unemployment rate, income level, gender ratio, poverty rate, and access to health services. In 2019 the number of rehabilitation patients reached 13,046 people, wherein 1,676 people of them received inpatient rehabilitation services at centers/workshops and 11,370 received outpatient services at BNNP/K clinics, hospitals and Community Health Centers. In addition, monitoring of rehabilitation patients is also classified into regular, advanced, and intensive post-rehabilitation services. In sequence, the number of patients who received post-rehabilitation services was 1,901 people, 1,568 people, and 349 people, respectively (BNN, 2019). Based on the classification of rehabilitation patients, both for outpatient and inpatient, it was found that the community component rehabilitation institutions had more patients than BNN's institutions. In 2018, the number of drug abusers in community component rehabilitation institutions was 3,134 people, compared to 1,725 people in BNN rehabilitation institutions.

The demographic conditions in Indonesia which are certainly influenced by the culture and habits of the community lead to more distinctive and specific cases of drug abuse, especially for drug relapse offenders. Several forms of prosecution that were found based on both criminal acts and rehabilitation tend to have a negative response in Indonesian society. In addition, the role of the community, such as family and the environment, is often in an outer circle that has no direct contact. The condition of the existing forms of rehabilitation in Indonesia is also a separate issue in which whether this form of rehabilitation can reduce drug relapse rate or actually increases it. Thus, it is necessary to develop a more complex approach in order to comprehensively observe the phenomenon of drug relapse in Indonesia.

2. Literature Review

Reintegrative shaming will communicate disapproval of evil in society. Simply put, the perpetrator's bad deeds become the focus of recovery, not the perpetrator himself (Braithwaite, 1989). On the other hand, stigmatization reactions have a tendency to treat perpetrators as bad people and deserve permanent negative stigma in society. Thus, there is a tendency for people who forgive criminals by means of reintegrative to create a lower crime rate in society compared to communities that reduce criminal behavior through humiliation (Braithwaite, 1989). It also supports the idea that social aggregates are characterized by high levels of communitarianism and non-stigmatic shaming practices (Schaible & Hughes, 2011). Braithwaite (1989) assumes that shaming is a form of behavior that seeks to show social disapproval to an individual so as to create shame. Shaming is expected to have a quality of moral improvement that builds awareness of the perpetrator. Related to the basic assumption of reintegrative shaming theory, it is stated that the delivery of disapproval messages through shame is the key to understanding the impact of the criminal justice system. This is because the conventional criminal justice system has the potential to create reoffending.

Furthermore, the theory of desistance discusses how individuals stop doing something, especially regarding a short break from crime. Bushway (2001) defines desistance as the process of reducing the offensive level in criminal acts. Since criminal incidents are often dependent on indirect factors and opportunities, the process of discrimination should focus on changes occurring in the propensity for crime rather than on changes in crime. Farrall & Maruna (2004) differentiate between primary desistance and secondary desistance. Primary desistance is a form of respite in criminal activity. Meanwhile, secondary desistance is characterized by a permanent cessation of crime and a change in personal identity. Besides that there is a factor of age which plays a role in influencing the desistance process. Hoffman & Beck (1984) suggest the relationship is due to the existence of an age-related saturation phenomenon among criminals.

Lifestyle theory was developed by Hindelang (1978) and is widely used in the studies on victimization. This theory emphasizes a lifestyle that influences the occurrence of crimes against a person. This is reinforced by the explanation that daily routines such as working to studying at school were evidenced to determine certain types of crime, including the risk of crime (Madero-Hernandez, 2019). Based on this understanding, lifestyle theory has an emphasis on time, place, and people at risk in the context of victimization. People with such conditions have a higher probability of being victims compared to people with time, place, and relationship with people at low risk (Pratt, 2015). Its application in victimization studies relates to the exposure given by lifestyle. Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) describe the differential patterns of victimization that exist across demographic groups. Support to a victim was evidenced to depend on age, gender, race and income. Furthermore, the variation in exposure to crime risk situations was determined by a person's lifestyle. This is in line with the study conducted by Schreck which found that self-control had a correlation with a risky lifestyle. The idea indicated that individuals with low self-control were more likely to engage in behaviors that made it easier for them to be the targets (Madero-Hernandez, 2019). This behavior can contribute to the potential for victimization because it causes individuals to place themselves at a higher risk than individuals with more conservative lifestyles (Dempsey, Fireman, & Wang, 2006). Lifestyle theory explains crime as a process that involves 3 (three) variables, namely intensity, opportunity, and choice (Walters, 2014).

3. Study Methods

The study method was literature review or literature study which involved theories that were relevant to research problems. In this section, an assessment of the concepts and theories used was based on the available literature, especially from articles published in various scientific journals. Literature review serves to build concepts or theories as the basis for studies. Literature review or literature study is a compulsory activity required in study, especially academic research with main objective of developing theoretical aspects as well as aspects of practical benefits.

Based on the type of study, this study was a library research, which is conducted through collecting data or scientific papers with the relevant study objects or through library data collection, or a study conducted to solve a problem which is basically based on a critical and in-depth study of relevant library materials. Before conducting a study towards library materials, researchers must certainly understand about the sources to obtain scientific information.

The study data were collected directly from data sources. Data sources in the current study are defined as the subjects that provide data. If the researcher uses documentation, then the document or note is the source of the data, while the contents of the study subject's notes are defined as the study variables.

4. Results

Lifestyle theory was developed by Hindelang (1978) and is widely used in the studies on victimization. This theory emphasizes a lifestyle that influences the occurrence of crimes against a person. This is reinforced by the explanation that daily routines such as working to studying at school were evidenced to determine certain types of crime, including the risk of crime (Madero-Hernandez, 2019). Thus, lifestyle theory has the premises stated by Benjamin & Master in the Threefold Model which are explained as follows:

1. The distribution of crime victimization depends on the time and space context. It can be interpreted that the risk of crime is at a risky place and time.
2. Perpetrators cannot be represented as the samples of a particular population, so they only target people at high risk.
3. Lifestyle determines the likelihood of personal victimization through intervention variables through exposure and association.
4. There is a difference between the risky places and times for each person, and it depends on relationships with people who are at high risk as well. In other words, a person's lifestyle has an effect on exposure and associations.

Based on this understanding, lifestyle theory has an emphasis on time, place, and people at risk in the context of victimization. People with such conditions have a higher probability of being victims compared to people with time, place, and relationship with people at low risk (Pratt, 2015). Its application in victimization studies relates to the exposure given by lifestyle. Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) describe the differential patterns of victimization that exist across demographic groups. Support to a victim was evidenced to depend on age, gender, race and income. Furthermore, the variation in exposure to crime risk situations was determined by a person's lifestyle. This is in line with the study conducted by Schreck which found that self-control had a correlation with a risky lifestyle. The idea indicated that individuals with low self-control were more likely to engage in behaviors that made it easier for them to be the targets (Madero-Hernandez, 2019).

It has been widely accepted that victimization is not random but is part of the victim's lifestyle. It is not surprising then that victims are analogous to impulsive personality and low self-control (Seigel, 2006). Dempsey, Fireman, & Wang (2006) also conducted a study that corroborated this statement, which found a correlation between victims and perpetrators of crime, both showing impulsive and antisocial behaviors. This behavior can contribute to the potential for victimization because it causes individuals to place themselves at a higher risk than individuals with more conservative lifestyles (Dempsey, Fireman, & Wang, 2006). Lifestyle theory explains crime as a process that involves 3 (three) variables, namely intensity, opportunity, and choice (Walters, 2014).

Related to lifestyle, criminology studies explain subculture theory to define deviance as subnormal, dysfunctional, resistant and consumerist behaviors. One of the advantages of subculture theory is its ability to define and describe deviant behavior in society (Blackman, 2014). Cohen assumes that criminal behavior is a consequence of the community of young people into a subculture that has a predominance of values and deviant moral concepts. Thus, subcultures are defined as subsystems or anti-systems of society with attitudes and norms that are often contrary to the moral concepts adopted by the majority of society (Cohen, 1955).

However, it should be understood that the background for the emergence of subcultures is due to the uneven social structural conditions that have led to the development of expressions of social differentiation. Norms deviation is a form of violation for the general public, but is considered normal in the subculture. However, Cohen took a subculture case limited to juvenile delinquency. In its development, subcultures can be implemented to explain other crimes, apart from delinquency. The subculture description is summarized as follows (Downes & Rock, 2007):

- a. Actions that are useless or have no benefit (non-utilitarian), and are not based on economic rationality.
- b. Classified as malicious since it aims to disturb or even injure others.
- c. Negative in nature (negativistic) as a form of violation towards conventional values.
- d. Performed in various forms (versatile) depending on the action taken.
- e. Has a goal of momentary pleasure (hedonistic).
- f. Tend to be resistant to conformity pressures from the external environment and instead foster loyalty to members, values, and norms of subcultural groups.

In the development, Cloward and Ohlin used subcultures and anomies in gang crime cases and in other crimes. The subculture provides an opportunity for the establishment of an illegitimate opportunity structure instead of considering the conventional opportunity structure (legitimate opportunity structure). Thus, subcultures are characterized by violent and destructive behavior patterns. Moreover, Cloward and Ohlin in (Coe, 1961) explain that a criminal subculture has the potential to emerge in a residential environment characterized by close ties to perpetrators of different age levels, and between criminal and conventional elements. As a consequence of the integration of these integrative relationships, then, the opportunity to bring up alternative means in achieving success. Subculture groups get a pressure from restricted access to the various means to achieve success. Effective application of social control to the perpetrators, who are generally teenagers, may limit freedom of expression and close gaps of dissatisfaction.

The scope of subcultural theory no longer defines perversion and delinquency alone. However, it develops by separating crime as a specific subculture. Based on the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, the explanation of subcultural theory is interpreted as a form of collective social formation based on broader social, political and historical boundaries. Thus, the subculture develops into a form of opposition to the bourgeois order through forms of resistance. Subcultures are considered a form of resistance. However, the development of subcultural theory emphasizes the meaning of individuals on the basis of individualistic attitudes, pleasure and independence (Blackman, 2014).

In social control theory, Sampson and Laub (1993) evidenced that resistance theory was a social bond that developed during adulthood. Sampson and Laub (1993) explain that the theory of desistance emphasizes the impact that forms it, namely independent and exogenous, which means that it comes from humans who trigger it to form bonds of "hopelessness" in committing crimes. Meanwhile, based on the differential association theory, War (1998) states that the condition of desistance is a form of post-adolescent human relationship changes or a person's interest in more formal relationships such as marriage. Hence, a condition such as desistance emerges which makes a person who was previously involved in criminal acts begin to experience changes which lead to cessation of deviant activities. Besides that, the differential association theory also illustrates that desistance arises from increasing age, loyalty to the environment, family and other large groups, which results in a decrease in crime rates and loss of motivation to commit such type of criminal behavior (Farrall, 2002). Through the symbolic interactionism theory, desistance is a turning point and (Giordani, 2002) states that this is a change that occurs in desistance which is different and depends on the level of motivation, openness and interpretation of each event.

Based on the above understanding, shaming is a counterproductive behavior that can push out offenders from the grip of the criminal subculture. In this condition, the role of reintegrative shaming has an effort to avoid crime through reintegrating the perpetrator into society. Individuals are demanded to be able to undergo confrontation and be reintegrated into society. If not, then the perpetrator has a relatively high chance of being involved in the crime again (recidivism) (Braithwate, 1989). In line with this, a study conducted by Lu, Zhang & Miethe (2002) which places reintegrative shaming to run optimally in Chinese society. For Braithwate (1989) the feeling of shame

is considered a form of reintegration when it is done under social conditions that are interdependent and have a communitarianism society. Thus, crime is best controlled when community members are the primary controllers through active participation in the attempt to humiliate criminals and concerted efforts to reintegrate into the law-abiding community of citizens (Braithwaite, 1989).

Braithwaite (1989) argues that there are 2 (two) forms of reaction in reintegrative shaming that will be carried out by society as a response to crime, namely reintegrative and stigmativ. If disapproval/shame is given in a reintegrative pattern, it will be the opposite of a stigmativ pattern. This has an impact on the decrease in the possibility of violating behavior due to the emergence of moral quality in society. Reintegrative shaming will communicate disapproval of evil in society. Simply put, the perpetrator's bad deeds become the focus of recovery, not the perpetrator himself (Braithwaite, 1989). On the other hand, stigmatization reactions have a tendency to treat perpetrators as bad people and deserve permanent negative stigma in society. Thus, there is a tendency for people who forgive criminals by means of reintegrative to create a lower crime rate in society compared to communities that reduce criminal behavior through humiliation (Braithwaite, 1989). It also supports the idea that social aggregates are characterized by high levels of communitarianism and non-stigmatic shaming practices (Schaible & Hughes, 2011).

Thus the conceptual framework developed by the authors does not fully adopt the propositions of the three theories but is fitted to the needs of the study. By not eliminating the essence of these theories, the authors applied the appropriate propositions to carry out a theoretical reconstruction. As an illustration of the 30 (thirty) propositions of shame management popularized by Ahmed, Harris, Braithwaite & Braithwaite (2001), the propositions were simplified to 5 (five) premises that underlied this study. The theoretical framework illustration was simplified according to the author's needs as presented in table 2.4 below.

Table 1: Theoretical or Conceptual Framework of the Study

Theoretical Basis	Relevance of the Proposition	Theoretical Work Formulation
Reintegrative shaming theory	Shaming plays a role in crime control	By referring to the relevance of the propositions of the three theories used, the authors created a lifestyle-related shaming theoretical formula with the following criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lifestyle-related shaming emphasizes the formation of an ethical identity that can produce shame-guilt which is oriented towards families and the environment ▪ Lifestyle-related shaming separates individuals from risky lifestyles on the basis of the vulnerability of the place, time, and environment to drug relapse stimuli ▪ Lifestyle-related shaming targets a subculture of drug relapse that is characterized by non-utilitarian, negative,
	Shaming is relevant to an ethical identity that can generate shame-guilt	
	Ethical identity leads to the occurrence of shame-guilt that can affect the prevention of crime	
	Shame-guilt refers to giving the perpetrator a responsibility and empathy for the victim and society	
	External anger has the potential to create stigma	
Lifestyle and routine activity theory	Behavioral vulnerability in a combination of time and space with a high risk of potential crime	
	Lifestyle puts a person at increased risk of exposure and associations with a high risk	
	Relationships with people at risk make the victim a potential target	
Desistance theory	The threat of punishment	
	Social relations with law-abiding people	

	Avoiding relationships with the old environment	hedonistic and resistant to conformity
	An attitude of frustration as a response to tension	
	Lack of situational opportunities	
	Social structures shifting	
	The assumption of the validity of the legal system	

Source: various sources compiled by authors.

The theoretical work formulation of lifestyle-related shaming is the result of elaborating propositions derived from reintegrative shaming theory, lifestyle and routine activity theory, and desistance theory. Lifestyle-related shaming is an attempt to embarrass or not make drug use a lifestyle as part of drug relapse. This is done by refracting 3 (three) aspects, namely ethical identity, shame-guilt, and elements of drug relapse (non-utilitarian, negative, hedonistic). Therefore, lifestyle-related shaming has a role as an effort to overcome drug relapse by using shaming, lifestyle, and desistance approaches (see Figure 2.2). The researchers define it as follows:

1. Interdependence element was adjusted for variables, among others, age > 20 years, had been married, had a job and had a high-secondary education (Junior High School-Higher Education). This element was examined by looking at the demographic data in Indonesia, especially in the study site, namely the Jakarta area, as the city with the highest number of drug relapse in Indonesia.
2. The communitarian element was adjusted by adding lifestyle variables. This element was also tried to be examined by looking at conditions in urban areas, namely Jakarta, which are very closely related to changes in lifestyle in urban communities (Hindelang, Gottfredson, & Garofalo, 1978).
3. The implementation of rehabilitation in the form of a therapeutic community aims to reintegrate drug offenders back into society. The therapeutic community as part of the method provided by the government for drug abusers in Indonesia was tried to be analyzed using John Braithwaite's macro theory of reintegrative shaming.
4. Former addicts who have been declared "clean" are prone to re-exposure to the subculture retreatism (Cloward & Ohlin). This subculture is developed with the existence of a lifestyle context which is a new finding in drug relapse cases in Indonesia.
5. Former addicts who experience subcultural retreatism infiltration have the potential to become drug relapse offender.
6. Drug relapse is faced with lifestyle-related shaming effort. Lifestyle-related shaming functions as a form of shaming adapted from reintegrative shaming, desistance and lifestyle routine activities.
7. Lifestyle-related shaming has the potential to become a desistance for residents after drug relapse
8. Desistance is able to suppress drug relapse to return to former addicts

5. Conclusions

Lifestyle-related shaming is a combination of reintegrative shaming theory, desistance theory and lifestyle activity theory. In its application in the management of drug relapse in Indonesia, Lifestyle-related shaming can function as a part of shaming that allows drug relapse offenders to become former addicts. This is because Lifestyle-related shaming provides a positioning for drug abusers namely desistance (the desire to stop) and shaming when drug abusers interact in society.

The condition of the entry of individuals into society is allegedly able to decrease the level of drug relapse experienced to a complete stop because of the shame given to serve as a stimulus so as not to repeat the similar action. In line with Braithwaite which illustrates that reintegrative shaming can make criminals become low crime, so Lifestyle-related shaming can be used so that drug abusers can change their status as former offenders or former addicts.

On the other hand, the condition of Lifestyle-related shaming is closely related to the lifestyle of urbanites who are certainly tied to the urban lifestyle wherein peer group groups in society play a role in forming an individual identity. However, if the subculture in the community rejects the drug abusers, then Lifestyle-related shaming will greatly function in its role in decreasing the level of crime, especially drug abuse in Indonesia.

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The Republic of Turkey on the Verge of its Centennial: Continuity or Change?

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Abstract

The modern Republic of Turkey is close to its 100th anniversary but it has substantially changed in comparison to the secular and Western-oriented state of its initial days. After almost two decades of the AKP rule and the dazzling Erdoğan leading figure, several transformations have been experienced as in politics, because of the ascending and consolidation of an Islamist ruling party; in economy, since Turkey had an impressive performance during the first decade of the AKP in power; as well as in social sphere, due the emergence of identities that challenged the prevalent Kemalist narrative. All these changes involve complexities and provoke tense debates within Turkish society, some of which can start to be solved through next elections. Hence year 2023 becomes a watershed in Turkish History and certain questions regarding if the current trend will persist or if new transformations will take place become relevant. The discussion necessarily implies to envisage a hypothetical scenario without Erdoğan and the consequences of his absence on Turkey's near future.

Keywords: AKP Rule, Erdoğan, Post- Erdoğan Era, Turkey, 2023 Elections

Introduction

Claiming that Turkey is in crisis could be a commonplace. For a country that experienced four coups d'état during the 20th century, lived periods—under civilian rule—of restricted democracy and has gone through an allegedly increasing process of authoritarianism over the last ten years (including a new coup attempt), the right questions are whether it has had moments of normality or if being constantly on the edge is Turkey's "normal" condition. Even so, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era has been different from former political experiences because it has contributed to the consolidation of political Islam in Turkey. Due to the secular character of the republic stamped by its founder Atatürk almost a hundred years ago, it had been nearly impossible for Islamist parties to come to power, with the notable exception of Necmettin Erbakan's failed rule in the mid-1990s which ended in the well-known "postmodern coup" (Zürcher, 2017: 325). The strengthening of the AKP, being itself the last stage in a continuum of Islamist parties conceived within the *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) movement whose first one was the National Order Party in 1970, has vindicated a Muslim identity as an element in the definition of Turkishness. Such identity has disputed the hegemony that Kemalism carried out during the 20th century while it competes against other collective modes of self-representation. This clash is what Hintz denominates "identity contestation, defined as ongoing processes of debate and pushback among groups holding differing understandings

of what constitutes the appropriate national identity for their state” (2018: 18). Therefore, the debate on what being a Turk means goes beyond the recurrent dichotomy between Secularism and Islamism.

The figure of Erdoğan has been key in the success of the AKP process. As a sign of mutual dependence, the party’s grassroots networks inherited from Islamist political parties in the 1980s and 1990s drove Erdoğan’s ascent while his charismatic figure and cult of personality have channeled votes for the political organization. However, the growing personalistic rule in Turkey has not only created unbalances in the symbiotic relationship with his own party but also provoked concerns about the immediate future and the long-term situation of the country. It seems that Turkey will continue under Erdoğan’s rule for a longer time than many predicted. In that sense, a discussion on coming events or the analysis of eventual scenarios—whether Erdoğan is in the picture or not—become relevant. This article, after briefly reviewing the rise of Erdoğan, will discuss future situations based on recent and current developments as well as scholars’ considerations. It will assume 2023 as a watershed because it will be the centennial of the Republic and the date for the next general and presidential elections. Recognizing the importance that Erdoğan has for the representation of current Turkey, the document will also try to reflect on eventual scenarios once he leaves power.

Material studied and methods

The necessary bibliographic material was collected in order to offer a historical reconstruction of the AKP rule in Turkey which has been the dominant for most of the 21st century. Although the review was mainly done in terms of politics, economic and sociocultural elements were examined, too. It also resorted to a quantitative analysis of electoral results taking into consideration that the breaking point referred to within the article is the year of next elections in that country. Regarding to forecasts for Turkey’s near future, the analysis is based on rigorous studies carried out by experts who have written on the different issues reviewed. After systematizing all the collected information and organize it on a historical and thematic linear basis, the results obtained are presented below.

1. The road to one-man rule

As mentioned, in 1996 Erbakan, as head of the Welfare Party (WP), became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey. This was possible thanks to a coalition with other center-right parties despite having obtained only 21 percent of the votes in the 1995 elections. Since the beginning his Islamist origin as well as some defiant actions in the foreign policy arena (as a visit he paid to Gaddafi in Libya) raised suspicions within the military, which in February 1997 launched an ultimatum that eventually led to Erbakan’s renunciation four months later. The “Postmodern (or Soft) coup” was followed by the ban of the WP by the Constitutional Court and Erbakan’s permanent expulsion from political activity. In those days, the then incumbent Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, took part in some demonstrations supporting the WP to which he also belonged. In one of those rallies he recited a poem that was considered an incitement of violence and as a consequence he was imprisoned for four months in 1999. After having been an active member of the Virtue Party (VP) that replaced the WP, Erdoğan led the reformist wing of the party which was also banned by the Court in 2001. This provoked a final split within political Islam in Turkey: on one hand, there was a traditional Islamist line, under Erbakan’s guidance which became the Felicity Party; on the other hand, there was a conservative pro-reform and pro-market organization, the Justice and Development Party, whose leaders were Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. The latter became Prime Minister after the November 2002 elections when the AKP obtained only 34 percent of the votes but, because of the electoral system, won an absolute majority in the National Assembly. With his partisans dominating the Parliament, in March 2003, the political ban for Erdoğan was lifted and he became Premier.

During its initial years, the AKP displayed an aggressive reformist agenda. Whereas it continued the Economic Stabilization Program initiated by the predecessor government as a reaction to the 2001 economic collapse -the final catastrophic event in what is known in Turkey as the “Lost Decade” in which the country “faced a worsened economic crisis and an intensified war in the south-east” (Delibas, 2015: 69)- the AKP also promoted reforms aiming at fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, requirements to be considered for European Union membership. The then Minister of Economy, Ali Babacan, was in charge of process of economic recovery. In this realm, Turkey’s

performance between 2003 and 2013 was impressive. Except for 2008 and 2009, the international financial crisis years, and 2012, when the percentage was oddly low, the GDP growth rate average was above 7 percent (World Bank, 2019). In terms of GDP per capita, the 2002 figures (USD 3 492) were tripled in 2008 (USD 10 444) although thereafter it has entered into a kind of “middle-income trap” and has been unable to surpass the USD 11 000 barrier (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016). Partially due to such positive results, the AKP was able to win the 2007 and 2011 general elections, maintaining its majority in the Parliament while Erdoğan consolidated his leadership and started to accumulate power. Indeed, after a golden age during his first period, in which the EU agreed that Turkey had fulfilled the referred criteria to be a candidate and opened negotiations in December 2005, Erdoğan focused on eroding the historical military tutelage on Turkish politics. In Republican Turkey, the army had always assumed the role as defender of secular principles of the nation, and of course Kemalism was dominant within it. However, first by altering the structure of the National Security Council during the reformist era, and later helped by judicial persecution, Erdoğan could weaken the military leadership to neutralize an eventual intervention. In fact, a deposition had been attempted by generals in 2007 through the same means used ten years earlier with Erbakan. In the most recent occasion, the “e-memorandum” posted by the military warning against the Islamist government, was responded to with a call for elections in which the AKP kept its absolute majority. As Waldman and Çalışkan note, “this episode proved that the days of military coups were over” (2017: 31) for now.

In 2008, at the same time that a lawsuit aimed at shutting down the AKP was rejected by the Constitutional Court, the Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) trials were opened extinguishing the remaining political power of the military in the following years. They were driven by Gulenist elements within the judiciary in times when the movement- also known as *Hizmet* (service) -founded by Fetullah Gülen in the 1960s was a strong AKP partner and simultaneously was consolidating its infiltration process in several institutions of the Turkish state. Some years later, through the appeal processes, when Gulenism was already being persecuted, it was demonstrated that the evidence against the military in those trials had been fabricated. But the wounds were already incurable, and the generals would never recover their former influence. In the case of the Gulenists, “once their common enemy was destroyed, the AKP-Gülen alliance began to crack. The alliance came to a bitter end in 2013 when pro-Gülen judges revealed corruption charges against Erdoğan” (Taşpınar, 2016). The Prime Minister’s reaction was a purge of *Hizmet* members in state institutions and the labelling of the Gulenist movement as a terrorist organization. In this sense, it was referred as FETÖ (*Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü*) even in official statements. Özeren, Çubukçu, and Baştuğ consider that “after winning its third consecutive general election in 2011, the AKP held more power in its hands than ever before (and) it also faced fewer institutional checks and balances, as the executive body’s domination over the judicial and legislative branches had continued to expand” (2020). Nevertheless, it was in 2013 that Erdoğan’s alleged turn to authoritarianism became irreversible.

