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# Qualitative Analysis of Factors Influencing the Decline of Saffron (*Crocus sativus*) Cultivation in the Valley of Kashmir, India: Need of Regaining its Legacy

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## Abstract

Kashmir is world famous for the cultivation of rich and quality saffron (*Crocus sativus*) and is one of the major saffron producing areas of the world. However, there has been decline in the production of saffron over the years and the current study is aimed at studying factors which has negative impact on the production and cultivation of saffron (*Crocus sativus*) in Kashmir. To examine the factors which has negative influence on the declining of saffron industry in Kashmir, the current study used descriptive qualitative research design to answer this research question. The researchers identified the three major saffron producing villages (Dusso, Chandhara and Lethpora) wherein major and experienced 36 saffron growers were selected using purposive sampling technique the data of the growers was retrieved from the records of Revenue and Agriculture Departments. Key-Informant interview schedule was used during the interviews which was developed and validated by two independent experts working in agriculture field. Thematic analysis was carried and colour coding of the statements were done for the themes by the researchers which were reviewed by two supervisors. The findings of the study indicate that there are various factors which are responsible for the declining of the saffron industry in Kashmir. The findings suggest that climate changes, irrigation facilities, marketing, awareness and training about cultivation, availability of unexperienced labour force, illegal construction on saffron land, clandestine of cheap saffron, adulteration, and non-availability of good quality saffron corms were the major factors found in the study responsible for declining of saffron cultivation in Kashmir and the conversion of saffron land into commercial purposes. The study has implication for the future research focusing on the factors and coming up with grower friendly interventions to protect this cash crop from declining.

**Keywords:** Saffron, Kashmir, Marketing, Adulteration, Shifting, Urbanization, Land Conversion



## 1. Introduction

Saffron (*Crocus sativus*) is a spice derived from the flower of *crocus sativus*, commonly known as the “saffron crocus”. One of the legacies of saffron farming practice for centuries in and around the Pampore Karewas of Kashmir in India is that this ancient farming system continues to inspire family farmers and local communities through their livelihood security that it provides for more than 17,000 farm families. Saffron a perpetual herb, famous for its fragrance and used for condiment, is a culinary delight. The most important part of the saffron is stigma which is used for commercial purposes. Apart from its use in cooking and preparing dishes and sweets, it also has medicinal benefits as its powdered form is used in treating various illnesses like bronchitis and cough where it is used as an oral sterilizer and as a sexual intoxicant to treat cases of frigidity. It is also praised because of its vitamin content (B1 and B2) as well as its high levels of beta carotenes. It is believed that origin of saffron is located on a vast area of earth like, Greece, Turkey, Iran and central Asia. Saffron is currently being cultivated more or less intensely in Iran, India, Greece and some other countries. According to other historical evidences saffron was brought to India by the Persian rulers around 500 B.C. In India it is cultivated in the State of Jammu & Kashmir from September to November and produces 8 to 10 tons of Saffron (Ahmad Tantry, Bashir Ahmad Dar, & Singh, 2017). In Kashmir it is mostly cultivated in Pampore town constituting 76.64% of total produce of saffron of the state. Besides Pampore it is cultivated in Srinagar (6.68%), Budgam (16.13%), Doda (2.50%) and Anantnag districts of Jammu and Kashmir (Husaini, Kamili, Wani, Teixeira da Silva & Bhat, 2010) [Figure, 1]. Saffron (*Crocus sativus*) covers about 4% of the total cultivated area of the Kashmir valley and provides about 16% of total agricultural income (Anonymous, 2008). The saffron cultivation is the second largest activity after the production of fruits in state. So, it is important to introduce the new techniques to promote the saffron cultivation modern scientific techniques must be included. Saffron is one of the most important export products and plays a significant role in the economic development of the state as it provides employment to about 5% of workforce in the Kashmir valley (Taufique, Khursheed & Ahmad, 2017). As per the government the state has an average production of 91.25 quintals of saffron in the year 2007-2008 (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2008) however, there has been a reduction in the productivity, production and marketing of Saffron during the last 10 years [Table 1] due to various factors i.e. uncertain climatic conditions, inadequate irrigational facilities, lack of availability of good- quality corms and seed material, poor soil fertility, infestation by rodents and diseases, poor post-harvest management, improper marketing facilities and increased urbanization on saffron lands. Besides that, due to its high value makes saffron the object of numerous adulteration and fraud (Ahmad Tantry et al., 2017).




Figure 1: Distribution of Saffron production areas in Kashmir (Source, mapsofindia.com)

The saffron industry in Kashmir is also contributing to employment generation to Kashmiri village women who contribute to this agriculture heritage through traditional tilling to flower picking over 3,200 hectares dedicated to the legendary saffron crop cultivation at Pampore. However, it has been facing grave challenges in production, sustainability and livelihood security with urgent need to adopt appropriate technologies. Kashmir has the huge potential of emerging as the global leader in the production of quality saffron if provided the adequate infrastructure, irrigation facilities, focus on marketing and providing the scientific aptitude among the saffron growers by adopting modern agro-technology, better pre-and post-harvesting management strategies. However, these techniques and services have not been given much attention which has led to the declining of the saffron production in Kashmir and farmers became ready to turn their land to build houses, residential complexes, and apple orchards. Due to rapid constructions the saffron land has been shrinking drastically from last few years [Figure 2 & 3]. In the present study we highlight the factors which are influencing the decline of saffron production in the Kashmir by adopting qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with saffron growers.

Table 1: Present trends in saffron production

Year	Rejuvenated under NSM	Cumulative Total	Average yield/ha	Normal	Average yield/ha
2010-11	-	-	-	3715	2.7
2011-12	331	331	4.5	3384	2.75
2012-13	943	1274	4.5	2441	2.75
2013-14	528	1802	4.5	1913	2.8
2014-15	157	1959	1.5	1756	1.5
2015-16	176	2135	5.5	1580	2.8
2016-17	79.81	2214.81	5.4	1497	2.85
2017-18	172.9	2387.71	1.64	1323.75	0.973
2018-19	74.29	2462			

Source: Directorate of Agriculture, Kashmir



Figure 2: Shrinking Saffron Fields at Lethpora

(Source: Google Earth) 3599m 33°58'19"N 74°54'52"E 1589 m]



Figure 3: Shrinking fields at Dusso Pampore

(Source: Google Earth) 3917 m 33°58'42"N 74°58'27"E 1634m]

### *1.1 Government initiatives for saffron production.*

Over the few years the saffron production has witnessed a drastic reduction and which has affected the growers economically leading to conversion of the land into commercial complexes, residential dwellings and other purposes. In order to sustain the saffron production in Kashmir which is considered finest of all saffron around the world. The local has responded with The National Saffron Mission (NSM) which was announced by then the Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh. It was introduced in year 2010-11 by Union Agriculture Ministry and under this mission the saffron cultivating farmers are given a subsidy of (Rs.2,64,000 per acre) to meet the technical and material ends to boost the crop production. This mission covers almost all technical aspects of cultivation like (drip irrigation), (mechanization), (research), and (marketing support) to come out from the crises. Under this mission Govt. put forth many steps to enhance the market availability of the locally produced saffron. The government limited the imported saffron especially from Iran as it flooded the market here because of low cost which directly impacted the state economy (Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana,2010).

To further boost the cultivation insurance scheme was launched to provide the security to the growers and cultivators. This scheme covers crops for dry spells and heavy rainfall or insufficient produce. Under this scheme the department would share 50% of its premium and the farmers have to pay other 50% to insurance companies. According to this scheme the one hectare of saffron cultivated land would be insured against (Rs 200,000) and the 12% of the insured sum would be paid for the premium (Dar & Sharma, 2016)

Another step to boost the production of saffron in Kashmir, Good Practices for Saffron Guidelines were developed by Sher-i-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology of Kashmir (SKUAST,n.d) with the aim that following good practices will reflect good production in Saffron in Kashmir which will ensure an average productivity of 5kg over a period of 4-5 years and will enhance economic benefits to saffron growers and ensure their livelihood security on long term basis. More importantly recently the Central Government has given GI (Geographical Indication) Tag to Kashmir with the view that it is very precious and costly product and would gain more prominence in the export market (The Hindu,2020). All these steps have been taking to maintain the heritage product of Kashmiri saffron. Apart from these growers are regularly given trainings, awareness programmes are being conducted, micro-credit financial help is provided to the to build their skills and help them to increase their production and cultivation.

Despite the proactive steps and services provided to growers, there has been drastic reduction in the saffron production over the last years which is affecting the cultivation as well as market outreach of this product. From the last couple of decades, growers have witnessed a declining trend of Saffron production in the valley of Jammu and Kashmir as the data also reveals. The land used for this famous cash crop commonly known as Golden Spice has shown waning trend from last one decade and growers have started moving out of this cultivation due to number of reasons which need to be explored [Figure 4 & 5]. Keeping in mind these changes the researchers have designed a study to understand the causes and factors leading to the commercialization of saffron land in Kashmir.




Figure 4: Area under Saffron (Ha.)  
 (Source: Department of agriculture, Kashmir)




Figure 5: Production of saffron  
 Source: Department of agriculture, Kashmir

**2. Method**

*2.1 Research questions*

The main research question of the study is to examine the factors that lead to the conversion of saffron cultivation land to commercial or residential purposes and also to examine other logistical factors which are contributing to its conversion.

## 2.2 Methods and Materials

The study used descriptive qualitative research design. Where in 36 saffron growers of three villages (Dusso, Chandhara, and Lethpora) from Pampore were taken into the study. The study was conducted in these three villages because they contribute highest in terms of saffron production and have witnessed higher rates of land conversions as well. The study used key informant interview schedule and the data was collected from the growers after taking written informed consent. This study recruited purposively only those persons who have been associated with saffron cultivation for at-least 20 years and possess some basic experience about the cultivation, cropping patterns, awareness and marketing. The data maintained by government revenue department were also used to prepare the list of growers who meet the criteria as mentioned earlier to avoid bias.

The major questions asked during the in-depth interviews were related to basic socio-demographic factors household composition, educational profile, land ownership, economic status, land possession of saffron cultivation and agriculture land, skill practices, trainings and awareness, cropping pattern, returns and the problems involved in cultivation of saffron, factors affecting its productivity and the constraints in the production was collected from selected saffron growers.

## 2.3 Data collection and Analysis

Written informed consent was taken from the participants who were selected for the study. The forms were given to them one day prior to the in-depth interview. Participants were made understand about the purpose of the study and it was made sure that they understand the details of the data collection. Participants were asked open ended questions and were told to answer the question based on their experiences and practices. In order to make the participants comfortable the interviews were taken in their respective houses and taking the due permission.

## 2.4 Procedure

The interviews were taken by the three researches by dividing the number of participants equally and each interview was taken for about 90 minutes. The interview schedules filled by researchers were in the sealed envelopes. All the schedules were destroyed after the analysis and generation of the themes by the researchers which were validated by two independent examiners having eight years of experience in rural development and agricultural sciences. The interviews were conducted in Urdu and Kashmiri languages using audio recorder. The interviews were transcribed and coded by the researchers using different colors to represent different factors. The statements and colour codes were reviewed by two independent supervisors in order to ensure that individual biases and assumptions did not influence the analytical process.

## 3. Results

### 3.1 Personal and Farming characteristics

The [Table 2] presents sociodemographic details of the respondents, a total of 36 participants participated in the study were in the age group of 36-75 years (mean age of 56.9 years [Table 2]). Nearly (22%) of the respondents have not been to the formal education, and (78%) had gone through formal education. More than (50%) of the respondents have reported to have chosen non-agricultural jobs over a period of time as they witnessed a downfall in the saffron production affecting their earnings. From the personal details and experiences of saffron cultivation as mentioned in [Table 2 & 3] it can be concluded that even though the growers are cultivating the saffron from years but there is lack of knowledge and awareness among the which can also be one of the factors negatively affecting the production. The results also present that although 81% of the respondents [Table 2] have gone through secondary and college education but a grower always need skill-based knowledge, awareness and right methods available to put in practice. More than half of the respondents (61.1%) have the land possession of below 3 hectares earning very minimal from the cultivation during the recent declining trends which often make them to think of switching the land to other purposes to earn good for themselves [Table 3]. Among the respondent's half

are able to adopt the skill practices while cultivating the saffron crop. In similar manner the respondents affirmed that they have not received any sort of training from the concerned agencies which sometimes put them in dilemma about the practices related to the cultivation of the saffron. Most of the growers often use traditional practices and methods while cultivating the saffron and they lack knowledge about the right ways of ploughing the land, use of unexperienced labour who often damage the corms , seasonal challenges and more importantly they have shifted to other jobs having inadequate time to put in the fields [Table 2&3].

Table 2 Socio-demographic Details

Variables	Sub-Variable	Frequency(N=36)	Percentages (Mean)
Age	Age	36	56.9 years(mean)
Gender	Males	29	80.5%
	Females	07	19.4%
Education	Illiterate	8	22.2%
	Secondary	22	61.1%
	Graduation	6	16.6%
Socio-Economic Status	Above poverty level	26	72.2%
	Below poverty level	10	27.7%
Main Occupation	Agriculture	17	47.2%
	Non-agriculture	19	52.7%

Table 3: Saffron cultivation Experiences

Variables	Sub-Variable	Frequency(N=36)	Percentages (Mean)
Land Possession	Above 3 hectares	14	38.8%
	Below 3 hectares	22	61.1%
Skill Practices	Yes	18	50%
	No	18	50%
Cultivation training	Yes	03	08.3%
	No	33	91.1%
Awareness about right ploughing	Yes	22	61.1%
	No	14	38.8%
Awareness about Season Ploughing	Yes	33	91.1%
	No	03	08.3%
Awareness about sowing of Corms	Yes	28	77.7%
	No	8	22.2%

### 3.2 Qualitative Narrations

The decline in the productivity of the saffron has caused distress among the farmers and changes in the climate and inadequate trainings have added to their distress. The saffron cultivation has lost a bit in market shares and

it has increased the share of unemployment in the region. the cultivable land has lost its fertility due to excess use of fertilizers and less availability of water in the region in order to alleviate these issues the government has proposed many schemes to enhance and faster the production of saffron in the region but the situation has not improved at the ground level as farmers are constantly witnessing decline in the growth. In most developing countries, the drawback in the operation of the dual sector approach is reflected in the adverse terms of trade, and realizing the problem of unemployment and livelihood in rural areas (Tripathy, 2009). The following are the themes generated after the analysis of the interviews with the respondent. Their own experiences help them to understand the issues causing decline in a more detailed form and understand their context of how to improve the productivity. The following section presents the experiences of the saffron cultivators under different themes.

Table 4: Themes reported by Saffron growers

Themes	Frequency	Percentages
Irrigation	33	91.6%
Marketing	30	83.3%
Adulteration	21	58.3%
Climate Changes	17	47.2%
Illegal Construction	20	55.5%
Expensive Labour	12	33.3%
Inadequate technology & Training	22	61.1%

### 3.2.1 Irrigation Facilities

The saffron cultivation requires timely at proper irrigation for the nourishment and growth seed corms for better output, but due to climatic change, irregular rainfall farmers face irrigation which requires government intervention for irrigation facility but it fails (Dass & Deshpande, 2017) . The State of Jammu and Kashmir faced an acute drought in 1999-2003 (Alam, 2007) and during this period productivity was reduced from 3.12kg/ha to 1.57kg/ ha. However, in 2004-05, favorable rainfall improved the productivity also to 2.96 kg/hectare. The government agencies under the National Saffron Mission, set up in 2010, to rejuvenate Saffron cultivation in Jammu and Kashmir, drafted measures to provide better and regular irrigation facilities to the farmers but the irrigation has not reached to the growers. Therefore, cultivators were left with no choice to switch to high-density crops such as apple, walnut and garlic, etc. The response from the agencies has not been adequate to enhance the proper irrigational facilities which could have become game changer to increase production as well as productivity of saffron industry in Kashmir (Haq and Shafi,2014)

*“The scheme proposed that the bore wells would be connected with an equal number of sprinklers. However only 8-10 sprinklers were found functional on the ground. There is no proper drainage system. Water pipes are not properly channelized in the saffron fields which added to the farmers woes”, [C1, C5, C11, C12] explained.*

### 3.2.2 Marketing related issues

Saffron has an unorganized market, as the grower has no direct contact with the customer. There is a long chain of intermediaries. The majority of the saffron is sold to brokers (Dalals) accounting 70.86 percent while 16 ppercentis sold through sub-firms and only 13% is sold through other agencies (Aga, Wani G, Khanday, & Wani S, 2008). Farmers are exploited due to ignorance regarding the prices as intervention of the government in marketing is not available to get fair remuneration to the cultivation (Dass & Deshpande, 2017; Taufique, Khursheed, & Suhail Ahmad, 2017). Government agencies play very little role in marketing of saffron and hence its distribution remains in the hands of intermediaries especially Dalals (brokers) and local traders, retailers,

wholesalers and firms who make huge profits leaving no scope for the farmers to progress (Qardri,2018) which has made the farmers to sell their to local produce who take huge margins out of the profit and affecting the growers economically.

*“ There is no fixed and reasonable price for the saffron crop .we do not get fair and full return in terms of profit from the crop also we are not aware about the market price of our crop so we sell the crop on meagre amount to the brokers as we cannot kept them long time without proper preservation. As long preservation took more cost which we cannot effort. The cultivators demand for the direct contact with the consumers. The government should intervene actively in marketing by providing direct market at national and international level to the growers so that they can sell their products themselves without any broker or intermediaries” [C2, C15, C30] explained.*

### 3.2.3 Adulteration of Saffron

Adulteration is done by mixing Iranian saffron or other low quality saffron or other ingredients like maize, plastic or wax with the original one i.e. Kashmiri saffron. Paper cuttings coated with sugar, meshed and dried flesh fibers dyed stigma of maize or corn slick fats oils and glycerin are used to increase the weight of saffron by traders later the same quality of saffron is sold to the tourists who come to visit in large numbers (Husaini, Kamili, Wani, Teixeira da Silva & Bhat, 2010). Adulteration of the saffron is also causing a threat to the declining of Kashmiri saffron at the international market. It is an emerging threat to the industry as large market share of saffron is being exported through sale of spurious saffron and thus warrants detection of adulterants and there is thus need for devising mechanism for spot detection of adulterants.

*“Most probably Iranian saffron is mixed with the Kashmir saffron due to the many reasons as Iranian saffron is produced constantly in bulk; it is also being available at cheaper price. Ironically there is no official agency to check the menace. Even government is also involved in the supply of Iranian saffron as the Kashmiri saffron is costly and is not available in abundant and is declining due to one or the other reasons” [C3] narrated.*

### 3.2.4 Illegal Construction in Saffron Fields

Unfortunately, saffron fields are slowly converted for construction purposes because of economic prosperity of the area which is located only 12 kilometers from the capital Srinagar. Despite the implementation of the saffron Act in 2007, the acquisition of land for residential purpose has gone unchecked. Even people are thinking of changing their saffron land into apple orchards or other fruit orchards which will lead to maximum profit with minimum cost or input. Land brokers of the area try to the construct the business firms in the saffron fields and with this construction of the various business plants air pollution caused by heavy traffic in the saffron belt Pampore and recently the mercury accumulation in the in the field of saffron which is closely to cement factories This will have negative impact on the saffron cultivation in nearer future as the Kashmir is known for this heritage crop. The fields also with the high rate of fossil fuels and highly increased mining which is burning by these cement factories have been pointed as the main sources of pollution. There has been very low response from government agencies to prevent the saffron fields for turning into residential colonies.

*“While having interview session with the farmers, one amongst them said that he is going to construct house over the saffron land as he is not getting the good return from the saffron production. The major reason for saffron decline is the unchecked and unabated construction activity in the areas which are meant for saffron cultivation he further blamed that government for turning the saffron fields into residential colonies as they are themselves constructing buildings on the saffron land i.e. the newly allotted degree college, Spice Park and some other government buildings around the saffron fields which in turn is reinforcing people to practice the same” [C4, C22] explained*



### 3.2.5 Climate changes

Corn sprouting flower initiation and time of flowering are the critical stages that are influenced by environmental fluctuation in terms of temperate and availability of water. Day temperature of 230 c -250c in the month of September is critical for corn sprouting and flowering starts when the day temperature reaches to 170c with a night temperature around 100c. Besides temperature, water is the critical factor for these changes during September. Any change in the critical limit of among these factors, influences the growth of the saffron plant. Especially dry summers, monsoon seasons and floods have played a key role in the decline of production of saffron industry. Due to climate change in the last some years the weather has become quite erratic and rains are either scanty or distribution is irregular, thus adversely affecting the critical stage of flowering in saffron. Kashmir faced an acute drought in 1999–2003 (Alam, 2007) and during this period productivity reduced from 3.12 kg ha<sup>-1</sup> to 1.57 kg ha<sup>-1</sup>. During 2005, favorable rainfall improved saffron productivity to 2.96 kg ha<sup>-1</sup>.

*“In recent years we are facing various climatic changes in our atmosphere i.e. global warming, dust, pollution, etc. which has badly hit the saffron industry” [C5, C28] narrated.*

*“unexpected and sudden heavy rains over a short period on poorly drained saffron soils are causing great woes as it will turn the saffron corms to rotting fungi” [C8, C33] narrated.*

### 3.2.6 Expensive and unexperienced labour

Saffron cultivation is labour intensive which requires lot of personnel from tilling to post harvesting process. A study on economics of saffron cultivation in Jammu and Kashmir reveals that human labour is the main item which cost 40.09% per hectare i.e. family labour and hired labour costs 2026.64 and 7333.34 respectively (Ganaie, Dwivedi, & Bhat, 2017). The growers have largely remained dependent on non-local labourers and saffron growers to plough or remove weeds in the fields. The labourers are not aware of the growth and sensitive nature of saffron. Often while working, they cause injuries to corms, resulting in damage to seeds, and thus the produce.

*“During early times we used to do all process regarding cultivation of saffron ourselves i.e. all members of the family used to work in the saffron field with traditional methods/ practices with zeal and enthusiasm, thus the production was more and of good quality. But our new generation shows no interest in cultivation due to their own busy schedules either in studies or in employment. For this reason, we have to hire laborers who are outsiders and have no knowledge about the saffron cultivation which could be possibly one of the reasons for decline in the productivity of the crop. It also costs high to pay for their labour” [C6, C7,C11] explained.*

### 3.2.7 Inadequate technology & Training

The world is rapidly going industrialized and use of technology is considered as backbone of every sector. The growers in Kashmir are using indigenous and traditional techniques to cultivate saffron which often produce declining results. To improve the yield and productivity this sector also needs the latest technology for improvement and development. Other countries have excelled very well in cultivation of saffron where use of technologies and trainings are put in practice at every stage in sowing, harvesting and in post harvesting process. The farmers are lacking in training and making use of the new technologies and machinery to get benefitted from them. The outdated technology is also considered as the cause of fertility loss of soil and in decrease in production.

*“So, it is true that farmers receive no trainings from the agencies and lack the knowledge about how to make use of modern technological tools machineries. If growers are provided adequate training and information the production can be increased and the grower will get benefit out of it and will make cultivation economically viable and ecologically sustainable” [C10, C19] reported.*

#### 4. Discussion

The valley of Kashmir is a major saffron (*Crocus sativus* Kashmirianus) growing area of the world, second only to Iran in terms of production. Saffron is the highest priced agricultural product due to its medicinal and other benefits. The available data shows that more than 95,000 farm families are associated with this cash crop directly or indirectly in Iran & India with 13000 families in Kashmir, therefore, there is an urgent need of creating efforts to protect this Golden Spice from declining and also to protect the economic interest of the families associated with this cultivation (Nehvi, 2010). Saffron being low nutrient plant requires a modest amount of nutrients. Kashmir, despite being one of the oldest historical saffron-producing areas, is now facing a rapid decline of saffron industry (Husaini, Ashraf Bhat, Kamili, & Mir, 2013). The total area under this crop in the State in 2012 is 3785 ha with an annual production of 11 t while almost one and half decade back in 1997 the area recorded was 5707 ha with an annual production of 15.95 t [Figure 4 & 5]. The lowest productivity of 1.57 kg ha<sup>-1</sup> was recorded in 2003–04 due to an acute drought from 1999–2003. The data clearly shows that there is need of response from the agencies in protecting the heritage crop and livelihood of the people. The fertility of the soil is reduced if saffron is grown year after year without the supply of nutrients through organic manures and / or chemical fertilizers. The soil becomes deficient to support the growth of corms and the productivity reduces very drastically. The findings of and narration of the respondents clearly presents that the use of modern technologies including biotechnology, creating awareness, trainings of cultivation, having a sound and structured market options can play a good role in preventing its decline (Mousavi & Bathaie, 2011). Over the past years the irregular rainfall, inadequate drainage systems, failed irrigation has resulted in poor fertility and affected the production levels of this crop. Lack of timely trainings and awareness programmes (at pre-and -harvesting period) to the farmers also resulted in its decline. The decline over a period of time has caused distress and worry among cultivators which resulted in huge illegal constructions, land conversion, shifting agricultural practices and illegal colonies.

Other concerns witnessed are improper marketing options which has created a way for brokers who take away huge margins out of the profit leaving the grower with minimal income. The influence of the brokers and inadequate marketing and grading options have resulted in adulteration of the crop and stretches the gap between the farmer and consumer. Adulteration and marketing of the saffron products which are both exploiting and depleting the name and fame of Kashmiri saffron as well as discouraging the saffron growers. Thus, there should be direct contact between saffron growers and consumers so that adulteration could be avoided with structured marketing channels. Once marketing is regularized the demand would increase and the farmers will get better incentives and subsequently divert more land for the cultivation of this crop. One of the positive change growers have witnessed last year 2019 was local labourers were used in cultivation which proved fruitful as non-local labours lack the skills and cause damage to the production. The latest and formidable challenge is the adverse effect of climate change as global warming has badly hit the saffron industry (Husaini, 2014). People are becoming more urban centered due to which they are converting their agricultural land into construction of buildings and complex which is more ironic. Due to less saffron production people are switching towards apple orchards fields and construction as climate no more favoring saffron. These factors have highly affected the production of saffron which subsequently resulted in the decline of income of growers cultivating saffron. Subsequently, this decline in production has led to rapid construction of buildings, land conversion into other agricultural cultivation purposes and increased the distress among the growers facing various challenges related to saffron cultivation.

The present study therefore, need to be extended in the multiple areas such as marketing, trainings and skill building programmes, irrigation facilities, prevention of illegal constructions, good cultivation practices and prevention of rapid urbanization. Prevention of mal-practices such as adulteration is the killer of quality saffron in Jammu and Kashmir needs attention and proactive efforts from government agencies at multiple levels. Moreover, the findings of the present study offer the great opportunity for future research studies in highlighting the problems of saffron industry and development of farmer friendly interventions to take this heritage cultivation to the heights.

## 5. Conclusion

From the above results and narrations, it can be concluded that there is an urgent need to revamp the cultivation, production, marketing and grading of saffron in Kashmir. The restructuring has to start from growers' fields by practicing the modern ways of cultivation, keeping track of changes that happen in cultivation and creating efforts to make good output of the saffron. The government agencies concerned with saffron cultivation should provide access to the farmers to basic facilities and services like irrigation, training, soft loans, good quality of saffron corms, advanced tools and machineries. Data from other saffron producing countries like Iran and Spain has revealed that use of modern tools and technology can make huge changes in the production and processing of the crop. It is also needed to work constructively to remove the factors which are influencing the saffron cultivation and which act as barriers in the development and marketing of saffron spice. Here, there is need of initiating new policies and programmes to protect the saffron cultivation by providing good incentives to the cultivators and implementing the rules which prohibits the illegal use of saffron cultivation land in commercial and business purposes. The study has also implication for future research by focusing on good practices and developing intervention packages to streamline the production and marketing of this heritage cash crop.

## 6. Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no potential conflict of interest

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# Synergic Effect on Election: Evidence from Nepal's By-elections, 2019

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## Abstract

Does the synergic effect work on politics, especially in elections? This article aims to seek to answer this question. The Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) and Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist Center (CPN-MC) separately contested election fray in 2017. These two parties merged with each other in 2018 and formed a new Nepal Communist Party (NCP). The unified NCP participated in by-elections that held in 2019. Could NCP produce a synergic effect in by-elections 2019? This is another point on which this article tries to focus on. This article is based on the facts of two elections published by the Election Commission. By-elections were held to fill 52 vacant posts. These posts were related to members of federal and provincial parliament, chiefs and deputy-chiefs of local levels, and chairs of ward committees. Unified NCP did not field its candidates in the two constituencies. Therefore, this article has analyzed the results of 50 constituencies. This study concluded that no synergic effect could be produced by the 2019's elections.

**Keywords:** Synergic Effect, By-Elections, CPN (UML), CPN (MC), NCP

## Introduction

Nepal has promulgated the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 through the Constituent Assembly. According to the provisions of the new constitution, Nepal has three levels of government: federal, provincial, and local. The 2017 AD may be recorded as a year of elections in the history of the country. Nepal launched elections to fulfill the members of all levels of governments' accordance with the constitution within the year. Elections were held for federal and province levels. Elections were also held for mayors and deputy-mayors of six metropolitan, 11 sub-metropolitan, and 276 municipalities, and president and deputy-president of 460 rural municipalities (RM).

The elections elect the chairpersons and members of 6,742 ward committees, too (Elections Commission, 2074 BS<sup>1</sup>).

The CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) contested separately at the local level elections in 2017 as rivals. However, they made an alliance and participated jointly in the province and federal level's elections. They became successful in their strategy and won many of the constituencies. It was only the working solidarity of the two communist parties in the election. In 2018, these two major communist parties, CPN (UML) and CPN (MC), unified and formed a new party – the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) (Poudel, 2018).

Within two years of the elections, 52 seats of the electoral office laid vacant for various reasons. In accordance with constitutional and legal provisions, the Election Commission of Nepal organized by-elections in November 2019 to fulfill these vacant posts. As mentioned above, the two major communist parties of Nepal were unified before the elections. Could the unified NCP produce a synergic effect on these elections? It is a researchable question in the field of electoral politics.

A synergic effect appears when the combination of two variables produces a better result than the one obtained by employing both variables individually. It is a situation where a better outcome is achieved by merging elements. A research scientist Matle (2017) has stated that "Synergic effect is an effect arising between two or more elements or substances, when they are combined together; they produce a greater effect than the sum of the individual effect". Studies on synergic effects are mostly used in the fields of the natural science and financial management sectors. It is rarely used in the fields of politics and elections. Human behaviors and activities will change according to circumstances, but natural elements will stay the same and produce the same result at any time. Therefore, the result of the synergic effect will accurate in natural science, but its result on politics and elections may be very changeable and unstable.

Hiramoto (2003) has examined the effect of parties' alliances have on gubernatorial elections in Japan. His analysis has revealed that electorate choice is most important to determine the election victory of candidates instead of the choice of political parties. He has concluded that candidates backing of coalitions of parties would not crucial in Japanese elections, whereas voting decisions of voters play a vital role to be elected or not of any candidate.

In parliamentary democracies for a single party to reach and operate the government is often infeasible. Thus, political parties either form a coalition before election or merge with each other and create a new party. Between these two options, electoral coalitions are common in many countries, which often affect electoral outcomes and that they influence voters' behaviors (Golder, 2006). Nepalese political parties have also practiced coalitions before and after the elections and merged with each other for achieve political strength.

In the case of India, electoral alliances work effectively, but the results via alliances seem different in different elections. In the general elections of 1999, coalitions of Congress got victory in most of the parliamentary seats; however, the Bhartiya Janta Party it's electoral alliances got more in 2004 (Jayal, 2007).

The study of Brazil by Machado (2009) has showed that electoral coalitions are very important, although the number of seats acquired via these alliances is unstable. In Brazil's elections, out of 513 legislative seats, alliances won 456 in 1998, 446 in 2002, and 409 in 2006. The results of the elections of Brazil show that positive results for the alliances of political parties.

In summary, several studies have been carried out in the field of electoral politics and voting behaviors. Scholars have mostly conducted studies regarding coalitions before and after the elections and their effect on the result. However, sufficient investigations have not been carried out in this specific field, especially in the Nepalese context. This is a very potential area of study. This article aims to search for facts about the synergic effect on elections on the base of Nepalese elections' result.

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<sup>1</sup> BS stands for Bikram Samvat (*Nepali official date that precedes to the AD by fifty-six years and eight and half months.*)

## Problems

The results of previous elections showed that many Nepalese voters chose the communist candidates while they were casting their votes. Although communists are spread into many different parties, they could collect the sympathy of Nepalese people. The first Constituent Assembly (CA), composed in 2008, had two-thirds majority of communists (Election Commission, 2065 BS). In the other CA (2013) also seemed overwhelming of communist members. Both of these CAs had other communist parties' members, too; however, CPN (MC) and CPN (UML) were the two larger communist parties as per their number of members (Election Commission, 2065 BS; Election Commission, 2070 BS). In 2017, when these two communist parties competed separately in the local level election fray, they could not get better results. Therefore, they decided to make a coalition and participate jointly in the elections of House of Representatives (HoR) and Provincial Assembly (PA). They got better result. They occupied two-thirds of the majority seats in the HoR and six PAs (except province 2) (Election Commission, 2074b BS). As mentioned above, these two larger communist parties of Nepal merged with each other in 2018, consequently forming a new Nepal Communist Party (NCP).

After the merger, the first elections were held in 2019, and these were by-elections to fulfill the vacant posts of local to central level. It is a potential area to research; whether the synergic effect was produced in by-elections, 2019 after these two parties unification. The studies have not been conducted in this area. This article tries to analyze this novel field. It tries to seek answers to the following research questions:

- Did the synergic effect work in by-elections, 2019?
- Could the NCP get political benefit after the unification of the two communist parties as per the result of by-elections, 2019?

## Objectives

The general objective of this article is to analyze the synergic effect on elections. The specific objectives of this study are as follows:

- to examine the synergic effect in by-elections, 2019.
- to analyze the position of NCP in by-elections, 2019.

## Research methodology


This article mainly builds on secondary data. The data published by the Election Commission of Nepal in 2076 BS were thoroughly utilized as the source. Similarly, concerned electronic databases and software were also consulted. Descriptive and analytical research designs were used for the analysis.

## Result and discussion

The by-elections were held in November 2019 to fill the 52 vacant posts in 37 districts include one member of HoR, three members of PAs, and 48 chiefs, deputy chiefs, and ward chairs at local levels. Altogether, 337 candidates, including 253 representing political parties and 84 independent, contested the by-elections (Himalayan News Service, 2019). Of the total candidates, 253 were men and 84 were women. These by-elections were held after the unification of the two larger communist parties of Nepal. The main objective of this article is to analyze the synergic effect in elections. It tries to examine whether the NCP could produce a synergic effect on elections and benefited from unification. Among the 52 vacant seats, NCP did not field its candidates in two constituencies; one was Baglung 2(2), election for member of PA and another was Airawat RM ward No. 2 (Pyuthan District), for the ward chair (Election Commission, 2076 BS). Therefore, only data from 50 constituencies were analyzed within the article.

In the elections of HoR that held in 2017, candidate for CPN (UML) alone got 56.16% of votes in Kaski district constituency number 2. The candidate for NCP could win the election in the by-elections (2019) in the same constituency. However, she received 54.27% of votes; 1.88% fewer than previous elections (Figure-1). The synergetic effect seems negative in that constituency. Similarly, in the elections of members of the PA also shows a negative pattern in the elections of Bhaktapur constituency number 1(1) and Dang constituency number 3(2). The candidate for CPN (UML) won the election with 40.01% of votes in Bhaktapur 1(1) in the 2017's elections. There was an additional 2.45% of votes earned by CPN (MC). The result of by-elections (2019) came differently. The candidate for NCP got only 35.47% of votes. The NCP not only lost 6.99% of votes but also defeated the election that held after the two parties' unification. As figure-1 shows, CPN (UML) had secured 56.20% of votes in Dang 3(2) in 2017. The candidate for NCP could get only 54.57% of votes in the 2019's election; fewer 1.63% to the previous election. The results of the by-elections for the members of HoR and PA show negative effect of unification of the two big communist parties of Nepal.

Figure 1: Comparative results of the HoR and PA members' elections held in 2017 and 2019



Note: Data are extracted from Election Commission, 2074a BS; Election Commission, 2074b BS; Election Commission, 2019


The result of the by-elections of the Mayor of Dharan Sub-Metropolitan (Sunsari district) showed the highest negative effect after the unification. The candidate for CPN (UML) had alone obtained 42.67% and CPN (MC) had got 22.74% of votes in 2017. The total votes percent of both parties was 65.41. In the by-elections (2019), candidate for NCP got only 44.53% of votes. This means that NCP lost 20.88% of votes in comparison to the previous elections (Figure-2). Similarly, the result of the president of the Pipara RM (Mahottari district) also showed a negative effect of two communist parties' unification. As figure-2 demonstrates, in the 2017's election, CPN (UML) had got 17.96% of votes, CPN (MC) had obtained 15.13% of votes, and the sum of total votes percent of the two parties was 33.08. But the unified NCP got only 26.36% of votes in 2019, with fewer 6.73% of votes.

The result of the president of Phalgunanda RM showed a positive synergetic effect in by-elections 2019. CPN (UML) had got 36.17% of votes and CPN (MC) had a 7.99% of votes in the 2017's elections. The sum of the two parties' votes percent was 44.16. The candidate for NCP obtained 50.48% of votes in by-elections 2019; 6.32% of votes more (Figure-2). Similarly, the by-elections result of the president of Makalu RM (Sangukuwasabha district) shows a synergetic effect. As shown in figure-2, in the 2017's elections, a candidate for CPN (UML) had got 35.13% of votes and CPN (MC) had got 17.11% of votes; the sum of both parties' votes percent was 52.24. In by-elections 2019, the candidate for NCP got 53.45% of votes. According to the result, NCP got a little profit of 1.22% of votes after the unification in Makalu RM. In the same way, the result of the Vice-President of Kharpunath RM (Humla district) showed another positive synergetic effect in by-elections 2019. The candidate for CPN (UML) had got 45.36% and CPN (MC) had got a 5.11% of votes in the elections of 2017. The sum of both



parties' votes percent was 50.47. In by-elections 2019, the candidate for NCP got 51.04% of votes, slightly more votes of 0.56%.

Figure 2: Results of Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs in the local level elections of 2017 and 2019



Note: Data are extracted from Election Commission, 2019; Election Commission, 2074c

Evidence of elections for ward chairs presented the mixed results. Some constituencies had positive and more had negative results. Altogether, the results of 18 constituencies showed a positive synergic effect (Table-1) and 24 showed a negative effect (Table-2). Among them, Thawang 1 (Rolpa) made the record of the highest point of positive effect on its by-elections of the ward chair held in 2019. The CPN (MC) had obtained 40.76% and CPN (UML) had got 2.07% of votes in the ward election of 2017. The sum of the votes of both parties was 42.83%. The united NCP got 87% of votes in the same ward in by-elections 2019; the party gained a profit of 44.17% of votes. However, very few numbers of votes (16.41%) had cast over there in 2019 (Election Commission, 2074c BS). Similarly, in the by-elections of chair of Chhinnamasta RM, ward No. 7 (Saptari), Matihani Municipality, ward No. 6 (Mahottari), Pouwadungma RM, ward No. 1 (Bhojpur), Gadhimai Municipality, ward No. 2 (Routahat), and Surnaya RM, ward No. 1 (Baitadi) the united NCP got double-digit more percent votes than the sum of CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) in the previous election of 2017. Similarly, 12 wards had positive results to NCP; however, the profit percent of votes was less than 10%.

Table 1: Sum of the votes obtained by CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) in 2017 and votes obtained by unified NCP in 2019 (in percent)

Constituency	in 2017	in 2019	Plus votes
Thawang RM, ward No. 1 (Rolpa)	42.83	87.00	44.17
Chhinnamasta RM, ward No. 7 (Saptari)	17.20	48.09	30.89
Matihani Municipality, ward No. 6 (Mahottari)	20.75	46.90	26.15
Pouwadungma RM, ward No. 1 (Bhojpur)	51.78	72.89	21.11
Gadhimai Municipality, ward No. 2 (Routahat)	20.59	39.18	18.59
Surnaya RM, ward No. 1 (Baitadi)	33.60	49.54	15.94
Kalyanpur Municipality, ward No. 12 (Siraha)	24.48	33.84	9.36
Phidim Municipality, ward No. 1 (Panchthar)	47.33	56.51	9.18
Mellekh RM, ward No. 5 (Achham)	49.08	58.02	8.94

Khandbari Municipality, ward No. 3 (Sankhuwasabha)	55.80	63.02	7.22
Balawa Municipality, ward No. 2 (Mahottari)	2.32	7.98	5.66
Pyuthan Municipality, ward No. 2 (Pyuthan)	51.88	57.21	5.33
Dakshinkali Municipality, ward No. 3 (Kathmandu)	56.40	61.37	4.97
Tribeni Municipality, ward No. 1 (Bajura)	46.46	51.26	4.80
Ruru RM, ward No. 6 (Gulmi)	50.36	52.42	2.06
Badigad RM, ward No. 2 (Baglung)	61.18	62.75	1.57
Umakunda RM, ward No. 5 (Ramechhap)	64.86	66.07	1.21
Indrawati RM, ward No. 8 (Sindhupalchhok)	61.02	61.06	0.04

*Note:* Data are extracted form Election Commission, 2019; Election Commission, 2074c

Among the results of the ward Chair's by-elections (2019), the result of Ghorahi Sub-metropolitan, ward No. 16 (Dang) provided a very negative message for the NCP. The candidate for CPN (UML) had got 52.24% of votes and the top of that CPN (MC) had obtained 19.29% in the 2017's election in the ward. The sum of these two votes was 71.53%. However, the candidate for NCP got only 35.37% of votes in the same ward in 2019 (Table-2). This means that, newly created NCP lost 36.16% of votes instead of a synergic effect over there. Similarly, the unified NCP lost in five wards more in 2019 than 20% of votes (Table-2) in comparison to the previous elections of 2017 when CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) were individually contested the election. These wards were Punarbas Municipality, ward No. 3 (Kanchanpur), Sakela RM, ward No. 3 (Khotang), Purchoudi Municipality, ward No. 4 (Baitadi), Sakhuwa Prasouni RM, ward No. 5 (Parsa), and Dhulikhel Municipality, ward No. 2 (Kabhrepalanchok).

Table 2: Sum of the votes obtained by CPN (UML) and CPN (MC) in 2017 and votes obtained by unified NCP in 2019 (in percent)

Constituency	in 2017	in 2019	Difference
Ghorahi Sub-metropolitan, ward No. 16 (Dang)	71.53	35.37	-36.16
Punarbas Municipality, ward No. 3 (Kanchanpur)	88.78	57.39	-31.39
Sakela RM, ward No. 3 (Khotang)	77.68	50.06	-27.62
Purchoudi Municipality, ward No. 4 (Baitadi)	76.66	52.79	-23.87
Sakhuwa Prasouni RM, ward No. 5 (Parsa)	33.26	11.02	-22.24
Dhulikhel Municipality, ward No. 2 (Kabhrepalanchok)	80.65	58.98	-21.67
Dharan Sub-metropolitan, ward No. 7 (Sunsari)	67.24	48.98	-18.26
Dhanpalthan RM, ward No. 2 (Morang)	62.37	46.12	-16.25
Dogadakedar RM, ward No. 4 (Baitadi)	58.96	45.07	-13.89
Bharatpur Metropolitan, ward No. 16 (Chitwan)	59.07	46.92	-12.15
Khairahani Municipality, ward No. 4 (Chitwan)	58.14	46.16	-11.98
Shivraj Municipality, ward No. 10 (Kapilvalstu)	20.51	8.64	-11.87
Haripurva Municipality, ward No. 1 (Sarlahi)	41.19	30.43	-10.76
Bungdikali RM, ward No. 5 (Nawalparasi)	71.38	60.66	-10.72
Kumakhmalika RM, ward No. 5 (Salyan)	84.96	74.44	-10.52
Balawa Municipality, ward No. 8 (Mahottari)	27.65	17.14	-10.51
Airawati RM, ward No. 1 (Pyuthan)	60.11	50.33	-9.78
Hilihang RM, ward No. 7 (Panchthar)	57.06	48.30	-8.76
Sundarbajar Municipality, ward No. 2 (Lamjung)	71.70	65.54	-6.16

Baragadhi RM, ward No. 1 (Bara)	39.63	34.67	-4.96
Khairahani Municipality, ward No. 5 (Chitwan)	50.45	45.79	-4.66
Adarsh RM, ward No. 2 (Doti)	48.31	43.66	-4.65
Malarani RM, ward No. 3 (Arghakhanchi)	50.73	47.52	-3.21
Kohalpur Municipality, ward No. 6 (Banke)	51.48	49.38	-2.10

*Note:* Data are extracted from Election Commission, 2019; Election Commission, 2074c BS

As shown in table-2, in the other 10 wards, NCP lost more than 10% of votes in by-elections 2019. Similarly, an additional eight wards gave negative results to NCP in 2019; however, the loss was less than 10%.

Evidences prove that the synergic effect did not work properly in by-elections (2019). Of the total 50 analyzed constituencies, only 21 had positive and 29 had negative results. In the HoR member's election of Kaski-2, the candidate for NCP was the widow of the incumbent. It is considered that widow of incumbent obtains more votes than others; that is called 'votes of sympathy'. On the one hand, NCP used this strategy and, on the other hand, two larger communist parties were unified just before the elections. However, NCP got less votes percent in by-elections, 2019 in comparison with 2017 in Kaski-2. Although having these double opportunities, NCP could not get profit of a synergic effect on the elections. Similarly, in the elections of two members of PA, NCP could not produce a synergic effect in 2019's by-elections. In the by-elections of chiefs and deputy-chiefs of the local level, Dharan (Sunsari) and Pipara (Mahottari) evidenced a great decline instead of a synergic effect. However, Phalgunanda (Panchathar), Makalu (Sangkhuwasabha), and Kharpunath (Humla) provide positive results to united NCP. Similarly, 18 ward chairs elections demonstrated positive results and 24 ward chairs elections showed negative results.

Why the NCP could not produce a synergic effect in by-elections, 2019? Why it could not grab the opportunity of merger of two larger parties. Answers to the question may be different, diversified, and difficult. According to Bhattarai (2076 BS), UML (party), Sun (electoral symbol), and Madan Bhandari (leader) were popular among the Nepalese left-oriented voters, but they were confused when a new party NCP appeared in front of them. Thus, the NCP could not gain the synergic effect of the unification of the two communist parties in by-elections, 2019.

According to Sharma (2076 BS), when pre-Maoist fell into grief, it was pleasure for pre-UML and visa-versa. The two communist parties have not united psychologically and emotionally yet. The mere technical and political unification between the two communist parties could not work in by-elections and the new NCP failed to get the expected result.

## Conclusion

After the analysis of the results, it is concluded that the synergic effect did not work properly in by-elections, 2019. In mathematics, 2 plus 2 equals 4. However, in politics, especially in elections 2 plus 2 may always not produces 4; it may be 5 and may be 3, too, sometimes. The result of 2 plus 2 was neither 4 nor 5, it was 3; the outcome of the by-elections (2019) proves it. Since the united NCP could not produce a greater effect than the sum of the individual effect, thus, there have not been produced the synergic effect on by-elections.

When the two larger communist parties merged with each other, all of the people (either supporters or not) imagine that the new NCP would greatly benefit after the unification. However, it could not grab the opportunity; as the result of the by-elections revealed. The election's results of higher posts create political high sounding to common people and other contestants. In the elections of members of HoR and the PA, and the mayor of sub-metropolitan, NCP obtained fewer votes in 2019's by-elections than in 2017's elections. In the elections of chairpersons of RM, NCP could produce positive results; however, these are covered by the shadow of the negative result of the higher posts. Similarly, more numbers of chair of the ward's result were negative. These all results showed the negative impact of the synergic effect in by-elections (2019).

There may be various factors that are responsible for the declining position of communists as by-elections demonstrated. This will be a potential theme for further research. These studies would trace the clear pictures. However, we can say that the result of by-elections is a warning bell for the NCP to evaluate its decreasing popularity.

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# The Credibility of Communicators as Leaders in the Peasant Movement

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## Abstract

One important aspect in the peasant movement is the existence of a leader figure. The peasant movement needs a communicator or leader figure with strong credibility and therefore, peasants want to join in the protest. A horrendous peasants protests was the self grave action carried out by the STTB peasants (The United Telukjambe Peasants Association). The peasant protest movement of STTB began when they were involved in a conflict with PT Pertiwi Lestari. PT Pertiwi Lestari claimed that the rice field land occupied and cultivated by STTB peasants was their own land in 2010 and the company asked the peasants to move from the rice field land. The research purpose is to identify the credibility of the STTB leaders in the peasant mobilization. The research is a qualitative research with case study approach. Data collected by interviewed three STTB leaders and three STTB peasants. The research findings show that the STTB leaders have initial credibility, i.e. the credibility related to social status and derived credibility, the credibility related to the leaders' competencies. Beside that, the leader of STTB also has character, competence, personality and dynamis. STTB leaders are generous, close to STTB members, and open-minded.

**Keywords:** Credibility, Leader, Peasant Organization, Peasant Protest

## 1. Introduction

Land conflicts occur in agrarian countries and these have contributed much to peasant protest movements (Choudhury 2013, Gao 2015, Lund & Rachman 2016). The peasant movement is a protest from the peasants which aims to demand a reform and provide them welfare. Scott (1975) states that the peasant movement is a kind of the peasants' anger voice for social injustice they have been experiencing. It occurred to the peasant movement in Karawang District, West Java Province, Indonesia. It occurred when PT Pertiwi Lestari suddenly claimed that the peasants' occupied land became its own property unilaterally. The peasants became restless particularly since they experienced intimidation and discrimination from the company. The peasant organization, i.e. STTB (United Telukjambe Peasants Association), was established and the peasants in Telukjambe, Karawang District, West Java

Province were invited to join to the organization and make protests. Hundreds of the peasants joined and became members of the association. They carried out protest actions, including long march from Karawang District to Greater Jakarta and the self grave action in front of the State Palace (Pratiwi, et al. 2019<sup>1</sup>).

As looking at the incidents, what made the peasants willing to join the STTB and carry out tens of kilometers long march and the extreme action? Something does not make sense to us. The researcher assumes that the leaders of the organization have good communication skills and therefore the communication established with the STTB peasants as the members is well established. Communication is the most basic thing in human life. This is because communication is an inseparable phenomenon in the establishment of a community or society to share information and so common goals can be achieved (Pehrson, et al. 2015). The success of communication depends on those who are delivering the message, i.e. the communicator. The credibility of the communicator will determine the success of the message delivering process. Credibility is the ability that the communicator has and so the audiences believe in the messages conveyed (Liliweri 2010). It can be said that the audiences will listen and believe the information that the communicator convey if the communicator has certain credibility.

De Vito (2012) explains that there are three types of communicator credibility, i.e. initial credibility, derived credibility, and terminal credibility. The initial credibility is a communicator credibility that shows the social status and position of the communicator. Moreover, the derived credibility is a communicator credibility related to intellectual abilities and competencies that the communicator possesses. Finally, the terminal credibility is a mixture of the two previous of credibility, i.e. initial and derived credibility. Moreover, Beebe & Beebe (2005) state that a communicator must have competence, honesty, dynamism and charisma. McCroskey & Young (1981) state that there are five sources of communicator credibility, i.e. competence, character, intention, personality, and dynamism. The competence is the mastery of issues that the communicator is discussing. The character shows the communicator's personality whether he is strong or tolerant in principle. The intention indicates whether the things the communicator has been conveying have good intentions or not. The personality indicates whether the speaker has a warm and friendly personality. Finally, the dynamism shows whether the things he delivers are interesting or otherwise boring. The role of the leaders is very important because they determine the success of an organization both in companies (Goren 2018), in schools or education (Ruslan et al. 2020), in government organizations (Mansyuri 2019), non-governmental Organizations (Mbogoh et al. 2019) and campus organization (Namaganda, et.al. 2018). Likewise in the peasant organization movement, the role of the leaders is very important (Borras et al. 2008, Ghildiyal 2008, McKeon 2009, Nayak 2014, Zhang 2015).

Based on previous researches, peasant resistance movements are usually born due to the organization carried out by one or several prominent figures, as those in India (Das 1982). Indian peasants at the local level are under the leadership of wealthy peasants or local elites. Moreover, at the national level, these peasants are led directly by Mahatma Gandhi, the intelligent and brave national figure. Gandhi was a leader with high credibility. He was lauded and gained wide support, particularly for areas in India where he had campaigned (Brown 1974, Kumar 1983). Otherwise, it differs from the peasant leader in Russia, i.e. Pugachev. He was a defector, a fugitive as well as a figure who had no status, no followers and no organization as well as no power (Longworth 1975). However, his dark background did not prevent him from defending the interests of peasants. He succeeded in embracing peasants to fight against injustice. Finally, what about the STTB leaders? Do the STTB leaders have the credibility and so they are able to persuade peasants to join the organization and make protest? For this reason, this research was conducted with the aim of finding out the credibility of the leaders in the organization's peasant protest movement.

## 2. Method

The research is a qualitative research with case study approach. Yin (2009) states that case study research is a study of a case in real life, in a contemporary situation or setting. The type of case study in this research is a single embedded case study. In this research the chosen case was a protest movement that the STTB peasants had been carrying out over the land grabbing and eviction. It could be said that this case was a special case when it could attract the attention of Indonesian President Joko Widodo to participate in resolving this case. This case was also categorized as an extreme case because the STTB's collective actions to demand the return of their land were in a

kind of taking a long march or walking from Karawang District to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. In addition, the more extreme collective actions taken by STTB in this case were the self grave actions in front of the Presidential Palace, Jakarta. Adults and children had carried out the actions. Creswell & Poth (2016) also state that case study research is one of a qualitative approach in which researchers conduct real-life investigations, embedded or multiple case systems, and they collect detailed and in-depth data that get assistance from various sources of information (observation, interviews, audiovisual, and documents as well as various other reports). In this research, the interviews were conducted with three leaders of the STTB organization and three peasants as the members of the organization to find out the credibility of the STTB leaders.

### 3. Results

The peasant protest movement of United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) began when they were involved in a conflict with PT Pertiwi Lestari. PT Pertiwi Lestari claimed that the rice field land occupied and cultivated by STTB peasants was their own land in 2010 and the company asked the peasants to move from the rice field land. Since then the lives of the peasants were full of tear and fear. The peasants had been experiencing discrimination and intimidation. The climax occurred in October 2016 when PT Pertiwi Lestari with the accompany of police force coercively evicted the local peasants, destroyed their land and houses, and arrested some of the peasants who made resistance. The peasants were forced to move from their cultivated rice field land and fled to Jakarta. Under the leadership of Maman, Aris and Dadi, the peasants of United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) carried out many protest actions and reached a peak in March 2017 when they held a long march from Karawang to Jakarta. Moreover, they acted self grave in front of the State Palace of the Republic of Indonesia.

#### *3.1 The Typologies of Narrators in the Peasants Protest Movement of The United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB)*

Provide dates defining the periods of recruitment and follow-up and the primary sources of the potential subjects, where appropriate. If these dates differ by group, provide the values for each group. The peasants of United Telukjambe Peasants Association had carried out many protest actions to claim their rights to the land that PT Pertiwi Lestari had claimed and grabbed. The protest actions they had carried out both at the district level (in Karawang) to the national level (in Jakarta). These actions could not be separated from the role of the three leaders, i.e. Maman, Aris and Dadi.

Following is the identification of the typology of the STTB leaders as communicators based on the background of the three leaders.

Tabel 1. Typology of the STTB Leaders as Communicators

<b>Communicator/Leader</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>Communications Practices</b>
Maman	The head of the STTB, a native son, a farmer's son, owns land in conflict land, a contractor	Persuasive message
Aris	Guidance and Advisor of STTB, national activist	Provocative message
Dadi	Chairman of BP-PAN, local activist, native son of Karawang	Storytelling and myth

#### *Maman Nuryaman*

Maman Nuryaman was a native son of the conflict area. The people in his village knew him. They called him Maman Cukil. He was a peasant child. His parents had occupied and worked on the four hectares of rice field land in the conflict area since the 1970s. His parents had passed on him to guard the rice field land. However, Maman was not interested in being a peasant. He decided to become a building contractor (project contractor). He did not live in his father's rice field land. He entrusted some peasants to guard and care for his father's rice field land.

Maman returned to his village when a number of peasants' rice field land in his village experienced damage, including his rice field land. He was astonished that some hoodlums of PTPL officers dared to damage his rice field land and the other peasants. With the SPPT (Tax Return) that was routinely paid annually, he was determined to defend the rice field land. He also established the United Peasants Association with his peasant friends who experienced the same problem with him. The United Peasants Association was legalized in 2014 and it changed its name to STTB (United Telukjambe Peasants Association).

Despite Maman did not come from activists or politicians, he was determined to defend peasants in his village. At the same time he also defended his father's inherited rice field land. He had experienced difficulties due to lack of advocacy experience for peasants. He also went to Aris Wiyono, the activist who lives in Jakarta, and he asked him to help in dealing with the conflicts with PTPL. Together with Aris, Maman became more solid. Maman supported the members of United Telukjambe Peasants Association not only in moral terms but also in material terms. He was willing to sell some of his personal assets when they had to flee to Greater Jakarta.

#### *Aris Wiyono*

Aris Wiyono was an activist from Solo but he lived in Greater Jakarta. He frequently had assisted peasants, urban poor people and workers to get their rights. In 2012, Aris assisted residents who were also the members of the United Tanah Merah Community Forum (FKTMB) to get the ID Card. He led the residents to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of the Interior Office to establish public toilet there. At that time Gamawan Fauzi occupied the position of Minister of Home Affairs. For the action carried out for almost a month, the FKMTB residents managed to get the ID card according to their domicile. He had also helped and assisted residents in Jambi and Riau to obtain HTR (Community Forest Plantation Permit) and HKM (Community Forest). As Maman and the representatives of the STTB peasants came to see him in Greater Jakarta to ask for his help, Aris immediately agreed. The activist's soul felt called to help the STTB peasants, particularly when he saw mothers and children who at that time experienced discrimination from PTPL.

#### *Dadi Mulyadi*

Dadi Mulyadi was a native son of Karawang District and he was also the General Secretary of GMBI (Gerakan Masyarakat Bawah Indonesia/Indonesian Movement of Lower Society) in Karawang District. Moreover, he also served as Chairman of the BM-PAN (Barisan Muda-Partai Amanat Nasional/National Mandate Party Upholder Young Wing) in Karawang District. Similar to Aris, Dadi Mulyadi was a true activist. He began his career as an activist of SEPETAK, Karawang Peasants Union. Dadi was an activist who often defended the oppressed peasants.

His initial involvement with the STTB and PT Pertiwi Lestari conflict was due to his research on the conflicts experienced by peasants in Telukjambe. In order to finish his thesis at the Faculty of Law, he chose the theme of the land conflicts that occurred in Telukjambe. At that time, the conflict was a serious and big problem in Karawang District. In order to find the data he required for his thesis, he frequently came to the conflict location to make observations on the land conflict issues here. As a result of frequently meeting and observing at firsthand the issues that STTB peasants overcame, over time his social spirit and activist enthusiasm to defend the peasants grew, finally he was totally involved in defending the peasants considered his own family.

### *3.2 Leaders Communication Practices*

In communication practice for the peasants protest movement, the leaders of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association as a communicator conveyed the messages to the peasants as audiences. Each communicator had his own type or characteristic when he shared messages to his audience. Despite he was lack of advocacy experience, as a native son he convinced the peasants to take part in the protest. He persuaded them to defend the land that is their right as peasants. He raised the ideas of the land ownership owned by the peasants. He persuaded them to be willing to join the STTB members and take part in the protest actions.

It was rather different for Aris. He was a national activist and he frequently had advocated a lot of peasants and marginal people. Despite he had a lot of advocacy experiences for peasants, in fact it was quite difficult for Aris as "outsider" to enter into the life of the peasants. He persuaded them to join the United Telukjambe Peasants



Association (STTB) and make protests. He explained Article 33 Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution and the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) Number 5 of 1960. He also used some sentences containing the elements of incitement to arouse the peasants' anger, such as "Karawang District Administration favors the company".

Dadi, the local activist in Karawang, was knocked his heart to "help" the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association to obtain their rights. The "assistance" he provided to the STTB peasants was to continuously accompany them, particularly in difficult times like in refugee camps. Dadi came to entertain the peasants and so they would not feel bored and returned to continue their struggle of achieving their rights to the rice field land. He frequently came and shared stories with the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association. One of the stories he shared with the STTB peasants was the Kuta Tandingan story, the story that was also a myth for the Karawang people about the greatness of an empire named Kuta Tandingan.

### *3.3 The Credibility of Peasant Leaders as Communicator*

From the typologies of communicators based on the background of communicators and the communication practices they carry out, each leader has his own credibility as a communicator. Maman was the leader and initial credibility communicator, i.e. the credibility of the communicator relating to the social status and the position of the communicator (Devito 2012). He was a native son who had a social status in the neighborhood. As a child of an old man with extensive rice field land in the village, other peasants respected Maman. He also had a high spirit of generosity. When the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) experienced difficulties during the conflict, Maman did not hesitate to spend his personal money. Moreover, he sold his personal items and therefore, he could bring the peasants to the State Palace, Greater Jakarta. Therefore, he covered all their living expenses when they were in Greater Jakarta. This generosity was a positive character possessed by Maman as a leader and communicator and became a plus in the eyes of the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB).

Aris had a different credibility if compared to Maman. Aris was a leader and communicator of the derived credibility, the communicator credibility relates to intellectual abilities and competencies the communicators have (Devito, 2012). At the beginning of his arrival in the midst of the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association, he was nothing. No peasant knew him. At the time he made the initial approach to the member peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association, it was very difficult. However, after there was news that Aris was 'able to free' the STTB peasants having been criminalized by PT Pertiwi Lestari, he became famous among the peasants. His rhetoric abilities in front of the peasants began to make them trustworthy to him. He was considered a highly intellectual activist. He persuaded the peasants through giving them an understanding on the basis of the legal arguments, Article 33 Paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution and the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) Number 5 of 1960 concerning land rights for the people of Indonesia. The peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) believed that his intelligence was able to help them in reclaiming their rights to land that PT Pertiwi Lestari had usurped. Aris also had a closeness (proximity) with the STTB peasants. While older peasants considered him as a son or younger brother, younger peasants considered him as older brother and uncle among the children of the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association.

Moreover, Dadi was also a leader and communicator with the derived credibility. He had a unique character and he was a peasant activist in Karawang District. However, Dadi was not as famous as Aris. He was also not part of the environment among the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association. However, his ability to tell stories was a big asset for him to make the peasants feel comforted and get back to fight against injustice. The closeness (proximity) between Dadi and the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) was also very close. He frequently stayed in the houses of the STTB peasants and moreover, they considered him as their family.

Tabel 2. The Credibility of STTB Leaders as a Communicators

Communicator/Leaders	Credibility	Dimension of Credibility
Maman	Initial credibility	Character
Aris	Derived Credibility	Competence, personality and dynamic
Dadi	Derived Credibility	Personality and dynamics

#### 4. Discussion

Sinamo & Santoso (2012) state that a credible leader is a leader with high integrity and he uses his power ethically and morally, fairly and correctly for each of its members. The leaders of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB) applied such a leadership. They were leaders who upheld integrity and they had consistency in their actions. Since leading the United Telukjambe Peasants Association (STTB), Maman and Aris had tried to advocate for peasants and therefore, they could regain their rights to the land that PT Pertiwi Lestari had seized. However, despite there are leaders who dedicate themselves to defending peasants, the presence of a leader in the peasant movement frequently becomes a place to seek personal missions. This is illustrated in the research conducted by Wahyudi (2005) that there are two different motives for peasant movement leaders, i.e. leaders with norms oriented, i.e. land reform for the common interests of peasants, secondly for the self-interest of the leaders themselves in a kind of social and political power.

Hartoyo (2010) finds that there is a conflict of interests between leaders in the peasant movement. This conflict of interest occurs when each leader scrambles to gain profits in a kind of controlling power and profits simultaneously. The occurrence of conflicts of interest between leaders in the peasant movement certainly makes peasants confused. In organization of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association, the conflicts of interest between leaders were not found. Otherwise, fellow leaders shared tasks for the interests of their members.

The popularity of a leader as a communicator is proven to be added value. It is found in the research conducted by Pratiwi, et al. (2019<sup>2</sup>). The involvement of artists and activists in a peasant movement is one of the communicator strategies and therefore, people are interested in participating and involved in a movement. Cangara (2014) states that there are three conditions that must be possessed if you want to be a communicator, i.e. the level of credibility, attractiveness, and strength. These three conditions are found in Mahatma Gandhi. The credibility of Gandhi is no doubt. It also has an appeal due to his popularity. He also has political power (Kumar, 1983). This is what makes Gandhi acceptable as a communicator and leader.

In fact, Aris had the three conditions despite he as in different versions. He had credibility, appeal and strength. His ability to advocate had been proven. Thanks to these abilities, Aris was known to many circles and even to the level of a minister who already knew his performance. He also has power because with the network he had built so far. However, in practice, all these conditions did not necessarily make Aris immediately acceptable among the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association. The peasants required real proof related to the issues they were facing at that time. After Aris succeeded in bringing home a number of the peasants having been criminalized, Aris was able to be accepted among the peasants of the United Telukjambe Peasants Association. This proves that credibility, attractiveness and strength are not enough to be a condition of a communicator, and it also prevails to a leader. For some individuals or groups, real proof is a must and therefore, they are stimulated to participate in a movement

#### 5. Conclusion

The credibility of the STTB leaders as a communicator in the peasant protest movement is in a kind of the initial credibility and derived credibility. The social status and competency of a peasant organization leader have added values and so the peasants participate in the protest movement. However, the peasants still need tangible proof of a leader's performance. Credibility without evidence becomes an obstacle for the peasants to trust their leaders. Evidence of work will make it easier for leaders to persuade the peasants to join the organization and protest

movement. This research certainly still has many shortcomings. Further researches are required to identify what messages the organizational leaders conveyed when they mobilize their peasants and therefore, they are willing to join and participate in the protest.

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# The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Beyond Race to Employment Discrimination Based on Sex: The “Three Letter Word” That Has Continued to *Vex* Society and The United States Supreme Court

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## Abstract

This article is a comprehensive review of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, more specifically, Title VII, which outlawed discrimination based upon, “race, color, creed, national origin, and sex.” The article traces the legislative genesis of the Act, the function of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and discusses some of the major cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts that have defined both the reaches and limits of the legislation which initially focused on prohibiting discrimination based on “race.” The article then focuses on discrimination based on “sex” and highlights the role the United States Supreme Court has played in fleshing out the parameters of employment discrimination from the 1960s through the historic decision reached by the Court in June of 2020 in *Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia*, relating to sexual orientation, transgender status, and sex stereotyping.

**Keywords:** Discrimination Based on Sex, Civil Right Act of 1964, Filibuster, Cloture, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

## 1. Introduction

In *Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia* (2020), a historic case decided by the United States Supreme Court on Monday, June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects gay, lesbian, and transgender people from discrimination in employment “on the basis of sex,” one of the protected categories under the Act (Sherman, 2020; Turner, 2020).

The United States Supreme Court had been asked to decide two discreet questions in *Bostock* and two companion cases, *Altitude Express Incorporated v. Zarda* and *Harris v. EEOC*:

*“Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination “because of ... sex,” encompass discrimination based on an individual’s sexual orientation?”*

*“Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination against transgender employee based on (1) their status as transgender or (2) sex stereotyping?”*

Justice Neil Gorsuch, a Trump appointee to the Court, authored the majority opinion and answered these two questions in the affirmative. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court: “An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. ... Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”

## **2. The Origin of the Debate**

The origin of the dispute which the Supreme Court at least partially resolved can be traced to a historic piece of legislation from the 1960’s: The Civil Rights Act of 1964—most especially Title VII—because of its inclusion of the term “sex” in its enumerated categories.

Geiling (2014) noted that “Congress had considered, and failed to pass, a civil rights bill every year from 1945 to 1957. In 1957, Congress finally managed to pass a limited Civil Rights Act, which it added to in 1960, but these bills offered black Americans only modest gains.”

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to outlaw the most severe forms of discrimination against African Americans, including all forms of segregation. In addition, the Act attacked the unequal application of voter registration requirements and all forms of racial segregation in schools, in the workplace, and by facilities that offered services to the general public.

Congress has enforced the various provisions of the Act (called Titles) under provisions of the United States Constitution, primarily Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce under Article One, the guarantee to all citizens of the equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment (Dunning, 1901), and the protection of voting rights for all citizens under the Fifteenth Amendment (Christopher, 1965).

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was previewed by President John F. Kennedy during a radio and television speech broadcast to the American people on June 11, 1963, where the President demanded that Congress enact legislation which would guarantee all Americans the right to be served in public facilities (Aiken, Salmon, & Hanges, 2013).

In commenting about two black students who had recently enrolled in the University of Alabama, but who needed the presence of Alabama National Guardsmen in order to safely attend classes, President Kennedy said:

*"It ought to be possible...for every American to enjoy the privileges of being American without regard to his race or his color. In short, every American ought to have the right to be treated as he would wish to be treated, as one would wish his children to be treated. .... Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act” to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law."*



[Registering two black students at the University of Alabama]

The bill which was introduced had its legislative origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Finkleman (2018, p. 366) notes that “The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was a fairly straightforward public accommodations act, prohibiting discrimination in restaurants, inns, theaters, and on public transportation.” The 1875 Act also sought to prevent being excluded from jury duty on the basis of race.

The 1875 law was enacted by the 43rd United States Congress and signed into law by President Ulysses S. Grant on March 1, 1875. However, in 1883, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883) that sections of the act were unconstitutional in an 8-1 decision. The Supreme Court held the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the state and local government (implicating “state action” or other actions undertaken “under color of law” (Brinster, 2020)), but it does *not* confer on the federal government the power to prohibit discrimination by private individuals and organizations. The Court also held that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eliminate “the badge of slavery,” but not to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations (see McAward, 2012).

Justice John Marshall Harlan (the only Southerner on the Court) provided the lone dissent (see Liu, 2008). Harlan wrote: “These authorities are sufficient to show that a keeper of an inn is in the exercise of a quasi public employment. The law gives him special privileges and he is charged with certain duties and responsibilities to the public. The public nature of his employment forbids him from discriminating against any person asking admission as a guest on account of the race or color of that person” (*Civil Rights Cases*, 1883, p. 41).

President Kennedy’s vision for a new civil right bill included provisions to ban all forms of discrimination in public accommodations while enabling the United States Attorney General to join in lawsuits against state governments which operated or encouraged the formation of segregated schools. President Kennedy was convinced that that Supreme Court would change the views expressed in the *Civil Rights Cases* and uphold new civil rights legislation based on a more modern view of congressional authority under the Constitution.

On June 19, 1963, Congressman Emmanuel Celler, a New York Democrat and Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. 7152—what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964—in the House of Representatives.

### 2.1. The Legislative and Political Process

The history of the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a unique view into the times and politics of the era. President Kennedy understood that he would be required to build a bipartisan coalition in the House and Senate in order to pass civil rights legislation, realizing that many members of his own party (most especially from the South) would not support the passage of a civil rights bill under any circumstances. President Kennedy sought allies in the Congress. One such ally was William McCulloch, a conservative Republican Congressman from Ohio, but who was an early supporter of the bill and a long-time supporter of civil rights. The August 1963 March on Washington proved to be a pivotal moment for the civil rights movement. The now iconic “*I Have a Dream*” speech of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. at the Lincoln Memorial seemed to galvanize public opinion in support of the legislation (Godwin, Houghton, Neck, & Mohan, 2011).



As Chairman of the drafting committee in the House of Representatives, Congressman Celler assured that the bill would receive a favorable hearing in the Judiciary Committee. There was one unexpected complication or rather “twist.” More liberal Democratic and Republican members (including a West Virginia Congressman, Arch Moore, whose daughter serves today as a member of the United States Senate) saw this as an unique opportunity to affect real change and crafted a bill which included calling for a fair employment section that would ban discrimination by *private employers*, as well as a section that expanded the power of the Attorney General to intervene in Southern civil rights cases. “Fearing that the bill would become impossible to pass (Senators Mansfield, the Democratic Majority Leader, and Senator Everett Dirksen, the Republican leader, did not favor provisions relating to public accommodations) Kennedy himself had to intervene, creating a compromise that kept the fair employment section but limited the power of the Justice Department” (Geiling, 2014).

The bill passed out of the House Judiciary Committee to the House Rules Committee on November 20, 1963. The Rules Committee was chaired by an avowed segregationist, Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia (Dierenfield, 1981). On November 22, 1963, however, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, and the future of the Civil Rights Act seemed to be in doubt.

President Lyndon Johnson decided to take up the mantle of the assassinated President on the issue of civil rights. President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress on November 27, 1963, five days after President Kennedy's death, and stated in somber terms: “We have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for 100 years or more. It is time now to write the next chapter, and to write it in the books of law.”

Not completely unexpectedly, President Johnson became personally involved in the legislative process. (He had served as Senate Majority Leader from 1955 through January of 1961 when he was sworn in as Vice President.) Under normal Senate procedures, the bill would have been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired by United States Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi. Eastland was an unabashed segregationist and was firmly opposed to the bill (Zwiers, 2015). Senator Eastland was quoted as saying:



“The people of the South are expected to remain docile while their civilization and culture are destroyed, while their segregation statutes are repealed by Federal action, and while the white race is destroyed under the false guise of another civil-rights bill. We are expected to remain docile while the pure blood of the South is mongrelized by the barter of our heritage by northern politicians in order to secure political favors from Red mongrels in the slums of the cities of the East and West” (Quote Park.com, 2020).

However, Senator Mansfield took a “novel approach” to prevent the bill from being assigned to Judiciary Committee and assured that the bill would immediately be sent to the Senate floor for debate. McWhite (2017, p. 946) noted: “As chair, Eastland managed to obstruct most floor votes designed to end segregation and safeguard voting rights for all citizens. Eventually, Senate leadership took the rare action of sidestepping the traditional committee process to gain passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”

The Senate Historical Office (2019) has provided the following background:

“To pass a civil rights bill in 1964, the Senate proponents of that bill developed a [three-part strategy](#). First, Majority Leader [Mike Mansfield](#) maneuvered the bill away from the Judiciary Committee and made it the Senate’s pending business. Second, a bipartisan legislative team of senators and staff, led by Majority Whip [Hubert Humphrey](#) and Minority Whip [Thomas Kuchel](#), developed a plan [to defeat a well-organized filibuster](#). Finally, they enlisted the aid of Minority Leader [Everett Dirksen](#). Only Dirksen could provide the Republican votes needed to [invoke cloture](#) and bring about passage of the bill. ‘The bill can’t pass unless you get Ev Dirksen,’ President Lyndon Johnson told Hubert Humphrey. ‘You get in there to see Dirksen. You drink with Dirksen! You talk with Dirksen. You listen to Dirksen.’”

When the bill came before the full Senate for debate on March 30, 1964, the "Southern Bloc" of 18 southern Democratic Senators and one Republican Senator (Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa) led by Senator Richard Russell of Georgia (a long-time mentor and protégé of President Johnson) launched a filibuster in order to prevent its passage (Perry & Powe, 2004, p. 661). Reflecting the deep societal divisions of the day, Russell stated: "We will resist to the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about social equality and intermingling and amalgamation if the races in our states."

Strong opposition to the bill also came from Senator Strom Thurmond (he would later officially join the Republican Party in 1964) who said: "This so-called Civil Rights Proposals, which the President has sent to Capitol Hill for enactment into law, are unconstitutional, unnecessary, unwise and extend beyond the realm of reason. This is the worst civil-rights package ever presented to the Congress and is reminiscent of the Reconstruction and actions of the radical Republicans" (quoted in Federer, 2019).

After 54 days of filibuster, Senators Humphrey, Mansfield, Dirksen, and Kuchel introduced a substitute bill that they hoped would attract enough Republican votes in addition to keeping the core “liberal” pro-civil rights Democrats behind the legislation in order to end the filibuster.

On the morning of June 10, 1964, Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) completed remarks that he had begun 14 hours and 13 minutes earlier opposing the legislation (Price, 2019). Until then, the measure had been before the Senate for 60 working days, including six Saturdays. With six wavering senators providing a four-vote victory margin on ending the filibuster (at that time, a cloture motion ending debate required 67 affirmative votes), the final tally stood at 71 to 29, ending debate on the measure. The future Republican nominee against President Johnson in 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, voted against ending the debate, and later against the bill itself, stating that the bill is a "threat to the very essence of our basic system." [This vote may have assured his selection as the Republican nominee against President Johnson in 1964, but may have doomed his chances against the President in the fall elections.]