In effect, that year marked a point of no return: there was an initiation of not only the persecution against Gulenists, but also the repression of the Gezi protests, which began with a small environmental demonstration against an urban infrastructure project but became the catalyst for nation-wide rallies. As McManus states, “Gezi was indeed a turning point - just in the wrong direction. Turkey was sliding from troubled democracy into an increasingly authoritarian state, centered on a single man” (2018: 287). The definitive steps toward a one-man rule can be illustrated in three different moments: First, in 2014 when Erdoğan became the first elected president in Turkey’s history. Second, when a coup attempt was launched by some units of the army, allegedly led by Gulenist elements. Third, when Erdoğan won (though by a narrow margin) the April 2017 referendum which formally changed the system of governance from a parliamentary to a presidential one. While social changes were also being experienced with an Islam-oriented influence -sometimes driven by the government- in Turkish people’s private lives as well as a reinforced role of Islam in society through public policies (for instance in education or family law), criticism against Erdoğan was officially persecuted. Insulting the President not only became an actively persecuted offense but also the press was the predilect target. Waldman and Çalışkan highlight that regarding the media, “the government has manipulated it, co-opted it or attacked it fervently” (2017: 31).

In its turn the failed coup provided extraordinary tools that Erdoğan used under the consequently declared state of exception that lasted two years. Such tools were useful to corner the Gülen movement, as its members were

involved in the putsch, and to put pressure on all the opposition voices within the mass media, academia, politics and the civil society. The measures also gave him legitimacy to confront the Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK), with whom peace talks had come to an end in 2015. His confrontation with the PKK was followed by a worsening of armed operations: according to the International Crisis Group, there have been more than 5 000 people killed in clashes related to the PKK conflict since the talks broke down (ICG, 2020). Despite his appeals to Nationalism and the defense of democracy, Erdoğan witnessed the division of the country between his followers and his adversaries. Such juxtaposition has led him to accumulate an enormous social base of support that in many cases evolved into a cult of personality and even fanaticism. According to Çağaptay,

“since the failed coup against Erdoğan, a new narrative has emerged amongst his supporters that I call Erdoganism. This ‘Erdoganist’ narrative holds that Erdoğan is a historic figure who will make Turks great and Muslims proud again (...) Here is Erdoganism par excellence: blending political Islam and Turkish nationalism under Erdoğan’s persona, whose leitmotif is that he is protecting Turkey and the Muslim World against foreign attacks” (2017).

Under such a polarized environment, the referendum was voted for in 2017 and the political system was transformed: the President became head of state and government, the role of Prime Minister disappeared, and the Parliament turned into a strictly legislative branch. Moreover, during the transition period, Erdoğan re-structured the ministries and pursued reforms to extend his control over the military.

In 2018, pressed by the dramatic fall of Turkish currency after a diplomatic incident with the U.S. (the well-know “Brunson Crisis”) (Çağaptay, 2020: 223), Erdoğan called for anticipated presidential and parliamentary elections in which he was re-elected as President. In the National Assembly, the AKP, despite not having obtained absolute majority, conformed a coalition with the ultranationalist National Movement Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli. He had supported Erdoğan since 2015 when the new Kurdish-oriented party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), gained seats in the parliament in detriment of the AKP, and new elections were held at the cost of PKK talks collapsing. In sum, for 2018, Erdoğan had become the most powerful person in Turkish history with extended control over other public power branches (including the central bank, the electoral board, and the high-profile judiciary) and keen pressure over his critics.

2. Road to 2023

The consolidation of a presidential system and the virtual elimination of checks and balances have led to an apparently steady autocratic rule. However, the deepened polarization in Turkey also means that Erdoğan’s supporters and opponents can be homogeneously distributed and despite the majority in the quantity of votes and provinces the AKP holds over the country, there are also regions where elections are more disputable or even dominated by other political parties. That was demonstrated in the March 2019 local elections whose results are shown as follows:




Figure 1: Turkey. March 2019 Local Elections Results

Source: www.hurriyet.com.tr/secim/31-mart-2019-yerel-secimleri/secim-sonuclari

The main opposition parties garnered 41% of the vote, figures lower than percentages obtained in the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections (46% and 44% respectively) but more meaningful this time because the Kemalist Republican People's Party (CHP) conquered the mayor's offices in most of the Turkey's biggest cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. In the latter case, the AKP alleged irregularities and asked for annulment and re-run. The Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey (YSK), which had validated suspicious votes in the 2017 referendum in favor of Erdoğan's interests (Cupolo, 2017), acceded to the AKP claims provoking even more concerns about its lack of independence. Subsequently, original results (which showed a difference of 24 000 votes between CHP candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, and AKP candidate, Binali Yıldırım, the last Prime Minister of Turkey) were annulled, new elections were called for June and a hard campaign was launched. As Grossman underlines, "Erdoğan himself had said many times, 'If we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey' (...) and called the results of the first election, 'blemished'. In the rematch, the usually fractious opposition to the AKP unified behind İmamoğlu, mounting a serious challenge to the AKP's power in its largest base of support" (2019). Despite Erdoğan's expectations, the difference between the contenders increased to 800 000 votes confirming the CHP victory which was supported by the İYİ (Good) party (an anti-Erdoganist faction that broke off from the MHP) and the HDP. The Istanbul elections had three main effects in the chessboard of Turkish politics. First, it erected İmamoğlu as an attractive figure within not only the CHP but the whole opposition to run against Erdoğan in 2023 presidential elections. Second, it proved *in-situ* the possibility of a wider alliance among opposition parties, including the HDP. Finally, it puts Istanbul, the main and most populated city and economic center of Turkey under CHP management with a large quantity of resources at disposal and the opportunity of demonstrating a renewed way of governance.

Regarding the implications of such results for a political change in Turkey, positions are not univocal. Grossman claims that "Overall, the aura of Erdoğan's invincibility seems to be dissipating and Turkey appears to be nearing the day that the transfer of power is viewed as a normal and nonexceptional part of political life" (2019). The RAND Corporation shares this view when it states that "these results, the 2019 election of CHP candidates to be mayors in six of Turkey's ten largest cities—particularly the decisive victory of Ekrem İmamoğlu in İstanbul—illustrate that Erdoğan and the AKP are not invincible" (2020). Undoubtedly, the results in local elections (as well as in the 2018 presidential and parliamentary ones) showed that despite 17 years of an iron fist rule by Erdoğan and the AKP, there is a vigorous opposition in Turkey. Its participation in total votes records overall a percentage above 40 that could be better in case of a more extensive coalition. In this context, Turkish democracy still stands. However, as the Hudson Institute points out "the AKP (...) also faced fewer institutional checks and balances, as the executive body's domination over the judicial and legislative branches had continued to expand" (Özeren *et al.*, 2020). In a similar sense, Hintz expresses that she doesn't "see any political changes while Erdoğan is in power, other than increased efforts to remain in power that rely on intimidation, media stranglehold even on streaming platforms, jailing of political opponents and dissidents, etc" (2020). The optimism about a political change in Turkey could also have been dispersed very soon after the elections when Erdoğan removed three elected mayors, HDP members, in predominantly Kurdish cities in Eastern Turkey, just like did in 2016 when 24 mayors lost their positions after alleged links with the PKK. At the end of 2020, 47 mayors out of a total of 59 municipalities won by the HDP in 2019 elections had been ousted and 21 of them have been imprisoned. This took place in the midst of escalation of hostilities against Kurdish militias, particularly the PKK within Turkish borders, and the People's Protection Units (YPG) forces -a PKK wing- in Syria.

Under current circumstances, the big conundrum to be resolved is double-faced: Will the opposition in Turkey be able to defeat Erdoğan in 2023 presidential elections? Providing that they are able to, would Erdoğan accept the results and willingly leave power? An answer to the first predicament is directly linked to the possibility of a unified candidacy, if not by all, at least by the biggest opposition parties in Turkey as well as smaller but meaningful organizations. It is clear that a coalition between the CHP and the İYİ party, just like happened in parliamentary 2018 elections, is not enough. In fact, both parties, despite their "National Alliance" to the legislative body, ran with their own candidates for presidency: Muharrem İnce for the CHP who barely surpassed 30 percent of the votes, and Meral Akşener from the İYİ party, who obtained 7.29 percent. In the same competition, the HDP leader, Selahattin Demirtaş also took part, but his figures were only one percentage point above Akşener. Of course, not even combined could they have reached Erdoğan, who gained more than 52 percent of the votes. The remaining question is if a unique candidacy could have changed the results. In fact, some rapprochements were

held by party leaders, including the head of Felicity Party, Temel Karamollaoğlu. The original idea was to support ex-president and AKP co-founder Abdullah Gül as a multiparty candidate against Erdoğan. In the end, negotiations broke down, each party ran with its own candidate and the results were as seen. In any case, although it was considered to be part of an alliance, the HDP never had a real chance to join it. The reluctance to accept the Kurdish-oriented party in a wider coalition is precisely the kind of alignment which looks politically uncomfortable for nationalistic elements within the CHP and the İYİ party. However, if the HDP is not included, a victory will be very difficult in the next presidential elections. The possibilities of a really strong candidacy depend on the Demirtaş' party inclusion, which creates a dilemma on how to navigate the positions against. Maybe the achievements in the 2019 Istanbul elections could be a draft of how reach a such coalition.

But the HDP is only one of the parties that should be added to an anti-erdoganist alliance especially because there are new political actors that could increase their relevance in the following years. That is the case of the recently founded Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) whose leader, former Minister of Economy, Ali Babacan, left the AKP in the middle of critiques against Erdoğan and had the support of ex-president Gül (Gürsel, 2019). Although there is not enough clarity about the location of his party on the political spectrum, his background as the creator of Turkey's "economic miracle" in the first years of AKP rule, envisages a liberal and pro-European orientation. Also, in his early statements he has made it clear that a return to the parliamentary system is healthy for Turkish democracy. In his turn, Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Foreign and Prime Minister, and author of the *strategic depth* doctrine that led the "Neo-Ottomanist" (Çağaptay, 2020: 284) Turkish foreign policy under AKP governments, released his own new party, the Future Party, after having moved away from Erdoğan. In the case of these ex AKP members, rapprochements with the CHP or İYİ parties are more likely for Babacan. However, it will be almost impossible for him to become the strong unique candidate required by the opposition. In this realm, possibilities seem to rely on Meral Akşener, the head of İYİ party, or Ekrem İmamoğlu, the CHP incumbent mayor of Istanbul. For the latter, his performance on managing the biggest Turkish city will be key to consolidating his popularity. Moreover, he must deal successfully with investigations into his local fundraising that can be used by the AKP to legally kick him out of the running. Additionally, his party is experiencing recent withdrawals of relevant members, some of whom have expressed their intention to create new political organizations which could increase fragmentation within electorate.

Concerning the AKP, the divergence of former recognized members show that Erdoğan's intimate group is every day smaller and despite the electoral results of the party, his rule has turned excessively personalistic. In this sense, with regard to the upcoming 2023 elections, it is necessary to point out a difference between parliamentary and presidential contest which is applicable to the AKP-Erdoğan relationship. While it is clear that the incumbent president is able to win his re-election, the party's ability to hold the voting majority once obtained is less evident. As Grossman indicates, "in both presidential races, including his most recent in 2018, Erdoğan didn't exceed 52.5% of the vote. The AKP in the parallel parliamentary election happening at the same time in June 2018 fell short of Erdoğan's share. This suggests AKP is far less popular than he is" (2019). With a larger number of parties, some of them aiming at the same electoral base as the AKP, the allocation of seats in the Parliament will be more assorted. If the alliances to surpass altogether the threshold are allowed again, then smaller parties will also have representation, which will likely be detrimental to the AKP. Therefore, the mutual dependence between Erdoğan and his party has become unbalanced and it depends more on him than inversely.

Due to the increasingly personalistic direction of the government in virtue of which Erdoğan has become a genuine *Reis* (head, leader, boss), a new electoral success could be assured for him, even without the support of the grassroots networks in his party, though these are still important. Hence, the probabilities of an Erdoğan's loss could originate not for political but for other reasons. The economic crisis could be one of them. In particular, Turkey's economic trajectory has not been good in the last lustrum. As Jenkins underlines, "in recent years, as the pace of growth has slowed, the Turkish economy has become heavily dependent on domestic demand, which – given the country's low savings rate – has been largely financed by borrowing from abroad, particularly in US dollars" (2016). On account of the local currency experiencing a dramatic devaluation since 2017, the external debt has skyrocketed, threatening economic performance in the incoming years. These forecasts represent a risk for the current president because "if Turkey's economy continues to worsen, it will weaken the government ahead

of elections and further reduce Turkey's regional standing" (Abramovitz and Edelman, 2013). It is important to note that a large part of Erdoğan's renown is based on the economic success of Turkey during the first decade of the AKP rule and that his main justification to move to a presidential system was its necessity for a better control of economic and security issues. Resorting to the IMF for a bailout would be a setback for Erdoğan and in the case of economic downfall will appeal to a nationalist discourse (surely composed of military operations against Kurdish militias and more anti-Western rhetoric) to stand in power. In the end, the question remaining is if the economy will still be relevant for Erdoğan's political purposes or if Turkey's government will follow a path like, for instance, the Venezuela's where despite economic disaster President Maduro has been able to stay in power using increasingly authoritarian methods at the expense of democracy.

3. A post-Erdoğan Turkey?

Regarding the question asked above on the possibilities for Erdoğan to accept a defeat and his eventual "peaceful" withdrawal from the presidency, his autocratic character and the supposed support by huge social sectors as well as by leaders within the military -which Erdoğan has tried to shape with loyalists- could lead to a negative answer. The president of Turkey every new day looks more like a classical Latin American *caudillo* who believes that the fate of his country is inevitably linked to him and in his absence the country will fall. Therefore, he will try to stay in charge whatever it takes. Hintz thinks that "his hold on power is an existential need: if Erdoğan leaves power, he will likely be subjected to prosecution unless whoever rules Turkey in his stead is a very strong ally of his. (...) His livelihood/life depends on him maintaining a hold on power" (2020). Although at least for now a defeat in the 2023 elections or Erdoğan's renunciation for any other reason looks unlikely, for strictly academic purposes, a dissertation on a future Turkey without him seems plausible.

The first question to address is about the person who would succeed him taking into consideration that, as mentioned, his intimate group is every day smaller. Jenkins accurately points out that "like many autocrats, Erdoğan has been reluctant to groom a successor for fear that s/he may launch an early bid for power" (Jenkins, 2016). And although he considers that if "his successor may come from within the Turkish Islamist movement, s/he is unlikely to be an Erdoğan loyalist or to be drawn from his inner circle" (Ibid.), it is probable that he finally opts for someone very close to him. In such a case, the candidates seem to be his son Bilal or the current Minister of Interior, Süleyman Soylu. Although was called to be Erdoğan's successor, his son-in-law Berat Albayrak, resigned as Minister of Finance and Treasury in November 2020, reducing even more the President's options and evincing cracks within the government and his own family. However, Erdoğan's image is immense and holding his legacy would be a very heavy burden that not anybody could bear. Moreover, the partisan support will surely not be the same for a different leader. In any case, as stated, the AKP's dependence on Erdoğan is vital and if results in the 2023 parliamentary elections are expected to be fewer, performance with Erdoğan out of the picture can be worse. According to Jenkins again, "This increases the likelihood of a purge of the Erdoğan nomenclatura from the state apparatus once Erdoğan himself is no longer in power" and "given that his successor is unlikely to be able to match Erdoğan's monopoly of political power, there would likely be at least a partial re-strengthening of Turkey's institutions" (2016).

In relation with the last subject, the second question to be addressed refers to the Turkish political system. It has been previously asserted that the AKP future largely depends on Erdogan's permanence. If absent, the political environment will be reorganized with non-absolute majority parties and the need to pursue coalitions. It will have a direct effect on the system of governance whose decision-making schemes have been deinstitutionalized in the last years. Because of this "strategic balance" the return to parliamentarism looks likely. Fuller considers that once the AKP reduces its power, the CHP will re-appear as the predominant party in Turkey but not that strong. In this sense, "while Atatürk's vital role in Turkish history as the heroic founder and modernizer of a new nation is secure, Kemalism -the ideology of his successors- is no longer regarded by the majority as a sacred national value" (2014: 346). The new configuration of political forces will also be reflected in the society, which has inevitably been transformed throughout the last decades. The emergence of collective identities that challenged the Kemalist as the privileged representation of Turkishness makes a reoccurrence of extreme secularism or Islamism impossible. For Jenkins, "in the foreseeable future, there appears little possibility of the return to the system of military

tutelage. (...) Nor does there appear any prospect of a re-imposition of the interpretation of Kemalism that prevailed before the AKP came to power” (Jenkins, 2016). However, the struggle for the definition of Turkish identity will continue and be the cause of social and political clashes. Without a divisive figure like Erdoğan on the horizon and the coexistence of several identities it is possible that the polarization within the country diminishes.

There are other relevant topics to discuss in a hypothetical end of Erdoğan’s rule. One of them is the fate of Gulenism. Some reasons could be addressed for considering that the Gülen movement will not re-emerge in the incoming years: First, it is not a unified organization. As Aydıntaşbaşı indicates, “Gülen’s movement was known to have millions of followers and tens of thousands of members within the state bureaucracy. But no one was sure who they were” (2016: 1). Although there is no doubt about Gulenist involvement in the plot, it is also true that many members could have not been aware of it. Even, as this author states quoting an intelligence source, “a Gülenist within the military doesn’t necessarily know who the other Gülenists are” (Aydıntaşbaşı, 2016: 7). Second, the movement has been severely damaged by the Turkish government, at least in Turkey where it is considered a terrorist organization, since many of its members have been incarcerated or dismissed (from public positions) and most of its properties have been confiscated. Third, probably more than Erdoganism, the Hizmet is ultra-personalistic and deeply dependent on the Fetullah Gülen’s guidelines. Gülen himself is a very old man and, in his case probably worse than in Erdoğan’s, there are no heirs that can adequately fill his role. The excessive cult of personality implies that, without its natural leader, the organization will weaken even more. As Fuller highlights, “at this point there is no clear successor who commands charismatic support from the public. Some speculate that the movement could split along different lines and interests down the road” (2014: 352). Maybe the Nurcu religious order will continue underground but only for educational or spiritual purposes, not political or economic. Finally, Gulenism was labelled as the main culprit of the 2016 coup attempt and is repudiated by all other political actors in Turkey. The coup was interpreted as an attack against democracy, and a Gulenist rule would be more concerning in Turkey than a normal Islamist party, even within the AKP.

Another issue to be considered is the Kurdish Question, which unfortunately will also remain unanswered. The main reason is the reinforced Turkish nationalism that characterizes most political parties. Maybe the only exception is the HDP. It was noted that nationalistic bases and the fear to lose support deter more committed rapprochements by the CHP or İYİ party with the Demirtaş’ one. Of course, the background is the fight against the PKK which, at least for some more years, will be a red line difficult to cross for the Turkish government whoever is in charge due to the political leverage provided by resorting to nationalism and the repulsion that the PKK itself (partially because of its portrayal in the media) generates in most of Turkish society. Even so, possibilities for further talks are not closed but it will be necessary the rise of moderate factions within the parties with the ability to understand the benefits that an agreement would bring for the future of Turkey. In that regard, Jenkins states that “the breaking of the taboo on ‘negotiating with terrorists’ and the dramatic decline in casualties during the PKK ceasefire in 2013-14 means that there is now a broad consensus in Turkey – including among many in the AKP – that the Kurdish issue can only be resolved through negotiations, not on the battlefield” (2016). The conundrum lies on when conditions will be favorable again for a reopening of rapprochements. As for the contents of eventual agreements, whereas most probably they will include cultural rights and certain degrees of autonomy as well as transitional justice, statehood is a non-negotiable subject for the Turkish government because of its nationalistic composition.

Finally, there is a sensitive question regarding Turkish foreign policy that under Erdoğan moved from a European approach to a Neo-Ottoman orientation in virtue of which Turkey attempted to exert influence in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and especially the Middle East. After almost 18 years of AKP rule, Turkey has definitely moved away from the West (Europe and the U.S.), held rapprochements with Russia and Iran and its policy in the Middle East region was not as successful as pretended, currently keeping good relations only with Qatar, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood at the same time that deploys troops in Syria and Libya for diverse interests (Çağaptay, 2020: 178). In the midst, there is a growing anti-Americanism in Turkish society based, again, on the nationalistic character of most of the political actors. Under such circumstances, the question about the future of foreign policy becomes relevant. Kirişçi suggests three scenarios with Erdoğan still in power. First, “Erdoğan walks back his party’s domestic political agenda to the early days of his reign.” In other words, he

readdresses the reformist path and sets his sights on Europe again. Second, “Erdoğan continues to mobilize his nationalist and Islamist supporters, only more aggressively.” Third “and most likely scenario is a return to a situation reminiscent of the 1990s, with Erdoğan leading a Turkey that limps from one crisis to another and with a fragile economy deeply stuck in a middle-income trap” (2017: 190). In the last case, “structural factors (...) would break the temptation to leave NATO and completely rupture relations with the EU” (Kirişçi, 2017: 190). At this point, the possibilities of a change in a post-Erdoğan era look minimal. Even if a pragmatic view prevails over an ideological one in near future Turkish foreign policy, the Western approach seems irretrievable since other political forces share the anti-Western sentiment and, in the case of the CHP, have become critics of the EU accession process. It is not clear how the West could “recover” Turkey. In this sense, the development of current processes in the global arena produces for Turkey more doubts than certitudes on the performance of its incoming international relations.

Conclusion

Falling back onto a common place, Turkey is in crisis. Not only do domestic politics give rise to problems because of the predicaments on democracy that the AKP government and especially Erdoğan’s leadership have caused in recent years, but also other aspects, such as the economy and foreign policy, provoke serious concerns. All of these elements are interrelated and although Erdoğan has the required skills to manage them in his favor, usually by resorting to a nationalist discourse or a hard attack against his opponents, a poor economic performance can bring with it real disadvantages for him. Perhaps the beginning of his end will be driven by negative outcomes in the economy, which have been noticeable since 2016 and may worsen in the upcoming years due to Turkey’s high indebtedness, growth stagnation, fall into the middle-class trap, high unemployment rates (especially youth joblessness) and the slowdown of key economic sectors such as tourism. However, as noted, the economy may not be relevant in the end and Erdoğan can insist on staying in power despite the adverse figures, in which case an enlargement of authoritarianism would likely be inevitable. Many things can happen in the next two and a half years just before the turning point that has been laid out in this article. After two decades in power, the AKP’s exhaustion becomes apparent, but Erdoğan’s continuity, except if extraordinary conditions happen, does not seem to be in doubt. However, there have been surprising moments throughout Turkey’s political history that have changed the course of trends. Hopefully the next shock, whatever it is, be beneficial for the country.

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Optimization of Sea Defense Strategy Through Operation of the Hospital Auxiliary Vessel to Support National Defense

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Abstract

The dynamics of the strategic environment at the global, regional and national levels give rise to various types of threats, both military and non-military threats, encouraging to optimize the Indonesian Sea Defense Strategy (SDS) which has the characteristics of an archipelagic country. In accordance with peaceful conditions, the optimization of SDS is more appropriate if it is directed at the military operations other than war, which in this study focuses on the operation of Hospital Auxiliary Vessel (HAV). There were problems related to the ineffective HAV operation, because it was used for material transportation and border operations. Its operation doesn't provide public health services in isolated, frontier and outermost areas. The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain the implementation and to formulate strategies to optimize SDS through the operation of HAV in order to support national defense. The research used is descriptive qualitative with a phenomenological approach. The data were obtained from interviews at the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health and Indonesian Navy Headquarters. The results of the studied that SDS through the operation of HAV was implemented quite well, but the operating time often exceeded the initial plan due to the limited number of HAV and their crew. The conclusion from this research is necessary for optimization of SDS which is emphasized on the Sea Control Strategy in accordance with the strategy development on the ends, ways and means components.

Keywords: Sea Defense Strategy (SDS), Hospital Auxiliary Vessel (HAV), Optimization, Sea Control Strategy

1. Introduction

The dynamics of the strategic environment at the global, regional, and national levels produce various threats that encourages the need to optimize the Indonesian Sea Defense Strategy (SDS). Those threats can be classified as threats of a military and non-military nature. This is in accordance with the explanation in Law Number 3 of 2003 concerning State Defense, which states that there are two types of threats to the country's sovereignty, namely military and non-military threats. Military threats are threats that use organized armed force and are considered capable of endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country, as well as the safety of citizens and the entire nation. Non-military threats are essentially threats that do not use force of arms, however, they can endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country, as well as the safety of the entire nation. These threats include radicalism, separatism, social conflicts, disease outbreaks, cyber attacks, exploitation of natural resources and so on.

The military threat to Indonesian sovereignty stems primarily from China's violations of territory in the North Natuna Sea. Non-military threats include the spread of covid-19, which is very detrimental to the state and all Indonesian people; rampant illegal fishing activities; border disputes, and public welfare problems in border areas.

The non-military threat in the form of the spread of covid-19 is a threat whose resolution is mandated by the state to the medical team who handles it directly at locations where the virus spreads. The aim of these efforts is to prevent the spread of Covid-19 from spreading and to minimize the number of victims due to the virus infection. Non-military threats in the form of illegal fishing activities and a crisis in the welfare and health of coastal communities can be resolved by optimizing SDS.

SDS which has been implemented in Indonesia since 2004 is the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy (ASDS). The target of the ASDS is to prevent parties from disturbing the sovereignty of the country and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia by sea. The ASDS is an integral part of the Archipelago's Defense Strategy which is laid out on three interrelated main pillars, namely the defense and security system of the universal people, defense in depth and deterrence (Herdiawan et al., 2020; Mustari et al., 2018).

ASDS is a translation of the TNI AL doctrine "Eka Sasana Jaya" which is used as a guide in carrying out the duties and functions of the Indonesian Navy. This is carried out to overcome maritime threats, domestic security disturbances, and armed rebellion in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia in order to create a safe and controlled national jurisdiction sea condition. To realize these various goals, the ASDS was implemented. Where the ASDS consists of Deterrence Strategy, Layer Defense Strategy and Sea Control Strategy (Mustari et al., 2018).

Basically, the ASDS is a framework for implementing the three general roles of the Navy as the main component of sea defense, namely roles in the military, diplomacy and police. The role in the military realm relates to the empowerment of state forces at sea in order to achieve a conducive maritime situation, build a strong maritime force, and ensure the creation of border security and the entire national marine area. The role of diplomacy is manifested in a variety of activities that support cooperation with other countries, such as conducting joint exercises, exchanging military members, and participating in multilateral activities. The third role is the role of the police, namely the role of the Navy which is held in peaceful conditions in the form of activities to safeguard national waters, law enforcement at sea, and the implementation of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) (Mustari et al., 2018)

According to Hidayat (2015), the threats that often arise in peaceful conditions are non-military threats. Therefore, the role of Indonesian Navy that needs to be developed is the police role, especially in the form of MOTW. This role is carried out with the aim of supporting the government in overcoming domestic crises, including poverty, hunger, health crises and so on. In order for the implementation of the role of the police in the form of MOTW to be optimal, it requires the completeness and adequacy of the Indonesian Navy's defense equipment, including in terms of the availability of Hospital Auxiliary Vessel (HAV).

However, it is known that currently the number of HAV owned by the Indonesian Navy is only three units consisting of KRI dr. Soeharso (SHS) -990, KRI Semarang-594, and KRI dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991. According to President Joko Widodo's statement as conveyed by representatives of PT PAL Indonesia as the maker of the KRI Semarang-594 and KRI Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991, the number is still very small and Indonesia needs at least five more HAVs (Dewanti, 2019). According to the Indonesian Navy's point of view, TNI Major General M. Sabrar Fadhilah, who served as the Head of the Indonesian Navy Information Center in 2018, stated that in theory there is no clear reference regarding the ideal number of HAV for Indonesia which has a very large water area. However, at least, Indonesia must have 10 HAV in order to cover this vast water area (Hadi & Persada, 2018).

The number of HAV is considered unable to reach all people living in disadvantaged, frontier and outermost areas (3T areas). In addition, it was also found that the operation of the HAV was intended for missions other than humanitarian missions and the operation targeting model still referred to data collection on the number of people who were sick and needed health service assistance, not for the purpose of prevention or health maintenance rather than treatment. (Rianto, 2017). Another problem is that the number of HAV operations so far is still very low. The following are some of the support operations and health services carried out by HAV:

Table 1: HAV Support and Service Activities

Year	No	Type of Operation	Location
2014	1	Ops Mentawai Megathrust (health services)	West Sumatera
	2	Ops SBJ LXIII/Sail Raja Ampat (health services)	West Papua
	3	Ops Bansos Bawean (health services)	East Java
2015	1	Ops Perisai Samor	Maluku and NTT
	2	Ops Social Service Banten and SAR Jakarta	Banten
	3	Ops Komodo Jaya & Jayapura (health services)	Papua and NTB
	4	Ops SBJ/LXIV & Sail Tomini (health services)	Gorontalo
	5	Ops Evacuation of South Kalimantan Haze Victims (health services)	South Kalimantan
2020	1	Ops for the evacuation of Indonesian citizens in Japan during the Covid-19 pandemic	Yokohama, Japan

Source: Journal of dr. Soeharso 990, 2020

Based on table above, it can be seen that the HAV operation only ranged from three to five times a year in the 2014-2015 period. Therefore, it can be said that the basic function as HAV in health services is still very minimal. By paying attention to the strategic environmental conditions related to geography and demography in current conditions, especially for the demands of the community for health service facilities with global standards, the problem of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the presence of military threats in the Natuna sea area, the optimization of the SDS that is urgent to be realized is in a more optimal form of HAV operation.

According to Corbett (1911), the sea can be strengthened by implementing a maritime power strategy, namely by maximizing the role of ships with the support of land forces. In accordance with this, increasing the operation of the HAV can be said to be a form of optimizing the SDS. As mentioned by Lykke (1998), that strategy formulation needs to refer to three main aspects, namely aspects of the goals to be achieved (ends), ways that can be applied to achieve these goals (ways), and the resources needed (means) to be able to take various ways to achieve goals.

Based on the overall explanation above, this research was carried out with the aim of analyzing and explaining the implementation of the SDS through the current HAV operation and analyzing and formulating the optimization of the SDS with the operation of the HAV in order to support national defense. The results obtained from this research

are expected to provide useful input for the development of SDS knowledge, especially those related to the operation of the HAV in supporting the optimization of SDS.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Strategy Theory

Definition of strategy according to Salusu (1996) is a decision pattern that is used with reference to the goals and objectives to be achieved, which is the basis for the emergence of various policies and plans in order to achieve these goals and objectives. Strategy has a scope that is used as a reference in determining and implementing various planned and targeted actions.

According to another point of view, Tangkilisan (2005) states that strategy is a form of reaction or response that an organization or institution has to face various challenges and demands that arise as a result of changes in the surrounding factors. The reaction or response is very important because it determines the success or failure of the organization to survive and thrive in the midst of changing environmental conditions. The right response will be a solid foundation for the growth of organizational strength. Conversely, if the response is not in accordance with the existing challenges or demands, the related organizations or institutions will be vulnerable to failure and destruction.

The formation of responses or reactions that are owned by organizations or institutions or government agencies is generally based on various factors that become the strength of the entity. Empowerment of all aspects of strength can be carried out effectively and efficiently if the parties who become the brain of the organization have superior abilities in formulating and planning strategy implementation, and coordinating strategies to all elements of the organization in order to create harmonious cooperation in the process of implementing the strategy (Tangkilisan, 2005).

Etymologically, strategy comes from the Greek "strategos" which is a combination of the words "stratos" (military) and "ag" (to lead), so that the word strategos can be interpreted as leadership, or various things that leaders do to achieve victory. in war. Based on this understanding, it can be seen that the term strategy is basically a term that is synonymous with the military world (Yunus, 2016).

In the military realm, the notion of strategy is explained by Lykke (1998) as "*the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.*" According to this definition, military strategy is a form of exploiting the power of the state to ensure that the stated goals can be achieved, so that the interests of the state can be fulfilled.

Strategy has three main components, namely the goals to be achieved (ends), actions or methods used to achieve goals (ways), and instruments that can be used to achieve goals (means). The strategic concept can be used as the basis for the formulation of military strategies, as well as strategies in other important fields (Lykke, 1998).

2.2 Optimization

Optimization is defined as an effort carried out with the aim of ensuring that the implementation of a plan can achieve all the objectives set and can minimize the impact of losses that may be caused during the process (Pratama, 2013). Based on this understanding, it can be concluded that optimization is a process of activity to improve and optimize a job to be more / fully perfect, functional, or more effective and to find the best solution of several problems in order to achieve the best possible goal according to certain criteria.

2.3 Policy Implementation

Public policy in the defense sector is an important factor that plays a role in the development of the national defense force. Policies can generate optimal benefits if implemented appropriately, by considering and fulfilling various factors that influence the implementation process. According to Prakoso (2016), those factors consist of Integrative, Interactive, Transparency, Controlling and Accountability (IITCA).

The first factor, namely integrative, is related to the need for integration between government agencies with an interest and a role in national defense development. The institution consists of the Ministry of Defense, TNI, ministries and other institutions, as well as various other defense components as stated in the 1945 Constitution article 30 regarding the rights and obligations of every citizen in an effort to defend the state.

The second factor, namely interactive, is a determining factor for the effectiveness of policy implementation. In accordance with Edward III's (1980) policy implementation model, policy implementation requires an interactive communication process, allowing the delivery of various important information between the parties implementing the policy. Interactive communication can also minimize rejection that occurs for policies that are implemented because of a complete understanding of the objectives to be achieved from the policy.

The third factor, namely transparency, is a factor related to the openness of the content and policy objectives to the public. This factor is very important to build public trust in the country and in the defense policy implemented. With transparency, the community can fulfill their need to be able to oversee the state. In general, transparency is concerned with planning, formulating and executing budgets.

The fourth factor, namely controlling, is a factor that determines the suitability between implementation and the policy plan. With supervision, various errors that occur during the implementation process can be detected immediately and the most appropriate solutions can be found, so that policy implementation can continue in a direction that is in accordance with the objectives to be achieved.

The last factor, namely accountability, is a factor that forms the main form of public trust in policies and institutions that are authorized to formulate and implement these policies. Accountability is the result of the implementation of responsibility, which can be achieved in line with the fulfillment of community needs for the benefits of all activities of government institutions carried out in the public interest. Accountability can be formed through the implementation of open outreach to the public who are the party that mandates government agencies in the defense force development process through the implementation of public policies in the defense sector.

Apart from referring to the factors above, the successful implementation of a policy also depends on public participation as the main stakeholder in public policy. Policy implementation, which is generally in the form of implementing programs compiled in accordance with the content of the policy, requires harmonious cooperation between policy implementers and the community so that policy goals and objectives can be achieved (Sunarti, 2016)

3. Research Methodology

This research is conducted using a phenomenological qualitative approach. The research was carried out at the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian Navy Headquarters, Komando Fleet I, KRI dr. Soeharso-990 and KRI Semarang-594.

The research data were obtained from interviews with research informants who were selected according to two criteria, namely: 1) Parties who have a deep understanding of sea defense strategies; and 2) Parties that have a direct or indirect relationship with HAV operations. Based on these criteria, the informants of this study were determined to consist of the Head of sub directorate the drafters of national defense policies Indonesian Defense Ministry, Secretary of the naval health service, directorate of health services and facilities Indonesian Health Ministry, Staff of sub-service of naval operations and training, Staff of 1st Naval Fleet, Commander of KRI dr. Soeharso-990 and Commander of KRI Semarang-594.

The results of interviews with informants were also supported by data from observations, documentation, and literature study. All of the data were analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques in five stages, namely data analysis, data reduction, data categorization, data validity, and data interpretation.

4. Result and Discussion

4.1 Overview of Hospital Auxiliary Vessels

Since January 7, 2021, Indonesia has had three HAV, namely KRI dr. Soeharso-990, KRI Semarang-594, and KRI dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991. The three HAV became the operational fleet of the Indonesian Navy which functioned both during war and peacetime. Operations during wartime are aimed at providing assistance to victims of war, while operations during peacetime are aimed at humanitarian missions, disaster management, and for certain other situations.

Indonesia's first HAV, namely KRI dr Soeharso-990, was designated as HAV on August 24, 2007 with reference to the Decree of the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy (Kasal) Number Skep / 1100 / VIII / 2007. The function of KRI dr. Soeharso-990 is as a HAV with the ability as a level II hospital which is part of the Indonesian Eastern Region Fleet Command (Koarmada II) in the supporting forces. (Susdarwono, 2019).

The second HAV is KRI Semarang-594. The HAV was handed over from PT PAL Indonesia as the maker to the Indonesian Navy at the Ujung Koarmada II Pier in Surabaya on January 21, 2019. KRI Semarang-594 which is the Makassar Class LPD is a fleet that strengthens Koarmada I under the Amphibious Ship Unit with the main function of supporting the military material distribution process and also as HAV.

The third HAV owned by Indonesia is KRI Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991. Like KRI Semarang-594, KRI Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991 is a product of PT PAL Indonesia and handed over to the Indonesian Navy on January 7, 2021.

4.2 Implementation of Sea Defense Strategy through Operation of Hospital Auxiliary Vessel

The conceptual framework that becomes the analysis reference for the implementation of SDS in this study is the IITCA model proposed by Prakoso (2016), which states that there are five important factors that influence the implementation process, namely Integrative, Interactive, Transparency, Controlling and Accountability factors..

In the first factor, namely Integrative, the informants stated that the operation of HAV was the result of an agreement between the parties concerned. The Indonesian Navy is the organizer that operates the HAV according to the needs or requests of the Ministry that proposed the operation of the HAV. In practice, for example in a humanitarian mission in 2016 which was a collaboration between the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian Navy for the operation of KRI dr Soeharso to Timor Leste (Hermawan, 2016). Furthermore, on the KRI mission of Dr. Soheraso in picking up Indonesian citizens who were crew members of the Diamond Princess and World Dream cruise ships, the Indonesian Navy collaborated with the Ministry of Health to establish procedures for handling Indonesian citizens who are indicated to be affected by Covid-19 (Firman Mawero dan Anries Tanu Radena, 2020).

Regarding the second factor, namely interactive, the Indonesian Navy and related Ministries with an interest in the operational mission of HAV continue to carry out intense and interactive communication in order to fulfill mission needs and ensure that the realization of the mission is in accordance with the predetermined plan. Although in the interaction process it was said that there were no significant obstacles, in practice there were problems that caused the operation time to swell and exceed the plan. The root cause of the problem is the limited number of HAV used and in terms of the competence of the crew, so that the implementation of activities cannot be on time according to schedule. This can be overcome by determining a sufficient operational time span by considering the possibility of additional operating time that may occur, of course, must still refer to the target time and budget provided for

the mission to be carried out. In addition, in early January 2021 the KRI Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo-991 was inaugurated as the third HAV fleet, so it is hoped that the addition of the new HAV unit can overcome the problem of the existing HAV shortcomings.

Regarding the third factor, namely transparency, especially transparency regarding the HAV operating budget, so far there have never been any problems that stem from the lack of transparency in the HAV operating budget. This is the result of intense and interactive communication regarding the issue, as well as the existence of trust between interested parties, namely between the Indonesian Navy and related Ministries.

The fourth factor that affects the implementation of SDS in the form of HAV operations is controlling the operation of HAV on each mission. In accordance with the opinion of the research informants, it can be seen that the control of the HAV operation is in the hands of fleet command and the Headquarters of the supervision to ensure that every mission carried out by HAV succeeds in achieving its goals effectively and efficiently (interview Muhammad Taufik, 2021). In accordance with the success of the implementation of the various HAV missions as previously explained, it can be said that there are no fundamental problems related to control factors. In that sense, all the objectives of the mission carried out by HAV can be achieved properly. However, it is necessary to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the process in order to avoid increasing the operational time of the HAV because it can lead to an increase in the budget and not meeting other HAV operating targets.

Furthermore, it relates to the last factor, namely accountability, or the responsibility of all parties involved in the operation of HAV. In accordance with the opinions of the informants, it can be seen that there are no problems related to the accountability of parties related to the operation of HAV. Both the Navy as the organizer and the relevant Ministries as the determinants of the mission carried out in the operation of the HAV have carried out their respective responsibilities well. This can be seen in the fulfillment of the material and personnel of the HAV crews. The Indonesian Navy provides for the HAV crew, while the Ministry of Health determines medical personnel to provide health services. Likewise with the Ministry of Defense which coordinates with friendly countries which are the targets of cross-border humanitarian missions. The implementation of the responsibilities of each of these parties is the main basis for the successful operation of the HAV which is part of the Indonesian SDS.

Apart from the need to pay attention to the five factors according to the IITCA concept developed by Prakoso (2016), there are actually other important factors that need to be considered as their influence on the policy implementation process of the SDS, namely the affordability factor or the ability of the Indonesian Navy to make purchases of various resources or facilitate the entire implementation process.

The affordability factor can be said to be a determinant of the smooth implementation process because without the ability to meet the various resource needs needed in implementation, the implementation objectives will be difficult to achieve. Integration, interactivity, transparency, control and accountability do have a major influence on the implementation of SDS through the operation of HAV. However, all of these factors ultimately depend on the affordability factor of the Indonesian Navy which refers to the availability of the defense budget set by the government.

4.3 Optimization of Sea Defense Strategy through Operation of Hospital Auxiliary Vessels

Basically, the implementation of the SDS by operating the HAV can be carried out quite well, which can be seen in the achievement of several goals and objectives of each mission carried out. This can also be seen from the lack of problems stemming from the main factors affecting the implementation process, both in terms of integration between related parties, established communication, budget transparency, controlling the HAV operation process, as well as the accountability of all parties interested in operating HAV. However, in accordance with the conditions of Indonesia's maritime security which still cannot be said to be safe and stable due to the various real threats faced, it is necessary to optimize the SDS which in the context of this research is specified with the operation of the HAV.

The strategy formulated to optimize SDS used in this study refers to the three components of the strategy proposed by Lykke (1998), namely the goals to be achieved (ends), methods or ways that can be applied to achieve these goals (ways), and resources required (means) to achieve the goal. These three components are interrelated with one another in forming a strategy that is directed, applicable, and rational in nature.

In relation to the first component, namely the ends (objectives) of the SDS optimization strategy, the informants stated several proposed objectives for the operation of the HAV. First, optimization can be done by ensuring that the operational objectives of the HAV have actually facilitated the entire scope of objectives as stipulated in the Technical Guidelines for Hospital Assistance Ship Support, which is linked to the Decree of the Chief of Staff of the Navy Number: Kep / 2 / II / 2006 concerning The Strategic Policy of the Chief of Navy Staff in Realizing the Posture of the Indonesian Navy until 2024, and integrated with the support for 14 TNI duties in MOOTW as stipulated in Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning TNI.

Regarding the development of its objectives, HAV in addition to carrying out humanitarian missions in the form of providing health services to people in remote and outermost islands of Indonesia, can also carry out a mission of strengthening the commitment to defend the state from the community which is a national resource in the universal defense system. In addition, the intense interaction between the HAV crew and the community in the target area can also be used to gather important information that is useful for increasing awareness of the efforts of foreign parties who try to enter or interfere with state sovereignty in the border area.

In addition, it can also be developed through the establishment of a routine operating schedule by considering the target area according to the level of need for medical services and the need for gathering important information related to the activities of foreign parties in Indonesia's maritime border areas. HAV operation with reference to this goal will be able to strengthen sea defense in terms of information and increase the commitment of coastal communities to participate in efforts to defend the country.

Furthermore, in relation to the second strategy component, namely the ways of the strategy to optimize the SDS with the operation of the HAV, the informants stated that the method for being able to achieve the various objectives set out to optimize the SDS was that the Indonesian Navy proposed to the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia to add new HAV units for increasing the ability of assistance support, proposing an increase in the number of human resources, in this case the HAV crew, and striving to improve the competence of the HAV crew (interview with Muhammad Taufik, 2021), as well as analyzing potential non-military threats for prevention and response by empowering the main components consisting of Ministries and other non-military institutions, as well as all national resources (community) which are classified as other elements of state defense from non-military threats (interview Sugeng Suryanto).

Furthermore, with regard to the third strategy component, namely the means or resources needed to achieve the objectives of the strategy to optimize SDS with the operation of HAV, the informants mentioned the determination of their own units or departments that are a permanent part of the HAV for the provision of health services; the appointment of a permanent man for HAV; as well as determining a budget in accordance with the operational needs of the HAV. These various resources need to be provided in sufficient quantity and quality as needed in order to optimize SDS by operating the HAV.

In terms of adding resources, it is very important to pay attention to the affordability aspects of these resources. Affordability comes from the word affordable, which means it can be purchased because of its affordable price. Thus, affordability means the nature of something that is possible to buy because of its affordability. A thing is said to be affordable to buy after a comparison between price and purchasing power is made, so that affordability and purchasing power are two things that cannot be separated (Jauhari & Manaf, 2014).

In the context of this research, the affordability aspect of various types of resources that need to be procured in order to optimize the SDS through the operation of the HAV needs to refer to the purchasing power of the Indonesian Navy and the defense budget set by the government. The analysis of the suitability between

affordability and purchasing power of the Indonesian Navy can refer to the concept of Military Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) proposed by Melese et al. (2018).

Based on the discussion that has been done regarding the optimization of the SDS with the operation of the HAV in order to support national defense, a common thread that connects this optimization strategy with one of the strategies in the MDSN, namely the Sea Control Strategy can be drawn. According to Mustari et al. (2018), the Sea Control Strategy is a strategy to ensure the use of the sea for Indonesia's national interests and prevent other parties / opponents from using the sea for their interests. As an implication, the value of sea control is to allow one's own use of the sea to protect resources in peacetime and prevent other parties / enemies from using the sea for their own interests. The application of the sea control strategy is carried out in accordance with the comparison of the relative strength with the opponent's strength, time and place limitations, and the objectives of the sea control itself. Operationally, sea control can be carried out offensively or defensively through various tactical actions in joint operations that use components of TNI forces in an integrated manner.

Through an emphasis on sea control strategies, strategy optimization is manifested in the implementation of the MOTW which aims to increase support from Indonesian people living in remote and outermost areas for efforts to safeguard the country's sovereignty. This can be achieved by carrying out regular interaction and guidance to communities in the region as part of a humanitarian mission in terms of providing health facilities.

In practice, as an activity in a sea control strategy, the higher the intention and efforts to defend the state from people living in outermost and remote areas, the output obtained from the implementation of the HAV mission is in the form of more information that can be collected for monitoring needs of border areas. The more surveillance is carried out based on information obtained from the communities around the border, the higher the achievement of efforts to uphold state sovereignty in the form of guaranteeing the use of the sea for national interests and preventing foreign parties from using the sea for their own interests.

Optimization of SDS through the operation of the HAV proposed by researchers still refers to the provisions in Article 22 of the Geneva Convention II of 1949 and Article 1 of the Hague Convention (X) 1907. Efforts to collect information and increase community commitment in coastal and outer areas are purely for the purpose of national defense development and carried out in peaceful conditions. This should be distinguished from the use of medical vessels for spying and military advantage as prohibited in Article 22 of the Geneva Convention II of 1949 and Article 1 of the Hague Convention (X) 1907.

5. Conclusion

Conclusions that can be drawn based on the discussions that have been carried out are as follows:

1. The implementation of the SDS through the operation of the HAV in order to support national defense in accordance with the IITCA policy implementation model was carried out quite well, but was still not optimal because there were several obstacles that were found. These constraints consisted of the insufficient number of HAV; readiness as well as the quantity of its crew. In addition, HAV operations are still carried out with reference to situational requests or needs from other Ministries (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense), and do not yet have regular schedules or regular programs for humanitarian missions and health services to communities in coastal and outermost areas.
2. Optimizing SDS through the operation of HAV in order to support national defense proposed by researchers is to focus on the Sea Control Strategy. The strategy is structured based on an analysis of the three components of the strategy, namely ends, ways and means.

Suggestions that can be submitted based on the research conclusions are as follows:

1. The Ministry of Defense needs to make efforts to increase the number of HAV units to reach the ideal number needed by Indonesia. The addition of HAV units can be considered in terms of the affordability of the units produced by PT PAL Indonesia which are compared with the benefits that can be obtained from the addition of these units, both benefits for improving national defense and other benefits that can be felt directly by the community..

2. The Indonesian Navy, which plays a direct role in the operation of the HAV, needs to have a definite concept in determining the ideal number of HAV needs and how long it will take to fulfill the HAV needs in accordance with the state defense budget capacity, and prepare the formulation and establishment of a more effective HAV operational Technical Manual.
3. The integration between the Ministry of Health and the Indonesian Navy is the basis for the current operation of the HAV. Therefore, the Ministry of Health needs to improve coordination with the Indonesian Navy, especially regarding the making of regular schedules or fixed programs every year using HAV. This is needed so that the nature of the HAV operation is no longer situational, but rather an activity that is routinely carried out as part of the national defense system.

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Implementation of Defense Policy Against Threats for Securing International Shipping Lanes in the Sunda Strait

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Abstract

The Sunda Strait is one of the areas in the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel (ALKI) I. The flow of this voyage is used for international interests. Facing the factual and potential threats that occur today, the Sunda Strait waters has an important role for international interest, particularly in Indonesia, since the position of its capital city is relatively close. This study is using a qualitative descriptive method of phenomenology and using the theory of George Edward III. The results of the study indicate that the variable communication between related entities shows that it still needs to be optimized since it is still not integrated. In the variable resources of each entity related to the security of the Sunda Strait are still have many limitations, particularly in budgetary resources that are related to the availability of other resources. The disposition variable is still found by persons related to the attitude of the executor who makes the obstacle an opportunity to do negative things, and in the variable structure of the bureaucracy, opportunities are still found to optimize the security of the international shipping channel in the Sunda Strait.

Keywords: ALKI I, International Shipping Channel, Sea Defense Strategy, Sunda Strait

1. Introduction

Indonesia as an archipelagic country that has a vast sea area has the advantage of having extraordinary natural resources, as well as a large potential threat, the potential threat in the Indonesian sea is one of Indonesia's five biggest threats at this time, as stated by Marshal TNI Hadi when carry out feasibility tests as TNI Commander. The consequence of having a vast sea area, the state must be able to protect the region from factual threats and potential ones, Marshal TNI Hadi said that "Vulnerability in the sea as an archipelagic country, Indonesia is responsible for safety and security in the sea area which is the jurisdiction the free sea which borders the region" (Hadi, 2017).

The Indonesian Sea Area not only has an important meaning for Indonesia, it also has a very important meaning for the international world, because the Indonesian sea area is located in a cross position of the world which is often passed by sea transportation of other countries. One of the consequences of world recognition for Indonesia as an archipelagic country, Indonesia must create and establish several international lanes that pass through Indonesia's national jurisdiction to be used by various countries to cross the Indonesian sea (Lukman Yudho Prakoso et al., 2020).

In 1996, the Indonesian Government proposed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) regarding the establishment of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Flow (ALKI) and its branches in Indonesian waters. In accordance with Article 1 paragraph 8 of Law No. 6/1996 concerning Indonesian Waters, Islands Sea Flow is a sea channel that is passed by foreign ships or aircraft above the channel, to carry out shipping and flights in a normal way solely for continuous transit, directly, and as quickly as possible and not hindered through or above the archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas between one part of the Indonesian high seas or EEZ and in the other part of the high seas or the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (Prasetyo et al., 2019).

Each ALKI has a potential threat that is considered relevant and requires more serious coordination. Based on the author's interview with the speakers from the Sea Security Coordination Agency (Bakorkamla), each ALKI has different potential threats. The potential threat in ALKI I is related to the impact of conflict over territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, such as the use of the ALKI I region for the activities of the state army involved in maneuvering. In addition, the impact of traffic congestion in the Malacca Strait, such as the use of ALKI I areas by pirates to avoid the pursuit of Indonesian security forces and joint security forces (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) or smuggling. The impact of the centers of growth and economy of Asia and Southeast Asia in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore, such as the smuggling of illegal goods and also human trafficking, is also a potential threat in ALKI I, including the effects of the danger of natural disasters and tsunamis in the Sunda Strait, such as the threat of volcanic earthquakes / volcanic eruptions (Anak Krakatau) and the impact of Malaysia's expansionary politics, such as the possibility of claiming new territorial territories.