The historical implications of invoking cloture on the bill cannot be overstated (Senate Historical Office, 2019). The Senate had never in its history been able to muster enough votes to cut off a filibuster on a civil rights bill. In

fact, only once in the 37 years since 1927 had it agreed to invoke cloture on any measure. Finally, on June 19, after 83 days of debate and parliamentary maneuvering, the United States Senate voted 73-27 to pass the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute bill. The final “Yes” votes included 46 Democrats and 27 Republicans — the “No” votes were 6 Republicans and 21 Democrats. The Senate compromise bill was quickly passed by the House **290–130 after it was passed through a House-Senate Conference Committee, and was** signed into law by President Johnson on July 2, 1964 — a year and 22 days after President Kennedy’s historic speech calling for a new civil rights bill.



**U. S. President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Behind him is Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., July 2nd, 1964**

Perhaps the most dramatic moment during the cloture vote came when Senator Clair Engle of California was wheeled into the chamber. Senator Engle, suffering from terminal brain cancer, was unable to speak. When his name was called, he pointed to his left eye, signifying his affirmative vote. Senator Engle died seven weeks later (Son, 2015).

[See Appendix I: Key Players in the Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]

### **3. Major Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964**

The Act is divided into several sections or “Titles” which were designed to address specific problems which President Kennedy had identified in American society that prevented many Americans, but most especially certain impacted groups, from fully participating in the promises of equal protection under the United States Constitution. However, in its most important provisions, the bill was designed to eradicate discrimination against African-American citizens.

**Title I** of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred unequal application of voter registration requirements. Although this provision required that all voting rules, provisions, and procedures be uniform regardless of race, it did not eliminate the administration of so-called *good character and literacy tests*, which was the predominant method used to exclude African American voters—most especially in the South. This was later seen as a major flaw of the legislation.

### 3.1. A Brief Detour: The Voting Rights Act of 1965: Progeny of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

In response to *Lassiter v. Northhampton Board of Elections* (1959), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that literacy tests were not necessarily violations of Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor of the Fifteenth Amendment (see Christopher, 1965), Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was specifically designed to remove the poll tax and unfair literacy tests and provided for federal oversight of voter registration in states where less than 50 percent of the non-white population had not registered to vote.

Literacy tests were considered as the most egregious forms of discrimination. From the 1890s to the 1960s, many state governments initiated “poll taxes” (see Highton, 2004) and administered literacy tests to prospective voters purportedly to test their fitness to vote as part of their voter registration process. However, white voters were generally exempted from paying a poll tax or the administration of a literacy test if they could meet alternate requirements that in practice excluded the vast majority of African Americans from voting, such as a “grandfather clause” which allowed any person who had been granted the right to vote before 1867 to continue voting without the requirement to take a literacy test, proof of ownership of property, or a finding of “good moral character.”

Since most African Americans had been enslaved prior to the 1860s and did not have the right to vote, grandfather clauses prevented them from voting even after they had won their freedom from slavery (see *Grimm v. U.S.*, 1915).

Quigley (2017, p. 60) provides an example of these discriminatory practices from the State of Louisiana:

“In 1960, the legislature tried to change the qualifications for new voter registration by authorizing a constitutional amendment election to require every new voter to have good character, pass a literacy test, and understand the qualifications to be eligible to vote. This law absolutely exempted from its requirements those already registered to vote, but defined the other qualifications in the following way:

(A) Good Character "One who has committed any of the following acts shall not be considered of good character:" (i) "given birth to an illegitimate child ... or proven to be ... father of an illegitimate child," (ii) "lived with another in a 'common law' marriage", (iii) convicted of a felony without full pardon, or (iv) convicted to 90-180 days in jail for misdemeanor, "other than traffic and/or game law violations." (B) Literacy eligible voter must also "be able to read and write ... and shall demonstrate his ability to do so when he applies ... by reading and the writing ... of any portion of the preamble to the Constitution of the United States" EXCEPT that the "inability of any person to read or write for any reason, who is registered to vote as of November 8, 1960, shall not be grounds for removal of such person from the registration rolls." (C) Understanding eligible voter must finally "be able to understand and give a reasonable interpretation of any section of either [the U.S. or state] Constitution when read to him by the registrar, and he must be well disposed to the good order and happiness of the State of Louisiana ... shall demonstrate ... [this disposition] by executing an affidavit affirming that he will faithfully and fully abide by all of the laws of the State of Louisiana.”

Ramirez and Williams (2019, p. 120) commented:

“The impact of the 1965 Act was immediate and dramatic. By 1968, more than one million new Black voters were registered, a figure that included more than 50 percent of the Black voting-age population in every southern state. The most dramatic immediate change occurred in Alabama, where the percentage of Black Americans registered to vote rose from 11 percent in 1956 to 51.2 percent in 1966.

Over the longer term, the Act delivered impressive (though not perfect) results as the number of registered Black voters continued to climb and the historic gaps between Black and White registration rates narrowed. In addition, there was significant growth in the number of Black elected officials. Most notably, by the time the Supreme Court heard *Shelby County v. Holder* (2013), "African-American voter turnout ha[d] come to exceed White voter turnout in five of

the six States originally covered by Section 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent."

### 3.2. Beyond Voting Rights: Other Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

**Title II** of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination or segregation in motels, hotels, theatres, restaurants and other public accommodations (public gathering places, educational institutions, parks, lodging facilities) which were engaged in interstate commerce based on race, ethnicity, or gender. A public accommodation was defined as any establishment that leases, rents, or sells goods and provides services to the general public.

**Title III** of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited state and municipal governments from barring access to public facilities based on an individual's religion, gender, race, or ethnicity.

**Title IV** of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encouraged the desegregation of public schools and enabled the United States Attorney General to initiate suits to enforce the Act.

**Title V** empowered the United States Commission on Civil Rights Civil, which had been established in 1957, to further investigate and act on allegations of discrimination (Lhamon, 2018).

**Title VI** of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrimination on the basis of race, creed, and national origin in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance or funding.

**Title VII** banned discrimination by employers on the basis of race, religion, color, sex or national origin in the employment sphere. It also added protections for individuals "associated with other races," such as individuals involved in an interracial marriage. Employers were prohibited from discriminating in any phase of employment including hiring, recruiting, pay, termination, and promotions. However, the Act provided for certain limited "Bona fide occupational qualifications" or exceptions to the Act (Thompson, 2006; Hunter, Shannon, & Amoroso, 2019).

As noted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1982):

"In §703(e)(1), Title VII provides an exception to its prohibition of discrimination based on *sex, religion, or national origin*. That exception, called the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), recognizes that in some extremely rare instances a person's sex, religion, or national origin may be reasonably necessary to carrying out a particular job function in the normal operation of an employer's business or enterprise. The protected class of race is not included in the statutory exception and clearly cannot, under any circumstances, be considered a BFOQ for any job."

**Title VIII** created a record of voter registration and data for use by the Commission on Civil Rights.

**Title IX** provided for the removal of civil rights trials with all white juries or segregationist judges to federal courts in order to secure a "fair trial" (see Wasserman, 1994; Dittman, 1985).

**Title X** established *Community Relations Services* (CRS) to investigate allegations of discrimination in community disputes in order to help resolve and prevent racial and ethnic conflict and violence. The mission of CRS is to "provide violence prevention and conflict resolution services for community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, or national origin."

The mandate of the CRS was expanded in 2009 under the *Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act* (2009) (Boram, 2016) to include working with communities to prevent and respond to alleged hate crimes based on actual or perceived race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or disability. According to the United States Department of Justice (2020), "With its unique mission, CRS

is the only federal agency dedicated to assisting state and local governments, private and public organizations, law enforcement agencies, tribal communities, and community groups to resolve conflicts based on these aspects of identity.”

**Title XI** established harsher penalties for violating the Civil Rights Act.

#### 4. Important Supreme Court Cases Interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Supreme Court has been called up on many occasions to interpret the constitutionality and reaches of some of the more important elements of the Act. The following is a summary of some of the important decisions of the United States Supreme Court relating to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Justia, 2020). In addition, a 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit case is discussed because of its importance regarding the awarding of attorney’s fees in discrimination cases.

- **Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States (1964)**

“Appellant, the owner of a large motel in Atlanta, Georgia, which restricts its clientele to white persons, three-fourths of whom are transient interstate travelers, sued for declaratory relief and to enjoin enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contending that the prohibition of racial discrimination in places of public accommodation affecting commerce exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and violated other parts of the Constitution. A three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II, §§ 201(a), (b)(1) and (c)(1), the provisions attacked, and, on appellees' counterclaim, permanently enjoined appellant from refusing to accommodate Negro guests for racial reasons.”

*Held:*

“1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place of public accommodation serving interstate travelers.

(a) The interstate movement of persons is "commerce" which concerns more than one State.

(b) The protection of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause whether or not the transportation of persons between States is "commercial."

(c) Congress' action in removing the disruptive effect which it found racial discrimination has on interstate travel is not invalidated because Congress was also legislating against what it considered to be moral wrongs.

(d) Congress had power to enact appropriate legislation with regard to a place of public accommodation such as appellant's motel even if it is assumed to be of a purely "local" character, as Congress' power over interstate commerce extends to the regulation of local incidents thereof which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce. (2) The prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting commerce does not violate the Fifth Amendment.”

The Supreme Court cited the relevant portions of Section 201 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that dealt with public accommodations:

“Sec. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:

(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;

(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station; (3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and

(4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment” (Justia, 2020).

- **Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)**

“Appellees, whose restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, caters to local white customers with take-out service for Negroes, serving food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce, sued to enjoin appellants from enforcing against their restaurant and others Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which they claimed was unconstitutional. A three-judge District Court granted an injunction, holding that there was no demonstrable connection between food purchased in interstate commerce and sold in a restaurant and Congress' conclusion that discrimination in the restaurant would affect commerce so as to warrant regulation of local activities to protect interstate commerce.”

*Held:*

“1. Since interference with governmental action has occurred and the constitutionality of Title II is before the Court in a companion case, the Court reaches the merits of this case by considering the complaint as an application for declaratory judgment, instead of denying relief for want of equity jurisdiction as it would ordinarily do on the ground that appellees should have waited to pursue the statutory procedures for adjudication of their rights.

2. Congress acted within its power to protect and foster commerce in extending coverage of Title II to restaurants serving food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce, since it had ample basis to conclude that racial discrimination by such restaurants burdened interstate trade” (Justia, 2020).

- **Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1974)**

“Negro employees at respondent's generating plant brought this action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, challenging respondent's requirement of a high school diploma or passing of intelligence tests as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs at the plant. These requirements were not directed at or intended to measure ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. While § 703(a) of the Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify employees to deprive them of employment opportunities or adversely to affect their status because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, § 703(h) authorizes the use of any professionally developed ability test, provided that it is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate. The District Court found that respondent's former policy of racial discrimination had ended, and that Title VII, being prospective only, did not reach the prior inequities. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, rejecting the holding that residual discrimination arising from prior practices was insulated from remedial action, but agreed with the lower court that there was no showing of discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the diploma and test requirements. It held that, absent such discriminatory purpose, use of the requirements was permitted, and rejected the claim that, because a disproportionate number of Negroes was rendered ineligible for promotion, transfer, or employment, the requirements were unlawful unless shown to be job-related.

*Held:*

“1. The Act requires the elimination of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race, and if, as here, an employment practice that operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, it is prohibited, notwithstanding the employer's lack of discriminatory intent.

2. The Act does not preclude the use of testing or measuring procedures, but it does proscribe giving them controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance” (Justia, 2020).

- **Washington v. Davis (1976)**

“Respondents Harley and Sellers, both Negroes (hereinafter respondents), whose applications to become police officers in the District of Columbia had been rejected, in an action against District of Columbia officials (petitioners) and others, claimed that the Police Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test (Test 21), were racially discriminatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Test 21 is administered generally to prospective Government employees to determine whether applicants have acquired a particular level of verbal skill. Respondents contended that the test bore no relationship to job performance, and excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro applicants. Focusing solely on Test 21, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The District Court, noting the absence of any claim of intentional discrimination, found that respondents' evidence supporting their motion warranted the conclusions that (a) the number of black police officers, while substantial, is not proportionate to the city's population mix; (b) a higher percentage of blacks fail the test than whites; and (c) the test has not been validated to establish its reliability for measuring subsequent job performance. While that showing sufficed to shift the burden of proof to the defendants in the action, the court concluded that respondents were not entitled to relief, and granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment, in view of the facts that 44% of new police recruits were black, a figure proportionate to the blacks on the total force and equal to the number of 20- to 29-year-old blacks in the recruiting area; that the Police Department had affirmatively sought to recruit blacks, many of whom passed the test but failed to report for duty; and that the test was a useful indicator of training school performance (precluding the need to show validation in terms of job performance), and was not designed to, and did not, discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks. Respondents on appeal contended that their summary judgment motion (which was based solely on the contention that Test 21 invidiously discriminated against Negroes in violation of the Fifth Amendment) should have been granted.

The Court of Appeals reversed, and directed summary judgment in favor of respondents, having applied to the constitutional issue the statutory standards enunciated in *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*(1974), which held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits the use of tests that operate to exclude members of minority groups unless the employer demonstrates that the procedures are substantially related to job performance. The court held that the lack of discriminatory intent in the enactment and administration of Test 21 was irrelevant; that the critical fact was that four times as many blacks as whites failed the test; and that such disproportionate impact sufficed to establish a constitutional violation, absent any proof by petitioners that the test adequately measured job performance.”

*Held:*

“1. The Court of Appeals erred in resolving the Fifth Amendment issue by applying standards applicable to Title VII cases.

(a) Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose.

(b) The Constitution does not prevent the Government from seeking, through Test 21, modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees, rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence, particularly where the job requires special abilities to communicate orally and in writing; and respondents, as Negroes, could no more ascribe their failure to pass the test to denial of equal protection than could whites who also failed.

(c) The disproportionate impact of Test 21, which is neutral on its face, does not warrant the conclusion that the test was a purposely discriminatory device, and, on the facts before it, the District Court properly held that any inference of discrimination was unwarranted.

(d) The rigorous statutory standard of Title VII involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where, as in this case, special racial impact, but no discriminatory purpose, is claimed. Any extension of that statutory standard should await legislative prescription.

2. Statutory standards similar to those obtaining under Title VII were also satisfied here. The District Court's conclusion that Test 21 was directly related to the requirements of the police training program, and that a positive relationship between the test and that program was sufficient to validate the test (wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual performance as a police officer) is fully supported on the record in this case, and no remand to establish further validation is appropriate.

The court further ruled that: "Racial discrimination by the state must contain two elements: a racially disproportionate impact and discriminatory motivation on the part of the state actor" (Justia, 2020).

- **Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal (1982) (7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals)**

"The plaintiffs in this case are female workers who were employed by the defendant. In 1972, they filed a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the defendant had engaged in the practices of segregated hiring and seniority rosters.

In 1979, the parties reached a settlement favorable to the plaintiffs, amounting to \$9,318,000 in cash and pension benefits, in addition to reinstatement of 296 terminated class members to active employment with full seniority. The defendant also agreed to pay attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, in an amount to be established by the district court.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs applied to the district court for an allowance of attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), with an initial amount of \$1,510,768 for the number of hours worked times the hourly rates for the plaintiffs' eleven attorneys. The plaintiffs also sought additional allowances for the risks of litigation and quality of representation.

The district court allowed a fee of \$833,679, which included an initial amount of \$583,679 for hours times hourly rates, \$50,000 for the risks of litigation, and \$200,000 for the quality of representation.

The plaintiffs have appealed this fee award, claiming that the district court erred in lowering the hourly rates and number of hours worked. The plaintiffs further claim that the district court abused its discretion in awarding only \$250,000 for risk and quality. The defendant has filed a cross-appeal, challenging only the additional \$250,000 awarded for risk and quality as too generous.

Thus, the issues raised by this appeal concerning the district court's award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs, pursuant to Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), are as follows:

1. Did the district court err in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to refuse to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs for time spent persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts on account of discrimination in employment, although these efforts by the plaintiffs led to the settlement of the Title VII action?

2. Did the district court err in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to lower the hourly rates customarily charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys to rates within the range of hourly rates customarily charged by attorneys in the locality where the district court sits? 3. Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding to the plaintiffs additional fees of \$50,000 for the risks of litigation and \$200,000 for the quality of representation?

*Held:*

"The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to refuse to award attorneys' fees for the time spent by the plaintiffs persuading the federal government to debar the defendant from its federal contracts. The Court of Appeals also found that the district court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it was required to lower the hourly rates



customarily charged by the plaintiffs' attorneys to rates customarily charged by attorneys in South Bend, Indiana, where the district court sits.

The Court of Appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding \$50,000 for risks and \$200,000 for the quality of representation. However, in light of the Court's conclusion as to the initial amount determined by the district court, it will be necessary that on remand the district court also reconsider the award of \$200,000 for quality of the services rendered."

- **Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989)**

"Jobs at petitioners' Alaskan salmon canneries are of two general types: unskilled "cannery jobs" on the cannery lines, which are filled predominantly by nonwhites; and "noncannery jobs," most of which are classified as skilled positions and filled predominantly with white workers, and virtually all of which pay more than cannery positions. Respondents, a class of nonwhite cannery workers at petitioners' facilities, filed suit in the District Court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging, *inter alia*, that various of petitioners' hiring/promotion practices were responsible for the workforce's racial stratification and had denied them employment as noncannery workers on the basis of race. The District Court rejected respondents' claims, finding, among other things, that nonwhite workers were overrepresented in cannery jobs because many of those jobs were filled under a hiring hall agreement with a predominantly nonwhite union. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed in pertinent part, holding, *inter alia*, that respondents had made out a *prima facie* case of disparate impact in hiring for both skilled and unskilled noncannery jobs, relying solely on respondents' statistics showing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in cannery jobs and a low percentage of such workers in noncannery positions. The court also concluded that, once a plaintiff class has shown disparate impact caused by specific, identifiable employment practices or criteria, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the challenged practice's business necessity.

*Held:*

"1. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a comparison of the percentage of cannery workers who are nonwhite and the percentage of noncannery workers who are nonwhite makes out a *prima facie* disparate impact case. Rather, the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market. *Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States (1977)*. With respect to the skilled noncannery jobs at issue, the cannery workforce in no way reflected the pool of job applicants or the *qualified* labor force population. Petitioners' selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a disparate impact on nonwhites if the absence of minorities holding such skilled jobs reflects a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants for reasons that are not petitioners' fault. With respect to the unskilled noncannery jobs, as long as there are no barriers or practices deterring qualified nonwhites from applying, the employer's selection mechanism probably does not have a disparate impact on minorities if the percentage of selected nonwhite applicants is not significantly less than the percentage of qualified nonwhite applicants. Where this is the case, the percentage of nonwhite workers found in other positions in the employer's labor force is irrelevant to a *prima facie* statistical disparate impact case. Moreover, isolating the cannery workers as the potential labor force for unskilled noncannery jobs is both too broad -- because the majority of cannery workers did not seek noncannery jobs -- and too narrow -- because there are many qualified persons in the relevant labor market who are not cannery workers.

Under the Court of Appeals' method of comparison, any employer having a racially imbalanced segment of its workforce could be hauled into court and made to undertake the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the business necessity of its selection methods. For many employers, the only practicable option would be the adoption of racial quotas, which has been rejected by this Court and by Congress in drafting Title VII. The Court of Appeals' theory is also flawed because, if minorities are overrepresented in cannery jobs by virtue of petitioners' having contracted with a predominantly nonwhite union to fill those positions, as the District Court found, petitioners could eliminate respondents' *prima facie* case simply by ceasing to use the union, *without making any change whatsoever* in their hiring practices for the noncannery positions at issue.

2. On remand for a determination whether the record will support a *prima facie* disparate impact case on some basis other than the racial disparity between cannery and noncannery workers, a mere showing that

nonwhites are underrepresented in the at-issue jobs in a manner that is acceptable under the standards set forth herein will not alone suffice. Rather, the courts below must also require, as part of respondents' *prima facie* case, a demonstration that the statistical disparity complained of is the result of one or more of the employment practices respondents are attacking here, specifically showing that each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites.

This specific causation requirement is not unduly burdensome, since liberal discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records, and since employers falling within the scope of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures must maintain records disclosing the impact of tests and selection procedures on employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex, or ethnic group.

3. If, on remand, respondents establish a *prima facie* disparate impact case with respect to any of petitioners' practices, the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate business justification for those practices will shift to petitioners, but the burden of persuasion will remain with respondents at all times. This rule conforms with the usual method for allocating persuasion and production burdens in the federal courts and with the rule in disparate treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment practice was based solely on a legitimate, neutral consideration. *See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981)*. To the extent that some of this Court's decisions speak of an employer's "burden of proof" with respect to the business justification defense, they should be understood to mean an employer's burden of production, not persuasion.

Even if respondents cannot persuade the trier of fact on the business necessity question, they may still prevail by coming forward with alternatives that reduce the disparate impact of petitioners' current practices, provided such alternatives are equally effective in achieving petitioners' legitimate employment goals in light of the alternatives' costs and other burdens" (Justia, 2020).

## 5. The Critical Role of the EEOC

The **Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)** is a government agency established on July 2, 1965, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to "ensure equality of opportunity by vigorously enforcing federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment"—particularly discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex, color, national origin, age, or disability. The EEOC is headquartered in Washington, D.C. and has 53 field offices throughout the United States. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees, as well as colleges and universities (both public and private), employment agencies, and labor organizations.

The following is a brief summary of the legislation which falls under the enforcement powers of the EEOC:

- **The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)** protects men and women who perform "substantially equal work" in the same establishment from sex-based wage discrimination.

According to Saba (2019, p. 778)

"Courts utilize a burden-shifting analysis to determine whether the Equal Pay Act has been violated. First, the plaintiff must make a *prima facie* showing of discrimination by establishing that the employer paid different wages to employees of opposite sexes for equal work. Next, the burden shifts to the employer justify the disparity with one of four affirmative defenses set forth in the Equal Pay Act: (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of product; or (iv) a differential based on "any other factor other than sex." Finally, if the employer proves one of the affirmative defenses, the burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the reason for the pay disparity was a pretext."

- **The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009**, which codified into law the EEOC's position that each inequitable paycheck is a separate incident of wage discrimination. The Act extended the statute of limitations for filing lawsuits in cases of pay discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, age, religion, and disability. The law directly addressed *Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (2007)*, a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that the statute of limitations for

presenting an equal-pay lawsuit begins on the date that the employer makes the *initial* discriminatory wage decision, not at the date of the most recent paycheck.

Coluccio (2010, p. 238) stated:

“The signing of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act embodies a climactic moment in an ongoing struggle between Congress and the courts to define the meanings of the civil rights statutes in a variety of contexts. Despite the fact that the core issue of the *Ledbetter* case turned on a statute of limitations technicality, the case, nonetheless, captured the nation's attention. Lilly Ledbetter's compelling personal story garnered an outcry of support and effectuated federal legislation.”

- **The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)** protects individuals who are 40 years of age or older from employment discrimination on the basis of age in hiring, promotion, discharge, compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The ADEA applies to organizations with 20 or more workers, including governmental entities, labor organizations, and employment agencies. (see Ventrell-Monsees, 2019).
- **Title I and Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)** prohibit employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities employed in the private sector, and in state and local governments. Title I covers employers with 15 or more employees from discriminating against people with disabilities in job application procedures, hiring, firing, compensation, job training, and other conditions of employment. Title I also applies to labor organizations and employment agencies. Morin (1990, p. 213) noted that “Title I of ADA also makes people with disabilities less dependent on government assistance and gives them the opportunity to become integrated and productive members of society.”
- **Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973** prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities who work in the federal government, as well as laying out specifications about legal remedies and attorneys' fees (see Herbst, 1978).
- **The Civil Rights Act of 1991** provides monetary damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination. The Act also amends several EEOC statutes, allowing, for example, jury trials and potential damages in Title VII and ADA lawsuits involving intentional discrimination.

Fiss (2018, p. 1953) noted that:

“The Congress finds that ... the decision of the Supreme Court in *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio* (1989) ... has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections ... . Congress, in particular, made clear that it was objecting to the way *Wards Cove* altered the burden of proof governing disparate impact claims. While *Wards Cove* held that the employer bore the burden of producing evidence that the test is job related, the Court in that case allocated the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff. The 1991 Act signaled its objection to this feature of the decision by placing the burden of persuasion on the employer.”

## 6. Civil Rights, Sex and Gender

In recent years, in addition to adjudicating cases relating to “race,” the EEOC and the United States Supreme Court have seen an increase in cases relating to gay, lesbian, and transgendered individuals in which both the EEOC and the Supreme Court would be called upon to interpret the reaches of Title VII relating to discrimination based on sex. From the outset, the inclusion of the term “sex” has proved to be a vexing area of dispute in both context and meaning.

The prohibition on sex discrimination found in Title VII was added by Rep. Howard Smith, who chaired the House Rules Committee, and who strongly opposed the legislation. Smith's amendment to add the word “sex” to the bill

was passed by vote of 168 to 133. However, several historians and others have debated Congressman Smith's real motivation (Osterman, 2009). The *Congressional Record* records that Smith was greeted by laughter when he introduced the one-word amendment (Freeman, 1990).

Was the inclusion of the term “sex” a strategic attempt to defeat the bill by Congressman Smith, or was it a genuine attempt to support women’s rights by broadening the bill to include the prohibition against discrimination based on sex? Some historians have speculated that Smith was trying to embarrass Northern Democrats who echoed the position of organized labor and some women’s groups who had opposed the inclusion of women in the bill because they feared that a new law would take away “protections for pregnant women and women in poverty” already in place (Napikoski, 2020). Others argued that Smith was sincere in his efforts. Napikoski (2020) offers the following commentary on Congressman Smith’s intentions:

“For twenty years Smith had sponsored the Equal Rights Amendment, however, with no linkage to racial issues, in the House. He for decades had been close to the National Woman's Party and its leader Alice Paul, who was also the leader in winning the right to vote for women in 1920, the author of the first Equal Rights Amendment, and a chief supporter of equal rights proposals since then. She and other feminists had worked with Smith since 1945 trying to find a way to include sex as a protected civil rights category.”

The inclusion of the term “sex” in the bill under these confusing circumstances led to the comments of Justice William Rehnquist who explained in *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson* (1986), "The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives... the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'" This comment would be quite prophetic!

#### 6.1. Cases Relating to Sex and Gender

Precisely because of unanswered question generated by the Act itself, the Supreme Court has been called upon to decide cases relating to the Act—more specifically to Title VII. These cases may be summarized as follows (Find Law, 2017):

- *Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur* (1974): The Court found that Ohio public schools’ mandatory maternity leave rules for pregnant teachers violate constitutional guarantees of due process.
- *Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson* (1986): The Court found that a claim of "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that may be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- *Johnson v. Transportation Agency* (1987): The Court decided that a county transportation agency appropriately took into account an employee's sex as one factor in determining whether she should be promoted.
- *Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools* (1992): The Court ruled that students who had been subjected to sexual harassment in public schools may sue for monetary damages.
- *Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc.* (1998): The Court held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual harassment can form the basis for a valid claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- *Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth* (1998): The Court held that an employee who refuses unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor (but suffers no real job consequences) may recover against the employer without showing the employer is at fault for the supervisor's actions.
- *Faragher v. City of Boca Raton* (1998): The Court decided that an employer may be liable for sexual harassment caused by a supervisor, but liability depends on the reasonableness of the employer's conduct, as well as the reasonableness of the plaintiff victim's conduct.

### 7. The Context of The Supreme Court’s June 2020 Decision: The Underlying Cases

The cases which the Court decided in June of 2020 involved two gay men and a transgender woman who sued for employment discrimination after they lost their jobs.

The facts of the individual cases may be summarized as follows (Justia, 2020):

- *Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia*

“Gerald Bostock, a gay man, began working for Clayton County, Georgia, as a child welfare services coordinator in 2003. During his ten-year career with Clayton County, Bostock received positive performance evaluations and numerous accolades. In 2013, Bostock began participating in a gay recreational softball league. Shortly thereafter, Bostock received criticism for his participation in the league and for his sexual orientation and identity generally. During a meeting in which Bostock’s supervisor was present, at least one individual openly made disparaging remarks about Bostock’s sexual orientation and his participation in the gay softball league. Around the same time, Clayton County informed Bostock that it would be conducting an internal audit of the program funds he managed. Shortly afterwards, Clayton County terminated Bostock allegedly for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.”

Within months of his termination, Bostock filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Three years later, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed his lawsuit for failure to state a claim, finding that Bostock’s claim relied on an interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to a 1979 decision holding otherwise, the continued which was recently affirmed in *Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital*, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). Bostock appealed, and the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. In addition to noting procedural deficiencies in Bostock’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit panel pointed out that it cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision” (Justia, 2020).

- *Altitude Express v. Zarda*

“Donald Zarda worked in 2010 as a sky-diving instructor at Altitude Express. Part of his job was to participate in tandem skydives with clients, in which he was necessarily strapped in close proximity to the client. A gay man, Zarda sometimes told female clients about his sexual orientation to address any concern they might have about being strapped to a man for a tandem skydive. On one occasion after Zarda informed a female client about his sexual orientation and performed the tandem jump with her, the client alleged that Zarda had inappropriately touched her and disclosed his sexual orientation to excuse his behavior. In response to this complaint, Zarda's boss fired him. Zarda denied touching the client inappropriately and claimed that he was fired solely because of his reference to his sexual orientation.

Zarda filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming that he was fired because of his sexual orientation and also because of he did not conform to male gender stereotypes. He brought a claim in federal court alleging, among other things, that Altitude Express violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating him because of his sexual orientation. The district court ruled for Altitude Express, finding that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation. After the district court's ruling, the EEOC issued an opinion in a separate case (persuasive but not binding on federal district courts) that Title VII's “on the basis of sex” language necessarily includes discrimination “on the basis of sexual orientation.” In light of this decision, Zarda moved for the district court to reinstate his Title VII claim, but the district court denied the motion, citing binding Second Circuit precedent, *Simonton v. Runyon*, [2000](#), and *Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble*, [2005](#).

Zarda appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled for Altitude Express as well. The panel declined Zarda’s request that it reconsider its interpretation of Title VII and overturn *Simonton* and *Dawson*, as only the court sitting en banc can do that. The Second Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc and expressly overruled *Simonton* and *Dawson*,

finding, consistent with the EEOC's position, that Title VII's prohibition on discrimination because of sex necessarily includes discrimination because of sexual orientation" (Justia, 2020).

- *Harris v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission*

"Aimee Stephens worked as a funeral director at R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., which is a closely held for-profit corporation that operates several funeral homes in Michigan. For most of her employment at the Funeral Home, Stephens lived and presented as a man. Shortly after she informed the Funeral Home's owner and operator that she intended to transition from male to female, she was terminated.

Stephens filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had been terminated based on unlawful sex discrimination. After conducting an investigation, the EEOC brought a lawsuit against the Funeral Home charging that it had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by terminating Stephen's employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and her refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Funeral Home, and a panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Funeral Home's termination of Stephens based on her transgender status constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII" (Justia, 2020).

### 7.1. The Majority Opinion

Shackford (2020) cites some of the more important points emphasized by Justice Gorsuch in his majority opinion:

"An individual's homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That's because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex. Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer's mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague."

Later, Justice Gorsuch explained how this also applies to the treatment of transgender employees:

"Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision."

Shackford (2020) notes that Justice Gorsuch's order concludes with a pure expression of textualism: "In Title VII, Congress adopted broad language making it illegal for an employer to rely on an employee's sex when deciding to fire that employee. We do not hesitate to recognize today a necessary consequence of that legislative choice: An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law."

### 7.2. Dissents by Justices Alito and Kavanaugh

Justices Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Clarence Thomas dissented. "The Court tries to convince readers that it is merely enforcing the terms of the statute, but that is preposterous," Alito wrote in the dissent. "Even as

understood today, the concept of discrimination because of ‘sex’ is different from discrimination because of ‘sexual orientation’ or ‘gender identity.’”

Justice Kavanaugh wrote in a separate dissent that the court was rewriting the law to include gender identity and sexual orientation, a job that belongs to Congress.

“Like many cases in this Court, this case boils down to one fundamental question: Who decides? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination “because of” an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The question here is whether Title VII should be expanded to prohibit employment discrimination because of sexual orientation. Under the Constitution’s separation of powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative process, not to this Court.”

Still, Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged that the decision represents an “important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.” Justice Kavanaugh wrote:

“Millions of gay and lesbian Americans have worked hard for many decades to achieve equal treatment in fact and in law. They have exhibited extraordinary vision, tenacity, and grit — battling often steep odds in the legislative and judicial arenas, not to mention in their daily lives. They have advanced powerful policy arguments and can take pride in today’s result” (Clark, 2020).

## 8. Why the Issue Will Simply Not “Go Away”

Echoing many of the points raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch himself noted that the Supreme Court would no doubt be called upon in the not-too-distant future to express its views and establish precedents under which a host of other questions would be litigated. For example:

... Lawsuits are currently pending over transgender athletes’ participation in school sporting events (Bezuvis, 2011; Hunter & Brown, 2015; Genel, 2017) and cases have been brought concerning sex-segregated bathrooms and locker rooms (More, 2008; Sanders & Stryker, 2016; Pogofsky, 2018; Portuondo, 2018), a subject that the several of the justices (most especially Justice Alito) had raised during oral arguments in October.

... Employers who have religious objections to employing LGBT people also might be able to raise those claims in a different case. As Denley (2020, p. 209) notes:

“A possible solution to the question of whether religion or equality should be given more weight is to balance the “substantial burden” on the petitioner’s religious freedom rights versus the burden on the third party. Once a petitioner has made a religious freedom claim and shown that the law has imposed a substantial burden on their religious expression, the court would then look to see how the third party is burdened by the religious freedom claim. Examining the burden on third parties is not a new idea as the Court has articulated in prior religious freedom claims that the accommodation should not impinge on the rights of others”

However, “But none of these other laws are before us; we have not had the benefit of adversarial testing about the meaning of their terms, and we do not prejudice any such question today,” Justice Gorsuch wrote.

Just as in the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court was beset—some might say inundated—with cases related to the civil rights of citizens who were discriminated against on the basis of race, creed, color, and national origin, the future holds out the prospect that cases relating to the rights of the LGBT community will dominate the courts—and public discourse—as these individuals press for a recognition of their rights in American society.

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

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**APPENDIX I: KEY PLAYERS IN PASSING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: PROPONENTS SENATORS HUMPHREY, MANSFIELD, KUCHEL, DIRKSEN, AND ENGLE; AND OPPONENTS REP. SMITH, SENATORS EASTLAND, BYRD, GOLDWATER, THURMOND, AND RUSSELL e**







# Impact of Higher Education Students Loan Scheme on Manpower Development in Bayelsa State

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## Abstract

The study investigated the impact of Higher Education Students Loan Scheme on Manpower Development in Bayelsa State. The research work was anchored by the human capital model. The study adopted Raosoft calculator to determine the size of the sample from the population of study and a sample size of 377 respondents was arrived at using the calculator and were distributed amongst students of Bayelsa state origin in higher institutions of learning and retrieved 100 copies. This shortfall in the total number of retrieved questionnaire was a result of the lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The distribution of sponsorship across students of Bayelsa state origin reveal that 63% percent were sponsored by Parent/Guardians, 3% percent were by Bayelsa Higher Education Students Loan Scheme, 2% percent are on scholarship while 33% percent are self-sponsored. The data obtained from the survey were analyzed with SPSS. The paper recommends that the Board should expand its scope beyond payment of school fees. Secondly, the Board should relax its policy on provision of guarantors to access loans and concentrate on withholding certificates as collateral.

**Keywords:** Bayelsa, BHESLS, Education, Human Capital Model, Raosoft

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background to the Study

The development of manpower development in Bayelsa State is important and critical which has spur the governments over the years to explore other avenues to improve on human capital development. Bayelsa state was created in 1996 from the old River State. Since its creation, the government saw the need to improve on the human capital development, which it saw as investment, though education creates costs in the present but delivers benefits in the future. While students are in school, expenses they incur include both direct costs (tuition, books) and opportunity costs. Future benefits include increased earnings, improved health and longer life. To pay the current costs of their education, students need liquidity. In a business deal, a borrower would put up collateral in order to

fund a potentially profitable investment. The collateral would typically include any capital goods used in the fledging enterprise such as a building or machinery.

In Bayelsa State, the significance of education and manpower development for the growth and development is critical to successive governments as exhibited in governments' policies and programmes, particularly in the educational sector. As a matter of fact, in Bayelsa State, the government alone cannot continue to shoulder the burden of funding education. Consequently, the Bayelsa State Higher Education Students' Loan Board was created by the Restoration Government of Hon. Henry Seriake Dickson to provide unfettered access to loans for tertiary education in the state. The Board was established to offer financial assistance to financially challenged students of Bayelsa State origin enrolled in various higher institutions nationwide. The Board has several functions: to supervise, coordinate, administer and monitor the management of the Students' Loan Scheme in the State; develop requirements, guidelines, criteria and modalities for qualification, disbursement and repayment of loans; control, monitor and coordinate the students loan account/fund and ensure compliance in respect of disbursement and repayment; monitor and maintain information on academic records, year of graduation, national service and employment in order to ensure that they commence repayment of the loan as and when due; liaise with the employer of the guarantors and conclude documentation with employers to ensure that the required sum to be deducted from the guarantors salary and remitted to the student loan fund/account as directed by the board; exercise all legal rights towards recovering all loans and enforce the provisions of the law; issue a report to the House of Assembly and the Governor on the performance of the students loan on quarterly basis; notwithstanding any provisions of the law or any other legislation applicable in the state, provide rules and guidelines, including methods of application, qualification, criteria and proof of identification to prevent multiple allocation to an individual impersonator to non-existing person and similar vices; enter into any negotiation, agreement, contractual relationship, such as may be necessary or expedient for the discharge of the functions of the Board; and to conduct studies, researches, and investigations that may further the attainment of the goal and development of the Students' Loan Scheme in the state.

The Board has as objectives among others to: increase equitable access to technical and higher education in the state, facilitate the mobilization of funds to provide interest free revolving loans to state indigenes studying in institutions of higher learning in the country for the payment of tuition fees and other related expenses, ensure constant and sustainable supply of loans to qualified students' applicants for the purpose of providing qualitative education, provide opportunities for qualified students of Bayelsa State origin who may not be able to afford higher education on their own, ensure a balance in discipline and competence diversity in higher education in the state, develop and support course critical to the development of the state and to ensure quality education to indigenous students through quality assurance and supervision, and to create a pool and guaranteed supply of competent manpower in Bayelsa State.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The Bayelsa State government established the Higher Education Students' Loan Board to provide loans to assuage the financial predicaments of indigent students of the State. In keeping with its responsibilities, the Board has provided loans to institutions of higher learning in the state and still providing such loans to students of the state who are eligible to benefit from the scheme. Preliminary findings suggests that about 568 students of the state-owned Niger Delta University; 100 students from the Federal University Otuoke; 378 from the African University, Toru-orua; 174 from Bayelsa State Medical University; and none from the state-owned College of Education at Sagbama have benefited from the scheme. However, has the Board been able to provide a pool and guaranteed supply of competent manpower in Bayelsa State? Answer to this question is critical to measure the impact of the higher education students' loan scheme on manpower development in Bayelsa State. This is the motivation of the study.

Many studies conducted on the Higher Education Students Loans Scheme (HESLS) have mostly concentrated on its success, sustainability and effectiveness on loans issuance and repayment. No such study has been conducted on the impact of higher education students' loan on manpower development in Bayelsa State.

The study, therefore, seeks to examine the impact of Higher Education Students Loan Scheme on manpower development in Bayelsa State with specific objective of to examine the impact of Higher Education Student Loan Scheme (HESLS) on students' access and completion of education.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is established on the human capital theory.

#### **Human Capital Model**

The human capital theory (Becker, 1962) posits that education is an investment that generates higher expected returns to the individual over his/her lifetime. Hence, student loans are considered investment loans rather than consumption ones where consumers maximize expected utility by the tenets of neoclassical economic theory (see e.g., Schwartz and Finnie, 2002; Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013; Avery and Turner, 2012). Becker (1962) assumes that in deciding to invest in human capital by attending college, a person would conduct a cost-benefits analysis of the investment and follow the investment decision criterion dictated by the standard economic theory of investment – that is invest if the discounted benefits exceed the discounted costs. The benefits are the expected future higher earnings accruing after completing higher education. The costs include the opportunity cost of higher education (earnings foregone while in college) and other direct education costs such tuition fees, transportation, etc. (Becker, 1962; Li, 2013; Avery and Turner, 2012). However, it is widely recognized that determining these costs and benefits and thus making an optimal investment decision is complex due to several factors, including incomplete information which may lead to underestimation or overestimation of costs and benefits, uncertainty about future economic and social conditions which may affect success in college, the cost of college and earning prospects, and behavioral idiosyncrasies such as degree of risk aversion which may affect optimal investment decisions (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013; Li, 2013).

Financing is part of the decisions to obtain a higher education qualification. All things being equal, people will tend to follow the Pecking Order Model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) that ranks internal financing first in the hierarchy of financing sources. Thus, students would prefer to finance their education, using personal and family sources of income first and would consider taking loans if they face financial constraints. Loan take up and the amount borrowed are influenced by supply and demand factors whose effects are usually difficult to completely delineate (Li, 2013). On the demand side, standard economic theory suggests that students who are not averse to risk, averse to debt and have high discount rates would be more inclined to take up student loans; they will also accumulate high loan debt (Oosterbeek and van den Broek, 2009).

Besides, there are a number of critics towards this theory. The opponents of this theory argue that “education acts as a screening device, since it calls for a certificate, a Bachelor’s degree or any of its kind which allows a person to get well-paid jobs without direct upsetting their efficiency”. Thus, awareness of high level of return on the individual’s higher level of education has been one of the bases for the introduction of cost-sharing with students in various universities of higher education. Likewise, HCT plays a vital role in evolving the connection between education and economic development of the country.

With this theory on hand, this paper examines the impact of the Higher Education Loan system with regard to students from low-income background based on its fairness and access. Therefore, application of this theory expects the policy makers and actors in Bayelsa to reflect and effectively implement their cost-sharing policy through higher education loan for the better allocation to the needy students, particularly those from poor and low-income backgrounds.

#### **Empirical Literature**

Several studies have been carried out to evaluate the nexus between higher education loan and access, impact as well as perception of higher education in both the developed and developing countries. Some of the empirical findings of these studies are presented in this study.

Canton and Blom (2004) studied the impact of student loans on access to higher education and performance, the case of student loan programme (SOFES) in Mexico. They hypothesized that financial aid to students in tertiary education can contribute to human capital accumulation through two channels: increased enrollment and improved student performance. With regard to the first channel, enrollment, results from the Mexican household survey indicate that financial support has a strong positive effect on university enrollment. Given completion of upper secondary education, the probability of entering higher education rises by 24 percent. Two data sources were used to investigate the second channel, student performance. Administrative data provided by SOFES were analyzed, using a regression-discontinuity design, and survey data which enabled a similar analysis, using a different control group. Empirical results suggested that SOFES recipients showed better academic performance than students without a credit from SOFES. However, the results cannot be interpreted as a purely causal impact of the student loan programme, since the impacts also could reflect (self-) selection of students.

Arora and Kaur (2016) investigated the status of higher education and education loan in India with special reference to Punjab. India's higher education system is the third largest in the world and has rapidly grown over the years. But unfortunately, there are several issues and challenges like access, equity, efficiency and excellence in higher education which has to be tackled efficiently. Out of these, access can be achieved only if higher education is affordable to all. Data shows that higher education institutions and enrolments are increasing with time and in line with this, percentage of education loan is also growing.

Dewan, Goel and Malhotra (2013) carried out a study in the Palwal and Faridabad District of Haryana, India, regarding the student perception about education loan and to compare male and female students with respect to various loan features like value addition, mortgage, effectiveness, eligibility criteria, procedure or convenience, disbursement and rate of interest regarding education loan. The education loan is to provide financial support to deserving students for pursuing education loan in India and abroad. The research was conducted on undergraduates and graduate students. Data has been collected through personal survey. Descriptive statistical tool like mean, standard deviation, co-variance and t-test were used for data analysis. The results revealed a number of issues including high rate of interest which retarded student participation, mortgage was not flexible, and eligibility criterion was not based on merit, distorted loan disbursement procedure and thus low value addition. The study thus recommended that the Authorities should address these problems to improve value addition in the student loan scheme and enhance access to higher education in the District.

Patra, Ray and Chaudhuri (2017) presents evidence of a strong positive impact of education loan availability on tertiary education outcomes in India. They evaluated the performance of a model education loan scheme introduced by the Indian Central Bank in 2001 that has drastically increased the availability of education loans in India. First, they estimated the impact of the increased availability of education loans on the years of schooling attained by an individual by exploiting the variation in the number of education loan accounts across districts and the exposure to the programme across age cohorts. They found that one standard deviation increase in the number of education loan accounts leads to a 6.17% improvement in years of schooling over the sample mean. Then they estimated the effect of availability of education loans on an individual's decision to enroll for higher education, by making use of across district and over time variation in the number of education loan accounts. The results suggested that one standard deviation increase in the number of education loan accounts results in a 6.87% increase in higher education enrolment over the sample mean. The study also found heterogeneous effects of education loans on enrolment and years of schooling, with the effects being more pronounced for the relatively disadvantaged groups across gender, caste and location (rural/urban).

Sadiq (2015) sought to ascertain whether the student loan trust fund (SLTF) has helped improve access to tertiary education in Ghana, using Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) as a case study. Using a systematic random sampling method, 285 students already on the SLTF were sampled and questionnaires were administered to them. Using descriptive statistics to analyze the data, the study revealed that the SLTF has improved access to tertiary education in Ghana. The study further revealed the SLTF is managed well to meet its purpose of enhancing accessibility. However, the amount paid as loan per academic year to students was not enough to meet all the needs of the students. Despite methodological and generality limitations, the study provided



important findings relevant to improving the SLTF in Ghana. As such, the study recommended that the loan amount be increased and loans paid on time to help students on the scheme.

Nyoni (2018) studied the impact of higher education loan system among students from low-income background in Tanzania. The study used the document analysis technique. The Authors used relevant literature, officially published statistical data and various theoretical justifications for examining the impact of higher education loan towards students from low-income background. The results of this study identified some challenges leading to a misallocation of fund to the needy students, application of Means Testing being one of them. Meanwhile, the study recommended careful planning and effective use of means testing with a sustainable operational mechanism which should address the issue of parity and justice for the needy students in accessing higher education in Tanzania.

Kyaligonza (2017) examined the performance of the student loan scheme in Uganda. Making reference to related literature, views of selected stakeholders, and the performance of government's earlier lending programmes, the study identifies gaps in the performance of the scheme. These were in the areas of application procedures; disbursement; and structures for recovery. To enhance the reach of the loan scheme, the study recommended that government decentralizes some of its operations to district levels. Furthermore, it was recommended that the loan application forms be stationed at Advanced Level Secondary Schools to ease access. Also, the Higher Education Students Financing Board (HESFB) should sensitize the general public about the law governing the university education loan scheme.

Onen, Ajuaba, Oceng and Ndaruhutse (2015) examined the management of students' loan schemes in three African countries (Ghana, Kenya and South Africa). It was intended for the discernment of best practices and weaknesses of such schemes in order to draw lessons for younger loan schemes like the one and a half-year-old loan scheme of Uganda. The study was triggered by recurring challenges younger loan schemes experience despite available lessons to draw from older ones. Literature search and desk study were used to collect data. Study results revealed that besides the usual legal challenge that virtually every younger loan scheme appears to face, there are several problems loan schemes in Africa face including the difficulties to: create credible loan boards, identify the right loan beneficiaries, determine appropriate loan amounts, create reliable data-bases, and institute an effective and efficient loan disbursement and recovery systems. The study concluded that the problems faced by younger loan schemes in Africa are embedded within the political, social and economic systems and unless these structural difficulties are addressed, younger loan schemes are poised for grueling challenges.

### **3. Methodology**

Every study is guided by research questions which requires to be treated/answered. The systematic ways of designing how such research question are tackled, the researchers plan about it is research methodology. This is the plan of the work; the techniques required in the research etc. The appropriate data has to be collected using the most efficient method which relies on the study method. This requires a system of models, procedures and techniques used to find the results of a research problem (Panneerselvam, 2011).

The study adopted a closed-ended survey questionnaires to collect primary data which will help in analyzing the data qualitatively for a holistic and narrative understanding of the challenges associated with the students' loan in Bayelsa state.

A pilot study was done to ascertain the designed questionnaire was appropriate and basically, to know its weaknesses in collection of suitable data such that it can be improved on with the help of the targeted respondents and it was found to be appropriate and it was adopted without any changes made on it.

### **Data Sample/ Study Period**

The data sample represents a judgmental sample of respondents' awareness and supportiveness of the loan scheme to address the inability of students seeking higher education. The sampling covers the various higher institutions within the state and extended to those outside the state.

The study adopted Raosoft calculator to determine the size of the sample from the population of study. A sample size of 377 respondents was arrived at using the calculator and the questionnaires were distributed amongst students of Bayelsa state origin in the various higher institutions of learning. One hundred questionnaires were retrieved from the distributed questionnaires. This shortfall in the total number of retrieved questionnaires was as a result of the lockdown period due to the Covid-19 pandemic. From the data, the researchers will know the aptness of current funding model of higher education that should be applied in Bayelsa State. The study period considered for this research is 2019 and the first quarter of 2020. The Bayelsa State Higher Education Students Loan Board was established as a result of the state governments' declaration of state of emergency on education. The scheme is to make sure that Bayelsa youths have quality education without facing any financial challenges while in school.

### **Data analysis**

The collected data were analyzed using Excel and Microsoft Word as these applications have features for analyzing the collected data with both graphs and charts for the illustration purpose and understanding of the end users of the report. Depending on the questions asked and answers obtained, the researchers underwent the processes of editing the raw data to remove errors and ambiguities. Tables were also used in the analysis for good understanding of the research report. The data collected from the survey using questionnaires were analyzed with SPSS to find frequencies. This helped in explaining the findings logically.

### **Validity and reliability of research results**

The study questions were fully answered since the survey method, which employed use of questionnaire, used to collect data was reliable. Triangulation is also a vital test on reliability of study findings (Mathison, 1988) as different methods are used in collecting data and analyzing them. The findings from this study can be generalized to different wider groups and the trustworthiness of the source of information increases the validity of the study results.

The questionnaire were carefully designed by the researchers to ensure research was perfectly carried out. The study gaps identified in the literature that molded the research questions for this study have to be narrowed since the findings from this study came up with some answers and recommendations.

Patton (2002) argues that reliability and validity of a study are paramount as the audience needs to be convinced of the research findings and the argument here is that the researcher has to trust his sources of information for the qualitative study. The source of information for this study is trusted and hence the results are reliable.

## **4. Results and Discussion**

### **Data Presentation**

The structured research questionnaire used for data collection for this study was administered to three hundred and seventy-seven (377) respondents made up of students of Bayelsa State origin in higher institutions. The institutions include the state own pioneer Niger Delta University (NDU), Federal University Otueke (FUO), University of Africa, Toru-orua (UAT), Bayelsa Medical University (BMU), College of Education (COES), Sagbama and others. Out of the three hundred and seventy-seven (377) questionnaires issued, only one hundred were returned while three hundred and sixty-six were not returned. The low turn up was largely due to the lockdown in the state arising from the Coronavirus pandemic ravaging the entire world. Irrespective of this, the reliability of the responses got from the one hundred respondents from the various institutions remained undisputable. The outcome of the administered questionnaire and responses are showed on table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1: Administration of Questionnaire and Response Rate

Institution	Questionnaire Distributed	Questionnaire Returned	Questionnaire Not Returned	Response Rate
NDU	160	85	75	22.55%
FUO	60	7	53	1.86%
UAT	51	2	49	0.53%
BMU	35	0	35	0%
COE	35	0	35	0%
OTHERS	36	6	30	1.59%
Total	377	100	277	26.53%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey May, 2020.




Figure 4.1: Multiple Bar Chart of Responses from Bayelsa State students in Higher Education

Source: Authors computation using table 4.1

Figure 4.1 reflects the data in table 4.1 using multiple bar chart for total questionnaire distributed, returned, not returned and the response rate.

### Undergraduate Category and Response Rate

Out of the one hundred (100) students that we retrieved their responses, a total of eighty-six (86) were undergraduate students. Of this number, four (4) were in 100 level, 17 in 200 level, 27 in 300 level, 32 in 400 level and 6 in 500 level. No ordinary diploma (OND) and higher diploma (HND) students responded to our questionnaire. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of undergraduate students' level of study and their respective response rate.

Table 4.2: Undergraduate Category and Response Rate

Undergraduate Study Level	Responses	Response Rate
100	4	4.64%
200	17	19.77%
300	27	31.40%
400	32	37.21%
500	6	6.98%
OND	0	0%
HND	0	0%
Total	86	100%

Source: Authors' computation from Field Survey May, 2020.

Table 4.2 further revealed that only 4.64 percent of 100 level student responded, 19.77 percent of the 86 students were in 200 level, 31 percent in 300 level, four hundred level students had the peak of 37.21 percent and 6.98 percent in 500 level were the second least next to 100 level students. This distribution is further given a pictorial presentation using bar chart as seen in figure 4.2 below;




Figure 4.2: Chart of Bayelsa State Undergraduate Students Response Rate

Source: Authors computation using table 4.2

### Postgraduate Students Categories and Response Rate


The second segment of the one hundred (100) respondents in this study were postgraduate students of Bayelsa State origin. This group of respondents were fourteen (14) in number and were made up of two (2) Postgraduate Diploma (PGD) students which constituted 14.29 percent in this category, four (4) Master of Science (M.Sc) students which made up 28.57 percent and eight (8) Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) students which constituted 57.14 percent in this category. This is shown on table 4.3 below;

Table 4.3: Categories of Postgraduate Students of Bayelsa State Origin

Postgraduate Category	Reponses	Response Rate
PGD	2	14.29%
M.Sc	4	28.57%
Ph.D	8	57.14%
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Authors' computation from Field Survey May, 2020.

The distribution of the responses of postgraduate students of Bayelsa State origin from the various institutions of learning are as shown in figure 4.3.



Source: Authors computation using table 4.3

Figure 4.3: Chart of Bayelsa State Postgraduate Students Response Rate

**4.2 Socio-Demographic Data**


**Gender Distribution**

The distribution of gender in the current study revealed that of the 100 respondents, forty-nine (49) were males and fifty-one (51) were females across the various higher institutions of learning. Table 4.4 and figure 4.4 below show the gender distribution in this study.

Table 4.4: Gender distribution

Gender	Responses	Response Rate
Male	49	49%
Female	51	51%
Total	100	100%

Source: Authors’ computation from Field Survey May, 2020.



Source: Authors computation using table 4.4

**Distribution of Sponsorship**


A survey of the distribution of funding sources from students in higher institutions of learning of Bayelsa State origin revealed that 63 of the 100 respondents representing 62% are sponsored by parents/guardians, 3 representing

3% are entirely been sponsored by the Bayelsa State Higher Education Student Loan Scheme (BSHESLS), none representing 2% was on scholarship while 32 representing 32% were self-sponsored. Table 4.5 and figure 4.5 show the distribution as seen below;

Table 4.5 Distribution of sponsorship of Bayelsa State students in higher education

Sponsorship	Responses	Response Rate
Parents/Guardian	63	63%
BSHESLS	3	3%
Scholarship	2	2%
Self-Sponsor	32	32%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Authors' computation from Field Survey May, 2020.



Source: Authors' computation using table 4.5

Figure 4.5: Chart Showing Distribution of Higher Education Sponsorship

This research makes use of primary data obtained from questionnaires distributed to 377 respondents. However, not all the questionnaires were retrieved as efforts made to retrieve the questionnaires from majority of the respondents was futile due to the Covid-19 pandemic as order to stay at home was strictly obeyed. As a result, one hundred (100) questionnaires were retrieved and were used for the analysis. This chapter, therefore, concerns itself with the analyzing the descriptive data of the respondents, analyzing the inferences of the study, discussion of the results obtained and interpretation of results.

The questionnaire had a question seeking to view from the respondents, on who is responsible for funding their education. The variables of concern were parents/guardian, the BSHESLS, Scholarship and self-sponsored.




Fig 4.1. Bar chart illustration of responses from BSHELS

Source: Authors' computation

Figure 4.1 shows that a total number of 62 respondents representing 64.58% are been sponsored by their parents or guardians and this implies that attaining a higher academic qualification through tuition fee payment possess a great challenge in the state as majority of the indigenes depends on salary. 33.33% of the respondents are self-sponsored, none of the respondents are beneficiaries of scholarships and only 2.08% representing 2 respondents agreed that they are being sponsored by the BSHELSB.

**Research question 1: Have you applied for the Bayelsa State higher education students' loan scheme?**

Table 4.2 Percentage of those applied for loan

Applied for loan	Responses	Percentage
Yes	13	13.40%
No	84	86.60%
Total	97	100%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey, 2020.

From table 4.2, it is seen that in spite of the high percentage of those with difficulties in paying their tuition fees in table 4.1, only 13 representing 13.40% really applied for the state loan scheme, 84 representing 86.60% refrained from applying for the loan possibly due to lack of adequate information. Figure 4.2 illustrates further the outcome in table 4.2




Figure 4.2 Percentage of students of Bayelsa State origin with tuition fees difficulties

Source: Authors' derivation using table 4.2

**Research question 2: Did you face difficulties in accessing the Bayelsa State higher education student loan?**

Table 4.3 Percentage of those who encountered difficulties in accessing the loan

Difficulties in accessing loans	Responses	Percentage
Yes	52	60.47%
No	34	39.53%
Total	86	100%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey, 2020.

From field survey on the experiences of students in accessing loan from the Bayelsa State higher education scheme revealed that 52 representing 60.47% had difficulties in accessing the loan. This figure reinforces the outcome from question 2 which showed low application for the loan earlier. Thirty-four (34) students representing 39.53% had no difficulties in accessing the loan. This is illustrated in figure 4.3 below.




Figure 4.3 Percentage of students of Bayelsa State origin with tuition fees difficulties

Source: Authors' derivation using table 4.3

**Research question 3: How long did it take to get the loan?**

Table 4.4 Duration of the loan to students in percentage

Duration of the loan	Responses	Percentage
1 -3 weeks	10	25%
1 month	11	27.50%
2 months	19	47.50%
Total	40	100%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey, 2020.

In every application for loan, it is expected that within a week the applicant should know if the loan will be granted or not. However, following the large number of applicants that the board may need to attend to and the processes involved in authenticating the eligibility of applicants as well as the funds procuring procedures involved, the duration may just vary. From the survey result in table 4.4, it is seen that only 40 students were able to access loan between 1 week and 2 months. Majority of the applicants possibly had to wait for much longer periods not covered by the range of options. This is illustrated further in figure 4.4 below






Figure 4.4 Duration of loan to students in categories and percentages

Source: Authors' derivation using table 4.4

It is also observed that the longer the duration the more loans were granted to students. Between 1 and 3 weeks 10 students representing 25% were granted loan, for the duration of 1 month it increased just marginally to 11 representing 27.50% and rose to 19 students representing 47.50% as seen in figure 4.4 above.

**Research question 4: Did you pay to access the loan?**

Table 4.5 Financial cost involved in accessing the loan on beneficiaries in percentage

Financial cost involved	Responses	Percentage
Yes	6	10.17%
No	53	89.83%
Total	59	100%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey, 2020.

In terms of whether financial costs were involved in procuring the loan, the survey result as shown in table 4.5 revealed that 89.83% of the 59 respondents admitted there were no financial cost and only 10.17% or 6 respondent incurred financial cost in procuring the loan. This is illustrated as seen in figure 4.5 below.




Figure 4.4 Duration of loan to students in categories and percentages

Source: Authors' derivation using table 4.4

**Research question 5: Do you think the student loan can enable you complete your study?**

Table 4.6 Percentage of students who completed studies with the assistance of the loan

Completion of studies through loan	Responses	Percentage
Yes	64	81.01%
No	15	18.99%
Total	79	100%

Source: Authors' computation from field survey, 2020.

Out of a total of 79 students who found this question pertinent turned in their responses and the result revealed that 64 of the students representing 81.01% were confident of having their studies completed with the loan from the scheme and thus affirmed according, 15 students representing 18.99% however had the reversed opinion.




Figure 4. 6 Completion or otherwise of studies through loan scheme.

Source: Authors' derivation using table 4.4

## 5. Conclusion and Recommendations

### Conclusion

The study was centered on the manpower development of Higher Education Students Loan Scheme in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Questionnaire were distributed to students of Bayelsa State origin in various higher institutions, ranging from the Niger Delta University (NDU), Federal University Otuoke, University of Africa, Toru-Orua, Bayelsa Medical University, College of Education, Sagbama and other Institutions across Nigeria. Three Hundred and Seventy-Seven (377) questionnaires were distributed and one hundred were retrieved, out of which 86 were responses from undergraduates and 14 were from postgraduate students. The distribution of sponsorship across students of Bayelsa State origin reveal that 63% per cent were sponsored by parent/Guardians, 3% per cent were by Bayelsa Higher Education Students Loan Scheme, 2% per cent are on scholarship while 33% per cent are self-sponsored.

From the foregoing, the high parental/guardian and a reasonable number of self-sponsorship coupled with the low tuition payments by students of Bayelsa State origin is an indication that government intervention in the form of higher education students loan is highly needed to keep students in school and eventual graduation, which shall encourage manpower development in the state.

### Recommendations

Based on the above results and findings, the study recommends that the Higher Education Students' Loan Boards should expand its scope beyond payment of school fees. This is because there are other education cost components that are more demanding such as textbooks, accommodation, feeding and upkeep. While, the study shall decline

in making a specific item from the list above to be included in the loan scheme, the study recommends that the loan scheme should incorporate other expenses that are tied to academics as the loan scheme would take students out of the streets completely in search of sourcing for fund to meet other school expenses such as the items listed above. Secondly, the study recommended that the Board should relax its policy on provision of guarantors to access loan and concentrate on withholding certificates as collateral. This recommendation is made because majority of the respondents are afraid of their inability to provide guarantors that are willing to guarantee them to access the loan; thereby, moving about with loan forms in search of guarantor until the time frame to access loan for registration would elapse, and that would require them to suspend their studies even with the presence scheme.

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# Climate Resources for Tourism: Case of Moc Chau Plateau, Vietnam

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## Abstract

Climate is an important resource of tourism industry; climate indicators can be measured and assessed. The determination of the right time for tourism activities contributes to the orientation of making investment plans for managers and advising vacation time for visitors. To determine the right time, the authors used 7 climate parameters: total precipitation, monthly average temperature, relative humidity, average maximum temperature, average temperature of dark temperature minimum, average of relative humidity, daily average of sunshine hours and wind speed to calculate TCI model in Moc Chau. The TCI calculation results based on 10-year climate data (2008 - 2018) show that this is a place with favorable conditions for year-round tourism, from October to April next year.

**Keywords:** Climate, Tourism, Moc Chau, Vietnam, TCI

## INTRODUCTION

Tourism is an important economic sector of the global economy. In 2018, the tourism industry achieved 1451 million visitors and achieved a total turnover of \$ 1401 billion, creating an average of \$ 5 billion per day for the world economy (UNWTO 2019). Tourism has been improving the quality of life for millions of people, changing the lives of communities in many countries, not only in developed countries but in developing countries also that have benefited from the tourism industry. Therefore, the development of the tourism industry is the object of many scientific studies with many different perspectives, including studies on the relationship between human health and climate, creating an application platform for studying the linkage between climate and tourism industry.

Climate and weather are considered a country's tourism resources, having profound impact on human health and tourism. During the past nearly 100 years, many researches on climate index with human health and resort activities have been conducted (Landsberg P.H.E 1972; Mc Micheal 1999). Many studies have even shown that climate affects the tourism industry as deeply as agriculture, namely: climate decides the location selection and

tourism experience (Yangzhou Hu 1993; Becken 2010; Hamilton et al. 2004). From the perspective of organizers, Matzarakis 2006, Gomez-Martin et al. 2017; Scot et al. 2001; Scott & Lemieux. 2010; Kozak et al. 2008) point that out that climate affects crop length, quality and profitability of tourism industry. Meanwhile, Matzarakis 2006; Gomez-Martin et al. 2017 suggest that climate and weather affect tourism dynamics and activities. In line with the above viewpoint, Ayscue et al. 2015; Gomez Martin et al. 2017 have pointed that: The climate influences the decisions of investors, tour operators and operators. Therefore, climate is an important criterion in assessing the image of a destination for tourism and is evaluated a tourism development resource of a locality. Climate parameters need to be specifically quantified to assist travelers in planning a vacation, managers' exploit and make their own decision in investment.

## **THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

In recent years, there have been many studies on climate index for tourism such as tourism climate index (TCI) (Mieczkowski 1985) BCI beach climate index (Morgan et al. 2000); developing tourism climate index TNDT (De Freitas et al, 2008). However, from its birth to the present, the TCI proposed by Mieczkowski is the most widely used indicator to assess the suitability of climate for tourism. The purpose of TCI is to provide a comprehensive measure to quantify and assess the world climate for tourism activities in general by integrating all climate-related climate variables into a single indicator, this indicator has three advantages: firstly, TCI determines the appropriate time to conduct tourism activities at a specific time in any locality when meteorological parameters are available; secondly, quantifying TCI uses data stored for many years, so it is possible to show the change of TCI at different stages, thereby quantifying the local climate change, this is significant in assessing the impact of climate change on tourism as currently (Scott and McBoyle 2001; Bas Amelung et al. 2007, Nicholls et al. 2008; Las Hein et al. 2009); thirdly, identifying TCI helps compare climate potential in different localities, allowing comparison of destination climate differences among different regions. Because of the diversity and integrated climate indicators for tourism, TCI is applied to research in many countries around the world (Amelung 2006; Cengiz et al. 2008; Amiranashvili et al. 2017; Cheng and Zong 2019).

In Vietnam, the relationship between climate and human health and production has been shown for a long time in folk songs, and proverbs. Le Huu Trac (pen name: Hai Thuong Lan Ong) was the first person to theorize about the relationship between human health and climate based on his own experiences (Hai Thuong Lan Ong 1971). Subsequently, studies on the effects of climate on the human body were strongly developed in many works of (Dao Ngoc Phong 1972; Phan Tat Dac and Pham Ngoc Toan 1980). Recently, research on climate and tourism has been paid attention (Nguyen Khanh Van 1992; Tran Viet Lien 2009; Nguyen Khanh Van and Nguyen Thi Hien. 2000; Nguyen Thu Nhung 2016). The authors analyzed the relationship between climate and potential tourism in different regions of Vietnam. In particular, in the study of Nguyen Thu Nhung, the author used the Mieczkowski climate index with the improvement of D. Scott and McBoyle. 2001 to analyze the climate index for the whole Central Highlands region of Vietnam.

This study selects the mountainous district of Moc Chau to assess the tourism climate index because of the importance of the district in the Moc Chau national tourist area in particular and the Northern Vietnam tourism in general. According to development planning, Moc Chau has been identified as one of the 10 National Tourist Areas, a driving force for tourism development for the whole region. Although in many reports and studies, it is always confirmed that climate resources played the most important role in the tourism attractions in Moc Chau; and no studies have yet quantified the local tourism climate index. Determining tourism climate index in Moc Chau creates scientific basis and creates decision-making tools for tourists in particular and the tourism industry in general for Moc Chau district.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

The authors collect the monthly average data on climate factors at Moc Chau station, Vietnam for 11 years from 2008 to 2018.

## Research area

Moc Chau is a mountainous plateau district of the limestone plateau in the Northwest region of Vietnam, with an average altitude of more than 1,050 m above sea level, with a natural area of 1,081.66 km<sup>2</sup> ranked 8<sup>th</sup> among 12 city districts of Son La province. The whole district has 2 towns (Moc Chau and Moc Chau Farm) and 13 communes (Dong Sang, Muong Sang, Long Sap, Chieng Khua, Chieng Hac, Tan Lap, Chieng Son, Tan Hop, Phieng Luong, Quy Huong, Na Muong, Hua Pang and Ta Lai) (Moc Chau District People's Committee 2015).

Overall, Moc Chau has a very cool climate, the average annual temperature is only about 18.7°C, in the hottest month, and the average temperature reaches 23.2°C and reaches 12.3°C in the coldest month. Moc Chau has two distinct rainy and dry seasons: the dry season from November to March next year, the average rainfall is about 20-40mm/month; rainy season is from April to October, the average monthly rainfall ranges from 100mm/month to 330mm/month. According to the observed data, the number of sunny hours at Moc Chau Station is very moderate, reaching 1665 hours/year. (Table 1)

Table 1: Temperature, rainfall, average monthly sunshine hours in Moc Chau district, period 2008-2018.

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Average in year
Average tem (0C)	12,3	13,6	17,0	20,5	22,4	23,2	23,1	22,6	21,3	19,0	15,9	13,0	18,7
Average rainfall (mm)	21,8	21,4	42,1	103,2	188,2	231,5	286,3	326,7	254,6	132,9	37,9	18,5	1665
Average monthly sunshine hours	118	138	165,9	192,8	153,1	148,0	147,7	148,7	143,4	134,6	146,0	127,7	1665,4

Source (Authors)

Moc Chau is located in the tropical monsoon climate but due to the impact of the high belt, it brings both the characteristics of the subtropical and temperate highland climate, which is very convenient to develop tourism for whole years.

## Data and research methods

This paper uses monthly average data on climate factors at Moc Chau station, Vietnam from 2008 to 2018.

The process of determining climatic indicators is determined as follows:

- (1) Collect data.
- (2) Calculate the comfort index daytime (CID) on the basis of average maximum temperature and monthly average minimum humidity (°C). (Figure 1)
- (3) Calculate the average daily comfort index (CIA) (°C) which is a combination of daily average temperature (°C) and average daily relative humidity (%).
- (4) Determination of monthly rainfall (R)(mm).
- (5) Determination of monthly sunshine hours (S)(h).
- (6) Determine the average wind speed W (km/h).
- (7) Calculate tourism climate index using the following relationship:

$$TCI = 8CID + 2CIA + 4R + 4S + 2W. \text{ (Table 2)}$$

Table 2: Additional parameters/indicators in tourism climate index.

Parameters	Climate change	Affect on TCI	Contribution level
CID	Daily maximum temperature and daily minimum relative humidity	Description of thermal comfort when tourist activity takes place at its maximum	40%
CIA	Average daily temperature and daily relative humidity	A description of thermal comfort within 24 hours including when sleeping time	10%
P	Amount of rain	Reflecting the negative effects of outdoor activities	20%
S	Number of sunny hours	Making a positive contribution to tourism, but there is a potential risk of sunburn and discomfort on extremely hot days	20%
W	Wind speed	Being positive in nature because of the cooling effect in hot areas	10%

Source (Authors)

(8) Determine the appropriate time for taking place tourism activities at local area. (Table 3)

Table 3: Classifying tourism climate index according to comfort level

NO	Tourism Climate Index	Comfort level
9	100 – 90	Ideal
8	90 – 80	Excellent
7	80 – 70	Very good
6	70 – 60	Good
5	60 – 50	Acceptable
4	50 – 40	Normal
3	40 – 30	Unexpected
2	30 – 20	Very undesirable
1	20 – 10	Extremely undesirable
0	10 – 0	Imposed

Source (Authors)

## Results

Through the research steps, this paper has the results of the sub-index and tourism climate index in Moc Chau district as follows. (Table 4)


Table 4: Results of sub-indicators and tourism indicators in Moc Chau district, Son La province, Vietnam.

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
CIA	3	4.5	5	5	3.5	3	3.5	3.5	4.5	5	5	4
CID	2.5	2.5	3.5	4.5	5	5	5	5	5	4.5	3	2.5
R	4.5	4.5	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	4.5
S	1.5	2	2	2.5	3	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	2
W	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
<b>TCI</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>73</b>

Source (Authors)

In general, Moc Chau district has a favorable climate to develop tourism in whole years. During the year, there are two months with excellent tourism climate index (March and November); four months have a very good tourist climate index (February, April, October, December), three months have a good TCI (January, May, September); three months tourism climate index reached the lowest level (May, June, July) but still acceptable in the general classification (Figure 1).


Figure 1: Changes in tourism climate index of Moc Chau district in months of the year.



Source (Authors)

Moc Chau is located on a plateau with an average elevation of 1050m, the daily comfort index (CIA) and the minimum to maximum temperature threshold (CID) show that Moc Chau climate is cool throughout the day and night, favorable for traveling vacation. This is also a district with a moderate number of hours of sunshine and wind speed, which brings a pleasant feeling to visitors, without the feature of being sunburned or too strong wind obstructing the movement so it is very convenient for outdoor activities (hiking, camping, cycling...). Especially March and November are the best climate months for visitors to Moc Chau, all of the meteorological elements are ideal for human health and safe for visitors' travel (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Chart of variation of sub-indicators related to tourism climate index in months of the year in Moc Chau district.





#### Source (Authors)

From May to August, the district's CTI reached the lowest level of the year (54% - 56%). The reason is that the district is located in the tropical monsoon climate zone, during this period; the district is influenced by the southwest monsoon combined with the tropical convergence band, so the rainfall is much higher than other months of the year (Table 1). It rains making travel activities difficult, especially affecting the travel and outdoor experience activities of visitors.

In addition, CTI in January dropped sharply to 63% compared to December at 70% and February to 77%. The main reason is due to the impact of the polar air block, brought by the northeast monsoon, making the temperature here reach the lowest level of the year; at the same time, the number of sunny hours is also sharply reduced because of heavy fog this month.

## DISCUSSION

The application model of the tourism climate index (TCI) of Mieczkowski in Moc Chau district, Son La province, Vietnam once again confirms that tourism activities are not only affected by the heat element of the atmosphere but also by other factors: rain, sun and wind. This paper results show that Moc Chau can organize tourism and recreation activities all year round because all months of the year have an acceptable climate index for tourism activities. The study also provides travelers with the best time to visit Moc Chau from September to April next year. Especially March and November are the two best climate months to relax and experience here. In addition, the TCI in Moc Chau provides a scientific basis for tourism managers and travel agencies to plan investments and establish appropriate businesses to achieve the highest efficiency.

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# Islamic Economy: Economic or Political Approach?

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## Abstract

Several Muslim economists have tried the development of a so-called Islamic economy. Its emergence has been the subject of several criticisms since it is regarded as a resistance and renouncement of Islam against the influence of the West. Assuming that it is hardly a discipline in its own right in which scientific analysis is paramount, but an instrument of pronging and endorsing Muslim thought. This special status, in general with the scientific vision of the economy, explains the many national debates within the discipline itself. The objective of this work is to make a flashback to the conditions of birth and development of the concept of Islamic economy, to deal with its political dimensions before questioning the religious legitimacy of its Islamic financing.

**Keywords:** Economy, Islamic Finance, Islamic Economy, Politicized Economy

**JEL Classification:** G0, G21, O10

## Introduction

The "Islamic economy", a deeply modern concept born in the 1940s, has undergone profound changes over the years. It first operated from an identity perspective: backed by a vision of Islam as a globalizing system, it was intended to be a third way, an alternative to the other dominant economic paradigms, liberal capitalism and communism. However, the reflection on the Islamic economy traced less a third way than it oscillated between the two paradigms that it initially intended to overcome before gradually rallying the networks and credos of liberal globalization. Indeed, if it is characterized by its political indeterminacy (it can be anchored on the left as well as on the right), the first "socializing" moment of the Islamic economy (in the 1950s and 1960s), which was more narrative and theological-philosophical, will give way, from the 1970s onwards, to Islamic finance, a technical and modelizable knowledge that is better able to blend into financial globalization. It is also much more in tune with its new promoters: the sharia compliant financial institutions that were developing at that time in the Gulf countries (Qutb, 1955). These institutions will tear the Islamic economy out of its initial militant matrix and impose its right-wing shift. It is no longer ideologues, but a body of specialists, technicians and "financial ulemas", who will contribute to the spread of banking practices legitimized by the reference to Islam and ensure their integration into the international financial circuits. In this new framework, finance not only integrates market institutions, but also allows itself to be infused by its "culture" (management, the cult of success, the value of enrichment). It loses its initial verve of identity and ultimately aims less at the global alternative than at creating a niche in a liberal capitalist economy accepted in its foundations. As a result, it becomes acceptable, including for non-Muslims.