The factual threat that occurred in July 2017 shocked the Sunda Strait region, namely the arrest of smuggling of shabu-shabu 1 (one) ton in Banten waters (Yandhi, 2017). This shows that the existence of access to the waters of the Indonesian sea area is still very vulnerable and has the potential for warfare asymmetric threats, if only the methamphetamine is not caught can kill five million according to the Head of National Narcotics Agency Budi Waseso (Budi, 2018). After the incident, successively captured again smuggling by sea in the amount of Ton.

In this study, the place of research taken was in the Sunda Strait. One of the strongest reasons for taking place in the Sunda Strait is the position that is very close to the State Capital so that it has a very high escalation of potential threats, if the potential threat of defense that might occur in the Sunda Strait is not anticipated. The policy on national defense has been made by the Indonesian Ministry of Defense to protect all nations, but it is considered important to always be vigilant by incessantly conducting research on how the implementation of this defense policy is carried out especially in locations that have the highest potential level.

2. Problem Formulation

Based on the background above, the formulation of the problem in this study is how is the Defense Policy Implementation in the face of the threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait, to secure international shipping lanes?

3. Method and Theory

The method used in this study is descriptive qualitative, phenomenology. The informants involved were all stake holders related to law enforcement in the Sunda Strait region. The theory used to answer the research problem formulation according to George Edward III, Edward proposed four factors that play an important role in achieving successful implementation or failure of policy implementation, namely communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure factors (Edward in Widodo, 2011: 96-110).

4. Discussion

The Sunda Strait is part of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel (ALKI) I, which connects the waters of the Indian Ocean through the Karimata Strait to the South China Sea or vice versa. ALKI is a consequence of Indonesia as an archipelagic country after the Indonesian government ratified the UNCLOS 1982 International Sea Law through Republic of Indonesia Law Number 17 of 1985. Indonesia has designated three ALKIs as crossing lines of foreign ships in shipping from an open sea (ZEE) to other free seas. covers the air path above it (Buntoro, 2012: 95). The Sunda Strait is a route commonly used for international shipping. In these waters there are also crossing lines from Java Island (Merak port) to Sumatra Island (Bakauheni port), operated by the Transportation Ministry of Lake and Crossing Transportation (ASDP) (Lukman Yudo Prakoso et al., 2021).

Asymmetric warfare is a war that has a pattern that is different from the pattern of warfare that we generally know. Asymmetric warfare is carried out not militarily; mobilize troops; use defense equipment or invade a country. Asymmetric warfare is carried out non-military (without military force), even the range of war areas is wider than military warfare, and can be carried out without declaring war or deploying troops (Harris et al., 2019). Aspects that can be reached are not just military or political. More broadly Asymmetric War has the power to influence all aspects of life. The principle used in Asymmetric War is to use the minimum resources to get maximum results (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019a).

The implementation of Defense Policy in dealing with potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait is as follows:

4.1 Communication

Communication in policy implementation includes several important dimensions, namely information transformation (transmission), information clarity (clarity) and information consistency (consistency). Submission of information regarding the contents of the policy to the implementor is very important, so that the policy can be implemented properly and the main tasks can be carried out (Redita et al., 2020).

Transmission of communication / delivery regarding national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person regarding the field of transmission / communication transmission, that: the national defense policy has been understood and has been implemented and described in the programs, informed and constraints and differences in perceptions can be resolved properly, and delivered by utilizing activities formal or through official announcements (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021). Clarity of communication regarding national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait.

Implementation in the Sunda Strait of the Banten Province. Based on the research data from the interview to the informants in the field of policy content, that: the contents of the national defense policy can be understood and described in programs and actions in accordance with the fields of duties and responsibilities of each maritime implementor, implemented in sea patrol activities (Risahdi et al., 2020). Consistency regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the

dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person regarding the consistency factor of communication, that: there is consistency from each implementor in the implementation of their duties and functions that are carried out continuously in the form of programs and evaluated according to the rules and work programs of each implementor (Kurniawan et al., 2018).

4.2 Resources

Staff / executive staff resources from the parties involved in the implementation of national defense in the face of the potential threat of asymmetric warfare especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on research data from interviews to resource persons on the factors of staff / personnel implementing resources, that: there is a limited number of personnel in carrying out their main tasks and responsibilities compared to the broad scope of supervision, however the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can still be implemented. Use of personnel in the implementation of duties and functions so that they are able to always carry out improvement in the quality of human resources through education and training (Prihantoro et al., 2021).

Budget support in the implementation of the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person on the budget support factor, that: there is budget support but the budget support is insufficient and the amount is minimal, its use is optimal in carrying out the main tasks and responsibilities according to the task fields of each implementor. If there is a development of a strategic environment in accordance with the dynamics in the field, the use of the budget is adjusted to the scale of priorities (Suhirwan et al., 2020).

Information on port governance in the implementation of the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource person on the information resource factor regarding port governance, that: at present there is clarity of information and port governance. However, there are private ports that have not been included in the supervision of government port authorities, this will create vulnerability in terms of supervision, so that it can allow crime in the asymmetric field of warfare to occur there (Dipua et al., 2020).

The executive authority of the parties involved in implementing the goals, objectives and contents of the policy regarding national defense in the face of warfare asymmetric potential especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the informant on the resource authority's executor, that: there is already the authority of the main duties and responsibilities of each implementor in the maritime field and carried out in accordance with the laws and functions of each, however, there is a need for socialization and education to parties outside of each agency. The implementation of the implementation is carried out in a mutually assisting and supportive manner in preventing crime (Sartono et al., 2020).

Physical facilities or infrastructure and facilities in implementing the objectives, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on the research data from the interview to the resource persons on the field of physical facilities / infrastructure and facilities, that there are sufficient facilities and infrastructure to carry out support in the sea defense but still need additions according to the ideal needs. In the case of the Navy and lack of facilities and infrastructure, the Indonesian Navy coordinated with the implementor related to their use, so that the implementation of their respective duties and functions could be carried out properly (Ali et al., 2021).

Support of Defense and Security Equipment in implementing the goals, objectives and contents of policies regarding national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions

of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on research data from interviews with resource persons (Defense and Security Equipment Tools), that: there are limitations (Defense and Security Equipment Tools) and if there are inadequate, both in the number and ability to carry out supervision in their respective working areas. In the case of the Indonesian Navy's limitations (Defense and Security Equipment), it will coordinate with the maritime implementer with involvement (Under Operation Control) of ships from other maritime agencies and coordinate with the unit regarding support (Defense and Security Equipment Tools) for marine security operations (Kusuma et al., 2021).

4.3 Disposition

Disposition or attitude of the parties involved in implementing the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait (Hermawan et al., 2020). Based on the data from the interview research on the resource persons in the field of implementing attitudes, that: there is / the attitude of the maritime sector implementor strongly supports the implementation of the maritime defense sector and is described in the main tasks and responsibilities of each maritime implementor. Implementation in the field is carried out by coordinating with each other (Listiyono et al., 2019b).

Commitment from the parties involved in implementing the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of the sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on data from interviews with informants on the attitude factor of the implementers related to commitment, that: there is / there is a high commitment of maritime implementors to carry out tasks in the face of the threat of asymmetry warfare, which is manifested in written regulations and verbal instructions, so that implementation the main tasks and responsibilities can be carried out properly (Supriyono et al., 2019)

4.4 Bureaucratic Structure

The organizational structure in charge of implementing the policy has a significant influence on policy implementation. The aspect of organizational structure is Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and fragmentation. Organizational structures that are too long will tend to weaken supervision and lead to complex and complex bureaucratic procedures.

Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) on the implementation of the implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats, especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. Based on data from research interviews to SOP resource persons in carrying out the task of facing asymmetric warfare, that: there are SOPs for each maritime sector stakeholder in accordance with their respective areas of main duties and responsibilities, but still need shared perception so that implementation can be carried out well (Arto et al., 2019). The implementation of existing SOPs has been carried out as part of the standard in carrying out tasks, so that members in the field can know what their main tasks are and what they do (Kusuma et al., 2019).

Fragmentation (division of roles) of organizational structures implementing implementation of national defense in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. From the interview data to the resource person regarding the fragmentation factor (division of roles) of the organizational structure, that there are already roles for each maritime field implementor in accordance with their respective duties and functions outlined in the implementation instructions and supervision, the division of roles for tasks internal and external tasks carried out in stages (Sartono, Prakoso, & Suseto, 2019).

Synergy or relationship between one work unit and various other work units in the implementation of the objectives, objectives and contents of the policy on the implementation of national defense in the face of

potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait. From the interview data to the resource person regarding the synergy factor, that there has been a synergy in the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities of each of the implementers in the maritime field, although it is still running separately, this can be proven in the absence of information exchange. Others seek information on their own. Combined official forums are needed that can bring together the implementers to exchange information that can be used for the benefit of tackling asymmetric warfare in the Sunda Strait in accordance with the potential of their respective task fields and functions (Sartono, Prakoso, & Suseto, 2019).

5. Conclusions

Conclusion of Defense Policy Implementation in the face of potential asymmetric warfare threats especially in the dimensions of sea defense in the Sunda Strait to secure international shipping lanes.

5.1 *Communications*

Information transformation (transmission), has been conveyed to the implementer and has provided understanding. The implementation of the acceptance of this policy has been translated into programs and informed to the implementer through formal activities and official announcements. Clarity of information (clarity), has been clearly understood, this can be seen by the elaboration into programs and actions in accordance with the tasks and responsibilities of each maritime field holder stake. The implementation of the clarity of the acceptance of defense policy is implemented in the activities of security patrols at sea. Information consistency (consistency), the consistency of the implementation of defense policies that have been carried out continuously in the form of programs and evaluated in accordance with the fields of duties and responsibilities of each maritime sector stakeholder. The implementation of duties and functions is carried out in accordance with the regulations in each implementer and carried out continuously and continuously, if it changes according to the dynamics in the field, it will seek approval from the head office.

5.2 *Resources*

Staff or implementers, have not run effectively because there are limitations in the number of personnel in carrying out their main duties and responsibilities when compared to the extent of the coverage area that must be implemented, however the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can still be implemented. In order to improve the ability of personnel to be able to carry out their duties and functions, quality improvement is carried out through education and training. By having trained personnel, the tasks given will be completed according to the duties and functions of each implementor.

Budget support, does not work effectively because there is budget support, but the budget support is insufficient, its use is optimal in carrying out the main tasks and responsibilities according to the respective task fields of stakeholders with a scale of priorities, thus defense policy in the sea in the Sunda Strait will not work effectively in achieving goals and objectives.

Information on port governance is not effective because there is information about domestic port data that has not been integrated in the port governance information system. This condition will make the implementation of the policy ineffective because the government port authority cannot carry out supervision, so that it can enable the occurrence of crime in the asymmetric warfare field in the sea of the Sunda Strait region.

Authority, has been effective. The implementation of the implementation is outlined in the regulations. Implementation of these regulations is carried out by means of socialization and education to the implementor and to parties outside of each agency. The implementation of the duties and functions of each implementor is carried out based on the rules of each implementor, in the event of problems in the

implementation, then each implementor will coordinate and help each other so that the crime does not occur.

Facilities or Infrastructure facilities, not yet effective, because there are still a lack of facilities and infrastructure, for additions it becomes a problem itself with limited budget support. In the case of one implementor does not have the facilities and infrastructure so that coordination between implementors is carried out by carrying out loans, so that the duties and functions of the implementor can be carried out properly.

Alpalhankam support, there is a shortage of defense and security and if there is inadequate both the number and ability to carry out supervision in their respective working areas. In the case if Indonesia Navy lacking Alpalhankam, it will coordinate with maritime implementers by involving BKO ships from other maritime agencies as well as coordinating with the top unit regarding al-Khalam support for Sea Security operations.

5.3 Disposition

The attitude, the attitude of the implementers of the policy has been effective, because the implementor strongly supports defense policies in the Sunda Strait sea, this is a good attitude for the implementor. For the success of the implementation, the implementation is carried out by copying the coordination in accordance with the respective task areas and functions.

Commitment, there is a high commitment from the implementor in carrying out their respective duties and functions. The implementation of this commitment is in the form of written regulations and verbal instructions, so that the implementation of the main tasks and responsibilities can be carried out properly.

5.4 Organizational Structure

SOP, that there is already an SOP for each implementor as a guide for all members in carrying out their duties and functions in the field. The implementation of this SOP is to achieve the implementation of defense policy so that its implementation can be carried out properly.

Organizational structure, that the organizational structure of each implementor is flexible in carrying out their duties and functions. The implementation of this activity is that it can be implemented to adjust the SOP in accordance with the development of the dynamics in the field, the SOP conformers are requested to approve the head office.

The synergy between one work unit and various other work units, is that there is no optimal synergy, because the implementation of defense policy is still running on its own, so that there is no information sharing implemented, the acquisition of information is obtained individually. Given the importance of information in the implementation of the duties and functions of defense policy, a joint forum is needed which is used as a meeting place for implementors in terms of exchanging information to carry out tasks on each implementor.

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Natural Resources, Property Rights, and the Domestic Logic of BIT Signing

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Abstract

In contrast to the substantial scholarship on whether bilateral investment treaties (BITs) increase foreign direct investment (FDI), there is less work on what drives governments to sign these treaties in the first place. I develop a theory of treaty signing that emphasizes the domestic factors that motivate a government to sign BITs. Using a panel dataset of developing countries from 1960 to 2010, I find that governments scarce in natural resources are more likely to sign BITs compared to their richer counterparts. In addition, governments with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs compared to those with low or high levels. Finally, the most likely BIT signers are resource-scarce countries with middle levels of property rights. That strategic dynamics exist in BIT signing has implications for assessing the effects of these treaties in other issue areas such as trade, human rights, and the environment.

Keywords: Natural Resources, Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, Bilateral Investment Treaty

1. Introduction

Of the key developments in the latter half of the twentieth century, the surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, from approximately US\$45 billion at the beginning of the 1980s to over US\$1.5 trillion in 2010, is perhaps the most evident. Unlike world trade, there is no international institution governing FDI. In its stead lies a network of international investment agreements (IIAs) that began with the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between West Germany and Pakistan in 1959. At the end of 2013, there were 6,092 international investment agreements (IIAs), with BITs constituting almost half of all agreements across 176 countries (World Investment Report 2014).

BITs are legal agreements signed between states to protect and promote FDI. For the capital importing (or host) country, the primary purpose of BITs is to attract FDI. For the capital-exporting (or home) country, BITs help safeguard investments made in the host country. BITs are thus regarded as instruments that developing country governments can use to enhance the credibility of their commitment to the proper treatment of FDI.

An extensive literature accompanies this rise in BITs, the bulk of which focus on whether these treaties fulfill their intended purpose of attracting FDI (UNCTAD 1998, Neumayer and Spess 2005, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Büthe and Milner 2009). Unfortunately, this research remains inconclusive. Some find that BITs result in increased FDI inflows (Salacuse and Sullivan 2005, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2006, Büthe and Milner 2009), but others find that these treaties have little to no effect on FDI at all (Hallward-Driemeier 2003, Gallagher and Birch 2006, Yackee 2007). Some attribute the lack of consensus to the different research designs and estimation approaches of each study. Methodological concerns aside, there is another question: What determines BIT signing in the first place? There is substantial variation in the number of BITs—signed and ratified—across time and space, yet few studies explicitly examine the determinants of BITs signing. The few that do emphasize a policy diffusion logic typical in the literature on international institutions (Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006, Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield 2011). While diffusion and competitive dynamics certainly play a role in BIT signing, these explanations paint only a partial picture of the BIT landscape. That is, these arguments may shed light on the general rate of BIT signing in response to global FDI or recognition of BIT costs, but are unable to adequately explain cross-country variation in BIT signing.

Since BITs entail costs, I argue that governments negotiate and sign these agreements only if they want capital that they cannot obtain otherwise. I show that governments scarce in natural resources such as petroleum, minerals, and natural gas are more likely to sign BITs compared to their richer counterparts. In addition, governments with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs than those with weak or strong property rights. Using a panel dataset of all developing countries from 1960 to 2010, I find that all else equal, resource-rich countries are less likely to sign a BIT. I also find that a country is more likely to sign a BIT as its property rights improves. However, this effect is non-linear: countries with low and high levels of property rights are less likely to sign a BIT. Finally, the most likely BIT signers are resource-scarce countries with middle levels of property rights.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I develop a theory of BIT formation that rests on a government's motivations and incentives in response to domestic political and economic conditions. This focus on the domestic factors that underlie BIT signing differs from existing work on BIT formation, which, as Milner (2014) notes, tends to draw from theories on “diffusion, power politics, and the rational design of institutions.” Second, if BIT signing is a product of strategic government decisions, then empirical analyses must account for this selection process in assessing whether BITs work. Finally, refocusing attention on the domestic factors that motivate governments to turn to international institutions has implications for scholars seeking to explain the variation in and effects of treaties across issue areas, such as trade, human rights, and the environment.

2. BITs in A Time of Plenty

In this era of mobile and plentiful capital, many countries want a share of foreign direct investment (FDI), and compete for the attention of multinational firms. FDI is a cross-border investment by an entity (typically referred to as a “multinational enterprise/corporation” or “direct investor”) in a “home” country with the goal of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (called the “foreign affiliate”) situated in a “host” country other than that of the direct investor.¹ Scholars and policymakers alike have shifted from a discussion of *whether* countries should attract FDI to *how* countries can attract FDI. FDI has the potential to promote economic growth, increase worker and firm productivity, generate positive spillover effects through technology and knowledge transfers, and contribute to long-run economic development (Markusen and Vernables 1999, Baldwin, Braconier and Forslid 2005, Jensen 2003, Jensen 2008, Biglaiser and Staats 2010). In addition, the relatively long-term nature of FDI makes it more stabilizing than other sources of capital—such as portfolio investment, foreign aid, multilateral

¹ Lasting interest implies management control over the foreign affiliate and consequently, a long-term relationship between a direct investor and a foreign affiliate. That is, the direct investor actively participates in managing the foreign affiliate, unlike the portfolio or indirect investor, who in contrast, profits passively from purchasing and holding a firm's stock. FDI is typically measured in terms of inflows or stocks. Inflows refer to the capital a foreign investor provides to a foreign affiliate, e.g. loans, equity, or reinvestment earnings, whereas stocks are the total value of foreign-owned assets at a given time.

finance, remittances, and private financial institution loans—since multinational firms generally have long time horizons and make investment decisions accordingly.²

At the same time, governments that seek to harness the promise of FDI face a time-inconsistency problem. Unlike other capital flows, FDI is vulnerable to a “hold-up” problem. Prior to investment, the firm holds most of the bargaining power—since it has yet to invest its mobile capital, it can pick and choose between alternative locations, i.e. it has outside options. Once investment is made, however, relative bargaining power shifts to the host country, as the firm’s assets are now immobile and not easily withdrawn, i.e. the firm is no longer able to credibly threaten exit. This generates incentives for the host government to impose additional conditions on the firm ex-post, from altering tax policy to outright expropriation. Consequently, multinational firms are cautious ex-ante, and—given the risks and challenges of ascertaining a host government’s long-term commitment to the proper treatment of their assets—may refrain from investing, leaving both the firm and host government worse off.

A crucial determinant of FDI is therefore a host country’s domestic environment. Some argue that the relative absence of constraints in authoritarian regimes makes them more attractive to foreign firms, since authoritarian leaders are better able to pass policies favorable to investment but which may be unpopular with constituents, such as undermining labor laws or environmental regulations, suppressing labor unions, and lowering capital taxes. In addition, unlike democratic leaders, who are accountable to a large electoral constituency, authoritarian leaders are more insulated from societal demands, and can more easily enact reforms if necessary (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). Consequently, for some multinational firms, authoritarian regimes provide a more favorable investment climate compared to democracies (O’Donnell 1988, Huntington 1975, Li and Resnick 2003).

Others contend that democratic regimes are more attractive to foreign investors. In democracies, popular representation, a free press, and a relatively transparent decision-making process facilitate information flows. The electoral mechanism disciplines policymakers, thereby increasing policy credibility through audience costs (Fearon 1995), and the existence of multiple checks and balances ensures a stable policy environment (Lipset 1960, Olson 1993, Tsebelis 1995, 2002, Jensen 2003). Democratic leaders also have longer time horizons and will therefore refrain from taking actions detrimental to investment (Jensen 2003, Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006).

International explanations focus on the effects of international investment agreements (IIAs) but empirical support remains mixed. A cross-sectional analysis of data from 1995 on 133 countries and 200 BITs by UNCTAD (1998) reveals a weak positive correlation between the presence of a treaty and an increase in FDI. Using dyadic data on FDI flows from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries from 1980 to 2000, Hallward-Driemeier (2003) finds little evidence of a positive relationship between BITs and increases in FDI flows. Using a cross-sectional dataset, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) find that while BITs signed with the US do increase FDI inflows, BITs signed with other OECD countries have no effect.

Neumayer and Spess (2005) argue that dyadic models do not account for the possibility that BITs may attract more FDI from non-signatory countries and underestimate the FDI-attracting power of these treaties. Using a monadic approach on 119 developing countries from 1970 to 2000, they find that the greater the number of BITs signed by a host country, a more FDI the country receives. Similarly, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) find that the effects of BITs on FDI depends on the level of political risk—a greater number of BITs increases the amount of FDI a host country receives only at low levels of risk but lowers FDI at high levels of risk. Finally, Büthe and Milner (2009) examine FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP among non-OECD countries and find a positive relationship between BITs and FDI inflows.

² As Busse and Hefeker (2005) note, “Short-term credits and portfolio investment run the risk of sudden reversal if the economic environment or just the perception of investors change, giving rise to financial and economic crises.”

This discussion suggests that governments use two main strategies to attract foreign investors: (1) domestic reform, and (2) international institutions. Domestic reforms such as strengthening the rule of law, improving property rights, and reducing corruption require costly effort on the part of leaders. What is more, the benefits of these reforms take time to realize, and there is no guarantee of success; domestic reform is a long-term strategy that entails significant political costs at some risk. Hence in the short-term, turning to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), bilateral tax treaties (BTTs) and, to a lesser extent, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with investment clauses, may help governments signal and make credible their commitment to protecting FDI. The rapid rise in the number of these agreements since the 1970s is suggestive of the popularity of this second strategy.

2.1. BIT Formation as Policy Diffusion

Much of the extant literature on BITs investigates the extent to which BITs affect FDI inflows. Fewer studies explain the differences in BIT signing across time and space and more importantly, deal with this potential selection problem in their analyses of these treaties on FDI. BITs are essentially assumed to arise spontaneously and treated as exogenous in empirical analyses.³ Yet Figure 1 shows significant variation in the number of BITs over time between democracies and non-democracies, and within each regime type.




Figure 1: Total number of BITs by regime type, 1960–2010

The white horizontal line in each boxplot indicates the median number of BITs in a specific year; the dots indicate outliers where the number of BITs is greater than the 75th percentile value plus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range (IQR). The IQR is the difference between the 75th and 25th percentile number of BITs.

Sources: The total number of BITs are from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Countries with a Polity scores of six and above are democracies; non-democracies are those with Polity scores below six.

Two studies do explicitly examine why countries sign BITs. Drawing from the literature on policy learning and diffusion (see Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006), Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) propose a competitive theory of BIT diffusion premised on the assumption that “BITs give host governments a competitive edge in attracting capital...” (p. 823). They argue that the proliferation of BITs resembles the spread of neoliberal policies in international relations. In particular, the rise of BITs is a consequence of increasing competition among developing host countries for FDI. Competition is especially fierce, and thus a BIT most likely, among host

³ Rosendorff and Shin (2012) raise a similar point

countries that: (1) are substitutable investment locations, (2) have specific industry sectors, (3) lack credibility because of weak property rights, and (4) as the global pool of FDI increases.

Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield (2011) argue that the policy diffusion argument does not apply wholesale to the trajectory and scope of BIT signing. Rather, they contend that BIT signing occurred in three distinct temporal waves. Only the second wave, beginning in the late 1980s, is suggestive of policy diffusion or a norm cascade à la Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006). During this period, the rate of BIT signing grew much faster, from less than 20 in the earlier (first) wave to an average of over 100 per year (Jandhyala, Henisz, and Mansfield 2011). BITs signed in the initial wave were attempts by host governments to credibly commit to protecting FDI. Finally, the third wave, in which the current BIT regime resides, is characterized by lower signing rates as countries become more aware of the costs associated with BITs in the form of increased investor-state disputes.

3. A Domestic Theory of BIT Signing

Most studies on BITs begin with the premise that all countries want FDI and sign BITs to enhance their attractiveness to investors. These studies therefore focus mainly on assessing whether BITs increase FDI inflows and pay relatively little attention to the determinants of BIT signing. Such an assumption, however, is questionable. As Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006) indicate, BITs involve a variety of costs: diplomatic, sovereignty, arbitration, and reputational costs. Diplomatic costs arise in the direct negotiations between countries on investment related policies. A government incurs sovereignty costs when it signs a BIT, which may include domestic policy reforms. Most important, however, are the costs associated with delegating adjudicative authority; as Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2006) state, “virtually any legal change or rule that affects foreign investors is potentially subject to review by a foreign tribunal.” As such, governments are not equally likely to sign BITs.

I argue that there are two basic conditions under which a government would consider signing a BIT. First, the government must need foreign capital. A government already receiving substantial amounts of FDI without having BITs has little incentive to spend the time and effort to negotiate and sign a BIT, as evidenced by the almost complete lack of BITs between the industrialized democracies. As Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006:843) state, “Most governments would prefer to avoid the explicit commitments contained in these treaties; there continue to be few concluded between the wealthiest countries of the world.” As such, a necessary condition for BIT signing is a need for FDI. Second, even if a government needs FDI, it must have trouble obtaining the investment by existing means. In short, governments sign BITs because they need FDI and are unable to obtain FDI due to existing domestic credibility problems.

Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) trace the development of political institutions and their subsequent impact on long-run economic growth to a country’s initial factor endowments and the incentives these created for European imperialists. Colonies endowed with sun, fertile soil, and an unsuspecting pool of indigenous labor—ripe for the cultivation of labor-intensive crops such as sugar cane and coffee—were forced on a brutal path of development. The imperialists established large-scale plantations to exploit these colonies and imported slaves from West Africa to supplement and replace indigenous labor. Colonies rich in mineral deposits and native labor suffered a similar fate. These production methods resulted in high levels of inequality in wealth and human capital, and the elites who ruled these colonies established institutions that reinforced their political and economic dominance. The long-run consequences were stagnant living standards, weak property rights, a lack of suffrage, and dismal growth.