And in fact, with the 2008 financial crisis, acceptability is turning into a craze. The French right had no problem in combining identity slings against hijab and other burka and benevolence for the various products marketed by Islamic finance operators. In the world of finance, Islam is no longer perceived in terms of identity, but in a pragmatic vision, namely a sector marked by strong growth potential and an ability, through its prohibition, in particular, of speculation and interest, to moralize a financial capitalism highly criticized for its abuses. Half a century after its birth, the Islamic economy - which has become finance - is now part of an approach that is far removed from the context and the spirit of protest that animates the founding fathers. However, if Islamic finance is now reconciled with a certain globalization, this ideological alignment is also at the expense of a real reflection on social justice, a central objective for the pioneers of the Islamic economy, but largely overlooked in its "normalization".

### **1. Return to the birth of the "Islamic Economy"**

The Islamist economy is a modern concept that initially operated on the basis of identity. The aim was to lay the philosophical foundations for an Islamic "third way" in the field of economics, which would turn Marxist and liberal approaches to the economy against each other. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the Indian philosopher and poet Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) was the first to address economic and Islamic issues in a 1902 book (*Al Faruqim*, 1982). It is then mainly the underdevelopment of Muslims in relation to the technical and economic superiority of the colonial power that is questioned by Iqbal (Feillard, 2004). We find the idea of an "Islamic economy" a little later by Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), an Indian and then Pakistani intellectual and activist among the most influential in the thought of political Islam (Nasr, 1996), who was at the origin of the formation of the militant group *Djama'at'at'Islâmî* (1941). Mawdudi was the main reason for the popularization of this concept (Kuran, 2005). In the 1940s and the three decades that followed, notably in his book *The Economic Problem of Man and its Islamic Solution*, first published in 1941. Mawdudi's reflections are largely marked by the question of the underdevelopment of Muslim countries and the solutions to be found (Chapra, 2004). This economic issue, which mobilizes the reflections of Muslim intellectuals and scholars, is expressed in the context of a quest for identity that is particularly strong in the Indian context of the 1940s. This identity paradigm is found in thinking The Islamist economy is a modern concept which, in the first instance, functioned at the level of identity. The aim was to lay the philosophical foundations for an Islamic "third way" in the field of economics, which would turn Marxist and liberal approaches to the economy against each other. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the Indian philosopher and poet Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) was the first to address economic and Islamic issues in a 1902 book. It is then mainly the underdevelopment of Muslims in relation to the technical and economic superiority of the colonial power that is questioned by Iqbal. We find the idea of an "Islamic economy" a little later by Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), an Indian and then Pakistani intellectual and activist among the most influential in the thought of political Islam (Chapellière, 2009), who was at the origin of the formation of the militant group *Djama'at'at'Islâmî* (1941). Mawdudi was the main reason for the popularization of this concept in the 1940s and the three decades that followed, notably in his book *The Economic Problem of Man and its Islamic Solution*, first published in 1941. Mawdudi's reflections are largely marked by the question of the underdevelopment of Muslim countries and the solutions to be found. This economic issue, which mobilizes the reflections of Muslim intellectuals and scholars, is expressed in the context of a quest for identity that is particularly strong in the Indian context of the 1940s. This identity paradigm is found in the thinking of the Islamic reformist movement, from al-Afghani (1838-1897) to Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Thanks to the contributions of Abul Ala Mawdudi and Hassan al-Banna, the concept of "Islamic economy" will take on a new dimension. Abul Ala Mawdudi starts from an observation, that of the inferiority of Muslims. He sees this as the direct consequence of their Westernization [5], which would have led to a relegation of religion to the private sphere, thereby depriving Muslim societies of their main identity and "civilizational" resource: Islam. However, Mawdudi and Hassan al-Banna believe that Islam is not just a simple belief, but a global system of life (*shumuliyya*). The solution to inferiority lies in the redeployment of the religious reference in all areas of private and public life, including the economy. Islam, as a totalizing system, is then logically seen as a total alternative to the two rival systems of the time: communism and capitalism. This positioning is central to Muhammad Baqer's book *as-Sadr* (1935-1980), *Iqtîadouna* (*Our Economy*). Published in 1961, the book offers a scholastic style typical of the reformist

movement of the early 20th century, marked by the desire to propose a "true aggiornamento identitariste du religieux, feeding on its polemical relationship to the West by striving to give it the attributes of otherness" .

### 3. Islamic economy or politicized economy?

Among the reformist Muslim authors addressing this economic and political theme, several approaches will emerge. Abul Ala Mawdudi in 1941, Sayyed Qutb in 1949 and 1950, Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr in 1961 were all proud to propose in their arguments a third way against the other two communist and capitalist systems, but their positions were far from uniform. Indeed, the Islamic economy, far from clearly defining the features of a clearly identifiable third way, has from the outset polarized itself between a liberal thinking and another more socializing approach. It is Abul Ala Mawdudi who will pave the way for a liberal positioning in the reflection on the Islamic economy. His posture is based on the Koranic verses guaranteeing private property and the complete morality of lawfully acquired gains. Abul Ala Mawdudi and the authors who followed him on this path also insisted on the prohibition of interest (riba). This orientation was expressed in the publication by Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr in 1969 of *Al-Bank al-la Ribawi fi al-Islam* (the bank without interest in Islam). This true book of banking practice without recourse to interest marked the first steps of Kuwaiti and Saudi banks (Mallat, 2004) ,(Wilson, 1998). The liberal dimension of this school is also reflected in its focus on criticizing the economic vision of communism (Carré, 1991). The distribution of income and wealth is discussed, but on a liberal basis. While they oppose the exploitation of the disadvantaged by the wealthy, the authors of this trend consider wealth and income disparities to be natural. And, in so doing, they consider the quest for equality, which they consider to be an obstacle to economic dynamics, to be futile . On these premises, the emphasis is therefore not on the social structures for organizing equality or justice, but on the necessary morality of society (Mawdudi, 1941). Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr thus presented society as divided into three classes: one enjoying, thanks to its talent and abilities, a high standard of living and a wealth enabling it to enjoy a comfortable lifestyle; the other being able only to provide for basic needs through its work; and finally, the disinherited social class which, physically or mentally weakened, cannot survive despite its efforts (Wilson, 1998). The State must help the latter group while ensuring that it does not penalize the members of the former group, who create the wealth that will ensure the sustainability of the socio-economic system. This positioning will lead Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr to be qualified as a rawlsian. On the other hand, it existed quite early in the reformist movement - and for the most part in the sphere of the Egyptian or Syrian Muslim Brotherhood - but also in Iranian Shiism through a figure such as Ali Shariati (1933-1977), a socialism of Islamic inspiration (Yavari,1985), (Rahnema,2000). Some authors of the Islamic left will present the Islamic legal principle of the common interest (maslaha) as one that could lead the state to confiscate land or means of production if the principle of equality is threatened (Square, 1991). The egalitarian ideal is much more pronounced than that of the Liberals who accepted social inequalities as an inevitable reality (Mawdudi, 1941) .

They will thus elaborate a socialism which, even if it claims to be a distinct path, often happens to be an attempt to bring it into line with secularizing Arab socialism. While Abul Ala Mawdudi and Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr speak distinctly of "Islamic economy", the theorists of this socially sensitive Islam more readily speak of "Islamic social justice", which also addresses economic issues in a less technical and legal than political and ideological way. Thus Sayyed Qutb published *The Struggle between Islam and Capitalism* in 1950, Mohammad Al Ghazali (1917-1996) in the same year, *Islam - The Crossroads between Communists and Capitalists*, a book in which the Egyptian author makes a distinction between Marxism and Socialism, Abdel-Qadir'Awda (1906-1954) published, in 1951, *The Wealth and the State in Islam*. Mustafa al-Siba'î (1915-1964) A Syrian Muslim Brother published a now famous booklet, *Le socialisme de l'islam*, in 1959. These works were created in the emerging context of Arab socialism in the Middle East and a vigorous and influential Nasserism. They emphasized the social justice of Islamic utopia and established zakat, the mandatory almsgiving as a fundamental principle of social solidarity (Jouini,2009) . Hassan Hanafi (born in 1935) is another key contributor to the reflection on socialism of Islamic inspiration. These reflections led to the emergence of the first Islamic banks in Egypt. At that time, their activities were limited to rural savings banks and were inspired by the German rural banks of the post-World War II period. Ahmed al-Naggar, a pioneer in this field in Egypt in the 1960s, conceived Islamic banks "as both local and cooperative savings institutions, modelled on what he had observed in Germany during a study visit, and simply adapted to the context of Muslim societies". He had also been able

to establish such an institution, named Mit Ghamr, after a rural commune in the Nile Delta (Galloux 1993) [18]. This polarization of the theorists of "Islamic economy", a concept now linked to the broader idea of shumuliyya, shows how political Islam, despite its identity paradigm, has always been deeply permeable to Western political ideologies and traditional left-right debates, particularly between the two wars. The Islamic economy, far from being on the third path, has therefore been deeply dependent on the recompositions of the world ideological scene: oscillating for two decades between liberal and socializing versions, it will take its right turn in the 1970s, a decade that saw the victory of liberal and capitalist Islamic economies over the more socializing versions.

#### **4. Islamic Financing: Is it Islamic?**

It was in the 1970s that Islamist finance emerged as a specialized discipline in the Gulf countries newly boosted by the oil windfall. It was also at this time that Nasserism lost its lustre and a new perspective was given to socialism, which was also increasingly perceived as colonial (Dot-Pouillard, 2008), particularly following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The petrodollars will allow the major oil-producing countries of the Gulf to free up the financial resources to set up the first commercial and international Islamic banks in the mid-1970s (Boltanski, 2002). In the 1980s, the successors of Abul Ala Mawdudi and Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr proposed more economically oriented analyses, making extensive use of mathematics and econometric models (Haneef, 1995). Authors such as Siddiqi (born 1931), Khurshid (born 1932), Chapra (born 1933), Naqvi (born 1935), Kahf (born 1940) or Abdul Mannan (born 1952) published extensively from the 1980s onwards works that were much less explicitly politicized and therefore less influenced by comparative logic (Haenni, 1999). The broad and political concept of the Islamic economy is thus increasingly becoming a technical knowledge largely reduced to Islamic finance. The dynamics are once again in line with the global trend towards the financialisation of the economy and the deregulation of capital. Intellectual productions are then logically much more inductive, strongly linked to the new situations encountered in the field of daily financial operations. The authors, in their vast majority of Indo-Pakistani culture, happen to be specialists working around the headquarters of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The technicisation of Islamic finance is taking shape, and is increasingly free from the ideological positions of the first Islamic economists. Inclusion in the international financial system is required, but the reality of Islamic finance remains a matter for insiders: professional practitioners and Muslim lawyers. A body of specialists is being formed in these new institutions, deeply oriented by the emergence of an increasingly financialized capital whose liquidity in the Gulf countries is in demand. By turning to the right, the Islamic economy has therefore become technological and financialized. It is less and less the business of ideologues and more and more of a body of specialists and technicians. Far from the alternative desired by the first thinkers of the Islamic economy, it is entering a phase of both cultural normalization (by reconciling itself with the market and the liberal credo) and economic and ideological trivialisation (by inclusion in the international financial system).

#### **Conclusion**

At the end of this brief study, it appears that we cannot talk about the implementation of a real Islamic economic system in the Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf countries and primarily in Saudi Arabia. The considerable increases in oil prices, benefiting mainly the "Muslim" Arab countries, have resulted in a change in the balance of power in the Arab region to the benefit of the latter countries. The expansion of Islam thus appeared to be a response to Baathist and Nasserian ideology, hence the means conferred for this purpose through the cooperation mechanisms set up within the framework of the various Islamic conferences. At the local level, the organization of the economy, strategies for investing financial surpluses abroad, and the functioning of the banking system continued to meet the traditional standards of the Western model as in the past. The long-standing and persistent mistrust of Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia is significant in this respect. Islam has therefore remained an external showcase of the Saudi State rather than a way of organizing the economy. The existence of a weak Zakat and the absence of other taxation in the countries is more similar to the behaviour of a rentier state at the top of the Welfare State than to a concern for the economic organisation of the whole country according to Islamic standards. In this respect, there is a total difference between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries on the one hand and countries such as Iran and Pakistan seeking a practical and widespread version of the Islamic caliphate model on the other. The extent and number of research carried out in this direction by researchers in these

countries, and in particular in Pakistan (see bibliography), clearly shows that the Islamisation of the economy remains a concern for non-Arab Muslim countries and certain minorities of Muslim migrants in Western countries who are committed to the principles of the prohibition of interest. The collapse of oil prices and its impact on Arab States' revenues will - in our view - have the effect of exposing the Islamic illusion in its relationship with the organization of the economy. However, Islamisation remains more than ever the rationalising element of Saudi external actions and the unparalleled means of building a substantial pilgrimage rent, the advantage of which with regard to oil rent is its permanent and renewable nature.

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# The Relationship between Participatory Democracy and Digital Transformation in Tanzania

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## Abstract

Democracy is something that is discussed differently from various public discourses. It should definitely be known that there is a reason for these different school of thoughts whether one looks from the left, centre or right of the political continuum. Additionally, through participatory democracy, ordinary citizens are engaged and empowered to have a voice on policy and/or decision – making process, which in turn nurtures democracy both at national and local levels. However, studies carried out in Tanzania on democratic process have not paid attention on the relationship between participatory democracy and digital transformation. Therefore, this paper focuses on addressing this relationship by looking first at how public/citizen participation and civic engagement has been increased through participatory democracy and secondly, how digital transformation succeeded in initiating public opinion on pertinent issues including politics and policies? The focal point of this paper is on the potentialities of the digital transformation in creating space for the very disadvantaged population to participate significantly in the political and public sphere.

**Keywords:** Participatory/Deliberative Democracy, Democratic Process, Citizens, Participation, Digital Transformation

## 1. Introduction

The global society is experiencing some specific developments concerning democracy. To make things tough, even defining what is democracy is becoming a multifaceted challenge because there are number of choices being developed and linked in normative theory and political practice. (Dahl, 2013) reminded that traditional approaches to democratic theory tends to come together on minimal accounts of democracy. This minimalistic school of thought considers political rights including rights of free speech, association, and suffrage are endowed to citizens, whereby through voting for their representatives in elections is one means of exercising their political rights. On the other hand, due to an unexplored normative potential, the liberal democracies give alternative elucidations on traditional accounts of democracy.

Other school of thoughts, focus on ‘democratising’ as expounded by (Santos & Nunes, 2004) or ‘deepening democracy’ as according to (Fung & Wright, 2003). This has resulted into creating a space for citizens to be at the driving seat of decision-making process. The approach birthed notions like public participation, deliberation



and citizen empowerment, which require strong political backing (Rosenberg 2007; Dryzek, 2009)). In a nutshell, participatory democracy put much more emphasis on the principle that democratic legitimacy is based on the active and enduring participation of ordinary citizens. (Doorenspleet, 2019) put it clear that in scenario like this, democracy definitely assumes an important meaning in the global citizenry's perspective.

In recent years, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have played a significant role in the field of e-governance and e-democracy at different levels be it local, national or international level. They have enabled ever more innovative arrangements of intra and interconnection and communication of citizens across global space. Citizens can now call for petitions in case of violation of human rights or any matter of interest that requires legislative process. Moreover, through social networking elected representatives as well as political parties can engage directly with the members of their constituents as part of their democratic processes. On the other hand, citizens' voices through ICT platforms can raise their voices in a situation which requires government interventions be it at local government or central/national government level.

There is no doubt that the Internet plays a significant part in the political and public sphere (Ceccarini, 2019). As (Manin, 2017) put it, digital transformation operates in the course of disintegration of the audience and public opinion space. On the contrary, there have not been a common conclusion yet on different theoretical perspectives because of the complications in evaluating and empirically substantiating the possible protopolitical effects on digital revolution (Dahlgren, 2009). (Christensen, 2011) emphasized that empirically, there are no any negative relationships between the use of the Internet by citizens and their civic involvement. This leaves an open room for discussion on potential impact of digital transformation on the political sphere. It is from this background that this paper tries to address the relationship between participatory democracy and digital transformation especially in the developing democracies of the world. Specifically, this paper aim to respond on the following questions:

- 1) Has participatory democracy pave the way for increased public participation and civic engagement?
- 2) Has digital transformation succeeded in initiating public opinion on pertinent issues including politics and policies?

## **2. Theoretical Background/ Conceptualisation**

The theoretical framework for this paper is centred on participatory democracy focusing on citizen participation, civic engagement and public opinion.

The current discussions on democracy reveal that many people consider it to be inviolable, and there is no any other option to replace democracy when it comes to political governance. This argument reflects what (Sen, 1999, p.15-16) says, "the practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution" and it need to be exported to the rest of the world. (Sen, 1999) tries to assert that democracy is a universal value whereby (Sen, 1990, p.16) points out that "includes its intrinsic importance in human life, its instrumental role in generating political incentives, and its constructive function in the formation of values (and in understanding the force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights, and duties). These merits are not regional in character."

Apart from being a universal value, democracy for quite some time has been considered to reflect majority rule even when the public is represented by few in decision making and/or have been engaged and participated in the process of ensuring majority rule. This can be seen in the writings of (Dahl, 1989) whereby he laid down four ways establishing majority rule include: make best use of the number of people "who can exercise self-determination in collective decisions" (Dahl, 1989, p.138); highest possibility of reaching correct decision through majority rule; reaching maximum utility based on highest level of satisfaction on decisions made; and, unavailability of substitute for cost-effective rule.

### ***Insight on Participatory Democracy***

Almost for the five decades, developed democracies in North America, Western Europe, and beyond that are considered liberal societies have faced what is known as ‘undemocratic challenges’ including lack of accountability of rulers to ruled; party-system crises; and quasi authority government institutions, and ‘challengers’ including invisible discriminatory hegemony. This has result into formation of what is known as ‘new social movements’ exerting pressure on innovative and more inclusive democratic practices (della Porta & Diani, 2006).

Participatory democracy emerged in 1960s whereby scholars and practitioners brought into attention the requirement of citizens to participate in decision making collectively on issues pertained to them (Bherer, Dufour, & Montambeault, 2016). Since all social issues in one way or the other involve politics whether at local, national, regional or international levels, then participation is inevitable (Bass, Dalal-Clayton, & Pretty, 1995; Gbikpi, 2005). (Lynd, 1965) singled out two specific goals for instituting participatory democracy, these are: each person has to be entirely part in decisions that have effects (positive or negative) in his or her life; and the society on the other hand should promote and ensure total independence of the individuals as well as creating supporting environment for their participation in achieving common goal. This pave a way towards social inclusion, which ensures democratic independence between the society and political administration.

In establishing his argument on participatory democratic practices, (Rogers, 2008, p.20-21) pointed out that “...democratic participation in local community development promises to increase civic responsibility and local sustainability, in accordance with local visions of a good community, while also increasing societal experimentalism and creativity, without the need for centralized control or bureaucratic administration. Maximal democratic participation promises to provide society with an evolutionary dynamic, alongside allowing the conservation of local traditions wherever these are valued by local people, which allows local people to determine the conditions of their own existence in accordance with their shared cultural meanings, values, standards, and ideals, when they deem these to be satisfactory. This assumes that local people have sufficient knowledge, experience, skills, imagination, and motivation to decide for themselves how best to live their own lives”.

Since inceptions to-date, (Bherer & Breux, 2012) elucidate that participatory democratic practices have resulted into introduction of heterogeneous participatory practices through various institutions and groups, including left-and right wings’ government globally. It has also been noticed that participatory practices took pace in different settings including private sector. Non-State Actors like NGOs and Community organisations have been using participatory approaches in running their programmes and projects they implement so that their beneficiaries take initiative and action in planning for the development of their communities (Tsigas, Hofisi & Mago, 2016). New Public Governance enforced bureaucratic organisations to adopt participatory practices in order among other things, to enhance citizen participation so as to improve policy formulation and public service delivery (Nabatchi, 2010; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013).

One of the early scholarship on this subject matter is the work of Carole Pateman (1970) who introduced a concept of participatory democracy intending to restructure democracy by putting in place structural institutions modifications for participation. (Pateman, 1970) conceptualised Greek theories of direct democracy as well as studied thoroughly the “social contract” of Jean Jacques Rousseau together with “on liberty” of John Stuart Mill. For her (Pateman, 1970), citizens should be given equal opportunity to participate in decision making process as opposed to what was offered by representative and direct democracy. Her arguments on equal participate based on the fact that representation in public sphere will not create equitable level for citizens to engage properly in decisions affecting their sustainability. She (Pateman, 1970) believed that the more citizens participate in their affairs, the more “stable system of democracy” can be achieved and maintained and at the end reach the ideal representative democracy.

As (Fisher, 2003) pointed out, generally speaking, participatory democracy is centred on scope of citizen participation. (Michels, 2011) added that according to participatory democrats, delegation of decision-making power alienates citizens from politics thus, in order for a democracy to be vital, then there should be citizen participation. (Michels, 2011, p.278) outlined three key functions of participatory democratic practices: “the first

is the educational function: citizens increase their civic skills and become more competent when they participate in public decision-making. In the second place, participatory democracy has an integrative function. Participation contributes to the development of civic virtues, citizens' feeling of being public citizens and part of their community. As a consequence, they may also feel more responsible personally for public decisions. And thirdly, participatory democracy contributes to a greater legitimacy of decisions".

The issue of civic engagement is somewhat significant too. Citizen engagement in social networks and voluntary organization is considered to be important in enhancing satisfaction and to be specific, in democratic practices (Putnam, 2000). This allows individual citizens to express their interests and demands on local or/and national/state government; being able to air out their voices to responsible institutions that in turns increase the level of inclusion. In discussing about citizen engagement, (Michels, 2011) put it clear that engagement make citizens more competent. It is through these social networks where citizens learn civic skills and hence, networks turn to be schools for democracy as they help members to understand what is going on and become active participant in public life, trustworthy and reciprocators.

A lot has been narrated by various scholars but in a nutshell, the discussion about participatory democracy is centred on these following foundations: firstly, participatory democracy involves active political participation at all levels within the society; secondly, there are must be a direct citizen engagement in dialogue and decision making; thirdly, participatory democracy requires widened space to ensure full citizen participation in governance of their affairs; fourthly, continual capacity building is vital for community empowerment towards active participation; and fifthly, participatory democracy depends on enhancement of the role of civil societies in area of their jurisdictions.

### ***Insight on Deliberative Democracy***

Deliberative democracy on the contrary, is derived from the conceptions that aimed at stressing broad quality of the democratic space in order to untangle from cultural hegemony, power relationships, and unconformity in thoughts, feelings, and actions to objective values. The Anglo-American and European philosophical traditions grounded on the works of Rawls and Habermas is the key foundation for deliberative democracy (Rawls 1993, 1984; Habermas, 1992, 1984). (Habermas, 1984) sees democracy as a sphere of public discussion that is controlled by "the unforced force of the better argument" and resulting to the common good. Whereas (Elster, 1998, p.3) points out that "democracy revolves around the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of preferences". On common declaration about deliberative democracy is that, "political choice, to be legitimate, must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, equal, and rational agents" (Elster 1998, p.5). That is to say, it "rests on argumentation, not only in the sense that it proceeds by argument, but also in the sense that it must be justified by argument" (Elster 1998, p.9).

Different scholars have studied deliberative democracy and defined it based on the assertions established by Rawls and Habermas. For instance, deliberative theory has been divided into "deliberative and communicative" (Young, 2000), "liberal, constitutional and discursive" (Dryzek, 2000), "deliberative and agonist" (Mouffe, 2000), "deliberative democracy and democratic deliberation" (Mansbridge, 2007), "type one and type two" (Bachtiger et al. 2010), "liberal deliberative and participatory deliberative" (della Porta, 2013) as well as "classical and radical" (Cini & Felicetti, 2018).

(Coleman, Przybylska, & Sintomer, 2015) elucidated that in various political systems around the world, deliberative innovations have been implemented in a wide range and massive quantity. This has resulted from an increased demand for more deliberative practises requiring engagement of ordinary citizens especially underrepresented ones (Curato, Dryzek, Ercan, Hendriks, & Niemeyer, 2017). Policy making processes and political affirmations call together various fora so as to draw views from the public on pertinent issues that either affects and/or will affect them directly or indirectly in the course of their implementation (Nabatchi, et al., 2012). (Barrett, Wyman, & Schatten, 2012) confirmed that findings from studies conducted on citizens' deliberations revealed that these deliberations do influence policies however, their effects differ and can be indirect. As said earlier, with regards to political affirmations, deliberative meetings are carried out likewise in parliamentary

settings and electoral environments like formulation of elections manifestos (Hendriks, 2016). Simply, deliberative democracy is more of a talk-centred kind of democracy (Curato et al., 2017). However, (Mendelberg, 2002) cautioned that talk alone can be irrational, generating enthusiastically varied results from an ideal deliberative perception.

(Curato et al., 2017), pointed out that findings in deliberative researches recommend that deliberation can modulate or weaken instead of strengthen those who occupy dominant positions. Citizens' conversations can destroy or impair the quality of influence of elite framing (Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Adding to this, (Niemeyer, 2011) revealed that deliberative mini-publics such as citizens' juries can fathom 'symbolic politics' or elite manipulation of public discourse over selective assembly of fact and shaping of nuance to support their particular political view. One example can be cited from the National Public Policy Conferences in Brazil, which is considered to be one of the successful public deliberation exercises at a national level whereby it has empowered ordinary citizens to influence public policy once been given an opportunity to participate in significant deliberation (Pogrebinschi & Samuels, 2014). In short, these examples evidenced that deliberative democracy provides room for ordinary political stakeholders to make, oppose, and closely consider on ideas, alternatives, and discussions.

(Curato et al., 2017), assert that in deliberative democracy, decision making is done by either voting, negotiation, or workable agreements that require agreement on a way forward and not much of the reasons to execute it. (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2012) suggest that deliberation should recognise pluralism and exert meta-consensus vigorously, which encompasses mutual recognition of the acceptability of various values, inclinations, verdicts and discussions carried out by other stakeholders.

One of the important point of departure is that participation and deliberations go together. (Paterman, 2012) in drawing a distinction between the two, argued that deliberative democracy failed to acknowledge participatory democracy well enough instead it paid much attention on 'new deliberative bodies'. A 'participatory society' according to (Paterman (2012, p.10) is "where various aspects of our social and political lives are democratised are not distinct from deliberative democrats' vision of a society where all citizens affected by a decision have capacities and opportunities to deliberate in the public sphere". Therefore, deliberations are carried out so as to augment the responsiveness of democratic systems, provide an unplanned forum for policy development (Liston, Harris, & O'Toole, 2013).

### ***Insight on Digital Transformation***

Digital transformation of 21<sup>st</sup> century pave the way for enhancement democratic practices as it gave a room for ordinary citizens to speak and initiate political debates. Citizens have been given access to express and share their perceptions freely between and among each other because of the strengthened values and basics of the democracy. It is no wonder scholars since expansion of Internet in the 1990s, have been arguing on how it can aid transformation of human society. (Shayo (2019, p.857) adds up that "mobile phones and internet access have become relatively widespread, and constitutes a new important resource for citizen participation in local democracy and its decentralized crowdsourcing methods". This is aided by an increasing proportion of Internet users who are always-on via portable devices that let them to use a mobile connection to the Internet (Ceccarini, 2019). (Welp & Breuer, 2014) exposed that there have been intensely disputed questions about the impact of ICTs on political processes and outcomes, as well as social classes, that is, position of persons within a social group, category, geographic region, or social unit.

Internet as a main platform for this digital transformation it is the most useful and powerful instrument or vehicle of communication that increases transparency in the conduct of all branches of the government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary); expand the room for access to information, and facilitate active citizen participation in building democratic societies (Olengurumwa, 2016). (Avila, et al., 2011), expounded that citizens' contributions on policymaking process can easily be facilitated through new and improved channels of

participation as well as citizen monitoring of government due to an increased transparency and accountability as a result of technological innovations.

In studying about the impact of digital transformation on political participation (Boulinanne, 2009), endorses positive and modest findings on citizen engagement. However, findings reveal that there are well established elements, which are like standards that moderate political participation within a public space for instance political interest and social capital. (Bimber, Stohl & Flanagin, 2008) expounded further that digital transformation will be a cause towards deepening democratic division particularly between those who do have skills and resources to enable their engagement on political process and those without them.

Furthermore, (Chadwick, 2012) clarified that diversity of digital architectures and their various uses, does not necessarily depends by the socio-demographic features of users of internet but also, depend on the particular category of political participation. On the other hand, the impact of digital transformation on democratic processes with reference to (Anduiza, Jensen & Jorba, 2012), can be reflected in the following perspectives; political participation, consumption of political information and political attitudes. According to (Anduiza, Jensen, & Jorba, 2012), political participation entails citizens' actions towards intended political outcomes; consumption of political information referring to trust in the trustworthiness of mainstream media especially government owned media houses as well as other media houses that are heavily censored by the State; and with political attitudes referring to operational independence from being exposed to different channels.

The digital democratic innovations as means of electronic participation have brought forward a game-changer for democratic practices, governance issues as well as representation around the globe unlike the traditional means of political participation including elections, petition-signing and protests. (Pogrebinschi, 2017) believes that democratic innovations enhanced by the digital transformation in the long-run will change the nature of democracy and its institutions apart from what has been observed so far that is, increased quality of citizens engaged in democratic practices through the use of internet. For (Pogrebinschi, 2017), digital transformation will impact democratic practices across the globe in the following aspects:

**“First**, digital innovations may change how democracy works by making it more inclusive and more deliberative. Real democratic inclusion takes place when the latter is understood not in terms of the number of citizens and volume of participation, but in terms of the groups targeted and the policy issues addressed by the new means of e-participation.

**Second**, digital democratic innovations may change how governments rule by making them more accountable and effective. The most innovative and democratic institutional designs are today found among those who rely on ICT tools to allow citizens to collaborate with their government by interacting with the public administration. Forms of interactive administration have evolved as both internet sites and mobile applications (apps), where citizens can identify problems in their cities and propose solutions to fix them.

**Third**, digital innovations may change how representation is performed by turning it more responsive. Digital innovations have been making representation less virtual by virtual means.”

(Pogrebinschi, 2017), summarises that the digital transformation apart from enhancing citizen participation, it enhances also political inclusion, improve accountability, eases administration of rule of law, and amplifying responsiveness, which in turn they strengthen democratic practices. It is quite open that through digital transformation social equality has been improved whereby the voices and underrepresented demands from traditionally disadvantaged populations have now been taken on board. Studies show that there is a growing number of active smartphones users in some of the least developed countries whereby these gadgets turned to be efficient tools on enhancing social inclusion in these countries (Sugie, 2016). The findings about the major shift on digital divide is completely the opposite of what has been discussed by (Smith, 2009, p.151) by pointing out that “one of the main challenges facing Internet-based engagement is the well documented ‘digital divide’ that exists in terms of access to and proficiency in ICT”.

### **3. Participatory Democracy and Digital Transformation experienced in Tanzania**

#### **3.1 How participatory democracy paved the way for increased public participation and civic engagement**

From the theoretical framework presented in the previous section, it is very clear that citizen participation in democratic practices is significant and hence calls for innovative ways to strengthening representative democracy (Grönlund, Bächtiger, & Setälä, 2014; Smith, 2009). Democratic innovations to be participative and inclusive must ensure the voices of voiceless within a given society are well linked up to an existing governance structure be it local or national level (Michels & Binnema, 2018). This means, participatory democracy should be considered as a creative, social process of gathering together nonconforming voices, different skills, thoughts, and experiences, as well as a multiplicity of goals, morals, and tenets, so as to reach best consensus.

Furthermore, participatory democracy is a social evolution process that ensures shared commitment in achieving good life and societal well-being encompasses shared understanding of all people who are concerned with the outcome of any proposed action within their local environment. Regardless of our own assumptions, consensus about proposed problems and solutions worthy of consideration can be reached through citizen inclusion and participation. Nevertheless, there is no completely agreed principles and methodologies for overcoming challenges but through participation there is a room for criticism and persuasion on course of action to be taken whereby whatever the outcome, participants are more than willing to accept it. Thus, it can be said that participatory democracy is unrestricted that is, a process of discovery of the best course of action, but not relativistic. In principal there is no best course of action hence, the decision making process should be an ongoing fine-tuning, re-examination and criticism, thereby adapting and amending the course of action to cater for unforeseen consequences, events and circumstances. In a nutshell, participatory democracy can be regarded as an eloquent, progressive, didactic, and experimental process.

One of the very popular form of democratic innovations is open forum whereby citizens participate in face-to-face interactions and come into agreement on number of pertinent issues (Smith, 2009, p.30–31), for instance in participatory planning and budgeting popularly known in Tanzania as Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (Mwasaga, 2019). This is a formal way of involving citizens in deciding about their fate but there are other informal ways whereby citizens participate freely by organizing themselves and airing their concerns in number of pertinent issues they are facing in the community.

Findings from the Assessment of Decentralisation by Devolution (D by D) in Tanzania conducted by (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018), revealed that the reform agenda set by the Government of Tanzania is broadly considered to have been successful in increasing awareness and practice of D by D at all levels, due to the established structures and impact of local government reforms. There is an increased people's participation in politics and local governance, which is manifested through increased participation in local elections especially at the very grassroots level, in planning and budgeting mechanisms through the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) planning methodology. The Assessment report reveals that up to 90% of the villages and wards in the sample LGAs were submitting participatory development plans. Citizens were also contributing labour and materials in construction of infrastructure.

Likewise, findings from the Assessment show increased transparency and citizen's demand for accountability (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018). The normal practice is to send the village meetings' meetings to the ward level where the issues are discussed and kept on minutes, and then after sent up to the Council for further decisions. In addition to this, citizens' demands for financial transparency and accountability is also increasing through their elected representatives and participation of women, youth and other disadvantaged groups in local governance is increasing as noted by LGAs' staff (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018).

However, apart from the good response on citizen participations, findings from the same assessment carried out by (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018), revealed that the general public lost interest on participating in community meetings due to the fact that they have continue to experience little action and/or changes on their identified priorities. This was also observed by the research findings from the Ibrahim Index for African Governance (IIAG, 2015), which revealed that since 2011, Tanzania has shown poorer performance in three out of the four governance categories (governance, rule of law, human rights and economic opportunity).

### 3.2 How digital transformation succeeded in initiating public opinion

In the modern times, it has been argued by different scholars that participatory democracy should focus much more on extensive decentralisation, citizen initiatives and decisive referendums. Although, there has been a slight change on citizen participation on local governance issues in Tanzania as observed by (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018) in their assessment, a new door brought by digital transformation provides access to citizens to participate on other issues affecting their welfare. Digital platforms are seen as “new hope” for participatory democracy as they do allow citizens to directly engaged in the decision making process as well as giving reviving local democracy (Gerodimos, 2001).

According to quarterly communication statistics published in the second quarter of ending June 2019 by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)<sup>2</sup>, internet penetration in Tanzania extended to 43 percent, with 51.22 per cent of the mobile phone subscribers being using internet that is, out 43.49 million mobile subscribers at least 22.28 million were internet users. These data when computed to the estimated population in Tanzania which stands at 58 million, show that about 38.5 percent of the population has access to internet. TCRA (2018) revealed that the trends of internet penetration and mobile penetration for the period of five years starting from 2013 - 2018 show that there are positive growths from (21%) to (43%) and (61%) to (81%) respectively. This means, at one-third of the population can now utilise the avenue provided by digital transformation to engage themselves into fruitful political process, deliberation, and impact on public policy as important aspects of democracy in action.

This avenue brought by digital transformation does not restricted by national or global sphere, that is to say, nothing can supersede debate and deliberations made at local level but instead national and global public spheres supplement more voices and experiences to the local public sphere (see also: Castells, 2005; Marginson, 2008).

Literature reviewed in the previous section (Smith, 2009) depicted that digital divide existed to some extent in the past decade but digital revolution is now gathering pace as average citizens take an active role in public discourse including engaging politically on a very different level. Maria Sarungi, who is a founder of Change Tanzania Platform concurred with this truth that #ChangeTanzania platform started as a social media hashtag but abruptly turned into an online social movement with an app and website registering lots of petitions and initiatives ranging from demands for security cameras at bus stops to a community beach clean (Ridgwell, 2017). She points out that with social media platforms, citizens' voices can be amplified because of the effects brought up by the digital revolution. (Shayo, 2019) added that digital platforms including Uchaguzi platform and social media page such as Facebook *Taarifa Za Uchaguzi Tanzania* and Twitter account *@ChaguziTanzania*, promoted novel forms of citizen collective action in monitoring integrity of local elections and general elections in 2014 and 2015 respectively. All these platforms served as an example of digitally empowered citizens to take part in local democracy online in Tanzania.

During the last general elections in Tanzania of 2015, social media platforms especially Twitter, WhatsApp and Facebook were highly used for the first time for campaigning purposes. Social media gave voters, especially youths, a platform to vocalise their strong aspiration for change.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/TelCom\\_Statistics\\_June\\_2019.xlsx.pdf](https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/TelCom_Statistics_June_2019.xlsx.pdf)

By the time of elections, 60% of all voters were youths under age of 35 years (NEC, 2016). Most of them were challenging the status-quo of the past regime (4<sup>th</sup> phase government since independence of 1961). They called for changes with hashtags like #Wearerestless and #YouthPower.

One of the negative effects of social media is destructive debates as well as spread of fake news. During the campaigns, there were reports of opposition smear campaigns conducted on WhatsApp and it was being used by 'unofficial' campaigners to reach voters who by that time were estimated to be around 8 million people. Memes were circulated to create widespread mimicry of party leaders. One meme states that presidential candidate from the ruling party CCM was corrupt, while on the other side, there was a meme questioned opposition party candidate's health. Also, Tanzania's mainstream media adopted a viral content from WhatsApp campaigns whereby there was a video shared across showing a candidate representing coalition of opposition parties (popularly known as UKAWA) attracting voters on the grounds of religion. This was picked up by Newspapers and gave ruling party candidate a chance to condemn was regarded as divisive politics. This shows how digital platforms were key influencer to the mainstream political coverage in Tanzania during the last general elections of 2015. Discussions on digital platforms proved that the electorate was engaged and sought to make a difference. (Shayo, 2016) pointed out clearly that the use of digital platforms offers plenty proof and prospects for aspirants, citizen and political parties to strategically recruit and mobilise potential voters. In addition, I concur with (Shayo, 2017) that digital transformation has a great role in transforming interactions between local politicians and the general public in democratic engagements due to the fact that ordinary citizens are empowered to have a voice by new electronic means from where they are.

As it has been revealed by the assessment done by (Lyon, Zilihona & Masanyiwa, 2018), citizens at the lower level of political administration have lost passion in engaging into policy and/or decision -making processes within their localities but digital technology provide means for the local government authorities to enhance participation and create more inclusive and cohesive local communities as well as to take on board all initiatives brought up by citizens in upholding democratic society (Shayo, 2019). In order for an online participation to bring impact, (Arias, Garcia, & Corpeno, 2015, p.185) emphasized that "people to be aware of what is happening and to be able to participate in the country's political processes".

#### **4. Conclusion**

This paper addressed the relationship between participatory democracy and digital transformation especially in the developing democracies of the world, Tanzania being one of them. Specifically, it responded on two key questions: firstly, has participatory democracy pave the way for increased public participation and civic engagement? And secondly, has digital transformation succeeded in initiating public opinion on pertinent issues including politics and policies?

Theoretically, participatory democracy still holds grounds in developing democracies around the globe as it gives rooms for disadvantaged citizens to engage into politics especially in those scenarios where representative democracy cannot avail. The most important thing to consider is the degree of political inclusiveness of provided by the practices of participatory democracy. The questions remained to be: to what extent are the viewpoints of the most disadvantaged citizens incorporated in such democratic practices? And to what magnitude are their expressions publicly reached at?

On the other hand, theoretical background on participatory democracy offered an important lesson about empowering ordinary citizens in the policy and/or decision –making process. The most significant questions are: how often are their proposals taken into consideration by decision -makers? To what extent these proposals will bring about sustainable impact in their localities? The answer to these questions depend on the magnitude of citizen empowerment, the degree of political inclusiveness and quality of public discourse as observed by (della Porta, 2007).

Another aspect that need to be considered is a role digital transformation has on democratic process. This creates more opportunities for citizen participation in local democracy using available, accessible and affordable digital



platforms to be crucial. However, (Lahmann, Otto, Djordjevic, & Maire, 2017, p.7) reminds that, “alongside the countless advantages it offers, the internet creates almost as many challenges for society-in different ways and to different extents, depending on the country concerned”. For the digital transformation to bring positive impact to the democratic process in Tanzania, there is a need to continue to improve legal and regulatory framework as well as encouraging all responsible institutions to play their role without biasness. Laws that do not unnecessarily restrict the use of these digital platforms can help design a more democratic digital environment.

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# Assessment of Government Response to Socioeconomic Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria

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## Abstract

Since the Nigerian economy is largely dominated by informal workers, the preventive measures (lockdown, movement restriction, social distancing and interstate travel ban) occasioned by Covid-19 pandemic will affect socioeconomic livelihood in Nigeria. Relying on secondary sources, this study examines socioeconomic challenges of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria, analyses and evaluates government response to curbing its effect on livelihood in Nigeria. Results from the study find bearings between Covid-19 pandemic and low socioeconomic livelihood in Nigeria. Palliative measures introduced by the government to minimize the effect of Covid-19 pandemic are largely ineffective owing to poor coordination, human right violations as well as inadequate fiscal policy. Recommendations from the study draws on the need for the government to diversify the economy by promoting the informal and agricultural sectors, facilitate infrastructural development and improve health facilities, to avoid economic recession of post Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Nigeria, Socioeconomic, Informal Economy, Covid-19 Pandemic, Lockdown

## 1. Point of Departure

Government exists for the preservation of human lives and properties. Locke (1689) proposes a social contract through the establishment of a legitimate authority to protect life, property and liberty of those who lived within the state. The role of the government in this regard is to provide enabling environment for economic efficiency and growth through protection of private property. These functions of the government become imperative for citizens to invest their resources and energies in productive process for the overall development of the country (Ismail and Imoughele, 2015; Meyer and Meyer, 2016).

Although, socioeconomic problems such as poverty, unemployment, low income, inequality, poor housing, ineffective health facilities, epileptic power supply etc. are present in developing countries (Adeniran and Sidiq, 2018; Kyambalesa, 2009), the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic may further confound socioeconomic livelihood in Nigeria where more than half of the population lives below international poverty line of US \$1.25 a day

(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2015; World Bank, 2014). To this end, this study examines government response to socioeconomic impact of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria. The study has five sections. Added to this introductory note, the second section provides conceptual meaning to the concept of socioeconomic, informal economy as well as Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria. While the third section discusses the methodology used in carrying out the study, the fourth section discusses socioeconomic challenges of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria, analyses and evaluates effectiveness of government response to Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria, before conclusion.

## **2. Conceptual Clarifications**

### **2.1. Socioeconomic and Informal Economy**

Socioeconomic is a combination of two words 'socio and economic'. Socio means society or social issues, while economic relates to means of income. Therefore, socioeconomic refers to societal and economic factors. It is a broad term used to describe the social and economic standing of individual in the society (Hellmich, 2015; Mark 2009). Socioeconomic covers a variety of ways that explains individual work experience, household, as well as access to basic needs and resources (Davis and Dolfsma, 2008; Heath, Martin and Beerten, 2003). While various indices may be applied in determining socioeconomic condition of the individual, major indicator includes occupation, income and education (Darin-Mattsson, Fors and Kåreholt, 2017; Hellmich, 2015). Darin-Mattsson, et al (2017) further maintains that these major indicators (occupation, income and education) affect the other, in the sense that, individual's type of occupation largely corresponds to their income which in turns determines their level of education.

Studies (Baizidi, 2019; Brown, 2009; Heath, Martin and Beerten, 2003) agreed on a typical model of socioeconomic classification such as the upper, middle, working and lower classes. Individual in the upper class are rich and wealthy, but few in number and controls larger part of the society's wealth (Akhbar-Williams, 2010; Brown, 2009). Two types of group exist in the upper class viz: the upper upper class e.g aristocrat who has been rich from generations and the lower upper class such as the capitalist (Brown, 2009; Heath, Martin and Beerten, 2003). The middle class, also known as the sandwich class, are largely white collar or professional workers characterized by moderate incomes and affordable basic needs (Baizidi, 2019; Liu, 2010). Based on their level of education, individual in the middle class are further divided into two groups. This includes the upper middle class, categorized as skilled workers or highly educated professional with high incomes and, the lower middle class typically comprises of less educated people with lower incomes such as secretaries, retailers, teachers etc. (Akhbar-Williams, 2010; Stephen, 2016).

Otherwise known as blue collar class, the working class are made up of unskilled workers who are engaged in manual or strenuous labour (Akhbar-Williams, 2010; Heath, Martin and Beerten, 2003). This category of people includes electricians, plumbers, carpenters etc. The last classification on the social rung is the lower or the underclass, characterized by poverty, unemployment and homelessness (Brown, 2009; Darin-Mattsson, et al, 2017). Individual in the lower class are excluded from mainstream society, lack medical care, education, housing, food, clothing and vocational training.

Informal economy is a shadow, gray, black or underground business enterprise, not fully regulated by the government. It can also be defined as the type of economic enterprise that is not taxed nor included in a country's GDP or economy projection (Ogbuabor and Malaolu, 2013). Informal economy covers a wide range of labour market activities including street trading, carpentry, motorcycle services photography, catering, hairdressing, fashion designing, painting, media personality etc. Informal economy is said to be widespread in developing countries due to scarcity of earnings opportunities and economic hardship (Awojobi, Ayakpat and Adisa, 2014; Nastav and Bojnec, 2008).

In Nigeria, the informal economy is significant because it provides employment opportunities for the teeming unemployed citizens and the medium to meet the needs of poor consumers through cheaper and accessible goods and services (Ogbuabor and Malaolu, 2013; Yusuf, 2014). Also, due to the ease and flexibility attached to the operations of informal enterprises, the sector is devoid of bureaucratic regulatory framework with little or no

formal educational requirements (Awojobi, Ayakpat and Adisa, 2014; Fapohunda, 2013). Information in table 1 shows percentage contribution of the formal and informal sectors to Nigeria's economy in 2019. Analysis from the table indicates that informal sector contributed 58% to GDP and 80% to employment generation in 2019. Despite rebasing its GDP to incorporate informal enterprises in the economy, Nigeria's informal sector has largely been underestimated by the government. The lack of accurate data on the growing rate of informal enterprises in Nigeria poses challenges for effective targeting of economic policy and control measures (Kwanga, 2015; Awojobi, Ayakpat and Adisa, 2014). Yet, informal business is seen as a source of employment and livelihood in Nigeria (Fapohunda, 2013; Amasi, 2016).

Table 1: Percentage Contribution of the Formal and Informal Sectors to Nigeria's Economy in the Year 2019

	Formal Sector	Informal Sector
GDP	42%	58%
Employment	20%	80%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2019.

Due to its vast population and abundance natural resources, Nigeria is arguably one of the largest economies in Africa. However, the paradox of these potential factors continues to manifest in low socioeconomic livelihood among its citizens. Socioeconomic problems in Nigeria are compounded by increasing unemployment, inadequate social welfare, ineffective health care facilities etc., which continues to widen inequalities and disparities between the rich and the poor, thus weakening social cohesion and citizen's trust in government (Adeniran and Sidiq, 2018).

### 2.3. Covid-19 Pandemic and the Nigerian Experience

Covid-19 is a new genre of Coronaviruses that causes illnesses such as common cold, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020; WHO, 2020). It is an infectious disease that spreads mainly through dribble of spittle or release from the nose when an infected person coughs or sneezes (Nigeria Center for Disease Control, 2020; WHO, 2020). The novel coronavirus is said to originate from Wuhan City in China (WHO, 2020; Wuhan Municipal Health Commission, 2019). Empirical investigations (Peiris, Lai and Poon, 2003; Shrikrushna, Quazi, Shubham, Suraj, Shreya, Rohit, Suraj and Biyani, 2020; WHO, 2020) reveal that coronavirus diseases such as SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV was contracted from animal in China, 2002 and Saudi Arabia, 2012 respectively. However, Covid-19 is a novel virus because it has not been previously identified in human system. Common symptoms of Covid-19 include fever, cough, Dyspnea and tiredness (NCDC, 2020; Shrikrushna, et al, 2020; WHO, 2020). The suffix '19' as used after Covid correlates to the year of discovery of the virus in 2019 (Ohia, Bakarey and Tauseef, 2020; WHO, 2020).

A pandemic is a widespread epidemic that affects people in many countries and continent. It is a term used to substantiate the rapid rate of contagious disease raging from endemic and epidemic (Muthu, 2005; Qiu, Rutherford, and Mao, 2017). An endemic disease is an infectious disease that is common in a particular region or community, while epidemic is an outbreak of infectious disease in a community at a particular time (Chakraborty, 2017; Qiu, Rutherford, and Mao, 2017). A pandemic occur when an epidemic becomes widespread and affects people in many countries. The contagious effect and rate of spread of Covid-19 globally justify the pandemic nature of the virus (see table 2 for the number of countries, confirmed cases and death rate of Covid-19 as at June, 22 2020). The WHO confirms Covid-19 as a pandemic on 11 March, 2020 (CDC, 2020; WHO, 2020). Historical accounts of similar cases of Covid-19 pandemic includes: Spanish Flu, 1918-1919; Asian Flu, 1957-1958; Swine Flu, 2009-2010; SARS, 2002-2003; Ebola, 2014-2016; MERS, 2015-present (Patrick and Daniel Krewski, 2016; WHO, 2020).

Table 2: Number of Countries with Confirmed Cases and Death of Covid-19, as at June, 22 2020

No of Countries	No of Confirmed Cases	No of Death
188	8,860,331	465,740

Source: WHO, 2020

Across polities, governments have continued to introduce a number of precautionary measures such as self-isolation and lockdown to curb the spread of Covid-19. Further still, personal hygiene practices such as frequent washing of hands with soap and water or use of alcohol based hand sanitizer, wearing of face mask, maintaining social and physical distancing at least 1 meter away in public gathering etc., has been suggested as means to minimize the spread of Covid-19 (WHO, 2020; NCDC). While global effort to develop vaccine to contain the spread of the novel coronavirus is ongoing, the movement restriction, lockdowns and social distancing occasioned by the pandemic has continued to cause structural changes in economy and social system globally. Based on the high rate of contagious effect of Covid-19, the WHO (2020) observes that developing countries may face inadequate testing capacity due to weak and ineffective health system.

The index case of Covid-19 in Nigeria was recorded on 27 February, 2020 when an Italian citizen tested positive for the virus in Lagos (NCDC, 2020). However, the number of confirmed cases and death of Covid-19 in Nigeria has continued to increase. Analysis in table 3 shows that 20,244 confirmed cases, 6,879 recovery and 518 deaths of Covid-19 were recorded across states in Nigeria as at 22 June, 2020. The effect of Covid-19 pandemic on socioeconomic livelihood in Nigeria implies negative consequences for larger part of its citizens who are engaged in the informal sector of the economy and lives below international poverty line of US \$1.25 a day (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2015).

The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria is hinge on conspiracy theories. One of such belief is that Covid-19 is nonexistence but a means for the government to divert public fund to private pocket. This position pervades public domain since public's trust in government is low (Odima, 2020). Another belief is that Covid-19 is a disease for the elites and wealthy individuals. This position seem catchy resulting from news from government officials, business leaders, celebrity, social and media personality who tested positive for the virus or died from Coronavirus related illness (Campbell, 2020). Thus, despite public awareness on preventive measures of Covid-19, the lower class in the society perceived government regulations as a sham, thus increasing the rate of community transmission of the virus in Nigeria (Campbell and McCaslin, 2020).

Table 3: Number of Confirmed Cases, Deaths and Recovery rate of Covid-19 across States in Nigeria as at 22 June 2020.

State Affected	No. of Confirmed Cases	No. of Recovery	No of Death
Lagos	126	8,576	1,444
FCT	1,567	486	30
Kano	1,190	712	50
Oyo	912	282	9
Rivers	874	391	31
Edo	784	197	31
Ogun	646	361	15
Kaduna	580	302	10
Delta	501	124	17
Borno	468	362	31
Bauchi	464	324	11
Gombe	451	246	14
Katsina	426	233	22
Jigawa	317	191	6
Plateau	251	125	6

Ebonyi	234	137	0
Imo	234	21	3
Abia	222	93	3
Nasarawa	184	88	6
Kwara	180	122	6
Bayelsa	169	29	10
Enugu	144	29	5
Sokoto	135	115	14
Ondo	134	75	17
Zamfara	76	71	5
Kebbi	67	40	6
Anambra	66	51	9
Niger	66	37	3
Akwa Ibom	65	43	2
Osun	60	46	5
Yobe	56	45	8
Adamawa	45	37	5
Benue	44	15	0
Ekiti	35	28	2
Taraba	18	10	0
Kogi	3	0	0
	<b>20,244</b>	<b>6,879</b>	<b>518</b>

Source: NCDC, 2020.

### 3. Research Method

The study made use of secondary data. Therefore, relevant literatures on socioeconomic challenges and Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria were purposefully selected for content analysis. Covid-19 pandemic is ongoing as at the period of conducting this research. Thus, the enforcement of social and physical distancing, movement restrictions as well as lockdown by the government could not allow for a field study.

#### 4.1. Socioeconomic Challenges of Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria

(a) Monolithic Nature of Nigeria Economy: Nigeria is a monolithic economy that relies on crude oil as major a source of government revenue and foreign exchange inflow (Al-Ghwell, 2020; Bjørnland, 2000; Oladipo and Fabayo, 2012). The depletion in the prices of crude oil amid Covid-19 pandemic portends negative growth in Nigeria GDP. Analysis in table 4 shows Nigeria's GDP growth rate in Nigeria from 2010 to the First Quarter of 2020. While economic recovery has been relatively slow since the 2016 recession, the depletion in the prices of crude oil and its attendant decline in the GDP by the First Quarter (FQ) of 2020 will worsen socioeconomic problems in Nigeria. More so, since government relies on external borrowing to finance public expenditure, the implication of crude oil depletion is further manifested on debt serving which is a major bane of economic development in Nigeria (Aluko and Arowolo, 2010). Amid Covid-19 pandemic, the House of Representative approved the President request to borrow \$5.513 billion to finance 2020 deficit budget (Nlebem, 2020).

Table 4: Nigeria GDP Growth, 2010-FQ 2020.

Year	GDP Growth	Performance Indicator
2020 (FQ)	1.87%	decrease
2019	2.3%	increase
2018	1.9%	increase
2017	0.81%	decrease
2016	-1.62%	decrease (recession)
2015	2.65%	decrease



2014	6.31%	decrease
2013	6.67%	increase
2012	4.23%	decrease
2011	4.9%	decrease
2010	11.3%	increase
2009	8.4%	-

Source: National Bureau of Statistic (NBS), 2020.

(b) Difficulties in Maintaining Social Distancing: Another major socioeconomic challenge of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria relates to the problem of maintaining social and physical distancing as well as good hygiene practices in high density and poor houses typical of rural and urban residence in Nigeria. Adesoji (2014) found that most residential houses in Nigeria are without good toilets, sewage, and drainage systems, as well as inadequate waste disposal facilities, space and setback. Several other studies (Babanyara, Usman and Saleh, 2010; Olotuah and Taiwo, and 2013) reveals that increased rural urban migration and urban housing deficit accounts for the proliferation of slums in many towns and cities across states in Nigeria. Since individual's position on the socioeconomic rung correlates to their health status (Michael, 2004; Olotuah, 2015), inadequate access to sanitation will further aid the spread of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria.

(c) Effect on Informal Workers: The 'stay at home' directive by the government to mitigate the spread of Covid-19 affects socioeconomic livelihood of the informal workers. Analysis in table 1 shows that 80% of the Nigeria labour force are employed in the informal sector. To this extent, Covid-19 pandemic and its attendant coping measures (lockdown, restriction on movement etc.) portends grave consequences for citizens who based their income on daily access such as face-to-face interactions and customer flow to meet basic needs. These challenges are not without negative consequences on low income, savings and consumption expenditure. In the same vein, Covid-19 pandemic creates uncertainty in global markets and interrupts supply chain. As a result, some industries and companies resort to layoff or salary modification to cope with economy downturn of Covid-19 pandemic (Arinze, Ogwu and Aliyu, 2020; Olorunbi, 2020). According to the NBS (2020), out of the over 200 million Nigeria's population, 23 million persons, aged between 15 and 35 years old are either unemployed or underemployed in the year 2019. Moreover, given the economy downturn of Covid-19 pandemic, it is not in doubt to postulate a steady increase in Nigeria's unemployment rate.

(d) General Belief that Covid-19 is Nonexistence: The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria is hinge on conspiracy theories. One of such belief is that Covid-19 is nonexistence but a means for the government to divert public fund to private pocket. This position pervades public domain since public's trust in government is low (Odima, 2020). Another belief is that Covid-19 is a disease for the elites and wealthy individuals. This position seem appealing due to news from government officials, business leaders, celebrity, social and media personality who tested positive for the virus or died from Covid-19 related illness (Campbell, 2020). Consequently, despite public awareness on preventive measures of Covid-19, the lower class in the society perceived government regulations as a sham, thus increasing the rate of the virus in Nigeria (Campbell and McCaslin, 2020).

#### 4.2. Government Response to Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria

(a) Lockdown and Movement Restrictions: The federal government announced a lockdown on 30 March, 2020 in Lagos and Ogun states, as well as Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) and later Kano state, which are considered as the epicenter of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria (NCDC, 2020). This was followed by similar directive by some state governments culminating into closure of school, religion, social and sport gathering as well as movement restriction and interstate travel ban. The federal government also institutes the Presidential Task Force (PTF) to keep update with the management of Covid-19 in Nigeria (NCDC, 2020). This is coupled with the establishment of Emergency Operations Centers as a rapid response strategy to flattening the curve of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria (NCDC, 2020).

(b) Distribution of Palliative: Another major response by the government to cushion the effect of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria was the distribution of palliatives such as food items and 'conditional cash transfer' to the

poor and vulnerable citizens. The beneficiaries of the 'conditional cash transfer' were estimated to cover 3.6 million citizens who depend on daily wage and persons with disabilities, whose means of livelihood has been negatively affected by Covid-19 lockdown and movement restrictions (Njoku, Ebiri, Olumide, Musa, and Agboluaje, 2020). Private individual and Civil Society Organizations also supported the government through cash donations and distributions of parcels of food items to the needy (Abara, 2020). Similarly, the government also continued the Home Grown School Feeding Programme aimed at addressing malnutrition and ensuring provision of food ration to schoolchildren amid Covid-19 pandemic (Onwuzoo, 2020).

(c) Fiscal Stimulus Measure: Fiscal stimulus such as interest rate reductions, tax cuts and tax holidays were implemented to mitigate the effect of Covid-19 pandemic on Small and Medium Scale enterprises. For instance, the government implemented tax holidays for small businesses against company income tax, while tax rate for medium businesses were revised downwards from 30% to 20% (Nnanna, 2020). The CBN also approved uniform exchange rate system for Inter-Bank market to ease pressure on Foreign Exchange rates (Onyekwena and Ekeruche, 2020). Other stimulus measures include the establishment of #50 billion Intervention Fund to improve health facilities in the country (Nnanna, 2020; Onyekwena and Ekeruche, 2020).

#### **4.3. Effectiveness of Government Response to Covid-19 Pandemic in Nigeria**

Government response to Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria was not without challenges that further aggravates socioeconomic livelihood.

(a) Human Right Abuse: The enforcement of lockdown, movement restrictions and curfew by the security agents were met with human right violations, degrading treatment, illegal confiscation of properties, extortion and unlawful arrests. The National Human Rights Commission (2020) reveals that security forces used excessive or disproportionate force leading to deaths in Kaduna, Abia, Delta, Niger, Ebonyi and Katsina States. The NHRC (2020) also identifies the Nigeria Police Force, the Nigeria Army and Nigeria Correctional Service to be responsible for the highest cases of human right violations during Covid-19 lockdown and movement restrictions. In the same vein, various cases of gender based violence including rape, and domestic violence such as spousal violence, and parent-child abuse were largely reported during Covid-19 pandemic lockdown in Nigeria (Amnesty International, 2020; NHRC, 2020).

(b) Poor Coordination of Palliative: Palliative aid to the poor and vulnerable was characterized by coordination problems. The eligibility criteria for the Federal Government Covid-19 palliative aid includes inability to recharge mobile phone with N100, bank balance not more than N5000, and referral by community leader (Njoku, et al, 2020). These criteria fall short of standard indicators (disability status, income, employment and education) for measuring household poverty (World Bank, 2014). Therefore, palliative aid meant to cushion the effect of Covid-19 lockdown on the poor and vulnerable may not achieve its intended objectives. Moreover, in what could be seen as party politics affairs, palliative aid were given to party loyalists at the expense of the poor and vulnerable in the society (Njoku, et al, 2020).

(c) Inadequate Fiscal Policy: The conventional fiscal policy measures (interest rate reductions, tax cuts and tax holidays) introduced by the government to mitigate the effect of Covid-19 pandemic on Small and Medium Scale enterprises may be effective when a decrease in aggregate demand is met with an increase in supply and vice-verse (Al-Ghwell, 2020; Bjørnland, 2000; Oladipo and Fabayo, 2012). However, the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic causes a decrease in both demand and supply in the global economic chain (Al-Ghwell, 2020). The demand factors include limitations in spending and declining consumptions due to movement restrictions, curfew and social distancing occasioned by Covid-19 pandemic. The supply factors include low productions, layoff, and risk of factory shutdown due to economy downturn of Covid-19 pandemic. The combinations of these two factors will manifest in Nigeria's unemployment rate and low GDP as seen in table 4.

(d) Ineffective Coordination of Covid-19 Lockdown across the State: Although the federal government announced a lockdown in Lagos and Ogun states, as well as Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) and later Kano state, which are considered as the epicenter of Covid-19 pandemic in Nigeria (NCDC, 2020), corresponding

response were not enforced by subnational government across the states. For instance, state such as Oyo either enforced partial lockdown or curfew (Feyisipo, 2020). Policy inconsistency on the implementation of lockdown creates a lacuna for movement of people and goods as well as nonobservance to the WHO Covid-19 protocol. Since the virus is highly contagious, ineffective coordination of Covid-19 lockdown and protocols in one part of the state will aggravate the spread of the virus in the country.

## 5. Conclusion

The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic portend negative consequences for socioeconomic livelihood in Nigeria. Government response to mitigate the effect of Covid-19 pandemic lockdown on the poor and sustaining the economy are largely defective. The aforementioned observation is considered in relation to the informal workers which accounts for Nigeria's largest economy, but bear greater brunt of Covid-19 pandemic lockdown in Nigeria. To guide against post Covid-19 pandemic recession, there is need for the government to expand the economy by promoting the informal and agricultural sectors which accounts for Nigeria's largest revenue. The government should also create an enabling socioeconomic environment through the provision of social amenities to facilitate economic growth and improve health facilities, thereby creating job opportunities and increasing GDP.

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# Florence Riford Library in La Jolla: A Historical and Vigorous Civic Place

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## Abstract

Florence Riford Library is a public library with more than a century years old. Its special spaces and decorations such as College Corner, lab, History Room and catamaran sculpture are the features. The historical elements are emphasized by the place they are located and their efforts in purpose. The donor wall reveals the reason why Riford Library can get abundant funds and works excellent. The various activities in the library deposit the social capital by the residences' place attachment, which make the library a vigorous civic place.

**Keywords:** La Jolla/Riford Library, Donor Wall, Civic, Social Capital

Florence Riford Library is a branch of San Diego public library. It locates in the heart of La Jolla---a pearl in west coast of Pacific Ocean. Not only sunny beach but also artists' and scientists' inhabitation make it wealthy and open. This article investigates the special features of Florence Riford Library in space comparing with the two libraries nearby---North University Community Library and Pacific Beach/Taylor Library, analyses the functions and connotations of the special spaces, explores the reasons why the La Jolla/Riford Library is both a historical and vigorous public space.

The three libraries are all the branches of San Diego public library, serving the communities nearby. The North University Community is in the northeast of Riford Library about 5 miles away. The Pacific Beach/Taylor Library is in the south about 3 miles away. The buildings of the libraries are the property of San Diego government. The books are circulated among the libraries. Compared with the other two libraries Riford Library has some specialties in space design and arrangement.

## Part One: the Spatial Specialties in Riford Library

A community library is generally made up by circulation desk, reading area, book storing area, rooms for community meetings or group study, new book exhibition area, donor wall, patio and etc. A library is not only

for borrowing books but also provides public space for community. So the daily working of the library reveals the spirit of the community.

The Riford Library covers 25000 sq. feet, much larger than the other two libraries(The Taylor Library is 12,484 sq. feet, The North University Community Library is 16,020 sq. feet ) because of the Joan and Irwin Jacobs Annex, which is added to the main building in 2004. It is a 2-story building with basement. So the Riford Library has more space to hold the books and accommodate other rooms. Among these rooms the unique one is the History Room which locates in the 2rd floor. This room is designed to hold multi-media materials about La Jolla history, such as La Jolla Newspapers from 1970s, books describing La Jolla, oral histories on tape, photos, slides, and phonebooks. It even preserves the historic newspapers on microfilm (1919-1969).

Below the History Room there is a lab. 3D printers, microscopes, tubes and beakers stand on the table. The 3D printer used to be placed in the room facing the gate. With microscopes coming they were moved to the current room and the science lab came into being.

Besides the gate at the right hand 'College Corner' holds the books related with the exams. It is a real corner covering only about 4 m<sup>2</sup>. The U-shape shelves cling to the walls from the desk to the ceiling are loaded with books. The corner is also good for an individual study because of its size, desk and chair.

The History Room, lab and College Corner are the special spaces in the Riford Library. Except for these fixed settings there are some decorations revealing the elegant taste. Behind the gate door at the left hand a bronze bust of Mrs. Florence Riford stands, who donated the land to the library. Her oil-painting portrait hangs above the door. On the right hand a long table is set to display a vase holding a bunch of fresh flowers. The flowers are offered and changed every day by the floarr group in the community. The door area is fabricated with memorial and delicate meaning.

Inside the library in children's area the small wooden tables and arm-chairs are in the classical style, of which the legs and the arms are in streamline. In the entertaining area there is a Chinese antique wooden closet. It is about 2 meters tall and 2 meters wide. These furniture are donated by the local residence. In the west wall there is a faked fireplace, above which hangs an oil-painting picture of La Jolla beach.

The most remarkable ornament suspended in the atrium of the annex is an abstract boat's hull, a catamaran, the inner face of each half lined in gold leaf. The stairs from the ground to the second floor offers an ascending view to watch it. The designer explains the idea of the atrium that 'All these individual elements combine to form a symbolic vessel of learning, the journey of exploration in La Jolla Library's 'Voyage of Discovery'. (see Photo 1)



Photo 1 by the author in the March of 2020

These special equipments and ornaments, which are not necessary parts of a public library and donated by the local residence, are the features of the library. They decorate the space and make the space alive.

### Part Two The High-Lightened Historical Elements: to be Memorized, Honored and Cherished

The history of the Riford Library can be traced to La Jolla Reading Club in 1894. Besides the circulation desk inside the window there is a big poster with pictures recording the landmarks in the development of the library. The names of donators are in bold. (See Photo 2) In contrast the Taylor Library can be traced to 1914. The name is to memorize Vern Taylor and Erma Taylor who donated \$3.75 million to purchase the land and construct the building. In July 12, 2014 the City Council of San Diego, Mayor of San Diego and California Assembly signed the 100 anniversary proclamations, which outlined its development. The documents were posted on the wall of passageway from the circulation desk to the community room. (See Photo 3) No photos are displayed. The two libraries are almost in the same age. But the historical information displayed is different not only in the amount but also in the way.




Photo 2 by the author in the March of 2020






Photo 3 by the author in the March of 2020

On the wall of lobby hangs a wooden-framed board on which recorded the names of every presidents of ‘Friends of La Jolla Branch Library’. (See Photo 4) This NGO has its website and works as the coordinator of the library staff and takes charge of the donations. It is their efforts that make the library excellent. This board is for memorizing, rewarding and honoring. Actually every public library has its ‘Friends of XXX Library’. Their endeavors are behind the scene. In these three libraries only the Riford Library has the memorizing board.



Photo 4 by the author in the March of 2020

The La Jolla History Room is established in 2004 with the building of the Annex. This room is not only for store and exhibition but also collecting the past information and making it into digital forms to keep it forever. Every Monday Wednesday and Friday there are volunteers to comb the information about La Jolla history and type it into the computer. They also record the oral history. With the continuous work the local history is well-knitted. So more and more persons and issues are open to the public. Why does a rich history contribute to the community? Because the history is the common memory of the community. The richer the history is, the more possibility the current local residence can find their ties with the community and the closer they feel to the community. So the history is the common treasure to the community. The History Room and the volunteers' work are to make the community united and connected.

### **Part Three Money Matters: the Donor Wall**

Public library runs by the public finance. It needs the donation to work better.

There are three Donor Walls in the Riford Library. Two of them are on the walls besides the door of community room in the lobby, and the last one is on the wall connecting the hall and the Annex. (See Photo 5 and 6) A minimum of \$1000 donation can get an acrylic plaques, each 12 inches wide by 4 inches high, engraved with donor names and sentiment the donor wants to express. There are around 400 plaques all together. Most of them have been engraved. Besides the Donor Wall there is a statement which explains the donation affairs with thankful words. The inviting sentence 'There is still a place for your name or your family's name' is in bold and italic style.



Photo 5 by the author in the March of 2020



Photo 6 by the author in the March of 2020

In Pacific Beach/Taylor Library there is a metal donor belt on the middle part of wall. On the belt the donation is marked by the logos. Each logo represents certain amount of money. The minimum is \$5000 with nautilus as the logo. There are 9 logos with donators' names all together. There is no statement explaining the donation affairs. (See Photo 7)




Photo 6 by the author in the March of 2020

In North University Community Library the donor board is on the wall leading to the community room. This library was built in 2007. The donor board is made up by many hexagonals which are in perfect tessellation. Each hexagonal is reserved for one donor. About one third of the hexagonals are engraved. There is no statement about donation affairs. (See Photo 7)



Photo 7 by the author in the March of 2020

Comparing the donor areas in the three libraries the one in the Riford Library is the best not only in the place and design but also in the information it shows. It is clear that the donors are not to show off. But the recipient should publicly show their appreciation. So the prominent place is necessary, which make the donation a glory. What's more, it is startling that a donor wall leap into the eyes. The tidy plaques line up just like an army group, which is impressive to the visitor. Another detail needs consideration. The minimum donations in the Riford Library is one fifth of that in the Taylor Library. That is a reason why there are less donators' names showed in donor belt. Which is better? The donor wall or donor belt. It is hard to compare. One is in grand style, the other is exquisite. But for collecting money the donor wall seems more effective. And it is more important that by using donor wall more persons can involve in the donation and donation tends to be popular.

Donation has its political meaning in modern society. It is a way to show donators' contribution to community, which is not compulsory. So it is a civic virtue to donate. The donor wall is a place to honor the donators and praise the virtue.

Money matters because more money can make the library run better. It is of vital importance that the donator is highlighted in the donor wall. So the money has the profound effect that is to trigger the civic contribution.

#### **Part Four Activities in the Libraries: a Vigorous Civic Life**

Space as a physical being is different from Place as a social being because the latter contains persons' activities, feelings and emotions. Public library is a Place. All these three libraries offer various activities. These activities can be sorted into three categories.

Firstly volunteers' activities. Volunteers' help is welcomed in any library. Middle-school students are likely to be volunteers in the library because serving the community is required by the school. Volunteers can do many works. So here only the institutionalized volunteer work is to be compared. 'Do your Homework @Library' is an activity launched by the San Diego Library, which aims to help the students finish their homework in library. But not all the branch libraries carry it out. Only the libraries with proper volunteers can actually make it. The Riford Library offers this service on every Wednesday afternoon from 12:30 to 5:00. The Taylor Library just offers the space but no volunteers every Monday to Thursday 3:00-7:00pm. 'Friends' Bookstore' is a part of library. It sells the books magazines and disks from the donated ones. The money from the selling donates to the library. The work in Friends' bookstore is taken by the volunteers. The Taylor Library has no particular room for

this function but there are books for selling shelved in the corridor to the community room and the corner in front of it. The scale of the Friends' Bookstore in the Riford Library is much larger than the other two. It even sells the shopping bag printed with the façade of the library building. It reveals to some extent that it can offer much funds. Another volunteers' work is in History Room mentioned above.

Secondly front-desk scheduled activities. These activities are scheduled and shown in the library website. Most of these activities are routine ones, such as Lego Builder Club in Riford Library on every Wednesday afternoon 4:00-5:00, QiGong in Taylor Library on every Tuesday morning 11:30 am-12:30 pm, Babies and Books in North University Community Library on every Monday 10:00-10:30 am. Taking the activities showed on the website in March 2020 as an example. There are 81 activities to be offered in the Riford Library, 79 in the Taylor Library, 50 in the North University Community Library. It needs to be clarified that in Taylor Library every Monday to Thursday in the afternoon the 'Do your Homework@library' does not need special effort to organize. So in the Taylor Library 63 activities can be counted. Before it there is an 'After School Happy Hour' which mainly offers students computer games. It is attractive to the elementary school students. Playing before studying is a quite smart way to improve the study.

Most of these activities aim to provide the entertainments and exercises to the older adults and preschool children. Besides these the first Saturday afternoon Middle School students can meet for the book club and they have their Teen Council in Riford Library. Local Merchants' Association also meets here. Kite-flying is a special activity in Taylor Library since it has a spacious playground and meadow. So Kite Making Workshop is a feature in the library. Also the Pacific Beach Planning Group meets every other week here. North University Community Library provides more activities for the preschool children. But it holds 'Fun with French' and 'Aloha Ukulele Strummers' which is favored by the youth. So every library has the activities with its own feature.

Thirdly self-scheduled activities. The study room in the Riford Library is scheduled by the users as showed below. (See Photo 8 and 9) The similar seminar room in the North University Community Library needs to be scheduled by the users at the front desk. (See Photo 10 and 11) It reveals that in Riford Library with more than one hundred years some spontaneous order has formed. There is no study room or seminar room in the Taylor Library because of the limited inner space. But the most interesting and remarkable note in the board of Taylor Library is written by the organizer. As showed in the photo below. (See Photo 12) Maybe it is the primary phase of formal meeting. It is very valuable because the organizer believe that he/she can find the fellows in the library, which he/she trusts.



Photo 8 by the author in the March of 2020




Photo 9 by the author in the March of 2020



Photo 10 by the author in the March of 2020




Photo 11 by the author in the March of 2020




Photo 12 by the author in the March of 2020

It is because of these various activities that the libraries become a place, a part of local residents' life. When they have the activities they not only enjoy themselves but also know each other more. Thus social capital is accumulated. Furthermore they believe that they are a part of the community. The place attachment is a civic identification in disguise.

Riford Library is excellent in modern equipments and activity organizing. So the social capital and civic identification are deposited. These positive attitude toward the library spark local residents to devote more money or work to the library. The abundant funds and volunteers make the library a place with civic spirit---devotion---not only donate money but also take care of the library and community as their treasure. Riford

Library is a model as a civic place. Its visual beauty from its historical background and vigorous activities based on the modern equipment make the space meaningful and self-motivated.

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# The Blemish of Voter Apathy in Sustaining Democratic Governance in Nigeria: The Role of Political Parties

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## Abstract

Sustaining democratic governance is a philosophy hinged largely on the functionality of the institutions of governance in line with democratic process and norms. The study established that virile democratic system is an illusion when a chunk of citizens are less concerned and disinterested in political activities of their country especially when it comes to voting. That is, a carefree attitude by the citizens towards voting is inimical and an aberration to widely celebrated modern democracy. Expectedly, political parties play a crucial role in citizens' participation in politics, because they are mobilization forces. When political parties stimulate violence then it becomes a problem. The core interest of this study therefore is to investigate the interplay between campaign characters of political parties and low voters turn out in Nigeria. Secondary method of data collection was adopted, as published article, books and relevant reports were captured from the national dailies. This study out found that in Nigeria, political parties are liabilities rather than assets to the Nigerian Democracy, considering their attitude that encourage voters' apathy. Indeed, failed electoral promises; ideological bareness; electoral violence, high level of indiscipline and unprincipled party defection characterizes Nigeria's political parties and by implication stimulate among the citizens a mood of pessimism about partisan politics. As the 2019 general elections had been concluded and Nigerians continue to yearn for sustainable democratic governance, political parties should reposition themselves; by being well grounded on ethos and ideology and build confidence and trust in the electorates. Hence, there is a compelling need for Nigerian political parties to be democratic, as democracy is incontrovertibly inconceivable without virile political parties.