Colonies less endowed with sun, soil, and labor—conditions appropriate for grain agriculture—experienced a more benign mode of development. In these colonies, a relatively equal distribution of wealth and human capital emerged, and coupled with a higher degree of homogeneity in the population, the elites who found themselves here had little choice but to create representative institutions that shared political power, which established a more level political and economic playing field. The long-run outcomes were rising living standards, strong property rights, universal suffrage, and sustained growth.

Factor endowments thus influence the initial mode of economic production and the development of human capital, which in turn, affect the distribution of political power. The distribution of political power subsequently shapes the types of law and policies—from property rights, labor, education, to a host of growth-related inputs—and the quality of institutions. What is more, the effects of these initial institutions may linger to the present day. Engerman and Sokoloff's (1997, 2000) historical analysis shows that a country's initial factor endowments may have a lasting impact on elite behavior and institutions. Drawing on this framework that links endowments to incentives and behavior, I consider how natural resource endowments (or the land factor) structure a leader's motivation to sign a BIT.

3.1. Natural Resource Endowments and Foreign Direct Investment

The effects of resource wealth has captivated political economists since the 1970s. Politically, resource wealth has been linked to rentierism, civil conflict and wars, authoritarian stability, democratic fragility, and poor institutions (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Humphreys 2005, Ross 2006). Economically, resource abundance is associated with poor growth and development outcomes. The pernicious impact of resource abundance on political and economic outcomes is widely and popularly known as the resource curse (Sachs and Warner 1995).

Recent work on the political economy of natural resources cast doubt on whether such a curse exists (Alexeev and Conrad 2009, Dunning 2008). This body of research examines how domestic political institutions, the global economy, and globalization may condition the effects of resource wealth (Bearce and Hutnich 2011, Kurtz and Brooks 2011, Morrison 2011). Further studies emphasize the distinction between resource wealth and resource dependence. Jensen and Johnston (2011) examine how resource abundance affects government incentives to expropriate foreign investment and uncover a positive relationship between resource wealth and expropriation risk. They argue that because natural resource-abundant economies are more attractive to the typical investor, leaders of these countries can "...choose a higher level of expropriation in a natural resource-dependent economy and attract substantially more investment than a leader in a resource poor country" (Jensen and Johnston 2011:667). In a separate study, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) find that natural resource abundance increases FDI.

Natural resources lie in a decidedly non-random fashion around the world; multinational firms have little choice but to invest in specific locations if they seek to exploit these resources, irrespective of the level of political risk. What is more, whereas the initial investment may be resource-motivated, it may help spur investment in other related sectors such as construction, finance, and services. This suggests that all else equal, resource-abundant economies will attract more FDI than resource-scarce economies. In light of the FDI that resource abundance attracts, I focus here on how resource wealth influences government incentives to sign BITs—because resource-rich countries are more attractive to foreign investors than their less endowed counterparts, the governments of these countries have less incentive to negotiate and sign a BIT. After all, if one already receives FDI without a BIT, then why would one incur the additional costs to sign one? This leads to my first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. Resource-abundant countries are less likely to sign BITs compared to resource-scarce countries.

3.2. Political Determinants

A need for foreign capital may be necessary but is not sufficient to induce BIT signing. In addition, a leader must be unable—or at the very least find it difficult—to obtain said investment without the potential benefits of a treaty. While the above discussion outlines one of the factors that reflect a country's need for FDI, the quality of domestic political institutions influences whether a country will turn to BITs in order to attract FDI.

Property rights are social institutions that specify the privileges that individuals and firms have over a fixed allocation of resources (Haggard, MacIntyre, and Tiede 2008). The secure and consistent enforcement of property rights and contracts increases the incentives for individuals to invest. In the absence of such protection and the shadow of time inconsistency, individuals can either protect their own property or reach self-enforcing bargains, both of which involve monitoring and enforcement costs that reduce and ultimately negate the gains from trade and investment. Uncertainty and asymmetric information further compound this problem. As such, the consistent application and enforcement of the rule of law allows individuals, as Ferejohn and Pasquino (2003) state, “to foresee accurately the consequences of their actions and not be subject to sudden surprises.” The lack of strong property rights—and the rule of law more generally—is a key inhibitor of investment in the developing world. Multinational investors are especially vulnerable to the problem of weak property rights since production and extraction facilities are not easily relocated in response to arbitrary policy changes.

Consequently, governments with strong property rights have little motivation to sign a BIT. Any commitment that such a government makes is ex-ante credible, and since BIT signing entails a strictly positive cost with little additional benefit, this government would prefer not to sign a treaty. At the other end, governments with weak property rights have little incentive to sign a BIT as well: First, the costs of BIT signing for such a government is prohibitively high; and second, even if such a government signs a BIT, it is unlikely that investors will perceive such a commitment as credible.⁴ The most likely candidates of BIT signing are therefore governments with “middle” levels of property rights. For these governments, the potential benefits that BITs confer in terms of FDI Outweigh the costs of signing.

Hypothesis 2. Countries with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs compared to those with low or high levels.

3.3. Natural Resources, Meet Property Rights

Thus far, I have identified two main factors—one economic, and one political—that shape the specific motivations of a government to sign BITs. My core argument, however, is that these factors jointly influence whether a government will do so. As Hypothesis 1 indicates, resource-rich countries are less likely to sign BITs irrespective of their level of property rights, all else equal. Resource-scarce countries, however, are not all equally likely to sign BITs. Since BITs are costly, a resource-scarce country is more likely to sign a BIT only if: (1) it is unable to obtain FDI due to weak property rights, and (2) its property rights regime is not so poor that investors would discount any BITs. As such, I expect that:

Hypothesis 3. Resource-scarce countries with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs than resource-scarce countries with lower or higher levels of property rights.

4. Empirical Approach

To assess my hypotheses, I use a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset that includes all developing countries from 1960–2010, with country-year as the unit of analysis. To deal with country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, I include country fixed effects in all logit regression models. To model temporal dynamics, I include a cubic polynomial following Carter and Signorino’s (2010) recommendations. Finally, I lag all explanatory and control variables by one year.

Outcome

⁴ This is not to say that such governments will not sign BITs, just that the likelihood of signing is low.

My main outcome of interest is BIT signing. I construct a binary dependent variable *BIT* coded one if a country signed a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in a given year (and zero otherwise) from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) online database.

Explanatory Variables

A primary determinant of BIT signing is the extent to which a government needs FDI, and that this need is in part a function of a country's resource endowments. Natural resources such as petroleum, natural gas, coal, and minerals are particularly attractive to foreign investors. Unlike other goods, these resource deposits are immobile—a multinational enterprise that seeks to extract these resources must invest in the location of these resources. To operationalize natural resources, I use *resource rents* as a percentage of GDP to measure the extent of a country's resource wealth. These include the rents from oil, natural gas, coal, and minerals, and are the difference between the world price and total production costs of the specific commodity (World Development Indicators 2013).⁵

To measure the extent of property rights protection, I follow established work and use contract-intensive money (*CIM*) by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson (1999). *CIM* measures the proportion of non-currency money—which is computed by subtracting the currency held outside banks (*C*) from the total money supply—relative to the total money supply (*M2*). In countries with security of contract and property rights, individuals and firms are more likely to trust financial institutions with their assets. At the same time, financial institutions are more likely to lend to these actors (Clague et al. 1999). These countries therefore have higher *CIM* scores. *CIM* ranges from zero, which indicates that no money is held in banks (poor property rights and contract enforcement), to one, where all money is held in banks (strong property rights and contract enforcement). There are two advantages of *CIM* over existing property rights measures such as the International Country Risk Guide (Political Risk Group 2011). First, the use of data from the International Monetary Fund instead of expert surveys makes *CIM* less vulnerable to arbitrary evaluations and potential biases. Second, *CIM* is available for many countries over time. To assess the non-linear effect of property rights on BIT signing, I construct a squared variable, *CIM*².

As an alternative measure—and to facilitate comparison with existing empirical work on BITs—I use data from Allee and Peinhardt (2011), who construct an index from the International Country Risk Guide (*ICRG*) that ranges from 0 to 30, where higher values indicate a greater degree of property rights protection. To facilitate model convergence, I standardize this *ICRG* variable so that it ranges from 0 to 1.

Moderators

I expect that resource-scarce governments with middle levels of property rights protections are most likely to turn to BITs. To test the joint impact of resource endowment and property rights, I include interaction terms—*resource rents* × *property rights*—in separate models.

Controls

Finally, I control for variables that may affect the likelihood of BIT signing. Logged *per capita GDP* is a proxy for the level of development. Since economic growth rates may affect the level of FDI inflows and thus a country's need for foreign capital, I include *growth* as a percentage of GDP. I also include Chinn-Ito's (2003) index of *capital openness* to capture restrictions on capital flows. To measure *regime type*, I use Polity IV. I also include the *cumulative number of BITs* a country has signed up to (and including) a given year. Jandhyala, Henisz and Mansfield (2011) suggest that BIT signing occurs in waves, with differing motivations behind each wave. To account for their argument, I construct a variable, *wave*, coded zero for the period from 1970 through 1987, one

⁵ In the appendix, I further disaggregate this variable into its constituents—oil rents, gas rents, coal rents, and mineral rents—and include each separately in the analysis to ascertain the impact of specific resource types.

for the period from 1988 through 2000, and two for the period from 2001 to 2010. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the variables in the analysis.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Distribution
BIT	7,148	0.22	0.42	
resource rents	4,592	9.22	12.08	
property rights (CIM)	4,884	0.74	0.17	
property rights (ICRG)	2,782	0.47	0.16	
development	5,447	7.25	1.26	
growth	5,452	4.03	6.90	
capital openness	4,105	-0.26	1.42	
cumulative # of BITs	7,290	7.54	14.83	
regime type	5,765	-0.12	0.69	

5. Results

Table 2 presents the results from the regression analysis. Model 1 shows the baseline model with resource rents as the main predictor, controlling for the level of development, growth, capital openness, the cumulative number of BITs, wave, and regime type. Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that countries rich in natural resources will be less likely to sign a treaty than their poorer counterparts. As model 1 shows, resource rents has a negative and statistically significant effect on BIT signing; this indicates that as the amount of natural resource rents increases in a country over time, it is less likely to sign a treaty. Further inspection of the components that constitute natural resource rents reveal that oil, coal, and mineral (but not natural gas) rents have a similar effect: as these rents increase within a given country over time, it is less likely to sign a BIT.⁶

Next, models 2 and 3 show that property rights, whether measured by contract-intensive money (CIM) or ICRG, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of BIT signing. For a given country, as the level of property rights improves over time, it is more likely to sign a BIT. However, I argue that the effect of property rights on BIT signing is non-linear and dome-shaped; that is, countries are more likely to sign BITs at middle levels of property rights but are less likely to do so at low and high levels. Models 4 and 5, which include squared property rights terms, provide evidence for this hypothesis (H2). The estimate on the property rights term is positive while that of the squared property rights term is negative. To correctly interpret these estimates requires the construction of marginal effects plots (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Table 2: Fixed Effects Logit Estimates of Resource Income and Property Rights on BIT Signing

	1	2	3	4	5
resource rents	-0.17*** [0.04]			-0.16*** [0.04]	-0.14** [0.06]
property rights (CIM)		3.71*** [0.89]		9.21* [4.98]	

⁶ See Table A1 in the appendix.

property rights (ICRG)			4.93***		13.13***
			[0.84]		[4.34]
property rights ² (CIM)				-4.09	
				[3.45]	
property rights ² (ICRG)					-9.73**
					[4.52]
development	0.56**	0.04	0.19	0.31	0.06
	[0.26]	[0.24]	[0.55]	[0.28]	[0.61]
growth	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
capital openness	0.05	0.09	0.11	0.03	0.06
	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]
cumulative BITs	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.01
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
regime type	0.08***	0.07***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
wave	0.85***	0.62***	0.36***	0.76***	0.51***
	[0.11]	[0.09]	[0.12]	[0.11]	[0.15]
N	2,599	3,119	1,854	2,404	1,535
Countries	103	111	96	96	85
AIC	2799.2	3019.4	2009.9	2428.7	1699.6
BIC	3444.1	3061.7	2048.6	2480.8	1747.6

Robust standard errors are shown in [brackets]. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by one year. Country fixed effects and time splines not shown. ***, and ** denote statistical significance at $p < .01$ and $p < .05$ respectively.

Figure 2 (left panel) shows the effects of property rights (CIM) on the likelihood of BIT signing. Where the confidence intervals (dashed lines) do not include zero indicates a statistically significant effect. This plot provides evidence of a quadratic relationship between property rights and BIT signing, which supports hypothesis 2. Countries at low and high levels of property rights are least likely to sign BITs, although this effect is not significant. As a country's property rights improves, however, it is more likely to sign a BIT up to a point (approximately 0.55), after which the likelihood of signing starts to fall. The right panel of Figure 2, which uses the ICRG measure of property rights, reveals a similar relationship between property rights and BIT signing.




Figure 2: Quadratic effect of property rights on likelihood of BIT signing

The solid and dashed lines indicate the estimated coefficient and its associated 95% confidence intervals respectively. The histograms display the distribution of the property rights (CIM and ICRG respectively) variable. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at $p < .05$ where the confidence intervals (dashed lines) do not include zero.

Yet my key argument is that the BIT signing depends on both economic need as proxied by resource rents and the level of property rights. To assess this hypothesis (H3), I include interaction terms $resource\ rents \times property\ rights$ and $resource\ rents \times property\ rights^2$ as well as all constitutive terms in models 6 and 7. Whereas the coefficient estimates of resource rents and property rights as measured by ICRG are statistically significant (Table 3, model 7), they are not significant with CIM as the measure of property rights (model 6).

Table 3: Fixed Effects Logit Estimates of Resource Income \times Property Rights on BIT Signing

	6	7
resource rents	-0.83 [0.63]	1.24*** [0.47]
property rights (CIM)	3.06 [5.21]	
property rights ² (CIM)	1.15 [3.75]	
property rights (ICRG)		18.77*** [5.20]
property rights ² (ICRG)		-15.11*** [5.28]
resource rents \times property rights (CIM)	2.14 [1.29]	
resource rents \times property rights ² (CIM)	-1.64 [1.29]	
resource rents \times property rights (ICRG)		-5.62*** [2.02]
resource rents \times property rights ² (ICRG)		5.24** [2.05]

development	0.26 [0.28]	0.05 [0.59]
growth	0.00 [0.01]	0.01 [0.01]
capital openness	0.01 [0.06]	0.04 [0.08]
cumulative BITs	-0.00 [0.01]	-0.00 [0.01]
regime type	0.07*** [0.02]	0.07*** [0.02]
wave	0.75*** [0.11]	0.50*** [0.14]
N	2,404	1,535
Countries	96	85
AIC	2430.3	1690.7
BIC	2494.0	1749.4

Robust standard errors are shown in [brackets]. All explanatory and control variables are lagged by one year. Country fixed effects and time splines not shown. ***, and ** denote statistical significance at $p < .01$ and $p < .05$ respectively.

Figure 3 (left panel) shows the marginal effect of resource rents on the likelihood of BIT signing as a country's level of property rights (CIM) changes, holding all other covariates at their respective means. As before, where the confidence intervals (dashed lines) do not include zero indicates a statistically significant effect. As a country's level of property rights increases, the marginal effect of resource rents on BIT signing is negative, increasing, and statistically significant between 0.3 and 0.9. This suggests that all else equal, resource abundant countries are less likely to sign BITs even as their property rights regime improves. To better assess this interactive relationship, the right panel of Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of property rights (CIM) on BIT signing as resource rents change. At low resource rents, the effect of property rights on BIT signing is positive and statistically significant at log values of resource rents between -6 and 2. As the level of resource rents increase, however, this effect decreases. Taken together, this shows support for hypothesis 3.




Figure 3: Marginal effect of resource rents (left panel) and property rights (right panel) on BIT signing

The solid and dashed lines indicate the estimated coefficient and its associated 95% confidence intervals respectively. The histograms display the distribution of the property right (left) and resource rents (right) variables. The coefficient estimate is statistically significant at $p < .05$ where the confidence intervals (dashed lines) do not include zero.

5.1. Substantive Effects

Figure 4 shows the predicted probabilities of BIT signing at three levels of resource rents—low (25th percentile), median, and high (75th percentile)—as the level of property rights increases. At low levels of resource rents (left panel), the likelihood of BIT signing is highest at middle levels of property rights as hypothesized, and small at low and high levels of property rights. This quadratic effect is present at median levels of resource rents (middle panel) as well but the probability of signing is lower across the range of property rights values. At high levels of property rights, the probability of BIT signing is linear with respect to property rights and rises with property rights improvements. While this result seems to contradict my hypothesis, there are two issues of note. First, at middle levels of property rights (approximately 0.6), the probability of BIT signing (0.40) is lowest among the three levels of resource rents (0.62 (low), and 0.50 (median)). Second, there are no cases in the dataset at levels of property rights exceeding 0.8, which renders these extrapolated estimates unreliable.




Figure 4: Predicted probability of BIT signing at low (left panel), median (middle panel), and high (right panel) levels of resource rents

The lines indicate the predicted probabilities of BIT signing across the level of property rights at three levels of resource rents—low (left panel), median (middle panel), and high (right panel)—with all other covariates held at their means.

6. Conclusion

Despite substantial scholarship on whether BITs increase FDI, there remains relatively less work on the domestic factors that motivates governments to sign BITs. Rather than assuming that all leaders want or would compete for foreign capital, I focus on the conditions that influence: (1) the amount of investment a leader receives, and (2) whether a leader will turn to BITs. I show that the extent of natural resource wealth—by influencing the ex-ante level of investment that a leader receives—affects the likelihood of treaty signing. Specifically, as resource rents increase, the less likely a country will sign a BIT. This finding is consistent with Ross and Voeten (2015), who find that oil-exporting countries are less likely to join intergovernmental organizations. In addition, leaders are more likely to sign BITs at middle levels of property rights than at low or high levels, i.e. property rights have a non-linear effect on BIT signing. Finally, the most likely BIT signers are resource-scarce countries with moderate levels of property rights.

This paper contributes to an emerging literature that treats BITs as outcomes instead of BITs as causes. For instance, Billing and Lugg (2017) find that governments that experience civil conflict are more insecure, and therefore more willing to sign BITs to attract FDI without the need for costly domestic reforms. The approach here also demonstrates the value of exploring the domestic processes and mechanisms that underlie treaty signing. The study of network, competitive, and diffusion dynamics currently dominate the scholarship on international institutions. While these effects undoubtedly affect state behavior, treaty negotiation and international organization (IO) membership are first and foremost motivated by domestic concerns—namely government survival—which are subsequently influenced by international (or external) conditions. To understand the variation in IO membership then requires theory development and empirical testing at multiple levels of analysis.

The finding that resource abundant countries are less likely to sign BITs adds to the “resource curse” literature as well. I find support for the argument that since resource rich countries tend to already receive (resource-motivated) FDI, these governments need not rely on either domestic reform or international treaties—both of which are costly actions—to attract foreign capital. In addition, I show that the effects of resource wealth (or lack thereof) on BIT signing depends on the strength of a country’s property rights regime. This extends Ross and Voeten’s (2015) argument by highlighting how domestic institutions might condition the effect of oil dependence on a country’s willingness to participate in certain international institutions but not others.

Finally, this paper’s emphasis on the domestic determinants of treaty signing reveals that governments are not equally likely to sign BITs. This selection into BIT signing suggests that analyses of whether BITs fulfill their purported purpose of attracting FDI must account for this endogeneity to accurately assess the effects of BITs. This has implications for recent work that explains the effects of BITs on outcomes other than FDI, such as income inequality and leader survival, as well as the design and content of international economic agreements (Allee and Peinhardt 2014, Manger and Peinhardt 2017). More broadly, treaty selection on the part of governments has ramifications for identifying the impact of agreements in other issue areas such as double taxation, trade, human rights, and the environment.

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Defense Policy Analysis to Deal with Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesian Universities

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Abstract

Indonesia has a diversity of ethnic groups, as well as the various religions practiced by its people. The impact of the development of the global and regional strategic environment. Indonesia also cannot remove the influence of the development of ideologies from outside which threatens the unity of the state. The research currently being carried out is to determine the extent to which state policy programs regarding state defense can be implemented in universities in Indonesia. This is interesting given the vulnerability of students to be influenced by radical understandings currently developing. Researchers analyzed the implementation of this state defense policy using the theory of George Edward III, which analyzes the focus under study using factors, Communication, Resources, Disposition and Bureaucratic Structure. The results of the research show that the state defense policy that has been implemented so far still needs to be further improved, so far the state defense program with the civic education model is only carried out at the beginning when students enter university. Furthermore, no more citizenship programs were found. The related entities also have not found the best model so that the state defense program can be integrated and interactive. The recommendation from the current research is that state defense in universities needs to be optimized again, considering that several cases were found to involve students from high schools. Students are the nation's human resource which is very valuable to determine this nation in the future. Policies on national defense, especially the state defense program in higher education, must receive serious attention from the government, so that the younger generation, especially students, can avoid radicalism and terrorism.

Keywords: Defence State, Public Policy Implementation, Universities, Urban Areas

1. Background

Based on the 2015 National Defense White Paper, terrorists are still a threat to the Indonesian people in the future. This is evidenced by the development of terrorist networks after the destruction of Al-Qaeda by the United States. Seeing from this condition, the government needs to immediately determine its position and take anticipatory actions to prevent acts of terror. In addition to making persuasive efforts, the law enforcement side must also be given a balanced portion. Citing the Routine Activities theory proposed by Marcus Felson and Lawrence E. Cohen in 1979, crime will arise if there are three components in the same space and time, namely: motivated offenders, suitable targets (appropriate targets) and the absence of capable guardians or protectors (no guards or protectors).

The perpetrators of acts of terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia mostly come from students and students (BNPT, 2012). Based on research on 110 perpetrators of terrorism in 2012, most were in the age range of 21-30 years (47.3 percent), after that in the age range of 31-40 years (29.1 percent) and 11.8 percent under age 21 years old, as shown in the following picture:




Figure 1: Potential of Radicalism in the Student Environment

Source: BNPT, 2016

Seeing the cases that have existed lately, the fact that more young terrorists are hard to disprove. The same year survey of potential radicalism in the student environment showed 26.7 percent agreed to jihad with the use of violence, while those who did not agree 68.4 percent. Besides that the facts also prove the results of a survey from the BNPT in 2016 saying that terrorists came from educated circles, such as the graph below:




Figure 2. Facts: Terrorists are from educated circles

Source: BNPT, 2016

The ease of students and students to become sympathizers of radical groups affiliated with ISIS is because they are still in the search phase of identity, emotionally immature, so that they are easily influenced by new ideas. In addition, their adventurous spirit is still large so they tend to try something new and full of challenges.

The phenomenon of the number of students becoming sympathizers of radical groups is strengthened by the results of a recent survey from the research institute Alvara Research Center in 2017 stating that radicalism has been among students and students. The Alvara Research Center conducted a survey of the attitudes and views of students and students about religious radicalization, khilafah, jihad and Islamic states in Indonesia. The result is that

students agree with the Islamic state by 23.5% and for students agree with the amount of 16.3%. Furthermore, the state ideology, the result is that the majority of students and students choose the Pancasila ideology. The percentage of students choosing Islamic ideology is 18.6% and students are 16.8%. (Faqif, 2017)

From the description above, it can be seen that the threat of terrorism in 2017 in Indonesia is still very strong. Therefore, integrated steps are needed from the government and the community so that there are no vulnerabilities utilized by radical groups to carry out their actions. One effort to counter radicalism is a state defense program, which among others is carried out by the Ministry of Defense. Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu said, the Bela Negara program was launched and became the Ministry of Defense's priority program, one of the goals and objectives was to establish the identity and personality of the Indonesian nation (Lukman Yudo Prakoso et al., 2021).

The State Defense Program is a form of mental revolution as well as to develop the nation's deterrence in facing the complexity of the threat dynamics as well as to realize national resilience. Martial arts are actualized in the roles and professions of every citizen. The state defense program is one of the government's policy efforts in empowering national defense which is regulated in Presidential Regulation number 97 of 2015 concerning General Policy on National Defense (Suhirwan & Prakoso, 2019a).

2. Problem Formulation

The acts of terrorism and radicalism that occurred in Indonesia especially those involving students were of particular concern in this study, because students are the generation that determines the future of the nation in time, so that in this study the formulation of the problem presented is how to implement government policies on defense Which countries are currently implemented in universities especially those in urban areas?

3. Theory and Method Used

In this study the theory used is the theory of implementation of public policy according to George Edward III there are four variables in public policy namely Communication, Resources , attitudes and bureaucratic structures (Edward, 1980) The type of research used is descriptive qualitative phenomenology.

4. Discussion

According to the results of the 2017 National Intelligence Agency (BIN) survey, 39 (thirty nine) percent of students have been exposed to radical movements, there are 15 (fifteen) provinces that have now become BIN's attention and continue to receive attention. Of the 15 (fifteen) provinces there are three universities which are the main concern because they are the basis for the spread of radicalism. The phenomenon of radical teaching among students utilizes psychological innocence in students who are still in the process of finding identity (Rivai, 2018). BIN gave an example that Bahrun Naim was a young man who began to engage with radical activities while studying at Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021)

Judging from the legislation, the obligation to defend the country can be traced to the provisions of the 1945 Constitution and law number 3 of 2002 concerning national defense. In the 1945 Constitution Article 30 paragraph 1, it is affirmed that "each citizen has the right and obligation to participate in the defense and security efforts of the state." Whereas in paragraph 2 it is stated that "the defense and security efforts of the state are carried out through a system of defense and public security by the TNI and POLRI as the main force, and the people as supporting forces"

The concept stipulated in Article 30 is the concept of defense and state security. While the concept of defending the state is regulated in Article 27 paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution that "Every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in efforts to defend the state." Participating in the defense of the country is manifested in

the implementation of national defense activities, as stated in Law No.3 of 2002 Article 9 paragraph (1) that "Every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in efforts to defend the state which is manifested in the implementation of national defense." Then in Republic of Indonesia Law number 3 of 2002 the section weighing letters (c) is affirmed among other things "in the implementation of national defense every citizen has the right and obligation to participate in efforts to defend the state ..."

Our problem now is how to manifest the participation of citizens in efforts to defend the country. According to Article 9 paragraph (2) Law number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense, the participation of citizens in efforts to defend the country is carried out through:

- a. Civic education;
- b. Mandatory military basic training;
- c. Devotion as an Indonesian National Army soldier voluntarily or compulsorily; and
- d. Dedication in accordance with the profession.

Based on these provisions, students who take Citizenship Education subjects in schools can be said to have participated in the state's defense efforts. One of the study materials / materials that must be contained in the basic and secondary education curriculum and higher education is Citizenship Education (Article 37 paragraph (1) and (2) Law Number 20 of 2003 concerning the National Education System). The problem that we want to explore is why can state defense efforts be carried out through civic education?

In the explanation of Article 37 paragraph (1) of the law, it is explained that citizenship education is intended to form students to become human beings who have a sense of nationality and love for the country. From the description above, it is clear that the formation of a sense of nationality and love for the homeland of students can be fostered through citizenship education.

The concept of nationalism and love of homeland is closely related to the meaning of the country's defense efforts. Note the phrase ".. in the spirit of his love to the united state of Indonesian Republic .." in the definition of state defense efforts that have been disclosed above. The sentence of love for the unitary state of Indonesia is the realization of the concept of nationalism (a sense of nationality) and the love of the country (patriotism). Whereas love for the homeland and national awareness is a feature of awareness in defending the country. Darmawan (2004) asserts that the concept of state defense is a moral conception that is implemented in the attitudes, behavior and actions of citizens based on: love of the homeland, awareness of nation and state, belief in Pancasila as a state ideology, and willingness to sacrifice for the nation and state of Indonesia. Thus, in relation to defending the country, citizenship education is a vehicle to foster awareness of students participating in the defense of the state (Risahdi et al., 2020).

In addition, we can see by tracing the juridical provisions of Article 9 paragraph 2 (letter a) of Law Number 3 of 2002 which states that "in citizenship education there is an understanding of the awareness of defending the country." This means that one way to gain an understanding of awareness of defending the state can be achieved by taking citizenship education.

Darmawan (2004) emphasizes that citizenship education, in addition to teaching citizens' rights and obligations, has included an understanding of the state's defense awareness for national defense. Then he stressed that the obligation to include citizenship education in the basic, secondary and high education curriculum is a manifestation of the participation of citizens in efforts to defend the country in the context of the implementation of National Defense.

Thus, fostering awareness of defending the country through citizenship education is intended to foster and improve national defense efforts. Malik Fajar (2004) asserts that Citizenship Education has the duty to instill national commitment, including developing democratic values and behavior and being responsible as Indonesian citizens.

Radicalism and terrorism in universities such as the results of research conducted by BIN is a big question, how has the implementation of state defense implemented in universities, the following are the results of research related to the implementation of defense in higher education from variable analysis of George Edward's public policy implementation theory III, the location of research in retrieving secondary data and primary data is carried out based on past bases of radicalism and terrorism movements, the locus covers Lampung Province in Bandar Lampung City and its surroundings, in West Java Province in the cities of Purwakarta and Bandung, in East Java in the City of Surabaya, in South Sulawesi in the City of Makassar and in the Jakarta Special Capital Region (DKI) as a Center of Gravity (COG) for terrorism:

4.1 *Communication.* Based on George Edward III, communication greatly determines the success of achieving the objectives of the implementation. Effective implementation occurs when decision makers already know what will be done. Communication is further divided into 3 determinants of successful policy implementation, including:

4.1.1 *Transmission.* Transmission is the main factor in terms of communication of implementing policies. According to Agustino, the distribution of good communication will result in a good implementation (Leo, 2008). There is often a problem in channeling communication that is misunderstanding, so that what is expected is distorted in the middle of the road.

Transmission on the implementation of the State Defense is carried out by the Ministry of Defense in this case represented by the Directorate General of Defense Potential to the regional government as the implementing policy then forwarded to the local government work unit through direct or verbal orders (Redita et al., 2020).

The results of the team's findings in the field found that almost all research locus occurred miscommunication and miscoordination of the implementation of State Defense in the regions. The causes of miscommunication and miscoordination are because the delivery of messages to the regions is done in a hurry then from the center to the regions not through appropriate procedures in the area.

4.1.2 *Clarity.* According to George Edward III, communication received by policy makers (street-level-bureaucrats) must be clear and not confusing or unambiguous. The implementation of the National Defense program in the regions from the results of interviews with several informants said that local governments need clarity related to this program, they need a legal umbrella for implementing the State Defense so that local governments can work optimally. the legal basis referred to here is the existence of derivative regulations from the Defense Law specifically regulating State Defense Kurniawan et al., 2018).

4.1.3 *Consistency.* According to George Edward III, the orders given in the implementation of a communication must be consistent and clear to be determined or executed. If the order given often changes, it can cause confusion for the implementer in the field. Therefore consistency must also get attention in a communication. Consistency in the implementation of the State Defense in the regions has been going very well so far, the regional government is very consistent in supporting the State Defense program (Prihantoro et al., 2021).

4.2 *Resource.* Resources are important factors for the implementation of policies well, so that sufficient human resources (HR) are needed and enhanced capabilities possessed by policy implementers. The resources here are divided into two, namely in the form of human (staff) and non-human resources (infrastructure facilities or advice).

4.2.1 *Staff.* Implementation of policy will not succeed without the support of qualified human resources, quality in this case is from education, experience, competence and professionalism and also besides quality is the quantity of the staff themselves who will implement the policy.

Human resources are very influential on the success of implementation, because without reliable human resources policy implementation will not run smoothly. The human resources (staff) referred to in terms of implementing the State Defense policy in the regions in order to prevent terrorism, especially being a foreign terrorist fighters, are the availability of official Martial Arts instructors or instructors from the Ministry of Defense (Suhirwan et al., 2020).

The findings in the field at the time of the interviews in several regions found that there were a shortage of teaching staff to provide materials for State Defense, teachers who had been using teachers from outside the Ministry of Defense so far, such as Kodam, Korem and Kodim. One example that was considered successful in overcoming the shortcomings of competent teaching staff was in Purwakarta Regency, where the Purwakarta Regent employed a former terrorist named Agus Marshal to teach at the ideology school formed by the Purwakarta Regent.

- 4.2.2 *Facilities.* Facilities are a very necessary factor in implementing a policy. Facilities here can mean in the form of buildings, educational materials, curriculum and so on. The facilities in implementing the National Defense policy in the regions as a result of the findings and interviews are the unavailability of special Martial Arts training centers for regions, so far the participants deposited in Rindam in the area meanwhile the Ministry of Defense is currently only available in Bogor Rumpin Training Center which was just inaugurated in February 2017. In addition to the building facilities that are needed there is also a need for a basic Bela Negara curriculum that has standardized from the Ministry of Defense. This curriculum contains the types or subjects that should be given to participants especially in relation to this research for students in order to prevent becoming foreign terrorist fighters (Dipua et al., 2020).
- 4.3 *Disposition.* Disposition or attitude of implementing policies is an important factor in the approach to implementation or public policy. If the implementation of a policy wants to be effective, then the implementers of the policy must not only know what will be done but also must have the ability to implement it, so that in practice there is no bias (Lukman Yudho Prakoso et al., 2020).
The attitude of implementing the policy will be very influential in implementing the policy. From the findings in the field during interviews with informants such as the Head of the East Java Provincial Kesbangpol, Director of Student Affairs, Airlangga Regional Head of East Java supported the Bela Negara program, they saw the Bela Negara program very good and important in order to foster a sense of love for the country and fight terrorism (Lukman Yudho Prakoso & Aprilliyani, 2021).
In addition, the results of interviews with Unair's Student Director and Unila's Vice-Chancellor III also supported that the State Defense be included in the education curriculum in higher education and there was a need to modify the delivery of materials for students to the State. From a number of informants, they said that they supported the State Defense for students not in a militaristic form, but could be in the form of public lectures, field work practices, museum visits, and other positive activities.
- 4.4 *Bureaucratic Structure.* Bureaucratic structure has a significant influence on policy implementation. This aspect of bureaucratic structure includes two things, namely mechanism and fragmentation (Rifqi & Prakoso, 2020).
- 4.4.1 *Mechanism.* The mechanism meant in the bureaucratic structure of policy implementation is the existence of a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) (Sartono, Prakoso, & Sianturi, 2019). In relation to the implementation of the State Defense, what is needed now is a guideline for the implementation of the State Defense program which is endorsed by the Ministry of Defense, besides that the Ministry of Defense must initiate the submission of a presidential decree regarding the implementation of regional defense (Listiyono et al., 2019a).
This presidential decree is deemed necessary in the regions because the regions need a clear legal umbrella related to this State Defense, in addition to that, it is also necessary to regulate the mechanism for the inclusion of special Martial Arts material into the student curriculum. This is in accordance with the statement from Minister of Technology Research and Higher Education Muhammad Nasir that in order to prevent radicalism in the campus, the National Defense program for students will be implemented, this program is in the form of general education in which there are national insight material (Yulida, 2018) to introduce back to students about the country of Indonesia.
- 4.4.2 *Fragmentation.* Fragmentation according to George Edward III is the division of responsibility for a policy area among organizational units. Responsibility for a policy area is often spread among various organizations, this responsibility can be in the form of socialization, training and services.
In the implementation of the National Defense in the regions, the results of data collection in Mataram, Lampung, Surabaya, Purwakarta, Bandung and Bogor found that coordination in the implementation of State Defense actually had gone well, as evidenced by the results of hearings with the Head of the East

Java Province Kesbangpol which explained Kesbangpol East Java Province with the Representative of the Ministry of Defense (PPTP) in East Java has often coordinated and implemented the Martial Arts program in East Java, but one thing that has not been implemented is the entry of State Defense into universities in East Java, especially in Surabaya (Sartono, Prakoso, & Suseto, 2019).

5. Closing

The conclusion of this study was faced with the results of the analysis of the implementation of state defense policies in higher education. It was found that the State Defense in higher education applied to the tertiary education curriculum, which was specifically in urban areas, was not enough to counteract radicalism and terrorism that entered universities. It was found that the stake holders related to defending the country did not have good communication, so that the utilization of resources was not optimal, communication that was not well established also had an impact on the attitude of implementing state defense in higher education. Communication problems between stakeholders also have an impact on the system that is still not well integrated, the bureaucratic structure related to the model of the national defense model through the civic education model currently being implemented at the beginning of the semester is also felt to be lacking so that the national defense model in universities must be reevaluated and together with other stake holders must have strong communication so that the phenomenon of higher education especially in urban areas is exposed to radicalism and terrorism can be overcome.

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Sea Defense Strategy Strengthening Through Improving The Readiness of Indonesian Naval Vessel Crew (Study: The Health Office of 1st Fleet Command)

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Abstract

One of the sea defense strategies in the scope of deterrence is by presenting the Indonesian Navy force in the sea. This demands the readiness of the Indonesian Naval Vessel includes the platform material readiness and its personnel. The Indonesian Naval Vessel unit is generally different from the land unit makes it difficult the crew and need the health manipulation to avoid health problems or diseases that can interfere with their performance. Research errors regarding the implementation of the Indonesian Naval Vessel crew/soldier medical checks at the 1st Fleet Command Health office for readiness in order to support the defense task, the factors that influence and what is the effort supposed to do. The aim of the study was to analyze the implementation of the Indonesian Naval Vessel crew checks at the 1st Fleet Command Health Office what factors influenced and the best strategies implemented to obtain optimal results of the implementation of the Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier medical checks. This study uses a qualitative method. The analysis uses the theory of policy implementation from George Edward III. Data were obtained from informants related to the implementation of medical checks for Indonesian Naval Vessel crew in 1st Fleet Command which were then analyzed using qualitative. The results showed that the implementation of medical checks for Indonesian Naval Vessel crew was not optimal. Efforts are being made to coordinate at the planning stage, it is necessary to make a policy that requires Indonesian Naval Vessel crew to carry out medical checks without exception and provide Covid-19 vaccinations. So that soldiers can serve optimally.

Keywords: Defense Strategy, George Edward III, Indonesian Naval Vessel Readiness, Indonesian Naval Vessel Crew, Medical Checks

1. Introduction

In the Universal Defense System places the Indonesian armed forces as the main component in facing military threats. The Navy is an integral part of the Indonesian armed forces which acts as a major component of state

defense in the maritime dimension. The Indonesian Navy must have a large and adequate force consisting of a Fleet, Military Sealift Command and a Marine Corps. Robert Art in Supriyatno (2014) states that defense will always refer to the use of military force to stop threats or attacks, or minimize the consequences of an attack that has been planned.

Indonesian Fleet charge of organizing sea defense and security operations other than required to be able to overcome various forms of challenges are increasingly complex and dynamic also must always be present to protect the environment and sea resources, maintain security, ensure the safety and defend the sovereignty of the country in the sea (Margono, 2019). Throughout the year, the 1st Fleet Command held maritime security operations, so in order to maintain maximum military capability, it had to develop operational readiness for each element. These capabilities are the manned main weaponry system, such as Indonesian Naval Vessel or Kapal Republik Indonesia (KRI) and reliable crew or personnel. Indonesian Naval Vessel is always prepared for high combat readiness. Indonesian Naval Vessel's readiness in operate includes technical readiness in the section of platform (material), sewaco (sensor weapons and command) section, readiness of spare parts (On Board Spare) and readiness of Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier.

The excellent, tough, and reliable health condition of Navy soldiers determines the ability and high quality of resources in each of the Indonesian Armed Force duties. Soldiers are professional human resources who are always close to the risks that affect their health conditions, such as minor injuries, disabilities, and casualties. (Ma'arif, 2015). Likewise with the Indonesian Naval Vessel crew under the authority of 1st Fleet Command. The health conditions of Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers have a major effect on their productivity and work capacity. Especially personnel who carry out operation of sea security and warfare exercises at sea.

The work environment at Indonesian Naval Vessel is very different compared to the work environment on land. The form of work space and accommodation at ship is limited. In addition, the crew occupies a room adjacent to the ammunition and fuel warehouse. Then coupled with the fluctuating conditions and weather in the sea. As a result, the level of risk and workload is high, because it demands vigilance and vigilance during work to avoid work accidents (Adriyanto & Muchlis, 2017). Meanwhile, working conditions in the middle of the ocean easily cause boredom and quickly make physically tired which makes you lazy to do activities, not alert to dangers and threats (Sutanto, 2018).

When the ship operates, in teamwork, the crew are in their respective positions of duty and function. The working time of one day at Indonesian Naval Vessel is 12 hours or 720 minutes and applies to all Indonesian Naval Vessel crews. Operations and wars at sea that require a firm attitude and do not hesitate to act require a great deal of energy so that it is very tiring. Combat at sea begins with a long observation and patrol, followed by the firing of both missiles and very fast cannons. Likewise, Military Operations other than war at sea also require the same characteristics. On large warships, restrictions on weather and sea conditions also apply. Including when at the port, the ship requires a level of supervision to ensure the safety of material and crew members (Rizanny, n.d.).

These conditions make Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers susceptible to diseases that can interfere with their performance. In addition to requiring regular health checks, it is also important to maintain health in order to obtain excellent physical condition and stamina to support their activities. At the Fleet I Command Base, the Indonesian Navy Ship Crew Health Checkup is carried out at the Health Office as an implementing element who is obliged to support the main tasks of the health sector. The health checks of the Navy crews are carried out regularly at the Health Service of Fleet I Command and at the dr.Mintohardjo Naval Hospital accordance with the Head of Navy Staff regulation number 6 of 2017. The goal is to detect early symptoms of disease or other physical conditions that can result in suboptimal tasks. Diseases and symptoms found by crew will be treated and treated until the soldier is ready to be used again or assigned to land (pendirat). The results of the Health checks of the crew at the Health Service of 1st Fleet Command mentioned a disease disorder suffered by naval crews as in the table below:

Table 1: Table of Diseases found in health checks of the crew in the Health Service 1st Command Fleet

No	Disease Group	2018 (%)	2019 (%)	2020 (%)
1	Less Hygiene-Sanitation and unhealthy lifestyle	32	10	12
2	Degeneratif	30	38	42
3	Trauma / injury	20	13	17
4	Viruses and bacteria	8	6	3
5	Mental health	8	3	4
6	Eye organ disorder	0	3	4
7	Complications	0	20	8
8	Contagious	8	7	10
	Total	100	100	100

The results of the evaluation of therapy and treatment determine the abilities of Indonesian Naval Vessel crew members to continue serving on Indonesian Naval Vessel or on land, as shown in the following table :

Table 2: Recommended Indonesian Naval Vessel crew members serve the courier based on the results of health checks at Fleet I command health office

Medical status	Quantity			Recommended for ground service		
	2018 (person)	2019 (person)	2020 (person)	2018 (person)	2019 (person)	2020 (person)
IIIP	43	31	80	43	22	45
IIP	3	3	4	-	-	-

This condition can lead to a shortage of Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier while the leadership of the Indonesian Navy insists on meeting the crew members of the Navy at least 90% of the need or from the Personnel Composition List determined by the Indonesian Navy (Margono, 2019). From the description above, an interesting problem to research and analyze is how the efforts of the Health Office of 1st Fleet Command in improving the readiness of the 1st Fleet Command Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers as a strengthening of sea defense strategies. Based on the data extracted from the sources, the theory of public policy implementation from George Edward III was used as a basis for analysis

2. Method

This study uses a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach and an analysis framework of public policy implementation. There is a theory in the analysis of the data obtained so that it is not truly qualitative. This is also called quasi qualitative or quasi-qualitative design. That is, this design is influenced by the quantitative tradition, especially in placing theory on the data it obtained (Bungin, 2008). This research focuses on looking at the efforts in realizing an optimal health examination program for Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier in 1st Fleet Command. Medical examination activities in its implementation are also called medical check up tests (urikkas). Data obtained through in-depth interviews, conducting observations and documentary studies. The purpose of the interview is to explore each other's views / thoughts about something that is the object of research and obtain the required data. In this study, researchers used unstructured-planned interviews, namely interviews that were arranged according to a plan (schedule), but did not use a standard format and rules (Yusuf, 2019).

In observation, direct observation is made on the object of research, namely the medical checks activity and its follow-up at the research location. Meanwhile, the documentation study is analyzing documents related to this research, including the order of the Commander 1st Fleet Command regarding the implementation of health checks, soldiers who carried out medical checks data, follow-up data on medical checks results, chronic disease data, and manual of chronic disease management techniques for naval soldiers.

Testing the validity of the data in this study using triangulation and reference materials. Creswell (2014) said triangulating different data sources by examining the evidence coming from these sources and using them is to build a coherent justification for themes. Themes that are built on a number of data sources or the perspectives of participants will add to the validity of the research. The triangulation used is triangulation of data sources and triangulation of data collection techniques. Meanwhile, reference materials complement the research in the form of photos or authentic documents, so that they become more reliable (Sugiyono, 2007). Interactive data analysis used by researchers is an interactive model consisting of: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing / verification (Miles et al., 2018).

3. Results

3.1 General description

The Health Office of 1st Fleet Command is the central implementing element in the organizational structure of 1st Fleet Command which is obliged to support the main tasks of 1st Fleet Command in the health sector. The location is at the Fleet I Command headquarters based on Jalan Gunung Sahari No. 67 Central Jakarta. The Health Office of 1st Fleet Command is tasked with carrying out health coaching which includes health support, services and health support in the 1st Fleet Command environment, as well as technical guidance for the Indonesian Naval Vessel health unit within 1st Fleet Command.

Health office of 1st Fleet Command has the duty to carry out coaching health which includes health support, services and support health within 1st Fleet Command, as well as unit technical guidance Naval Vessel's health within 1st Fleet Command consists of:

- a. Compile and describe and carry out coaching health based on the 1st Fleet Work Program and Budget I and Naval Health Service per fiscal year.
- b. Describe and implement technical instructions from The Indonesian Navy Health Service and 1st Fleet Command.
- c. Prepare a plan for the activities of the 1st Fleet Command and Health Service determine the funds required based on the allocation budget per budget year.
- d. Organizing health technical guidance function activities maritime affairs, public health and health administration which cover:
 - 1) Organizing good health support personnel and health materials in each operation and Exercises organized by 1st Fleet Command and coordinating health support in devotional operations health service for other Indonesian Armed Force and other health agencies related
 - 2) Organizing medical checks activities, coaching the Health Book (BRK), health counseling and promotion, implementing general health and dental services, improving environmental sanitation hygiene at Base 1st Fleet Command, Pondok Dayung port and naval vessels in the ranks 1st Fleet Command, lists chronic disease sufferers, monitors and reports them periodically (new cases) and quarterly (repeated cases) to relevant leaders, and carries out preventive activities within 1st Fleet Command.
 - 3) Carry out development of health resources includes personnel, materials, facilities and procedures and budgets in a transparent and accountable manner as well as implementing health information in the environment 1st Fleet Command.

The targets of Fleet health development generally are:

- a. The realization of reliable health support
- b. Achieving professional health services
- c. Increasing the pattern of clean and healthy life for soldier 1st Command Fleet and family
- d. The realization of health resource coaching transparent and accountable.
- e. Health checks for soldiers of naval vessels are carried out with the following conditions:

- f. Health checks for crew soldiers are carried out once a year.
- g. Health checks for middle-level officers are carried out at Naval Hospital dr. Mintohardjo Jakarta, while still being coordinated by the Health Service, 1st Fleet Command.
- h. Types of health checks are routine health checks, combat capability and mental health checks

3.2 Implementation of medical checks for Indonesian Naval Vessel crews at the 1st Fleet Command Health Office

The result of the analysis using George Edward III's theory is to find the answer or synthesis of each factor of policy implementation. George Edward III in Subarsono (2011) argues that policy implementation is influenced by four factors. The communication factor, namely the successful implementation of the policy, requires the implementor to know what to do. Resource factors, although the content of the policy has been communicated clearly and consistently, if the implementor lacks the resources to implement it, the effectiveness of the implementation will be hampered. The disposition factor, is if the implementor has a good disposition, then the policy objectives can be achieved. The disposition is in the form of character and characteristics possessed by the implementor, such as commitment, honesty, and democratic character. The bureaucratic structure factor is in charge of implementing policies consisting of aspects of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and fragmentation.

In the communication factor has been carried out by each party related to the implementation of the 1st Fleet Command Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier medical checks. Both in the form of delivery of information and coordination between work units that support the Health Service in organizing medical checks. There were problems coordinating when vessel was sailing.

In the resource factor 4 (four) things that support the implementation of medical checks for Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers, namely:

- i. The staff of the 1st Fleet Command Health Service are 79% of the Personnel List, so that causing they lack resources at the time of the medical checks along with health support for other 1st Fleet Command activities.
- ii. Information, consisting of information about:
 - 1. How to administer medical checks to Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers. This information refers to the regulation of head of Navy staff Number 6 of 2017, it has been disseminated but has not been thoroughly implemented. Another information guide, namely The Manual of Chronic disease management techniques for naval soldiers published in 2007, needs to be updated.
 - 2. The compliance of the Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldier with orders to carry out medical checks has been carried out but there are some who avoid it for various reasons besides being on duty. The soldier's compliance is the responsibility of the section head on a Navy Ship. The unit leader must provide solutions to existing obstacles, and also avoid ignoring undisciplined subordinates.
- iii. The highest authority rests with Commander 1st Fleet Command as the highest leader of the organization, while the authority to organize medical checks the 1st Fleet Command Naval Vessel crew soldier rests with the 1st Fleet Command Health Office.
- iv. Infrastructure

Medical checks are carried out at the Fleet 1 Commando health Service building and also available medical equipment. The checks are carried out for the first Officer level to the enlisted level. Meanwhile, the middle officer level, the medical checks was carried out at the Mintohardjo Naval Hospital. Medical equipment is adequate for a certain capacity so that new medical devices are needed as rejuvenation.

Resources in both Liddel Harts' and Lykke's strategic theory are a means to achieve goals. So it is necessary to always strive to be fulfilled so that implementation is successful optimally. In organizing health checks, resources in the form of a budget are crucial support that must be available and sufficient. The budget is submitted by the Health Service Command Fleet I in stages for the needs of the following year. In general, implementation means

providing resources to do something. This means that to implement a policy must be accompanied by means that support the achievement of goals (Wahab, 2004).

As in the implementation of health checks for Naval vessel crew soldiers in 1st Fleet Command Health service which aims to support national defense at sea. Staff resources, namely personnel health and infrastructure such as buildings and equipment health can be said as a priority in implementation which when insufficient can hinder implementation of health checks. In the concept of strategy according to Clausewitz and Liddell Harts, resources are means that are deployed to achieve goals (ends). So that it is in line with the implementation of health checks for Navy crews as a method and then to mobilize the available resources (means) to achieve the desired goal (ends) in the form of healthy soldiers so that they are ready to be in charge of defense operations.

The leadership disposition factor for the implementation of medical checks for the crew soldier of the Indonesian Naval Vessel consists of:

1. The appointment of the bureaucracy according to Edward III's policy implementation theory is to select personnel / staff who are capable and dedicate to the policy. Based on this, what can be done is to provide suggestions to the leadership of 1st Fleet Command, for existing personnel (staff), both the Health Service and the side units must have the same vision. Namely realizing sea defense that is able to protect the sovereignty of the country through the readiness of Naval Vessel crew soldiers who are responded to with medical checks
2. Incentives, considered as driving the implementation of medical checks. Incentives or compensation as one of the driving techniques in order to trigger the executors to carry out orders well (Winarno, 2005). So far, there has not been any special incentive provision and is deemed unnecessary because it is considered sufficient with a salary from the government. Not giving incentives to health examiners does not automatically result in the failure of the purpose of carrying out medical examinations.

The last factor is the bureaucratic structure, there are two main characteristics that can boost the performance of the bureaucratic / organizational structure towards a better direction, namely:

1. Standard Operating Procedures, in the medical checks of the Naval Vessel crew soldiers, the SOPs used are routine medical checks SOP, Combat Capability medical checks SOP and mental medical checks SOP. All three have been carried out by health examiners. And the function of that is :
 - a) As a standard that explains the details of inspection standards consistently and firmly, and makes it easy executive personnel to adapt.
 - b) SOP is the legal standing for medical examiners.
 - c) As a control function that shows that the Health Service Command Fleet I has an efficient and well-managed process for implementing health checks
2. Fragmentation (spread of responsibility). Fragmentation has not been understood as full responsibility that is borne by a other unit that is not directly involved with the medical examination.