**Keywords:** Democratic Governance, Sustainable Development, Voter Apathy, Political Parties, Nigeria

## Introduction

It is an axiomatic expression that popular participation is one of the key elements of democracy. Citizen's active participation in political activities in a wider sense constitutes a building block for the promotion of democracy.

We can hardly have a robust democratic system when the citizens are less concerned and disinterested in discussing issues and events that affect them and their community. It is arguable to say that, political participation takes a central position in the viability and sustainability of democratic project. Put differently, at the centre of every democratic idea is the notion of political participation which describes the extent to which individual members of the society share, take part, or get involved in decisions that affect the life of the citizens/society. Political participation is therefore, a barometer that shows the degree of political interest and concern that establish a line of demarcation between democratic and non-democratic citizenry (Deth & Elff 2000:1). Ultimately, engagement in politics is not to be considered as a specific type of activity rather, it is an integral part of social life and it is essential for the well-being of every individual. It is a statement of fact that the most popular means of citizens' participation in politics today is through voting in an election. Therefore, exhibition of carefree attitude by the citizen to political issues specifically voting exercise constitutes voter apathy. Put simply, voter apathy implies lack of interest of the eligible electorate in electoral processes as well as voting during elections.

Expectedly, political parties' strategic position in a democratic dispensation to serve as a pivot mobilization and recruitment force is to obviate any apathetic menace in democracy. Political parties are major vehicles for enhancing citizen participation in governance. According to Agbaje (1999:198) through internal debate and discussion, as well as campaigning and electoral competition, parties engage in political education and socialization. Thus, subscription to the above orientation is to perceive political parties as an antidote to voter apathy. Moreover, it was argued by Omotola (2010:25) that "political parties basically are expected to sever as (a) formidable democratization force... engendering popular participation and promoting political education and national integration". This simply means that, political parties are basic prerequisites in a democracy as they provide the platform in which people are engaged politically.

The aforementioned important role of political parties has not substantially manifested in citizen participation in political activities. Put differently, the level of political apathy in Nigeria is a big challenge for political parties that appear on the country's political map in terms of political education. Indeed, despite a round of applaud that greeted the 2019 general elections. In fact, Empirical evidence from the INEC shows that 35.66% voter's turnout was recorded in the 2019 election as against (43:65%) electorates that officially voted during the 2015 presidential election. It is of concern that as a significant increase is observed in the number of registered voters while the vote cast keeps decreasing. Regrettably, considering the scanty attention paid by the scholars to political apathy; most specifically voter apathy in the literature, the phenomenon appears innocuous to Nigeria's fledgling democracy. Of course, this orientation has been ill-conceived and erroneously indisputable (it does not augur well for democracy), as parochial political culture, if unaddressed could be counter-productive and lead to what Diamond (2008) in (Ogundiya, 2011: 1) termed 'democratic reversal'.

### Statement of the Problem

That popular participation is a major substance of a healthy democracy is indisputable. Democracy is a game of numbers, in essence the government draws its power and legitimacy from the number of votes cast in a free, fair, credible and acceptable elections. Understanding the forgoing assertion in the contemporary party politics in Nigeria appears hard considering the worrisome level of citizen's participation in voting exercise which is strategic to political participation. In simpler sense, it is unhealthy for any democratic system to have unappreciable level of citizens' participation in its political activities. Since the return to new democratic order in 1999, Nigerians participation in voters' registration exercise as well as voting during the elections has not been encouraging. In spite of government's effort to ensure full participation and involvement of citizens in politics and governance which constitute one of the main thrusts of representative democracy, yet majority of Nigerians still demonstrate lack of interest in political activities.

Apparently, it has been argued that:

*since 1999, the country witnessed its major lowest voter's turn out ...in the... 2015 presidential elections. The country recorded 43.65% compare to the 54% in 2011 or the 57% in 2007 and lastly the 69% and 52% in the 2003 and 1999 elections respectively (Fagunwa 2015:4).*

This simply suggests that, low turn-out of voters in the 2015 general elections is a spill-over of voters' apathy in Nigeria. In fact, out of 181,562,052 million Nigerians, 67,422,005 million registered voters were recorded, while just 29,432,083 million total votes were recorded, representing just 29%. Worst still, the recently concluded 2019 general elections was a mere child's play compared to previous elections conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Indeed, Salahu, (2019) remarked that, ...if the numbers are anything to go by, the 2019 registered voters as presented by INEC is a far cry compared to actual vote cast on election day (*Business Day Newspaper*). As reported by Abang, a voter, Mary Suleiman says that "I came out to vote but the place is empty as you can see and the low turnout shows a major deficit about the electoral process" (cited in [Aljazeera.com/news/Africa/2019](http://Aljazeera.com/news/Africa/2019)).

The record of Independent National Electoral Commission INEC shows that the percentage of voters' turnout in the 2019 general election stood at 35.6%. Paradoxically, there was a significant increase in the total number of registered voters (84,004, 084 million) in this election year while only 28,614,209 were total number of votes cast ([www.inecnigeria.org](http://www.inecnigeria.org)). The above data is democratically poor looking at the centrality of people's participation to the legitimization and good standing of democracy. The foregoing voting revelations are of political concern because it is a pointer to bad governance. It is cancerous to Nigerian systemic governance. Therefore, necessary steps must be taken to address this situation because of its negative implications on the prospect of democracy in Nigeria. Despite, the gravity of this problem in the nation's fledgling democracy, little or no attention is given to this issue in the extant literature. It is an attempt to fill this gap in knowledge that this study becomes necessary.

### Theoretical Framework

As a tool of analysis, this study employs Structural Functionalist Theory in Political Science propounded by Gabriel Almond (1956). Structural functionalism is relevant to this study because it posits that every political system performs certain functions and that every political system has some structures while these structures perform certain functions meant for them. Meanwhile, the functions performed by these structures are quite essential to the effectiveness, efficiency and stability of the political system. By structures, he meant institutions such as political party, legislature; executive, judiciary etc. indeed, (Ray 2009:12) asserts that the basic theoretical proposition of structural functionalism is that in all social systems, certain basic functions must be performed. Almond was primarily concerned with how political system change in time, that is, from the traditional to modern world. He emphasized on the structures and their functions instead of the process that happened in the political system, a political system is composed of several structures that are "pattern(s) of action" (ibid). Put differently, Almond identified seven (7) variable lists of functions to be performed by the political system. These include: political socialization and recruitment; interest articulation; interest aggregation and political communication. These he called **input** and non-governmental functions. While the **output** and governmental functions consists of rulemaking; rule application and rule adjudication. It is essential to note that, political socialization and recruitment as an input function is very germane to this study, because Almond is reported to have argued that political recruitment takes up where general political association function leaves off. According to Nistisha, (2013) political party recruits members of the society out of particular subcultures, religious communities; statuses; classes; ethnic communities and the-likes and inducts them into specialized roles of political system, trains them appropriately in skills, provides them with political cognitive map, values, expectations and effects. This simply implies that political parties play a crucial role in this process, since political recruitment and socialization are input functions. It is therefore becomes essential that the political parties be actually involved in creating a more deserved virile democratic system.

Meanwhile, Almond's proposition was not without shortcomings. Firstly, by the assumption of the theory it is not easy to distinguish between deliberate aims of the participants and what the system intends to achieve. Secondly, the identification of functions is alleged to rest on the interpretation the analyst places on observed developments. Thus, there cannot be complete objectivity. Also, Structural functionalist theory has been seen as culture-bound since the functions attributed to the political system are too closely modeled on Western political

system (Enemuo, 1999:23). Despite all these criticisms, Structural functionalism has been recognized as the major existing tool for genuine comparative analysis of political systems.

## Conceptual Exploration

### Democracy

Considering the fact that, democracy houses political parties, it has enjoyed prominence in modern political debates. As a model, democracy arrests the attention of a chunk of political actors' world over, as a concept it attracts continuous intellectual discussion among the scholars particularly in social sciences. In fact, all other political and socially significant issues like; justice, human rights, rule of law, good governance, poverty and development are discussion(s) within the purview of democracy (Ogundiya, 2011:2). It is inferable from this assertion that democracy is by far the most popular form of government in the world today. Indeed, as every political actor/politician wants to be addressed as a democrat, every regime wants to be described as democratic. Democracy is a system of government under which people exercise their governing power directly or through representatives periodically elected by them (Appadorai, 1968:17). This simply implies that democracy is in operation if it provides institutions for the expression and, direction of people's will. In a similar vein, Schumpeter defined democracy as a system to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the vote (Ogundiya, 2011:3). In this context, democracy is governance that involves the widest participation, either through elections or through the administration of the accepted and adopted policies.

However, in its classical sense, democracy is a Greek word which means "people rule" or "rule by the people". By implication therefore, democracy means the acceptance of the basic quality of means as humans and the basic responsibility of all adult men and women for their own destiny (ibid). In effect democracy means direct and active participation of the citizens in the affairs of the city/ state. Meanwhile, direct democracy has become practically impossible today owing to the complex nature of modern societies. In order to overcome the challenges posed by the size, complexity and multicultural nature of the contemporary society, various models of democracy were developed by political theorists. In a broad sense, we can view democracy from Liberal or representative, to social democracy perspectives. Put differently, democracy is a system of government under which people possesses power to send packing, an unwanted government through majority vote. In addition, the will of the people in democracy is the basis and legitimacy of power, authority which is to advance their interest. In this regards, popular sovereignty is the hallmark of democracy.

For democracy to work well, Dahl (1971) argues that 'eight institutional guarantees are required. These include: freedom to join organization, freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; the right of political leaders to compete for support and vote, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expression of preference (Timothy, 2010:180); to this can be added the right to adequate representation. It is clear that Dahl's requirement is insufficient as protection for minorities rights hardly get considered. In another development, democracy is also viewed in terms of procedures (such as elections and constitutional provisions and principles. Griddens (2000) submits that democracy exists when you have a multiparty system with political parties competing with one another, free and no-corrupt procedures to elect political leaders and an effective legal framework of civil liberties or human rights that underline machinery of voting processes; at given intervals.

Central to Griddens analysis are, a competitive multiparty system, free and non-corrupt election, an effective legal framework of civil liberties or human rights. Meanwhile, Democracy entails much more than laws and procedures. Instead, it is all about the quality, that is "Substance of political (social and economic) life. This simply suggests that democracy as Till (2000) put it revolves around issues of human welfare, individual and social freedom, security, equality, social equality, public deliberation, peaceful conflict resolution and so on, (cited in Timothy, 2010:181).

The liberal or representative democracy implies a system of rules embracing elected "officials" who undertake to "represent" the interest and views of citizens within the framework of rule of law (Enemuo, 1999:144).

Liberal democracy has emerged as the dominant model of democracy. According to Ogundiya, (2010:5), representative democracy could be celebrated as both accountable and feasible government, potentially stable over great territories and time Spans. This mode of democracy has sought to justify sovereign power of the state, while at the same time, justifying the limits on that power. The ultimate authority of government is vested in the common people so that public policy is made to conform to the will of the people and to serve the interest of the people (Guaba, 2003:421). Democracy is therefore seen as a tool of politically-oriented objectives realization. Hence, central to democracy in this context are: equality, sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, the rules of law, and liberty of individual. To have democracy sustained in developing countries in particular, the role of political parties cannot be downplayed considering its political socialization and recruitment functions. Put differently, any fledgling democracy like we have in Nigeria needs mass participation through effective and viable political parties. This is because democracy is unthinkable without political parties.

### **Democratic Governance**

In a philosophical sense, democratic governance is the perception of sovereign nature of the public in democracy. The exercise of power by the general public via the institutions of the state arose as a sense of governance that is self, procedural, and participatory. In democratic governance, institutions play a vital role in the determination of the affairs of the state. In fact, in this channel of thought, Amit (2012) in the Oxford Handbook of Governance, contends that democratic institutions serve both as the voice of the people and as their agents. According to this perspective, this form of decision-making is commonly described as democratic government: “democratic” because decisions are made by representative institutions that stand for the voice of the people; “government” because the decisions of these institutions are carried by the bureaucracy of the state. In another orientation, democratic governance is anchored on some standards which include: political pluralism, institutional accountability and responsiveness, an active civil society, human rights, rule of law and democratic election (OSCE office for democratic Institutions and Human Rights).

### **Political Parties**

It is obvious that many scholars have written on political parties. Of course political parties are often described as the bedrock of democracy. The argument for the dominance of political parties over and above other democratic institutions largely stems from the fact that parties are absolutely essential for the proper functioning of representative democracy. Indeed, political parties in the theoretical literature have long been recognized as a requisite for any democratic political system (SchattSchneider 1942, Downs 1957, Aldrich 1995, Kuenz& Lambright, 2001, Mannig, 2005, & Ogundiya, 2011:11). This is to submit that in the contemporary world democracy cannot make sense without political parties. Bryce (1921) in (Montero and Richard, 2013) argued that parties are inevitable: no free country has been without them, and no one has shown how representative government could work without them. Stroke (1999, 245) asserts that parties are endemic to democracy, an unavoidable part of democracy (Montero & Gunther, 2013). Having said this, in a bid to conceptualize what political party is, the perception of scholars differs. While the approach of some is ideological, i.e. viewed parties in terms of common held idea, value or issues as a group of like-minded people, others see parties largely in terms of what they do. That is, the roles, functions or even activities in addition to party’s organization, structure amongst others. All these have direct link with what we call “interest in parties” and “principles in parties”. In other words, the offered definitions of a political party by some scholars were narrow in operation because they were only concerned with what a political party is. While definitions of a few scholars were extensive and captured not only what a party is, but also what it is meant to do in the political system.

Political parties can be defined as power oriented organizations aiming at governmental responsibility without accepting share in the burden of running a government (Beyme, 1985:12). However, (Ujo, 2004:97) rightly observed that a political party is an organized group with clear defined policy whose aim is to win or retain political power. In essence, a political party tries to win political power when it is the opposition, but when it is the party in power, it tries to hold-on to power. In addition to the above line of reasoning, a political party was defined as: “a group of person (s) bound in policy and opinion in support of a general political cause, which essentially is the pursuit, capture and retention as long as democratically feasible of government and its offices”

(Agbaje, 1999:195). In his own view, Innocent, (2011:181) succinctly asserts that, a political party is a group, organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to public office. It is therefore unambiguous from the thought of these scholars (Ujo, Agbaje, & Innocent) that, the commonly held ideas, values or stand is central in their definitions of a political party being an organized group whose aim is 'to gain control of government'.

Also, a political party has been defined as, an organization formed to compete in elections for constitutionally elective positions in the various organs of government, especially the legislative and executive arms, and if it wins it take over and exercise the power of the state (Ayeni-Akeke 2008, 128). In line with Akeke's thought, it implies that political parties are organization formed primarily to pursue electoral objectives, as well as competitive activities while other function (of political parties) being formidable to influence governmental decisions and policies was grossly underestimated. In a related development, the new Encyclopaedia Britannica conceives political party 'as a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power through election or revolution'. Indeed, this idea is in consonance with the views of aforementioned scholars that political parties are organizations that are primarily concerned with capturing governmental power and to form a government.

Furthermore, a political party is a more or less organized group of citizens who act together as a political unit, have distinctive aims and opinions on the leading political questions of controversy in the state and who, by acting together as a political unit, seek to obtain control of the government (Appadorai, 1968:537-38). In another development, the views of some scholars on political parties do not only address the "interest" as exemplified above, but far beyond that, the "principles" in party was captured. Edmund Burke offer famous prescriptive definition of political party as: a body of men united for promoting their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principles in which they all agreed (Harris 1979:143). In essence, party exists to serve the needs of all men in the nation and not sectional interest.

Moreover, the critical role played by political parties in elite formation and recruitment, political socialization and mobilization has been affirmed and reaffirmed by scholars (Agbaje, 199; Omotosho, 1997; and Dode, 2010). Political parties, according to these scholars, serve as instruments of political education, policy formulation, interest aggregation and articulation, political socialization and leadership recruitment. To perform these noble functions, political parties through internal debate and discussion, as well as campaigning and electoral competition engage in political education. In addition to this, the issues parties chooses to focus on help to set political agenda, values and attitudes that they articulate which becomes part of the larger political culture.

At this juncture, the functions of parties that are in opposition are germane. To Yaqub, (2002) 'it is the basis of competently performing these roles that a political party can stand a good chance of displacing and, thereby, taking power from a political party currently in power (Dode, 2010:190). In fact, in the course of preparing to capture state power and excises authority in the future, the party must devote its attention to recruiting and training people to occupy political positions in the state. By performing these functions, political parties reduce the incidents of anti-nation building factors like ethnic chauvinism, bigotry and other communal culturally diverse countries like Nigeria (Dode, Ibid). This scholar therefore warned that if such parties do not perform their democratic function, it would not be possible for instance, to recruit a broad section of the people of the country concerned into the party, nor, as a result, would it be capable of mobilizing and developing resources to obtain majority vote in support of their programme.

The above wisdom unequivocally dictates that political parties created democracy. Ogundiya, (2011:12) and Diamond (1997) state that: political parties remain important, if not essential instruments for representing political constituencies and interests aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternative, setting the policy making agenda, forming effective governments and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process. Meanwhile, to function effectively, political parties must be well organized and adequately structured to meet the need of the society.

Essentially, however, for a political party to function very well and be effective, it must have a strong base and ideology. Put simply, a political party must have the quality and be stable. In the view of Veen, (2007), the quality and stability of a party system is determined by a number of factors including, the make-up of the parties; the strength of their internal cohesion and programmatic profile; the structure and efficiency of the organization; the vitality of their members; the identification of everyone with the party; their democratic structure from bottom to top and from local to state level and their internal and external communication skills. Hence, the stability and viability of democracy are to a large extent a function of the party system.

### **Voter Apathy**

Voter apathy arguably is a popular phenomenon in the electoral world. In fact, hardly would concerned actors in electoral project offer analyses without an allusion to voting behaviour and by extension voter apathy and voter turnout. This came to light because voting is the most visible and popular form of citizen's involvement in politics globally, hence, its decline in most democracies raise more question about the stability of the political system. Voter apathy is a distinct aspect of political behaviour in which eligible voters participate not in voting in an election. Voter apathy is a syndrome in which the electorates are indifferent as regards their attitude towards (voting) the most critical aspect of the electoral process. According to Cloud, (2010) voter apathy occurs when eligible voters do not vote in public elections. Understandably, eligibility of voters as well as elections that concern the generality is underscored by Cloud while considering non-involvement in voting exercise.

In another development, voter apathy connotes the absence of a feeling of personal obligation to participate. Voters apathy as Ogunbiyi, (2015) contends, refers to the insensitivity of the people towards participation in electoral processes. Also, the goal of using elections for the selection of competent individuals for public office otherwise refers to as '*legitimacy effect*' may as well be jettisoned when voter apathy manifest itself in an elections. A government produced with a considerable weak legitimacy (low turnout of voters during an election) is far less democratically judgmental. In a similar vein, when voter apathy manifests itself in an election, to reflect the preferences of a large spectrum of voters termed '*representative effect*' may be prevented. The explicit negative consequence of voter apathy appears contrary to the philosophy of an election to make government better and make people lives better life.

In another development, what inform voter apathy is differently perceived in the extant literature. Prominent perspectives includes: sociological; rational choice and political efficacy factor. It has been argued that socio-economic and psychological status of the voters may largely in form his or her disillusionment about voting in an election. Also, the principle of the cost and benefits that guide human behaviour could be a determinant factor for electorate's abstention from elections. In addition, the impact and affectivity of political system to various individuals do shape and inform insensitivity of eligible voters to voting during the elections.

### **How Political Parties encourage Voter Apathy in Nigeria**

Engagement in politics is not to be considered as a specific type of activity, rather it is an integral part of social life and essential for the well-being of every individual (Deth & Elff 2000). The above statement attests to the substance of political participation in the political system. The role of political parties in this regard cannot be overemphasized. Unfortunately, the roles played by both the politicians and the political parties are basically one of the primary realities that continue to trigger political apathy in Nigeria. Expectedly, elections are meant to enhance economic growth and development, but it sounds disappointed and unjust when elections are not playing these roles. Over the years, the failure of the politicians to keep to their campaign promises has discouraged voters by extension strengthen the spirit of political apathy.

Evidently, however, the then National chairman of People Democratic Party PDP Chief Nwodo, submits that:

*Many Nigerians are skeptical of the credibility of the 2011 elections not only because their votes may not count at the end of the day but because they have lost interest in voting as those they voted for before now disappointed them due to lack*

*of performance and their rapid transformation from acute penury to stupendous wealth, all at the expense of the electorate.* (Ojukwu & Olaifa, 2011: 25).

This reality has informed the irrefutable conclusion by the people that elections do not have any value whatsoever and are of no correlation with neither growth nor development. Also, (Ogunbiyi 2014) reported that:

*for one, those who shun the polls readily inform you that their votes would not count. There is this pre-conceived notion among Nigerians that the outcome of most elections in the country is predetermined while many considered political class undeserving of their votes because of their pre-conceived insincerity to electoral promises* (Daily Independent, 2014).

In essence, the general feelings of apathy has been formed by the people that election out comes do not have either direct or indirect positive effects on their livelihood. Consequently, citizens believed that it is not worthy taking part in a process that is fraught with deception.

Also, most people are indifferent to politics in Nigeria because of the unprincipled and un-ideological nature of the existing political parties. Considering ideology as a means of identification, as an instrument of conflict management, as a prescriptive formula and most importantly as a mobilization force, Nigerian political parties do not have clear cut political ideologies if assessed against the above functions (Omotola, 2009:629). Consequently, the parties have found it extremely difficult to emphasize politics of issues. Rather, their mobilizations of popular forces have been largely driven by ethnicity and religion, as much as the influence of money politics (Omotola, Ibid). In fact, the unguided ethnic and religious driven campaigns by the high profile citizens in the last general elections vindicate the above argument. Disappointedly, the former Vice- President Nnamadi Sambo at Minna PDP campaign rally on 4th February, 2015 said that his party was more Muslim-friendly than the opposition party, All Progressive Congress (APC). Iyatse Geoff captured Sambo's words thus:

*Our chairman, Adamu Mu'azu is a Muslim, the Director General of the campaign Organization Ahmadu Ali, is also a Muslim. I am a Muslim. It is only our presidential candidate that is a Christian. In APC, its National Chairman is a Christian, its presidential campaign Director is a Christian, and the vice presidential candidate is a pastor. Which between the two parties has more Muslims?* (The Punch Newspaper, February 2015).

Also, at the Jigawa campaign rally on 21st of January, 2015 Sambo says: "*Buhari has selected a pastor as his running mate, do you know how many Churches he has? He has 5000 Churches, so based on that don't vote for them.*" ([www.naijaloaded.com.ng/2015/01/26](http://www.naijaloaded.com.ng/2015/01/26)).

In a similar vein, the wife of former president Mrs. Patience Jonathan's unguided statements at various campaign rallies before the elections also attests to the ideological sickness of Nigerian political parties. Jala, (2015) reported that during the 2015 PDP presidential campaign rally in Calabar Mrs. Jonathan said: "*Anybody that tell you change, tell that person, carry your change and get away. Anybody that come and tell you change, stone that person.*" Also, at the rally on March 2nd, 2015 in Lokoja, Patience Jonathan asserts that, Buhari's brain is dead. Her words: "*wetin him (Buhari) dey find again? Him dey drag with him pikin mate. Old man wey no get brain, him brain don die patapata*" (Owete, [www.thisdaylive.com](http://www.thisdaylive.com), 2015).

The above impetuous messages credited to the former vice president and wife of the former president was an outburst and act of whipping up religious sentiments in their desperate move to increase the chances of their party in the general elections. Former Ekiti State Governor Ayo Fayose once expressed that "*Buhari would likely die in office if elected, recall that Murtala Muhammed, Sani Abacha and Umaru Yar'Adua, all former heads of state from the North West like Buhari, had died in office*" (This Day Newspaper January, 2015). Also came from Former Chairman of People's Democratic Party, Colonel Ahmadu Ali (rtd) that: "*The Yorubas are ungrateful kind of people, who do not appreciate what others have done for them*" (Sun Newspaper, March 16, 2013). Moreover, as reported by Wahab, (2014:48) that: former Osun State governor Rauf Aregbesola was reported to have said that All Progressive Congress (APC) supporters should attack security agents with charms and



amulets during the August 9th 2014 governorship election in the state (cited in Anthony and Anyanwu, 2019:137).

Consequently, this act would not only trigger ethno-religious crisis in the country, but in addition encourages political apathy because hardly would people see sense, morality and ideology in politics. By implications citizens perceived threats and discouraged from exercising their lawful constitutional duty of political participation most specifically voting in an elections.

In another development, Ogunbiyi, rightly maintained that:

*The failure of political parties to embrace internal democracy is equally accountable for prevalence of voters' apathy in the country, because the culture of imposing candidates without popular appeal on the people is one that most Nigerians did not approve of and this is reflected in their shunning the ballot* (Daily Independent Newspaper, 2014).

The Nigeria politics is suffering from sound ideology as politicians cross carpet from one political party to the other just for personal ambitions. Humorously, prior to the 2015 general election, prominent members of the People Democratic Party, PDP defected to the All Progressive Congress, APC in order to secure relevance in the political dispensation. It is worth mentioning that former Governor of Rivers State Mr. Rotimi Amechi, Engr, Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso, (former, Kano State's Governor,) former House of Representative Speaker, Alhaji Aminu Waziri Tambuwa, Dr. Bukola Saraki, Kwara State Governor, Alhaji Abdu-Fatah Ahmed to mention but a few all decamped from their previous party (PDP) to the governing party APC. This defection, (Fagunwa 2015:31) maintained, poses danger to the so called democratic survival of the country, by extension accelerating political apathy, even after the defection of some of them back to the APC. To him, the effect of the groundless decamping is that a good number of Nigerian felt cheated, they, felt the whole scenario is about having the same old wine in a new bottle thus the enthusiasms was not there during the electioneering process.

According to Ogundiya (2011:209) the alarming trend of defection of politicians and increasing number of party switchers since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic rule remains a source of concern. At every level of governments, defection has become part of the political culture. In Nigeria, ethnicity and religion have the place of ideology. In fact, none of these parties have convincing policies that are to be used as a basis for mobilization among the masses. In fact during the 2015 pre-election, there were several reports of prominent politicians openly lobbying for the vote on the basis of ethnic and religious inclinations.

In another development, Fagunwa (2015:33) posits that the reason for political apathy are not just based on the voters feeling that their vote would not count but also on the basic fact that there is a feeling among Nigerian voters that there is often so little to choose from among the existing political parties. It must be added that the undemocratic nature and lack of internal democracy have always been another pointer to backwardness of Nigerian political parties, this often scares potential voters away from elections. Indeed, the People Democratic Party (PDP) national Publicity Secretary Mr. Olisah Metuh cautioned that, "*Internal democracy must succeed for PDP to grow. I get scared sometimes when I think of the fact that if we don't manage our party very well, some day we might be in opposition*" In Ojukwu & Olifa, 2011:25).

Moreover, political parties in Nigeria have encouraged political apathy through the instrumentality of God-fatherism and political violence. It is irrefutable that citizen's sense of political participation can only be developed in an aura of peace and stability. The state of electoral violence in Nigeria has become a source of worry. In another development, Most Nigerians hold the view that the electoral process in the country is replete with violence. Those with this opinion enthusiastically point to the high number of people that have died through the political process (Daily Independent Newspaper, 2014). Meanwhile, the issue of god-fatherism is one of the causes of political violence in the country. Indeed, former National Chairman of PDP Chief Nwodo submits that: "*the party has been handed over to god fathers who with "reckless abandon" impose candidates with questionable character and no leadership qualities on the citizens*"(Daily Independent, Ibid), god-fatherism clog the system of political representation in Nigeria. It is an act that subverts democratic process as it negates commitment to democratic values among the citizen. Arguably however, over the years, (excluding the

December 10<sup>th</sup> 2014 All Progressive Congress APC Presidential primary that produced Muhammadu Buhari) the primary elections in Nigeria have failed to provide the people with credible leaders, while elections have always been awash with irregularities. During the primary elections across the country, crisis broke out in Ondo, Delta, Rivers, and Abia states (Fagunwa 2015:33).

Additional, too, religious ethics amongst the Muslims for sometimes hitherto have been denying some of its followers from participating in elections because of the believe that the leadership process and indeed the type as well as style of governance is against the ethics of the religion; particularly amongst the Ahlus Sunnah sect of Islamic religion in Nigeria. Additionally inspire of the Belgin declaration of equity in the representation of women in politics as well as governance, the religious/cultural values amongst most Nigerian women has not allowed most of them to participate in governance and or its processes.

### **Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Mobilization and Curbing Political Parties Excesses in Nigeria**

In democratic project, the rules of engagement particularly for the key players (Political parties and electoral body) cannot be downplayed. It was not a different story in Nigeria as various mechanisms are in place to curb the excesses of political parties, unite the country with spill-over effect on democratic consolidation. Institutionally, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is statutorily empowered to register and monitor the activities of political parties so as to ensure their full compliance with the existing laws and by implication perform their essential recruitment and mobilization role in the society. Sequence to this, both the Nigerian 1999 Constitution and the 2010 Electoral Act provided a guide to achieve this political objective.

In fact, in the wisdom of the Section 221 of the 19999 Constitution, “No association other than a political party shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the fund of any political party or the election express of any candidate at an election”. This simply means that only a political party is allowed by law to recruit and mobilize citizens in respect of canvassing for votes for candidate(s) in elections in Nigeria. Hence, a political party in the Nigerian context is a major platform and a vehicle through which citizens could engage in active political project. To this end, Section 222 states that: No association by whatever name shall function as a political party, unless (Sec. b) the membership of the association is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religion or ethnic grouping.

Essentially, however, in order to ensuring peace and tolerance in performing their role in the society, Section 227 of the 1999 Constitution and Section 95 (5) of the 2010 Electoral Act stated that:No association (A political party or member of a political party shall not) shall retain, organize, train or equip any person or group of person for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of physical force or coercion in promoting any political objective or interest or in such manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organized and trained or equipped for that purpose. This provision was unambiguously in-place to forestall political violence and distortion of public order. Meanwhile, the cases of political violence across the country since the advent of democracy in 1999 are utterly a violation of these provisions, threat to democracy and inimical to the unity of the country.

Equally, the 2010 Electoral Act re-echo the above constitutional provision. For instance, Section 95 (1) clearly stated that: A political campaign or slogan shall not be tainted with abusive language directly or indirectly or likely to injure religion, ethnic, tribal or sectional feelings. While sub-section (2) says: Abusive, intemperate, slanderous or base language or insinuations or innuendoes designed or likely to provoke violent reaction or emotions shall not be employed or used in political campaigns. Also germane was Section 96 (1) that stipulated that: A candidate, person or group of persons shall not directly or indirectly threaten any person with the use of force or violence during any political campaign in order to compel that person or any other person to support or refrain from supporting a political party or candidate.

It can be held without contradiction that the above provision that guides political parties and electoral game in Nigeria was anchored on the need to check the excesses of political parties and foster citizens’ participation in political activities in the country. Put differently, if the cardinal philosophy behind the existence of these laws

was to provide a serene environment for Nigerians participation in their own affairs, therefore, any act whatsoever by a political party or any individuals that goes contrary to these status is utterly fostering citizens mood of pessimism about voting specifically and politics generally, which otherwise refers to as 'political apathy.'

### **Conclusion**

It is not incorrect that, in an ideal sense, political parties are mobilizing agents in the political system. By implication, political parties facilitate mass participation of citizens in politics, because democracy hardly makes sense without vibrant and ideologically inclined parties. Disappointedly however, the attitude of political parties and politicians serve as impetus to the existing political alienation otherwise refers to as apathy in Nigeria. This turned a worry because political parties are important drivers of democratic governance. In a simple sense, the mode of operation of political parties during the electioneering process as well as how they exercise power while in Government are chiefly inimical to the philosophy of mass political participation. It is not an overstatement that the crops of parties in Nigeria today lack well-articulated policies and programmes because they are suffering from poverty of ideology. By implication, the feeling and spirit of non-involvement in political activities is invariably strengthened.

In a similar vein, campaign exercises in Nigeria are marked with intolerance and violence. The implication of this is that, people do not expect anything different from the political class. As such, they develop a feeling of apathy toward pre-electioneering process. In other words, the failure of the ruling elite to build confidence of the generality of the people in the country has continued to create the feelings of indifference in political participation in Nigeria, this was reflected in the 2015 general elections. For instance, in Lagos state, only 1,495,975 people voted out of the 5,827,846 registered voters. (Fagunwa, 2015:12). Sequel to the above understanding, there is compelling need for genuine political awareness which is the first step in the educational preparation and empowerment of the next generation of citizens who will be called upon to vote, pay taxes and lead the nation in the challenging decades ahead.

### **Recommendations**

In furtherance to the findings, the study therefore recommends that political parties should strengthen their structures and fully explore their platform for highly desirable political mobilization. This of no doubt shall stimulate virile and mass participation of the citizens in the affairs of the state. Political parties should be well grounded on ideology and operate in line with democratic ethos. Also, as another general election is some three (3) years from now, and Nigerians continue to yearn for sustainable democratic governance, it becomes imperative for political parties as the first institution to facilitate mass participation of voters rather than rigging a bell capable of fostering voter apathy in the country. In essence, political parties and politicians during the campaign should be moderate, objective and be articulate just to achieve singular but fundamental goal of attracting the attention of the potential voters.

Religious sentiments of the none involvement of women in politics by a section of the two(2) main religions in Nigeria; Christianity and Islam should be enshroud in the country, because, based on this a number of women don't participate in politics away or the other, all through casting their votes or even contesting for elective positions.

In a related development, the cultural sentiments of women as only 'domestic and or household property' who must not be seen or heard nor allowed to participate in politics should also be erased in the contemporary age in Nigeria because, in other environments/countries where women are allowed and given political positions of responsibility, there are known to give their best; for example here is one time Prime Minister of England, Margaret Thatcher.

Lastly, it is quite imperative for political parties and politicians to build confidence and trust in the electorates by fulfilling their electoral promise(s). This is important because you cannot build something on nothing, as good governance attracts mass participation and validate legitimacy.

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# The Multi-Party System in Indonesia: Reviewing the Number of Electoral Parties from the Aspects of the National Defense and Security

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## Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the effect of the multi-party system on national security stability in Indonesia. There are two questions related to national defense and security aspects, namely how many political parties are suitable, and how do the election and the number of parties influences the stability of national security? The research approach is a mixed method. For quantitative methods, we use inferential statistical analysis based on statistical data from the 1955 to 2019 elections and the 2005-2018 local elections. From the Effective Number of Election Parties (ENEP), the total Crime, and the Indonesian Democratic Index, we find that all national voters in each election in Indonesia will accumulate significantly in the range of five to ten parties, regardless of the number of political parties participating in the election. For qualitative methods, we formed a two-session FGD that discussed ENEP and its risks to national defense and security and how to recommend related policies. We conclude that the 4-5% Electoral threshold is sufficient to be enforced as a rule in the next election. Local elections (pilkada) outside Java and Bali have a more significant influence on national security stability than national legislative elections. The implications of this study encourage policymakers in the field of national defense and security to take anticipatory steps towards differences in the risks of holding elections and local elections (pilkada), as well as the direction and focus of pilkada research, especially in the perspective of national defense and security.

**Keywords:** Effective Number of Electoral Parties, Multi-Party System, National Defense and Security, Social Engineering Policy

## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to see whether there is an explanation of party numbers in elections (legislative elections, presidential elections, and regional head elections) related to national security stability. Many experts argue that a multi-party electoral system has vulnerability to national security stability, especially in countries

that are in transition to mature democracy (Ikrar Nusa Bakti, 2004; Mietzner, 2016; Skaaning, Jiménez, Institute for Democracy, & Assistance, 1975). Although Bawaslu (Election Oversight Body in Indonesia) has published the Election Vulnerability Index (Yamin, 2018), we do not consider its relationship toward the number of parties participating in the election to be so "clear." However, elections are a way out when there is a deadlock between the government and the parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008). Under such conditions, national security stability can be disrupted if there are effects of political distortion, and will usually be reflected during the political parties' campaign activities, at the time of the election, and after the election results are announced.

Although security instability is not solely due to violence of an election, the apparatus needs to respond thoughtfully to the disruption of national security stability due to such distortions. Furthermore, if not, it will trigger a form of continued political vulnerability that will lead to social conflict. This condition will usually be followed by a decline in several dimensions of state capacity, for example (Mietzner, 2018), the economy, the fall of leadership, and even the risk of national disintegration. Indonesia has experienced such severe cases of political stalemate which, although not purely due to the electoral system, we thought that at that time the multi-party system was not appropriate, so it had the accumulating impacts on political deadlock in Indonesia, for example, cases of political deadlock which led to the fall of President Soeharto and Wahid.

Various kinds of literature interpret election violence as violence to influence the process or the results of general elections (Höglund, 2009). Such abuse will occur a year before the election, which culminates with violence on days before the election day (Harish & Toha, 2017), after the voting, and even after the announcement of the winner of the election when there was much public protest and dissatisfaction (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 2018). The peak of uncontrolled political tension will not only lead to violence, even very dangerous for national defense, whose mission is to maintain the integrity of national sovereignty and security. Research conducted by Berenschot (2020) shows the existence of mass manipulation factors as a trigger for violence in the electoral process. Especially in a multi-party system, political actors can manipulate the masses utilizing ethnic patronage networks (Flesken, 2018), religious sentiments (Schwörer & Romero-Vidal, 2020), and clientelistic-political (Berenschot, 2018).

Meanwhile, the security forces will usually be lacking in the amount of force distribution, especially when facing simultaneous elections over a large area. Such a political situation will result in the security forces being overwhelmed based on considerations of standard security measures. From this description, we hypothesize that the more political parties participating in the election, there are more political risks, and there are more actors that will be directly involved in the election process. The actors will try to manipulate the masses through various dimensions of personal and network capacity for their interests. Even Indonesia is suspected by Muhtadi (2019, p. 46) as the third-highest vote-buying in the world. Such conditions will ultimately make election vulnerabilities increasingly nuanced in a corrupt and violent manner and threaten national security stability.

In essence, government instability is closely related to the weakening of the structure of political institutions (Balitbang Kemhan, 2017), such as many conflicts between political parties, weak party coalition, increasingly pragmatic opposition in mobilizing partisans, and nervous political party cadre system. This condition is thought not to reflect leadership and is an indicator of weakness in political institutions in Indonesia. The implementation of multi-party systems in Indonesia should be a way of democracy that results in good governance. However, if it only produces a pragmatic government, in the end, the existence of political parties and the holding of elections only weakens national security stability.

So far, in the discourse on the multi-party system in Indonesia, primarily since the reform era, no formulation of the number of suitable political parties has been obtained, which guarantees that it does not significantly disturb security stability. Reflecting on the multi-party systems that exist in various countries, various policies have been widely discussed, and the results show that almost all systems have a paradoxical nature (Felsenthal & Machover, 2012), or the electoral and party systems applied have advantages and disadvantages. Thus we interpret that it is not a matter of the chosen electoral system accordingly. It is also a matter of implementation and the need for policies to address the emerging paradoxical effects.

The choice of the electoral system is dynamic. Indeed, the rules can change because of changes in society. Nevertheless, as with most electoral histories in various countries (Lijphart, 2012), changes to democratic electoral systems should lead to the formation of effective governance - one of which is through efforts to reduce the number of parties participating in elections. In Indonesia, at least there has been an effort like that, namely attempts to determine the minimum vote acquisition of political parties in the next election through the parliamentary threshold, see the Law of Republic of Indonesia number 7 the year 2017 where the parliamentary threshold is 4% of the national vote. However, the number of political parties with the current system is still considered ineffective in achieving democratic goals (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011), there are still many pros and cons in society (Indrawan & Aji, 2019) and even need to discuss the appropriateness of numbers of parties in an election so that not confuse the public (Fukuoka, 2012; Nico Handani Siahhan, 2016). Based on this description, we assume that the "ideal numbers of political parties" is not suitable for articulating the pros and cons of the number of parties participating in the election, at least in the contemporary political context in Indonesia and because of the paradoxical nature of the existing electoral system. The pros and cons are also the reasons why the application of the current political system in Indonesia regarding the electoral threshold figure as a path of natural selection in simplifying parties will continue to be a discourse. We consider the discussions to be reasonable, including if the impact will cause frequent changes to regulations or policies related to political parties, which we then assume will have positive or negative effects on national security stability.

Thus we need to analyze the answer to the research question about how many parties are suitable and how such elections affect the stability of national security. In this study, we use the legislative election data for the DPR (House of Representatives in Indonesia) and the local elections to explore related arguments and also specifically provide an overview from the perspective of national defense. For this reason, we also use other data related to measures of national security stability, namely the Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI) and Total Crime Counts (TCC). Furthermore, the study within the national defense aspects is expected to be able to complement the views in the discourse on the effective number of electoral parties, which so far have rarely been reviewed and considered from the national defense and security approaches.

## 2. Literature Review

The literature is very varied in discussing the themes of the party system, which is based on social heterogeneity as an embodiment of the number of parties participating in the election. It is logical to accommodate social heterogeneity through the party system of election participants to prevent conflict. In the Indonesian context, social heterogeneity can be understood from the meaning of "Unity in Diversity." Thus the number of parties participating in the election is one feature of democracy that will represent the diverse preferences of community groups, religions, ethnicities, and social communities (Moser, Scheiner, & Stoll, 2018). The number of parties forms alternative types and ranges - the more extensive the range of party choices in an election, the more democratic the election will be because it will accommodate more voter preferences. In other words, the size of the party system in an election is a linear function of social heterogeneity. However, the number of parties in the election that is too large will reduce the effectiveness of votes, increase election costs, and also open up opportunities for the emergence of vulnerabilities that will affect government coalitions and public policymaking (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011).

In this study, we take references from various journals that discuss elections in multiple countries that focus on seven dimensions related to election relations and violence, vulnerability, and national security. Generally, the factors or aspects reviewed include: socio-economic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post-materialist issues (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 76-77). Meanwhile, Bawaslu (RI Election Supervisory Agency) has also published the Election Vulnerability Index (Yamin, 2018), one of the measurement sub-dimensions is the level of security in the electoral process (pre-election, during the election, and post-election). Although there are various dimensions of the discussion related to the conflict, very few, provide a specific review of these dimensions in the context of aspects of national defense and security.

We need a theoretical basis and discourse related to whether there is a relationship between the number of parties participating in the election and the stability of national security. The premise is that "differences in preferences"



can lead to "conflicts" that can have a more significant effect on the disruption of security stability and can also unite forces if differences can be addressed (Reilly, 2001, p.113). In such a context, the premise of holding elections as a manifestation of democracy will have both positive and negative effects. What later became the focus of this study is how to ensure that elections in Indonesia will not shake national security stability. Such efforts are referred to as "non-military defense," as defined in Law Number 3 of the year 2002 concerning National Defense, article 7, paragraph 3.

In the election literature, a measure of party competition in obtaining votes is represented by the ENP (Effective Number of Parties) (Laakso & Taagepera, 2017). Although the use of ENP is widely opposed, it continues to be used in electoral research (Wilkinson, 2004, p.7), and so in this study. Meanwhile, to understand whether the level of competition is related to the level of security, we will use total crime data at the regional and national levels. Furthermore, the deepening of the characteristics of the electoral system needs to be done to understand the simplification of the optimal number of parties participating in the election (Indra, 2014; Nico Handani Siahhan, 2016; Romli, 2011). However, to simplify the number of parties, we believe that the discourse needs to be enriched with studies that have the perspective of national defense. The context of enrichment needs to be in line with what was stated by Supriyanto and Mellaz (2011, p. 5) that the application of the threshold of representation in an election needs to be limited, because if not, the number of political parties in the DPR is believed to affect the effectiveness of decision making, which in turn will affect the performance government, and can even undermine democracy (Klimczak & Petersen, 2015). Furthermore, suitability and balance must be calculated so that the reduction effort does not sacrifice the significance of votes (damaging democratic development), and do not let the application of the threshold cause an increase in the number of votes that are not converted into seats, or wasted votes.

### *2.1 The Effective Number of Parties, Diversity, and Balance*

In political science, diversity refers to Hill's number in the second-order known as "Number of Effective Parties (ENP)." Although some believe that ENP has many shortcomings (Golosov, 2010; Grofman & Kline, 2012; Jean- FranCois & Patrick, 2009), ENP is still used in socio-political, scientific research (Laakso & Taagepera, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004). According to Laakso & Taagepera, an essential achievement of an effective number of parties is to offer a simple and more easily understood index calculation of the number of parties in a competition that does not depend solely on the votes of the largest party or is distorted by changes in the number of voters in small parties.

The core contribution of ENP on the effect of the electoral system is to predict that the number of effective parties in legislative representation ( $N_s$ ) is equal to the sixth root of the multiplication of the average size of voters per region ( $M$ ) and the size of the number of seats contested ( $S$ ), or mathematically written  $N_s = (MS)^{1/6}$ . Taagepera refers to quantity,  $M$  times  $S$ , as the acquisition of a chair (Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Taagepera, 2007, p.251). There are two methods of calculation, based on the number of voters called ENEP (Effective Number of Electoral Parties) and based on the number of seats called ENPP (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties). The general formula of ENEP (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979):

Figure 1 shows the ENP in the 1955 Election. Both pictures explain that there are only five parties and two small party groups, or there are seven effective party groups. The seven parties were in accordance with ENP 1955 (ENEPP = 6.3 and ENPP = 6.4). Thus, the ENP number will provide knowledge about the number of parties that are effective in the election.




Figure 1. Illustration of ENP (ENEP and ENPP)

The minimum number of "relevant parties" occurs when the winning party votes equals the number of votes of the second party, and the smallest party vote reduces both. Under these conditions, it is predicted that the strength of the coalition government will be more stable. Meanwhile, the maximum number will be reached when the winning party gets a dominant vote, e.g., > 50%, and all minor opposition parties, e.g., ~ 1%. For example, the winning party votes are 61%, and there are 39 other parties, each with 1%; in this situation, the cost of coordination will be high. According to Taagepera (2007), for a given effective number of parties, the actual shares of parties may be quite equal or highly unequal. Later, he proposed the index of balance to measure the variation in the form of a logarithmic comparison, see equation (2).

$$B = \frac{\log N_{\infty}}{\log N_0} = \frac{-\log s_1}{\log N_0} \quad (2)$$

$N_0$  is the number of parties that get a seat.  $N_{\infty}$  is the inversion of the largest percentage of votes, notated as  $1 / s_1$ . As such, we need to map the ENP and B balance to elections in Indonesia and their relevance to political stability and security, such as the level of ideological polarization (Ford & Jennings, 2020), ethnicity, and clientelism (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). This balance will characterize the patterns of opposition, whether they are competitive, cooperative, or united (Sani & Sartori, 1983). However, with a few exceptions, that balance might complement the party's number rather than replace it.

## 2.2 The Discourse of Electoral Threshold

An appropriate proportional seat quota is the divisor between the total population (or votes) and the total number of seats, which is  $1 / M$  (where  $M$  is the size or number of regional-based seat allocations). This formula has a significant disadvantage because the distribution of population between districts or provinces, or the vote of the party, has almost no such multiple quotas (Colomer, 2004, p.43). Therefore, the remaining seats that cannot be allocated based on the right quota must be allocated using some other additional formulas that can cause significant distortion. This discourse is then closely related to the magnitude of the voting threshold that must be met by the parties participating in the election.

The discourse about the magnitude of the parliamentary threshold revolves around its stipulation, where small and medium parties are afraid of failing to win a significant vote if the threshold is raised so that they wish to keep the number fixed or lowered, in contrast to large parties, to gain more seats will hope to increase the amount of the threshold the boundary (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011). Meanwhile, general elections are closely related to the number of seats contested ( $M$ ) in the electoral district. The smaller  $M$ , the higher the level of competition, and conversely, the greater the  $M$ , the lower the level of competition. On the other hand, when there

is high political fragmentation, the government often has to negotiate various policies with very diverse political party interests. The latter situation means that high political fragmentation will have high costs. Thus it becomes crucial to have rules that prevent high political fragmentation without reducing the meaning of democratic development. Such practices are known as the threshold or the number of votes to get a seat.

Mathematically the upper threshold ( $T_a$ ), the lower threshold ( $T_b$ ), and the effective threshold ( $T_e$ ) of the formula are introduced by (Taagepera, 2007, pp. 246-253), see equations (3) and (4). There are three variables in the formula, namely: the average size of the electoral district ( $M$ ), the number of parliamentary seats ( $S$ ), and the number of electoral districts ( $E$ ). The equation shows that the effective threshold value for the (local) district is distinguished from the national level, see equation (5) and (6). Political parties must break the upper threshold ( $T_a$ ) to get their first seat and must break the lower threshold ( $T_b$ ) to get the remaining seats.

$$T_a = \frac{100\%}{(M+1)} \quad (3)$$

$$T_b = \frac{100\%}{2M} \quad (4)$$

$$[\text{for the district}] \quad T_{ed} = \frac{75\%}{(M+1)} \quad (5)$$

$$[\text{for the nasional}] \quad T_{en} = \frac{100\%}{(M+1)E^2} \quad (6)$$

#### 2.4. The Perspective of National Defense and Security

In developing democracy, elections should act as a mechanism for conflict resolution without violence. But the basic nature of elections is to fight for votes for interests and power. Strong parties are more likely to win votes when the public believes that they are not a source of anxiety. Conversely, their defeat has the potential to cause riots (Harish & Toha, 2017). Besides, the ruling regime will face higher levels of political unrest if there are many strong opposition parties (Fukuoka, 2012). The more the level of political unrest, it shows a failed campaign and is associated with a weak coalition regime (Ellman & Wantchekon, 2000; Passarelli & Tabellini, 2017). Therefore, they need more repressive policies that are vulnerable to riots. If the policy fails, then it can create a cycle of recurring riots, which will create more considerable uncertainty over the long-term stability of a country's security (Braithwaite, Kucik, & Maves, 2014).

Several variables can be related to security stability in Indonesia. In this study, we use several independent variables, namely the IDI (Indonesian Demorporation Index) and Criminal Statistics. The correlation between annual IDI statistics and crime rates against elections is essential to know. That knowledge will provide an understanding of the relationship between multi-party systems and the level of democratic achievement and the level of security. That knowledge will be a reasonable basis for encouraging new policies or amending election rules.

The effective number of party votes in elections (ENEP) is generally paired with a formula to calculate the electoral threshold. The electoral threshold ( $T$ ) is a formula to reduce the number of parties that can participate in the next election. The rules regarding  $T$  have changed several times (Indrawan & Aji, 2019; Nico Handani Siahhan, 2016). Finally, the  $T$  rate was 4%, but then many academics suggested that  $T$  be 5%. The discourse of increasing the electoral threshold is fascinating seen from various angles. We argue that the Election Vulnerability Index published by Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) has not reviewed the effects of ENEP and  $T$ . This is the case when the vulnerability index is confronted with a total crime rate or IDI, specifically to provide an overview from the perspective of national defense and security. Therefore, we will analyze ENEP,  $T$ , TCC, and IDI in this study.

### 3. Method

We use a mixed-methods approach. There are two steps in conducting the plan.

The first step of this research are as follows: 1) Collecting election data: number of parties participating in the election, number of voters, and number of seats; 2) Analyze security stability thorough calculating ENEP, diversity, party balance, and its correlation to total crime and the democratic index; and 3) conclude. In quantitative analysis, we use election data from 1955-2019, local elections from 2005 to 2018, criminal data, and the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI). Data was obtained from BPS Statistics, the General Election Commission (*KPU*), and the Independent Election Commission (*KIP*). Also, we got permission to use some of the FGD projects of Balitbang, the Ministry of Defense.

In the second step, we analyze the report of the qualitative data resulted from FGD reported by the Research Team of Balitbang Kemhan that discussed the suitable number of parties for elections in Indonesia related to the national defense and security aspects. A total of twelve experts and researchers attended the FGD session. Some of them are representative of Kemendagri (Homeland Ministry), Kemenlu (Foreign Ministry), and LIPI (National Science Institute), and the rest are from MoD (Kemhan) and TNI (Indonesian Arm Forces). Finally, with this approach, we make conclusions and policy recommendations in securing the holding of near-future elections.

We analyzed the 1955-2019 election data and the Provincial Election (Pilgub) for 2005-2018, which was paired with total crime data. We also examine the correlation and significance of the changes that occur. Meanwhile, to understand whether there was a significant influence on the election due to changes in IDI and total crime, we analyzed by juxtaposing the data and comparing the effects. We try to refer to the underlying assumption in statistics that external variables can influence the results so that we need to release some data that is likely to overlap, the outcome we get 42 valid election data from "outliers" in the total crime data. The analytical framework follows inferential statistical analysis procedures with reliability, validity, normality test, t-test, and variance test.

#### **4. Discussion**

##### *4.1 How many parties are suitable for future elections in the context of national security stability?*

Although the government formed from the election results during the New Order era was relatively stable, democratic life was seen as not developing because there were only limited political choices (Ikrar Nusa Bakti, 2004). In addition, the remaining organizational structure was destroyed (Ufen, 2008). Therefore, we are more focused on election data in the reformation era.

Table I shows the results of an analysis of the number of effective parties and the real differences using the party balance index and diversity index (Simpson) based on the results of the 1955, 1971 and 1999-2019 elections. Absolute stability is achieved when entropy = 0. From the ENEP score, we can conclude that the effective number of parties that can represent Indonesian voters is between 5-10 political parties. Regardless of the electoral system rules that have been made, from 1999 to 2019, the number of ENEP with parties that obtained seats was strongly correlated (-0.88 at  $p < 0.05$ ).

Table 1. Diversity Index, ENEP and Party Balance in Legislative Elections

Year	Parties	ENEP	Diversity	Balance
1955	29	6.3	0.84	0.45
1971	10	2.3	0.56	0.22
1977	3	2.1	0.52	0.43
1982	3	2.0	0.50	0.40
1987	3	1.7	0.43	0.29
1992	3	1.9	0.49	0.35
1997	3	1.6	0.39	0.27
1999	48	5.1	0.80	0.35
2004	24	8.4	0.88	0.55
2009	38	9.6	0.90	0.71
2014	12	8.9	0.89	0.72
2019	16	9.3	0.89	0.75

If we only look at ENEP in the reform era, we conclude that regardless of the number of parties participating in the election, only 10 (ten) parties will get a sufficient vote. While the votes in each province in the 1999-2014 elections, minimum accumulation of vote in two parties (ENEP = 2) in two provinces (Bali and Gorontalo). At the same time, the majority of the vote is in 10 (ten) parties (ENEP = 10), which is also in the two provinces (Bengkulu and NTB). The average ENEP for all provinces is 8 (eight). Meanwhile, the comparison of party balance in the New Order era was 0.46, and in the Reformation era was 0.87. According to Taagepera, in the Reformation era shows aspects of the development of democracy better (party balance more than 0.5).

Table 2 shows the electoral threshold variation of 1% -5% and the estimated number of political parties that will qualify. With an electoral threshold of 4% and 5%, the prediction of parties participating in the election that will be eligible for the 1999-2019 election period is 5 to 10 parties. We can make such interference if we look at ENEP, the diversity and balance of the party, which is relatively stable (average B > 0.5), see Figure 2.

Table 2. Threshold Simulation for National Legislative Elections

Year	T1=1%	T2=2%	T3=3%	T4=4%	T5=5%
1955	10	8	4	4	4
1971	7	5	4	4	4
1977	3	3	3	3	3
1982	3	3	3	3	3
1987	3	3	3	3	3
1992	3	3	3	3	3
1997	3	3	3	2	2
1999	8	5	5	5	5
2004	14	11	7	7	7
2009	15	9	9	8	8
2014	11	10	10	10	10
2019	13	11	9	9	8

In Figure 2, the diversity of voters is shown by the Simpson index, where the value of 0 (zero) indicates no difference in voter preferences (usually in a single-party election system), and 1 (one) shows that voter preferences are entirely different (multi-party with the strength of evenly distributed votes). Since the 1999

elections, diversity has been demonstrated that voter preferences are wholly separate and stable until 2019, which is in the range of 0.8-0.9. This diversity figure can be interpreted as the availability of choice and freedom of choice. This figure is strongly correlated with ENEP, and ENPP figures, respectively 0.995 and 0.795 (or very strong). From the results of the two tail t-test test showed the stable diversity of voter preferences, namely in numbers (5,487, 9,291) where  $p < 0.05$ , and therefore it was interpreted that the value of ENEP would be around 5 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). We also tested with the Mann-Kendall trend test/Two-tailed test whether the two numbers (Diversity and ENEP) had a trend, and the results showed they did not have a trend ( $p > 0.05$ ), in other words, the lowest number of 5 and the highest of 10 parties are relatively unchanged (no trend).




Figure 2. Diversity and ENEP in the 1955-2019 Elections

Table 3. The number of qualified parties for the next election using threshold simulation of 2019-Election Data in all Provinces

	T1=1%	T2=2%	T3=3%	T4=4%	T5=5%
Median	14	12	11	9	8
Max	16	15	13	12	10
Min	10	6	5	5	5
Average	14	12	10	9	8

Note: Processed From 2019 Election Statistical Data (BPS, 2019)

We argued that regardless of the number of parties participating in the election in Indonesia, there will only be five to ten parties that will get sufficient votes, and the 5% threshold is relevant enough to guarantee the availability of variations in party choice to the average ENEP rate 9.8 (10 parties) and a balance of 0.7 (this figure is greater than 0.5 which is interpreted as a right balance). Such thresholds have also been discussed by (Indrawan & Aji, 2019) and (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011).

The inference is commensurate with Duverger's Law as endorsed by (Bhattacharya & Smarandache, 2006), that when there are quite a lot of floating voters (usually occurs in countries with immature democracy), then the maximum ENP value (ten parties for our context) is the optimal number to guarantee the availability of variations in the choice of voters. Even so, when democracy is ripe, in a proportional system, votes will only accumulate to some effective parties according to the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). Likewise, seats will be distributed to the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Taagepera, 2009).

#### 4.2 Effect of elections on national security stability

We can see in Table 1 that the 1971 elections with ten parties provided the calculation of ENEP = 2.3, Diversity = 0.56, and Balance = 0.22. We understand that the "dominant party" scenario is achieved, with Golkar dominant, 68% of the vote. The dominance of the vote caused the winning regime (New Order) to easily simplify the number of parties for the next election to only three political parties (the seven remaining political parties were merged into two political parties). Although the number of parties participating in the 1977

elections has diminished, the balance of power between parties is still poor. The balance figure is 0.43, still below 0.5, which means there is still a dominant party. Besides, the diversity index declined to 0.52, indicating increasingly limited choices. The decline in the diversity index in the 1977-1999 elections showed the period of "less freedom" in Indonesia.




Figure 3. ENEP plot of Balance (Keseimbangan) and Diversity (Diversitas)

In contrast, the 1999-2019 elections showed a stable balance of more than 0.5. Such stability of balance shows that the political process is functioning as it should.

Furthermore, by conducting a cluster test on the diversity index of all electoral years in Indonesia, it was found that there were only two groups: low diversity group ( $<0.5$ ) and high diversity group ( $>0.5$ ), see Figure 3. The high cluster diversity group is giving broader democratic voter preferences, and vice versa for low diversity groups. Such interpretation is based on the premise of democratic elections, which must guarantee voter differences and freedom. (Amorós & Puy, 2010). A similar test on the balance index shows similar results.

In the context of the discourse to reduce the number of parties, it is imperative to understand the impact. Many previous papers held that the New Order Era (1977-1997), with a low ENEP and destitute of balance and diversity, had curbed people's political freedom, and the ruling regime only privileged one party "Golkar" (Busroh, 2017). Meanwhile, they consider that the elections in the reform era (1999-2019) have been aligned in pursuing democratic development. Therefore, referring to Figure 3, we consider that the simplification of parties must pay attention to ENP (ENEP and ENPP), balance, and diversity. That view has the full support of FGD participants.

According to (Górecki & Kukołowicz, 2018), when we refer to the 'psychological effects of Duverger', that the political elite tends to form fewer parties, and voters tend to avoid supporting small parties; consequently, the number of parties in the election will tend to decrease. The need to limit the number of parties is also widely recommended by experts (Golosov, 2010; Grofman & Kline, 2012; Laakso & Taagepera, 2017; Singer, 2015).

Similar consideration comes from FGD participants that if the election is more permissive to the number of parties, then the widening fragmentation of seats will make it difficult to operate the formation of legislation and governance. For this reason, the concept of the maximum limit of the parties participating in the next general election needs to be applied, while guaranteeing varied party choices. Apart from the current threshold provisions in Indonesia, we recommend that the number of parties participating in elections in Indonesia can be optimally reduced to 10 parties. This number is predicted to be sufficient to maintain the adequacy of choices and still guarantee the balance of party power so that political stability is maintained.

Furthermore, the correlation coefficient shows a moderate relationship between the diversity index and IDI (Pearson)  $R = -0.5735$ . Likewise, between IDI and ENEP with  $R = 0.5219$ . A negative sign indicates the inverse relationship, i.e., when ENEP increases, it will cause IDI to decrease. Meanwhile, diversity is the opposite. Therefore it is necessary to see the achievement of the party's balance outlined in the above discussion.

We also analyzed the Democracy Index (IDI) 2009-2018 during the election year, where if a province had a local election (Pilgub), then the provincial IDI generally declined; 88% of 33 provinces declined, and only five regions (12%) showed an increase in IDI. Meanwhile, during the year of the national legislative election (Pileg), only 3% of the provincial IDI declined, and the rest increased (97%). Higher IDI shows higher political stability and security. Thus, local or regional elections have a dominant-negative influence on political stability, while national legislative elections have a positive impact.

Next, we observed whether there were significant differences in the total crime data (TCC) a year before Pilgub (T1) and in the year of Pilgub (T0). The results show that outside Java, T0 decreased, and T1 increased significantly. As for the Java region, there is no significant difference between T1 and T0. Thus Pilgub does not significantly influence the rise and fall of TCC in Java, but in the other regions, Pilgub greatly influences TCC. Similarly, we also observe whether there has been an increase or decrease in total crime counts (TCC) in the implementation of Pileg in Java and Outside Java. The results do not show the significance of the increasing TCC during the Pileg year.

The discussion about the relationship between political competition and violence is certainly not new (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017). The result of this study, which shows that there is still an increase in total crime a year before the elections outside of Java, is consistent with previous scholarly arguments. For example, Sambhi (2019) shows that precisely political tensions occurred a year before the election compared to the year of election. Meanwhile, at the level of national elections, the total number of crimes is not significantly affected that in line with the argument Aspinall & Berenschot (2019) about the possibility of the transfer of political and fiscal authority, which has shifted the locus of political contestation to a lower level. As such, we also argue that the context of national political contestation has contributed to the fragmentation of ethnic maps and regionalism, and has expanded the opportunities of the ethnic and regional coalition at national level contestation. The implication of such consideration, firstly, is how the policy should be formulated to anticipate the risk of the violence in local elections or Pileg in the outside of Java, and secondly, how the security enforcement should be devoted to it. Moreover, FGD participants also highlighted the needed regulatory in distributing security enforcement taskforce during the simultaneous local election based on the above analysis.

The last inferential statistical analysis of the regional legislative elections is shown in Figures 5 and 6. There are 12 provinces with ENEP more than ten correlated with an increase in total crime before the election, namely: Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, NTB, NTT, Kalimantan North, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua. At ENEP more than nine, there are an additional three of the twelve provinces mentioned above, namely: Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Papua. All fifteen regions are areas outside Java and Bali. Two things need to be underlined, first, for an ENEP number of more than ten, regional legislative elections have a positive correlation with increasing total crime or affecting security stability; and second, local legislative elections have a positive effect on the total number of crimes, or elections affect security stability before the vote takes place. The results of this final analysis reinforce the claims of the analysis described above.




Figure 4. Two-sample comparison of variances of TCC for Province Head Election






Figure 5. Two-Sample T-Test And Z-Test Of TCC For Province Head Election

During the FGD, there were many views and comments about "the optimal number of qualified parties for the upcoming elections." Although there is confirmation of agreement on the electoral threshold from 4% to 5%, there is also a bias in determining whether it is better 4% than 5% or vice versa, to maintain democracy. An essential agreement among the FGD participants was their view that security risks in the application of the 4-5% electoral threshold would still be manageable. With such a view, they stressed the importance of a more comprehensive study and focus on efforts to standardize the level of election security in the future, for example, to strengthen the IKP (Election Vulnerability Index) that has been sought by Bawaslu.

## 5. Conclusion

To answer the question of this study, "how many optimum numbers of parties in an election that should be limited in the context of Indonesia national security stability?" We conclude that in the case of national general elections (Pemilu) and regional head elections (Pilgub) in Indonesia, regardless of its numbers, the number of parties that will get a significant vote is 5 (five) to 10 (ten) parties. In that context, a threshold value of 4% to 5% can reduce the number of parties participating in general elections and local elections that are effective as a different representation of the social preferences of voters; moreover, with such threshold percentages, the national security stability considered to be ongoing maintenance by the appropriate handling of the risk. Another finding is that the national general elections are safer than the regional head elections. Simultaneous local head elections (pilkada serentak) has a significant influence on national security stability. Meanwhile, the national legislative elections (pemilu legislatif) do not significantly influence on national security stability, but for the area outside of Java and Bali, such local election (Pileg and Pilgub) shows a significant influence. The implications of this study encourage policymakers in the field of national defense and security to take anticipatory steps towards differences in the risks of holding national elections and local elections, as well as the direction and focus of the research related to the perspective of national defense and security.

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# The Reasons for War and Social Choice

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## Abstract

War is a hunter of millions of lives, destruction of resources, but war sometimes could be the alternative choice of people, leaders, and policy makers. Wars are mostly responsible for intelligence failure and bad crisis management. Scholars have exposed various propositions as causes of war and debated if war is rational or if it is either miscalculation and misperception, which led to the initiation of war. Leaders, in many cases, have initiated wars either for their own interest (e.g. winning in election) or state’s national sovereignty. In some cases, wars are considered as a public choice whether people are solely aware of the benefits of war or they are misunderstood by the leaders. Our research have found that misunderstanding, intelligence failure and inadequate foreign policy management, as well as standing of a country, are mainly responsible for engaging in war. Findings show that public opinion is volatile, and could be changed over time. That is why war often cannot be considered as a social choice. Therefore, our research proposes a further research on the concept of war as social choice.

**Keywords:** War, Social Choice, Rational, Irrational, Miscalculation, International law

## Introduction

War is a hunter of millions of lives, destruction of resources, but war sometimes could be the alternative choice of people, leaders, and policy makers. General W. T. Sherman famously said “war is Hell, but war is worse than Hell. War is real, and it destroys people’s lives” (Biddle, 2014). War is the consequence of certain ideas and aims, which is sufficiently accepted or refused by people of a given society and gives rise to certain norms and policies that led to war or help to abstain from war. To understand these causes, it is necessary to have the possibility of war or peace. Scholars have exposed various propositions as causes of war and debated if war is rational or if it is either miscalculation which led to the initiation of war. Many leaders have tried to get the public opinion of initiating war against a nation for either their own interest, to ensure their power or state’s

sovereignty. Furthermore, in some cases, war can be considered as a social choice, which is the aggregated decision of the population to engage in war or not. First, it is not a small task to be sure of what the majority public opinion about war is. Second, it is not always the case that political leaders openly inform their population about war declarations as it was the case before 1945. Third, some cases of public opinion majority disagreement on engaging in war were ignored by political leaders, as in the Syrian War. For those reasons, the limits of war as a social choice will be detailed in another section. In this paper, we focus on the fundamental causes of war based on the notion and experiments of war experts and foreign policy makers and analyse the limitations of considering war as an aggregate choice of a nation. Our argument is that misunderstanding, intelligence failure and inadequate foreign policy management, as well as standing of a country, are mainly responsible for engaging in war. In addition, public opinion is volatile, and could be changed over time. Therefore, it is necessary to do further research on the concept of war as social choice.

### **Research Hypothesis and Methodology**

Our hypothesis is twofold: first, causes of war can include certain notions and aims and second that opinion aggregation issues, possibility of policy makers to circumvent public's opinion as well as policy makers possibility to dissimulate their engagement in war because of international laws are limitations to consider war as a social choice. In order to show that the research hypothesis are reasonable, we will be looking at two main questions. First, what caused the great wars in the past and in the modern times. Second, if those causes of wars are rational, could war be considered as the lump choice of a nation. The research is primarily qualitative and descriptive in nature. We will try to give an overview of the causes of wars and analyze if war can be considered social choice in modern conflicts. Historical causes that led states to initiate wars in the past; what caused the present-day wars and the people's opinion about wars as social choice will be provided.

### **Causes of War**

This section will include past historic motives that led nations to initiate wars using the idea from scholarly literature and what caused the great wars of modern times using the analysts' study and our own experiments.

Four generic motives have historically led the countries to begin war: fear, interest, standing and revenge (Richard Ned, 2010). Whereas the majority of wars across three and a half centuries was caused by security or material interests, the majority was caused for standing and revenge reasons. According to the war experts, most of these wars were responsible for intelligence failure and bad crisis management.

In his book *Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Past and Future Motives for War* Richard Ned (2010) exposes six propositions as causes of war according to his dataset. His six propositions is first that aggressive states are either rising hegemonies looking for recognition or already dominant powers attempting to consolidate their hegemony. Second, hegemonic and emerging powers are highly unlikely to engage in war against one another. Third, the most likely target of hegemonic and emerging powers would be weaker third parties. Fourth, 'hegemonic wars' are generally the result of unintended escalation or miscalculation. Fifth, unintended conflict escalation and miscalculation are much more often causes of war than 'incomplete information' available. Sixth, declining and weak states are unlikely to declare war against great powers. after reviewing Marxists, realists and other approaches to the causes of war. He considered those six propositions as an answer to only partially satisfying Marxists, realists and international relations scholars' explanations of war. Indeed, many scholars have already put forward the important role of 'status' and 'reputation' as reasons for war. Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014) in their article 'Reputation and Status as Motives for War' regard reputation as 'common beliefs about a given state recurrent characteristics or behaviors, such as respecting treaties or not respecting them' whereas they regard status as 'an attribute of an individual or social role that refers to position vis-a-vis a comparison group such as expectations to have about behaviors. In other words, reputation concerns expectations one state or a group of states can have about another state's behavior whereas status concerns its standing in the 'international power hierarchy'. Dafoe, Renshon and Huth (2014) argue that the quest for status is a good enough reason for the state to declare war. Some examples in which status could be consider a good enough reason to engage in war is when a "declining hegemon is unwilling or unable to revise the status hierarchy to accommodate the

challenger; when there is confusion in the international status hierarchy by creating a situation prone to status conflict or when one state is willing to engage in war in order to maintain its hegemony over the international order.

In his work *The causes of war and those of peace* Biddle (2014) asserts five reasons of war are statism, collectivism, altruism, mysticism and evasion. Statism is considered as the primary political cause of war. It is known as a social system based on the notion that the state has a right to force individuals to act against their judgment for the sake of some “greater good,” whether the community (communism), the race (Nazism), the nation (fascism), or “God” (theocracy) (Biddle, 2014). Collectivism is one of the main ideological causes of war. It is the idea that an individual's life is included into some collective group that may force him or her to act according to the instruction of that collective group. Serving others, for example the American's involvement in the Vietnam war, in self-sacrificially is regarded as altruism - the primary moral cause of war. Mysticism is treated as the most fundamental philosophical cause of war: acceptance of the notion that knowledge can be acquired by non-sensory, non-rational means, such as faith, revelation, intuition, or any other form of ‘just knowing’ (Biddle, 2014). The most fundamental psychological cause of war is evasion. It is defined as the refusal to face relevant facts, the act of pretending that reality is other than it is.

Matthew and Massimo (2009) in their article ‘*The reasons for war*’ claimed the “bargaining failure” as mainly the reason for war. In addition, they explored five reasons for bargaining failure. First, asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war. Second, a lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability to credibly commit to abide by an agreement. Third, indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are feasible. Fourth, agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the populations that they represent and finally, multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it.

There are also some scholars such as Geller and Singers (1998) who found that miscalculation and misperception are the vital causes of war.

### **War as social choice**

Social choice is considered as ‘the study of collective decision process and procedures’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013) It must be understood as a ‘cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs, such as votes, preferences, judgments, welfare, into collective outputs, such as collective decisions, preferences, judgments and welfare’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013) Wars are sometimes supported by masses of initiator countries, because of a feeling of gaining something out of it. Hence, war can be generated by social choice. Social choice is defined as ‘the process by which individual preferences are aggregated into collective choices through group decision processes such as voting’ (Adam, 2014).

Gaubatz (1995) addresses the numerous problems of drawing conclusions about military intervention as a social choice supported by a majority of a given nation in his article ‘*Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad*’. He outlined several reasons limiting interpretation of opinion polls as social choice approving of military intervention. The first explanation brings up that the general public is unable to express a shared majority opinion. Aggregation of public opinion is more often than not biased because the public is generally unable to behave in a ‘coherent attitude’. Gaubatz mentions that proponents of this argument believe that ‘foreign policy is simply too complex and too remote for most of them [individuals of a given nation]. Others argue that incoherence of poll results is due to the difficulty of ‘crafting effective polls.’ Proponents of this explanation allude to the sensibility of publics’ answers to sentence formulations and wordings used in polls. Although respondents may be well informed and sincere in their answers, wordings will affect their answers much more than what is thought at first glance. Gaubatz expounds in his words that: ‘Subtle differences can change the way respondents interpret questions, because the words that make up questions carry substantive and emotional contexts and provide cues that will bias the responses’. One striking example of the gap between the percentage of American supporting U.S. airstrikes in Bosnia in between

Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll which published that 36 percent of respondents approved the use of air strikes whereas ABC News poll announced that 65 percent of respondents supported airstrikes. The huge gap between the two journals' news was due to the sentence 'along with its allies in Europe' of the second poll according to Gaubatz. Hence, the context sensitivity of polls is the first problem limiting the generalization of those results and interpreting them as sources validating the use of violence as a social choice. The last explanation to polls' incoherences is due to intransitivity. To illustrate the intransitivity problem, Gaubatz takes the example of three voters A, B and C, who should decide what is their favorite color between white, gray and white. Each voter has a preferred color, a second preferred one and a least preferred one. Even though voters answer genuinely and without changing their minds, generalizing results in an aggregate manner to consider those results as a 'public opinion' would still be difficult. It is so because there is a high probability that if the question: 'What is your favorite color?' is asked that results would be one third for each color; that if the question asked is 'Do you prefer white or black?', two thirds will prefer white to black. If similar questions are asked for preferences over gray to white and black to gray, the results will again be around two thirds. Gaubatz explains that aggregation of these preferences shows intransitivity and that 'Following the voting analogy, we would say that there is a cycle in this structure of preferences: an attempt to find a social preference by majority vote could get stuck cycling through the alternatives indefinitely, since white beats black, and black beats gray, but gray in turn beats white'. The same results would happen with aggregation of different opinion polls. Gaubatz unravels that 'cycles in the majority preference lead to a situation where the order in which alternatives are evaluated determines the outcome. Indeed, McKelvey has shown that with the right order and with a few quite restrictive assumptions about the nature of preference distributions, any alternative can emerge as the social choice'. Thus, the order in which alternatives are compared in an absolute sense and the formulation of questions may distort our perception of public opinion compared to real opinion of each individual. According to Gaubatz, this is the precise reason why aggregations of opinion cannot be considered 'public opinion' of the majority of a given nation for the use of violence as a foreign policy either for declaration of war or for military intervention.

Some recent examples in which public opinion of engaging in war was mitigated are spelled out by Shany Mor (2016) in 'War and democratic decision making: How do democracies argue and decide whether or not to intervene in distant wars?' is the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany's intervention in Iraq War in 2002 and 2003, in Libya War in 2011 and in Syria War in 2013. Mor noticed that public engagement in debate over involvement of each country in the Iraq War was the most important. Public opinion was also much more divided than in the two other wars. Mor pointed out that the Iraq War was the main topic of op-ed newspapers in the four countries mentioned above. Debates dealt with duration and outcome of engaging in war. Public opinion results were the following in the four countries: the U.K. and the U.S. voted for war whereas France and Germany voted against. Plus, almost anti-Iraq War demonstrations including millions of demonstrators took place in Europe and America on the 15th of February 2003. Conversely, such disagreement over war engagement or not did not occur for the Libyan and the Syrian War. Disagreement did not occur because such debates were not directed towards the general public. Mor reveals that '[...] the three countries which led the bombing - France, the U.K., and the U.S. - weren't even really notified that anything more than a 'no-fly zone' was being implemented'. Here comes another issue of 'social choice' in war. In fact, general opinion is often not taken into account when political leaders decide to intervene militarily outside of their borders. The Syrian War made parliamentary forums about war reappear. Some heated parliament debates both in the U.S. and in the U.K. led to the final decision of blocking wars in opposition to previous debates on war occurring in the Commons or in the Congress. This forced the U.S. president to pass upon this opposition. Those three cases can make one wonder if public opinion or parliament as an opposition to war is sufficient to prevent war. Indeed, this was not the case for the Iraq and the Syrian War.