Some units consider medical examinations to be the purely responsibility of the 1st Fleet Command Health Service, the Naval Health Department of the dr. Mintohardjo Naval Hospital and the Naval Health Service. However, in general the process flow that passes through units other than the 1st Fleet Command Health service can be completed completely. Naval Health Service as the health corps supervisor of the Indonesian Navy had a big role in determining the readiness of the 1st Fleet Command Naval Vessel crew soldiers. Especially for the distribution of an adequate medical checks budget, competent health personnel resources and the procurement of medical equipment needed. In line with Wahjosumidjo (Wahjosumidjo, 1992) which states that leadership has a central role in organizational life, where there is collaborative interaction between two or more people in achieving goals.

4. Discussion

Drew and Snow (2002) define military doctrine (military doctrine) as what to believe about the best way in carry out various activities related to the military (Putra & Sholeh Hadi Pramono, 2017). Likewise with the implementation of sea defense strategy based on the doctrine of the armed forces of Tri Dharma Eka Karma (name of the doctrine Indonesian armed force). Where the function of the armed forces is to deter every threat, obstacle and disturbance that disturbs the country, it becomes the act of taking action for any attacks or threats that have entered Indonesian territory.

The conception of the Archipelago's Sea Defense Strategy adopted by Indonesia has based the Navy to move in carrying out defense tasks in Indonesia's maritime territory, both in critical and peacetime times. The development of the navy's strength and capability is to deal with aspects of sea threats, said Admiral Siwi Sukma Adji as Chief of Navy staff for the 2018-2020 period (Hutomo, 2019). For this reason, the strength of the Indonesian Fleet is always present in every situation and challenge faced by the country, said the current Chief of Navy, Admiral TNI Yudo Margono, S.E., M.M (Dispen Koarmada I, 2020).

One of the Sea Defense Strategy in the scope of deterrence by presenting the force of the Indonesian Navy in the sea area. This requires the readiness of Indonesian Naval Vessel which includes the readiness of the platform material and its personnel. There is different conditions between vessel from the conditions on the ground unit (pendirat) generally require adjustment of each personnel and health engineering personnel in order to avoid health problems or diseases that can interfere with their performance.

As one of the elements of the defense force in the sea dimension and guarding the Indonesian sovereign territory at sea, naval vessel crew soldiers who are professional and physically also mentally healthy are the assets to control the sea. This is absolute and cannot be avoided by an archipelago country like the Republic of Indonesia. Defense is carried out continuously / all the time, because defense is a state of alert that is needed at all times.

The crew who are physically and mentally ready to operate cannot be achieved without an effort in readiness. For this reason, through a medical checks of the Indonesian Naval vessel crew soldiers at the 1st Fleet Command Health Service, it will be determined whether ready or not soldiers are on duty on a Naval vessel.

The reference in formulating efforts to strengthen sea defense strategies to improve the readiness of Indonesian Naval vessel crew soldiers is from the concept of military strategy Arthur F. Lykke (1989). Lykke developed a strategic framework from a concept previously introduced by Clausewitz and Liddell Harts, so that strategy is a coherent and balanced decision-making process for the main elements of strategy. These elements include ends (goals, objectives, or targets), ways (ways of acting, course of actions, concepts, and methods) and means (strengths, resources, and potential). So the goal related to the sea defense strategy is the realization of the 1st Fleet Command Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers who are ready to support Indonesia's sea defense. Based on the analysis of the implementation of health checks, the ends determine as follows:

1. Fulfilment of medical personnel resources to optimize the results of medical examinations in order to reach the readiness of the Indonesian Navy vessels.
2. In order to increase the readiness of Indonesian Navy soldiers, efforts can be made to maintain health, prevent or minimize disease and overcome injuries by establishing a special centralized health service center for Navy crew. The location is near the dock to make the distance between the crews of the Navy ships docking. The unit is able to use science to conduct research in the areas of performance optimization for naval crew members, physical endurance, fatigue management, injury prevention and recovery from injury, and can develop medical and logistical planning. The results can serve as a reference for decision making to keep naval crew healthy and improve operational readiness. These efforts are supported by legal standing in the form of policies which then the implementation process meets the principles of integrative, interactive, transparent, controlling and accountability (Prakoso, 2016)

3. Indonesian Naval Vessel crew soldiers who are fully motivated to carry out health checks. At least the naval crew members realize the importance of their own self-readiness is to support the operational readiness of naval ships. The way that the 1st Fleet Command Health Service is trying is to provide knowledge about how to maintain health and recommend a healthy lifestyle on board for Naval Vessel crew soldiers.
4. Other units understand and share the responsibility of carrying out medical checks for naval vessel crew soldiers.

Based on the explanation from the informant, the method (Ways) is:

1. Conduct special recruitment for health professionals and submit recommendations for the procurement of medical devices.
2. Establishment of a naval health center for naval crew soldiers located near the base / dock
3. Provide education / socialization of health material for naval crew soldiers
4.
 - a. The Commander's policy emphasizes that the head of the work unit in the 1st Fleet command who is involved in the implementation of health checks is responsible for providing support in accordance with his function.
 - b. The Indonesian Navy's first school curriculum, both enlisted and officers, contains material for medical examinations for Indonesian Navy soldiers generally and specially for Indonesian Navy crew soldiers is an effort to build Indonesian armed force posture in the defense sector and also the responsibilities of heads / officers in work units or supporting units.

The above efforts must be accommodated with legal protection in the form of policies from the leadership as legal standing and means of affirmation. The health check policy for Navy crew members is a top down policy, so it requires the role and function of the leader to achieve policy objectives. However, it requires suggestions from the proposing units, namely from the Health Service of 1st Fleet Command as the spearhead of conducting health checks for Navy crew.

5. Conclusions

Fleet I command as the coaching city that carries out fostering sea and base power and being responsible directly to the Chief of Navy staff. In enforcing the rules and safeguarding the country's sovereignty, the implication is the optimal contribution of Navy crews in an effort to ensure the achievement of the main tasks assigned to the warship fleet. Both in maritime security operations and marine combat operations. Indeed, the readiness of the Navy ships is part of the marine power to support the marine defense system. In carrying out state defense operations at sea, Navy Vessel crews need physical and mental readiness. Health checks of Navy Vessel crew members are a measure of whether they can serve on a Naval vessel or not. The need for efforts in realizing the success of the implementation of the health check of the Naval vessel crews at the Fleet I Command Health Service, in the form of determining the ends, means and ways needed to achieve the goal, namely the Health Service 1st Command Fleet optimally implementing health checks to get the crew of the Navy who are physically and mentally ready to be in charge of state defense operations at sea.

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Investigation of the Language Usage of Hmong Ethnic People in the Northwest (Tây Bắc) Region of Vietnam - A Case Study in Bắc Yên, Sơn La province

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Abstract

The linguistics research in general and in particular, sociolinguistic study of ethnic minorities in Vietnam is a fascinating topic, but is also a very complicated subject in term of some typical reasons. The complication of the subject is originated from the objective reasons such as natural conditions, social and economic conditions and some other subjective reasons which belong to subjective of languages-the ethnic minorities. Hence, when considering the language scenarios of the ethnic minorities in general and the status of using language of ethnic people in particular, the selection of research subject and survey area are very important. Discussing on this subject, author Van Khang Nguyen in his work “Social linguistics” has speculated that: “first of all, one can see that the key point of the perception when investigating language from the perspective of sociolinguistics is the sociability and the variability of language.” The birth of language is the development need of human society and the development of the human society leads to the development of language which aims to meet the need of communication. Therefore, when studying language, the sociolinguistics always set the relationship between social transformations with the language usage. In our case study, the Hmong people in Bắc Yên district is an ethnic group with many typical characteristics for Hmong in Sơn La province as well as in the Northwest region of Vietnam. Currently, the language of Hmong people in Bắc Yên raises quite topical questions. For example, it is important to understand how Hmong people use their native language, national language and foreign language at the same time in their daily activities. How do Hmong people use Hmong writing system in their communication situation? What is their attitude with their language? The above-mentioned questions urged us to carry out a case study on the language usage status of Hmong people in the Northwest Vietnam.

Keywords: Northwest Vietnam, Hmong People, Language, Ethnic Minority

1. Content

1.1. Introduction to Bắc Yên district and Hmong ethnic people in Bắc Yên

Bắc Yên is a highland district of Sơn La province with an average latitude of 1000 m above the sea level. In term of geographic position, Bắc Yên is located in the Northeast of Sơn La province. Its four neighbouring regions are: Phu Yên district on its east side, Mường La and Mai Sơn districts on its west side, Mộc Châu and Châu Sơn

districts are on the south and Trại Tầu district of Tây Bắc province on its north side. Regarding the administration units, Bắc Yên has one main town and other fifteen communes. In term of the geographic zone, Bắc Yên can be divided into two smaller sub-regions if Đà river is taken as a boundary line: the north and the south of Đà river. Based on the elevation of the terrain, Bắc Yên can be divided into three geographic sub-regions. The highland region includes 6 communes Tà Xùa, Làng Châu, Xím Vàng, Hang Chú, Háng Đồng, Hua Nhàn); the middle region includes three communes Phiêng Ban, Mường Khoa, Hong Ngai and Bắc Yên town. The lowland region includes six communes Song Pe, Tạ Khoa, Chim Vàn, Phiêng Côn, Chiềng Sại, Pắc Ngà - the communes which are located near Đà river. Bắc Yên has the form of high-mountain terrain and very highly separated terrains. The geographic division together with the large difference in elevation between the sub-regions lead to the great difference in the climate and the soil properties of each region. In addition, with the large discrepancy on the population and population distribution of different ethnic groups in Bắc Yên.

Nowadays, the population of Bắc Yên district has about 56.848 inhabitants. In term of ethnic minority composition, Bắc Yên has seven different ethnic minorities that live together: Hmong, Thái, Mường, Kinh, Dao, Khơ Mú, Tày (Tran, 2014). The number and ratio of these ethnic group per total population of the district is shown in the table 2.1.

Table 1.1: Population and ratio (%) of different ethnic minorities in Bắc Yên

N	Communes	Number of people	Ratio (%)
1	HMông	24.366	42,86
2	Thái	17.765	31,25
3	Mường	9.837	17,30
4	Kinh	3.044	5,35
5	Dao	1.679	2,95
6	Khơ Mú	105	0,18
7	Tày	52	0,09
Total		56.848	100

Source (Thao, 2017): Cadastral data of Son La province, 2016

These data shows that the Hmong people in Bắc Yên has the largest population with 24.366 over the total 54.848 people of the whole district (occupying 42.86%). In comparison with other Hmong population of other districts, Bắc Yên has largest Mong population in Son La province. Not only having the largest population, Hmong population in Bắc Yên also has the most diversity in Mong branches. According to our preliminary data, there are four main Hmong branches in Bắc Yên: white Hmong (Hmong Đơuz), black Hmong (Hmong Đuz), Hmong Hoa (Hmong Lành) and Mong Si (Hmong Đò). Considering their residence locations, Hmong people which belong to these branches also show the distinctive and the mixed features with other ethnic minorities. This accidently created language contact situations among Mong branches and between Mong people with other ethnic minorities.

Hmong people in Bắc Yên reside over a large area which has both concentrated and scattered properties. Nowadays, the Hmong people in Bắc Yên reside in all the communes. The concentrated nature of the population can easily be recognized through the narrow range in a form of a village. Typically, in one Hmong village, most of people are native Hmong without any other type of people. Consequently, where there are many Hmong villages gathering together will create a larger Hmong community. In Bắc Yên, the high-lying area (with 6 communes) can be considered as a typical Hmong ethnic area of Son La and can be considered as a typical region in Tay Bac. The Hmong villages and Hmong ethnic regions both combine to form the traditional residence form of the ancient Hmong. The scattering and intercalation properties in the population distribution of Hmong people are the today derived features. This is reflected through the joint residency with the other ethnic groups in the same village or region. In Bắc Yên, in the middle lying region and low-lying regions, Hmong people have resided mutually with the other ethnic groups such as Thái, Mường, Dao. This style of residence was even though not popular in the history, however, became an essential tendency in the presence because it is the product of the language contact evolution, of the change in administrative boundary, extending or narrowing the farming lands, trading and even

urbanization with Hmong people in Bắc Yên. The population distribution of Hmong people in Bắc Yên is shown in the table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Number and ratio of Hmong people distributed over communes/towns

N	Communes	Number of people	Ratio (%)
1	Hua Nhân	3.324	13,64
2	Hồng Ngài	2.879	11,81
3	Hang Chú	2.819	11,56
4	Làng Châu	2.629	10,78
5	Tà Xùa	2.379	9,76
6	Xím Vàng	2. 210	9,07
7	Háng Đông	2.093	8,58
8	Phiêng Ban	1.547	6,34
9	Tạ Khoa	881	3,61
10	Phiêng Côn	789	3,23
11	Chim Vàn	714	2,93
12	Chiềng Sại	622	2,55
13	Song Pe	501	2,05
14	Thị trấn Bắc Yên	470	1,92
15	Mường Khoa	431	1,76
16	Pắc Ngà	6	0,02
	Total	24.366	100

Source (Thao, 2017): Cadastral data of Sơn La province, 2016

1.2 Research Object

In order to investigate the language usage of Hmong people in Bắc Yên nowadays, we carried out the object selection based on the following standards:

Research location: We chose three local locations in three different areas in the district. First, we carried out the survey at Lang San village, Hang Dong commune- which is representative for Hmong in the high-lying mountain region; second, at Moi village in Bắc Yên town-which represents for Hmong in middle-lying mountain region; third, we carried out our survey in Tà Đò B, Tạ Khoa commune- representing for Hmong people in low-lying mountain region (which locates along Đà river). The reason for these selections is that we realized that the language communication situations of Hmong in these regions are quite distinctive. For example, by comparing the geographic locations from these survey locations running down to the center of Bắc Yên district, it can be seen that: if Moi village of Bắc Yên town is only 1 km away from the centre of the town, while Lang San village of Hang Dong commune is up to 49 km from the center of the town and Tà Đò B village of Tạ Khoa commune- a village lying nearby Đà river with mainly waterway has a distance of 21 km from the center of the town. Besides, one should be taken into account is the language communication situation factor of Hmong from above-mentioned regions with the other ethnic groups. All of these influenced to the status of using language of Hmong people in Bắc Yên at different level.

Number of survey: 105 people have been studied in which 35 people have been chosen to be directly questioned in each regions and interviewed via question table.

Gender: 50 males and 55 females joined the interview.

Age: There were three age levels were interviewed: level 1 with age under 30 years old with 35 people (33.33%); level 2 from 30 to 50 years old with 50 people (47,61%); level 3 from 60 years old and above with 20 people (19,06%).

Profession: Farmers with 68 people (64,76%); government officers with 12 people (11,42%); student, pupils with 25 people (23,82%).

Education level: Without basic education 29 people (27,6%); primary level: 34 people (32,38%); secondary school: 21 people (20%); high school: 11 people (10,47%); colleges: 3 people (2,85%); university: 2 people (1,9%).

1.3 Language attitude of Hmong people in Bắc Yên

“The language attitude is defined as the love of native people to their mother tongue and to other languages” (Nguyen, 2016). Sociolinguistics refers to three basic linguistic attitudes: the attitude of language loyalty, the attitude of language discrimination and attitude of language inferiority.

Attitude of language loyalty begins with the love to the language of its people. Thus, all individuals will think toward the protection of their own language. The attitude of inferiority of language can be understood as the bad feelings when one can see that its mother language is not as good as other ones. The attitude of language discrimination can be understood as the underrating and disregards the language or the dialect of another ethnicity, at the same time, too appreciating the language or dialect of one’s own language.

The result of the study on 105 Hmong people in Bắc Yên on the language attitude showed that all of them (100%) have the loyal attitude on their own mother tongue. With the given question “Do you love your own mother language?” All answered “yes.” This shows that Hmong people do love their own mother tongue. When we asked them “Do you love Vietnamese.” The answers showed that 92/105 said “yes,” yielding 87,62%, only 7 people said “no,” making 12,39%. Most of the people who said “no” are elderly. They said that they do not love Vietnamese because they do not know how to speak Vietnamese and cannot understand what others speak to them in Vietnamese. Therefore, Vietnamese language-the national language also received the loyalty from Hmong people in Bắc Yên.

With the same question, but when we asked them “Do you love English?” the result showed that 9/105 people (8,57%) said “yes” to the question, 96 people said “no” (91,43%). All 9 people who answered that they like English are all primary and secondary school pupils. They like English because they want to be good in English in the next school years. Those with the answer “no” because they cannot use English in their daily life. In 16 people who dislike English, there are 16 people who are also students of different school levels, they express that English is difficult either in understanding or in learning in the schools. As a result, the study shows how the attitudes of Hmong people with English of which it is considered as being discriminative because many of them thought that English is not a necessary language in their daily life. We have asked them the same questions: “Do you like other languages of other ethnic groups in the region?” As the result, 61 people said “yes,” occupying 58,09%, 44 people said “no” (41,91%). This means that Hmong people have quite neutral attitude with the other languages of the other ethnic groups with almost the same rate between “like” and “dislike.” The reason that they like the other ethnic’s languages because they want to exchange, to trade or simply to communicate with them in the same region for good friendship or partnership. The other said that they dislike the other ethnicity’s language simply because they do not understand it.

1.4 Current status of language usage of Hmong people in Bắc Yên

1.4.1 Current status of language usage in daily life of Hmong people

The most common way of inhabitation of Hmong people in Bắc Yên is gathering together in a village (jaol Hmôngz). Nowadays, Bắc Yên has 89 villages of Hmong people in which 81 villages are native Hmong people (91,01%), 8 villages in which Hmong people live together in the same village with other people such as Thái and Mường ethnic groups. Thus, in the two ways of inhabitation of Hmong people that are viewed as concentration and intercalation, the former is most predominant. Not only that, the Hmong village has also a characteristics of being closed meaning in the same village, there are only several dominant big family lines with the same bloodline

and rarely seen more than five big family lines in the same village. In the daily life in Bắc Yên, Hmong people keep a close relationship among the family members, among the families in a village and among villages in a region. This is reflected via their living habits, production of food, customs and belief.

We observed the communications that can be easily seen in two scenarios: **i)** communication in a family and in a family line and **ii)** social communication. The communicative activities were obtained such as talking to each other among the family members, talking to the visiting guests (Kinh or other people), talks in a wedding party, funerals and ceremonies of giving name for the new-born babies or worships. The social communication can be seen as salutation on the streets, in the village meetings, in the talks between the villagers with the local government, in communication in the market or in music festivals.

The results of our study via question table and observation has shown that in the communications at family and family line level, Hmong people only speak to each other by their mother tongue-Hmong language, with 100%. Vietnamese was also used and mentioned but only expressed via the borrowed words that Hmong vocabulary does not contain such as *bank, car, noodles, ..., computer, committee, Pasteurellosis*. Vietnamese is used in family communication space when talking with the Kinh guest (who speaks Vietnamese) (97,51%), or when communicating with other ethnic groups, Hmong use also Vietnamese with 58,53%, Thái (27,16%), Mường's language (11,14%), Dao (3,17%). One can be seen that in the different communication scenarios containing different types of communication objectives, most of Hmong people are multilanguage speakers. Besides their mother tongue, they can also communicate by other languages such as Vietnamese, Thái, Mường, Dao. However, on the aspect of Multilanguage of Hmong people, there are some special points should be taken into account: the Hmong living on the high-lying mountain region (the Làng Sảng village in Hang Dong commune), most of multilanguage citizens can speak dual Vietnamese and Hmong. For the Hmong living in the middle-lying mountain region (the Mòi village, Bắc Yên town) and the Hmong in the low-lying mountain region (the Tà Đò village, Tà Khoa commune), the multilanguage usage can be seen by the fact that the Hmong people can speak their mother tongue and Thái, Mường and sometimes Dao at the same time. A Hmong person can even speak three, even four different languages. In particular, there are 11 in 35 people (31,42%) in Tà Đò, Tà Khoa with the age between 30 and 50 can speak Vietnamese and Thái fluently as their second languages.

One should keep in mind that even the multilanguage ability of Hmong people is quite highly developed, there are still a small fraction of people who cannot can only speak their own mother tongue. This is the case of Mrs. Thi Pa Mua (age 67 at Tà Đò B, Tà Khoa commune) and Mrs. Thi Do Giang (age 82 at Làng Sảng, Hua Nhàn commune). When we asked them by Vietnamese, they appeared not to understand at all, their descendants told us that they can only speak in Hmong. This proves that fact that beside a large number of citizens who can use multilanguages, there are still a small numbers who can only use a single language.

1.4.2 Language usage situation of Hmong people in the school in Bắc Yên

In determining the research objects, we have carried out a survey by interviewing 25 pupils in different primary and secondary school levels in three different regions in Bắc Yên to briefly evaluate the language usage status in school of students and pupils. In addition, we used a highlighted question "what kind of language did you use when you were in the school?" The data is showed as the following.

There are 25 in 25 Hmong pupils (100%) who can speak their mother tongue and Vietnamese, in which 4 in 25 (16%) can speak Thái, 1 in 25 (4%) can speak Dao. 21 in 25 (84%) pupils joining the interview cannot speak English or can speak only few English words. Thus, with the data shown above, we can conclude on the language usage ability of Hmong pupil as the following.

Vietnamese is the main communicating language in the school, it is used in the main school time when teacher and pupils and other ethnic pupils communicate to each other, all by Vietnamese. This shows that Vietnamese is important official language being used in the school (Tran, 2004, pp. 10-13). The fact that 100% Hmong pupils using Vietnamese in the school is a great achievement from the government in eliminate the illiteracy in Bắc Yên.

Although the ability of using Vietnamese is at different levels but knowing how to use Vietnamese in writing, communicating, reading is considered as a good signal.

Their mother tongue - the Hmong language is used among the pupils during the break time in school, in the dormitory or in the private conversation in the class. If their teachers or friends can speak Hmong, then they are willing to speak in Hmong (however, the conversation take places when someone starts first in Hmong). On the aspect the writing of the mother tongue in the school with the question “*do you know writing in Hmong language?*” The result shows that there are 20 in 25 answered “yes” (80%). Then the question “could you try to read and to write?”, then 20/25 pupils can read and write (with different skillful levels. Then the question “where did you learn this Hmong word?” The answer is “I learned from my friends or from my brothers or siblings; I learned from the telephone.” Also with the question concerning to Hmong language, we gave a small text in Hmong with the title “*lul pǎngx tru chiêx qiv*” cited from page 73, book 1, Hmong language textbook, published in 1998, author Thanh Phan, released by Education and Training Minister, the result showed quite surprised that 25/25 Hmong pupils said that they do not understand these words. This obviously raises a question whether they are **illiteracy** or **not-illiteracy** with their mother tongue. We thought that the above result shows a need that relates to some types of Hmong language that suitable for the present Mong people to learn. This will be presented in another research paper.

Another issue that we learned from this survey is that Hmong pupils do not speak English outside of the class. If they need to practice English under requirement of the teacher, then they also speak reluctantly. They said that English is difficult with them and they do not like English. A Chia Mua (the seventh class pupil, secondary school Hang Dong) told us “I was taught English from the 3rd class, but I cannot speak, if someone ask me about English, then I can only tell that I know “hello.” Thi Chung Thao told us that English is very difficult, she can read English following her teacher on the class but she would forget it easily after that. From the above observation and interview, it is clear that the learning foreign language of the ethnic pupils and overall in the school remains an unsolvable and need further solutions.

1.4.3 Language usage situation of Hmong people in the traditional culture of Mong in Bắc Yên

The media culture of the small ethnic minorities in the North of Vietnam has been highly cared by the Vietnamese government because it not only serves as an informative tool, but also is an important spiritual symbol in their life.

The media culture is expressed through books, journals, propaganda materials, radio, television channels and telephone and so on. Our study shows that there are post offices which can be accessed to the information and communication system in all the three studied communes Hang Dong, Tà Khoa, and Bắc Yên town; there are also sorts of journals and magazines in Vietnamese, however, there are no Hmong language materials in such forms. There are also radio and television stations spoken in Hmong in Bắc Yên that daily broadcast with certain amount of time: specifically 45 minute with radio channel and 60 minutes with TV channel (Source: wikipedia). The survey were carried out in a 31 families (105 people), the result shows: there are 17/31 people own radio (54,8%), 28/31 (90,32%) own TV, 73/105 (69,5%) with telephone, smartphone, computer with internet access 48/105 (45,71%).

In the field of media and culture, the Hmong in Bắc Yên use their mother tongue (Hmong language), Vietnamese and Thái in which mother tongue and Vietnamese are widely used, Thái is seldom used (2/105 people can understand through the radio, TV by Thái, yielding a 1,9%). All of them (105/105) told that they can watch and understand (at different levels) the radio, TV by Hmong language. There are 103/105 (98,09%) can watch and understand the contents in Vietnamese. When comparing the entertainment programs in Vietnamese and Hmong, Hmong people think that the programs in Vietnamese are more attracting while those in Mong language have no movies in Hmong. Hmong language only broadcasted news and updates which have already been known through Vietnamese programs.

In term of book and newspapers written in Hmong language, all of the interviewed people (105/105) said that they have never read them. The number of people who read newspapers in Vietnamese regularly also have a small numbers with 4/105 people (4,76%); some of them seldom read newspapers in Vietnamese 21/105 (23,8%) or very rarely or never read 79/105 (59,43%).

In term of using telephone, Hmong people use their mother tongue and Vietnamese when talking via telephone, this also depends on whether those who they are talking with are in the same or different ethnic groups. This is understandable because when communicating through the phone, one needs a certain levels of language ability, because they do not see each other when telephoning, then they need to choose their best language type in which they are good at. With the smartphone, Hmong people also use it as a multimedia equipment in order to read, listen music, exchange and learn Hmong language.

This picture shows us a fact that even though the economic conditions of Hmong people have been very much improved as compared to before, but generally, their spiritual life in Bắc Yên still remains so poor and not diverse. Hmong people in contacting with media and other cultural media still remains restricted and less beneficial from public media. We think that in order to improve this situation, one needs to have regulation so that the media can have deeper and better influence inside the Hmong society, enabling media to become a favourable and improve the spiritual life as well as improve language ability of those people at the corner of the world.