Another reason why it is difficult to consider war as a social choice is that states almost never declare war officially nowadays as clarified by Fazal (2012) in her article '*Why States No Longer Declare War?*'. Jus in bello of international laws, or 'the law of war governing belligerent conduct', limits states' incentives to officially declare war. Indeed, half of wars between states were followed by war declaration whereas during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, whereas only three were followed by war declaration since 1950. Nowadays international laws disincentivize political leaders to declare war by escalating the states' costs to comply with those laws. Declarations of wars' costs have risen for two reasons: first, because

of the higher bureaucratic costs, such as military training to respect laws of war enacted in *jus in bellos* and second, because strategic costs are also higher, such as weapons which should be unused that states have already paid for or refraining from opting for certain military strategies. Also, Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Huth noted other costs of *jus in bellos*, which are liability costs, domestic political costs and reputational costs. In an attempt to circumvent international laws *jus in bellos*, modern states would more likely engage in informal wars. In turn, engaging in informal wars makes it harder for the general public to measure its state involvement into this war and also to measure possible outcomes since states are a lot less likely to be accountable to international laws in informal wars.

## Conclusion

Many reasons which are used to engage in wars in different conflicts have been presented. Causes of war can include misinterpretation or miscalculation, status or reputation, statism, collectivism, altruism, mysticism, evasion and many others. Although those causes or reasons may seem rational when one takes into account a country's interests, it does not make it reasonable or rational internationally. For this reason, war is mostly considered irrational. Even though war is considered mostly irrational, it does not mean that causes of war should be left unstudied since there are no patterns to be deciphered in order to prevent further wars. Indeed, the more we know about the cause of war, the better able we are to design strategies and policies to reduce its likelihood. The study of war remains important for humanitarian and intellectual reasons. Furthermore, we come to the conclusion that in practice, war can often not be considered as a social choice. First, aggregation public opinion issues are numerous and a small reformulation can change one's answer in a survey and hence the survey's overall outcome. Second, modern wars are different since 1945 since states no longer declare war. For this reason, war is much more disguised than before and less obvious to detect at first glance. Third, examples of modern wars have proven that political leaders may easily pass beyond parliaments and public opinion's disagreement to engage in war, such as during the Syrian War or that public debates about war may not take place, such as it was the case in the Libyan War. All of those reasons limit the possibility to consider war as a social choice approved by a majority of citizens. Political leaders veto power in the military sphere should not be underestimated.

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# Conceptual Significance in Contemporary Political Environments and Pakistan's Security Dilemma\*

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## Abstract

Concepts of Sovereignty, National Interest, and legitimacy have a new interpretive significance in International Relations. Strategic communication is impacting political perspectives. The paper discusses how the extended usage of these political concepts can cause a security dilemma. How it can entail expediency and skulduggery when it involves National Interest of powerful states and how the weaker state can suffer. Study find Pakistan, prone to such intrusive threats; that can pose security dilemma. Paper recommends caution to Pakistan policy makers; against strategic crafts that might provoke an international interventionist pretext based on secondary and insular interpretations of Sovereignty, National Interest, Legitimacy leading to new concept, '*Responsibility to Protect*' (R2P) that allows military intervention. Communication play a vital role in the making of Nations perception of political environment. Strategic communication is an advance political tool to drive policies catalyst to effect interventionist foreign policy. The paper analysis that due to the preponderance of big powers in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); this is comparatively possible to adopt and execute resolutions passed against a weaker state leading to a security dilemma. It is recommended that Pakistan will have to keep caution of such conceptual circumvention through the art of diplomacy. This would by default compensate Pakistan's National interest and survival.

**Keywords:** Sovereignty, Political concepts, R2P, National Interest, Strategic communication, Security dilemma

## 1. Introduction

This paper deliberate the purposive change in Political concepts. The epiphenomenal options will allow in future; the powerful states to intervene to stop an undesired state action or activity; deemed threatening global peace. Pakistan can face threats if it gaffes in steering her role in the world order. How International Relations concepts are interpreted in a different environments and impact Pakistan's security; forms the research question of the study. Mixed research method is used with more emphasis on ground realities and observations. The study finds that an expediently driven political interpretation of the major International Relations concepts can cause Pakistan security dilemma. The paper's finding caution Pakistan of such political crafts; provoking international

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\* This paper has been developed from my Ph.D. dissertation.

intervention, consequent to security dilemma. It is recommended that Pakistan has to strike a balance her policy mechanism in International Relations.

## 2. Sovereignty

The old concepts of sovereignty, national interest and other intrusive political conceptual framework were defined with strictest possible interpretation in Westphalia by the European communities. The top among such concept that made the base of the treaty was 'Sovereignty'. A state was protected from outside intrusion by the sovereign rights. In contemporary global environments these and other connotations have been radically changed due to global power asymmetry. The powerful states are forwarding new interpretations as a world political controlling mechanism. Like France and UK intruded in Libya using R2P shield vide UNSC resolution 1973 authorizing the member states to take necessary action to act in Libya (UN, 2011).

This action when compared to Gaza bombing of Israel makes it dubious as people in Libya enjoyed far better welfare than how Gaza is bombed by Israel frequently destroying and smashing the whole infrastructure. Following discusses the major Political concept those are now interpreted in a different and in a way which will in future allow the powerful who hold sway on the forum that approves these intrusive provision to militarily attack other nations. Pakistan can face the same fate as of Libya if it slips in disagreement of the order under the powerful states making War on Terrorism a pretext.

In a landmark 'agenda for peace' report; forwarded by Boutros Boutros Ghali in 1992, the former UN Secretary General said, "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of states today to understand this and to find a balance between the need of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world" (Ghali, 1992).

New interpretation of sovereignty suggests more intrusive and acceptability of interventionist policies. It expands the political securitizations to attack nations when they fail to align with US world order designs and political preponderance. "Sovereignty is being reduced in importance and belied in a kind of 'limited sovereignty' is developing...sovereignty has begun to erode. It is under attack from globalization forces, economic and trade liberalization, the changing nature of technology and American hegemony. In some cases these factors has caused state to collapse;<sup>1</sup> in others they have given rise to transnational or trans-sovereign problems of refugees, disease, ethnic conflict, drug smuggling, terrorism, violence and civil war<sup>2</sup>. (Robert J. Jackson, 2006 ).

The ex-U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, giving idea of reciprocal sovereignty is that, "...Each sovereign nation must respect the right of other nations, so that all nations are obliged to contain the external consequences of any security threat emerging within their borders" the author suggest further that, "...And when countries fail to live up to their responsibility, international law should recognize- and indeed authorize-mechanisms that would allow protective action on the part of the world community and if necessary the injured or threatened states" the writer then talks of a generational task of evolving a new concept of 'reciprocal sovereignty' with a sweeping disregard as to what constitutes the act of terrorism or to elaborate how people take different approaches to define resistance and terrorism. Chertoff draws principles to set a new security paradigm, "Implementing international order that advances U.S. security interest will require difficult decisions and sustained work for at least a generation. To begin, the United States and its partners must ground the reciprocal responsibility to contains on three core principles: no subordination, collaborative security, and reciprocal sovereignty." (Chertoff, 2009).

This premise has potential of setting a dangerous trend where chaos in a target state can be circumvented, by a powerful nation to intervene militarily. This would become a law of privileged and powerful international political players only. This interventionist mind-set is a critical fault line for the world peace as we see the

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<sup>1</sup>Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya are a few examples

<sup>2</sup> The example of Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq Palestine are a few examples

military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya is lingering for over a decade with no end in sight. Such interventions have further provoked conflict and have proven as a war multiplier. With trillions of dollars budget, the whole NATO forces' resource and a huge combat and civilian' causality, the military interventions by international community have proven to be a failed concept. Our present internal and international political environments are prone with nationalists and secessionist and ethnic movements. Issues of nuclear proliferation and weapon of mass destruction have become the threatening elements of international power politick. The Security Dilemma asserts that both weakness and strength in national security can be provocative to other nations. Nations have politicized military interventions through UN resolutions as a legal shield. The assertiveness by the powerful alliances to attack a particular nation has been so much urging that their action bypassed approval even by UNSC.

The NATO authorization of supporting a proxy group in attacking Libya for a regime change with France and UK's use of force to enforce a no fly zone substantiates this argument. However, a loose reference to provisions of R2P was made to work in this regard:

'R2P is often described as an 'emerging norm' in international affairs. But as Noam Chomsky has noted, Japan's attack on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia were 'all accompanied by lofty rhetoric about the solemn responsibility to protect the suffering populations..... A second version of R2P, proposed by the [Gareth] Evans Commission (2001), goes much further. It authorizes 'regional or sub-regional organizations' such as NATO to determine their 'area of jurisdiction' and to act in cases where 'the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time' (Evans, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001).

Pakistan is prone to all the danger and politick use of R2P and collective security provisions due to the internal political weakness and problems. It has a nationalist movement in the Southern Baluchistan province, a sectarian tension, and its nuclear capability pursuits are ingredients readily available to grind a Security Dilemma to escalate what it is already going through. Pakistan's alleged interventionist role in Indian occupied Kashmir through its alleged covertly support of Islamic organizations like Jaishe Muhammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) and Mujahedeen of mix groups notwithstanding the justification, prove to be a pain in the neck.

The unimaginative policy shortcuts can be a dangerous move in totally transformed modern international political environments. By resorting to such trendy security measures Pakistan will put its national security on peril, if crossed international community's tolerance threshold.' Britain and America shocked Pakistan and its allies at the 23rd regular session of the United Nations Human Rights Council's general debate in Geneva on 7 June, 2013 when the two countries clearly supported nationalist leader Mehran Marri, Baluchistan as Baloch representative to the UN, who spoke against the recent elections and alleged that Pakistan was committing rights abuses in Baluchistan. This is an indicator the way things can be construed or politicked in the present international political environment, leading to dire troubles for Pakistan security. The emerging doctrines and norms of collective security and responsibility to protect also compromise state sovereignty and defies a national government as a single agent to have a total writ over the geography and the its citizens. The nuclear program of Pakistan is under threat to be dismantled, as international powers are exerting to monitor it unusually and intrusively on generalized pretext that non-state actors might lay hands on it. (Washington post, 4 November, 2001, p. A27). A UN resolution 2325 (2016) was adopted to this effect, "calling for a framework to keep terrorists, other Non-State actors from acquiring Weapons of mass destruction" (UNSC, 2016). The concept like R2P can be 'worked out' by International game players to pose Pakistan Security Dilemma.

The principle of sovereign equality of states is enshrined in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. "Article 2 (7) states that the United Nations has no authority to intervene in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." (UN, 2016). Westphalia model (1648) of sovereignty has been unhinged in recent times. Westphalia model was exclusive in nature that models a nation state as a single agent surpassing supranational influence. Sovereignty of nations now goes beyond a single state authority and territorial integrity. "The question of which body was ultimately responsible was increasingly separated from that of which body was allowed competence" (Dugard, 1996). Sovereignty is explained now as being ultimately responsible. Sovereignty is not taken as right

but responsibility according to the emerging literature that has culminated in an elaborate document, 'Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty', ICISS ( December, 2001). This report expands beyond the Westphalia concept of sovereignty that ended supranational control in internal affairs of a nation state. This notion of sovereignty emits out of nationalism of post-world wars era. It establishes that, "Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being increasingly recognized in state practice, has threefold significance. First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse on the concept of human security." (Evans, 2001) This connotation of sovereignty implies that this is a changed world and every nation is responsible to the global community for their domestic acts. This articulation of sovereignty, though, is wrapped around the core themes of human security and rights but in fact has scope of its exploitation as human nature can't be trusted in all cases as interventions in Cambodia by Vietnam or in East Pakistan now Bangladesh, by India, in Libya by UK and France, in Iraq and by U.S.A., on the proven wrong pretext of possessing weapons of mass destruction which were never found by international regimes. Such acts of military interventions by powerful raised questions as these were based on not very sound presumptions and international law, but were carried out on the premise that these constituted humanitarian intervention aimed at preventing genocide, large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing.

On the contrary, following world war-II and the holocaust, the United Nations adopted a resolution on December 9, 1948, which stated that "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." (UNHR, 1948) Clearly, the massacres in Rwanda constituted genocide, so why didn't the world step in to stop it? These models create an ambiguity and a sense of Security Dilemma where nations feel threatened under emerging interventionist provisions.

These can jeopardize security of a nation on an invented pretext where a powerful nation creates such a chaos in a target state and use it to fit the provisions of military intervention that becomes an instrument of usurpation than a concern for human security. Like it is famously reported that in Libya it was Bernard Henry Levy who crafted such an intervention, perused French president Sarkozy to convince NATO members, UK and US for Libyan intervention to eliminate Libyan Col Muamar Kaddafi and degrade the whole Libyan state on the pretext of no so visible human rights there. "Qaddafi is the one who planned and waged war. I only supported the NATO intervention," he in the very next reply to Al Arabia television show said, "The Libyan issue was not a priority for the French people, but [French president] Sarkozy wanted to do it because it was a fair war... Obama was in the back seat and Cameron was hesitant, while Sarkozy was determined and led the initiative." (Arabiya, 2012). That show how such international interventions are planned on political expediency. Pakistan has the shades of same vulnerability owing to its international political and strategic stature that might engulf it in such political intriguing on the Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq or even like Syria model.

Pakistan is a playground of great gamers owing to its strategic locations and approaches to rich market, mineral and energy regions of Central Asia to Middle East. Its position as ideological 'Time Square' compounds its predicaments. Pakistan's strategic position is a lure for the international power politics. Pakistan has a legacy of intriguing and foreign influences in its internal affairs which are ever increasing in present time. The tension between its interest and international demands and obligations are dichotomous thus prone to foreign pressures and security threats.

The Security Dilemma has already entered in its critical phase with drones having an implicit license to fly over Pakistani territories and bomb its people, killing few perceived terrorists and many innocent civilians. This is unprecedented in nations' history to have a covert understanding; that too under a military regime in Pakistan to allow foreign military intervention and creating a free bombing zone in a sovereign state. This kind of strategy can't be thought of; under normal circumstances as a tactical move even. This emerging interventionist model is

an indicator of a mounting Security Dilemma as it would encourage from consented to forced foreign intrusion. Pakistan will be seriously vulnerable to this changing security paradigm that will make its Security Dilemma increasingly critical. Intervention has been traditionally defined as a deliberate incursion into a state without its consent by some outside agency, in order to change functioning, policies and goals of its governments and achieve effects which favoured the intervening agency (Vincent, 1974). Pakistan's political and military state order should be read under this implication for most of intended international interventionist executions. Good cause of intervention was aimed at imposing conditions on new states after the First World War to guarantee the rights of minorities (Claude 1955), but state like U.S.A deem it an exceptional right to intervene militarily as expressed by U.S.A President Barak Obama on 10 September, 2013 in a statement on Syrian crisis (2013). President Barak Obama, in his speech to the American nation, made a case for military strikes on Syria in response to an alleged chemical attack on its Sunni populated area said, "United States' policy is 'what makes America different. It's what makes us exceptional.'" Russian President Vladimir Putin promptly rebutted him in an op-ed piece that was published in the New York Times on 12<sup>th</sup> September, 2013 saying, "It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see them as exceptional, whatever the motivation," Putin continued. "There are big countries and small countries, rich and poor, those with long democratic traditions and those still finding their way to democracy. Their policies differ, too. We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord's blessings, we must not forget that God created us equal." (Putin, 2013).

This represents a tension between the theory of intervention and the dangers of its wrong implications. Russian response was in part to defend its interest that converged with wider interest of the Middle East particularly vital for Syrian civil war crisis. Pakistan lacks this kind of complimentary international or regional support that can ward off effects of any such interventionist approach and thus is prone to negative outfall of this kind of interventionist notion that has the potential of causing it a Security Dilemma like Libya and Syria.

### 3. National Interest

National interest is an ambition to achieve national goals and objectives that make *raison d'état*, a French expression for the reason of the state or national interest. Interest has an isolationist character and is exclusive to a particular nation's necessities. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, (1469-1527) is deemed to be the first proponent of national interest. Joseph S. Nye, Jr, a prominent American political scientist wrote in '*Foreign Affairs*' that, "The national interest" is a slippery concept, used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy." (Joseph S. Nye, 1999). Why we discuss this concept in this study is pertinent to its implication on Pakistan's national security. According to Kenneth Waltz, "The requirements of state action are imposed by circumstances in which all states exist" It drives us to analyse, can a comparatively smaller and weaker nation like Pakistan preserve its national interest while working in an international political system where powerful states with a bigger appetite seek their own national interest? This is what makes one of the elements of Security Dilemma for Pakistan as it is trapped between the NATO nations' regional national interest and the domestic idealist influences that are deemed an antithesis to NATO nations' interests. This has created internal conditions of civil war, insurgency, terrorism and external scepticism prompting fear of military threats and interventions aiming at controlling Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's probable strategy to contain blow back and retaliation of estranged resisting Islamic groups with a calibrated role in war on terrorism has the potential of being viewed as deliberate reluctance, and can become a major cause of Security Dilemma.

### 4. Legitimacy

The Western strategic trending is based on dialectical legitimacy, where they need to act with force. What might be framed as legitimate, can be used as justification in international law. But in modern political world the powerful has always been able to craft legitimacy, manipulating through regimes, influenced or installed by foreign powers. One can draw a clear comparison in support of this argument as all issues relating to Middle East, Pakistan and Palestine fail to get priority i.e. Kashmir issue where NATO nations military actions are approved in shortest possible time and executed in days like the Gulf war and with regard to Iraq, where US got UN sanction under the pretext of wrongly proved theme of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is because the NATO nations have a unified stance and wield enough power to prevail. The 'Weapon of Mass Destruction'

theme was a matter of crafting legitimacy for the Iraq war, Terrorism is used as a free card in case of Afghanistan and Libya was prey to R2P and new legitimacy tool for intervention what is deemed by the West a threat to their vital interest. Germany was the only country in Europe who did not approve interventions via R2P against Libya as it remained sceptical about the use of force for other than the humanitarian grounds. Germany's role in all other anti-terrorists and anti-piracy operations is an evidence to tell fairness from the maligned intentions of the rest of the NATO nations (Brockmeier, 2012).

Pakistan can in the same way learn from these vivid episodes to secure her from an aggravated Security Dilemma. Pakistan Army fought terrorism to micromanaging the internal law and order i.e. in Karachi and desirous to be doing the same in Punjab. Pakistan military was not successful to find headway for law and order operations as stipulated in national action plan. The federal government and their affiliates in Punjab government remain reluctant to approve, in case of Punjab, for the army to operate there. In a statement prime minister Nawaz Sharif said, "There is no room for any [military] operation in Punjab as there are neither any safe havens of terrorists here nor a territory is controlled by militants" (Manan, 2016). Pakistan will face rise in its Security threats with the changing strategic priorities where Indian has come to the centre stage in the region and Pakistan has drifted to security quagmire as it has now lesser relevance to Western strategic interest after the end of cold war. India will exploit any weakling in Pakistan security system and will try to make its strategic assets as illegitimate to put Pakistan under international pressure that can be catalyst for Pakistan Security Dilemma.

## 5. Strategic Communication

"In international relations, the news media are considered to be an external, yet critical factor in shaping foreign policy decisions to achieve broader national interest goals. (Graham.T. Allison, 2000)". According to a report that appeared in a Pakistani daily it was noted that US paid salaries to the correspondents stationed at Washington through an NGO, American Abroad Media (AAM). It is enough to understand how US can control the media. In the same report it quotes Aaron Lobel, President of AAM, "I haven't encountered any Pakistani channel that doesn't want to work with us," (The Express Tribune, September, 2011).

Shumaila Farooq work finds that the, "The results show that journalists tend to cover conflicting events and tensions rather than positive ones in foreign affairs analysis, highlighted through keywords which appeared with high frequency in each newspaper. This reveals the editorial policy of U.S. elite media in particular" (Farooq, 2015). According to an investigative report by the Bureau of investigative journalism US paid half a billion dollar for secret propaganda during Iraq war for making fake Al-Qaeda videos. (Fielding-Smith, 2016). West played Communist mantra against U.S.S.R. to keep it hyped and by keeping it on front burner now the West wanted to deal with the next perceived threat that was against Muslim states who possessed comparative military power were deemed threat to US interest like Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria and some infer from this that all the resource rich Muslim states and the only nuclear power capable Pakistan is also West's war and occupation hit list. Very vital information confirms this analytical and manifested fact. A former US general who were privy to information which was disclosed to him said, the US electronic and print media unleashed all sort of propaganda against communist Russia to form and design certain perceptions against a country where they planned to impose war.

Figure: The Dog attack faked as propaganda.

The image shows two side-by-side news articles. On the left is a screenshot from JewNews with the headline "Swedish child beaten by muslim immigrant for having blue eyes". The text below the headline is highly inflammatory, suggesting a conspiracy involving Arab immigrants and a Swedish boy's eye color. On the right is a screenshot from BBC News with the headline "Girl, 4, attacked by Rottweiler". This article provides a factual report of a dog attack on a young girl, including details about the dog's name (Kaizer), the father's name (Rob Willis), and the dog's destruction by a council.

Source: (GlobalElitetv, 2015)

This picture shows how themes are made against Muslims. The referred link entails full details from where this news was picked to concoct. (GlobalElitetv, 2015). Muslim identity is different than Christians who are first identified with their regions and Muslims are taken as one whole community living anywhere due to their strong pan Islamism character. It is not so in the case of Christians living anywhere. The Western identify them as German, English, American and French etc.; their Christians sub-identity remains secondary due to their political system. However, they insert religion expediently to the political narratives to juxtapose it with Islam or any other religion with who they are in conflict. This makes it evident that Muslim image anywhere matters and counts for the security narratives as a whole. This picture is intended to blame all Muslims that include Pakistan as well.

Everything about communists used to be characterized as villainous by the West and specially U.S. This kind of political propaganda and projection is peculiar to Western strategic culture. If we see the movies made in USA and their themes we would know dozens of such movies. "The Woman on Pier 13 (1949), The Red Menace (1949), Arctic Flight (1952), Atomic City (1952), Diplomatic Courier (1952), The Steel Fist (1952), My Son John (1953), Man on a Tightrope (1953), Savage Mutiny (1953), and Prisoner of War (1954) - to name just a few of many." (blog, nd). North Korea, China, U.S.S.R, and even Arab and others have been subject of such characterization. The military industrial complex called USA is the biggest war launcher on this earth. This video would show you how a retired US General Wesley Clark was told by George W. Bush that they are going to attack seven countries in next five years. General Clark was shocked and asked why? The answer was even shocking, 'I don't know about terrorists but we have got a good military and we can take down governments' (youtube, 2012).

A study carried out by Shumaila Farooq from International Relations Department, University of Peshawar has investigated that the US print media was unfavourable to Pakistan. (Farooq, 2015). Pakistan is portrayed negatively in the Western and US media. That should be something alarming as it always has proven a precursor of a coming threat. A serial propaganda campaign about Pakistan's nuclear plan on the theme of the command and control and creating doubts about its safety is done to make a case for its role up. US has a law 'Passed as part of the National Defence Authorization Act (H.R. 4310), signed by Obama on 12/29/2012. Pages 326-328' it




is meant to "...Unbound the legal regulations against using propaganda against foreign audiences and American citizens. The intention is to influence public opinion by using television, radio, newspapers, and social media targeting the American and foreign people in controlled psy-ops<sup>3</sup>." (GETV, 2013)

Prominent Journalist Naomi Wolf explains it in a lecture, how and why fake news are created and published. The fake news and stories are run in mainstream media like CNN without verification and to advance a particular agenda. (GETV, 2015).

## 6. International Interventionist Concept and Pakistan's Security Dilemma

According to a new study that appears in the '*Journal of Conflict Resolution*' August, 2016, the American interventionist designs are going beyond the containment of the sort during cold war. It further says that Washington's capacity exist to act beyond a purely national interest. A military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya and Somalia indicates that appetite. (Seug-Whan Choi, 2016). The NATO experience in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq and now in Syria has made US and its allies unscrupulous and unhesitant if they have to intervene to get the less powerful state under their quasi-imperial order. Pakistan's strategic position warrants caution in this regard owing to its high political and representative stature in the Muslim world and being a nuclear state. Any unwarranted proactive move can provoke international military threat and can cause Pakistan's Security Dilemma. It is easier to assimilate this fact in present times, than it was possible a decade ago when foreign intervention was not that alarming a term and did not make sense beyond the theoretical realm. The recent interventions and its successful execution by the NATO nations in Middle East and Russia in Syria is a case to confirm this argument. The historical prejudices would be formed into justification for such actions. The use of coercive strategies by the powerful states like USA will have an aim to change the state behaviour. Human rights, terrorism and political issue like democracy and governance would be circumvented offensively and will be part of strategic communication to legitimize foreign interventions. Western media is already projecting themes about Pakistan nuclear programme, human rights violations, anti-military themes and lack of democracy. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has already been unleashed in case of Libya with partial human rights justifications which are presumed as not the exact cause but how it threatened the national interest of the NATO nations. Libya proved in practice a welfare state with some tribal grudges peculiar to the Middle East which were projected to put Libya on international politicking anvil and eliminate it, which was done swiftly and successfully leaving the ravaged country in doldrums'. Any potent state in any region threatening US interests can face the same consequences. This would cause Pakistan more than what Security Dilemma it faces presently.

Figure 1: Major Interventions in Muslim Countries by Projection Terrorism as Justification



## 7. Conclusion

The world is becoming more unscrupulous in the application of theoretical concepts. Sovereignty, National Interest, legitimacy are applied offensively in real politics by the powers that be. This offensive usage of political concepts has increased security threats to weaker state. The powerful Nations and their alliance have consequential influence over the international regimes like United Nations and Security Council and rather

<sup>3</sup> Psychological Operations

superimpose their authority; wielding veto power. This helps them move and get any desired resolution passed expeditiously that might create a security dilemma being lopsidedly deliberated, ignoring reservation of the states at the receiving. Pakistan is prone to this advance political implication in contemporary real politics environments. It needs an appropriate focus and caution in the wake of Pakistan's entanglement in tricky strategic game plans of the powers that be. While making alliances Pakistan must first ensure her own National Interest and should not become a target of one-sided interpretation of strategic designs. Pakistan needs to evolve a balancing mechanism in her foreign policy to avoid being ditched into a political dilemma.

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# Georgian Supra as a Cultural Artifact

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## Abstract

Culture as the basis of a human being's uniqueness creates a space, where we socialize and through which its significant norms, elements, and values are bestowed on us. The diversity of the contemporary, civilized world is ensured by those self-sufficient national cultures, unity of which forms a whole, complete panhuman culture. Georgian culture is the creation of Georgian, self-sufficient nation, being shaped for centuries as an uninterrupted chain of unity. A unique manifestation of this unity is Georgian Supra, bearing the national character, national worldview. Nothing unifies people more than a feast, where guests' social status and class are disregarded. Georgian Supra, as a subcultural artifact, is a vivid illustration of our national identity. And most importantly, it is a unity based on and oriented towards love. If we paraphrase Plato's words, "Eros" is what turns every feast from a mere physiological act of eating and drinking to a special, distinctive event. In the article below we do not plan to provide an in-depth analysis of the work written by Plato, one of the most eminent Greek philosophers of the Classical era. Instead, we intend to draw parallels between Plato's Symposium and Georgian Supra, both based on unity, dialogue, common understanding, and love.

**Keywords:** Georgian Supra, Cultural Artifact, Plato, Symposium, Eros

## 1. Introduction

According to an omnipresent assumption, uniqueness of a human being is exhibited not through his/her biological or social activities, but cultural and creative deeds that result in the formation of the world of culture. However, the above-mentioned should not be understood as if the importance of biological and social activities for a person is neglected. Everyone would agree that humans act preeminently to satisfy their basic physiological and biological needs and instincts. It is also evident that to achieve the latter, people have to interact with one another as without such interactions no one would be able to survive. It is a fact that a person lives not in the world full of abstract objects, "but in a reality that is being created and modified by him/her" (Kerkadze, 1984, pg.38). This reality is an amalgam of two worlds. The first one is the world of nature, into which a human being is introduced and the products of which he/she actively utilizes and recreates. As a result of this, the world of culture emerges. Therefore, the latter is created by a human and what makes it different from nature is that during the process of culture making a person develops, grows, socializes, and self-reflects. The world created

by a human is unique, original, and, most importantly, can largely define his/her life, behavior and actions, moralistic and aesthetic stances. Culture incorporates a value system, created and cherished by a person. This “openness towards the world” (as German philosopher Arnold Gehlen would say) accentuates the fundamental difference that exists between a person’s boundless potential and an animal’s limited capacity. Hence, a human being does not merely exist (as an animal, no matter how “developed” it can be), but he/she lives in the world that has a meaning granted by culture. “Culture is an objectified world. It can be understood through a value system. The latter unites standards, norms, ideals, ideas, projects, goals, and interests - everything that is a product of a person’s intellectual and physical work - and turns them into objects of culture” (Kerkadze, 1984, pg.4). Work completed by a human, as opposed to an animal’s work, is cultural and creative, as it is oriented not only on fulfilling basic quotidian, materialistic, and socio-economic needs, but also on implementing those values which help a person grow and develop,<sup>1</sup> act in accordance to “high” moral values and, in this way, discover sacred “humane strengths” (Kulijanashvili, 2001, pg.93) in himself/herself. Culture is pivotal for one’s self-appraisal. As a member of a society, it is essential for a person to evaluate his/her actions and behavior based on shared and acclaimed values<sup>2</sup> and, in this way, find “the meaning of life” (Jgerenaia, 2004, pg.69).

## 2. Discussion

Therefore, culture is the basis and the most prominent manifestation of human uniqueness. Besides, a human as a social being belongs to different unions such as a social class, ethnos, race, etc., which indicates that every person acts within and through the help of a specific union. Hence, culture as a fruit of human action is a social phenomenon and is connected to a particular social group<sup>3</sup>. National cultures, when combined, create a pan-human culture that becomes a foundation for the diversity of the contemporary civilized world.

Similarly, Georgian culture is the creation of Georgian nation that, like every nation, possesses a unique value system<sup>4</sup>, customs, and rules. A nation’s cultural life is based on traditions through which main values are transferred from generation to generation, creating unity and continuity of the national culture “(Kerkadze, 1984, pg.60). A distinctive example of this unity and continuity is Georgian Supra. Nothing unifies people more than a banquet or, as Plato would put it, a symposium. The symposium unites table-companions, neglecting their social status and origin. Georgian Supra is not a mere staged performance. As a sub-cultural artifact, it to this day remains as the most overt manifestation of Georgian identity. And most importantly: Georgian Supra is a communication based on love through which, attendees’ complete ... “education” (Berdzenishvili, 2004, pg.173) is evidenced. Table-companions are trying to make a good impression on others by displaying their oratory skills, knowledge, the sense of togetherness, etc. Coming from Plato’s words, “Eros”, love, is what turns a symposium into a special event, exceeding it over a mere physiological act of eating; into an event, during which people do not devour wine in massive quantities but drink gradually and enjoyably (Plato, 1964), as love is a strive towards virtue and righteousness. Likewise, Georgian Supra aspires towards kindness and mercy.

As we touched upon Plato, let’s understand the architectonics of Georgian Supra, its sonorousness and spirit based on Plato’s *Symposium*, which revolves around the symposium hosted by eminent tragedian and poet - Agathon. His guests are illustrious Athenian intellectuals, including wise Socrates, sophist Pausanias, doctor Eryximachus, comedy writer Aristophanes, and bashful Alcibiades. They discuss and argue about God of love, Eros.<sup>5</sup> After making a toast as an expression of their admiration towards God, the members of the symposium agree upon drinking wine for pleasure and praising Eros, instead of consuming it like “people, who are mad about wine” (Plato, 1964, pg.67). Even though it cannot be gleaned from the text that Eryximachus was chosen as a toastmaster, he is the one advising the guests not to imbibe too much alcohol (on what he receives a unanimous assent) and choosing the topic of conversation: extolling Eros. And prior to addressing the first

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<sup>1</sup> We would like to once again emphasize: it is extremely important for a human being to satisfy his/her basic needs and demands. Though, a type of a person as well as his/her value system should be taken into account. For a Homo Faber, it is crucial to satisfy psychological and physiological demands that are vital for existence. While a Homo Culturus strives towards fulfilling “high”, spiritual needs and acts according to these urgings.

<sup>2</sup> However, it should be noted that this topic is debatable, not universal or agreed upon, and needs further consideration.

<sup>3</sup> As English philosopher Steve Bruce (2012, pg.39) notes: “We socialize through culture and its important elements are transferred to us.”

<sup>4</sup> Every single culture is a unity of values specific to this culture” – Buadze, 2016, pg.29.

<sup>5</sup> According to notes taken by Bachana Bregvadze: “Words pronounced by each of one of them are individualistic, complete, and independent, and can serve as a hymn dedicated to Eros.” Plato, 1964, pg.5.

speaker of the symposium, we would like to note that “a toastmaster (“Tamada” in Georgian) is the most significant structural element of Georgian Supra” (Berdzenishvili, 2004, pg. 174), who does not merely manage Supra, but unifies it, and a united Supra subordinates to the will of the toastmaster. Just like in the *Symposium*, Georgian Supra begins with the toast raised in honor of God, which is followed by “strictly determined discourse” (Berdzenishvili, 2004, pg. 174) - sequence of toasts (despite the fact whether Supra is hosted for joyful or mournful reasons).

Let's return to the *Symposium*. The first person to speak about Eros is Phaedrus - Athenian aristocrat and politician of his time. He believes that Eros, love “bestows the greatest benefits” (Plato, 1964, pg.17) on a human being; that “only love shows a true path to a person and not gentleness, fame, glory, or something else” (Plato, 1964, pg.17). In a similar way, Georgian Supra also intends to bring happiness upon people as it is governed by love, love that can overcome any impediment or social inequality. Georgian Supra is an institution, which brings together people of diverse origins and social status.

The next person to speak is Pausanias (a colleague of Phaedrus - a politician), who underscores the bilateral nature of Eros: a baser and a nobler kind of love - similar to Aphrodite's two-sidedness. The base lover is rampant and strives towards bodily, physical pleasures; as for the noble lover, he is lofty and does not concentrate on sexual gratification. The baser kind of love is “untrustworthy and inconstant” (Plato, 1964, pg.24), while the nobler kind of love, admires the beauty of a soul and remains loyal to it for the rest of its life, and it is eternal and uninterrupted” (Plato, 1964, pg.25). We can characterize Georgian Supra in the same way. Its earthliness is manifested through insobriety and repletion; and it can be noble when governed by love and admiration towards the beauty of this world.

The third person to make a speech is a doctor, Eryximachus, according to whom: Eros is the powerful, .... almighty God” (Plato, 1964, pg.31). God can be found in everything that exists in the world, indicating that love is spread across the globe and creates harmony: “Harmony is polyphony; and polyphony is an assent, which cannot be achieved through uniting dissonant, opposing sides” (Plato, 1964, pg.29). Correspondingly, Georgian Supra is a polyphony created by its members, who are connected with one another by love and who provide harmony at Supra. Given that polyphony does not exist, Supra will not be able to fulfill its main purpose - to unite its members through love.

The fourth speaker is Aristophanes, a great Greek comedy writer. In the beginning of his speech, he addresses the mystery of human nature and tries to elucidate it. Aristophanes maintains that there are three sexes: male, female, and “androgynous”, the latter possessing both male and female origins. As the androgynous people represented a threat to Zeus due to their strength and appetite, he decided to split them into two halves. The androgynous, separated from the second half, always strived towards finding and merging with the lost half. Ever since, humans have been yearning for one another. “The greatest happiness ... is finding your significant other, the second half” (Plato, 1964, pg.38). That is why, when we glorify God ... we justly praise Eros as well “(Plato, 1964, pg.38). The aforementioned can be applicable to Georgian Supra as it is a unity of soulmates; unity of people who enjoy each other's company; unity of significant others, governed by love.

The fifth speaker is the host himself, Agathon. He names Eros as the youngest God among Gods<sup>6</sup> and lists all the virtues that Eros is known for: He is just, reasonable, and attractive. Everyone “obeys Him voluntarily” (Plato, 1964, pg.43). He supervises people during feasts and oblations. “Eros is a wise poet, who morphs others into wise poets as well” (Plato, 1964, pg.43). Eros helps Gods establish order and by doing so He “lessens our chances of becoming savages, connects us with one another, and creates friendships” (Plato, 1964, pg.44). Many parallels can be drawn between Agathon's speech and Georgian Supra. Georgian Supra, too, is a voluntary union of people; it also assembles friends and relatives; both during joyful and mournful times, people gather around Supra to talk, argue, and discuss. Georgian Supra is a symbol of eternal togetherness. It also detests the old age<sup>7</sup> and thus is always young. Georgian Supra is oriented towards the future: after remembering the

<sup>6</sup> Agathon says: “Eros wholeheartedly loathes old age and does not come in close vicinity to it. He is young and never leaves adolescents' company.” Plato, 1964, pg.41.

<sup>7</sup> What is meant here is a soul's, and not body's, feebleness.

deceased, toasts are raised in honor of those, who are alive, as a symbol of eternal life, continuation of life, its immortality.<sup>8</sup> “The definition of time at Supra is “timeless”, meaning that it is never present. That is why, a toast - a significant structural element of Georgian Supra - is never directed towards the present. Instead, it refers to the past or the future” (Berdzenishvili, 2004, pg.173-174).

Following Agathon’s brilliant performance, the patriarch of the Classical era - Socrates begins to deliver his speech about Eros. Remaining true to his method of dialogue, the philosopher states that Eros as love is directed towards someone or something and it desires what it lacks. “Eros loves what it does not possess”(Plato, 1964, pg.49). Love can be beneficial for a human being as it encourages a person to constantly yearn for beauty. One that longs for beauty also longs for well-being, and well-being is a guarantee of happiness. Hence, “Eros is love of beauty” (Plato, 1964, pg.59), “admiration of beauty” (Plato, 1964, pg.54), “is a desire of kindness” (Plato, 1964, pg.56), “love is ... a desire of immortality” (Plato, 1964, pg.57). Therefore, love is a strive for contentment and eternal life. Through love, a human being becomes an observer of “boundless ocean of beauty” (Plato, 1964, pg.62) and expresses his/her emotions with elevated words. By comprehending love, a person comprehends himself/herself. Thus, love is the basis of self-understanding.

Likewise, Georgian Supra, with its deep, sacral meaning, coalesces with beauty and magnificence. Each member of Supra is given an opportunity to make grand speeches, accept the truthfulness of his/her words, and step into the world of beauty. While doing so, a person can cognize himself/herself.

Plato’s *Symposium* is concluded by Alcibiades, who eulogizes Socrates, characterizes him as a person with high moral values, and thanks the host for a splendid gathering. Similarly, by the end of Georgian Supra, guests make a toast to honor the host/hostess and praise his/her hospitality.

Throughout the duration of the symposium, its members did not only discuss Eros. They also joked and feasted, which is similar to what happens at Georgian Supra<sup>9</sup>. According to Georgian publicist and writer, Levan Berdzenishvili (2004, pg.175): “Georgian Supra is a performance, a concert, accompanied by mellifluous singing and coordinated dancing, through which its members try to present themselves in a favorable way, and search for a collective harmony.”

### 3. Conclusion

To reiterate, we would like to say that our aim has not been to idolize or sacralize Georgian Supra. We realize that from time to time it may turn into a carnival or bacchanalia (Nizharadze, 2004); that it often resembles “an amalgam of Apollonian and Dionysian origins” (Nizharadze, 2004, pg.29); that it quite frequently becomes an instrument for achieving a “psychotherapeutic effect”<sup>10</sup>, etc. In recent years, many works have been dedicated to outlining negative features of Georgian Supra and, presumably, this will continue so in the future as well. However, in this essay, we have attempted to discuss Georgian Supra from a positive angle,<sup>11</sup> as it represents “a phenomenon necessary to preserve ethnic uniqueness” (Nizharadze, 2004, pg.26). It is a distinctive cultural occurrence that voluntarily assembles and unifies its members; it is a unity of like-minded people and hence is marked by love; it is constantly oriented towards future and is not merely designed as an activity to kill time; instead, it has an ambition to become “a platform for heroic, free words” (Berdzenishvili, 2004, pg.175). It creates a micro society with its rules and norms. That is why, we believe that Georgian Supra should be recognized as an intangible cultural heritage.

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<sup>8</sup> “Love... is a wish of immortality”. Nizharadze, 2004, pg.57.

<sup>9</sup>Excluding funerals, of course.

<sup>10</sup> Please see Jgerenaia E., Social Philosophy of Georgian Supra and Some Other Things in the book “Georgian Supra and Civil Society”, Tbilisi, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> It is always easy to find, outline, and write about a negative feature of something.

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# The Influence of Socio-Cultural Factors in Access to Healthcare in Kenya: A Case of Nairobi County, Kenya

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## Abstract

The study examined factors that determine access to healthcare among the households in Nairobi County. The problem of concern in this study was that access to healthcare challenges have persisted despite expansion in healthcare system in Nairobi County. Access to public healthcare in Nairobi County is unequal among social classes. Lower social classes have worse healthcare than either the upper or the middle classes. The study sought to find out why the disparity in access to healthcare in Nairobi County persists despite government efforts to address the issue. The study employed a qualitative design. The households living in Nairobi County provided the frame in which the population sample was drawn using multistage cluster random sampling to arrive at a sample size of 1066. Qualitative data was collected using observations, focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. Content analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. The results confirms robust positive correlations between independent intervening variables (explanatory variables: socio-cultural variables) and dependent variables (access to public healthcare). The independent intervening variables had significant influences on access to public healthcare. The P-value was statistically significant. The results were not due to random chance and that  $P < 0.01 < 0.05$  confirms a positive relationships between the variables. The study objective and question were achieved. The hypotheses were disconfirmed.

**Keywords:** Social class, Access to Public Healthcare and Socio-Economic Status

## 1. Introduction

Access to healthcare among the various social groups is unequal in both developed and developing countries. In the United States, access to healthcare is unequal among families with different socio-economic backgrounds. For example, low income families have less access to healthcare, and this explains why they have high infant mortality rates compared to families of high incomes (Kitagawa, E.et al.1973). Evidence also show that African Americans, Red Indians and Hispanics have less access to healthcare due to their racial backgrounds compared to the majority whites (ibid). Socio-economic and racial factors play a key role in the distribution of access to healthcare. In France, access to healthcare for manual workers is less compared to professional workers (Andersen R. 1979). Professional workers have better socio-economic resources, defined by income, occupation



and education, which positively influence access to healthcare. The manual workers have less of these socio-economic resources, hence, the reason for not having good access to healthcare. In this case, occupation or employment statuses have some influence on access to healthcare. In Canada, low income population has less access to healthcare compare to middle or high income population. As a result of this health differences, life expectancy is lower among the lower income households compared with the higher income households. Income in this case appears to have an important influence on access to healthcare. Households with high incomes can purchase healthcare services at private or specialized outlets. But those with less income have limited options and this limits their access to healthcare.

In another study, evidence show that Eskimos have less access to healthcare, due to their origin status, compared to the native Australians. Originality status appears to affect access to healthcare. In this study, the native Australians have better advantages over the non-population. The evidence suggests that the non-locals are discriminated against and do not access equal resources and opportunities like the locals. Origin and discrimination therefore appear to be important factors in this study.

In Britain, low income population has less access to public healthcare compared to the higher income populations (Donabedian A, 1980). Income includes wages, salaries, rents, pensions and gratuities among others affect access to public healthcare. Those with high incomes have better capacities to procure public healthcare. Those with less income have less opportunities or resources to access public healthcare. The studies above show that access to healthcare was unequal among social classes. Socio-economic and cultural factors are distributed unequally and the upper social hierarchies have better access to healthcare, compared to the lower social classes. Health inequality persists despite the fact that these are developed countries with advanced health system.

In some Sub-Saharan countries, access to healthcare is still common despite numerous research and policy interventions. The World Bank shows that 50% of African population has access to modern facilities, and more than 40% do not even access clean water and sanitation. Immunization has not covered the entire population. This has resulted in high levels of maternal and infant mortalities, despite adequate human and material resources at their disposal (World Bank, 2006). For example, access to healthcare among poor Tanzanians is poor compared to the wealthy. This is more pronounced in rural areas, where incomes, education, employment is low compared to the urban areas (Schellen, A. et al. 2003). In Uganda, access to healthcare is adversely affected because of poor health systems-poor hospitals, lack of equipment, low staff capacities leading to high infant mortality rates (Donabedian A. 1990). The low socio-economic class population has limited options compared to the upper and middle class who can afford health insurance cover and use of private facilities (Brawley M. 2000).

Like the developed world, selected Sub-Saharan African countries provide unequal access to public healthcare. Sub-Saharan Africa is endowed with many natural and human resources, and yet access to public healthcare is still unequal. Socio-cultural disparities play an important role in access to public healthcare. The above shows that there is an extensive literature considering association between socio-position and subsequent health outcomes (Gallo V. et al. 2012). Socio-position has been conceptualized and measured in different ways internationally as demonstrated in USA, France, U.K and Sub-Saharan countries.

Access to healthcare challenges have persisted despite expansion in healthcare system in the Country. While all social groups need available, timely, convenient and affordable healthcare (IOM, 1993), these are only available to the upper and lower middle class. These are gaps that require urgent further research and policy interventions that specifically focus on these disparities. Policy makers also need to address the capacity of healthcare systems in order to effectively focus on these disparities.

According to National Bureau of Statistics, NBS, only about 52% of Kenyans have access to healthcare within 5 km. Mortality and morbidity rates are high; use of skilled attendants is only at 46% during delivery; use of modern contraceptives stands at only 46% and fertility rates are high at 2.7%. Majority of Kenyans have limited

access to healthcare due to the following: poor of proximity to health facility; unavailability of essential and prescriptive drugs in the facilities; high costs for the available drugs; unaffordable insurance services; unfriendly, unprofessional health personnel.

Apart from the structural problems, Kenya has over the years suffered under ethnic political divisions that have determined distribution of resources (Holmquist and Githinji, 2009; Thomas-Slayter, 1991). Ultimately, certain regions that correspond to certain ethnic communities are relatively endowed with health facilities than others. While Nairobi County is multi-ethnic, certain informal settlements are highly populated by specific ethnic communities which suffer from the ethnic political dynamics reflected across the country.

Access to public healthcare is also lopsided in favor of the upper and middle class. These categories shun public healthcare facilities and opt for private health facilities which offer more specialized or better care compared to the public facilities. These private facilities that provide public healthcare but are private functionally include Nairobi hospital, Aghan, mater and Karen hospitals. It is only the upper and middle social classes who utilize these facilities because of their advantaged positions and lucrative social insurance packages. These facilities isolate the lower social classes from accessing specialized or better care.

## 2. Definitions of concepts

### *Social class---Independent variable*

Multiple theories of social class have been articulated but such theories are interlinked and co-dependent. For example, social class has been defined as "...social groups arising from interdependent economic relationships among people. These relationships are determined by a society's forms of property, ownership labor and their connections through production, distribution and consumption of goods, services and information. Social class is thus premised upon people's structural location with the economy-as employees, employers, self-employed; and unemployed (in both formal and informal sector), and as owners or not of capital, land, or other forms of economic investments" (Krieger, N. 2001).

Another theory is associated with Max Weber (Weber, M. 1978). This theory suggests that class differences emerge through the process of "social closure", where some groups are prevented from accessing particular positions. This occurs through education (e.g limiting the availability of appropriate education; and then limiting the best paid and most interesting jobs to those who hold particular certificates of training/degrees; through ownership of capital (limiting the position of a company, housing, land ownership to those born into particular circumstances); through legal or cultural rules ( e.g color, religious, marriage or gender. Any of these barriers act to deny most people access to favorable positions in the occupational structure and facilitates access to others. Capitalists are defined by private property rights in means of production; the middle class are defined by mechanisms relating to the acquisition of education and skills; and the working class is defined by exclusion from both higher education and capital.

And yet another aspect of class theory is in relation to the process of exploitation and domination. This conceptualization is closely aligned with that of Marxism (Muntatner,C., & Lynch, J. 1999). This one describes the process through which some social classes control the lives and activities of other classes (domination); the process through which the capitalists (the owners of the means of production) acquire economic benefits from the labor of others (exploitation).

Even when all these theories are synthesized, none explains social class in Kenya appropriately. However, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics provides some clue that appears more useful for this study. According to the KNBS, the upper class comprises those who spend more than Shs. 200,000 per month (KNBS, 2020). The


middle class consists of households who spent Shs. 24,000-Shs. 120,000 per month (NBS, 2020). Further, upper class earn 200,000 and above, middle class earn 23,670-199,999 and lower class earn below 23,670 (KNBS, 2019). In this study, therefore, monthly earnings are used to conceptualize social class.

#### ***Access to Public healthcare-----Dependent variable***

At the theoretical level, access to health is defined as a way of approaching, reaching a place, opportunity to reach a health facility (Whitehead, M. et al. 1997). It has also been defined as access to a service, a provider, or an institution; access here is defined as the opportunity (Gulliford, et al. 2002). Access to healthcare means helping people to command appropriate healthcare resources in order to preserve or improve their health. This implies that services should be available and adequate to supply the services required. For Nairobi Residents, access to healthcare means; proximity to health facilities, availability of affordable insurance services, timeliness of care, availability of prescription drugs and readily available health personnel. However, it is only the upper class that has full access as opposed to the lower class that lack or have only limited access to public healthcare. The upper class and to some extent the lower class have health insurance and this helps to mitigate high costs especially in the private health facilities that also offer public healthcare services.

In this study, access to public healthcare is conceptualized using indicators like: lack of access, limited access, and full access to public healthcare. This relationship between the independent variable (social class) and the dependent variable (access to public healthcare) is explained using various socio-cultural variables as shown in figure 1.1 below:

**Figure 1.1 Social class and access to public healthcare**



In addition, high and middle classes have access to healthcare in private healthcare facilities like Aghan University hospital, Nairobi hospital, and Mater hospital including health clinics across the County. This is because they can afford given their socio-economic status. These classes have high earnings and in some instances they have healthcare insurances that they can use to purchase full or limited access to healthcare.

### **3. Methods**

#### ***Site description***

This study purposively selected Nairobi County, from the 47 Counties of Kenya. Following the adoption of the 2010 constitution, Kenya was divided into 47 Counties. Nairobi County has an area of 696.1 km<sup>2</sup> and is located between 36<sup>o</sup> 45 ' east and 1<sup>o</sup> 18' south latitudes. It lies at an altitude of 1,798 meters. The County also offers a mix of rural and urban economic systems; it depicts a traditional and modern ways of living. The County Houses University of Nairobi where the study was taking place. The County also houses other institutions like Parliament, Ministry of Health and Education whose members had been identified as useful sources of data.

It has a combined population of about 4 million people drawn from all parts of Kenya and beyond. The County has both urban and informal settlements. Some of the urban settlements comprise high income areas like Karen, Westlands, Kileleshwa, Lavington, Muthaiga, some middle income areas like Parklands and Embakasi and low income areas especially in informal settlements like Kibera, Kawangware and Kangemi. Informal settlements in particular have very high population densities. The population comprises male and female at 52% and 48% respectively. This is a ratio of about 1.08. The labour force (15-64 years) is almost equal (approximately 49/51%) between male and female. The age population (65 years and more) is again approximately equal between both sexes; however, the male population is slightly higher with approximately 55% and that of female being 45%. This is so because of the influx of males from the neighboring district in search for employment. The County is divided into 17 sub-counties, formerly divisions, used in picking the sample of the study. The sub-counties are sub-divided further into divisions.

### ***Population***

The population was chosen from among households in Nairobi County. The participant characteristics in this study included: age structure, gender, income, employment/occupation, marital status, wealth and place of residence.

### ***Sampling technique***

The study used multi-stage cluster sampling to determine the study sample. This is a form of cluster that involved several cycles of sampling from the groups. The population was divided into clusters then samples were taken. The selected clusters were further divided into smaller clusters and re-sampled again. This process was repeated several times until the ultimate sampling units were selected at the last of the hierarchical levels.

Nairobi County.....cluster 1.....random selection  
Constituencies.....cluster 2.....random selection  
Wards.....cluster 3.....random selection  
Sub-locations.....cluster 4.....random sampling  
Village units.....cluster 5.....random sampling

Multistage cluster random sampling was used to select the population study sample. This sample was 1066. This method allowed the researcher to apply cluster or random sampling after deterring the groups for selection. This allows the population to be divided into groups without restrictions. It also allows for flexibility to choose the sample carefully. It is also useful when collecting primary data from a geographically dispersed population such as the one in Nairobi County.

### ***Data collection instruments***

Data for the qualitative design was collected using the following instruments: in-depth interviews and focus group. The data was analyzed using content analysis. Content analysis is used to determine the presence of certain themes or concepts within the qualitative data. Content analysis helps to quantify and analyze the presence of meanings and relationships between the variables. Such robust associations helped to determine if the study questions and objectives were achieved. They also assisted to confirm or de-confirm the study hypotheses. The results were used to make recommendations.

### ***Data Analysis***

Qualitative data was collected for objective two using individual, in-depth and focus group discussions. These were the socio-cultural factors which included culture, language, social capital, poverty, race, ethnicity, migrant status, habits, values and others.

The responses defined households' perceptions, opinions, and feelings about the phenomena. The study made discovery of various themes from common sense, constructs, researcher's values, and personal experience with the subject matter. This is what ground theorists call open coding, and what content analysts call qualitative analysis or latent coding (Gibbs, 2002).

The transcripts were analyzed using content analysis and analytical phases included becoming familiar with the data, generating new codes, searching for and review for themes and patterns. The assistant researchers read each transcript a number of times in order to familiarize them with the content and thereafter generated initial codes (Patton MQ. 2002). Items describing similar ideas were grouped, coded manually, and sorted to capture common themes (Pope C. et al. 2000). The team conducted all analyses and resolved discrepancies through discussions. The objective here was to measure the relationship between socio-cultural factors and access to healthcare.

#### **4. Ethical consideration**

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation approved the study's research protocol on 14<sup>th</sup> July, 2015 for a period ending 18<sup>th</sup> December, 2015. Permit No. NACOSTI/P/15/7814/6977 was issued on 14<sup>th</sup> July, 2015. The Ministry of Health authorized the study to be carried out on its health facilities; The Ministry of education too authorized the study to be carried out; The County Government of Nairobi, Health Department authorized the study to be carried in the County.

Households in Nairobi County were eligible to participate in the study, 15+ years of age, and they live in Nairobi. Prior to participating, all individuals received a letter describing the study purpose and procedures, and that participation was voluntary. Oral and written consent was obtained from the participants before the interviews commenced. All the data obtained was held confidential. The use of the data collected, the purpose and access to information as well as the role of the researcher was explained. The interviewers explained the usefulness of the study findings, which was to help plan improvements of access to public healthcare among various stakeholders.

#### **5. Findings**

The data collected was qualitative through focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The study was designated to evaluate the influence of socio-cultural factors on access to public healthcare in Nairobi County. This was a qualitative study designed to explore perspectives and experiences in access public healthcare among the households in Nairobi County. The study explored how socio-cultural factors influenced public healthcare in Nairobi County. It conducted focus group discussions because they are important techniques for working in diverse cultural settings and provide rich and invaluable information. In-depth interviews were useful in providing detailed information about the respondent's thoughts and behaviors. This also helps to understand the underlying motivations, beliefs, attitudes, and feelings of the respondents on particular issues. Transcripts were analyzed using thematic/content analysis. Data was coded in phases to create meaningful patterns. Themes identified included new policies/regulations, culture, behaviors, attitudes, values, poverty, deprivations, social resources, social capital, communication, discrimination and so on.

##### ***Attitudes***

The majority did not like nor understood the new regulations. According to them, these new regulations were a preserve of households of upper and middle class hierarchies. This failure to appreciate the regulations further alienated them from access public healthcare.

However, the minority understood and followed the new regulations. The new regulations increased access among the upper and middle class social groups. There is therefore a linkage between the intervening variable (attitudes) and access to public healthcare. This relationship is positive. We therefore conclude that attitudes (explanatory variable) have significant influence on access to healthcare. This positive relationship confirms the questions and the objective of the study. The null hypothesis is nullified and the alternate hypothesis is upheld.

### *Perceptions and perspectives towards services provided*

The majority of the respondents were not satisfied with the services provided by the county health systems. The healthcare delivery systems did not satisfy their needs as they are not treated well by the healthcare personnel. All kinds of treatments were quite unsatisfactory, and this limited their access to healthcare.

On the other hand, a few households, mainly the middle class, expressed satisfaction with healthcare services. The services were not readily available but they were satisfied with what was available. This is so because this category had additional opportunities that gave them access to healthcare in private facilities. They had alternative options compared to the lower class.

But the minority had poor perceptions and perspectives but they did not care about services given. This category of social class had better socio-economic resources that gave them many options to access private healthcare. Whether services were available or not, was of less significance given the opportunities before them.

This means that perceptions and perspectives (intervening variable) have a potential association with access to public healthcare. Perceptions and perspectives had a positive relationship with access to public healthcare. This relationship confirms the objective and the question of the study. The relationship also nullifies the null hypothesis and upholds the alternate hypothesis.

### *Access to public healthcare services*

The minority did not appreciate access to public healthcare services. This is because they were not using public facilities much. Their healthcare was mainly in private health facilities, given that they had better opportunities to purchase private healthcare services.

On the other hand, the middle class care somehow appreciated access to healthcare services. They partly used public facilities and therefore accessibility was to some extent important. This was because they had some socio-economic packages that gave them some options to use private healthcare.

However, the majority of the lower class viewed access to healthcare as a very important component of their healthcare. They entirely depend on public health services and any delays or otherwise seriously affected them. This is so because they entirely depend on public facilities to access healthcare. They have no opportunities, given their deprived status to access healthcare.

Perceptions were therefore found to have a social relationship with access to public healthcare. This potential association influenced access to public healthcare. This association nullified the null hypothesis and affirmed the objective and questions of the study.

### *Communication*

The findings show that majority of the lower class did not understand English or Kiswahili. They could only communicate in their local languages. The health facilities lacked interpreters to help them communicate with health providers. This affects their ability to access public healthcare.

The middle class had fairly good communication skills and could communicate with health providers well. They could communicate in English and Kiswahili. This medium communication increased their access to healthcare. This advantage was due to their advantaged socio-economic status.

However, the minority upper class had very good communication with the health providers. They communicate easily with health providers, and this increases their access to healthcare. This is partly due to their socio-economic status. Consequently, ability to communicate had a positive association with access to healthcare. The potential association influenced access to public healthcare. This explanatory intervening variable was an important factor in access to healthcare. It influenced access to public healthcare, and this nullified the null hypothesis and affirmed the alternate hypothesis. The causal effect confirmed the objective and the question of the study.

### ***Lack of faith in public facilities***

The findings show that minority upper class had no faith in health facilities. These facilities were dilapidated, old and needed repairs urgently. They lacked efficient health workers. In addition, health facilities lacked clean water and sanitation. They shied away from using them in preference to private health facilities.

On the other hand, the middle class had some limited faith in public health facilities. They used them partly to supplement their use in private facilities. This was so because they had limited access to socio-economic opportunities compared to the upper class.

However, majority lower class had faith in public facilities despite lack of essential facilities like laboratories, clean water and sanitation and few health personnel. Even without faith, lower class entirely relies on public facilities for healthcare. They lack socio-economic resources and cannot afford private healthcare.

Lack of faith in public resources had a causal relationship with access to public healthcare. This positive relationship influenced access to public healthcare. The relationship nullified the null hypothesis and affirmed the alternate hypothesis. The relationship also confirmed the objective and the question posed in the study.

### ***Cultural factors***

The majority lower social class respect culture/ because it affects perceptions of health, illness and death. They value customs, values, language and traditions as they make it easy to communicate freely and honestly. In this way, they can reduce disparities and improve health outcomes.

On the other, middle class have some respect of cultural components because their socio-economic positions have added considerable challenges to culture and traditions. They consider culture and traditions as somehow outdated and they prefer modern western culture. Cultural factors therefore have limited effect on access to healthcare.

However, minority upper households have limited respect to culture and related traditions. They consider culture outdated and outrageous and therefore try their best to discard in preference to modern culture. Most of these households have high opportunities occasioned by their access to socio-economic assets—high income, education and occupations. These factors have profoundly changed their life styles and now only prefer to use modern medicine. They shun culture because it makes them look backward and primitive.

Culture had a significant association with access to public healthcare. The association was positive and this correlation nullified the null hypothesis and confirmed the alternate hypothesis. The objective and the study question were also confirmed.

### ***Perceptions towards health workers***

The majority of the lower class experienced hostile receptions; the workers were rude and lacked cultural appreciation. Despite these negative attitudes, they still seek healthcare in public places, due to limited options arising from their socio-economic deprivations. These attitudes seriously affect access to healthcare.

On the other hand, the middle class had some negative attitudes towards health workers. This forced them to seek healthcare in private facilities, where staff are respectable. They are able to do so because they have better access to socio-economic resources. These opportunities give them alternative options.

However, the upper class had very negative attitudes and cared less because they had alternatives. They were of high socio-economic status—high incomes, education, and employment and therefore they do not rely so much on public health facilities for their health needs.

Perceptions towards health workers have potential associations with access to public healthcare. These explanatory intervening variables have a positive relationship with access to public healthcare. These positive correlations nullified the null hypothesis and confirmed the alternate one. Both the objective and question were confirmed.

### ***Poverty***

The minority upper class is above poverty lines and therefore poverty does not concern them. They have high incomes, way above 200,000 as per the (NBS, 2019) records and therefore access to public and private healthcare is not a challenge. They can access full healthcare at both private government wing and the private sector.

The middle class too have some middle level incomes between 3,670-199,999 and therefore can access both public and private healthcare facilities. They have medium social insurance covers and this mitigates high healthcare costs. They can therefore access some limited access to healthcare.

However, the majority lower class has no resources and therefore cannot access public healthcare. Their earnings are below 23,670 and this cuts them off from accessing public healthcare. They live in deplorable conditions which in themselves increase poor health.

Poverty therefore has robust relations with access to public healthcare. Poverty has a positive relation with access to public healthcare. This correlation influences access to public healthcare at all stages—infancy, adulthood and old age. It is therefore an independent variable (intervening variable/explanatory variable) that has significant influence on access to public healthcare.

### ***Social resources***

Social resources include tangible items like money, information, goods and services. Love and affection fall in this category. Social position in society is part of social resources.

On the other hand, middle class have fair respect or value to social resources. They too have some fairly moderate social goods. They have fairly good incomes, education and employment opportunities. These factors influence their access to healthcare.

However, the majority lower class value social resources as they have considerable influence on access to healthcare. These factors frame behavioral choices including decisions affecting health.



Social resources (explanatory variable) therefore have a causal relationship with access to public healthcare. This association influence access to healthcare, and hence, nullifies the null hypothesis and accepts the alternate hypothesis. The correlation upholds the objective and the research question.

### ***Social networks***

Social networks are defined as the web of person-centered social ties. They include social relationships, size, density, blondness, homogeneity, frequency of contacts, extent of reciprocity and duration. Other factors include secure attachments necessary to access food, warmth and other natural resources. They provide love, security and other non-material resources that are necessary for human development.

The majority lower class values these resources but the upper and middle class are somewhat reserved. They have enough socio-economic resources and therefore do not rely on social networks.

Social variable potentially affect access to public healthcare. This association determines the extent, strength and the quality of social connections with others. The correlation is positive and therefore nullifies the null hypothesis and upholds the alternate hypothesis.

### ***Social capital***

These are resources that available to households. Social capital includes dimensions like economic resources gained from being part of networks of social relationships, trust, trustworthiness, and civil norms, association of membership, voluntary associations, and homogeneity. Social networks, social support, social networks and social connections are valuable to households and allow access to healthcare resources. They sometimes provide job opportunities and help enhance skills.

The minority do not value social capital because they are insulated by high socio-economic resources. They have high incomes, education and employment opportunities and these resources promote their health needs.

On the other perspective, the middle class had some middle level value for social capital. This was because they sometimes benefit from social capital. This position they hold is because they also have some social goods like moderate incomes, education and employment opportunities that enable them access healthcare resources but in some limited way.

However, the majority of the lower class has considerable value for social capital. High level of social capital does influence access to healthcare through spread of health norms. Social capital increase knowledge and skills that affect access to healthcare. It also helps tackle health inequalities that result from social isolation, low levels of support and confidence. Social capital sometimes tries to reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. Furthermore, it helps to increase support opportunities for people and groups to form connections. Negative social capital can also pose restrictions of individual freedom and exclusion.

Social capital has potential association with access to public healthcare. It is an explanatory variable that shows a positive relationship with access to public healthcare. This correlation nullifies the null hypothesis and confirms the alternate hypothesis. The relevance and magnitude of the association has significant influence on access to public healthcare. The findings confirm the research question and the objective.

## **6. Discussion**

Socio-cultural factors have been found to have significant influence on access to public healthcare. These factors include culture, attitudes, values, discrimination, stress, associations, and social capital among others. Stress for example has been found to affect access to healthcare in many instances: Stress has been associated to risk

behavior and chronic diseases and these are dominant causes of mortal (Brunner, 2000). Quite often, people do not take stress as important for their health let alone the fact that some do not even understand when stressed. This continues to be a killer disease albeit lack of specific policies to address the vice.

Other socio-cultural factors include lack of “social resources” among the lower socio-economic classes. These include character and intensity of social net works, associational social hierarchies (Hall and Taylor). These resources are important and they assist households’ access resources that are adequate to meet their healthcare needs. It is important that these resources are nurtured and distributed evenly among the households.

Other factors related to the above are social relations, social net works, trust, secondary associations, marriages and friendships. All these constitute “social capital” that is critical for day –to -day living. Others include status hierarchies in society that create distinctions among social class, and assign individuals with prestige social positions (Ollivier, 2000). These factors (independent variables) have profound influence on access to public healthcare (dependent variable). Lack of them increases inequality in access to healthcare. The most affected are lower social class. These are gaps that need to be addressed.

Migrants all over the world have been found to lack adequate access to healthcare because of their citizenship status (Carmononce, R. 2014). Migrants have serious challenges especially in the US where access is healthcare is restricted among non-citizens. In Nairobi County, migrants are not restricted from having access to healthcare using public facilities. This is partly so because migrants have not been clearly defined as most neighboring counties flock into the city county in search of employment and other socio-economic benefits. However, they increase pressure on the limited health resources in the county, making difficult for the city population to access healthcare. Migrants therefore (independent variable) have significant influence on access to public healthcare (dependent variable).

The government has implemented many policies and programmes to address the plight of migrants and many of them access limited socio-economic benefits. In fact, because of the poor identification systems in the Country, many migrants simply melt into the city population. In that way, they access the social benefits provided by the state. However, these benefits as suggested earlier are inadequate and more needs to be done to increase social protection programs. These proceeds can increase their capabilities to access socio-economic resources that can meet their healthcare needs. The situation is worse in informal settlements where the majority live (GOK, 2012). These are the lower social class who live closely with what Karl Marx terms “*lumpenproletariat*” (Brown D. 2009).

According to Max Weber, households with prestige, honor and power have more opportunities to access healthcare compared with those who lack them. Prestige, honor and power are very important social assets that increase social inequality among social classes. The households with honor, prestige and power also have better socio-economic benefits and these only help to divide society further. Those with these combined assets have more opportunities to compete in a competitive market and therefore access more healthcare compared with those without.

Unfortunately, little is being done to augment these factors and these have increased stress leading to premature deaths. Some studies have shown that such people appear to be healthier (Kawachi, K. 2004). Such illusions have resulted into fatal health outcomes. It is imperative that government and other stakeholders address the need to have these factors so that they can enhance access to healthcare. Relevant departments of government should increase these among the people who need them most.

## 7. Conclusion

Access to public healthcare is influenced by many factors. In this study, socio-cultural factors are independent (intervening/explanatory variables) determinants of access to public healthcare. They indicate the extent,

strength and quality of social connections with others. They recognize the importance of such social connections. These are resources that available to households.

Attitudes impact on emotions, well-being, satisfaction with care, and access to healthcare services. They influence health outcomes. Positive attitudes increase satisfaction while negative ones create stress and can consequently reduce the life span of households.

Perceptions play an important role in shaping health outcomes. This explains why several factors affect the perceptions of health seekers: shortage of staff and logistics, lack of supplies, training, and insufficient supervision. Perceptions on all these affect access to healthcare.

Effective communication is important for healthcare. It makes providers protect their patients, save on costs, and increases day-to-day operating efficiency. It helps patients to access medical histories and hence reduces chances of medical errors.

Faith is important and helps to get through situations. It gives strength in times of uncertainties. Without faith, many things cannot be resolved. Hence, faith is important in making healthcare decisions

Cultural respect is critical to reducing healthcare disparities. They help improve access to healthcare. Healthcare should be responsive to the needs of all categories of patients. Hence, faith is important in dispensing healthcare matters.

Social resources include tangible items like money, information, goods and services. Love and affection fall in this category. Social position in society is part of social resources.

Social networks are defined as the web of person-centered social ties. They include social relationships, size, density, blondness, homogeneity, frequency of contacts, extent of reciprocity and duration. Other factors include secure attachments necessary to access food, warmth and other natural resources. They provide love, security and other non-material resources that are necessary for human development

Social capital includes dimensions like economic resources gained from being part of networks of social relationships, trust, trustworthiness, and civil norms, association of membership, voluntary associations, and homogeneity. Social networks, social support, social networks and social connections are valuable to households and allow access to healthcare resources. They sometimes provide job opportunities and help enhance skills.

These social variables potentially affect access to public healthcare. The magnitudes of the associations are vast and have significant influence on access to public healthcare. The study questions and objectives were achieved. The hypothesis was de confirmed. The associations nullify null hypothesis and accept alternate hypothesis. The nullification confirms the study objective and question.

Healthcare is central to quality of life, yet many households in the County lack proper access to public healthcare. This study adds to the current literature on access to public healthcare. It provides new information on households' perspectives and experiences in accessing public healthcare. The study also identifies opportunities for improving access to public healthcare.

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### Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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# Negara Madura: From Puppet State to United State 1949-1950

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## Abstract

The purpose of H.J. Van Mook formed the state of the Republic of Indonesia as a Dutch Commonwealth country or rather the idea of establishing a federal state, namely the Republic of Indonesia United States, was based on the success of America in establishing a union state. Departing from the Malino conference H.J. Van Mook seemed to pretend to show the outside world the concept of decolonization, because after World War II colonization of the world had been abolished, even though it was still too heavy for the Dutch. Reflections on the political turmoil that occurred at the central level, turned out to have a large impact on disruption at the local level as in Madura. The expansion of the federal model for Indonesia consisting of many islands and heterogeneity of regions, population, language and culture is of course very suitable. Despite this, the Dutch East Indies in the first decade of the twentieth century were still governed centrally from Batavia. At the time of the reorganization of government in the thirties with the implementation of administrative decentralization where the colony was divided into six governments, namely West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatra, Borneo and the Great East. Simultaneously on 11 November 1947 there was an unhealthy relationship and was cut off between Jakarta and Madura, so that on 21 November 1947 the administration of the government was taken over by R.A. A Cakraningrat. Starting from the results of the collection, the Madurese state was established based on a Decree dated February 20 no.1 as contained in Staatsblad (State Gazette) 1948, no.12. The Madura state chose the diplomatic struggle to achieve further goals, but in fact this method did not result in various agreements that were considered fair for the Madura state. Therefore this way was changed by carrying out military actions.

**Keywords:** Puppet State, Madura State, H.J. Van Mook, R.A.A. Tjakraningrat, Political Diplomacy, Military actions

## 1. Introduction

The independence of the Republic of Indonesia which was proclaimed through the proclamation on August 17, 1945 was a very important milestone for the Indonesian nation. The event was a new government for the Indonesian nation, so that through the PPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) immediately formed symbols of power including the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the composition of the presidential cabinet. At that time in accordance with the decree issued by the PPKI, the territory of Indonesia



consisted of eight provinces under the governor appointed by the president including: West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and the Lesser Sunda (Kahin, 2003, p.202).

On 29 August 1945 the president Sukarno dissolved the PPKI and replaced it as the KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee), which functioned as the legislative and advisor to the president. Then following the lower level was formed the KNID (Regional Indonesian National Committee), which assisted the task of the governor and regent. Along with the establishment of this national committee in terms of defense, it was to continue the BKR (People's Security Agency) organization which was immediately transformed into the TKR (People's Security Army) on 5 October 1945.

In conjunction with the establishment of the Madurese branch of the KNID member, two responsible people have been appointed, Amin Jakfar and Mohamad Hanafi. KNID Madura began working realistically after receiving instructions from the central KNIP, which immediately formed the Madura branch of the BKR. On October 17, 1945 the Madras branch of the KNID held a meeting by proposing the former captain R. Asmoroyudo to be appointed commander of the West Madura regiment for the Bangkalan and Sampang areas. Then R. Candra Hasan ex Chūdanchō Madura was appointed commander of the East Madura regiment for the Pamekasan and Sumenep areas. After the KNIP considered the proposal then it was agreed with a decision that the two would get military rank Lieutenant Colonel. For Lieutenant Colonel R. Candra Hasan was assigned to form TKR Madura Regiment 35, while Lieutenant Colonel R. Asmoroyudo was ordered to form TKR Madura Regiment 36 (Heru Sukadri et al., 1991, p. 20-21). After three months it was formed because they had to adjust instructions from Jakarta, that the TKR was still unable to face internally, so it was changed to TRI (Indonesian People's Army) (Nina H, Lubis, 2005, p.165). The formation of TRI Madura at that time was a member of Major Hanafi in charge of Klampis, while other members were Lieutenant II Achmad, Lieutenant II Molawas, Lieutenant II Trimo, Lieutenant II Maruki, Young Lieutenant Saputro, Suromarso, and Abdul Rachman (Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2002, p.30).

The formation of military power for the Indonesian people and especially the people of Madura is one of the positive responses from President Sukarno's advice which always said that the proclamation of independence must be maintained and no need to ignore foreign forces from anywhere who want to help the Dutch regain the Indonesian state (Kahin, 2003, p.206). President Sukarno's statement must have come true because he knew that the Dutch considered the news of the independence of the Indonesian people as a joke, so they were hesitant and confident to be able to regain control of the Dutch East Indies. Starting from the Treaty of Potsdam in July 1945, the restoration of the Southeast Asian region was under the control of the allied army, so that in the event of a defeat in Japan it was immediately taken over by the allied army. At that time Laksmana Mountbatten and General Blaney gained the trust of being the Southeast Asian command leader SEAC (South East Asia Command), immediately forming a special unit called AFNEI (Allied Forces Netherland East Indies). AFNEI's main task is to restore security and prosecute war criminals as well as free civilians and soldiers held by Japan or called the Recovery of Allied Prisoners and War Internees (Kodam VI Siliwangi, 1981, p.46). The arrival of the allied army was also confirmed by the London agreement on August 24, 1945 which was known as the Civil Affairs Agreement which was in substance that the British army led by the allied commander Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison was assisted by the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.

The first exodus of the British army with the Netherlands to Indonesia was carried out on September 16, 1945, led by Laksda W.R. Petterson by Chumberland ship and accompanied by other warships. After successfully docked at the port of Tanjung Priuk, it was discovered that the allied forces were British royal navy forces called Fifth Cruizer Squadron and were joined by a group of figures from the Netherlands including C.H.O. Van der Plas and H.J. Van Mook (Cribb, 2010, p.76). As is known that both figures C.H.O. Van der Plas and H.J. Van Mook was included in the Stuw Groep group, which was one of the groups that agreed with the Ethical Politics policy that wanted to advance the natives and wanted to continue to join hands, even though the Dutch East Indies had been independent they would still be fully trained or want to mature the Indonesian people to politics. This has a profound effect on the ideas of the two figures as in the struggle for diplomacy in the period after Indonesian independence.

Then the second exodus could be said to be more official because it was led by Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison by bringing three divisions of the NICA troops, approximately 24,000 soldiers were deployed in three

places, namely Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan. The Dutch intention to come to Indonesia was with the aim can instill power again because it is based on the concept of the speech of Queen Wilhelmina on December 7, 1942 in London which states the status of Indonesia bound in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with Suriname and Curacao, so that the Netherlands still has the right to determine Indonesia's future (Gerbrandy, 1950, p. 59-62). Starting from Queen Wilhelmina's speech then on February 10, 1946 the Dutch government issued a decree which became the basis of each negotiation with Indonesia. The important points in the decision are (Regerings Voorlichting Dienst, 1946, p. 13-15) :

1. Indonesia will be made a commonwealth country in the form of a self-government federation in the Dutch royal environment.
2. Domestic problems are managed by Indonesia, while foreign affairs are managed by the Dutch government.
3. Before the establishment of the commonwealth a transitional government will be formed for 10 years.
4. Indonesia will be included as a member of the United Nations.

Regarding the path that must be taken by the Dutch government to regain control other than with diplomacy as well as military force. Based on this condition of Indonesia, then H.J. Van Mook offered a federal political idea, which was to divide the Republic of Indonesia into states, because if it remained a state in the form of a unit it would still be a danger associated with an overly dominant Javanese tribe. Considering the power of the Republic mainly centered on Java and also in Sumatra, so that if the Dutch succeeded in establishing countries outside of Java it could reduce the strength of the Republic of Indonesia and facilitate the achievement of cooperation with the Netherlands (Smith, 1976, p. 31).

## 2. Establishment of the State of Madura

Starting from this, what are the ideas offered by H.J. Van Mook to form federal countries after the Indonesian people could declare their independence. In this case, it is as especially the case in Madura, when after being pursued with a difficult struggle for military action and diplomacy, it gave birth to the State of Madura. In April 1946 H.J. Van Mook began to realize his thoughts through various talks with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Sutan Syahrir in Jakarta. In the meeting basically the Republicans were willing to accept the stipulation of a proposal regarding the establishment of a federal Indonesian state bound in the form of a unity with the Netherlands. The description of this thought was carried out without the conversation with the Dutch government being initiated, so that it was not surprising when H. H. Van Mook conveyed this to the Dutch government, so the cabinet was not willing to enter into an agreement with the Republic of Indonesia. This was a sign that the Dutch were not at all willing to recognize the Republic as having authority over Java and Sumatra.

Subsequent discussions were held between a delegation of the Dutch government and the envoy of the Republic of Indonesia on April 14-24, 1946 in the city of Hoge Veluwe, the Netherlands. The Dutch delegation is; H.J. Van Mook, Prime Minister W. Schermerhorn, Minister of Overseas Ocean J.H. Logeman, and Foreign Minister Van Roijen. Then the delegations from the Republic of Indonesia were Suwandi, Sudarsono, and A.G. Pingodigdo. As a supporter of the Indonesian delegation from the Indonesian community in the Netherlands is; Indonesian Association, Islamic Association, Sinoman Indonesia, Indo-Committee "Vrije Indonesie", Indonesian Student Association, and VNI (Vereniging Netherlands-Indonesie). In the negotiations, an agreement was not found. According to P, J Koets was the director of the Cabinet of the Governor-General and one of the most important advisors to H.J. Van Mook said that the conference which was held was one of the good opportunities lost in solving Indonesia's problems. This is unfortunate because the conference has received close supervision and formal assessment from British diplomat Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. With various pretexts because there are general elections in the Netherlands, so that in parliament there is a backlash because there are various political interests. At that time the KVP Party (Katholieke Volkspartij), represented by Romme, reminded the Dutch government to bear the shame of the international community because of its indecisive attitude when offering a form of federalism in the Republic of Indonesia (Poeze, 2008, p. 368-369).

The aims and objectives of H.J. Van Mook formed a federal state, namely the State of the Republic of Indonesia of the United States, as a commonwealth of the Netherlands, because it imitated the success of Britain in establishing a commonwealth country with Malaysia. With the success of the Indonesian state as a federal state, it made it easier to become a puppet state for the Netherlands, so that it could influence several regional leaders

to realize the politics of divide or *devide et impera*. Starting from the failure of the two previous conferences, namely in Jakarta and the Hoge Veluwe and the maturity of thought in compiling the federal state, it was made the basis of the grip which would later be discussed at the conference talks in Malino on July 15, 1946. In this conference led by H.J. Van Mook and was attended by state representatives from West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Bangka-Belitung, Riau Islands, South Sulawesi, Minahasa, Manado, Bali, Lombok, Timor, Sanghie-Talaud, South Maluku, North Maluku and Papua. In this conference representatives from Java and Madura were not involved, because H.J. Van Mook deliberately set up the state of Borneo and East Indonesia.

Before the formation of Negara Indonesia Serikat ( the united states of Indonesia) H.J. Van Mook also prepared a transitional period with the statement that he only recognized the independent Republic of Indonesia as a state equal to other states. Besides that the Dutch also demanded that the Republic must return the authority taken by force, the Republic must break all relations with foreign countries and abolish its diplomatic service. The TNI (Indonesian National Army) must also be dissolved, because a state is not entitled to own its own army. Briefly, the Dutch government demanded that the Republic of Indonesia must abandon its sovereignty rights achieved since the proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, while the Deputy High Crown had great power during the transition period (Burgers, 2011 p. 433).

Starting from the Malino conference, apparently H.J. Van Mook pretended to show the world the International to approve decolonization, because after World War II colonization of the world was abolished. Starting with the business through the policy of diplomatic struggle and military power, is one of the things that can be expected by H.J. Van Mook to regain control of Indonesia. At that time the British government as an allied official represented by AFNEI stated that it was difficult to accept H. H.'s policy. Van Mook because it's not rational. Starting from this, then the British government sent Lord Killearn to Indonesia on the end of August 1946, with the aim of leading the negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. At the British Consulate General in Jakarta, they agreed to prepare to hold negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, which contained weapons of arms that would be held at Linggarjati on October 14 to November 10, 1946.

In this negotiation the delegates held negotiations based on one of the drafts prepared by the General Commission. According to this draft the Dutch government would recognize the *de facto* Republican government power over Java and Sumatra, except for areas already controlled by Allied forces or Dutch troops. The Netherlands and the Republic will work together to establish a free and democratic country based on federative principles called the United States of Indonesia. Likewise, cooperation in the formation of a Dutch – Indonesian Union, one of which before 1949 had to be realized (Burgers, 2011 p. 435).

Linggarjati, is one of the small cities approximately 21 km west of the city of Cirebon, chosen as the place of negotiations. At that time the Indonesian delegation was represented by the prime minister Sutan Syahrir, while the Dutch delegation was represented by H.J. Van Mook and Schemerhorn. As the leader of the negotiations was from the British government represented by Lord Killearn, the results of the agreement were announced on November 15, 1946 and were concluded as a text of agreement consisting of 17 articles, the main of which are;

1. The Netherlands recognizes *de facto* the Republic of Indonesia with a territory of power that includes Sumatra, Java, and Madura. The Netherlands must leave the *de facto* territory no later than January 1, 1949.
2. The Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands will cooperate in forming the United States of Indonesia, under the name RIS (Republic of Indonesia United), which is one of the parts of the Republic of Indonesia.
3. RIS and the Netherlands will form the Union - Indonesia - Netherlands with Queen Wilhelmina as its chairman.

In the Linggarjati agreement it actually runs tough because both parties have conflicting grounds. The Dutch government applied deception so that the Indonesian side would immediately be willing to sign the agreement. With the signing of the agreement, it can be submitted to the Dutch parliament for support. In the end the agreement was agreed upon by both parties on March 25, 1947, resulting in a change in circumstances related to the time delay or indeed planned by the Netherlands. This must be known that the Dutch government in Indonesia is under British supervision, so that the signing of the agreement means ratifying the role of the British government in relation to the settlement of Indonesia - the Netherlands. By not being supervised by the British government, the Dutch immediately prepared military forces including the preparation of compulsory military service in the Netherlands which was scheduled for 1947. The Linggarjati agreement did not provide political

refresher even between pros and cons. On the Republican side, they strongly refused, especially from the Masyumi and PNI parties, while those who agreed were the PKI, the Indonesian Socialist Party, the Indonesian Labor Party, the Catholic Party, the Christian-Protestant Party, and the Pesindo Youth Organization (Kahin, p. 368).

After the departure of the Japanese army, the Dutch actually wanted the Dutch East Indies region to be returned to its heyday. However, what must be realized is that at that time the Dutch East Indies would not be able to restore its authority. This makes various reasons, that the Netherlands came for a different solution, so it must avoid not cooperating with the Republikein. In the work of Linggarjati, the Dutch managed to buy time, so they could plan to create new ideas and options that would benefit them (Smeulders, 2011, p. 18.).

The Dutch government deliberately made tensions according to the right vision, namely the struggle for diplomacy and the military, so on July 21, 1947 the first military aggression occurred. The action was interpreted as a police action, because it had been approved by the Dutch parliament with the main goal of dissolving the Republic.

The first Dutch military aggression, specifically the residency in Madura, was on September 1, 1947, so the capital was moved from Bangkalan to Pegantenan. At the same time, the East Java provincial government office was also transferred to Blitar City, led by Roeslan Wongso Kusumo, while for the Madurese government representative office, the office also followed (Heru Sukadri et al., 1991, p. 18-21). The Goal of the First Dutch Military Aggression wanted to regain and establish states in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, one of which was, Madura. In the beginning of August 1947 the Dutch attacked in Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep. The Dutch lowered their troops and combat equipment throughout the Madura region, especially in Botorobu-Bangkalan, Camplong-Sampang, Tlanakan-Pamekasan, and Prenduan-Sumenep (Pemda Pamekasan, 2004, p. 156 ; Mohammad Moestadji, 1988, p. 14).

This Dutch military aggression was instructed by Major Sitters as the commander of the Dutch army in Madura. The first period was carried out on August 4, 1947 at around 2:30 a.m. with the strength of 100 armed forces driving 7 tanks and 14 trucks, with the target city of Bangkalan. In the attack, the resistance of the Madurese people was coordinated by the Madura Regional Defense Council, led by among them were Major Mohammad Hanafi, and Major Imam Sukarto. After Bangkalan can be mastered until on August 18, 1947 Madurese warriors can survive in Arosbaya north of approximately 14 Km from Bangkalan and had consolidated to hold a resistance with the guerrilla system. At that time the Bangkalan regent was R.A. Sis Cakraningrat stayed in Arosbaya and lived in Kyai Mat Yasin's house. Recomba officials (Regeerings Commisioner voor Bestuurs Aangelegenheden) East Java, namely Van der Plas, were finally able to persuade R.A. Sis Cakraningrat to return to Bangkalan city. Seeing this signal, the Madurese people had to return the regent R.A Sis Cakraningrat to side with the people. By receiving assistance from the Arosbaya district namely R.P. Mohammad Nur by submitting various resolutions to the Madura Resident, finally the regent R.A Sis Cakraningrat agreed to the will of the people, although the patialan Bangkalan remained in favor of the Dutch ((ANRI, Algemeen Secretarie, No. 1265; Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2002, p.15).

When Dutch forces carried out an attack in Pamekasan on August 16, 1947, there was a fierce resistance. Before the attack the role of the ulama was very important in maintaining independence, because there had been an agreement to hold a preparatory meeting at the Kayumanis boarding school, Jungcang, at the home of KH Abdul Hamid Pamekasan. Led by K. H. Abdul Hamid, K.H. Mohammad Toha, (both from the figures of Hezbollah Madura forces), K.H. Abdul Adhim Ening, K.H. Muhammad Tamim, K.H. Zaini Munim, K.H. Syarqawi, and K.H. Muhtar (representing Sabilillah Madura forces), Lieutenant Colonel Candra Hasan and Slamet Guno (representing TNI), K.H. Jakfar Amin (representing BPRI or Barisan Rakyat Indonesia Revolt), R. Sudomo (representing PESINDO or Indonesian Socialist Youth), RA Latif (represent of the IPI or Indonesian Youth Association), and Usman (representing the State Police Forces), Consolidating the power of the clerics and fighters from Pamekasan, by KH Abdul Hamid has also held communication and cooperation in preparation against the Netherlands with K.H. Mohammad Ashim Ilyas is the owner of An-Nuqayah Islamic Boarding School, Guluk-guluk Sumenep (Mutam Muchtar, 1987, p. 70-73. Events of resistance against the Dutch occurred around the Jamik mosque, Joko Tole street, Pamekasan. It was told that in the war began at 2:00 a.m. from various directions under the leadership of Major Mangkudiningrat, and assisted by the commanders below, among them were kalpten Zaeni, Slamet Guno, Mudhar Amin, Major Abu Jamal, K.H. Tamim, and K.H. Amin Jakfar. In the battle the Dutch troops received such a large supply of weapons, so that they could repel the

Pamekasan fighters. In the event that the resistance of the Dutch army in Pamekasan was estimated to have fallen victim to the Dutch as many as 65 people and fallout of Pamekasan people as many as 85 people (Sulfan Afandi, 2016, p, 248-251).

In addition to Bangkalan and Pamekasan, the target of the Dutch attack on East Madura was also carried out in Sumenep. On September 9, 1947, the Dutch, led by Lieutenant Baron van de Linde, had placed warships and opened fire on everything around Pasongsongan, Pasiyan, and Ambunten beaches. The peak of the attack was on September 11, 1947, starting at 6:30 a.m. targeting in Pakong, Pegantenan district with the strength of Dutch troops, an infantry company, three companies riding motorbikes, and also still protected from the air by four bombers carrying a bomb ready to detonate. The attack was carried out along the road from the village of Guluk-guluk, Lenteng and finally to Sumenep. In the attack there was resistance from Madurese fighters in Manding and Karangtengah. The resistance can last until September 15, 1947, because it lost in terms of weapons and limited supply of food (Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2002, p.97).

The impact of the first Dutch military aggression caused sympathy and strong reaction from the international community, one of which was Australia and India, urging the UN Security Council to immediately discuss the Indonesian problem. On August 4, 1947 the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands announced that the cease-fire began immediately, as the end of Dutch military aggression. But in reality the Netherlands continues to expand its territory until the demarcation line is formed or often called the Van Mook line. In accordance with the wishes of Van Mook Indonesia continued to refuse, so that the arms traps approved by the UN did not apply effectively. Thanks to the struggle for diplomacy in the UN forum, many countries supported the struggle of the Indonesian people and helped the way of resolution peacefully. In an effort to monitor the settlement of disputes between Indonesia and the Netherlands and agreed to end the ceasefire, the UN Security Council formed the Three Nations Commission (KTN). The countries that sit in the KTN are the results that have to be shown from the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands and a neutral country, including; 1. Australia is showing Indonesia represented by Richard C Kirby, 2. Belgium is a Dutch show represented by Paul Van Zeeland, and 3. The United States is a show of Australia and Belgium represented by Dr. Frank Forter Graham (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 1983, p. 56).

Thanks to the KTN proposal, negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands were held on December 4 on the American Renville ship which was anchored in Jakarta. The Indonesian delegation consisted of Prime Minister Amir Syarifudin, Ali Sastroamijoyo, Dr. Tjoa Sik Len, Mohammad Roem, Haji Agus Salim, Sutan Syahrir, Mr. Nasrun, Drs. Setiyajid, and Ir. Juanda. The Dutch delegation consisted of Abdulkadir Widjoatmojo, Jhr. van Vrederburch, Dr. Somoukil, Aji Pangeran Kartanagara and Tengku Dzulkarnin. Although some of them were Indonesians, they became Dutch representatives and were pro-Dutch. Thus, the Dutch can still conduct political fighting so that Indonesia is easy to master. After the debate was completed from December 8 to December 17, a peace agreement was obtained. The main points of the contents of the Renville agreement are as follows;

1. The Dutch remain sovereign over all Indonesian territories until Indonesian sovereignty is handed over to the Republic of Indonesia (RIS) which will soon be formed,
2. RIS has an equal position with the Netherlands in the Indonesian - Dutch Union,
3. The Republic of Indonesia will become a state RIS.
4. Before the RIS is formed, the Netherlands can surrender a portion of its power to the interim federal government.
5. The Republic of Indonesia troops in the enclave must be withdrawn to the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. The enclave is the area behind the Van Mook line, the line connecting the two leading regions occupied by the Dutch.

In the continuation of the Renville agreement can be signed by both parties, namely on January 17, 1948, Related to the losses suffered by the Republic of Indonesia with these signatories are; 1. Indonesia was forced to approve the establishment of the United States of Indonesia through a transitional period, 2. Indonesia lost part of its territory because the Van Mook line was forced to be recognized as a Dutch territory, 3. The Republic of Indonesia had to withdraw all of its troops in Dutch territory and enclaves guerrilla entered the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

The signing of the text of the Renville Agreement also caused adverse consequences for the government of the Republic of Indonesia, including the following; 1. The Republic of Indonesia became increasingly narrow because it was confined by Dutch territories, 2. The emergence of violent reactions among the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia which could lead to the fall of Amir Syarifudin's cabinet because it was considered selling the country to the Netherlands, 3. The Indonesian economy was strictly blocked by the Dutch, 4. Indonesia was forced to withdraw its military units from guerrilla areas to then migrate to the adjacent territory of the Republic of Indonesia, 5. In an effort to divide the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands formed puppet countries such as West Borneo, East Sumatra, East Java and Madura. In reality the puppet state is incorporated in the BFO (Bijeenkomst Federal Overleg) (Burgers, 2011, p. 52).

A week after the signing of the Renville agreement, Amir Syarifudin's cabinet resigned on January 23, 1948. The issue of reimbursement had already been prepared in the past, which was November 11, 1947, because there were seven ministers from the Masyumi Party, PKRI (Republic of Indonesia Catholic Party) and PARKINDO (Indonesian Christian Party) becomes a parliamentary coalition cabinet. These three parties are on the grounds that they cannot approve the agreement on weapons trafficking and the policies that were run by the Prime Minister during the negotiations, while the PNI only demands the replacement of portfolios. It can be said that from November to December 1947, in the Republic of Indonesia internally there was indeed an acute political chaos, so President Sukarno immediately commissioned Vice President Mohammad Hatta to form a new cabinet. Mohammad Hatta was chosen on the grounds because of his position as vice president, so it was expected to have a great authority. In this case Mohammad Hatta succeeded in forming a new cabinet supported by his ministers, especially from the Masyumi, PNI, PKRI and PARKINDO parties. Related to the Hatta cabinet's work agenda including; 1. Continuing negotiations with the Netherlands on the basis of the Renville agreement, 2. Rationalizing and reconstructing the army and civil servants, 3. National development, and 4. Accelerating the formation of the United States of Indonesia (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, 1983, p. 79).

Reflections on the political turmoil that occurred at the central level turned out to have a large impact on disruption at the local level as well as on Madura. Simultaneously on 11 November 1947 there was an unhealthy relationship and was cut off between Jakarta and Madura, so that on 21 November 1947 the administration of the government was taken over by R.A. A Cakraningrat. Even when a meeting was held in Jakarta at the end of December 1947 for the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, R.A.A. Cakraningrat was a member of the committee representing the Madura section (Sudarno et al., 1983, p.267; Sjamsoel Arieffin, M.,1950, p. 13 ;Sinpo, XXXVIII, No.671, 20 April 1948, p. 2).

Inspired by the Linggarjati agreement, one of which was democracy or the right to self-determination, then on January 14, 1948 in the Bangkalan district hall and continued in Pamekasan on January 16, 1948, Madurese figures gathered to negotiate to solve the political conditions of Madura. From the results of the negotiations a Madura Position Determination Committee was formed consisting of advisors to R.A.A. Cakraningrat representing the Resident of Gedelegeerde Madura Recomba was then assisted by representatives of three people from Pamekasan, three from Sumenep, two from Sampang, and three from Bangkalan. This committee also established a resolution asking for the approval of the people to establish the Madurese state by voting from each sub-district and district. The conditions for eligible voters are that every citizen in all Madurese is at least 18 years of age and above or is excluded for those who are married. The vote to determine the Madurese state took place on January 23, 1948 as a result; the number of residents entitled to vote 305,546 people, the number of those present was 219,660 people, the number who agreed 199,510 people, the number who did not agree 9,923 people, and the number who did not vote 10,230 people. The conclusions obtained from the collection are; the number was 71.88%, the population agreed 90.82%, the number that did not agree was 4.51%, and the number that did not vote was 4.65% (ANRI, Algemene Secretarie, No. 4734).

Starting from the results of the collection, the Madurese state was established based on a Decree dated February 20 no. 1 as contained in the Staatsblad (State Gazette) 1948, no. 12. It was stated that Lieutenant Governor General in this case was willing to hear and approve the wishes of the Madurese people because those who had previously submitted a resolution on January 23, 1948 so that the state of Madura was recognized and formed as a state unity based on legal force with Pamekasan as its capital. Furthermore, in the Decree, stated that R.A.A. Cakraningrat as Madurese resident was appointed and given authority as the Mayor and established a Provisional Council to prepare more complete state organization (Bastian, 1965, p. 16).

According to T. Sumarto's report, the establishment of the Madura state was also inspired by the formation of the East Java state because when there was a East Java Position Preparation Committee Meeting at the Bubutan National Building in Surabaya on January 25, 1948, discussing the existence of a separatist movement led by Sekartaji did not get welcome of the people. At the same time, one of the meeting participants, Asmoroyudo, and Akman founded PKM (Madura Nationality Party), whose purpose was specifically to take care of the calculated Madurese people outside the island of Madura to support the independence of the Madurese people. Therefore PKM requests the shipping sector (scheepsvaart-afdeeling) to be the main agenda, because it can streamline transportation mobilization activities in supporting the independence program of the Madurese people (Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2002, p.21).

Having felt that there are several supporting strength factors from within, both in the form of social organizations, as well as political parties, Madura branch representatives, KNID, TNI, and PKM, the Madura State People's Council will temporarily be inaugurated on 15 July 1948. These include; 1. R.P. Amang Makmur former KNI Probolinggo as Secretary of State, 2. K.H Munir R. Hafiludin, R.P. Machmud, R. Sukaris, R.P. Pratamingkusumo, Dr. Aminuddin was appointed as a commission that studied governance rules. 3. Achmad Syarif Shijders, R. Kaina Halim, R. Syafii, R. Abdul Gafur, and R. Bagiohadi as commission for making Madura state plans. Besides that RAA. Cakraningrat has previously been in contact with Islamic figures or Islamic Boarding Schools in Madura to help fully include; Kyai Jambu, Haji Munir, Haji Munif Abusujak, Ahmad Sarbini as leader of the Indonesian Islamic Army Madura, and Barisan Islam Indonesia Madura (ANRI, Arsip Kabinet Kementrian Djogdjakarta, No. 84).

Even before the launch of the July offensive, Beel was in favor of forming new political units in the areas to be occupied in order to separate those areas from the Republic. After the offensive, Van Mook took up its implementation energetically. In doing so, he abandoned his earlier thought that the Indonesian federation should consist of only a few large units. At the end of January 1948, for example, the negara (state) of East Sumatra was born, followed by the negara Madura in February, the negara Pasoendan (West Java) in April, the negara South Sumatra in August and the negara East Java in November. The creation of these federal states followed a simple pattern. Usually a committee of Indonesians was formed in a particular region with the support of Dutch government officials to advocate an independent status for that region. Subsequently, the government recognized this committee, or a conference convened at its request, as a "provisional representative body". This was then followed by a legal decree by Van Mook that made the region a federal state with its own "Head of State" was converted (Burgers, 2011.p.154).

As the launching of the first task of the Madura State People's Council was on August 1, 1949, by establishing August 17, 1949 as Madura's national day. At the same time the Vice Mayor R.A.A. Cakraningrat is also able to form various departments to assist in the implementation of government in the Madura state. Among others are:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Government Department, Police and Public Security    | : R.T. Abdurrochman                         |
| 2. Ministry of Finance                                  | : W. Kuiper                                 |
| 4. Ministry of Economic Affairs<br>Land and Sea Traffic | : Ir. Irigati                               |
| 5. Department of Education, Culture and Science         | : R.H.W. Stappershof                        |
| 6. Ministry of Health                                   | : Dr. Mas Suparmo Hinggopati Cotro<br>Hupoy |
| 7. Ministry of Religion                                 | : R.T.A. Zainallatah Notohadikusumo         |
| 8. Ministry of Justice                                  | : Mr. Sudibyoleman                          |

Then for the composition of the Madura State People's Council is as:

- |                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| Chair              | : R. Abdurrasid           |
| Deputy Chairman I  | : R. Abdul Nohai          |
| Deputy Chairman II | : R. Bagioadi Monconagoro |

Table 1: The list of members of the Madura State People's Council

Name	Origin	Appointment date	Remarks
1. Abdul Azis RH	Bangkalan	15-04-1948	Chosen
2. Abdul Baki R	Pamekasan	"	"
3. Abd. Jalal Dipamarjana	Bangkalan	"	"
4. Abdul Gafur R	Sampang	"	"
5. Abdul Kadir R	Sampang	"	"
6. Abd. K. Singosingoyudo	Sumenep	"	"
7. Abdullah Sulaiman	Bangkalan	"	"
8. Abd. Rahman Singoatmojo	Pamekasan	03-06-1948	"
9. Abd.Rasid Kusumodiwiryo	Sampang	15-04-1948	"
10. Abdussalam K	Sumenep	15-04-1948	"
11. Abubakar R. Amidarmo	Pamekasan	"	"
12. A. Hafiluddin	Pamekasan	"	"
13. Achmad Munir N	Sampang	"	"
14. Achmad Putrodiharjo	Sampang	"	"
15. Achmad T Hadisaputro	Sumenep	"	"
16. Aliurida Tirtonegoro R	Sampang	"	"
17. Alwi B. Belfagi. S	Sampang	"	Designated
18. Asmaun Suyodiharjo R	Sumenep	03-06-1948	Chosen
19. Deighton H.A	Bangkalan	15-04-1948	Designated
20. Faturrachim Sarbini H	Sampang	"	"
21. Hasan B. Saulin Bausir	Bangkalan	03-06-1948	"
22. Hasim Makki KH	Sampang	"	"
23. Hosen. R	Sampang	21-10-1048	"
24. Ismail Prayitnodirono	Sumenep	15- 04-1948	"
25. Mahmud Sosrodipuro	Sumenep	"	"
26. Mangkuadiningrat A	Sumenep	"	"
27. Mastufah	Sampang	10-09-1948	"
28. Munir Abusujak KH	Sumenep	15-04-1948	"
29. Murijono. H.A.R	Pamekasan	"	"
30. M. Ali Prataningkusumo	Sumenep	"	"
31. Mochamad Anwar. M	Sumenep	"	"
32. Moh. Ersad Trunojyo	Pamekasan	"	"
33. Moh. Hanafia Ilyas	Sumenep	"	"
34. Dipokusumo . R.H	Sumenep	"	"
35. Moh. Iksan Tohir	Pamekasan	"	"
36. Moch. Machfud	Pamekasan	"	"
37. Moch Ramadan R	Bangkalan	"	Chosen
38. Moh Saleh N	Sampang	"	"
39. Moch. Saleh R	Bangkalan	"	"
40. Moch. Zainalalim M	Sampang	"	"
41. Ong Hok Sing	Sampang	"	Designated
42. Ong Lion Wan	Sampang	03-06-1948	"
43. Sukarim Budisujono R	Sampang	"	"
44. Syafi'i. K	Pamekasan	"	Chosen
45. Syaman N	Bangkalan	15-04-1948	"
46. Snijder H.R.O	Bangkaan	"	"
47. Subardi Nolopruso. K	Sumenep	03-06-1948	"
48. Sosrowinoto. R.A.A	Sumenep	15-04-'948	Designated
49. Zaafiril	Bangkalan	03-06-1948	Chosen

Source: (Bastians, 1965, p. 16-19).



### 3. From political diplomacy to military action

Starting from the formation of governance that is configured by Madurese state guardian R.A.A. Cakraningrat, shows that whether the State of Madura has fulfilled the requirements to accommodate state theories as they have developed in the West. If categorized or with the aim of being a puppet state, it is impossible if the H.J Van Mook caliber statesman only wants to blind the international statmen, especially labels such as the establishment of the Madurese state. The puppet state is understood that the state is officially independent and its sovereignty is recognized, but it is de facto under the control of other countries. As what was intended by the Dutch, that the formation of a real puppet state was only to surround the position of the Republic of Indonesia or narrow the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. Each of these puppet countries must also be led by someone appointed by the Dutch. Through the puppet countries it formed, the Netherlands could form a Federal government with H.J. Van Mook as head of his government. The list of puppet states formed by H. J. Van Mook was the state of East Indonesia in December 1947, Sumatra Timur 16-02-1947, Pasundan 26-02-1948, Sumatra Selatan 30-08-1948, Jawa Timur 26-11-1948, and Madura 16-01-1948.

The case of the puppet state in particular regarding the sustainability of the Madura state after the formation of the cabinet as formed by R A. A. Cakraningrat clearly found many obstacles that could be overcome in the not too distant future. This was evidenced when on July 5, 1949 before the establishment of the Madura state cabinet, R A. A. Cakraningrat had once submitted a letter of application to the Dutch government in Batavia which contained a request for budget funds for the administration of state employees. The proposed budget funds are valid from 1948 to 1949 with details of attachment A for budgeting of the Madura People's Council and secretariat of f. 419,569. Appendix B for the costs of returning the facilities and infrastructure damaged by the Dutch attack in 1947, because it was not so urgent that the costs were not made in detail. Appendix C. for the budget for payment of salaries of Department heads as many as 7 people and those realized are as many as 5 people in the amount of f. 21,600 and C for the cost of living for the Madurese state guardian for one year amounting to f. 32,022.

Actually the submission of a Madurese guardian was reasonable because in Besluit van Gouverneur General 20 February 1948 No. 1 published in the Staatsblaad van Nederlandsch Indie 1948, no. 42, decided that the government would provide operational funds for various salary budgets and various other needs for the Madura state. However, with various alibis regarding the weak condition of the Madura income budget and not being supported by a population of only around 2,000,000, the budget approval is only given at f. 250,000 (ANRI, Algemene Secretarie, No. 1267). Evidence of another weakness when the Madurese mayor, R A. A. Cakraningrat, will propose a need for truly professional officials, especially the Ministry of Finance and Justice. Through a letter of application that was submitted to East Java Recomba on December 13, 1948, the contents asked W. Kuiper to become the head of the Ministry of Finance of the state of Madura, considering that he had experience in the financial sector. The request was not immediately granted because it received an answer from the state secretary in Batavia on May 20, 1949, which A D. Loth was assigned to become the head of the Madura state Finance Department. Because Madurese mayor R A A. Cakraningrat objected to accepting candidates for Treasury Department official A D. Loth, then finally East Java Recomba agreed to W. Kuiper as head of the Madura state Finance Department. (ANRI, Algemene Secretarie, No. 15440).

Starting from a small portion of such weaknesses, it is easy to create a negative view of the people of Madura. In the period between 1945 and 1950 there were always issues adopted from Java about the domination of fighters, about the term for the title of the Republicans for those who were able to fight for independence and the non-Republicans for those who were despised because they were in favor of Netherlands. This phenomenon has a big influence and has a psychological impact on the Madura state, especially in the direction of RAA. Cakraningrat as mayor of Madura. When it began to occur between the pros and cons of the formation of the Madura state it revolved around the absence of any change at all about the level of small people's welfare and security

The evidence that is burdensome to the small people as it is known that the money in effect is NICA money which at that time if the exchange rate with ORI money or the money of the Republic of Indonesia is between 1:10, so that all basic needs become expensive. Related to the actual security factor after the armaments were held according to the Roem Royen agreement on May 7, 1949, Madura's condition in the Dutch view was still said to be unsafe so it was declared still in danger or Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (SOB). Various reports that

entered around 1947 until 1979 were contained in the occurrence of many violations of law such as gambling, theft, and *carok*. To follow up on this, the Netherlands, through General Major Baai of East Java Recomba, assigned police and army units to conduct cleanups in order to restore the security situation and conditions (Badan Arsip Propinsi Jawa Timur, 2002, p.21).

Other disadvantages of RAA. Cakraningrat as Madurese mayor according to the view of the Madurese republicans group is that the person concerned is carrying out acts of nepotism by placing many members of his family and closest friends to occupy strategic positions in the country of Madura. The possibility of this is one of the RAA's efforts. Cakraningrat to strengthen the legitimacy of his position and also the factor of his endurance. The names of officials who occupy strategic positions include:

1. RA. Sis Cakraningrat who was appointed as regent of Bangkalan was the son of RAA. Cakraningrat.
2. RA. Ruslan Cakraningrat as general secretary of Madurese state guardian is the son of RAA. Cakraningrat.
3. R.P. Abdul Azis who was appointed Major Commander of VI-35 Battalion was the son of the niece of RAA. Cakraningrat.
4. R P. Abdul Rachman as Wedana Bunder, Pamekasan is the son of the niece of RAA. Cakraningrat .
5. Kyai Abdul Hamid Mudlahari who is believed to be a spiritual advisor to RAA. Cakraningrat.
6. Abdurrachman was appointed as head of the Government Department, Police and Public Security of Madura, a close friend of RAA. Cakraningrat.
7. Hasyim Sosrodanuatmojo became head of the Madura National Police, a close friend of RAA. Cakraningrat.
8. RTA. Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo was appointed regent of Pamekasan still in family relations with RAA. Cakraningrat.
9. R T. Prataningkusumo being the regent of Sumenep is the younger brother of the RTA. Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo is also still related to the family of the Madura state leader.
10. Rp. Mohammad Rivai was appointed as wedana Kwanyar, Bangkalan is the younger brother of the RTA. Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo.
11. Rp. Mohammad Sadali was appointed as inspector of the Bangkalan class II as well as family relations with RAA. Cakraningrat.
12. R. A. Usman was appointed as a high employee Madura is the son of a niece of RAA. Cakraningrat.
13. Rp. Abdul Brotomiprojo is the Patih Sampang is still a family with RAA. Cakraningrat.
14. RA. Abdulrachnan became the head of Pamekasan district Public Works, a cousin of RTA. Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo is still family related.
15. RA. Mohammad Taha was appointed to the office of Public Works Bangkalan district is the son of the niece of RAA. Cakraningrat.

The list of names of Madura state officials was written in full and detailed by the anti-RAA. Cakraningrat group in the name of the patriots of the Republic of Madura for the sake of demonstrating the dissolution of the Madurese state led by R. Santosa (ANRI, Arsip Kabinet Kementrian Djogdjakarta, No. 84).

Other disadvantages of RAA. Cakraningrat as it is known that the embryo of the emergence of the Republican group was actually because at that time it had to accept the choice of the establishment of the Madura state as a Dutch puppet state and if this did not cause weakness certainly there would be no internal turmoil or intrigue. Although the emergence of the Madura Struggle Movement was considered primordial, this organization was the only social organization that had a commitment to the fate of the Madurese people. This movement is not in the form of political parties but its members are spread in many places and have branches in various cities in Java such as Surakarta, Madiun, Nganjuk, Kediri, Blitar, Jombang, and Tuban. Based on articles 2 and 3, the articles of association of the Perjuangan Madura Movement are stated as follows:

1. Moving the people of Madura to fight for the interests of the island of Madura and the people within the Republic of Indonesia
2. Intensifying the people of Madura both in the occupied area and in the Republic of Indonesia
3. Provide awareness to the people of Madura of their interests in choosing the Republic and defending the Republic of Indonesia
4. Supporting all state efforts in implementing the Renville Agreement

##### 5. Paying attention to the fate and interests of its members.

The composition of the organization of the Madura Movement organization is as follows (ANRI. Arsip Kementrian Penerangan, No. 99):

- Chair : R. Sosrodanukusumo,
- Deputy Chairman: Mohammad Tabrani
- Treasurer: R. Senosastro
- Comitte I : M. Kafrawi
- Comitte II: Iskak

Assistant: R. Safiudin and R. Abdul Hajat for Yogyakarta representatives; R. Ruslan Wongsokusumo for Blitar representatives; K. Amin and Jakfar for Kediri representatives; R. Ilyas for representatives of Tuban; R.P. Mohammad Nor and R. Sulaiman for Babad representatives.

The state of the state and the same time to administrators of the government because it was deemed too dictated by the government, the republican groups were wanted to move against and dissolve the state and wanted to return to the government of the Republic of Indonesia. After training inspiration from the Madurese Movement of Struggle Organization in Java, Madura Region, Regional Madurese Indonesian Youth Movement, Madura Indonesian Student Association, and many Forces groups Sabilillah Madura.

This group after succeeding in gathering a mass of approximately 25,000 people, then on February 15, 1950 held a demonstration to demand the dissolution of the Madura House of Representatives and reduce the position of Madurese state guardian held by R.A.A. Cakraningrat. It was stated that during the demonstration the mob began to move from 9:45 a.m. while shouting the chants while walking a long march from the Pamekasan Agricultural School - Jalan Sumenep - Kebon - Sedangdang - Pamekasan Town Square and then entering the building of the Madura Parliament. After negotiations between Zainalfatah and Hafid representing the demonstrators with Abdul Gafur as chairman of the Madura People's Council, tensions could be overcome without anarchic actions. One of the effects of the incident was the emergence of dissatisfaction among the Madurese population towards the establishment of the Madurese state and this resulted in residents venturing it by forcing officials considered anti-Republican as well as Assistant Wedono Pegantenan Mohamammad Hanafi, Assistant Wedono Pakong Mohammad Amin, and Assistant Wedono Proppo Wongsodirejo to immediately resign from his position. In addition, the people also sued some of the officials who were still close to the RAA's mayor. Cakraningrat to immediately put down his position. Among these alain were Bangkalan regent R A. Sis Cakraningrat, general secretary of Madura's mayor R A. Ruslan Cakraningrat, and Abdulrochman. Furthermore, as a reaction to the situation which was considered to be no longer conducive, the Madurese mayor through a letter dated February 8, 1950, No. 512 / Secr.Um sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the RIS gave a statement that the Madura state was returned to the government of the Republic of Indonesia United.

After the demonstration, on February 23, 1950 the regent of Pamekasan R.T.A. Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo immediately reported to the government of the Republic of Indonesia about the political situation in Madura and urged the government to immediately issue a decree stating that the Madurese state wanted to rejoin the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. After waiting for several days it turned out that the desire had not been received in reply from the government of the Republic of Indonesia, then on March 4, 1950 R. A. Zainalfatah sent back several faction representatives to meet the governor of East Java and requested that Madura de facto obtain legal recognition as a residency area of Madura which was part of the East Java province. . Starting from the state of Madura which was considered not conducive anymore, then on March 19, 1950 the RIS president issued a decree stating that the Madura area was designated as a residence and was followed up by appointing R. Sunarto Hadiwijoyo as resident official and Hanafi as the Pamekasan regent who had just replaced RTA . Zainalfatah Notohadikusumo. The enthusiasm for returning to the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia was based on the United Nations meeting on December 19, 1949. At that time the Three Nations Commission (KTN) ordered the United States to issue a resolution approved by members of the congregation which contained:

1. Freeing the president and vice president and leaders of the Republic of Indonesia who were arrested since December 18, 1948

2. Ordered KTN to provide a full report on the situation in Indonesia since 19 December 1948.

Then the results of these decisions that were successfully achieved by the UN include:

1. Charter of recognition of sovereignty on December 27, 1949
2. Establishment of RIS
3. Establishment of the Union of Indonesia - the Netherlands
4. Establishment of the KNIL army (Koninklijke Nederlands-Indische Leger) and KL (Koninklijke Landmacht) which are integrated into APRIS (Republic of Indonesia Union Armed Forces)
5. Charter of citizenship
6. Approval of the financial economy
7. The issue of West Irian will be discussed within a year later.

#### 4. Conclusion

Imperialism is a process in which the state shares its power under the pretext of conquering and at the same time expanding its territory. As in this case, it was when the Dutch adopted their policies with Indonesia, especially in the period between 1945 and 1947. There was no right statement and reason, because the Dutch had no power from 1942 to 1945, so when they wanted to return their power in 1947 until 1949 it had to act imperialism.

In the history of the Indonesian revolution, Dutch imperialistic actions took place when there was no agreement in the Linggarjati agreement, so the Republicans continued to fight to defend the territory which did not all belong to the Netherlands. In this struggle the Republicans also opposed the feudalist power that had long existed in Indonesia. The aim of the war, the Republicans in accordance with the substance of the Linggarjati agreement, was to demand the largest vote in the countries incorporated in the RIS. With this vote, they can want the union states to be in the hands of the Republicans.

The creation of federal states and the formation of a provisional federal government could give the impression that the centralist administrative system of the old Dutch East Indies had already given way to a decentralized system. That impression was only partly correct. When each federal state was founded, a large number of subjects were designated each time that remained within the competence of the central government; moreover, the *Länder* could only take up the functions that belonged to their competence after the central administration had handed them over, and that transfer was often delayed. The Provisional Federal Government therefore managed the part of the archipelago controlled by the Netherlands mainly in the same centralistic way as was the case in the past; it was essentially a continuation of the existing government in a new outfit. Although the federal states had only limited powers of their own, their existence did have political consequences. The fact that Dutch officials had to obey Indonesian ministers was a striking contrast to the colonial past. The fact that state governments needed the support of their parliaments opened up new political possibilities. For the Republic, there was a substantial difference between the state of East Indonesia and the federal states established after the July offensive. The first was provided for in the Linggarjati agreement; the latter were a blatant violation of it.

Starting from the results of the Dutch government's decision to give recognition of sovereignty to Indonesia, on December 23, 1949 the RIS delegation chaired by Drs. Mohaammad Hatta with members of Sultan Hamid Algardri, Suyono Hadinoto, Dr. Suparmo, Dr. Kusumaatmojo, and Prof. Dr., Supomo left for the Netherlands. The transfer of sovereignty to RIS was held in two places, namely in the Netherlands and in Jakarta and officially submitted on December 27, 1949. The surrender of sovereignty in the Netherlands was carried out by Queen Juliana, Prime Minister Willem Dress and Overseas Minister A.M.J.M. Sassen told Drs. Mohammad Hatta as chairman of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia United. Then the surrender of sovereignty in Jakarta was carried out by the highest representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, A.H.J. Lovink to representatives of the government of the Republic of Indonesia United, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX. Along with this, President Sukarno in Yogyakarta received the surrender of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia from Mr. Assaat representing RIS officials.

With the recognition of sovereignty which was revealed on December 27, 1949, the armed revolution in the Republic of Indonesia ended and de jure the Dutch recognized Indonesian independence in the form of the state of the Republic of Indonesia (RIS). Regarding the agreement of the Indonesian people, on 17 August 1950 the RIS country was dissolved and then the Indonesian Republican Unitary State (NKRI) was established. The national capital which was originally located in Yogyakarta was then moved to Jakarta. Then on December 28,

1950 the Republic of Indonesia was officially accepted as the 60th member of the United Nations and this meant that the independence of the Indonesian state had officially gained international recognition.

The merger between the Madurese state and the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia began with the merger with RIS which was constitutionally possible through articles 43 and 44 of the RIS constitution provided that the merger was desired by the people and also regulated by federal law. Then later on March 8, 1950 the RIS government with the approval of the parliament (DPR) and the Senate RIS issued Emergency Law number 11 of 1950 which essentially regulated the procedures for changing the composition of the RIS state. Based on this Emergency Law, the states combine themselves with the Republic of Indonesia in Yogyakarta, including in this case the Madurese state.

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# Women's Participation in Education and Politics: Evidence from the Selected OIC Countries

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## Abstract

In this twenty-first century, it is crystal clear that education is the most powerful instrument for a nation's progress and prosperity. Islam has also emphasized on educating both men and women since the beginning. So, Muslim countries should take initiatives to enhance participation of women in education. In reality, it is seen that women's positions in the field of education and politics are very nominal compared to their male counterparts within Muslim countries. Situation is even worse in under-developed and non-democratic countries where the position of women and their participation in both the education and political sectors alongside men are visibly low. In this context, the purpose of this study is to explore the level of Muslim women's participation in education and politics in some selected Muslim countries. Two South-Asian countries, Bangladesh and Pakistan, two south-east Asian countries, Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries have been considered for this study. Thus, empowered women can take part in politics to resolve social issues. One of the findings of this study is that in democratic countries such as; Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, women's participation in both the educational and political sectors have been significantly improving over the years. Though economic conditions and social stigma, directly and indirectly, are still the barriers to enhance women's education level as well as their participation in politics. Finally, the study highlights the obstacles that hinder women's participation in both sectors and discusses the remedies to overcome the situation from an Islamic point of view.

**Keywords:** Women's Participation, Education, Politics, Islamic Perspective, Muslim World

## 1. Introduction

There is a widespread debate going on about the issue of 'women's rights and empowerment' across the globe. However, some scholars are clearly focused on women's empowerment and some have not been (Mosedale, 2014). Women's positions and their dignity in older societies was dreadful and a disputable issue in their society.

They were treated as the stuff of men's enjoyment (Ansiya et al., 2014). Even at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, Muslim women were barred from participation in politics, left out of social and community works, and were living in poverty, illiterate, and in the midst of collapsing and declining communal and moral states (AK, 2019). The situation of women and their position in their community still did not change as compared to their male counterparts in both the family and wider society. It is a common phenomenon that women are always suppressed in male dominant societies in every aspect of their lives (Zengenene & Susanti, 2019; Ali, Solihin & Haque, 2018; Odine, 2013), e.g. in education, politics, the labour force, entrepreneurship etc. Moreover, globally, women in the 21<sup>st</sup> century still cannot secure as strong of a position in the previously mentioned sectors as men have been able to achieve either in the family or in society, particularly in the Muslim world (Haque, Sarker, Rahman & Rakibuddin, 2020). It is very unfortunate that, in the Muslim world, often women are considered as subordinate to men and they are treated as second class citizen in family and society (Sударso, Keban & Mas'udah, 2019; Kabir, 2007). Women in the family and in society are mistreated because of the ill practice of socio-cultural norms and the patriarchal social system (Haque, Sarker & Rahman, 2019). Even in developing Muslim countries, the poor families considered girls a burden for the family (Susanti, 2019). Thus, the parents often arrange early marriage for their daughters at the premature motherhood age.

Hence, it creates negative thoughts in Western minds. Outside of Muslim countries there are discussions or criticisms of Islam; that it does not provide equal rights to women along with men in terms of empowerment. Several Muslim leaders and scholars have observed and identified the internal challenges which are the causes, such as; misinterpretations of Islam, refusal to be modern, trendy and secular; and also, an underpinning of ideas of the disintegration of Muslim women in the modern world (AK, 2019). Astonishingly, some leaders and scholars have realised that internal intransigent and extremist forces are the cause of exposing political, cultural, and ideological challenges (AK, 2019). They have started to adopt western ideologies in alignment with Islamic principles and views to develop the area of politics, education, and economic theories (Monshipouri, 1998). These intellectual ideas have facilitated the objectives of fundamental Islam, for example; Islam is a modern religion which is compatible with modernisation, science and trends, benighted thought, theology, and philosophy that isn't scientific in nature (AK, 2019). In these circumstances, Muslim leaders and intellectuals have adopted western political and scientific theories to develop Islam through socio-economic empowerment for both men and women (Mawşilili, 1999).

Islam secures a dignified and strong position for women in all aspects of their lives (Sha'rāwī, 1998; Haque, Solihin, Ahmad & Jani, 2020). There is no sacred text in the Qur'ān or Sunnah that obstructs women's empowerment in public and private affairs (Qarh Dāgī, 2011). In addition, Islam is very affirmative regarding women's participation in the above-discussed areas, maintaining their dignity and chastity after completing household tasks which are assigned by the Almighty Allah. If we observe Prophetic history, we find that the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h) encouraged women to take part in all areas of life; i.e. social, political, economic, and religious fields (Jawad, 1998). Empowering women in the economic sector is one of the ways to ensure a good quality life to women in families and society (Subramaniam, et al., 2013). It is found in hadith that *Ansāri* women wanted to participate in all activities during the establishment of the first ever Islamic state of Madinah. They set the model role for other women to follow (Jawad, 1998). Women made a great contribution in the field of expedition (*Jihād*). It was narrated that 'Umm'Atiyyah al-Ansāriyyah said: "I have participated in seven expeditions (wars) with the Messenger of Allāh; I have stayed behind in the camp, making food for them, treating the wounded and looking after the sick" (Sahīh Muslim, 261H, vol.3, hadith, 142 (1812)). In this context, this study explores women's positions in the Muslim world in certain areas, specifically in education and politics, with a discussion of remedies to overcome this issue from the Islamic perspective.

## 2. Objective of The Study

Islam has secured women's status and a strong position in the family as well as in society in terms of receiving an education and their participation in politics for the betterment of society. In the 21st century, women's positions and statuses are gradually rising in education and politics in the Muslim world (Bangladesh, Pakistan,



Malaysia, Indonesia and MENA countries). However, the objective of this current study is to explore the current status of women's participation in the education and political sectors in the Muslim world. It also emphasises on the gathering of Islamic views on women's rights and positions of power in education and politics.

### 3. Data and Methodology

The present study has followed a qualitative approach, where it gathered the data relevant to women's participation in education and national parliaments from World Bank data sources. This study attained data of women's literacy above the age of 15 and women's participation in national parliaments, focusing on Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. According to Hackett et al. (2015), about 73% of Muslim populations live in Muslim majority countries such as in the Middle East and North Africa and southern Asian countries. The data is presented as a percentage in the table and graph. Besides this information, the current study also followed the analytical method in which all the pertinent texts related to women's empowerment in the area of education and politics were analysed within the Islamic scholars' viewpoints. Finally, data has been analysed and briefly explained in an argumentative approach from past findings in related studies.

### 4. Literature Review

#### 4.1 Education

Islamic principles in the Qur'an and Prophetic tradition have empowered women in all aspects of life, either in the family or in society, especially in the area of education where they are treated equally to men (Jawad, 1998; Vidyasagar & Rea, 2004). According to Maududi (1981), Islam strongly encourages women to obtain both religious education and social branches of knowledge, i.e. agriculture, technology, politics, economics, and they must also be well-trained culturally. These dimensions are important and integral elements of social development. In addition, in relation to gaining an education, there is no preference given to men over women, rather; both are equally encouraged to get education (Malik, 1979; Haque, 2020). In this consequence, it is acknowledged that acquiring and acquisition of knowledge is part of Islamic teachings. The Qur'an did not put any distinction of pursuing education for men and women which shows the equal duty for every Muslim.

It is very unfortunate that, because of misunderstandings of Islamic principles and poor practice of socio-cultural norms created a block for women to be associated with societal affairs on a par with men, particularly in the field of education in Muslim countries (Ta'imah, 2005; AK, 2019). Even, in the Western world, intimate partner violence and a discriminatory mindset determine women's access in the family to education, nutrition, and healthcare. These behaviours impede women's participation in education, the workforce, and public service (O'Rourke, 2017). The common perception among people is that education is not necessary for women (T'imah, 2005), whereas, education has been highly 778adith778zed in Islamic sacred texts, such as the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions. In fact, it is obligatory for every individual Muslim to be educated. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) urged every Muslim to seek knowledge: it was narrated by Anas Bin Mālik, Prophet (p.b.u.h) said: "Seeking knowledge is made compulsory upon every individual Muslim (male and female)" (Al-Khurāsānī, 2003, vol. 3, 778adith no 1545).

Education for girls has been recognised as a fundamental element in creating strong economic growth and sustainable social development across the globe (Hill & Elisabeth, 1993). Many Muslim scholars like Imām Ghazālī and Muhammad 'Abduh have emphasised girl's education. In fact, they have argued that without educating girls, it is impossible to empower them and change their status and position in the family as well as in society (Saiful Islam, 2016). Imām Ghazālī defines education as "a process which enables an individual to distinguish between the truth and the false, the good and bad, and the right conduct and the evil doing" (Saiful Islam, 2016). Moreover, if women get more opportunity to obtain higher education it gives them a boost and enables them to participate in the workforce and politics. Hence, female education is a key indicator which minimises gender discrimination as well as increasing female autonomy in family and society (Inglehart &

Norris, 2003; AK, 2019; Jensen, 1995). From the Islamic point of view, if women achieve religious and social education, it helps them to become a good wife and mother, as well as good housekeeper (Maududi, 1981). It is also proven from the Islamic history that Allāh (SWT) sent the first revelation through Angel Gabriel to the Prophet (SAW) to 'read' (*'Iqra'*) (Sūrah al- 'Alaq, 1).

#### 4.2 Politics

Islamic teachings from the Qur'an and Prophetic traditions strongly emphasise women's participation in politics along with men (Surah al-Tawbah, 9:71). Traditional and contemporary Muslim scholars have agreed that women need to be associated with politics for the betterment of citizens' lives and a nation's development (Jawad, 1998; Abu Faris, 2000). Participation in politics is an obligatory action (*wājib*) for both men and women and it is based on the concept of vicegerent (*khalīfah*) and both are responsible to establish the commands of Allah (s.w.t) (Abu Faris, 2000), i.e. enjoying good deeds and forbidding evil, establishing salat (prayer), and paying zakat (charity) (Surah al-Baqarah, 2:30; Surah al-Tawbah, 9:71).

However, In Muslim societies, women's participation in the field of politics and leadership is still barely significant and it is often controlled by political parties and social norms as well as a lack of access to financial resources, information, and education (Rahman, 2014). For example, Turkey is one of the leading Muslim countries in today's world. But the position of women and their participation in education, economics, and politics is insignificant compared to the Western world. According to the World Economic Forum's gender gap index, Turkey ranked 131<sup>st</sup> among the 144 countries surveyed (Cinar & Kose, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2017).

In the traditions and cultures in south Asian societies like Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc, women's participation in politics is considered to be going against society (Rahman, 2017). According to Adeela Rehman, these Muslim societies believe that women are created to serve domestic roles and responsibilities (Sakuan, 2019). Hence, women must acknowledge that politics is a very tough task for them and that it is more appropriate for men. Women are considered less intelligent and weaker in policymaking for the country in comparison to their male counterparts (Rahman, 2017).

Women's minimal participation in the political arena is because of the influence of scholars who justify extremely limited social roles for women due to gender segregation (Moten, 2017). They "demand greater control over women's bodies, emphasising women's roles in procreation and call for women's submission to patriarchal values" (Afary, 2004). According to Keddie and Baron, these scholars always put pressure on the government to enforce public morality, ensure observance of religious rites, and tighten control over women (Moten, 2017).

On the other hand, Islam is very much affirmative towards women's participation in social development, especially in the field of politics. Islam accepts women's views in various aspects such as education, politics, social aspects, economics, and other areas (Abu Faris, 2000). Both men and women are entitled to ask the people to do good deeds for the betterment of everyone. They are also asked to raise their voice to stop evil practices within society. As Allāh (SWT) says in this regard:

Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity (Sūrah Āli 'imrān: 104), (Al-Hilali, & Khan, 1990).

Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allāh (Sūrah Āli 'imrān: 110), (Al-Hilali, & Khan, 1990).

Allah (SWT) further says that women's participation in politics is obligatory as shown in Sūrah al-Tawbah verse 71.

The believers, men and women, are *Auliyā'* (helpers, supporters, friends, protectors) of one another; they enjoin (on the people) *Al-Ma'rūf* (i.e. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do), and forbid (people) from *Al-Munkar* (i.e. Polytheism and disbelief of all kinds, and that Islam has forbidden); they perform *As-Salāt* (*Iqāmat as-Salāt*), and give the *Zakāt*, and obey Allāh and His Messenger (p.b.u.h). Allāh will have His Mercy on them. Surely Allāh is All-Mighty, All-Wise (Al-Hilali, & Khan, 1990).

In addition, the Prophet (SWT) also said that both men and women are entitled to establish '*al-amr bil-ma'rūf* and *wa nahyu 'anil-munkar*' in the family, society and, nation. He said:

The Messenger of Allāh (SWT) said: "Whoever among you sees an evil action, let him change it with his hand (by taking action); if he cannot, then with his tongue (by speaking out); and if he cannot, then with his heart (by hating it and feeling it is wrong), and that is the weakest of faith" (Al-Hajjāj, 2007, vol. 1, hadīth no: 78).

The above verses and the Prophetic traditions clearly indicate that men and women are both entitled to participate in social affairs for the betterment of the society and nation. In the exegesis of the first verse, al-Rāzī and al-Qurtubī say, the word '*minkum*' is not *li-al-tab'īd* (replacement); rather it is '*bayaniyyah*' or an imperative command for both men and women. Their responsibility in society is to conduct or carry out '*al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf* and *wa nahyu anil-munkar*' which is described in the following verse. In fact, it is an obligatory task for every *mukallaf* in the family as well as in society (Al-Qurtubī, 1964; Al-Rāzī, 1420H).

In the exegesis (*Tafsīr*) of the above verse, scholars have asserted that this verse is a clear message for every individual Muslim male and female that they must take part in politics for the betterment of their nation. According to Sayyid Qutub, the nature of the male believer (*Mu'minīn*) and the nature of female believer (*Mu'mināt*) are the same as the nature of unity and the nature of solidarity. He further asserts that if hypocritical men and hypocritical women come together to destroy the society and the commands of Allāh (SWT), then why don't believing men and believing women come together to do righteous deeds and abolish all forms of bad actions from the society (Qutub, 1412H, vol.3)? Moreover, Muhammad Shaltūt clarifies that the meaning of '*Al-'amru bil-ma'rūf* and *wa-yan hawna 'anil munkar*' shows the leading responsibilities for men and women as vicegerents of Allāh on this earth. In this regard, both believing men and women are equally responsible to implement these commands of Allāh (SWT) on this earth (Shaltūt, 2001; al-Qaradāwī, 1994).

During the era of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) and the *Khulafā'*, women used to participate in every crucial sphere of the society, especially in politics. Women shared their views without any reservation and sometimes the view went against the leader. In fact, on certain occasions where the leader himself did not have a proper idea for a special issue, he used to accept the idea of women in resolving the problem. For example:

When the writing of the peace treaty was concluded, Allāh's Messenger said to his companions, "Get up and slaughter your sacrifices and get your head shaved". By Allāh, none of them got up, and the Prophet (p.b.u.h) repeated his order thrice. When none of them got up, he left them and went to Umm Salama and told her of the people's attitudes towards him. Umm Salama said, "O the Prophet of Allāh! Do you want your order to be carried out? Go out and don't say a word to anybody until you have slaughtered your sacrifice and call your barber to shave your head". So, the Prophet (p.b.u.h) went out and did not talk to any one of them until he did that, i.e. slaughtered his sacrifice and called his barber who shaved his head. Seeing that, the companions of the Prophet (p.b.u.h) got up, slaughtered their sacrifices and started shaving the heads of one another (Sahīh al-bukhārī, 1997, vol.3, hadīth 2731).

This *hadīth* discusses the political contract which was made by the Prophet (p.b.u.h) and Quraish in 628 A.D. In 6<sup>th</sup> year of *hijrah*. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) and 1400 companions went to Mecca to perform the Umrah, but they were obstructed by the Quraish and were prohibited from performing the Umrah. After that, both parties had a long discussion regarding a 'peace treaty or peaceful agreement' between Mecca and Madinah. One of the

conditions of the treaty of *Hudaybiyah* prohibited the Muslims from performing Umrah in that particular year. Consequently, the Prophet (p.b.u.h) requested His companions to stand up, do the slaughter and shave their heads. No one stood up and followed His command. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) was trying to resolve the situation so immediately he consulted with his wife Umm Salmah regarding the issue. She gave a wise idea which solved the problem and they went back to Madinah (Al-Dimashqī, 1976, vol. 3). This *hadīth* is clear evidence that a woman's opinion is valued and considered in solving social problems, particularly relating to political conflicts which is derived from the Prophet's (p.b.u.h) action in consulting his wife 'Umm Salamah (R.A) regarding the incident of *sulh hudaibiyah*. The view of 'Umm Salamah (R.A) solved the issue between the Prophet (SWT) and his companions and led the way for a successful solution (Haque & Osmani, 2017).

Moreover, during the era of *Khulafā'*, they also used to consult women about societal affairs. For instance, second Caliph of Islam 'Umar (R.A) did not take any decision regarding women's issues unless he consulted with women, especially on the matter of matrimonial life (Al-Zuhaylī, 2008). Another example of women's participation in politics is when 'Ā'isha (R.A) participated in the Battle of Camel (*gajwah Jamal*) against the fourth Caliph of Islam 'Ālī (R.A) on the issue of third Caliph of Islam Othman's uncertain death (Abu Faris, 2000).

Hence, there is a very clear message from this verse that both men and women are commanded by Allāh (SWT) to participate in politics after fulfilling their household responsibilities. Participation in politics is an obligatory task for men and women as vicegerents on this earth to establish a well-balanced nation in every aspect of life.

## 5. Findings and Discussion

### 5.1 Women's Education

Figure 1 presents women's literacy rates in several Muslim countries in Asia and in MENA countries which are under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). According to the figure, it is cleared that Muslim women do receive education in all countries. More than 90% of women are educated in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Likewise, Bangladesh shows a sharp increase after 2010. These findings are consistent with Mcclendon et al. (2018), who stated that Muslim women had better level of educational achievements and enhancements in richer countries than poorer countries (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Although all countries are showing growth in women's education, MENA and Pakistan are showing a steady growth. The growth percentage in women's education in the highlighted countries can be found in Appendix A. the growth of women's education is also recorded and proven in past studies. For example, despite the strict dress code for women and lack of mobility in Gulf countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, young women's enrolment is sharply increasing in colleges (Gorney, 2016; Paschyn, 2014), Muslim women's education levels have increased on the whole in the Middle East and North Africa (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Furthermore, young women are more educated than men in the Gulf countries, yet they are not actively participating in the context of national politics (Mcclendon et al., 2018). This pattern was also noted among Arab women in the United States (Paschyn, 2014). Conversely, a few studies have found that women in Muslim majority countries have a lower level of participation in education, lower rates of employment, less participation in national politics, and wider gender gaps compared with other countries (Cherif, 2010; Rahman, 2012). Similarly, a few studies have also found low level of women's education compared to other non-Muslim countries (Feldmann, 2016; Østby, Urdal, & Rudolfsen, 2016). However, Islam has played a role in education inequalities, encouraging societies to reduce culture clashes between traditional Islamic values and gender equality (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Likewise, in the last few decades, it has been observed the progress and development of Muslim women around the world comprising intellect, education, political engagement, and many more indicators (AK, 2019).

There is a debate on religion's role in women's education in Muslim majority countries. Hence, economic development, not religious constraints or cultural attitudes, is the key factor of Muslim women's education levels in a country (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Likewise, economic and structural obstacles may restrain countries and

regions from achieving universal or conventional education or enhancement of enrolment in schools to western levels (Østby et al., 2016). Women's lower level of education in Muslim countries is caused by economic situations and structural constraints rather than religious or cultural impacts (Mcclendon, Hackett, Potančoková, Stonawski, & Skirbekk, 2018). These findings reflected the findings of this study; it clearly shows how economic development links to the growth in women's education in Malaysia, Indonesia, and recently Bangladesh. Economic development is a tool of improving the education sector through access of schooling, resources of education, and quality that relates to the flexibility and advancement of women's education (Østby et al., 2016).

Many African governments, following independence, have resisted distributing resources for universal education due to economic slumps, escalating foreign debts, and rapid growth of populations (Launay, 2016). Indeed, the majority of Muslims are focused in the Middle East, Africa, and southern Asia, areas which are comparably economically less developed and less democratic than other countries in the world (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Interestingly, education is the key indicator involved in all kinds of economic activities as well as socio-economic factors including political activities; in addition, mothers are the fundamental players in the education, socialisation and well-being of their children (Ross & Mirowsky, 2010). In reality, Islam does not restrict women in gathering knowledge or achieving an education, at least not globally. Even though Muslim countries have lower levels of growth in education compared to other religious group, they is still progress (Mcclendon et al., 2018). Thus, it is clearly proved that education levels are, directly or indirectly, linked to the economic condition of a country. Islam, or any other religion does not restrict women from participating in educational programs as long as they follow the designated criteria set out by their religious principles.




Figure 1: Women's literacy in Muslim countries; Source: World Bank Data (2010-2018)

## 5.2 Political Participation

There is a significant growth of Muslim women participants in political decision-making in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) (CMI, 2018). Similarly, Muslim majority countries in Asia especially Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia are showing an uptrend in women's participation in parliament, except Pakistan which has been decreasing recently (Figure 1, see the percentage rate in Appendix B). In line with the general trend, there is an increase of women participating in MENA countries (Figure 1). Figure 2 presents the percentage of women's participation in national parliaments in MENA countries. What is noteworthy is that Qatar and Yemen

have no women participating in their national parliaments. Saudi Arabia has recorded participation at 19.9%, followed by 30.5% in Sudan, 31.6% in Algeria, 31.3% Tunisia, and 17% Morocco. Furthermore, the overall percentage of women participating in politics in MENA countries is recorded at 18%, as compared to the global rate which is 22%. Surprisingly, Pakistan has shown a decreasing number of women in politics after 2011. It might be due to the political instability in the country, which may have discouraged women from engaging in politics.

The findings from both figures present the growth of women's participation in politics in Muslim countries. Although the growth is not even significant, compared to the global rate of women's participation, it is quite considerable that women are prone to participate in national parliaments if the constitutions allow it. It is still pegged to the domination of men in the constitution, instead of religious perspectives. Furthermore, the growth and active participation of women in several Muslim countries strongly represents that Islam does not prohibit or present an obstacle to the participation of women in politics. It is a system that has dominated in such countries, mainly due to social stigma, whereas men dominate the society and believe that women's participation in politics is against social norms (Rahman, 2017; Sakuan 2019). Additionally, democratic countries have supportive tendencies of gender equality and liberal sexual attitudes (Inglehart & Norris, 2009), for instance in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh. The findings of this study support past studies where women participate at the highest level of political decision-making endeavours and holding institutional power (AK, 2019). Indeed, women's involvement in politics is commensurate with levels of education and mobility of employment outside the home (Allwood & Wadia, 2000). Therefore, it is clearly denoted that participation in politics by women somehow is disturbed by social stigma and a lack of education.

In fact, democracy plays an important role in nurturing unbiased gender education, middle-class politicians, and opportunities for women to mobilise and impact on policy making decisions in a country (Cooray & Potrafke, 2011; Østby et al., 2016). Also, democracy has played an important role in educating women widely through ensuring equal rights and fair distribution of resources. For example; women in government have promoted participation in politics and education through providing opportunities as well as by being an inspiring female leader, such as Bensir Bhutto in Pakistan, and Begum Khaleda Sia and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh. Similarly, highly educated women are pressing to reform policies to encourage gender equality and opportunities for women's education in several countries (Gorney, 2016; Power, 2015).




Figure 2: Women's participation in national parliament in Muslim countries; Source: World Development Indicators




Figure 3: Women's political participation in MENA countries; Source: (CMI, 2018)

## 6. Conclusion

This study has presented the level of women's education and participation in national parliaments in a few Muslim majority countries. From the findings, it is noticeable that, under-developed and non-democratic countries are still far behind in their levels of women's enrolment in the field of education and active participation in national politics as compared to their male counterparts. However, in democratic countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, there are signs of significant improvement in both educational levels and participation in national parliaments of women. Surprisingly, although Pakistan is the second largest Muslim populated country among the Muslim world, women's positions are still left behind in both sectors. In addition, based on the exploration and discussion of this study, it is observed that Islam is very affirmative and gives much emphasis on women's extensive participation in both the educational and political sectors. Unfortunately, the overall facts and the situation of women's positions in Muslim majority countries shows that women are often deprived of active participation in the fields of education and politics. The lack of immersion of women in both sectors causes misinterpretations of the sacred text related to women's participation in social and familial tasks, cultural traditions, and the patriarchal social system.

Thus, women may develop their position in terms of education and empowerment in both politics and social aspects, observing and adopting best civilizations through focusing, following, and perceiving. Development can be acquired by individuals through following the first verse of Al-Qur'an, "Iqra" (Surah al-'Alaq: 1) which means not only to read, but also to understand and follow; it sharply denotes the importance of education and wisdom for all. Undoubtedly, the verse was not indicated only for men. Furthermore, Allah (SWT) clearly indicates women's active participation in the field of politics next to their male counterparts after fulfilling their household tasks according to their capabilities and skills (Surah al-Tawbah: 71). Muslim exegetists assert, regarding verse 71 of Surah al-tawbah, like al-Rāzī and al-Qurtubī say, the word '*minkum*' is not *li-al-tab'īd* (replacement); rather it is '*bayaniyyah*' or an imperative command for both men and women. Their responsibility in society is to conduct or carry out '*al-amr bil-ma'rūf* (enjoining what is right) and *wa nahyu 'anil-munkar*' (forbidding what is wrong), which is described in the verse. In fact, it is an obligatory task for every *mukallaf* in the family as well as in society (Al-Qurtubī, 1964; Al-Rāzī, 1420H).

Finally, it can be concluded that men and women both are the creation of Allah and they both are entitled to take extensive participation in education and politics to fulfil their individual and societal development as vicegerents on this Earth. It is next to impossible for a nation to be developed in all demographic indicators and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the 21<sup>st</sup> century without involving the full two halves of their population, women and men, in these two sectors. Moreover, the Muslim world should create a congenial environment whereby men and women can take active involvement in the fields of education and politics, which will endeavour to raise their quality of life in individual and societal affairs. Likewise, parents, society, and the country should create more opportunities for women to achieve education through enrolling girls in the primary to tertiary levels of education.

## 7. Implications and Policy Recommendations

The findings of this study have given several implications for both Muslim populations as well as policy makers for the Muslim world. Muslim populations may find these findings to be a lesson and find motivation to promote education and political participation regardless of gender, especially so that women may understand their equal rights and opportunities as adopted in the greatest Islamic knowledge. The findings may also benefit the Muslim world through providing concrete texts from Islamic literature that highly encourage both men and women to be educated and to actively participate in political endeavours in order to facilitate and contribute in the development of an economy. Policy makers may understand the extensive lessons of Islamic jurisprudence towards women's right to an education and to participate in politics and societal affairs. As a result, they can influence women to participate in both educational institutes and political endeavours through creating equal opportunities for both men and women. Finally, the findings of this study provide extensive literature from the Islamic point of view relating to women's participation in the fields of education and politics.

However, this study has several limitations which leaves scope for future studies. Firstly, this study is mainly based on secondary data that has been adapted from World Bank statistics, which may not include significant and in-depth analysis. As a result, future studies may adopt advanced methodology and extensive data for further analysis. Secondly, this study only includes a few countries instead of all Muslim majority countries in the world. Therefore, future studies may include more countries. Finally, future studies may adopt primary data with empirical studies to improve the findings.

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**Appendix A: Women's literacy in Muslim countries**

Year	1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Bangladesh	..	..	..	55.1	54.2	57.8	57.9	62.3	69.9	70.1	71.2
Indonesia	75.3	..	..	90.1	..	..	93.5	93.3	93.6	..	94.0
Malaysia	..	85.4	90.7	..	..	..	..	..	91.1	..	..
Pakistan	..	..	41.0	42.0	43.1	42.0	44.3	..	..	46.5	..
Middle East & North Africa	45.5	59.1	68.6	69.6	70.3	70.8	71.4	72.3	71.0	72.3	72.3

**Appendix B: Women's participation in national parliament in Muslim countries**

Year	1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Bangladesh	10.3	9.1	18.6	19.7	19.7	19.7	19.8	20.0	20.0	20.3	20.3	20.6
Indonesia	12.4	8.0	18.0	18.2	18.6	18.6	16.9	17.1	17.1	19.8	19.8	17.4
Malaysia	5.1	10.4	9.9	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	10.4	13.9	14.4
Pakistan	10.1	..	22.2	22.5	20.7	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.6	20.2
Middle East & North Africa	3.8	4.2	10.4	10.1	13.1	15.9	16.1	16.4	17.0	16.2	16.6	16.8



# Sanctioning Arabia through the Caesar Act: Economic Violence & Imperial Anxieties in the “Middle East”

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## Abstract

This paper appraises the regional impact of economic sanctions initiated by the United States against the Syrian Arab Republic by analyzing the ‘spillover effect’ of such measures elsewhere in the Levant. Specifically, this paper measures the impact of the ongoing American sanctions regime in Jordan and Lebanon. Excising the Syrian market from the regional economy has had -and will continue to have- ruinous consequences for Lebanese and Jordanian balance sheets. This eventuality redounds to the benefit of the United States, which seeks to extend its hegemony over a weak and divided Middle East. America’s ‘off-shore balancing’ act in the Syrian context should thus be analyzed through the lens of the realist school of IR theory. Using a hybridized research methodology incorporating qualitative and quantitative analysis, this article examines the myriad effects of the embargo while deconstructing the epistemological and theoretical frameworks underpinning the theory and practice of contemporary ‘liberal- interventionist’ discourse.

**Keywords:** Sanctions, Syria, Regional Economy, Hegemony, Liberal-Interventionism, Realpolitik

“The real challenge is not to get the humanitarian interventionists to stake a position, but rather to get them to maintain that position when events and processes go exactly counter to all their stated ideals...and when ‘protection’ becomes a mere fig-leaf for regime change.”

- Maximilian Forte (2012) in *Slouching Towards Sirte: NATO’s War on Libya and Africa*

## Introduction

Any attempt to appraise the significance of western imposed economic violence, within the targeted polity or beyond its borders, must include a critique of the systems of knowledge and power underpinning the strategic vision of American policy makers. Seen from an American setting, humanitarian language is commonly used as a skeleton key to push open the doorway to international sanctions—or even to justify the occasional volley of cruise missiles. Action against Syria, for example, is curated for U.S. media consumption as an essentially upright, necessary, and just enterprise. Contemporary liberal-interventionism, which functions as an expression of

neocolonial western power in the international arena, relies on the same rhetorical devices and categories of analysis used by the ‘territorial imperialists’ of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Euro-American tradition.

While appraising theoretical and discursive expressions of imperial power, this article places the economic fallout of the Syrian crisis in its proper regional context. Serious analysts agree that the Syrian population stands to suffer terrible consequences as the American embargo intensifies. However, the broader regional ramifications remain relatively understudied in the literature. Despite the ruinous impact of the embargo within and beyond Syria’s borders, America and its European allies justify such measures as part of a broader campaign of isolation designed to “keep Damascus weak and poor” (Landis, 2017). In so doing, western policy makers hope to rob Russia, Iran, and Syria of an outright military victory.

The indiscriminate impact of the embargo, and the Caesar Act in particular, appears to have escaped serious scrutiny in the western academy, and in most western newspapers. The Caesar Act expands on the existing sanctions regime in that it explicitly targets Syria’s “domestic production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products,” and any person or entity who “knowingly, directly or indirectly, provides significant construction or engineering services to the Government of Syria” (H.R.31, 2020). In practical terms, these new restrictions target the totality of the Syrian economy and reconstruction effort. Local reports reveal that Syrians with the means to do so have begun stockpiling essential goods, anticipating the catastrophic fallout of the Caesar Act (Syrian Autonomous Journalists, 2020). Ahmed, a Syrian employed in the private sector, remarked that “living has become more difficult, and what is available today may be lost tomorrow with the implementation of the law” (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2020). According to Zain Al-Abideen Taraf, a beekeeper living in the Latakia governorate, operational costs have skyrocketed “due to the economic siege on Syria. Understandably, the ongoing Coronavirus crisis has taken the situation from bad to worse” (Al-Tamimi, 2020).

These experiences are typical; some Syrians have had to close their businesses completely or take multiple jobs. Many face serious and worsening food insecurity (Al-Dahan and Francis, 2020). At present, the average monthly salary in Syria only “buys slightly more than two watermelons, or if one really pushes the boat out, a kilo and a half of *mabrumeh*, a popular local delicacy” (Makki, 2020). The ongoing embargo has exacerbated these difficulties: American actions in Syria are emblematic of a strategy in the Middle East that will, by design, lead to “...instability, (and) turmoil” elsewhere. (Moussalanejad, 2017, pp. 20). At present, Syria represents the central axis upon which America’s security posture in the Levant rests; what happens in Syria will invariably affect the wider region. As American politicians accelerate the economic decimation of Syria, its neighbors—particularly Jordan and Lebanon<sup>2</sup>—look to the future with great trepidation and uncertainty.

### **When Lebanon Sneezes, Syria Catches Cold**

Deep cultural, religious, political, economic, and familial ties define the connections between Syria and Lebanon. During the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Beirut emerged as one of Ottoman Syria’s most profitable port cities, a critical gear in the Ottoman economic machine and a magnet for foreign direct investment (Henssen, 2005). Cotton, silk, and other high margin commodities destined for Europe departed on ships loaded in Beirut. Concurrent revenue inflows fed the growth of Beirut, while also stimulating the economy of the Syrian hinterland. As Jamal Wakim points out, “...the Damascene upper class...became partners of the Beirut mercantile elite in the transit trade coming from Beirut and passing through Damascus on its way to Jordan and the Arabian peninsula”(Wakim, 2013). The separation of Lebanon from Syria in 1918 drew the ire of many Syrian nationalists, although extensive political, social, and economic ties linking Damascus to Beirut remained unshaken.