2. Conclusions

The picture of using language of Hmong people in Bắc Yên district, Son La province is a study on a specific local area but can be considered as a small social picture which can be a representative for the current status of using language of the Hmong people in Son La as well as in Northwest of Vietnam. The current status of using language undergoes the influence of real and objective factors and it is changing overtime. The study results showed that the Hmong people in Bắc Yên love and respect their native language and they also respect the other ones (Vuong, 2020). Only on the aspect of using foreign language, it may begin from different reasons, so Hmong people seem not really care about the foreign language and almost do not use it in their daily activities. In term of cultural media in the life of Hmong people, we think that one needs a change and adjust in order to adapt with growing social trends and more importantly is to change the media culture (the culture that binds to the use of language) to become a suitable information for people. Thus, handling the issues in using language of Hmong people in Bắc Yên is also aim at promoting society economy.

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Strengthening the Marine Defense Strategy of Lanal Banten Area through Empowerment of the Traffic Separation Scheme in the Sunda Strait

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Abstract

Indonesia as an archipelagic country is gifted by God with a geographical location between two continents and also two oceans, making Indonesia's position very strategic. In accordance with UNCLOS 1982, as an archipelagic country, Indonesia has an obligation to provide a shipping route called ALKI (Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel). ALKI 1 stretches from the Malacca Strait to the Sunda Strait. The Sunda Strait as one of the busy shipping lanes is vulnerable to various forms of threats. To ensure the safety of shipping in the Sunda Strait, the TSS of the Sunda Strait is designated as a shipping lane separating channel. With the determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait, shipping using the Sunda Strait will be increasingly crowded, this will pose an even greater threat. The purpose of this study was to analyze the strengthening of the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait carried out by Lanal Banten by utilizing the TSS of the Sunda Strait. The method used in this research is descriptive qualitative research using the theory of policy implementation from Van Meter Van Horn and strategy theory from Lykke. The results of the study indicate that the lack of facilities and infrastructure and the absence of a special operation carried out by the Indonesian Navy to secure the Sunda Strait, so that the implementation of strengthening the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait has not been optimal. There needs to be support for facilities and infrastructure as well as support for special operations in the Sunda Strait to strengthen the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait and the participation of the people around the Sunda Strait.

Keywords: ALKI, Marine Defense Strategy, TSS OF Sunda Strait

Introduction

Indonesia as an archipelagic country is gifted by God with a geographical location between two continents and also two oceans, making Indonesia's position very strategic. Indonesian waters are passed by ships that will pass both for trade and for other activities. We can see the world's interest in Indonesian waters where Japan as an industrial country has eighty percent of raw materials as well as industrial products are shipped through Indonesian waters, coal and iron ore originating from Australia are exported to their destination countries through Indonesian waters, eastern countries. middle as an oil exporter using tankers through Indonesian waters as well, in military interests, warships from China, the United States, Russia, India, and other countries need Indonesian waters to carry out cross navigation. At the International Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) convention or what we know as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which we know as the UN convention that discusses International sea law in 1982, Indonesia was designated as an archipelago. . In accordance with the agreement, Indonesia has sovereignty in the sea which is recognized by the international community which must pay attention to the rights owned by other countries in terms of the right of peaceful passage so that Indonesia must provide an international shipping channel which we call ALKI (Indonesian Archipelago Sea Channel) as a sea shipping channel can be used. Indonesia is designated as an archipelagic country, in accordance with UNCLOS 1982 which is explained in article 46 to article 53. In this article, Indonesia can determine shipping lanes that can be used by foreign ships in conducting cross-peaceful voyages. On the Indonesian shipping route, there are 4 choke points, one of which is the Sunda Strait (Marsetio, 2014). With a strategic geographical position the Sunda Strait is a busy strait and is passed by many ships to sail, every year there are 70,000 ships crossing the Sunda Strait (Kemenhub, 2017). As one of the straits with busy traffic and also the entry point for international shipping that will use ALKI 1, the Sunda Strait becomes the main trade route between the Australian continent and the Asian continent. With the busy number of ships passing through the Sunda Strait, there are many threats and disturbances. Not only the threat of navigation but also other threats that can disrupt the survival of the nation, one of which is drug smuggling. In 2016, drug trafficking in the form of 54 kg of methamphetamine and 40,894 ecstasy pills was successfully thwarted by the Police at the port (Indonesia, 2017). In July 2017, the National Police arrested 1 tonne of methamphetamine smugglers, using a route starting from the South China Sea to Johor, then along the western coast to enter the Sunda Strait (Badriyanto, 2017). The Sunda Strait also became an arena for the British ability to showcase the "Show of Force" on August 24, 1964 using the HMS Victorious with two distroyer ships escorting from Singapore to Australia using the Sunda Strait route without permission (Ajinugroha, 2020) to Indonesia although in the end Indonesia was able to thwart it. Judging from the situation above, the Sunda Strait is an opportunity and also a challenge that must be answered so that it can be used as well as possible for the Indonesian people. To deal with these problems, it is necessary to have a strategy that must be taken to strengthen supervision and reduce the threats and disturbances that will be caused in the Sunda Strait. Defense as one of the functions of government to achieve the ideals of the state by realizing state unity and integrity to achieve the nation's goals (Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense, 2002). The strengthening of defense in the Sunda Strait needs to be increased and can be used as a useful strategy to maintain national sovereignty.

Research methods

This research uses descriptive qualitative method, the qualitative research process does not have the factors that influence the data so that it aims to obtain real data in natural conditions. Descriptive research does not provide certain treatment, make manipulations or make changes to the variables under study, but rather provides an overview of the actual conditions (Bungin, 2007). The theory used in this research is the implementation theory according to Van Meter and Van Horn about the policy implementation approach model (Agostino, 2006), and the strategy theory from Lykke (Lykke Jr, 1989). This study uses the interview method conducted to informants, who are personnel who are appointed by officials of each agency and have competence in their fields, so that the aim of researchers to obtain information can be implemented properly.

Results and Discussion

The research carried out obtains data and discussion which will be described as follows:

Current marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait

The maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait has been implemented. Currently, securing the Sunda Strait is included in ALKI 1 Security Operations starting from the Malacca Strait to the Sunda Strait. Whereas the Sunda Strait Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) was implemented on July 1, 2020 (Jurnal Maritim, 2020), TSS is a shipping lane separation scheme in a shipping lane, where the route has busy, narrow traffic and has many obstacles in navigation. . The determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait in ensuring the safety of shipping vessels crossing the Sunda Strait is one of the implementations of the Indonesian Maritime Policy in accordance with Indonesia's vision to become a World Maritime Axis. With the implementation of TSS Sunda Strait, passing ships will feel more comfortable, because security is more guaranteed so that it will increase the volume and activity of shipping in the Sunda Strait. The increasing volume and activity of shipping in the Sunda Strait will also increase the threat that will arise in the Sunda Strait. The threats that will arise are not only military threats, but other threats that are increasingly complex and diverse. One of the very big threats is the circulation of drugs through the Sunda Strait. Research conducted using qualitative research that does not generalize research answers but by paying attention to the existing details, from all the answers put forward by informants in the research discussion have been adjusted to the theory of Van Meter Van Horn (1975). This theory explains that the implementation of policies to strengthen marine defense strategies through the determination of TSS in the Sunda Strait is influenced by the variables that the researchers have compiled. The results of the research based on field observations and interviews are:

1. Understanding of policy objectives

At the executive level, it must understand the general purpose of a policy objective. The objectives of the policy must be conveyed and understood by every implementer in the field. Based on the research results, policy implementers, in this case members of Lanal Banten, members of KAL Anyer, Ditpolair Polda Banten, Pengawak VTS Merak, understand the policy objectives, in this case the determination of the Sunda Strait TSS is one way to strengthen the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait.

2. Resource

In implementing the policy of success in achieving by utilizing existing resources. Based on the results of the research, it was found that the existing facilities and infrastructure in the Sunda Strait related to the strengthening of marine defense strategies, are still very limited, the lack of patrol boat facilities, especially the presence of the KRI, the limited Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) radar which is very much needed to assist carry out operations at sea, as well as human resources to support operations in the Sunda Strait.

3. Characteristics of Implementing Agencies

Based on the results of the study, it was found that the Indonesian Navy, Ministry of Transportation and Police agencies in carrying out their duties and responsibilities showed organizational characteristics that were compatible with the policy of enhancing marine defense strategies in the Sunda Strait. Each of the above organizations in carrying out their duties and authorities daily has carried out well. However, good coordination is needed in order to maintain marine defenses in the Sunda Strait.

4. Communication Between Implementing Agencies

From the results of field research with informants, it was found that communication and coordination between agencies in the Sunda Strait related to strengthening marine defense strategies had been well established. Not only formal communication but also informal communication between agencies. So that the operational implementation

of each agency can be carried out properly. However, there is a need for integration in order to synergize sea power and carry out joint operations around the Sunda Strait.

5. Disposition of the Implementers

The implementation of strengthening the marine defense strategy involves many agencies and personnel in the Sunda Strait region, not only military units but also existing civilian units. The attitude of the implementers who carry out policies related to marine defense strategies have carried out their duties properly. They carry out the regulations related to their respective agencies, this cannot be separated from the understanding they receive and also understand the objectives to be achieved. From the research that has been carried out, the researcher found that the attitude of the policy implementers has carried out their duties properly in accordance with their duties, functions and responsibilities. This is due to an understanding of the tasks they are given, as well as the training and education they receive before carrying out their duties. With this attitude, the policies that have been given can be implemented properly in their implementation.

6. The Influence of the Social, Economic and Political Environment

The success of a policy will be greatly influenced by the surrounding environment, whether the social, economic and political environment supports the policy. From the research that has been carried out, the researchers found that the influence of the social, economic and political environment in order to strengthen the marine defense strategy through the determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait was well implemented. Not only the government in terms of making regulations regarding the TSS of the Sunda Strait but the people living in the Sunda Strait with their livelihoods as fishermen feel helped and support the TSS of the Sunda Strait.

Supporting and Inhibiting Factors for the Strengthening of Marine Defense Strategies by Establishing TSS of the Sunda Strait

Based on the results of the research, it is found that the supporting factor in strengthening the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is government support through regulations and other policies, especially the PMD Vision, because Indonesia's ability to manage the Sunda Strait is a sign that Indonesia is capable of managing and utilizing one of its marine resources. In addition, there is also great community support, in this case the users of the Sunda Strait. With the TSS Sunda Strait, it automatically increases the safety of Sunda Strait users. Meanwhile, the inhibiting factors for strengthening the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait include the lack of part of the Sunda Strait user community, namely small fishermen who carry out fishing in restricted areas so that it can endanger shipping safety. There was no special operation undertaken by the Indonesian Navy in order to secure the TSS of the Sunda Strait, so that if there was a threat from the Sunda Strait it would take a lot of time to respond to this situation this happened because of the lack of KRI presence in the Sunda Strait. In addition, there is also a lack of facilities and infrastructure, in this case the sensors owned by the Banten lanal Meanwhile, the latter lacks human resources, in this case VTS crew and Lanal Banten personnel.

Discussion

Law No.34 of 2004 on the TNI states that the Indonesian Navy has the task of the TNI as the maritime element in the defense sector. The implementation of defense at sea is a task that is owned by the Navy. To realize this task, various efforts have been made, one of which is strengthening marine defense in the Sunda Strait. This strengthening cannot be separated from the threats that arise due to the increasing number of users of the Sunda Strait every year.

In the theory presented by Ken Booth in his book entitled "Navies and Foreign Policies," it is explained that, the roles that the navy have universally have three roles that are interrelated with one another, namely 1). Military role; 2). Diplomacy and Role; 3). The role of the police. In the military role, the navy has the duty to uphold the country's sovereignty at sea through elemental forces and bases, prepare for strength in the face of war, ward off

military threats that arise at sea through operations carried out, protect and guard borders at sea with neighboring countries, and protect security stability in the maritime area.

In the discussion of this research will answer the formulation of problems that have been determined by referring to the data obtained from the results of research on strengthening the marine defense strategy of Lanal Banten through the determination of TSS in the Sunda Strait. The current state of marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is after the determination of the Sunda Strait Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS).

With the size of the maritime area and as a maritime country, Indonesia naturally can maximize its maritime potential for the advancement of the nation (Mustari & Barnas, 2018). With the determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait, it is hoped that it will improve shipping safety and protection of the maritime environment so that it is well maintained. In addition, the determination of the TSS for the Sunda Strait gave a positive assessment to Indonesia and raised the name of the Indonesian nation in the international world in realizing the aspirations of the Indonesian nation to become a world maritime axis. Maritime security is no longer seen only as an effort to uphold security in a traditional context, but also to realize the maintenance of sea order, because there are many variables of objects of interest that exist in the sea, such as natural resources, means of transportation and environmental aspects (Keliat, 2009). The security operations carried out in ALKI - I, especially those carried out in the Sunda Strait, use the concept of maritime sovereignty in Indonesian waters, where the current operation uses the concept of the World Maritime Axis (Gunawan et al., 2018). From the results of research in the field that the strengthening of the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is not optimal, it still needs to be improved, namely through several discussion variables as follows:

1. Understanding of Policy Objectives

The determination of TSS in the waters of the Sunda Strait aims to provide security in navigation navigation. This is in accordance with the government's objective in implementing the Nawa Mimpri program to make Indonesia a PMD. In Presidential Decree No. 16 of 2017 concerning Indonesian Maritime Policy. It is stated in article 1, point two, that PMD is a vision of Indonesia to become a maritime country that is sovereign, advanced, independent, strong, and capable of making a positive contribution to regional and world security and peace in accordance with national interests (Presidential Decree No. 16, 2017) For the implementation of strengthening the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait, the focus of this research is how the understanding of the defense security executing agencies in the Sunda Strait region can understand and understand and implement the objectives of the government regarding Indonesian maritime policy (KKI) on factors policy in point 2 about defense and security. In reality, in the field there are still a small number of fishermen who use the Sunda Strait as a place to find fish, do not yet understand the determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait and the stipulation of prohibited areas for fishing. There is a need for socialization regarding the determination of TSS for the Sunda Strait and places that cannot be used for fishing in fishing communities.

2. Resource

In the theory of maritime strategy presented by Alfred Thyer Mahan in his book entitled *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, states "It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in. the history of the world; (Mahan., 1987). That the use and control of the sea is a very determining factor in world history. Maritime strategy is control of the sea, by ensuring the use of the sea for its own interests and closing all opportunities for opponents to use it. To protect and maintain this natural wealth, we need the right strategy to control the sea. This requires several resources, including:

a. Facilities and infrastructure

Researchers will discuss the facilities and infrastructure that can support the strengthening of marine defense strategies in the Sunda Strait. The facilities and infrastructure include the patrol boat and IMSS radar in the Sunda Strait. One of the facilities in the Sunda Strait is the Integrated Maritime Surveillance radar. System (IMSS). This radar serves to facilitate the supervision of ships passing through the Sunda

Strait (Dotulung, 2020). From the research, it is known that the IMSS radar in the Sunda Strait is currently experiencing damage.

Apart from the IMSS radar, one of the facilities it has is a patrol boat. Researchers will discuss the condition of the Lanal Banten facility, in this case the ship that is under the line of Lanal Banten. The need for patrol boats in order to create security in the Sunda Strait is an important factor. Apart from patrols carried out by the Indonesian Navy, other agencies also carry out patrols around the Sunda Strait, one of which is the Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) and other agencies. KAL Anyer is currently carrying out the ALKI 1 security operation (Pam ALKI 1), securing the Sunda Strait is part of the ALKI1 security, Pam ALKI 1 stretches from the North Natuna Sea, Natuna Sea, Karimata Strait to the Sunda Strait. With the wide coverage of the Pam Alki 1 KAL Anyer operations, it was not continuously in the Sunda Strait so that there were very few elements of Indonesian Navy ships in the Sunda Strait. Supposedly, to strengthen the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait, two ships can be mobilized at any time to support operations in the Sunda Strait. This happened because there was no special operation to secure the Sunda Strait. It needs sufficient budget support in order to fulfill facilities and infrastructure. In fulfilling the budget, it is necessary to submit an RKA KL (Work Plan and Budget of Ministries and Institutions) submitted by the work units of each agency.

b. Human Resources

Lack of human resources in Lanal Banten must also be considered because the lack of personnel will hinder the success of the operation carried out. From the results of the interview, it was found that from the number of Lanal Banten's Personnel Composition List (DSP), which amounted to 250 people, only 168 people were filled or only 61%, the lowest level of fulfillment was Officer strata, which was only 43%. In carrying out operations, personnel who are directly involved in the operations unit (Sops) are required. Meanwhile, the fulfillment in the operation department was only fulfilled around 30%.

From the above discussion, it further adds to the confidence of researchers that control of the sea can be done by building a maritime security and defense system in the Sunda Strait through good facilities and infrastructure in the form of detection devices using advanced technology and the addition of elements of patrol boats that operate routinely so that they can oversee the entire Strait waters Sunda. Strengthening the defense system in the Sunda Strait can also take advantage of technological advances to modernize the integrated sensing system between Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Observation and Reconnaissance (K4IPP) (Ministry of Defense, 2015).

3. Characteristics of the Implementing Organization

Strengthening defense in the Sunda Strait is not only the task of the Indonesian Navy, in this case Lanal Banten, but also involves various maritime agencies around the Sunda Strait. The implementation of safeguards from the perspective of civilian power requires coordination and an agency that can carry out sea security guarding and safeguards supported by a clear legal basis. So that it will make a big contribution in terms of maintaining security and order and safety at sea.

From the results of research in the field with several sources, it can be concluded that the aforementioned agency in carrying out its daily tasks shows organizational characteristics that are compatible with the policy of improving marine defense strategies in the Sunda Strait. Each of the above organizations has the authority in accordance with their respective duties so that the implementation of the assigned tasks can be carried out properly. However, good coordination is needed in order to maintain maritime defenses in the Sunda Strait.

4. Communication Between Implementing Agencies

Communication is one thing that must be carried out in every operation. With good and effective communication, the goals to be achieved can be easily achieved. Geostrategic management in the Sunda Strait is a problem that cannot be solved sectorally by one agency alone, it needs the involvement of various agencies in an integrated manner. This requires good inter-agency communication.

Good communication through the establishment of an Online Crisis Center and the establishment of the Sunda Strait Operational Control Command Center (Puskodalops) will facilitate coordination and synergize existing Maritime forces.

5. Disposition of the Implementers

According to Van Meter and Van Horn, success in policy implementation really depends on the attitude of the implementers whether the implementing agency accepts or rejects the public policy.

The attitude of the implementers in accepting or rejecting a policy cannot be separated from understanding the objectives of a policy. The implementer's understanding of the stated policy objectives is a strong motivation for implementing the policy. In addition, the understanding that the implementers get depends also on the education they get.

6. The Influence of the Social, Economic and Political Environment

To achieve strong security and defense requires reliable control of the sea (Sea Power), Geoffrey Till in the book *Sea Power: A Guide For The Twenty-First Century*, says: Seapower is clearly a larger concept than landpower or airpower, neither of which encompasses the geo-economic dimensions of human activity to the extent that power does "(Geoffrey, 2009). Sea Power is a concept that is bigger than land or air power, both of which do not include geo-economic dimensions and human activities using the sea. The word sea power cannot be separated from the word Maritime power.

a. Social environment

In the creation of a strong maritime power, a basic component is needed, namely a maritime community that has an awareness of the importance of defense and security as well as supporting maritime resources. From this understanding, we can conclude that the realization of the strengthening of the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait requires the support of all maritime components in the Sunda Strait which is consistent, this is aimed at realizing maritime security stability which is the responsibility of all citizens.

b. Economic Factors

The determination of TSS for the Sunda Strait is one of the policies taken to improve the safety and smoothness of shipping in the Sunda Strait, another positive impact is the improvement of the economy of the surrounding community. The number of ships passing through the Sunda Strait opens opportunities for the surrounding community to increase their income by providing assistance facilities needed by users in the Sunda Strait. These include tug services, bunkering services, transit services including ship to ship transfers, ship spare parts supply services, crew replacement services, including insurance services.

c. Political Factors

Government support for the determination of the TSS for the Sunda Strait can be seen in the Decree of the Minister of Transportation No. KM 130 of 2020 concerning the establishment of the Route System in the Sunda Strait. through this regulation of the Minister of Transportation, it is clear that the TSS of the Sunda Strait has a legal basis. Other government support in determining the TSS for the Sunda Strait was also evident in the preparation of the TSS for the Sunda Strait, from upgrading the VTS of Merak to informing the international community through the digital world as well as delivery at international meetings regarding the implementation of the TSS for the Sunda Strait.

Lykke says that strategy consists of goals, means and means, we can formulate this concept with the equation:
Strategy = Goals (Ends) + Actions (Ways) + Instruments (Means)

This general concept can be used as a basis for formulating all kinds of military, political, economic and other strategies.

Through this theory, it is formulated that the strategy for strengthening in the Sunda Strait is to realize the "Ends" or the objectives of security, defense, law enforcement and ensuring safety for Sunda Strait users. By carrying out the mandate in accordance with applicable laws as a means or "means." And empowering the maritime component by integrating maritime forces and making use of existing resources. Meanwhile, "Ways" are used through efforts to increase public awareness to participate in improving security, law enforcement, and ensuring safety for marine users in the Sunda Strait through improved facilities and infrastructure, governance of authority, integrated operations, training, education, socialization to the community, fostering state defense to the people around the Sunda Strait. The following is the formulation of efforts to strengthen maritime defense strategies in the Sunda Strait through strategic analysis using the Ends, Means, Ways approach in the table below.

Table 1: Implementation of Theory's Strategy

End	Means	Ways
Implementers in the field understand and can implement defense and security policies	Guidelines for the implementation of duties as well as Inherent Supervision guidelines	The implementation of an inherent supervision system so that the executors carry out their duties properly. Providing provision in the education of each institution about understanding the duties and responsibilities.
Fulfillment of the needs for facilities and infrastructure in maintaining maritime security in the Sunda Strait with the latest technology	Submission through budget planning for improvement of maritime facilities and infrastructure in the Sunda Strait	Additional budget for agencies that need to improve maritime facilities and infrastructure
The establishment of the Sunda Strait control and operation Command Center	Through policies, cooperation between agencies, regulations	A control and operations command center was formed which involved all maritime agencies around the Sunda Strait
Fulfillment of Human Resources for manning maritime agencies	Submissions for additional maritime agency crew personnel through the personnel division of each agency	Increase the number of personnel in recruitment to meet human resource needs
The reduction of violations in the Sunda Strait region, the formation of public awareness of the importance of maritime security through awareness of defending the country and loving the country	State Defense Education	The local government collaborates with other agencies to promote awareness of state defense for the maritime community and promote socialization on the policy of determining TSS for the Sunda Strait.
Implementation of special operations to secure the Sunda Strait	Policies made by maritime agencies in the Sunda Strait	Strengthening security patrols with the deployment of ships around the Sunda Strait

Source: Rahmad, 2021

Conclusion

From the results of the research that has been carried out and the discussion that has been carried out regarding the strengthening of the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait through the determination of the TSS of the Sunda Strait, the following conclusions are drawn:

- a. The current condition of the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is not optimal, it is necessary to strengthen the title of the Navy elements operating in the Sunda Strait, currently there is only one

element, namely KAL Anyer who carries out the task of securing ALKI 1 so that the presence in the Sunda Strait is still lacking, it is necessary special operations degree for handling security in the Sunda Strait related to the busy shipping traffic crossing the Sunda Strait. For security factors related to international shipping, it is currently running smoothly, one of which is the establishment of the TSS of the Sunda Strait.

b. The supporting factor influencing the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is the government's policy regarding Indonesia's Vision to become a World Maritime Axis. Apart from that, the support of the people in the Sunda Strait region has welcomed the policy of establishing the TSS of the Sunda Strait. Also maritime agencies in the Sunda Strait have good coordination, both formal and informal. Meanwhile, the inhibiting factor for strengthening the marine defense strategy in the Sunda Strait is that there are still fishing communities using the Sunda Strait who do not care about the regulations that have been set. Furthermore, there has been no special operation carried out by the Indonesian Navy to secure the Sunda Strait. Lack of facilities and infrastructure is also an obstacle to strengthening the maritime defense strategy in the Sunda Strait, the IMSS radar in the Sunda Strait is currently ready to be limited. Also lack of human resources for manning operations.

c. Efforts made to strengthen the marine defense strategy include the addition of elements of the Navy patrol through special operations to secure the Sunda Strait. Submission to repair the IMSS radar in the Sunda Strait so that the IMSS radar can function optimally again. The formation of the Sunda Strait Puskodalops, which consists of all maritime agencies in the Sunda Strait so that the handling of operations in the Sunda Strait can be well coordinated and synergized. Fulfillment of human resources must also be carried out by proposing additional personnel through applicable procedures. In addition, it is also necessary to conduct socialization and fostering awareness of State Defense for the communities around the Sunda Strait. It is also necessary to implement a policy of inherent supervision for personnel implementing policies in the field, so that the implementation of the assigned tasks can be carried out properly.

Recommendation

From the research that has been conducted by the author, the recommendations that will be given include:

a. Through the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment of the Republic of Indonesia, it is necessary to harmonize regulations in the maritime sector to make regulations that serve as guidelines for all maritime agencies in maritime security.

b. The Ministry of Transportation, in this case Sea Transportation, should form an Online Crisis Center and the Sunda Strait Operational Control Command Center (Puskodalops) to integrate maritime forces in the Sunda Strait in order to secure the Sunda Strait. Puskodalops Sunda Strait as a control center for operations carried out in the Sunda Strait starting from the field of security operations and handling problems around the Sunda Strait.

c. The Indonesian Navy, in this case the Chief of Staff of the Navy, to increase the budget for the maintenance of IMSS radars in the Sunda Strait.

d. Disminpersal to add personnel in Lanal Banten, or to provide additional education to improve the abilities of Lanal Banten members through LDD, courses and other education.

e. The Commander of Fleet 1 to make special operations in the context of securing the Sunda Strait by adding the title of elements (KRI assistance) that will be present in the waters of the Sunda Strait by taking into account the capabilities of the ship / KRI that will operate, the deployed elements can operate in the characteristic conditions of the Sunda Strait waters.

f. The Banten regional government to develop awareness of State Defense for Maritime community groups and instill the importance of love for the homeland through their respective fields so as to create resistance against emerging threats.

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