The bureaucratic machinery of the French administration echoed the logic of natural Syrian-Lebanese collaboration. Until 1948, nearly 30 years after the colonialist partition of ‘Greater Syria,’ Syria and Lebanon used the same currency (Banque Du Liban, 2008). Additionally, “customs administration, together with a number of other departments...fell under the control of the High Commissioner...they were considered matters of common interest to all parts of the Mandate territories and could not therefore be wholly controlled by the governments of the different regions” (Seale, 1968, pp. 94). The relevant historical context deserves study as it has shaped the commercial nexus now between Damascus and Beirut. Thus, any fiscal strictures applied against Syria will also

have a cascading, adverse effect on the Lebanese economy. On the other hand, deteriorating economic conditions in Lebanon have also had a regional, rather than strictly national, impact.

Through the 20<sup>th</sup> century Syria continued to wield tremendous influence in Lebanon, culminating in Syria's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. Syrian forces remained in Lebanon from 1975 until 2005<sup>3</sup>. This provided ample opportunity for Syrians to permeate the Lebanese financial sector and engage in interstate commerce through comparatively liberal Lebanese banks. This reliance on (and familiarity with) Lebanese markets and banks helped Syria overcome American sanctions prior to and during the early stages of the Syrian Civil War. But the recent economic crisis in Lebanon has had an outsized impact on overleveraged Syrian investors, especially those with large deposits held in Lebanese banks.

As a means of accessing global capital markets, circumventing sanctions, and procuring foreign currency, many Syrians have developed a preferred reliance on the Lebanese banking system over the years. This includes both private citizens and those investing on behalf of the Syrian state. With their commitment to banking secrecy and high rates of return (measured both in interest earned on private accounts and on the purchase of government bonds) Lebanese banks have for decades attracted investment from around the world (IMF, 2020)<sup>4</sup>. Syrian investors in particular have flocked to Lebanese banks, especially since the end of the Lebanese Civil War. For example, prominent Lebanese institutions such as *Blom Bank* owe their existence to substantial support from Syrian investors (Cochrane, 2019). Indeed, "a study prepared by Dr. Ali Kanaan, supervisor of the Department of Banking and Insurance at the Damascus University, shows that Syrian deposits exceed 25.4 percent of total deposits in Lebanese banks" (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2020)<sup>5</sup>. Others estimate that nearly 80% of all Syrian savings invested abroad remains trapped in Lebanon (Corniche, 2019)<sup>6</sup>. For Syrians, the recent collapse of the Lebanese banking sector has effectively closed off one of the few remaining doorways to the global economy. Worse still, capital controls have effectively frozen Syrian deposits, rendering them inaccessible. Because the Syrian economy has become increasingly reliant on remittances, (Al-Watan, 2018) recent changes dealt a catastrophic blow to Syrian families who depend on money transfers from Lebanon (Advani, 2019). Such symbiosis helps underscore the difficulties in viewing these as independent economies, and how decoupling the Lebanese economy from that of Syria is not a practicable goal. The most recent collapse of the Syrian Pound, which coincided with the start of the *thawra* in Lebanon, reflects a tendency to link Syria's economic decisions to the Lebanese financial climate.

A myriad of issues accelerated Lebanon's descent into a deep economic depression, and the ramifications for Syria are highly significant. A bloated banking sector, rampant corruption, dependence on expensive imports, persistently large current account deficits, emigration, the Coronavirus pandemic and instability in Syria have all contributed to the collapse of the Lebanese economy (World Bank, 2019). While a closer examination of the ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon falls beyond the scope of this study, it is important to consider the impact of Lebanon's crisis inside Syria. Given the deeply intertwined economic ties linking Lebanon to Syria, the implementation of the ill-timed Caesar Act promises to wreak havoc on both countries at a moment when both Damascus and Beirut are especially vulnerable. As we shall see, the line between private trade and business with the Syrian government remains blurry even after nearly a decade of civil war.

For example, in 2019 Lebanon and Syria conducted public and private transactions amounting to over \$600 million (Al-Modon, 2020). This includes extensive Lebanese imports of electricity produced in Syrian power plants, amounting in 2019 to over 200 kilowatts (Yassine 2020). Additionally, 100 percent of Lebanon's overland trade must necessarily cross through Syrian territory; customs duties paid to the Syrian state would under the Caesar Act constitute a violation of the sanctions regime. One Lebanese observer pointedly argued that "if the law is applied without exceptions that take into account the interest of the Lebanese state and the needs of its citizens, Caesar's law will constitute the final blow to the Lebanese economy" (Al-Modon, 2020). Other Lebanese columnists have a similarly ominous outlook. Even if Lebanon were able to abide by the new restrictions on trade with its neighbor and third largest trading partner, "losing Syria would be debilitating for the Lebanese economy. Therefore, as it seems, Lebanon will, directly or indirectly, be badly affected by the Caesar Act" (Yassine, 2020). Aside from the ruinous impact such measures will have on Lebanese entrepreneurs, small depositors and government institutions, the Caesar Act also represents an existential threat to the 1.5 million refugees languishing in shanty towns and on the streets of Lebanon's urban centers.

Aside from providing a disincentive to return to Syria, the implementation of the Caesar Act will undermine the capacity of the Lebanese state to assist Syrian refugees. At present, “Lebanon hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees per capita, with a Government estimate of 1.5 million Syrian refugees” (UNHCR, 2020). While “Lebanon’s response to the arrival and protracted stay of such a large refugee population is unprecedented, having been recognized worldwide as a remarkable contribution to ‘public good’” (UNHCR, 2020), the costs shouldered by Lebanon have been enormous (Xinhua, 2020). While a variety of factors have prolonged the refugee crisis in Lebanon, the imposition of punitive economic sanctions on Syria has contributed to the delay in reconstruction and the resumption of normal economic activity. That the broader socio-economic impact of such measures would spill over into Lebanon should come as no surprise. With their country half-destroyed and languishing under a suffocating economic embargo, many refugees see little benefit in returning to Syria.

It is also worth highlighting the impact of the Caesar Act on Lebanese consumers and entrepreneurs. Beleaguered Lebanese small-business owners will soon face a myriad of obstacles due to trade restrictions targeting Syrians and Syrian firms. For the average consumer, this translates into higher prices and shortages. Despite existing sanctions and the upcoming implementation of the Caesar Act, some Lebanese companies continue to explore investment opportunities in Syria. 41 Lebanese companies attended the 2018 Rebuild Syria Exhibition held in Damascus; companies from South Korea, the UAE, India, Italy and Russia also participated (Alrifai, 2019). Responding to international, non-aligned investment in Syria’s reconstruction efforts, an expatriate Syrian think-tanker living in the United States argued that “the U.S. Treasury Department should pay closer attention to (these companies). In particular, it should monitor the activities of companies that may be violating U.S. sanctions orders. Washington should also push its allies and the wider international community *to hold off on full-scale reconstruction in Syria until true political transition has been achieved*” (Alrifai, 2020, emphases added). In light of the insurgents’ failure to seriously threaten the survival of the Damascus government during the climax of the conflict, the notion that withholding reconstruction aid – or worse, discouraging investment in Syria – might bring about a ‘true political transition’ seems dubious at best. Expressing his disdain for Syrian lives more openly, James Jeffrey suggested in 2018 that America should “make life as miserable as possible for that flopping cadaver of a regime...This status quo is not only acceptable but possibly favorable given the otherwise lack of overwhelming leverage to secure a better outcome” (Lister, 2018).

Such comments reveal American disregard for Lebanese interests, since a continuation of the status quo will certainly undermine efforts to get Lebanon’s struggling economy back on track. Some have even suggested that economic damage inflicted on Lebanon via the Caesar Act may be a feature (rather than a bug) embedded within the tranches of new trade restrictions. One prominent ‘expert’ at the Foundation in Defense of Democracies (FDD) succinctly summed up America’s preferred outcome, arguing that “Lebanon’s stability, insofar as it means the stability of the Iranian order and forward missile base there, is not, in fact, a US interest” (Badran, 2017). Unfortunately, the fallout of such measures also poses a threat to the economic future of Syria’s neighbor to the south: Jordan.

### **Amman’s Northern Lung: Sanctioning the Jordanian Economy**

Aside from Lebanon, no country in the Arab world has been more profoundly impacted by the crisis in Syria than Jordan. Despite withdrawing its ambassador from Damascus in 2012, Jordan has maintained official diplomatic relations with Syria throughout the civil war (Jordan Times, 2020). Jordan’s recent appointment of a new *chargé d’affaires* to its embassy in Syria indicates a shared interest in promoting commercial engagement and collaboration on security issues. Syria was, after all, Jordan’s largest Arab trading partner prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 (Al-Makahleh, 2019). The Nasib border crossing, Jordan’s largest overland trade artery, “provided \$1.5 billion (Dh5.5bn) in annual trade before the war” (Luck, 2019). Like Lebanon, Jordan also hosts hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees, who “as a group and on an individual basis, (represent) the lowest-paid workers in Jordan” (Lockhart, 2019, pp. 16). Nevertheless, tensions remain fraught between Damascus and Amman. Contrasting sharply with Syria’s history of close relations with Lebanon, a tradition of mutual mistrust and suspicion has plagued relations between Jordan and Syria for several decades.

During the Cold War, Jordan's close ties to the United States placed it at odds with the pro-Soviet Syrian Ba'athist government. When the Jordanian monarchy violently expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970 -an event known as Black September- Syria launched a limited incursion into Jordanian territory in support of the Palestinians. During the 1980s, Syria and Jordan found themselves supporting opposite sides in the Iran-Iraq War (Seale, 1988, pp. 462). During the period known as the 'Arab Spring,' King Abdullah II inserted himself in the debate surrounding Syria's political future, publicly calling for President Bashar Al-Assad to resign (Al-Jazeera, 2011). At the same time, Jordan was temporarily used as a training and logistic extending corridor in concert with the CIA under the codename Operation Timber Sycamore (Younes, 2016). The CIA eventually scuttled the program, but not before some armaments fell into the hands of *death squads* pejoratively named "Islamic fighters" or members of an "Arab-Islamic Caliphate" (Inowloki, 2017; Al-Kassimi, TBA). For some time thereafter, American intelligence officers based in Amman maintained close ties with "Islamist terrorists" who had once benefited from CIA largess; these include war criminals like Manaf Fahad Al-Deiri, among others (Al-Tamimi, 2020). Yet as the tide of the war began to turn, Jordan adopted a gradualist return to neutrality with the return of Syrian government troops to Daraa, Sweida, and Quneitra during the summer of 2018 and with King Abdullah II taking an unequivocal legal stance against the transgression of Jordanian sovereignty with foreign intelligence agencies using the Military Operations Center (MOC) in Amman as a launching pad and intel hub for "Islamist training". These developments foreshadow a renewed and quiet reconciliation between two vital Arab civilizational bastions – Amman and Damascus (i.e., Jund al-Sham and Jund al-Urdunn).

Political differences due to the civil war have at times obscured the myriad areas in which Syria-Jordan interests overlap in fundamental ways. As we analyze the regional impact of so-called 'targeted' sanctions directed against the 'Asad regime,' it is necessary to explore these arenas of possible cooperation and the role of western sanctions in undermining Jordanian political and economic interests. To that end, we must turn our attention to the state of Jordan's economy and its prospects for real organic growth absent a resumption of normal trade relations with Syria. Unfortunately, punitive sanctions directed against Damascus fail to take into account Jordan's economic health or Syria's natural role as Jordan's primary regional trading partner. The precarious state of the Jordanian economy and its overreliance on foreign aid left the monarchy vulnerable to external pressure, which has largely succeeded in undermining efforts to bring about a broader rapprochement between Jordan and its northern neighbor. Additional sanctions will continue to hamper overland trade not only with Syria but also Turkey and the European Union. It is this broader regional picture, and the consequences of western economic violence as experienced by Jordan and Jordanians, that deserves closer scrutiny.

While government troops swept through southern Syria during the summer of 2018, Jordan experienced a sustained period of civil unrest due to worsening economic conditions. These protests exposed the deep structural weaknesses plaguing the Jordanian economy, weaknesses which have been exacerbated by the fallout from the Syrian Civil War. The catalyst for the 2018 demonstrations was the passage of a controversial tax bill in the Jordanian parliament, one which included sweeping tax hikes as well as austerity measures targeting subsidies for food and energy (Al-Jazeera, 2018). It was believed that by cutting public expenditures, the Jordanian government could tackle its unsustainable debt crisis and stimulate economic growth. Jordan's debt to GDP ratio stands at nearly 99 percent as of 2019, while underlying economic growth remains negligible (World Bank, 2019). Some observers blamed the government for failing to address the stubbornly high unemployment rate. Others blamed the inflexible approach taken by the IMF, which essentially blackmailed the Jordanian government into passing painful austerity measures in exchange for badly needed aid<sup>7</sup>. By the summer of 2018 Jordan's unemployment rate climbed to over 18 percent; at the time of writing, nearly 1 in 5 Jordanians, or roughly 20 percent of the population, remains out of work (World Bank, 2019). Additionally, the ongoing refugee crisis, which costs the Jordanian economy billions of dollars each year, has had a ruinous impact on the Jordan's economic health (Malkawi, 2016). High unemployment, an out of control debt crisis, caring for nearly 700,000 Syrian refugees, and a dependence on handouts from foreign powers have collectively led to the virtual implosion of the Jordanian economy.

The available data seems to forecast a bleak future for the Arab Hashemite kingdom. Underlying structural weaknesses embedded within the foundations of Jordan's economy aside, the ongoing crisis in Syria has contributed to sluggish economic growth. The myriad effects of the war, ranging from the presence of refugees to the closure of critical overland trade routes, continue to plague an economy already teetering on the brink of collapse. According to the World Bank, "transit trade (through Syria) is large, accounting for about 11 percent of



Jordan's exports and 30 percent of its imports" (World Bank, 2013). Jordan's massive reliance on imports, especially given its weak industrial infrastructure, only serves to hinder future economic growth. Despite the reopening of the Nasib border crossing in 2018, overland trade has ground to a virtual standstill. Security concerns persist, as do anxieties related to ongoing and future sanctions directed against Syria, including the Caesar Act (Abdul-Jalil, 2018). In an effort to remain in the good graces of the United States, Jordan has thus far proven reluctant to revamp trade ties with Damascus. But in a recent interview, Jordanian member of parliament Qais Zayadin lamented America's handling of the Syrian issue, arguing that Americans "...are tens of thousands of miles away, you can afford not to have a relationship with Syria. We do not have this luxury" (Luck, 2019).

It is axiomatic that ongoing efforts to strangle Jordan's natural commercial ties to and through Syria represent a threat to Jordanian interests. Rather than promote regional participation in Syria's reconstruction, which would encourage refugee repatriation while opening new markets for Jordanian investors, the United States continues to erect barriers designed to undermine economic integration and inter-state collaboration (Al-Sabaileh, 2020). Faced with defeat in Syria after having failed to overthrow the government through proxy warfare and overt occupation, intransigent American rejectionism serves only to undermine the Jordanian economy while threatening regional peace and security. Considering the inherent weakness of Jordan's economy and the myriad challenges it faces, heaping on more pressure in the form of sanctions against Syria may eventually threaten the stability of the Hashemite kingdom.

Destroying what remains of the Syrian economy while effectively sealing off Syrian markets from regional investors has already had a reverberative impact elsewhere. America's callous disregard for Jordanian interests may belie a more sinister tertiary motive behind the imposition of current and future sanctions against Syria. For the United States, keeping Jordan hooked on handouts carries strategic advantages, whereas a healthy, independent Jordanian economy may empower its leadership politically and encourage a more activist foreign policy. As it stands, Jordan receives nearly 2 billion dollars each year from the United States (USAID, 2018). This desperately needed aid functions as a form of economic blackmail, leveraged by the United States as a means of purchasing Amman's political acquiescence. Setting aside the question of trade relations with Syria, consider Jordan's passive inaction in the aftermath of America's decision to open an embassy in Jerusalem. Settler-colonial expansionism and ethnic cleansing in southern Bilad al-Sham (i.e., *de facto* Palestine) are particularly sensitive issues for Jordan, especially considering the preponderance of Arab-Palestinians residing east of the Jordan River: over half of Jordan's population is of Arab-Palestinian origin (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Should Jordan take proactive steps to prevent the illegal and immoral seizure of Arab-Palestinian territory in the Jordan River Valley, for example, America may feel inclined to freeze its 'assistance.' This is manifest with King Abdullah II announcing in November 2019 his refusal to renew a 25-year deal allowing Israeli farmers to enter an area known as *Baquora* to harvest their crops including special provisions allowing Israeli farmers to work the land without visas (Khoury, 2019). It therefore stands to reason that propping up a weak, pliable government in Jordan furthers American interests far more than the emergence of a self-reliant and economically independent Jordan would. So long as the Jordanian economy continues to live hand to mouth on American 'aid' and the occasional cash infusion from Washington's surrogates in the Arab Gulf, Jordan's political passivity in regional affairs is all but guaranteed.

### **Deconstructing the Theoretical Transformation of Interventionist Discourse**

Analyzing expressions of geopolitical tension in the Middle East necessitates a review of the narrative framing weaponized in defense of western imposed 'unilateral coercive measures.' As was the case a century ago, indiscriminate economic violence works in tandem with military occupation as a means of advancing the Euro-American imperial project. Both expressions of power were invariably clothed in the trappings of orientalist paternalism. In the intervening years, a reformulation of this rhetorical tradition emerged in conjunction with the birth of the post-World War II (WWII) liberal internationalist world order. Liberal-interventionist rhetoric, in other words, represents a discursive repackaging of the infamous *mission civilisatrice*. Acts of aggression and wars of conquest are invariably characterized as altruistic ventures, justified under the pretext of securing 'liberal values,' 'human rights,' and most importantly, 'free' markets. These rhetorical tools obfuscate the economic and geostrategic motives lurking beneath the superficial veneer of contemporary liberal-interventionist discourse and the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P).

According to Immanuel Wallerstein's World Systems Theory, the modern world remains roughly divided between a dominant core and a structurally disadvantaged post-colonial periphery (Paul, 1997). This 'dominant core' survived the controlled demolition of old-line European colonialism through the institutional machinery of modern finance capitalism born out of the Bretton Woods conference. Built as they were by the United States with the tacit approval of other European colonial powers, these levers of coercion were built for the express purpose of locking in western (colonial) dominance within the world capitalist system. As a means of clarifying Wallerstein's globally oriented geopolitical perspective, Isa Blumi traces the legacy of the liberal- internationalist world system to its roots; namely, the political economy of colonial capitalism and its evolution following WWII. Blumi argues that the 'traditional territorial imperialism' of the 19th century spawned "a system of economic, political, and cultural domination that has reigned supreme since the conclusion of WWII (Blumi, 2018, pp. 9)." These geopolitical and economic forces have aligned themselves against the government of Syria and its allies.

Crucially, it is also necessary to reconsider the various categories used to describe Syria, Syrians and the political economy of governance and power in the post-colonial Middle East. For many western politicians and policy analysts, a recourse to essentialist reductionism is the discursive weapon of choice. All too often the complexities of the Syrian crisis are obscured by monolithic labels such as the 'Alawite' regime, the prototypical 'Middle Eastern dictatorship,' the hotbed of 'Islamic terrorism.' In the United States, analyzing so-called 'Shia militias' recently emerged as an accepted subfield of Middle East studies. In the arena of Syria 'analysis' these labels have, unfortunately, reinforced western misconceptions vis-à-vis the socio-economic and political ordering of society in the countries ostensibly being analyzed. For example, tensions between citizen and state are often reduced to sectarian affiliation, tribal allegiance, or membership in a particular ethnic group. Other contingencies are obscured or disregarded completely, as are other factors that determine one's allegiance to the 'evil regime,' the 'moderate rebels' or the 'terrorist' groups smuggling Syrian oil into Turkey. As was -and is- the case elsewhere in the post-colonial Middle East, 'ancient hatreds' between supposedly monolithic tribal or sectarian groups may explain conflict as well as collaboration.

What is lost along the way, particularly as such flawed analytical paradigms gain traction in the court of public opinion and in the literature, is a more nuanced approach to appraising continuity and change in Syria. According to Isa Blumi, "a major element of the problem stems from the heavy reliance on terminology often used to describe the Middle East...too often the reference to Yemen's social pathologies, in particular, is linked to 'tribalism' and 'sectarian rivalries,' and then used to explain group motivations and processes of change" (Blumi, 2010, pp.4). In the Syrian context, many contemporary 'experts' lean too heavily on orientalist epistemologies to frame events, explain behavior, and justify acts of violence. Conflicts and the structural schisms that catalyze them are simplified and misrepresented. Subsequently, post- conflict 'solutions' necessarily require western supervision, input, intervention and investment. In the new American crusade to plunder and dismantle the Syrian state, we are reminded that tensions between incorrigible tribes and 'ancient hatreds' pitting "Sunnis" against "Alawites" demand the heavy hand of western input. Accordingly, occupation and intervention are not only necessary to promote 'regional peace and security,' but also to promote the well-being of Syrians themselves. Essentialist categories of analysis thus contribute to the perpetuation of the liberal-internationalist world system and the inequality upon which it depends.

More importantly, Arabs conceptualized as being "objects" and/or "outside" of law because they violate the "standard of civilization" inevitably results in there being an absence of any legal limitations on the ability of Western sovereign states to commence war and/or be accountable for atrocities committed during "humanitarian sanctions" because domination and violence in the case of a war between a civilized and non-civilized peoples becomes essential in transforming lawless Arabia. Although theoretically pre-emption should apply to all states, the U.S. articulated the doctrine following 9/11 never intending to extend it to its declared enemies since under the logic of the doctrine, the attempts of U.S enemies to arm themselves could be interpreted by (realpolitik) defense strategists and (positivist) lawyers itself as an emerging threat or aggression, therefore, a *raison d'être* for declaring pre-emptive war (Anghie, 2004, 2009). Pre-emptive defense strategy (PEDS) is then a right reserved only for the most powerful with advocates of the doctrine claiming that PEDS is the U.S. essentially claiming "an assertion of

the right to review the policies adopted by the other government and to override them whenever the US finds it necessary” (Benvenisti, 2004:691; Anghie, 2009).

The uprisings of 2011 and more recently the economic sanctions imposed on Arabia through the Caesar Act reminded Arabs generally and Muslims particularly that international law continues to be animated by a civilizing mission adopting (neo)-Orientalist discursive representations claiming Latin-European epistemic knowledge structures as inherently democratic in contrast to Arab epistemology inherently being deficient in, and resistant to, democracy. Therefore, and more to the point, Arabs were reminded that (ratiocinative) Latin-European epistemology continues to fail in explaining developments in Arabia since they are legally constructed as embodying a philosophical theology that is a priori a necessary exclusion for the coherence of *jus gentium*. With the critique of culturalist discursive representations occupying an important place in the discipline of International Relations (IR) in the last few decades, the Arab uprising in 2011 and the subsequent economic sanctions are therefore interpreted by aligning with critics who claim that the foreign policy of the U.S. and Europe has for several centuries failed to articulate political visions that do not ascribe them as being a “redeeming” nation, with the telos of history being the transformation of Other places “into mirror images of its idealized self” (Borg, 2016:213; Al-Kassimi, 2018). The Arab uprising in metropole regions is interpreted as an event that reinforces an idealized version of Western/European Self with policies produced and articulated being influenced by a positivist jurisprudential conceptualization of foreign policy theorized as simply being constitutive of political community rather than the “external deployment of instrumental reason on behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm of necessity” (Campbell, 1998:37; Borg, 2016). This is particularly true since realism is the traditional approach adhered to by Western sovereign figures informing foreign affairs and is directly indebted to positivism as a juridical school of thought. Realism during the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century has “rendered culture not merely epiphenomenal, but invisible and mute” (Mingst and Warkentin, 1996:171; Al-Kassimi, 2018) with a *realpolitik* lens deducing foreign policy *a priori* making “culture invisible by suppressing difference in favor of sameness” even though “culture is about difference” (as cited in Mingst and Warkentin, 1996:171)

Western sovereign figures imagining the “shade of culture” in Arab spaces as “uncivilized” or connotated by “Islamist tendencies” provides legal coverage to adjudicate legal principles constellating discourses surrounding “human rights”, “democratization”, and “good governance” decriminalizing extrajudicial “redemptive measures” such as indiscriminate bombing (i.e., Operation Inherent Resolve). These principles regulate and preserve the supposed unbridgeable cultural gap characterizing *jus gentium* claiming that a natural antagonism between a *Madīnian* and *Athenian* man necessitates a *realpolitik* zero-sum engagement because the former is constituted as an irrational mode of *Being*. The antagonism between Europe and Arabia legalizing extrajudicial practices (re)produces the colonial jurisprudence system of the 19th and 20th century (i.e., mandate system) asserting that cultural differences between civilized and uncivilized states decree that civilized states have the “sacred trust of civilization” – therefore the responsibility – to democratize and protect uncivilized Arabs from their Self through any (violent) means necessary (Al-Kassimi, TBA).

The privatization of violence through operation Timber Sycamore is crucial in revealing that while activities conducted by *death squads* are blamed on, and perceived as, a “natural” occurrence in a space furnishing Arab civilization attempting to adopt liberal-secular temporal coordinates accenting (Western) modernity, the war in Iraq, and more recently Syria, Yemen, and Libya reminded Arabs that the catalyst of *en-masse* Arab displacement and human carnage is directly linked to a “modern” puritan development of *war-machines* (i.e., *death squads* à la ISIS/ AQI/ Peace Companies/ Badr Organization/ Academi) engaging in barbaric acts rather than Arab epistemology being deterministically imagined as inherently averse to *reason* but receptive to *terror*. The inherent violence of (positivist) juridical concepts such as sovereignty and teleological narratives such as modernity reifying *ratiocinated* Latin-European philosophical theology is manifest with neo-Orientalist scholars – located in Northern and the Southern centers of knowledge – claiming that the uprising will *certainly* become an “Islamist Winter”<sup>8</sup>. The current Caesar Act inflicting *creative destruction* across Arabia by treating inhabitants of the Arab *Mashreq* and Arab *Maghreb* – according to neo-Orientalist imaginaries – as *Saracen* or *homo sacer* reminds us of the importance of being *anachronic* when reading to deconstruct legal-history thus realizing that the *present* terror engulfing the Arab world is not endemic to an Arab mode of *Being*, but rather is a familiar and necessary violence for the rejuvenation of a *jus gentium* founded on a *secular* idea claiming that the particular history of Latin-Europe

is the general history of the world, or put differently, that the *telos* of history is adhering to a Judeo-Christian rationalization of morality.

## Conclusion

The economic fallout of the western war on Syria continues to inflict grievous harm on Syria's neighbors, particularly Lebanon and Jordan. New tranches of punitive sanctions have exacerbated the structural weaknesses of both countries' economies while simultaneously locking in absolute poverty within Syria itself. American policy makers are acutely aware of these regional reverberations, calculating that these measures do not undermine western efforts to secure hegemonic influence in the Levant. On the contrary, this study suggests that the regional economic crises engendered by American sanctions advance the neocolonial Euro-American hegemonic project, insofar as these outcomes may indirectly weaken America's rivals (Syria, Iran, and Russia in particular) while helping Washington consolidate economic leverage over its Arab allies. Several mutually reinforcing rhetorical devices work in tandem as a means of justifying unilateral coercive action directed against non-compliant polities in the Global South. Cosmetically, well-positioned 'experts' sell economic violence and military interventionism to western audiences through humanitarian appeals and the invocation of R2P. Such arguments represent an orientalist reformulation of the Euro-American 'civilizing mission.' This study highlights the myriad epistemological pitfalls plaguing the categories of analysis used by many of these 'experts,' which as we have seen are irredeemably contaminated by essentialist reductionism. While further study is required, this article suggests that any attempt to measure the significance of western imposed economic violence, within the targeted polity or beyond its borders, must necessarily include a robust critique of the systems of knowledge and power underpinning the contemporary liberal- internationalist world system.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The term was first coined by American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902 before WWI to “designate the area between Arabia and India”. Later on, after WWII it was adopted by former US president Eisenhower in 1957 in his strategy known as the “Eisenhower Doctrine”. Unfortunately, the term continues to be used even though such cartographical categorization is “historically empty”. More accurate endogenous cultural terms would be the Arabian East, Fertile Crescent, Bilad al-Sham, Bilad al-Yamam, Levant, Arabian Peninsula, or Arabian Mashreq.

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the destructive explosion occurring in Lebanon on August 4<sup>th</sup> 2020 further exacerbates economic and social turmoil in Arabia especially when we consider that port in Beirut was discussed prior to the explosion as becoming the primary commercial hub utilized to import products required to rebuild Syria. It is also worth highlighting that countries and local Arab *comprador* elites coming to the “humanitarian aid” of Lebanon after the blast, are not only the same countries and actors who initiated and benefited from the “underdevelopment” of Lebanon since the neo-liberalization of the economy took place after 1989, but are also the same hegemonic political actors which advocated for the CAESAR Act. The consequences of the explosion included the almost complete destruction of the most important Mediterranean port (i.e. Beirut); preliminary numbers estimate over 200,000 homeless Arabs; property damages amount to over 15 billion \$USD, and finally, sites relating to Arab civilizational cultural heritage involving centuries of inter-civilizational encounters have also been damaged and/or destroyed. Further research concerned with the economic and social ramifications catalyzed by the destruction of the port in Beirut across Arabia will seek to demonstrate the moral issue with a “humanitarian logic” subsuming the technical and problem-solving solutions suggested by members of “International Civil Society” (i.e., France, U.S., Britain, etc.) supposedly vital in remedying the plight of Arabs.

<sup>3</sup> The Taif agreement – approved by Lebanon’s parliament in November 4<sup>th</sup> 1989 – concluded the sectarian war inflicted in Lebanon because of internal and external forces in 1989 and legally addressed the importance of the Arab Syrian army remaining in Lebanon.

<sup>4</sup> Asset managing corporations such as BlackRock and Lazard went as far as to suggest that the Lebanese banking sector is “bankrupt” even though it is well known that the Lebanese banking and finance sector is one of the most reputable in the world. Blackrock suggested that Lebanon should terminate its banking sector by only keeping 5 banks with a maximum capital of 200 million \$USD in each. Elie Firzli, current Deputy Speaker of the Lebanese parliament stated that the articulations of Blackrock and Lazard point to *Nifaq* (i.e., hypocrisy) of the highest rank especially since it is well known that Beirut’s banking sector has not simply consistently outperformed Tel Aviv’s banking sector, but that Lebanon’s debt is mostly internal rather than external. He also emphasizes that what is occurring with Lebanon’s banking sector is similar to the Intra Bank scandal in 1966.

<sup>5</sup> The Caesar Act prohibits Syrian’s working in Lebanon to transfer Lebanese pounds to their families in Syria. Also, and more insidiously, Arab-Syrians in Lebanon are told that they can only transfer U.S. currency to Syria.

<sup>6</sup> Frozen funds belonging to the Yemeni government are estimated to be around 1 billion \$USD, while funds for the Syrian government including Syrian citizen deposits in Lebanon exceed 35 billion \$USD.

<sup>7</sup> It should also be noted that in tandem with the spill-over effect of the Caesar Act in Lebanon, for instance, the EU through a program called CEDRE and the U.S. through the IMF have offered an amount of around 10-12 billion \$USD in loans conditioned on the privatization and/or wholesale of the ports, airport, electric grids, and telecommunication sectors.

<sup>8</sup> Using Islam and/or Arabness as “historical information” supposedly explaining the *cause of* chaos and violence informing Arabia is fundamentally the fictional and reductionist aspect of neo-Orientalist narratives. As matter of fact, *death squads* were not all genealogically from Arabia but rather came from over 70 countries whether from Europe, Africa, or North/South/Central America. In addition, some were not even Muslim, however, communication centers linked violence and chaos to Islam while generalizing all Arabs as Muslim thus developing the “Islamist figure” which dominated media centers after the Arab uprisings in 2011.



# The Effectiveness of Strategic Management and Leadership Style on Performance of Local Hotel Operators in Managing Hotel Unit Businesses in Ubud Bali, Indonesia

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## Abstract

The tourism development is headed toward sustainable tourism which stands to local people, poverty alleviation, environment conservation and the increase of jobs opportunity. This concept is in line with the concept of fair economic growth which packed up in triple track strategy consists of pro-growth, pro-poor and pro-job to decrease the unemployment. The role of local human resource in managing accommodation in Bali can be seen in the top level as General Manager in star or non star hotel in Bali. The increase of local's role in managing hotel or accommodation business is crucial in reducing economic leakage of the tourism sector. This study aims to find out the effectiveness of the strategic management and leadership style on performance of local hotel operator in managing hotel unit business in Ubud, Bali Indonesia. This was a qualitative research. This approach was applied to gain a more depth data through indepth interview, library research, and observation. The data was presented in the form of performance table which describe the leadership effectivity and strategy. The results showed that strategic management and leadership style were very effective on performance of local hotel operator in managing hotel unit businesses by local in ubud Bali

**Keywords:** Strategic Management, Leadership Style, Performance, Local Hotel Operator

## 1. Introduction

The tourism development has been directed into sustainable tourism which stands for local people, poverty alleviation, environment conservation and the increase of jobs opportunity. This concept is in line with the concept of fair economic growth which was packed in triple track strategy consists of pro-growth, pro-poor, and

pro-job the decrease of the unemployment (Wijayanti, 2019). The community based tourism (CBT) prioritizes the local community to be the main player, as responsible and sustainable owner or the management of tourism business. The development of CBT has increased more within the past decade. The management of CBT which applied bottom up approach has brought astounding results from the net profit of 5 to 41,4 billions in 20015 (Darmaputra). This showed that local people of Bali has able to show themselves as succesfull tourist management in each area.

The existence of local hotel operator in Bali has started to develop in the past ten years. Ubud is one of major tourism destination in Bali was chosed to be the location for this research for some reasons. The first reason was, Ubud has grown as tourism destination since the Dutch colonization when Walter Spies was invited by the King of Ubud in 1927 to witness Ubud culture (Pringle, 2004:133). The second, this area has many hotels and inn which was managed by local people and also local hotel operator. The third reason was, the uniqueness of Ubud has brought consequences toward the hotel management characteristic in this area.

This research becomes important because the success performance model which was presented in BSC form can measure strategic management applied, leadership style implemented which were used and the level of success of both variable toward the performance of local hotel operator in Ubud, Bali. This BSC model was made based on the best practices of strategic management and leadership style which give positive contribution toward the sustainable success performance of local hotel operator in Ubud, Bali.

Based on the above background, the formulation of the problem from this study is how effective the strategy and leadership style of local hotel operator performance that is sustainable in managing hotel unit businesses in Ubud, Bali? The research was conducted at Ubud, Bali, Indonesia. The local operators chosen as the research objects are Pramana Experience, Adi Wana and Puri Villas Indonesia. Those local hotel operators have been established for more than three years and had a great development either for hotel unit numbers and businesses performance. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of strategic management and leadership style on performance of operator hotel local in managing hotel unit businesses in Ubud, Bali, Indonesia.

## **2. Litterature Review**

### ***Meaning of The Local Hotel Operator***

Hotel operator is the entity who enter into agreement to carry out day to day operational including employee recruitment, procurement and promotion (Outlaw, 2011). Moser (2016) stated that to be able to get clients, hotel operator should be able to show hotel performance which have been managed and able to show type of services provided. Besides that, hotel operator is also can show the ability in managing the previous hotel through the success story in solving problems.

There is no research about local hotel operator yet. The existing research is research about the impact of tourism in Ubud where the society agree that tourism has positive impact to the society economically, culturally and environmentally (Ernawati et.all, 2018). Other research which was conducted by Pitanatri and Pitana (2009) about position of homestay in the accommodation business competition in Ubud. Therefore, the previous research focused on the tourism impact and the ability to compete in accommodation business in Ubud. The role of local operator who managed some unit businesses of the existing accommodation facilities has not been available, hence this research become interesting and previously it has not been done.

### ***Strategic Management***

Strategic management is an approach system to identify, create and to measure signifiant changes of the organization's performance which refer to vision (Wells, 2018:3; Antara, et. Al, 2020). Meanwhile, Ritson (2011:17) defines that strategic management as the organization of all resources to achieve goals. Okumus (2010:5) stated that the strategic management is the process to formulate vision, mission, and objective and implemented in every level of organization to create the competitive excellence.



To be able to survive, every hotel unit business is required to make precise strategy so it will keep the level room occupancy and the average room rate or Average Daily Rate (ADR) and revenue per available room (RevPar). Strategy is the long term goal setting which equipped with series of actions and the allocation of resources which support achievement of the goals (Evans, Campbell, dan Stonehouse, 2009:11). Enz (2005:17) defines strategy into two, strategy as the continues decision making pattern, and strategy as the action plan to achieve short term goal and main goal of the organization. So strategy is an action plan which is equipped with allocation of resource to achieve goals.

### ***Leadership Style***

According to Igbaekemen dan Odivwri (2015:2) leadership is the leader responsibility to direct the attitude and behavior of the employees to reach the department's and organization's objective with characteristic a high sense of belonging. (Rihal, 2017); and the desire to lead, committed toward the vision and mission achievement and also has high integrity. Clark (2001:6) stated that leadership is the ability to realize the vision by inspiring the followers to create changes. So the leadership is commitment in doing something right to achieve vision through high integrity based on the sustainability innovation.

Leadership is leader responsibility to direct all the human resources to achieve the goal of an organization. (Igbaekemen, 2015:2) with ability and willingness to own the organization based on internal motivation to always give the best contribution (2017). Two types of leadership were chosen because according to previous research (Kara et.al., 2013:9; Hurduzeu, 2015:290; and Junga, 2003:525) transformational leadership is more effective in achieving the goal of organization compare to transactional leadership. So the leadership concept analyzed in this research include scanning, focusing, aligning/mobilizing and inspiring which studied from various sources, such as Howkins (2016); DDI World (2016); Odumeru & Ogbonna (2013); Hurduzeu (2015); and Lemay (2016).

### ***Balanced Scorecard (BSC)***

A business is getting failure not because it has not own a strategy, but more into the inability in executing the strategy (Nair, 2004:3). BSC presents in the capacity to overcome the weakness. Therefore, BSC is a method in finalizing challenges in the balance of strategy and execution (Nair, 2004:13). This is justified by Wright (2018) that the strategy framework of BSC is the strategy execution model which are frequently applied.

This strategy is in demand, because to keep the balance of the internal and external factors. The balance of internal and external; indicator of leading and lagging; financial and non financial measurement, strategy in each level of organization; and the measurement of financial with operational priority. This balance should be maintained so there will be no imbalance in the internal and achievement process. For example, the customer satisfaction should be balanced with expenses so the customer satisfaction does not sacrifice the ability to gain profit or in the contrary.

### **3. Research Methods**

This research is qualitative research. This approach was applied to obtain deeper data. The first stage was done by indepth interview and documentation study by applying list questions instruments and check list documents which concern with leadership, strategic management, and strategy effectiveness and leadership toward the corporate performance and unit business operator of local hotel in Ubud. Further, the data will be presented in performance table form which describe the effectivity of leadership and strategy.

Type of data in this research is qualitative data which was supported with quantitative data. The data source were primary and secondary data. The primary data was the leadership and strategic management and also the effectivity data of strategic management and leadership toward the performance of local hotel operator in the corporate level or in the unit business level. Meanwhile, the secondary data was the thing that have been owned

by local hotel operator such as management system, leadership, strategy, survey result toward the consumer satisfaction and employee also the performance within the last three years.

#### 4. Results and Discussion

The effectiveness of local hotel operator in Ubud was seen from the four BSC perspectives, they are learning and growth, internal process, consumer and financial. Each perspective describes the parameters including the target and achievement. Target and achievement compared to see the percentage of every parameter achievement from each BSC perspective. From the description it can be concluded that the management effectiveness of local hotel operator in Ubud.

So the strategy and leadership of hotel operator management has been very effective which can be seen from the target achievement that reached 111,55%. This achievement was 11,55% higher from the established target. This was remarkable achievement. Detail achievement was compared to average industry explained as the following.

The ability to return the average capital is 6,5 years very or similar to 15,38% ROI. Even in some cases, such as The Kayon Resort, was able to achieved 40 % ROI. This achievement was higher from the average Hyatt Corporation achievement which was only 10% (Macrotrend, 2019). Meanwhile, according to Shankar (2014) by *rule of thumb* annual hotel ROI in India was 10-12%. According to Basari Bachri and Arta, middle class hotel, two and three stars' hotel, ROI were able to turn over capital in seven or 10 years (Kompas, 2013). So the performance of local hotel operator in Ubud can be seen from the ability to return the capital was very effective because they were able to return the capital on the above industry average.

Meanwhile, if it is reviewed that the ability to gain revenue per occupied room for Rp 2.000.000, it was also above the industry average. According to Horwath HTL report (2019) *Revenue/occupied room* was Rp 1.580.596. Therefore, the operator local hotel achievement in Ubud 27% higher from the industry average. From *Revenue Growth* aspect, the industry average from 2017 to 2018 the growth decreased 13%. Meanwhile, the revenue growth average on local hotel operator in Ubud reached 12%.

These achievements can be achieved because of the hotel popularity increased so the selling price was also increased. This thing happened because the product offered was unique and high valuable because the ability to give excellent prime service (some observed hotels can reach 10 out of 10 for consumer satisfaction toward the staff service).

Other achievement was GOP and the profit growth. The average GOP achievement was 50% or 15 % higher from the industry average of 35% (Horwath HTL, 2019). This excellence can be achieved because the ability to control price was very good however not lessen the satisfactory level of employee and consumer. The cost percentage of human resource was only 18-20% of the total revenue. Meanwhile the standard of human resource percentage industry reached (Horwath HTL, 2019). The set percentage by local hotel operator in Ubud has been set off with the achievement of employee satisfaction that reached 92% and consumer satisfaction reached 94%. The benefit growth reached 10% because the ability to control cost and the ability to increase revenue. All cost tightly controlled such as human resource cost and other costs. Revenue can be increased by increasing room selling price and level of room occupancy as well as the new property growth which reached 125% per year. Room price can be increased because the level of guests satisfactory increased and encouraged the demand which eventually can also increase the selling price and sales.

The consumer satisfaction of local hotel operator in Ubud can be seen from the review of guests' experience in OTA. Score review of the consumer toward the managed hotel by local hotel operator reached 9,2 out of the highest score, 10. Compare to Adiwana and Puri Villas Indonesia, Pramana achieved the highest score, one of the managed resort reached 9,7. In the other hand, Adiwana and Puri was 9,0 and 9,4. Compare to international chain hotel such as Fourseasons and Alila Ubud with each score 9,1 and 8,9. PE can still outperform both, meanwhile Adiwana can only outperform Fourseasons. The excellence of local operator lies on staff services, which reached 10 like what has been achieved by The Kayon Jungle. The hotel prime excellence which managed

by local hotel operator are staff service, room cleanliness, and diversity of breakfast. All of this can be achieved because of the high employee satisfaction and the presentation of beverages products which prioritize on quality and ability to present Balinese culture into the presented product.

The customer loyalty has reached 6% of 5,4% target. The average repeater percentage was still relative low because majority of the managed hotels has been running less than two years. However, for luxurious resort, the repeater percentage has reached above 15%. According to Yu and Timmerman (2014) different segment has different rebuying attitude. For luxurious hotel types, the loyalty percentage reached 33%. Luxurious hotel guests have a stronger engagement compare to budget hotel guests. For budget hotel guests, the repeater rate reached 12%. So the repeater percentage was still low compare to industry benchmark because the hotel was relative new and the consumer behavior tends to try new products, therefore on three or four of their first visit they will choose different hotels.

## 5. Conclusion

Strategic management and leadership style are very effective on performance of local hotel operator in managing hotel unit's businesses at Ubud Bali because the performance based on four perspectives BSC was above than established target. Tourism human resources in Bali are not only capable as worker but also as a successful local hotel operator. The existence of the local hotel operators has stimulated the tourism development in Ubud in particular, and Bali in general. Local hotel operator became new choice for the local investors and new hope for local community to have the benefit of tourism economic

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# On the Development Path of Chinese Culture Based on the Theory of Cultural Structure

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## Abstract

From the perspective of cultural structure theory, the key link of Chinese cultural development and innovation in the new era is to find the specific path, form and method of its integration into modern society. The Five-in-One cultural development path is an organic whole. It enhances the national cultural integration power through education guiding the leading path and enhances the national cultural radiation power through the daily path of public opinion publicity. The two are “exterior and interior” to each other. It enhances the national culture attraction power through the concentrated path of cultural edification and enhances the national culture cohesion power through the fundamental path of practice cultivation. The two are “internal and external” to each other. Through the system guarantee path, we can enhance the national cultural creativity power, which is the bridge connecting “exterior and interior” and “interior and exterior”. The five innovation dimensions jointly construct the Five-in-One cultural development path.

**Keywords:** Cultural Structure Theory, Chinese Culture, Development Path of Five-in-One

The development path of Chinese culture is a structural set composed of multiple nodes. The five basic dimensions of the leading path of education guidance, the daily path of public opinion propaganda, the centralized path of cultural edification, the fundamental path of practice cultivation and the guarantee path of system construction are sub-nodes, and the all-round, multi-level and wide fields jointly build the Five-in-One cultural development path. The Five-in-One cultural development path is based on the traditional cultural structuralism methodology, which supplements, enriches and develops the theory of cultural research methods. The culture development path of Five-in-One means the modernization of cultural construction from local construction to all-round development.

## 1. Leading Path: Enhancing National Cultural Integration Power through Educational Guidance

The comprehensive education and guidance of citizens is in the dominant position in the Five-in-One development path, and its important basis is to follow the internal laws of cultural development. The inevitable trend of cultural development is the development direction of advanced culture, and “advanced” is embodied in the strategic thinking, forward-looking thinking, innovative thinking and guiding thinking of “facing

modernization, facing the world and facing the future". The essential feature of comprehensive education guidance is that it is holistic, complementary in content and progressive in logic. Therefore, its function is to devote itself to the modernization power of culture and enhance the integration power of national culture.

The process of educating and guiding the majority of people is the basic link of cultivating forces to form consensus. To promote the unity of core values, it is necessary to produce and publish all kinds of information advocating core values within the audio-visual scope of the country, and to conduct a comprehensive education for the people. Comprehensive education guidance is divided into levels and sequences. Visually speaking, it is a gradual process from top to bottom, from inside to outside, digestion and absorption. In ancient times, there were no media and specialized schools for the general public, and Confucius paid special attention to the enlightenment effect of "Poetry" on the people. The enlightenment of Poetry is imperceptible. By singing among the people, it can inspire and educate the people, achieve the effect of communicating the feelings of the people, issuing official wishes and safeguarding the rule of the country. Confucius believed that "Poetry" has the function of cohesion, enlightenment and unity to people. "People are infected by poetry in singing, which purifies their hearts and corrects their virtue, thus uniting and upward. This is the function of poetry 'as a group'." (Teng Zhenfu, 2015) The educational and guiding function of Poetry is realized by forming a strong public opinion through folk singing, which is very similar to the dominant tendency in the media today.

Fei Xiaotong pointed out that in the field of spiritual culture, it is necessary to establish an educational system to promote mutual understanding, tolerance and coexistence, which is called cross-cultural exchange. In the 20th century, Huntington preached the "theory of cultural conflict", which is different from the struggle realm of natural selection in the West. The traditional Chinese position and concept advocate the conscious consciousness at the moral level, and a new moral force is needed to make the human world develop continuously. In the face of the current economic globalization, the ideological circle puts forward the view of "cultural consciousness", that is to say, people in the real social and cultural life field should have "self-knowledge" of their own culture and understand the source, generation, formation, development, characteristics and trend of cultural tradition. This kind of self-knowledge does not refer to "cultural return"; nor does it advocate "overall westernization" or "adherence to tradition". But in order to adapt to the new environment and new era, enhance the independent ability of cultural inheritance and innovation.

Through the leading path of education guidance, the cultural subject organization can achieve the greatest organic whole, reflecting the image of a civilized country with diverse and harmonious cultures of all ethnic groups in China. It contains powerful cultural integration and is an integrated element of the Five-in-One cultural development path.

## **2. Daily Path: Enhancing National Cultural Radiation Power through Public Opinion Publicity**

Strengthening public opinion propaganda is the daily path in the development path of the Five-in-One. Its important basis is to adhere to the dialectics of theory as the Tao and public opinion as the device, and the two working together; adhere to the dialectics of internal soul casting, external morale-boosting, and the two resonance at the same frequency. The essential characteristics of public opinion propaganda are synergy, adhering to the same position, the same direction, the same goal and the same task, generating the dialectical thinking of coordinated combat, and forming the historical vision of the overall situation. Therefore, its function is to grasp the relationship between cultural globalization and homogenization, and enhance the radiation power of national culture.

Public opinion propaganda involves four aspects: goal, media communication, understanding and integration, and goes deep layer by layer. The first is the target problem. Culture is the way of human existence. This kind of cultural existence is an indirect and deep existence. It needs to convey the ideological consciousness of the subject through media intermediary, connect the relationship between the subject and others, environment and society, and synthesize the profound abstraction and dynamic reflection of the cultural subject. In the process of public opinion propaganda and practice, we should not only safeguard the personality dignity of the subject, enhance the subject's ability and realize cultural self-improvement, but also adhere to the principle of seeking

truth from facts in practice and promote the coordinated development of understanding and acceptance. The second is the media communication. Promoting the creative transformation and innovative development of Chinese culture through public opinion propaganda is a systematic project of material communication, spiritual communication and media communication. It is in the practice of public opinion propaganda that human society has condensed a new consensus and promoted cultural identity. The third is the understanding problem. The logical basis of the Chinese culture development is the basic cognition of this culture, which is Heidegger's "preconception" (Heidegger, 2006) and Gadamer's "historical consciousness" (Gadamer, 2004). On the basis of technology and system, cultural cognition comes from the practice of understanding. The practice of understanding realizes the synthesis, generalization and promotion of cultural elements through representation, and creates the culture of understanding. Therefore, understanding is the only way of cultural cognition and "human spiritual process" (Wittgenstein, 1996). It is an important way to realize cultural identity to reach consensus by means of equal communication or intermediary values. Gertz believes that Ryle's theory of "thick depiction" is a contextualized understanding of the local knowledge of other cultures. (Clifford, Geertz, 1985) The complementary anthropology or complementary knowledge advocated by Alan Le Pichon can also be seen as a conscious methodology for understanding others. (Alain Le Pichon, 1995) The way of thinking with the understanding of others as the core develops a common recognition space through the understanding and understanding of others, so as to create a mutually acceptable identity process. The fourth is the problem of integration. Integration depends on communication and public opinion propaganda, and which means that "the subjects keep their own opinions and give up the opinions that are not conducive to negotiation and cooperation. And each provides the 'subject group-will group' with 'synthetic' components acceptable to all parties" (Yang Jingye, 2012). The premise of successful value dissemination is to strengthen cultural consciousness and reduce cultural prejudice. It is necessary for cultural subjects to lead the sense of cultural differences to rational thinking and examination, and to promote intercultural understanding and cooperation, that is, to have cultural counter consciousness. It is formed to replace "simplistic thinking" with the concept of "three-dimensional view of the world" and deeply understand the two sides and internal contradictions of culture.

Through the daily path of public opinion propaganda, correctly express the intention to the outside, improve the national discourse power, promote the construction of a new model of major-country relationship, contain powerful cultural radiation, which is the structural element of the Five-in-One cultural development path.

### **3. Concentration Path: Enhancing the National Culture Attraction Power through Cultural Cultivation**

To carry out cultural edification is in a basic position in the Five-in-One development path. Its important basis is to meet the needs of the public, continuously satisfy the people's growing pursuit of a better life, and finally realize the social prospect and grand blueprint of protecting the people's interests and adhering to the all-round development of people. The essential feature of cultural edification is systematicness, changing the traditional fragmented thinking and forming a whole-process thinking on a series of basic issues such as the overall goal, overall task, overall layout, construction direction, construction mode and construction power of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics in the new era. Therefore, its function is to promote the popularization of Chinese culture and enhance the attraction power of national culture.

Cultural edification includes three aspects. First of all, cultural edification attaches importance to the needs of emotional response, respects personality and advocates happiness. Respect for personality requires a breakthrough change in the original personality and values. The important function of cultural edification is to encourage people to express their opinions more and to train them with independent thinking and necessary abilities. Secondly, cultural edification attaches importance to the needs of long-term security and cultivates self-confidence and independent character. "One of the mental characteristics of individuals living in a national society is a strong sense of security," (Barber, 1968) Barber said. The sense of security of members of modern society can be obtained through cultural edification. Japanese physiologist Sugiyasushi Miro put forward that "ideal man" is a man who uses the wisdom of the new cortex to think, judge, and develop higher spiritual upward abilities such as knowledge, emotion, and will. For the sake of social peace and prosperity, it is necessary to cultivate such independent and adaptable social people through cultural edification. Finally, cultural edification attaches importance to the need to pursue novel experiences and balanced value development. Each

era has its own cultural characteristics and shows the bias of value development. For example, ancient Greek philosophy, Roman law, medieval religion and modern science and technology are the main characteristics of the values of each era, and other values are relegated to a secondary position. Modern values such as medieval religion and traditional Chinese morality will limit the development of modern science. Modern cultural edification does not require the melting and casting of the same model, but focuses on the full play of individual pursuit of novelty. This will not only enhance co-operation between societies and individuals, but also remove obstacles to the balanced development of values.

In addition to maintaining the original three contents, in order to adapt to the new situation, modern cultural edification also needs to integrate some new content. The first is to attach importance to the cultivation of social responsibility. Cultural edification must expand the scope of responsibility from the traditional family to the modern society, considering social and political participation as its part. In modern economic society, organized morality is far more important than individual morality, and cultural edification should give full play to organized morality to meet more requirements of modern organized society. The second is to attach importance to the cultivation of love for human beings and the cultivation of open thoughts. To develop an open mind and apply it to the field of interpersonal relationships through cultural edification is to understand the views of others and establish a sound relationship with others. When applied to state relations, it is willing to understand the cultural anthropological knowledge of other ethnic groups, respect individuality, develop the concept of national equality, and extend from individual, society and state to all mankind. Based on humanism, Confucianism and Mohism show universal love with the whole human being as the center, which is the new ethics that culture nurtures. Russell said: "If we want to maintain world peace, we must extend the current love of our compatriots to all mankind." (Xu gaoruan, 1969) Sociologist Sorokin believes that in order to eliminate human conflicts, it is necessary to build an altruistic society, which is to guide culture, social institutions and human nature of citizens to an altruistic direction through cultural edification. Through cultural edification, "love neighbors as yourself" and "if you want to establish yourself, help others to establish themselves" are put into practice.

Through the centralized path of cultural edification, it is conducive to the dissemination of contemporary Chinese values, gain foreign imitation, contain cultural attraction power, which is the functional element of the Five-in-One cultural development path.

#### **4. Fundamental Path: Enhancing National Cultural Cohesion Power through Practice Cultivation**

The soul of the development of Chinese culture in the new era is to shift from value and norms to practice and narration, and to promote the practice cultivation, which is the fundamental path of the Five-in-One development path. Its important basis is that cultural identity is the core of self-identity and the internal foundation and important dimension of cultural rejuvenation. It is necessary to strengthen the effect of identity, enhance cultural consciousness, cultural self-confidence, cultural power, and enhance theoretical self-confidence and strategic determination. The essential characteristic of practice cultivation is to pay attention to practical results and thoroughly implement the fundamental stand of Marxist theory of practice and epistemology. Therefore, its function is to give full play to the main role of all aspects of society and enhance the cohesion power of national culture.

According to the theory of cultural structure, "in a stable period, cultural experience and the structured environment of society strengthen each other, while ideology produced in a unstable period can establish new styles or action strategies." (Hall, Neitz, 2009) Therefore, the focus of the analysis should be on the "action strategy". The traditional action theory holds culture shapes action by providing the ultimate purpose and value of action orientation. Swidler thinks that Weber's method is to discuss the shaping of thought for action, but she regards culture as a "tool". She thinks that "all practical cultures include all kinds of symbols, rituals, stories and behavior guides which are often conflicting at the same time" (Swidler, Ann, 1986). The competition between core values and other cultural strategies makes people should consider the logical consistency of core values and get strong support in causality, so as to be different from other strategies, become the "tradition" in the field of experience, and further use style and traditional "way of doing things" to construct the meaning of life.



The purpose of carrying forward Chinese culture, shaping culture and formulating systems is to implement core values, implement the standard of norms, implement norms, and achieve the effect of practice cultivation. At the same time, this is an innovation process based on a certain practical basis. Among them, understanding daily life is the understanding method and realization foundation of practice cultivation, and it can promote the innovation of Chinese culture. Husserl put forward that: "The world of life is always given in advance and always exists in advance" (Ni Liangkang, 1997). Ideological activities come from perceptual activities and life practices. On the other hand, the reflection and criticism of social reality is the existence mode and application basis of practice cultivation, so as to reach the realm of "revolution" and highlight people's search for value and meaning. The former deepens the latter and the latter realizes the former. Criticism of social reality "enables people to think, act and establish their own reality as rational people without fantasy" (Marx & Engels, 1995). Hegel believes that reflection is the re-thinking of thinking results and the study of thought itself (Hegel, 1980).

Through the fundamental path of practice cultivation, enhance the self-confidence of values, encourage the Chinese nation to form a strong centripetal force, contain a powerful cultural cohesion, which is the core element of the Five-in-One cultural development path.

### **5. Guarantee Path: Enhancing National Cultural Creativity Power through System Guarantee**

Strengthening system guarantee is the guarantee path of the Five-in-One development path, and its important basis is to adhere to the principle of innovation. In-depth analysis of the practical basis and historical orientation of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, exploration and study of the new situation, new characteristics and new problems of Chinese social and cultural development, adhere to innovative ideas, broaden development paths, and promote the all-round prosperity and rapid development of Chinese culture. The essential feature of system guarantee is innovation, releasing the huge potential of economic, social and cultural through "institutional profit" and promoting the transformation of cultural construction from ideology to cultural strength. Therefore, its function is to devote itself to building a cultural innovation system in the new era and enhancing the national cultural creativity power.

Institutions can strengthen core values. Values are the core of culture. They can be expressed by cultivating the habits of groups. The system can strengthen its effect through organizational discipline. If the implied values of culture and institution are the same, the direction of their function is the same, which will benefit the core values, but the mechanism and effect are different. Habermas and Foucault see the cultural power base of today's society, which is a broad set of institutions and not just economic factors. The content of culture is linked with specific political and economic interests, which gives rise to the ownership of cultural production, that is, the political economy of cultural production. The complex power of culture does not only mean direct authority and influence. On the contrary, it is a world view based on popularization that has gained public legitimacy for the design, production and dissemination of culture.

On the other hand, institutions can overcome the limitations of values. In view of the limitation that values can not achieve the same degree of restraint for everyone, we need to treat everyone equally and have an equal degree of restraint system. In addition, the system will also interfere with the members of the group to form a recognition of core values and form a new culture, which is an imperceptible process. On the other hand, human behavior is complex and cannot be regulated entirely by the system, and the formulation, implementation and revision of the system itself have defects or deviations, which also need to give full play to the role of value in compensating the system. The core values contained in culture will permeate the new system and play a role in the formulation or revision of the system. In view of the limitations of values and systems, we must grasp them together to learn from each other. The mutual influence of values and systems is phased, similar to the front and back "dislocation" of zipper, forming an alternating influence.

Through the system guarantee path, displaying the unique charm of Chinese culture, promoting development and pursuing leadership, and containing powerful cultural creativity are the multiplier elements of the Five-in-One cultural development path.

## 6. Summary

The Five-in-One cultural development path is an organic whole, including five aspects of innovation dimension and hierarchical framework: following the internal law, carrying out comprehensive education and guidance to citizens, committed to promoting the modernization of culture and enhancing the integration power of national culture, which is the leading path; promoting open exchanges, strengthening public opinion propaganda, striving to grasp the relationship between cultural globalization and homogenization, and enhancing the radiation power of national culture, which is the daily path; meeting the needs of the public, carrying out cultural edification, committed to promoting the popularization of culture and enhancing the attractiveness power of national culture, which is a centralized path; strengthening the identification effect, promoting the practice cultivation, playing the main role in all aspects of society, enhancing the national cultural cohesion power, which is the fundamental path; adhering to the principle of interests, strengthening the system guarantee, devoting the construction of cultural innovation system in the new era and enhancing national cultural creativity power, which is the guarantee path. The leading path of education guidance is committed to enhancing the integration power of national culture, and the daily path of public opinion publicity is committed to enhancing the radiation power of national culture. The two are “exterior and interior” to each other. It enhances the national culture attraction power through the concentrated path of cultural edification and enhances the national culture cohesion power through the fundamental path of practice cultivation. The two are “internal and external” to each other. Through the system guarantee path, we can enhance the national cultural creativity power, which is the bridge connecting “exterior and interior” and “interior and exterior”. To promote the development of culture, we should achieve Five-in-One and “five forces and functions interaction”.

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# Graffiti and Architecture: A Case Study of Kenneth Dike Library, University of Ibadan

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## Abstract

In 2007, graffiti totaling 1058 were copied off the walls of Kenneth Dike Library, University of Ibadan. The graffiti were grouped and analysed to determine what this researcher calls the ‘mind of society’. The same exercise was done 10 years later in 2017, and results of the comparison are presented in this essay. The results show that there was a significant decline in the number of graffiti found on the walls of the library in 2017 and while the general distribution of the content remained the same, there appeared to be a noticeable drop in sexual and obscene comments. This trend is rather inconsistent with studies of the same nature in other climes. This deviation may be linked to behavioural adjustments of graffiti authors who now use online platforms as their primary choice for expression. More importantly, the study finds that the significant decline in the number of graffiti on the walls of the library doesn’t necessarily suggest that the act of graffiti writing is dwindling, instead, it confirms that the culture of the use of physical libraries is endangered. This phenomenon therefore raises another issue – the dwindling relevance of architecture as a platform for intuitive expressions. Should architects, social scientists and environmental scientists be concerned?

**Keywords:** Architecture, Communication platform, Graffiti, Kenneth Dike, University of Ibadan

## 1. Introduction

Man is a social being, and our need to communicate is intrinsic. We possess a primal intuition for the expression of inner thoughts as evident in the earliest examples of cave paintings and semiotic inscriptions. These visual expressions are the proto origins of graffiti and the beginning of the act of depicting individual thoughts and topical themes prevalent in communal living. Paleolithic wall writings are indeed some of the earliest evidences of man’s documented thoughts and it helps us understand the inner nature of man with respect to stored visual data, and the desire to narrate our environment and experiences.

Beyond cave inscriptions, etchings or symbolic arrangements of megalithic stones, our ‘written language’ gradually morphed into a more organised form of pictorial and communally accepted ideograms. Through this entire journey, the walls of architecture, presented us with the earliest and probably the most enduring platform for the art of self-expressions. Long before modern media, architecture has been a readily accessible surface and

medium for communication. In this study, we can safely propose that architecture has--or might we say, had--a well-developed symbiotic relationship with visual communication. While we can argue that the early man had few, if at all any alternative platform for visual expression, still, walls of habitation were the most accessible option at the time owing to several imaginable exigencies.

Beyond the 'lithic' eras and on to the more modern age, we will find that the content of graffiti in the classical world--as it is in most eras--is comprised mainly of expressions reporting frustrations from politics, philosophies or hopelessness, ideologies or alignments to sexual desires and loose thoughts. Graffiti discovered in ancient Pompeii depicted curses (in Latin), magic spells, literary quotes and happenings in everyday Rome (Keegan, 2014). Unrequited love was also a theme as well as explicit sexual imagery and imaginations which some early 20<sup>th</sup> century physiologists such as Freud (1915) and Kinsey et al (1953) believe to be as a result of repressed sexual fantasies. Indeed, graffiti, as an aspect of culture, can unobtrusively measure patterns of customs and attitude of society (Stocker et al, 1972).

This paper will investigate the thematic content of graffiti on the interior walls of Kennett Dike Library, University of Ibadan. In 2007, during a long break, the author was privileged to document the graffiti inscriptions on the walls of all the reading floors of the library except the ground floor. 10 years later in 2017, and now through a research assistant, the same exercise was carried out. To this end, and with the data gathered, this study embarked on a comparative analyses of the graffiti content on the library walls for the two different years. This gave an insight into the topical issues prevalent in the mind of the student community of the two periods. More importantly, it helped to determine if there was a shift in the number and issues most important to the student community of the periods under study. The study is interested in seeing if the major thoughts and concerns of society remain the same. Beyond these, we will discuss the relevance of architecture to public communication and to see if architecture's role has waned.

## 2. Some Early Studies into Graffiti

For clarity, it is important to define the scope of this paper's use of the word graffiti. The word graffiti refer to incised writings and it is derived from the Italian word *graffio* which means to scratch. In recent years, the word graffiti has been used to refer to a broad spectrum of public wall writings that range from individual texts to elaborate spray-paint wall art in different styles. For the purpose of this study, we will assume and restrict graffiti to mean writings or drawings on the walls, doors or other surface of buildings as seen in most schools and public buildings. This study may refer to, but is not centrally concerned with spray paint graffiti that is quite popularly identified with street artists, groups and sometimes gangs.

The earliest modern studies on graffiti were done in the Humanities and they focused on thematic and contextual inclinations of graffiti as a vehicle for the expression of all manner of thoughts emanating from the human mind in an age of 'purity' as Schouwenburg (2013) notes. One can quite easily see why these early works (Kinsey, 1953; Webb, 1966; Dundes, 1966; Read, 1977) may have concentrated efforts on toilets as a study area. Besides the very obvious concentration of graffiti in lavatories, another important index, and frankly a possible reason for the abundance of graffiti in lavatories, is the aspect of anonymity that the space presents. It allows close to total cover for the author while in the act. Nwoye (1993) also notes this stating that graffiti thrive in lavatories because they afford the 'author' relative privacy in which to express their thoughts without fear. This is surely one of the exclusive strengths of graffiti as a medium of communication – the ability to genuinely express oneself, even on matters of a most intimate nature, without reservation or fear of discovery. This feature is atypical and almost exclusive to graffiti as a form of communication. This freedom however, is heavily criticized and widely prescribed to be amoral and irresponsible, especially as some see it as an act of defacing architecture. Generally, no one wants to be seen writing on a wall because of the perceived moral depravity attached to the act. To a certain degree, anonymity is still desired today when creating wall graffiti, but what has remained rather constant through the ages is the primary intention for the graffiti to be open to, and seen by all. The feedback mechanism inherent in graffiti allows people see and respond to an inscription fostering continuous conversations in an anonymous setting.

Perhaps one of the biggest critic of this act of wall graffiti is Austrian theorist and modernist architect, Adolf Franz Loos. Loos (1901) in a very provoking essay, fervidly condemns what others agree to be an inherent impulse in man, which is the uncontrollable desire to express the innermost thoughts in whatever available media there was. Loos states that the man of our times who daubs the walls with erotic symbols to satisfy an inner urge is a criminal or degenerate [...] With children it is a natural phenomenon: their first artistic expression is to scrawl on the walls, but what is natural to the Papuan and the child is a symptom of degeneration in the modern man. Suffice it to say that Schacter (2014) disagrees. Erotic symbols and blabbering are in fact the oldest and most popular content in wall text graffiti all through modern history. And while the more modern societies have done everything necessary to contain the expressions of such aspects of human thoughts, it continues to present itself as a strong force that seeks to be heard. One of the earliest modern-styled depiction of graffiti discovered in the city of Ephesus now Turkey is believed to be an advertisement by a prostitute for her service. The inscription shows a heart-like handprint, a footprint, a number and a carved image of a woman's head. The very nature of graffiti encourages this type of expressions and it is seen mostly as a release valve for the more 'dirty thoughts'. Most inscriptions on men's toilets are 'erotic', i.e. referring to sexual intercourse, and also homosexual (Schouwenburg, 2013). In another study, Schouwenburg (2013b) also notes that erotic writings and images are a common place occurrence particularly with male authors. In the study, he examines graffiti at the Utrecht University Library and uncovers the plentiful use of phallic images among fraternities to symbolically construct and communicate a corporate identity. By highlighting their own fertility and sexual skills, they define themselves against other groups. Further, the study concludes that there is a strong connection between fraternity culture and stereotypical gender attitudes, male dominance and hyper-masculinity. Kinsey et al (1953) also argued that [toilet] graffiti, like Freud's erotic jokes or dreams, are 'uninhibited expressions of sexual desires'.

In more recent times, the art of graffiti is linked to vandalism and deviant behavior. Street graffiti in particular, has been viewed by authorities as an act of protest or disruption aimed at instigating the public. Nwoye (1993) disagrees with this blanket ideology about graffiti of any form. The study argues that graffiti is a social outlet and a template for sociopolitical consciousness. It further states that the interaction of architecture and graffiti does provide some validation for the medium and a platform for the expression of the mind of the people. Reisner (1967) already presented this position before when he argued that graffiti are a good index to study social thought. It must be seen as a repository of raw data that gives insights into the goings-on of the time. While eroticism may prevail, there is more to the issues raised and discussed on the walls of architecture, particularly in historically erogenous environments like university campuses.

### **3. Method**

Data gathering was by physical observation and documentation at the Kenneth Dike Library. The graffiti were copied off the wall in a manner that mimicked the original wall text. The data was then appropriately counted, tabulated and catalogued into seven main subgroups. The categories are Sexual & Obscene, Political & Social Issues, Religion, Educational Stress, General Life Issues, Love & Emotions, Salutations. Mimicking the writing style, ink colour, and peculiarities in the arrangement of the graffiti in the study area, the entire corpus was copied by the researcher into a handbook while paying attention to visual character of the works. This copy was properly labelled to show which floor and wing the data was extracted from and it became the reference point for the rest of the research. The raw data were assigned into the different subgroup and through simple frequency analysis, the study was able to derive a distribution and the various issued as represented in the collected data. The same process was done for data of both years and a comparison of the trend and frequency was done.

### **4. Study Area**

This study chose Kenneth Dike Library as case study mainly because it presents the oldest and most consistent template for the study of graffiti within the context of a university community in Nigeria. Kenneth Dike Library, being the first purpose-built library structure for university education in Nigeria, offers a type of consistency in the character and scope of users. This peculiar opportunity helps preserve the quality of the graffiti data under study, as we can confidently define the psychographics of the graffiti authors as young adults exposed to university education.

Kenneth Dike Library of the University of Ibadan is named after Professor Kenneth Onwuka Dike, the renowned historian and the first indigenous Vice-Chancellor of the University. The Library's main building designed by the duo Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew opened in 1954 and the Research Library which is an extension to the main structure was opened for student use well over a decade later in 1968. Situated on the Agbowo main campus of the University, Kenneth Dike Library building ranks as one of the most iconic structures on the university campus alongside Trenchard Hall, the main administrative block with the Clock Tower and undergraduate residential hostels like Mellanby, Tedder and Sultan Bello Halls.

The main structure of Kenneth Dike Library is comprised of a basement, ground floor and four other mounted floors. It is to these four upper floors that this study has focused. The internal layout of the building is divided into wings--the North and South--with a centred staircase system which takes you to the different floors. The library building is a first-rate example of tropical modernism architectural style. The repeated slightly curved-edge-square patterned screen wall arranged in a simple grid layout gives a deceptively simple character to the exterior of the building but not the type one can misinterpret for long. The intermittent strong concrete spine that frames the curved-edge-square screen elements, reinforces visual order and gives an undeniably sublime demeanour to the otherwise simple-minded elongated cuboid form. See Figure 1. The simplistic geometric form, presents the building with charm and forthrightness even in the most optically unflattering tropical sun. On the inside, the structure flaunts Bi-fold (concertina) wooden partitions attached to the inner walls. These open for circulation of both air and human traffic and very well extends the area of functional use of the library interior space. The reading floors are low energy consumption spaces with functional cross ventilation features reminiscent of and in line with the culture and style of the tropical living. The dual wing open floor interior is flanked on the East and West axis by end to end verandas which are deftly covered by the curved-edge screen blocks arranged in a manner that allow for reasonable natural ventilation, fine lighting and a hint of Afrocentrism in the screen pattern's shadow imprints on the veranda floor on a sunny day. In recent times, to accommodate more library users, rows of reading tables and chairs have been positioned on the verandas along the length of the building on either side close to the interior walls. It is mostly at these locations that numerous graffiti were found.



Figure 1: Exterior view of the Kenneth Dike Library from the Eastern side. Photo by Author.

## 5. Results and Analysis

### 5.1. Graffiti in Kenneth Dike Library

This study has deliberately excluded lavatories from its study area because ample early works have covered the dynamics and thematic analysis of lavatories (Kinsey et al, 1953; Dunes, 1966; Matthews, Speers and Ball, 2012; Schreer, G. and Strichartz, J., 1997; Haslam, N., 2012) and it will be unnecessary to repeat that in the context of the study's location. Instead, this study focused its attention on the writings on the interior walls of the main reading floors of the Library. Graffiti on the walls are mostly done with ink from biros and coloured markers.

The data (graffiti) collected, in both the 2007 and 2017 exercise was grouped into seven categories already mentioned earlier. Assigning data to these different categories aided the process of content analysis where one will identify the pattern and prevalence of the issues seen in the data. In all, a total of 1058 graffiti were documented in the study area in 2007 as against 324 in the exact same area in 2017. This is a significant 70% decrease in the total number of graffiti. Of the 2007 corpus, General Life Issues were the most prevalent making 23% of the whole graffiti found in the study area. Interestingly, this trend remained consistent in the 2017 data but a slight drop was noticed to bring the figures for General Life Issues to 20%. Some examples of what was found under the General Life Issues in the 2007 data include life philosophies and experiences, aspirations, and plentiful instances of general word play possibly out of boredom or a need for creative outburst. Some examples are given here: *'What you believe determines how you behave, and both determines what you become'*; *'To play safe, is not to play at all'*. Another example; *'Something is gravely wrong, someone is mad! I jacked the book until the pages went blank! Who is mad, the book or I?'* Salutations were the next most common item in the 2007 data making 22% of the lot, followed by religious matters with 18%. See Figure 2. It must be noted that under the religious matters, a further subdivision was created to capture a more accurate nature of the religious data. The data was divided into the three most popular religions in the area – Christianity, Islam and Traditional belief (here designated as others). Christianity had the largest presence in graffiti writings with a huge 85%, while Islam had 11% and traditional belief, 4% for the 2007 data and the 2017 was not significantly different. (See Figure 3).




Figure 2: Showing the comparative group percentage distribution of graffiti data from Kenneth Dike Library for 2007 and 2017.




Figure 3: Showing the percentage distribution of religious content graffiti for the three main religion groups

Many of the Christian content are targeted toward evangelism and enunciation of Christ. *'Jesus is the way; He can give you rest. Accept Him now before it is too late'; 'May the blood of Jesus set all you ppl free and take control'*. See Figure 4. Some were however hard lined, warning of impending damnation to those who refuse to acknowledge Jesus as redeemer. The Islam writings were also annunciatory in nature, proclaiming the sovereignty of Allah; *I bear witness that there is NO deity worthy of worship except Allah (S.W.T)*. In some cases, the Islam graffiti shrewdly antagonise Christian ideology and approach of soul awareness. This trait was however seen on both sides. An example is seen here – *'Be born as many times as you like, die not except as Muslim'*. Some examples of General Life Issues carry some humour and in other cases, they are just ambiguous words written for the fun of it. Some examples are seen here: *'In the examination hall, chickens are allowed but NO CHIPS!'; 'I came to symbolize my symbolical symbolism'*. Graffiti of a sexual or erotic nature were the least found on the walls of Kenneth Dike Library, accounting for only 6% of the total. It is however interesting to note that despite the relative paucity of sexually explicit graffiti text, the few that were available stood out, giving an impression that there were a greater number that actually existed. This study reasons that the cause of the perceived high number might be related to the fact that the Sexual and Obscene sub-category had the highest number of images and diagrams making it appear more frontal and copious than it actually is. Less than 5% of the total number of graffiti items in the study area for 2007 were images and diagrams. This figure rose in the 2017 data to approximately 10%. In the 2007 data, 75% of the images were sexual or obscene in nature. See some examples in Figure 5. Some of the images are rather reminiscent of the 2013 Schouwenburg's study of the Utrecht University Library titled *The Tale of the Four Foot Phallus*. In the 2017 data however, there were no obscene images at all. Diagrams were mostly academic in nature except for a few heart shape and stick-animal diagrams. Generally, the data of documented graffiti on the inner walls of Kenneth Dike library for the years under study show a reasonably diverse content with general salutations, religion and issues of life being the most prevalent. This will suggest a vibrant and intelligent community of diverse individuals with varied interests.






Figure 4: Graffiti showing a Christian post as copied off the wall of Kenneth Dike Library in 2007. Source: Author




Figure 5: Graffiti showing a sexual and obscene images as copied off the wall of Kenneth Dike Library in 2007. Source: Author

## 6. Discussion of findings

Deductions from the 2017 data clearly show that Kenneth Dike library was stripped bare of the graffiti scribbles that covered its walls ten years prior. This did not happen through the painting over of the walls as this study made ample enquiries about the last dates the walls of the library were painted. It will appear that architecture is gradually being reduced to its barest function as habitable space and nothing more. Users are finding alternative media for the expression of self beyond the proverbial four walls of the room, or the building. Must this concern social scientists?

This study opines that while there is a drastic reduction in the number of graffiti seen on the walls of Kenneth Dike Library, this does not directly mean that the practice of wall graffiti and *Latrinalia* (graffiti found on toilet doors and walls) is dwindling. In fact, contrary to the results shown by this study, the act itself is greatly increasing, but elsewhere. What the result of this study shows us is that there appears to be significantly less usage and patronage of physical libraries around university campuses. There is a direct correlation between rate of human activity in a building and number of graffiti on the walls. The less human activity in a space, the less graffiti will be seen. Therefore, because of the changing nature of data storage, where students find more information and academic resource for assignments online, there is significantly less actual library time hereby resulting in evidently less physical prove of the use of the space. In the 2017 data, it was noticed that some of the spaces used as reading spaces in 2007 have now been converted to offices, while some to computer rooms. This is a clear indication of the significant rate of reduction in the physical use of the library by students. This is perhaps not unexpected. Shill and Tonner (2003) already echoed the minds of academic librarians, saying they have debated the future of the library as a place for more than twenty years. Many asserting that the virtual library would replace the physical library, that the library as a place would no longer be a critical component of an academic institution due to technological advances. Students in 2017 found it strange to ‘travel’ to Kenneth Dike library when they have what they referred to as well functioning and stocked departmental libraries. The departmental libraries seem to offer more bespoke materials to students and the location, often nested within the department, is certainly of advantage to both the facility and the students. All, of course, at the expense of the University main library – the Kenneth Dike Library.

A thing must be said for the reading culture of these two eras. While it was popular to use the main library years ago, ‘libraries on devices’ have taken over the labourious dynamics of physical use and restrictions of the old style libraries. The availability of online resources for students in more recent times, makes it unnecessary for them to move out of a comfort zone to buildings dedicated to studying. Proper online access to resources liberates the individual and he or she may create a new reading environment for him/herself while making timely adjustments to accessibility and comfort levels. These factors play a role, however minuscule, to the changing tides of the relevance of physical libraries for basic studies. One must note, that special collections and archival materials, which appear to be the last frontier and the key value now attached to old libraries, are also frantically being digitised. This means, a time may come, when it would be totally unwarranted to travel to a physical library to get knowledge.

With these thoughts as a backdrop, the diminished number of graffiti on the walls of the library under study, does not suggest that the practice of graffiti wall writing is disappearing, rather it points to another factor which is the lessened use of the library. Further investigation shows that there are sustained numbers of graffiti in other buildings the students still use often. For example, the student hostels and classrooms. This buttresses the notion that the practise of graffiti wall writing, while it is finding alternative platforms in online social media, has not in any way significantly affected the original practice. The findings of this study also imply that graffiti can then be seen as an index for the evaluation of human interaction or general success of building-use with certain architectural typologies.

## 7. Architecture as Communication Platform

Evidently, social media platforms have become a more popular method of sharing thoughts and it appears fewer young people, particularly university students, are turning to physical wall graffiti to express themselves. The appeal of the unobstructed visibility the internet offers presents a challenge for architecture and its nature of

immobility in the contest for 'followers'. Social media sites are helping individuals, who were once thought of as voiceless, gain significant recognition. Hence, the contemporary thing to do if one has a point to make, is to turn to the internet - the new platform for communication without boundaries. With this development, there is a direct consequence for architecture as a platform for communication. While architecture battles on the front of identity and cultural integration, it appears to be losing relevance as a canvas for expression. Our buildings and structures which once sacrificed their pristine facades to take on the important role of hosting the opinions of the masses have now relinquished this role to social media leaving them bare and lifeless. More graffiti authors are now drawn to the enigma of the internet, leaving behind what may now be called the 'old media' - building or bathroom scribbles. But, has architecture really lost its role as a platform for communication or is the decline of graffiti on some walls an indication of something else?

It is important to note that despite the availability of convenient alternatives, some wall graffiti and *latrinalia* may still be found and are still being created. This, perhaps is as a result of the resilience of purists or oblivious individuals who find themselves fulfilling the inherent urge to mark spaces they find themselves with physical markers of identity. To explain this, we need to go back to the reasons why people make graffiti in the first place. Blume (1985) identifies some of the general motives for writing graffiti, including furnishing proof of one's existence; acting on a need to express oneself; documenting one's membership of a group; taking pleasure in aesthetic, creative and physical acts; boredom; expressing criticism, protest, rejection and agreement; marking out territories; and searching for contact with others. Sometimes it runs much deeper than just boredom. It's the idea of permanence; giving one's ideas and opinions a tangible form. While your tweets and Instagram posts might live on forever in the cloud, there is nothing quite like having it engraved in a wall or table. The thought that it's going to be a long time before these drawings and writings are removed does something in favour of the 'old media'. It could also be for a better visibility. Although social media allows for a message to reach a much larger audience, the sheer amount of content almost guaranteed it would be swept away from the frontlines in a few minutes. The fact is that unless you're incredibly famous on social media, your scathing criticism of local politics, for instance, might be read by just a few people and swept into the sea of forgotten tweets. But a spray-painted message on the school wall is sure to catch everyone's eye no matter who wrote it. It has and will always be a way for the voiceless to make their opinions their opinions seen by the masses; to get their message out to the public.

Further, should this apparent popularity of social media, take away from architecture's role as a platform of communication, posterity might judge us as a people so disconnected from their physical environment to such a point that they failed to humanise their spaces and leave signatures of their existence. If one considers this from an anthropological point of view, then any degeneration of the one platform that characteristically encourages authenticity in communication, must be of concern to social scientists. While the dexterity and multiplicity of opportunities that the internet brings is welcomed and possibly inevitable, indeed if not properly served, it may subconsciously promote a type of populist identity. The art and craft of graffiti has been criticised and resisted for a long time. Measures have been enforced to prevent, criminalise, and suppress it. Extreme measures designed to moderate the act has been recorded to include banning sales of graffiti instruments, even creating special graffiti walls for the very purpose of writing on, and yet, it still finds a way to circumnavigate these restrictions and seek for freedom. Although it is seen by many, technically as vandalism, over the years, it has become a part of architecture itself. While people may love the look of the clean polished concrete wall, there's something about seeing *skillachi wuz ere* or *Geo 325 is HELL* scribbled on the wall that immediately gives life and locational meaning to that wall. In some way, graffiti are in fact a testament that students actually use this building. Ultimately, it is the users of a building that bring life to it. The life of a structure does not end when construction is done, how it is used by the people is as much a part of the building as the shape and form.

The role of architecture in this form of self-expression has not and will likely not be usurped by social media anytime soon. The same reason people still prefer physical books to much more convenient ebooks is the reason people will continue to draw on walls. Real tangible objects have an air of gravitas around it that feel more alive than the words in the virtual space. So, while the internet and social media may be the future of self-expression, architecture still has a huge role to play and must not be so quickly dismissed.

## 8. Conclusion

The graffiti of the classical era depicted political murmurings, literary quotes and sexual themes of that time. In the same vein, graffiti today are a depiction of repressed emotions of all the above concerns within a structure of anonymity. This study has shown, that the act of graffiti writing continues to reinvent itself. The various and emerging platforms become significant in the presentation of graffiti only to such extent to which the platforms respond to the needs and assertions of graffiti as a communication conduit.

While the act continues to transform itself in line with cultural and technological mobility, the fundamental framework of the idea remains the same. Continued attention must be paid to the several templates through which society expresses itself freely. Architecture, being the oldest and most consistent surface available to man for intuitive expression remains significant in the examination of the 'mind of society'. A blank wall will not remain blank for long. As long as people exist, they will always have opinions to share and they will see the environment--built, virtual and natural--as canvas available to them. Therefore, social thinkers must not relent in fostering the centrality and importance of architecture in communication.

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# Constraints to Get Access in Maternal Healthcare: A Review from Lower-middle-Income Countries

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## Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explore the basic constraints to get access to maternal healthcare utilization during the pre- and post-delivery period of women in selected lower-middle-income countries around the world. This paper is a review of the literature of previous articles published from 2000 to 2019 in different database. The findings of the study show that different types of intervening factors including socioeconomic status, health literacy of the women and their husband, education, employment status, decision-making power of the women and religion significantly influence the full and free access to the maternal health care facilities in lower-middle-income countries.

**Keywords:** Maternal Health Service, Socio-Economic, Determinants, Accessibility

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Introduce the problem

Regardless of overall endeavours, maternal mortality remains a noteworthy medical issue in many lower-middle-income countries around the world where approximately half of the maternal death occurs only because of pregnancy-related complexities (Houweling et al., 2007; Hwang & Park, 2019; Pulok et al., 2018; Stephen &

Joshua, 2016; Woldemicael, 2010). Perfect maternal care includes initial and attentive ANC (antenatal care), delivering under skilled birth attendants, and utilized post-natal care (Muzyamba et al., 2019). Maternal health is considered very crucial (Wong et al., 2017) because in most cases maternal and neonatal death ensued during this period (Khaki & Sithole, 2019). And it is evident that nearly half of all maternal death happened within the first 24 hours of delivery and in the first week after delivery of a newborn child (WHO, 2013). In fact, in MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) crucial efforts have been made to reduce maternal mortality rates for 15 years but the majority of the lower-middle-income countries failed to achieve the target (Wehrmeister et al., 2016), as a result, the UN additionally incorporated this objective in its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 to 2030 as a major aspect of the target of ensuring the wellbeing of all people (Hwang & Park, 2019) in which improvement of the maternal health remains a global priority (Novignon et al., 2019). On this note, the main objective of maternal healthcare is based on early recognition and management of pregnant women (Abor et al., 2011). Though, significant improvements to decline maternal mortality over the last three decades have been achieved, millions of women in lower-middle-income countries still experiencing life-threatening and other serious health problems related to pregnancy or childbirth. On top of that, pregnancy and childbirth complications result in more deaths and disabilities than any other reproductive health problems (Pulok et al., 2018). On this ground, though the SDG target 3.1 aimed to reduce the maternal mortality to 70 women per 1000,000 live births by the year 2030 but still over the globe, pregnancy-related complications causes 216 deaths of women per 1000,000 live births (Khaki & Sithole, 2019). An approximately 287,000 maternal deaths are reported annually, of which 99% happened only in developing countries (Srivastava et al., 2015). Moreover, in some developing countries, one woman out of ten dies of a pregnancy-related cause during her childbearing years (Abor et al., 2011). In this regard, records of moms' wellbeing conditions are significant for the accomplishment of these objectives since they demonstrate not just the adequacy of every single nation's human services' framework yet additionally the condition of a state's general social and financial conditions (Hwang & Park, 2019). In such a situation, ensuring access to maternal healthcare services is undeniable for timely achievement of SDGs.

On this ground, the purpose of this review is to identify the factors that act as constraints for the women to get full access and utilize the maternal health care services in some selected lower-middle-income countries. In this regard, depending on the articles reviewed, we tried to clarify some basic contributing factors including socioeconomic status, health literacy, education, employment, decision making power, and religion which create inequality in the utilization of the highest possible maternal care services.

### *1.2 Defining Maternal Health Care*

In recent decades, maternal health has gone through a significant epidemiological transition and become a global concern because through maternal healthcare we can save the lives of millions of women (Kifle et al., 2017; Knaul et al., 2016). However, the present maternal health only focuses on a narrow period of women's lives: pregnancy, childbirth, and six weeks postpartum. So, maternal healthcare should include the antenatal care, delivery care and postnatal care of women (Kifle et al., 2017; Knaul et al., 2016; Langer et al., 2015; R. Zhang et al., 2018).

Maternal healthcare in relation to pregnancy and childbirth reflects the inequalities which affect the women especially in lower-middle-income countries (Knaul et al., 2016; Langer et al., 2015; Rosenfield & Maine, 1985). On top of that, a low level of maternal healthcare is the main reason for maternal mortality in developing countries (Berhan & Berhan, 2014). Moreover, breast and cervical cancers are now the leading causes of mortality among reproductive-aged women in lower-middle-income countries (Bonita et al., 2013). So maternal healthcare should not only address the agenda associated with pregnancy and childbirth but also focus on the expanding diseases and injuries which threaten girls and women throughout their life cycle.

## **2. Methodology**

### *2.1 Search strategy*

We have conducted this study by using secondary literature which has already published on this topic all around the world. More precisely, we tried to focus on the factors which influence the access of maternal healthcare in pre-delivery, during delivery and post-delivery periods.

We reviewed the literature systematically from those published from 2000 to 2019 in English language. Apart from this, we have considered One paper published before 2000; as the article is very relevant to the issue we have discussed here. We searched through seven electronic databases including PubMed, Science Direct, Scopus, Emerald Insight, EBSCO, JSTOR, and Google Scholar by developing search strategies specific to their subject headings and text word. In this study, searches were conducted by using the keywords including “socioeconomic inequalities” or “socioeconomic factors” or “inequalities” or “determinants” or “constraints” or “barriers” “maternal health” or “maternal healthcare” or “prenatal care” or “antenatal care” or “maternal care” or “pregnancy outcome” or “health outcome” or “maternity care”, and “developing countries” or “middle-income countries” or “low-income countries” or “poor countries”. Searches were carried out with the Boolean operators “OR” and “AND” between the main phrase and the aforesaid keywords. It is noteworthy to mention that, we obtained only those articles that were more likely to meet the objective of our study. Besides, we also went through the reference arrangements of the selected articles which were further screened for important papers. We only consider those articles reported in English and undertaken in developing countries and which reported the non-clinical factors on the use of maternal healthcare access.

## 2.2 Analytical Framework

We used an extended version of the analytical framework which only focused on findings that explain the socioeconomic status and other related variables that influence the utilization of maternal healthcare in lower-middle-income countries.

On that note, we retrieved over 1600 articles using advanced search strategy of which only 84 articles were included in the review. Most of the articles were excluded after screening the title and abstracts. Apart from this, we also screened out a good number of articles due to duplication and irrelevant to our issues.

## 3. Results and Discussion

In many parts of the globe, predominantly in rural areas, the utilization of these services are substandard as well as these specific services are being hampered (Yaya & Ghose, 2019; C. Zhang et al., 2019; R. Zhang et al., 2018) by numerous socioeconomic, cultural, demographic and community-level factors (Fenny et al., 2019; Rajesh Kumar Rai et al., 2012) which make difficulties for the poor and vulnerable groups to get full access and ideal use of maternal healthcare (Novignon et al., 2019). However, Yaya and Ghose (2019) have been found that significant inequalities exist especially in Asian and African context and the severity reach its pick in Afghanistan, Somalia, and South Sudan.

### 3.1 Socioeconomic status (SES)

Socioeconomic status (SES) of women and their household is frequently connected with different types of health risks and lower utilization of maternal health services in low-middle-income countries (De Groot et al., 2019; Solanke, 2018; X. Wang, 2017; Yaya et al., 2019). In contrast with the developed nations, in the lower-middle-income countries, the scarcity of the resources such as infrastructural, skilled human personnel, technological and financial barriers and weak health care policies create impediments to accessibility and affordability of the poorer section of the society (De Groot et al., 2019; Elmusharaf et al., 2015; Green, 2018; Hwang & Park, 2019; Kanengoni et al., 2019; Pulok et al., 2018; Tesfahun et al., 2014; Yaya & Ghose, 2019) and limiting the optimum uses of maternal health care. In lower-middle-income countries, insufficient fund allocation in health sector drives the poor people away from the health services, which results in imbalanced health outcomes (Green, 2018; C. Zhang et al., 2019), where maternal health care especially during delivery and after the delivery period is most neglected (Koroma et al., 2017).

However, in this part, we include different factors like income, wealth, geographical location or place of residence of the people, the distance between service provider institution and users, and availability of the health insurance as the indicators of socioeconomic status of the users.

### 3.1.1 Income

Income of the general people has a direct connection with healthcare service utilization (Devkota & Upadhyay, 2015). Linking with this point, financial drawbacks deprived women from antenatal, delivery, and postnatal services in many lower-middle-income countries (Koroma et al., 2017). Consequently, women from lower socioeconomic strata are generally exposed to various types of perinatal complexities including premature birth, low birth weight, restricted growth in intra-uterine, antenatal and neonatal mortality, etc. (De Groot et al., 2019; Paredes, 2016; Zere et al., 2013).

There are a number of studies all around the globe that have already looked up the measure to find out the role of income inequalities in the utilization of maternal health care. In this context, Ambel et al. (2017), Fenny et al. (2019) and Novignon et al. (2019) in their research in Ghana, with the same data set, found that the pro-rich characteristics of the household significantly ensure the utilization of ANC services than their poorer counterparts. The same situation exists in Bangladesh, a South-Asian country, the evidence of which is explored in the study of Pulok et al. (2018), Rana et al. (2019), according to these studies, women from higher income strata are more likely to get access in maternal health-related services both from public and private service providers in comparison with their poor counterparts. In this ground, Rahman et al. (2017) claimed that the difference between rich and poor class is very common in the utilization of ANC - at least four times; the probable cause is the modern outlook along with better education which makes the rich class willing to tear out the traditional barrier and seek better maternal health services (Houweling et al., 2007). These findings are also in line with the study of Ononokpono and Azfredrick (2014), Stephen and Joshua (2016), Solanke (2018) and Koroma et al. (2017) from Nigerian context along with many other sub-Saharan African countries.

### 3.1.2 Wealth

Novignon et al. (2019) argued that inequality in wealth has its peak in the African context. Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa showed that the poor women are the worst sufferer of maternal health complexities due to out of pocket health payments (McKinnon et al., 2016; C. Zhang et al., 2019) as a result women from families having less wealth are at higher risk of death (Paredes, 2016; Rajesh Kumar Rai et al., 2012; Walton & Schbley, 2013). This is the picture of Pakistan also, along with other lower-middle-income countries in South-Asia (Mumtaz et al., 2014), besides, the study of Zere et al. (2013) and Walton and Schbley (2013) demonstrated that in Bangladesh, the use of ANC is more common among women from wealthier section than the poor counterparts. Additionally, women from well off families generally take maternal healthcare service from professional doctors and nurses which is considered as the foundation of safe motherhood. This finding is also matching with different lower-middle-income country perspectives as stated in the study of Houweling et al. (2007). Furthermore, the study of Dalinjong et al. (2018) revealed that the rich often live in urban territories with greater availability, better framework, and sufficient resources which enable them to access better health services comparing with the poor people living in rural settings. These findings are in line with the findings of (Iacoella & Tirivayi, 2019; Muzyamba et al., 2019; Rahman et al., 2017; Stephen & Joshua, 2016; W. Wang et al., 2017; X. Wang, 2017; Yaya et al., 2019). The wealthier section can likewise more promptly manage the cost of services and the persevering out of pocket expense for specific deliveries and so more likely to get maternal health services (O. E. Banke-Thomas et al., 2017; Dalinjong et al., 2018; Haider et al., 2017; Iacoella & Tirivayi, 2019; Koroma et al., 2017; McNamee et al., 2009; R. K. Rai et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2017; Yaya et al., 2019), these findings are also documented in the literature of Anyait et al. (2012), Kitui et al. (2013), Ononokpono and Azfredrick (2014) and Shahjahan et al. (2017). In lower-middle-income countries, poor women are reluctant to utilize the formal health sector in the event that they should pay for maternal health services (Koroma et al., 2017; Stephen & Joshua, 2016).



### 3.1.3 Geographical location

The decision of taking healthcare services is implanted and interweaved not only with social and cultural practices but also with the distance of the service provider institutions (Elmusharaf et al., 2015; McNamee et al., 2009; Walton & Schbley, 2013). The study of Blanchet et al. (2012), Sahoo et al. (2015) and Yaya et al. (2019) unfold that the characteristics of the region like the doctor to population and nurse to population ratio along with feeble infrastructure, distance, fragile transportation making the health service to be utilized, particularly for the vulnerable groups living with limited medical resource facilities (Ambel et al., 2017; Faye et al., 2013; Gage, 2007; Haider et al., 2017; McKinnon et al., 2016; Shahjahan et al., 2017; Yaya et al., 2019). In the Ethiopian context, the distance between house and health service provider organizations had an impact on the use of maternal service including ANC, delivery, and PNC. Another study of Faye et al. (2013) in Senegal demonstrates that women in rural area cross more than 5 kilometres on feet to get medical facilities only due to fragile road transport and lacking the way of transportation. Similar types of findings also derive from Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Uganda (Tsfahun et al., 2014; Walton & Schbley, 2013). The study of Moindi et al. (2015) and A. Banke-Thomas et al. (2017) argued that due to distance a majority of the women in Kenya are reluctant to get maternal health service. In the context of Bangladesh, the distance along with poor transport and communication system is one of the entree fences to the maternal health care service in rural parts (Haider et al., 2017; Pulok et al., 2018; Walton & Schbley, 2013). As a result, a high percentage of the rural women deprived of having proper examination during pregnancy (X. Wang, 2017). Kanengoni et al. (2019) explored that due to the unavailability of ambulance or high price, Zimbabwean women are deprived of receiving health service during emergencies (Hwang & Park, 2019; Shahjahan et al., 2017). On the other hand, the utilization of health care is most often depended on the location of the service provider, for instances, in Bangladesh, a majority of the modern health facilities are located in the capital city which deprive the people living in other locations (Rana et al., 2019; Shahjahan et al., 2017; Walton & Schbley, 2013).

### 3.1.4 Health Insurance

Health insurance is another factor initiated from socioeconomic inequality which, in most cases, ensures the highest level of healthcare service utilization in developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries. Usually, people having enough health coverage always get the highest level of service facilities. Regarding this, Bonfrer et al. (2016), Browne et al. (2016) and Novignon et al. (2019) found a strong relationship between essential ANC visits and health insurance in Ghana.

Access and use of maternal health care services are possible through removing financial constraints in the health care sector by providing subsidies and health risk protection scheme to the vulnerable and poorer section, who are unable to bear the health-related cost (Novignon et al., 2019). Because, exemption from paying the premium by the pregnant women (Blanchet et al., 2012), mostly poor and vulnerable group, encourage them to seek pregnancy-related healthcare during complications.

### 3.2 Health Literacy

In the context of health literacy including poor knowledge regarding health, mother's educational level, husband's educational background and level along with behavioural attitude towards maternal health also play a pivotal role to create inequality in the maternal health sector (Yaya & Ghose, 2019). On this ground, Elmusharaf et al. (2015) stated that a lack of understanding regarding the significance of proper medical service during the time of pregnancy affects health-related decisions. In Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso factors like misconceptions, lack of knowledge, etc. reduce the frequency of utilization of maternal health services (Enameh et al., 2016; Hwang & Park, 2019; Yaya et al., 2019; C. Zhang et al., 2019). Access to media, in this regard, can be a good solution to increase health literacy, particularly for the poorer section. In their study, Iacoella and Tirivayi (2019) claimed that exposure to media played a potential role to increase health knowledge of the women in comparison with those who do not have access to media. Studies of R. K. Rai et al. (2013) and A. Banke-Thomas et al. (2017), claimed that knowledge regarding health through media can be an influential predictor to increase consciousness about the utilization of maternal health care services, mainly among the women in Kenya and Malawi. The possible explanation could be the effectiveness of the media to disseminate

information that obviously makes the women conscious about medical facilities available and also accelerate inter-personal communication that would help behavioural change (Rajesh Kumar Rai et al., 2012).

On this ground, Akhter and Dasvarma (2017) claimed that in Bangladesh along with other lower-middle income countries, lesser access to information regarding health along with lower literacy regarding health are the significant variables of a lesser number of skilled birth attendance during delivery which increase the maternal mortality rate.

### *3.3 Education*

Education, regardless of gender difference, is considered as a significant variable to take the health-related decision (Enameh et al., 2016; McNamee et al., 2009; Stephen & Joshua, 2016). Education plays an important role to determine the maternal health care around the globe. According to Gage (2007), McNamee et al. (2009), Rajesh Kumar Rai et al. (2012), Shahjahan et al. (2012), Gupta et al. (2014), Ononokpono and Azfredrick (2014), Sahoo et al. (2015), Paredes (2016), Stephen and Joshua (2016), Green (2018), C. Zhang et al. (2019); R. Zhang et al. (2018), Muzyamba et al. (2019), Iacoella and Tirivayi (2019) and De Groot et al. (2019) educating the women can be an important determinants to utilize maternal health care services throughout the developing world. The possible explanation could be that advanced education encourages women to oppose inconsistent power relations that encroach on their health and enable them to extract health-related information very proficiently, particularly when to seek and how to use it. In this context, different literature, for example, the studies of , Babalola and Fatusi (2009), R. K. Rai et al. (2013), Tesfahun et al. (2014), Ambel et al. (2017), Rahman et al. (2017), Haider et al. (2017), Shahjahan et al. (2017), W. Wang et al. (2017), Bonfrer et al. (2016), Yaya et al. (2019) and Khaki and Sithole (2019) described that educated women, in Rwanda, Uganda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, Malawi, Indonesia, Nepal, and Bangladesh are more likely to take maternal health care during the ANC and PNC period than their less-educated counterparts. In this regard, the study of Yaya et al. (2019) reveals that in Guinea-Bissau about 75 percent of the educated women are prone to get maternal health care facilities compared with those women who have no education at all whereas, in Zambia, higher levels of education upsurge the probability of utilizing the post-natal maternal health service. Shahjahan et al. (2017) found a solid and critical relationship between education ANC and PNC practice in rural Bangladesh. On the other hand, it is evident from Bangladesh that women with higher level of education usually take at least four ANC comparing with those women who had no formal education. Not only this, the frequency of utilizing health facilities from qualified doctors and nurses are 1.8 percent higher among the women who completed secondary or higher education than their uneducated counterparts (McNamee et al., 2009). This result is similar with the findings of the studies conducted in Indonesia and other different countries with similar socioeconomic backgrounds (Gupta et al., 2014; Shahjahan et al., 2012).

On this ground, husband's education also plays a critical role. In most cases, educated or highly educated husbands always seek better care for their wives as evident from the study of Rajesh Kumar Rai et al. (2012), R. K. Rai et al. (2013), Browne et al. (2016), Enameh et al. (2016), Iacoella and Tirivayi (2019) and Hwang and Park (2019). O. E. Banke-Thomas et al. (2017). These studies indicated that husband's education is the most influential predictor to ensure the highest frequency of maternal health care utilization in deferent parts of lower-middle-income countries. Sahoo et al. (2015) concluded that educated husbands may likewise put few imperatives on their wives' decisions regarding health issues which ultimately encourage the highest possible care-seeking behaviour.

### *3.4 Employment*

Employment is another factor that ensures the maximum use of maternal health care all around the world. The study of Rana et al. (2019) explained employment as a possible cause of empowerment which enables women to decide fertility choice and access to maternal health services. Studies of Khaki and Sithole (2019) and Iacoella and Tirivayi (2019) in Malawi found a strong relationship between women's employment and utilization of post-natal care. These findings are also similar in the context of Ethiopia, Nepal, and many other lower-middle-income countries (Babalola & Fatusi, 2009; Dhaher et al., 2008; Dhakal et al., 2007). The study of Khanal et al.

(2014) in Nepal explained that the paid employment status of women increases higher chances of getting maternal health services. Husbands are generally unwilling to pay health cost for their wives, unless she is employed or serve the demands of husbands particularly in Bangladesh (Walton & Schbley, 2013).

The study of R. Zhang et al. (2018) claimed that employed women generally take sufficient prenatal visits to the doctor which usually starts from the first 12 weeks and continues after the delivery period than their unemployed counterparts. And here the possible explanation could be the incapability of the jobless women to meet the expenses related to maternal health service.

Besides, the employment status of women and their husband's is also a crucial factor for the utilization of maternal health care services (Dhaher et al., 2008; Dhakal et al., 2007; Sahoo et al., 2015). In this connection, Jithesh and Ravindran (2016) indicated that the maternal mortality rate is seven times higher among women whose husbands or partners are unemployed.

### *3.5 Decision-making power*

Women's autonomy is regarded as one of the significant features to motivate their health-seeking behaviour (Woldemicael, 2010). Different studies including, Tesfahun et al. (2014), Kanengoni et al. (2019) and Iacoella and Tirivayi (2019) suggest that the utilization of healthcare services often depend on the decision-making power of the women, particularly, economic independence, in most cases, ensure higher rate of maternal health care utilization but it is also true that unemployed women, to some extent, get full access to reproductive health service, particularly when the decision regarding health depends on her husband and herself jointly (Khaki & Sithole, 2019). Besides, the economic independence and education also enable women strongly to participate in decision-making process both in the public and family spheres and ensures better access to health-related services which is evident from sub-Saharan African countries (Iacoella & Tirivayi, 2019; Woldemicael, 2010).

### *3.6 Religion*

Religion, interestingly both in Asian and African continents, is regarded as an important determinant of maternal health service utilization (Iacoella & Tirivayi, 2019). In Bangladesh there has been found an association between maternal health care practice and religion. According to the findings of Shahjahan et al. (2017), Muslim women, in general, are more likely to use maternal health care compared with the non-Muslim group who are usually attached to traditional practices. These findings are also similar with the study of Mekonnen and Mekonnen (2003) who claimed that between 25% and 28% of the Ethiopian Muslim women take maternal health care from the professional service providers in comparison with only 11% of non-Muslim women which is contradictory with the findings of Stephen and Joshua (2016) in Nigeria where both ANC and PNC is determined by religion; the findings of the study explored that the majority of the Christian women utilize skilled medical service provider than their Muslim counterparts. Besides, Adjiwanou and LeGrand (2014), in their study told about the practice of *pardah* as a means of women's seclusion from society, particularly, in Muslim community in Bangladesh, India, Nigeria along with other Muslim countries. These findings match with the study of Desai and Andrist (2010).

## **4. Recommendations**

Based on the review, we recommend some strategies that can ensure the maximum possible utilization of maternal health care services in lower-middle-income countries which are highlighted in Table 1.

Table 1. Themes and subthemes related to policy suggestions to improve maternal health care outcomes in lower-middle income countries

Main themes	Subthemes
Free maternal health care	Free antenatal visit, delivery and postnatal care, free medicine and other supplies
Economic incentives	Conditional cash transfers, voucher scheme, community-based health insurance scheme
Broad outreach and education	Spousal, family and community inclusiveness (in reproductive health and maternal plan of care)

#### 4.1 Free Maternal Healthcare

The recommendation for free maternal health care is justified because evidence from Ghana showed that introducing the provision of free maternal care under the delivery exemption policy in 2004 increased the use of antenatal care (Aboagye & Agyemang, 2013). Apart from this, Nigeria introduced a cost-removal policy since 2009 which provides free maternal health services and removes the direct cost of maternal health services resulted in increasing the number of women who utilize antenatal care, delivery and postpartum care at health facilities (Edu et al., 2017). Similarly in Kenya, to promote health facility in the sector of delivery service and to reduce pregnancy-related mortality, the government abolished delivery fees in all public health facilities since 2013 and got a significant (29.5%) increase in the number of facility-based deliveries (Gitobu et al., 2018).

#### 4.2 Economic incentives

Financial incentives is, so far, the most common form of a mediator to improve and increase the utilization of maternal and reproductive health care service that published in the literature which includes “conditional cash transfers, voucher schemes, and Community-based health insurance” (Elmusharaf et al., 2015). Evidence showed that, conditional cash transfer generally increases household income and overall nutrition and consumption (Kabeer et al., 2012). In addition, it also increases the access to healthcare for hard-to-reach groups as well as improving health status and maternal health (Knaul et al., 2012; Lagarde et al., 2007).

Another vital form of economic incentives is the voucher scheme which has been introduced to provide access to pre-defined services to the communities that are hard to reach (Elmusharaf et al., 2015). Introducing a voucher scheme in India increases the institutional delivery for emergency obstetric care for the poor (Bhat et al., 2009). In Cambodia, vouchers were used to improve access, efficiency and disparities of selected maternal health care services (Bellows et al., 2011). Moreover, Eastern Uganda experienced the effect of the voucher scheme on improving institutional delivery and enhancing maternal follow-up. The success of the voucher scheme is also evidenced from Pakistan where this technique increases institutional delivery from 31% to 47% among the poorest group along with lessening the inequalities between rich and poor women from 33% to 16% (Mumtaz et al., 2014).

Similarly, community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme is contributing to financial protection as well as increasing both the demand for maternal health services and the rate of delivery with skilled birth attendants (Elmusharaf et al., 2015).

#### 4.3 Broad outreach and education

In order to improve reproductive and maternal health outcomes, spousal, family, and community inclusiveness in the care plan are essential. It is proved that reproductive problems are not only the problems of women but also the collective problem for everyone in the community. For this reason, family members and the larger community should be targeted by delivering health talks at social and religious gatherings. On top of that, education is highly recommended for creating awareness regarding family planning, antenatal care, sexually

transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS and dietary needs during pregnancy (Ezeonwu, 2014; Weitzman, 2017). A recent study in Malawi has found that knowledge regarding the expansion of antenatal care to men can help to overcome the barriers to improve maternal health at a community level (Aarnio et al., 2013).

## 5. Conclusion

It is, in fact, universal truth that universal health access won't be accomplished until women are being taken care of in their own networks and are enabled to take decisions regarding their reproductive health within a friendly environment. The accomplishments in maternal wellbeing are an after effect of political responsibility, viable arranging and deliberate exertion among different stakeholders. So, it is necessary for all the individual countries to adopt specific indicators of their own, based on the resource's availability. In fact, the utilization of maternal health care is not solely related to health-related objectives as opposed to bringing down dissimilarity in the use of facilities. To accomplish a quicker rate of progress, the health policy makers, particularly in lower-middle-income countries which are still lagged behind to achieve the desired targets to ensure universal maternal health service, must have to think about the guaranteed access to basic social insurance benefits by all, irrespective of class, race, religion, ethnicity, culture and monetary status of family units. Additionally, the behavioural factors, which are frequently mentioned to as a successful way of increasing consciousness, ought to consolidate two-route correspondence between the suppliers and the clients of the facilities to guarantee better quality and use.

## Author's contributions and Acknowledgement

TEAS: Conceptualized and conducted the literature search, writing - methodology, original draft, review, editing the manuscript structure, and approved the final manuscript. NF: Review the original draft. AAJT: Literature search, writing – original draft. ZFK: Writing original draft. MHH: Critical review of original draft, editing and approved the final manuscript.

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# Urban Space Atmosphere as Identity of the Klungkung Urban Area, Bali, Indonesia

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## Abstract

The development of the city in Indonesia has different character and identity. Recognizing identities will understand who and what their needs are, how much and how they meet these needs, and strive to nurture and nurture them well and sustainably according to their characteristics or identity. Similarly, with a city, to be able to maintain and understand the needs of the occupants and their environment, the city must be known and thoroughly (comprehensive), so that the needs of the community and environmental sustainability can be fulfilled and maintained sustainably. A city can be recognized if the city's identity is well known and understood from a cultural and social perspective. City identity has an important role in the development and sustainability of a city. City identity can also be formed from the atmosphere of the city space that surrounds the city area. One of the famous cities in Bali with the nickname "Bumi / Serobotan City" is one of the city's traditional foods. This identity is attached as an identifier for the community when remembering and imagining the city of Klungkung in general. On the other hand, Klungkung has a long royal history, culture and historical buildings. The identity of the city of Klungkung can be seen from a different perspective when viewed and discussed from the atmosphere of the city space that surrounds the Klungkung urban area. The study used qualitative methods by implementing a descriptive approach, and studying literature with research instruments through interviews and questionnaires. The research aims to find out how atmospheric urban space is seen from the theory of atmospheric and image of the city as the identity of urban areas Klungkung, Bali. Results of the analysis in the conceptual order of this research obtained benefits and results about the atmosphere of urban areas that can be used as identity of urban areas in terms of visual, sense and passion at the operational level can formulate policies on urban identity areas.

**Keywords:** Urban Atmosphere, Urban Area, Urban Space, Urban Identity

## INTRODUCTION

### *Background*

Urban identities can also be formed from urban elements and elements of the historical or cultural owned by the city. Many cities have finally become famous for having a special identity and custom identities that are built

from a series of old historical elements, and not because of the mere patch brand that originally attached just behind the city's name such as an empty slogan, there is no participation from its citizens (Abiyoso, 2007).

A city can be known when the identity of the city is known and well understood in terms of culture and social society. The city's identity plays an important role in the development and sustainability of a city. City identities can also be formed from the atmosphere of the city space surrounding the city area. The identity of Klungkung city is not detached from traditional Balinese architectural roles. In the regional regulation of Bali Province # 5 of 2005 about the requirements of architectural buildings and the regional regulations of Klungkung Regency No. 8 of 2016 about building buildings need to follow the rules and principles of traditional Balinese architecture in the emergence of building facades. The visual appearance of traditional Balinese architectural buildings provides the atmosphere that urban areas.

Klungkung is one of the famous cities in Bali with the nickname "City of Serombotan" one of the traditional food typical of the city. The identity is inherent as an identification for the community when remembering and imagining the city of Klungkung in general. On the other hand, Klungkung has a long royal history, culture and historic buildings. The identity of the city of Klungkung can be seen from a different point of view when reviewed and discussed from the atmosphere of the city room that surrounds the Klungkung urban area. Not a lot of people understand or government about the role of atmosphere of the city room that gives "sense" to the life and development of the city itself.

The research is based on a low understanding and community implementation, the Government with a sense of has and the use of urban space as the identity of the city, and still does not see the identity of the city as a marker for the community while in urban areas Klungkung. This study will discuss about the atmosphere of urban space in the urban area of Klungkung by looking at and identifying the concept of Balinese cultural spatial planning, the atmosphere of the city and the image of the city of Klungkung Bali. This research is very important to do because the atmosphere of the city space can be used as a marker of city identity in terms of visual, meaning and soul and at the operational level can formulate policies regarding the identity of urban areas. The urban Klungkung area in the future can provide an overview of the city atmosphere as the identity of urban areas in Bali.

### ***Research Question***

Based on the background that has been proposed above, the research question faced by the urban areas of Klungkung as follows:

1. How is the atmosphere of urban space in urban area Klungkung?
2. What urban atmosphere affects the identity of urban areas in Klungkung?

### ***Research Objectives***

The selection of this research topic focuses on urban spaces in Klungkung City which play an important role in forming the identity of an urban area. From the position of this study, the authors try to identify and link the relationship between the urban atmosphere and the identity of an urban area and have the following objectives:

1. Knowing the atmosphere of urban spaces in the Klungkung urban area
2. Knowing the atmosphere of urban spaces that affect the identity of the urban area in Klungkung
3. Knowing the contribution made by city identity to the development of urban areas

### ***Outcome Targets and Research Benefits***

This research emphasizes the atmosphere of urban space as the identity of urban areas in which to be researched is the atmosphere of urban space visible from the theory of atmospheric and image of the city as the identity of urban areas Klungkung, Bali, results of analysis in the conceptual order of this study, then the benefits and results obtained explanations about the atmosphere of urban areas are also expected :

1. Provide an overview and identification of the atmosphere of urban space as an element in the identity of the urban area of Klungkung.
2. The importance of the atmosphere of urban space area in contributing to the identification and development of the identity of urban areas in Bali especially and Indonesia and the world in general.
3. Provide a knowledge of the atmosphere of urban spaces that can be used as a city identity and contribute to the role of the city identity to the development of urban areas for Asian countries and Asia

### *Literature Review*

The identity of the city is not in the sense of likeness of an object with another, but instead refers to the meaning of individuality reflecting the distinction with other objects and the introduction as a separate entity (Lynch 1960). The identity of the city is a mental image formed from the biological rhythms of places and certain spaces reflecting the time (sense of time), which grows from the inside by the socio-economic activities of the city's own cultural culture (Lynch 1984). From this understanding, it can be said that identity is a condition when one is able to recognize or recall (memory) places that have differences with other places because it has distinctive character and uniqueness.

In the context of Urban design, spatial can be interpreted as being related to space. According Trancik, Space (space) consists of hard space and soft space (Trancik 1986). The Hard space is principally restricted by architectural walls which are intended to provide social activity. Soft space areas are dominated by natural environment, such as garden, garden or green Line. It is known that there is a link between architectural works/buildings and the natural environment in forming space. From that sense it can be said that spatial is a relationship that occurs between buildings, natural environment and space in the establishment of human activity. Peter Zumthor in a book titled "Atmospheres – Architectural Environment and Surrounding Objects" says the atmosphere is a state of architecture when buildings can 'move' users inside. The term atmosphere was born out of Peter Zumthor's anxiety to the quality of architectural works (Zumthor 2006). The quality of architecture works is not about architectural rules but about how to bring natural elements to the design. In the process of designing, should have the essential context that is to consider and review the 'invisible things' (sensory experience) to be able to create quality 'visible things' (buildings) that have their own appeal. Architecturally is an architecture not limited to something of the naked eye, but also on the sense and presence, that is how the presence of an architectural building affects anyone who sees, enjoys, or engages with buildings, simple in shape but has a strong.

substance. In each design process always use an invisible approach, which is a 'sensory experience' against any design architecture object. This approach is outlined in nine aspects that must be considered in creating an atmosphere in a building, that is; (1) Body architecture; (2) Material compatibility; (3) space noise; (4) room temperature; (5) between calmness and seduction; (6) objects in the vicinity; (7) Tension between interior and exterior; (8) the level of intimacy; (9) Light on Things (Zumthor, 2006).

One form of success that makes up the place to design a City Room is Lynch (1987), covering:

1. Legibility (clarity) an emotional clarity from a city that is clearly perceived by its citizens. This means that a city or part of a city or region can be recognized quickly and clearly about a district, a path of many or a path and can be seen in the overall pattern immediately.
2. Identity and arrangement means that the image of the person will require an introduction to the object in which the object should be implied with other objects, so that people can easily recognize it. This arrangement means there is an easy understanding of the pattern of city blocks that blend between buildings and open spaces.
3. Imageability means the physical quality of an object that provides a great opportunity for the creation of a powerful image that people receive. Image is emphasized on the physical qualities of an area or environment linking identity attributes to its structure.
4. Visual and symbol connection relationship that occurs because there is a visual similarity between one building with another building in an area, thus creating a certain image. The connectionless Symbolic is

more of a non-visual or to a more conception and symbolic, but can give a strong impression of the skeleton of the region. Symbolic connection from the point of view of symbolic and cultural communication anthropology includes: Vitality, through sustainance principles that affect physical and safety systems that control urban structures planning. Fit, concerning the characteristics of the physical system generation of the structure of the region relating to the culture, norms and regulations apply. Sense is often interpreted as a sense of place which is a level where one can remember a place that has uniqueness and characteristic characteristics.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

Research emphasizes on qualitative methods with a descriptive analytical approach of existing phenomena. Where in this study explained, identify the urban atmosphere of Klungkung from the city image and the city's atmosphere. Data collection techniques are conducted with direct observation to the field by looking at the existing conditions, interviews, questionnaires and literary studies related to the spatial layout of Bali and the atmosphere of the city room in the urban area of Klungkung. This research aims to determine how the atmosphere of urban spaces in the city of Klungkung. This research was conducted to find part of the city room atmosphere that can be identified as the identity of urban areas in the cities of Bali, and cities in Indonesia in general. The stages of the activity conducted in this study are

### **Stages of Data Collection**

1. Primary Data obtained directly from the field through observation and interview with informant. The primary data collection method is conducted with a direct interview with involving, Klungkung cultural figures, Klungkung society, the Government of Klungkung and documentation related to the important matters in the identification of the urban area of Klungkung.
2. Secondary Data in this study in the form of documents, previous research related to this research. Secondary data is also obtained from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), the Office of District Spatial Planning, Internet, newspapers, accredited journals and so forth. Secondary data collection is done by retrieving or using multiple data sets that are already recorded or reported and adjusted to the field conditions that occur.

### **Analysis and conclusions**

1. Analysis of data by using methods of descriptive analysis narrative to know the understanding of the community to the element of urban space as the identity forming of urban area Klungkung. From the collection of data obtained through observation results, interviews and questionnaire, data is then analyzed with various theories that already exist and discussed through the linkage of the field analysis with the theory used and obtaining results such as the atmosphere of urban space existing in the urban area Klungkung and the atmosphere of urban spaces such as what influences the identity of urban areas in Klungkung.
2. Conclusion of research and recommendation: formulate conclusions obtained and advise of the results of the research obtained.

## **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

### ***Results***

The focus of this research is located in Klungkung Regency, precisely in Klungkung District and focuses on the Klungkung urban area. The land use pattern in the Klungkung Regency area consists of land use for rice fields, moor / huma, plantations, yards (settlements), graves, and other land. The widest type of land use is land use for rice fields, which is around 1,256 hectares.




Figure 1. Research location

The urban area of Klungkung has a variety of diverse potentials especially from the cultural potential, historic building of Klungkung Castle. The potential of the region can provide a different atmosphere that can form a character area. The urban area of Klungkung is formed by several elements designed to surround the urban city. Land use in the urban area of Klungkung divided into functions of cultural history, offices, commercial, services and places of worship. The main functions in the region are cultural and religious tourism, residential, education and research, commercial, and the role of tourist centers in the Klungkung area. With this role, the position of urban area Klungkung well seen from the corner of regional development, equitable development and design elements of the city into an integral part of the development of the urban area of Klungkung.

### Identity nodes in urban area space

Field observations and interviews the potential identity of the urban area of Klungkung more dominated by the relics of Klungkung Castle in the form of historic buildings and monuments. Potential identity in the vertices of the existing urban areas of Klungkung is still dominated by historical relics that have a high significance and historical that is Kertha Gosa, Bale Kambang with the garden of Gili, the area Puri Semarapura Klungkung, the gate of the Great Pemedal and monument Puputan Klungkung.

Semarapura Klungkung Palace is a historical building complex located in Semarapura Klungkung, Bali. This castle is a legacy from the Klungkung Kingdom. The Palace or Puri Klungkung was founded around the end of the 17th century. Most of the fort's buildings were destroyed during the Dutch conquest in 1908. The layout and architecture are embodied in a single site that has a panoramic view of the beautiful mountains. Initially, Semarapura Fort was the center of government and residence of the King of Klungkung. The arrival of the Dutch who wanted to control the kingdom received strong resistance from the king and the people of Semarapura, known as the Puputan Klungkung war on April 28, 1908 (Agung, 1985). As a result of the war, many castle buildings were destroyed. The main building of the fort (offal) was destroyed and turned into a residential area. Finally, the beauty of this architectural work becomes the ruins of Balinese cultural heritage that are not maintained before being preserved.




Figure 2. the position of Semarapura Castle towards urban areas of Klungkung




Figure 3. Kertha Gosa area towards urban areas of Klungkung

In the context of the Klungkung urban area, Kertha Gosa is a historic building and is worth a high historical value. Can be seen from The body of architecture and Material compatibility that surrounds the building Kerta Gosa. From the side of the body of architecture, Kerta Gosa is an open building, in other words not surrounded by walls. Kerta Ghosa has two levels supported by wooden poles carved with carving Balinese style. Kertha Gosa in the physical setting of the area space is seen as a fixed element that is essentially fixed and unchanged. With a location located in the center of the urban area, Kertha Gosa is also surrounded by semi-fixed elements around this building located in the north and east such as street elements, advertising marks, directions, shop storefronts and so on.




Figure 4. Puputan Klungkung monument area towards urban areas of Klungkung




Figure 5. Bale Kambang area towards urban areas of Klungkung

In the perspective of image-forming elements of urban areas, the monument Puputan Klungkung as one of the Landmark/marker urban area Klungkung. From the location of the monument located in the main district of the urban area, shows that this monument is a point of physical object guidelines. With this landmark, the general public easily orient itself within the urban area of Klungkung. Landmark is one of the physical elements of a city as a reference to the landmark of KLungkung's urban area. The identity and arrangement of this Klungkung monument provides a significant difference between the surrounding buildings and other objects as well as the landmark of Klungkung's urban area. This monument looks very different from the structure of the surrounding buildings. Imageability physically provides a great opportunity for the creation of a powerful image that people receive against the monument, and indirectly links the identity attribute to its surrounding area structure.

Bale Kambang in the physical setting of the area space as a fixed element that is essentially fixed and unchanged. The location is also adjacent to Kertha Gosa Building which is located in the center of urban area. Non fixed elements that surround this building in the form of community activities located around Puri Semarapura area with a prominent activity is a tour in the context of recognizing historical buildings. Bale Kambang is one of the icons of the Puri Semarapura area. In the image forming element of Klungkung urban area, Bale Kambang becomes one of the important buildings as one of the area markers. Legibility (clarity) Bale Kambang can be seen from the shape and mass of the building and the location of the building located at the center of the urban main intersection with a prominent difference between the buildings around it. For the community of Klungkung Bale Kambang and Kertha Gosa is one of the pride of society with the history that is in the can of the royal journey of Klungkung.

### Urban area space from the perspective of Atmospheric theory

The atmosphere of the area is a sense, the ambience where one is in the sphere of space, copyright, flavor and karsa that form a place of shelter in the urban area of Klungkung. In the theory of atmosphere Peter Zumthor always emphasizes or uses the naked eye approach, which is the ' sensory experience ' of every architectural object of its design. This approach is a design atmosphere which is then outlined in nine design aspects. In the nine aspects of the criteria to the atmosphere of building design in relation to the city identity only four that can be application to urban areas Klungkung namely The body of architecture, Material compatibility, The temperature of a space, Surrounding objects, will be analyzed, attributed and expanded into the concept of urban area of Klungkung in the city identity frame, seven aspects that can be visualized in the atmosphere of :

#### *The Body of Architecture pada kawasan perkotaan Klungkung*

From the urban setting of Klungkung, the body of architecture which covers the arrangement of buildings that surround each part of the area that makes up the space. From the masses and buildings covering the area is dominated by buildings with architectural style combined with minimalist concept. From the body architecture of the urban area Klungkung is still the same as the urban areas in Bali still prioritize the features of Balinese architecture building by using the concept of head and foot from observation field there are some buildings that are not equal in concept but still have the characteristic of the equation is by having the upper Limas with not very contrasting with the building around it. If viewed from form, the proportion and identity of no interesting things can be highlighted. The building that has a high historical value, has a unique characteristic with old bricks as well as Balinese carvings that have more ancient impression.




Figure 6. The Body of Architecture in the urban area of Klungkung



Figure 7. Material compatibility in the urban area of Klungkung



## Material Compatibility

In the urban area of Klungkung, the material used is dominated by historical buildings using bricks expose. With typical Balinese ornaments on the front view of the building. There are several modern buildings using only the finishing paint, combined with black stone decoration and using the taro paint in red and gray. Uniqueness in the use of materials in the urban area Klungkung more combined on the use of red brick expose on each column and the front of the flat field building with black stone and there is also use a groove stone to look ahead of the main building. Historical buildings and fences from government agencies use more raw bricks and brick-and-eye bricks in terms of texture. The material used in terms of maintenance and efficiency has less ' sustainable ' properties, where sustainable properties can be used in the next with the materials that can be easily and done in a building.

## *The Temperature of Space*

In the discussion about temperature of Space, in the urban area of Klungkung, emphasis on two namely physical temperature and psychic temperature. Physical temperature in the atmosphere of the urban area of Klungkung more to the temperature of the medium and almost to the heat in the phone screen programmatic about temperatures ranging from 25-30 degrees Celsius. This is because it is influenced by the less vegetation in the area spots that have a high density intensity. Activity activities also affect the center of the urban area of Klungkung dominated by commercial areas, offices and historical tourism objects. The use of Material in buildings covering the urban area of Klungkung does not significantly affect the temperature of the air, this is due to material used no one that uses material fully exposed glass or full material roofing from Spandek/Trimdek. The use of material on the facade of the building is still using bricks, stone, black stone and on the roof more Limasan shape with tile cover. The psychic temperature in this case more circumstances and the atmosphere of a space area affects the ' mood & feeling ' of people who are in the area, be it local people or visitors or tourists who visit the urban area of Klungkung. Psychic temperature is more to how to give a comfortable flavor in the area of space. The domestic and foreign tourists are very comfortable with the historic building zone of Klungkung Castle with Bale Kambang and Kerthagosa which covers the urban area of Klungkung. However, when in the zone of commercial trade area, the market, the shopping center of the atmosphere in the area is changing not great in the historic building zone. Surrounding Objects

Aspects of the surrounding objects as well as the appeal of the area that can evoke the atmosphere, imagination, beauty, or interest in the urban area of Klungkung. From the analysis and observation field there are several building spots, spot monuments that look visible and have the meaning and placement of locations on the main lines of the region. The first statue of Kanda Pat Sari located at Catuspatha, the main intersection of the urban area of Klungkung as a city centre, this area also serves as the center of the event of a major cultural event or carnival-carnivals. Like the implementation of Grand Tawur ceremony before Nyepi Day and parade Ogoh-Ogoh, this statue becomes the center of the attention of the people of Klungkung, as well as domestic and foreign tourists.



Figure 8. Surrounding objects in the urban area of Klungkung

### Urban area space from the perspective of city imagery

Visual images that are functionally arranged in the Klungkung Urban Area are composed of functions and designations of office land including the Regent's office and other public service offices, historical and cultural functions including Puri Agung, Puri Semarapura area with Kertha Gosa buildings, Bale Kambang, Semarajaya Museum and Pemedal Agung. Commercial functions include the Klungkung market area, shopping areas as well as trade and other services.



Figure 9. Image in the urban area of Klungkung



Figure 10. Path in the urban area of Klungkung

In urban areas of Klungkung Imageability can be seen from the center of objects that have been marked and recognized by the Klungkung community and national and foreign tourists. This means the physical quality of an object that provides a great opportunity for the creation of a strong image that people receive. The image is emphasized on the physical qualities of an area linking the identity attribute to its urban structure. From the image of the urban area of Klungkung formed by the element of the face forming of urban areas namely: Path movement in urban areas Kungkung is the main element as a means to observe the city, which is the path used by observers to move and move the place. Edge is a strong visual form that is used as a barrier area with other areas. The visual edge shape is expected to distinguish, distinguish or unify different areas according to the relationship of two areas. A region can have a better identity if the boundaries of its territory are clear but still a boundary. C. Districtin urban Area Klungkung is part of a city with special characteristics that can be directly recognized through historical objects ranging from the Grand Palace of Klungkung, Kertha Gosa area, Gili Gardens, Semarajaya Museum, Puputan Klungkung Monument and the intersection point with the statue of Kanda Pat Sari. The district image can be viewed through a homogeneous physical character from the display of texture components, spaces, shapes, details, and other visual component ampersand

The node in the urban area of Klungkung is formed from a knot or strategic area that starts from the center of the city Catuspatha area. Furthermore, from the commercial area of the market with solid community activities is the second point of activity node. From the commercial area continues towards the office area that is mixed with the historical area is the Palace Agung Klungkung area, Kertha Gosa area where the activities meet each other and can be changed in the direction of other activities, which can be shaped circle, square, linear form, center of the area and so on. In general there are two types of nodes that reside in the urban area of Klungkung, namely the intersection of the path and the concentration of the character area of the identity node will be more obvious if it has a unique features or specifications in it and can target the environmental character in the sekitarnya Landmark is a point that can visually attract observers of its size and location.

In the urban area of Klungkung, the physical character of the landmark is in the Puputan Klungkung monument which has a "peculiarities" or a single impression, and creates a spatial aspect as something most influential through the contrast of the form of buildings with buildings and the surrounding environment. The second Landmark is in the middle of the city's main intersection with a statue of Kanda Pat Sari. Landmark that is in the urban area of Klungkung other than as a landmark of downtown areas, in the system of religious rituals and traditions as a place for the implementation of ceremonial activities




Figure 11. Node in the urban area of Klungkung

Figure 12. Landmark in the urban area of Klungkung

Table 1: The implementation and role of the atmosphere theory in the identity of the Klungkung urban area

Urban Atmospheres	Its implementation in the urban area of Klungkung	Role of identity Urban areas	
		Visual	Sense
<i>The Body of Architecture</i>	In terms of body architecture, the urban area of Klungkung puts forward the characteristics of Balinese architectural buildings using the concept of head, body and feet.	Provide identification through the shape of the building with the concept of head, body and feet.	Providing the atmosphere and feel of the Balinese area with the architectural style of the surrounding buildings
Material Compatibility	In terms of Material compatibility In the Klungkung urban area, the materials used in historical buildings are dominated by exposed bricks. With Balinese ornaments on the front of the building.	Provide identification through building materials and ornaments with traditional Balinese characters combined with modern minimalist spaces that surround the city.	Providing an atmosphere and traditional Balinese taste and cultural nuances that are thick with materials from historical buildings of the Klungkung kingdom
<i>The Temperature of Space</i>	Urban Space temperature with Landscape setup in road corridors and green open spaces	Visually gives an impression on the urban landscape of green, beautiful and regularity	Providing convenience for people in their activities and healthy air circulation
<i>Surrounding Objects</i>	Nodes of cultural objects such as castles, monuments to the city center, open areas and jagatnatha temples	Provides a very large attractiveness to the area with various existing node	Provide a positive and different atmosphere when you are in the area

Table 2: Implementation and role of city image on the identity of the Klungkung urban area

City Image	Its implementation in the urban area of Klungkung	Role of identity Urban areas	
		Visual	Sense
<i>Legibility</i>	the zoning division of the Klungkung urban area and the concept of placement of the functions of the cultural, commercial and office area as well as from monuments and urban center points	Provide identification through building forms and division of area functions	Gives a sense of the atmosphere in community activities in religious activities and traditions of customary organizations and periodically carried out ritual rituals
<i>Identity and arrangement</i>	The central point of the area in the form of statues and monuments as well as historic buildings of the castle and the structure of the function of the area which is divided into office, cultural, commercial zones	Provide identification through area objects, building forms and division of area functions	Gives a sense of the atmosphere in community activities in religious activities and traditions of customary organizations and periodically carried out ritual rituals
<i>Image ability</i>	The connecting path of area movements, area borders, strategic area node nodes and area objects, as well as area landmarks of zero and other monuments	To provide identification through the function of the node area of strategic areas and area objects, as well as the landmark of the zero area and the monument	Giving sense to the urban atmosphere with various functions of the area and atmosphere of Bali

## CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the analysis and discussion that has been described above, it can be concluded as follows:

1. The atmosphere of urban space in the urban area of Klungkung which is identified visually through the form of buildings with the concept of traditional Balinese architecture that is dividing the building with the head and foot. From the visual activity of Balinese people that are held every period and incidental traditions are shown at the center of the urban area of Klungkung. The atmosphere of the urban space that is identified emotionally, gives a different sense of the sacred atmosphere when an activity of the tradition of Balinese society periodically implemented with local customs and traditions. To provide an enormous appeal to the area with various vertices of the cultural area and historical buildings of the royal heritage of Klungkung. In addition, the atmosphere of the urban area of Klungkung provides different feelings to the atmosphere of other urban areas with various functions of the region that surround the area.
2. Urban space atmosphere that influences the identity of the urban area of Klungkung is the tradition and activity of the people of Klungkung city that still uphold the local customs and culture. The style of proportion and building composition visually affects the atmosphere of the area. The latter is a segmentation of regional functions consisting of commercial functions, offices, culture and services.

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# Amour: Preserving the Alter Ego

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## Abstract

One witnesses the sudden dissolving of the diegetic musical piece into an utter silence in *Amour*. One finds no departure, but to admit the abrupt and yet ever likely and expected transition of life to death. The concert is over. One is to take a bus ride home gracefully. All is done. Anne has been a superbly competent master whose pupil has managed to surpass her skills. The very own daughter is raised to become a musician herself. The apartment is in the most orderly manner one can imagine. The partner has become his most elegant being. It sounds about the right time for death to impose itself in the manner of catechism to the elite couples' routine and orderly life. It strikes Anne as a philosophical dilemma, whereas for Georges, death bell tolls to remind him of his most monumental responsibility. In *Amour*, Georges portrays the ultimate responsibility towards the friend through responding to the other's elegance, illness, deterioration, and death; he shoulders the aforementioned through sincerity and the welcoming of wounding. The paper intends to undertake a *philia*-thematic study on Michael Haneke's *Amour* (2012) through the ideas of Luce Irigaray's transcendence of the other, Aristotle and Derrida's friendship, and Levinas's responsibility towards the other.

**Keywords:** *Amour*, Michael Haneke, Friend, Other, Responsibility

## Introduction

The elderly couple Anne and Georges Laurent, both musicians, live in their modest and yet elegant apartment in Paris. Their living space, not only represents their sensibility and intellectualism, but their morality between the two and towards the others, specifically those of a lower social class –the building's concierge-, and the less privileged. The audience is left with no doubt in the strong ethical stance and practice of the couple. It is no longer the matter of expectations from life and its materiality with the Laurents, nor is it the intellectual accomplishments, it is the riddle of approaching the other -the most intimate other- that imposes itself on the two. The ellipsis of the breakfast scene, where every aspect of life sounds in an utter peaceful status into the bedside scene -after the stroke- delineates Anne's abrupt decay, hence the portrayal of the theme of unanticipated deterioration of human life.

Irigaray's imperatives of the ethical approaches towards the other find a deeper and more complicated application when the catastrophe occurs, and so does Derrida's notion of friendship, and its most undeniable embodiment between Anne and Georges. The element of time and its relative nature paralleled with the theme of alterity poses the ever-fluid concept of futurity onto the elderly couple's life. Levinas tends to the idea of the

inevitable passage of time and the consequences it brings to our friendships. His concepts of sincerity and vulnerability towards the other map out the possibilities Georges and Anne have to opt for.

Levinas's alterity brings forth the inevitability of death, triggers the question of an ending and its parameters, and quality in the audience's consciousness. We have no departure, but to fear the severity and the nature of the resolution that is to be brought on the two. Derrida discusses friendship and the inevitable death of the friend in his *The Work of Mourning*, the moment is thus imposed on us in Amour. Heidegger defines an unalterable concept of anxiety that human being is to face until the moment of death, the anxiety one is to bear and take actions in response to. The intention of this paper is to conceptualize the above-mentioned theories, hence the portrayal of Georges's undeniable loyalty and responsibility towards the other, her vitality, personhood, decay, and death.

### **“Pourquoi tu n's pas reagi?”**

(Ménégoz, Arndt, Heiduschka, Katz, 2012, 0:12:30)

### **Why didn't you react?**

“When one is with one's friends one is, in a way, perceiving oneself.” ( Barnes, 1995, p. 232)

Although the apostrophe pertains to a causal dialogue as a result of Anne's losing touch with reality, Georges's expectation to be recognized and responded to resembles a dire need. The necessity of Anne's recognition of Georges in the moment of the stroke, which constitutes not merely a physical decay and insufficiency, but also an absence from the constitution of partnership in the couple's life, strikes the audience as both the starting point and the resolution of the friendship. Georges begins as a character, incapable of recognizing Anne's transcendence. He is unable to admit Anne's transcendence within the constitution of friendship –relationship-, which is the gist of Irigaray's concept of the transcendence of the other: the irreducible transcendence of you.. (Irigaray, 2004, p. 24). Georges defines himself in the proximity of the other and only one specific other –Anne.

To perceive oneself in relation to the other requires a constant cluster of responses from the other. It no doubt, gives rise to a series of catastrophes and unprecedented shortcomings; shortcomings whose backlashes shatter the definition of the self. Being the loyal spouse, Georges's existence depends on his dimensions and those received from the other-Anne. He has taken the habit of making his own the tokens of the relationship with Anne. Irigaray poses:

“We have been educated to make our own all that was pleasing to us, all that we admitted into our proximity, into our intimacy, all that surrounded us. On the level of consciousness, on the level of feelings, we make our own what we approach, what approaches us.” (Irigaray, 2004, p. 9)

The more conscious of a choice the individual makes about their surroundings –the beings- one bathes their existence in, the more burdensome the reaction of the beings' turns out to be. Georges's conscious making Anne his own has clearly taken place in a lifetime of marriage. And thus, it is crystal clear that a moment of absence of Anne's approaching Georges has in its heart a threatening consequence, i.e. Georges's shattered existence.

Not only is this approach towards the other unethical, but it reduces the autonomy of the self. The unethical sense of the manner -as Irigaray defines- limits the other:

“But we reduce the other to ourselves. We incorporate the other in turn: through our knowledge, our affection, our customs. At the limit, we no longer see the other, we no longer hear the other, we no longer perceive the other. The other is part of us. Unless we reject the other.” (Irigaray, 2004, p. 24)

Obviously, Georges is in no condition, nor is he in the mental poise to reject Anne, hence the reduction of her into himself, which takes place rather unquestionably. Thus, when Anne worries about the trivial task of calling the caretaker and the possibility of the need to call the police, Geroges amiably and decidedly tells her: Don't let



this put a damper on your good mood (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:5:30), which obviously reflects on that of Georges.

Nonetheless, Georges is an ethical being, recognizing his responsibilities towards Anne. He refuses to receive any help from their daughter –Eva- on the grounds of not being a burden to her. He never complains, not even in Anne’s absence about the misfortune of Anne’s surgery being among the five percent that goes wrong. Georges is a realist, thinking and acting based on the present reality, settling Anne his top priority. The relationship has always been that of a romantic nature, and all the caring Georges displays throughout the movie is that of a genuine-habitual manner in the constitution of their marriage. Eva says: I remembered how I always used to listen to the two of you making love as a child. This always reassured me. It gave me a feeling that you loved each other and we’d always be together (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:19:54).

Georges’s manners in taking care of Anne and tending to her are so delicate, Anne has got to object: “you don’t have to hold my hand all the time. And don’t feel guilty. That would be pointless.”, to which Georges immediately replies: “I don’t feel guilty.” It is an arduous task for Anne to see it upon herself that all the cordial caring she is at the receiving end is out of love and responsibility that it entails, what negates Irigaray’s commentary: Intimacy, familiarity, and proximity do not exist only through living alongside one another and sharing the same space. On the contrary, that often leads to their destruction (Irigaray, 2004, pp. 132-3). There is no guilt and pity involved as far as Georges is concerned. There exists merely love and respect, to create the perfect equilibrium: For love can be regarded as attraction and respect as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other (Kant, 1991, p. 261). And that is precisely why, Anne recognizes the right to herself, putting her existence at a distance, to request never to be taken back to the hospital. She sees it on Georges -the friend- to situate himself at a proper distance to grant her the wish, although the element of love may draw stronger than the element of respect.

The couple’s sanctuary in their apartment is so solidly set that they never feel the need to leave. After the first stroke, when Anne returns home from the hospital, she asks to be taken to the living room, where she instructs Georges step by step to lift her from the wheelchair and help her into the armchair. Two armchairs are set in front of each other, signifying the only spots in the life of the two that matter, contrasting the large sofa that remains unused and insignificant –except for one occasion-.

Georges continues to seek his own image into the reflection of Anne’s. He is dependent on being defined by the other, as Derrida puts forward: What does the friend’s nostalgia reveal? That we wish to believe in the other, because we want, in vain, to believe in ourselves. (Derrida, 1997, p. 281). The urgency reaches its highest point when Georges recounts a childhood memory of having been touched by a movie and crying over the romantic plot. Anne wonders why she has never heard of this tale, to which Georges replies the tale to be only one amongst the many. The implication is Georges’s constant attempts in filtering the mortifying tales. However, under the present conditions, he feels more secure sharing those so-called embarrassing memories. Further on, when Anne speaks of the mental image she has accumulated of Georges over the years, he gets slightly disappointed.

Anne: Don’t tell me you’re going to ruin your image in your old age?

Georges: But what is my image?

Anne: Sometimes you’re a monster. But you’re nice (Ménégoz et al., 2012 0:33:19).

The ramifications of conceiving himself to be a “nice monster” manifest themselves in large measures. And yet, there is a small room left in Georges’s interpretation of Anne’s description; that Anne is prone to be deflecting her own image, -how she sees herself- describing Georges’s.

## Friendship

### The Call of Vulnerability

Being musicians, sharing similar intellectual interests, Anne and Georges's friendship is that of having substantially in common, "virtue" and "respect", as Aristotle puts forward: ..but the best friendship of the best men is the friendship of mutual respect and virtue. It is the best kind of friendship and therefore the primary example of friendship (Barnes, 1995, p. 229). This mutual respect and virtue is precisely the reason for which Georges feels annoyed when Anne reads her horoscope to him. Georges finds it difficult to respect Anne while hearing her trivial train of thoughts and says: You've got only yourself to blame if you read this nonsense (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:35:02). For Anne to take herself to be the pre-stroke Anne, the elegant musician, is simply a lost notion, yet Georges strives to revive the image all the more, as we wish to see ourselves in the other.

Further on, Anne wants to know every bit of detail about Pierre's funeral. She wants to picture her own through another's. Georges resists giving in to this morbid fantasy of hers, and yet he is aware enough that she has the right to what she asks.

Anne: How was the funeral?

Georges: It was bizarre. The priest was an idiot (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:39:47).

So, he continues giving a full account of what happened at the funeral, in spite of his own taste. It is difficult not to notice that Georges is getting closer to Irigaray's transcendence of the other, as a result of which Anne asks to her death.

Anne: There's no point in going on living. That's how it is. I know it only gets worse. Why should I inflict this on us, on you and me?

Georges: You're not inflicting anything on me.

Anne: I don't want to carry on. You're making such sweet efforts to make everything easier for me. But I don't want to go on. For my own sake, not yours.

Georges: I don't believe you. I know you (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:40:55).

Whether either of the two, or both for that matter, are trying to save themselves or the other, the principle at play is the principle of justice.

Anne does her best to set Georges free, making that wish her own. Derrida paraphrases Kant: "One must help the friend –not to help him, not because he needs assistance, or because that would be the principle or the end of friendship, but in order to give him the signs of friendship (Derrida, 1995, p. 256). And consequently, Georges presupposes a duty on himself to be just towards the friend. He has the responsibility of considering the friend an autonomous being, whose wishes are to be granted. Aristotle puts forward justice in friendship: When men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just, they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality (Aristotle, 2000, p. 1155a25). Georges's dilemma consists of saving the friend through the principle of justice and saving her from Kant's imperative of helping the friend not to help you.

When Georges implies that Anne is not inflicting anything on him, Anne accuses him of lying, and Georges is in no manner concerned about defending himself, rather he wants Anne to put herself in his situation: Put yourself in my place. Didn't you ever think that it could happen to me too? (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:41:25). And by saying so, he suggests the unity of them two. Levinas paraphrases Rimbaud:

"Is it certain that Rimbaud's "I is another" means only alteration, alienation, betrayal of self, strangeness of self, and servitude to that stranger? Is it certain that the most humble experience of the one who puts himself in the other's place, that is, accuses himself of the other's illness or pain, is not already animated by the most eminent sense in which "I is another"?" (Levinas, 2003, p. 62)

For Georges, Anne is rhetorically another, whose wishes are to be met, as the principle of distance and justice suggests, however, he is the most just friend, and the most vulnerable, whose image is saved in that of Anne's

wholesome existence. He is not on the pursuit of saving Anne, no matter the price, rather he wishes he could do so with the other's transcendence being savored. Stoehr states:

"Georges's deep love for his wife has made it unbearable for him to continue seeing her fade painfully into a mere semblance of her former self. It is far from being a selfish or even nihilistic decision, especially given all that we have witnessed of his selfless dedication up to this point." (Stoehr, 2016)

And that is why he puts forward his vulnerability in the eyes of the other, wanting the other to experience it, through their own "I is another".

It goes without saying that to display one's vulnerability takes courage on the part of the self and trust in the other. Georges poses his vulnerability at the very moment that Anne requires to be heard and her wish to be granted. Let us keep in mind that Georges is an utterly ethical character in *Amour*, considerate of Anne's every need. To imagine Georges's courage to dare to put forward his vulnerability while it is the other that is at a vulnerable state, one needs to keep in mind his ethical stance:

"Who could ever answer for a discourse on friendship without taking a stance? The urgency of the question is in no way lessened by the fact that this discourse on friendship, this *de amicitia*, claims to be theoretical or philosophical." (Derrida, 1997, p. 228)

Noting Derrida's notion of taking a stance and its necessity, as well as Rimbaud's "I is another" seem more than crucial in understanding Georges's intention and the source of his decision to display his vulnerability.

Levinas scrutinizes vulnerability:

"Vulnerability is more or less than passively receiving form or shock. It is the aptitude –that any being in its "natural pride" would be ashamed to admit- for "being beaten" for "getting slapped"... in vulnerability lies a relationship to the other that is not exhausted by causality, a relation prior to all affection by the stimulus. The identity of the self does not set limits to submission, not even the last resistance that matter "in potential" opposes to the form that invests it. Vulnerability is obsession by others. It is for others, from behind the other of the stimulus." (Levinas, 2003, pp. 63-64)

Georges could potentially be in Anne's situation, and that is what he is inviting Anne to witness, the impossibility of surpassing his vulnerability and granting Anne her request. The ego from top to toe and to the very marrow is vulnerability. (Levinas, 2003, p. 63). To act upon Anne's wish is to admit his own death, he does not have the strength to bring his ego to accord with it.

In a few stages ahead, handling Georges's vulnerability does seem to be a task Anne has accepted to shoulder. Alexandre –Anne's former pupil- paying them a visit, is taken aback and does not bear to see her in that condition, specifically when he recounts a memory of his first session with Anne, which she fails to remember. He has got to ask what has happened to Anne.

Alexandre: What has happened to you?

Anne: My right side is paralyzed. That's all. This can happen when you get older (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:47:02).

During the cold and detached recount of the catastrophe that has befallen her, Anne gratifies Georges -with the strength of utter objectivity- he is in dire need of. In the close-up of their faces, Georges drops his head down, at the hearing of the shockingly possible ending awaiting anyone and everyone.

## Responsibility

### Death

"I didn't want to make a social drama, but an existential drama that deals with the question: 'How do I cope with the suffering of a loved one?'" (Calhoun, 2012).

The coping Haneke speaks of, is of course spoken to through the responsibility one shoulders towards their loved one(s). What Bosch asserts to be a "threat" is precisely what Haneke paraphrases as "suffering". Haneke's

vision of threat is correct. If we live long, we will not escape aging's threat to our bodies and perhaps to our minds. (Bosch, 2013, p. 518). However, what is neglected in Bosch's assertion is that the threat is not to the self, yet to the vulnerable other.

A vast cohort of romance in the literature available to us neglects the inevitability of the death in the best of friendships and relationships. Anne and George are far from mundane and primitive responsibilities of a romantic relationship –friendship-. They have the inevitable before their eyes and their very existence.

Responsibility grows in time. Levinas elaborates: .. Time is not the achievement of an isolated and lone subject, but that it is the very relationship of the subject with the other (Levinas, 2003, p. 39). It would be rather naïve to define the other, the ethical approach towards the other, friendship, responsibility, and yet neglect that all is subject to time and alterity. Not only does every parameter of the aforementioned concepts have to be defined and re-evaluated through time, but the alterity of the self and alter ego –friend- is at its very core.

Any long-lasting relationship with the other brings upon its participants the unavoidable death and the subject's responsibility to respond to that. Levinas elaborates: What is important about the approach of death is that at a certain moment we are no longer able to be able [nous ne pouvons plus pouvoir]. It is exactly thus that the subject loses its mastery as a subject. (Levinas, 2003, p. 74). And this losing subjectivity in a relationship is the grandest of all responsibilities it brings forward for the other of the other. Heidegger's views on death are of a complete isolated nature. The anxiety he ascribes to death, in his opinion, is of a solitude nature, as if negating himself that Existence means ecstatic involvement in the world, not simply self-consciousness raised to its limits. (Cohen, 2003, xix.)

In his *Being and Time*, Heidegger approaches death as an inevitable stage of Dasein, yet he neglects the fact that death of the subject is merely an experience in solitude.

"We may now summarize our characterization of authentic-being-towards-death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self. And brings face-to-face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom which has been released from the illusions of the 'they' and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious." (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 310-311).

Although "being-towards-death" is the characteristic of an authentic being and Anne has no lacking in this regard, Georges's stance and responsibility are not thought through. Levinas further explains the concept: The relationship with the other is indeed posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure of Dasein, but practically it plays no role in the drama of being or in the existential analytic (Levinas, 2003, p. 40). The neglecting of the unavoidable interweaving of "being-towards-death", authenticity and the relationship with the other –as an ontological part of Dasein- brings us back to Haneke's questions: 'How do I cope with the suffering of a loved one?' and inescapably, how do I respond to her suffering and death? For How can a being enter into relation with the other without allowing its very self to be crushed by the other? (Levinas, 2003, p. 77).

I have mentioned Levinas's stance towards the death of the other which is an essential parameter of futurity and alterity in the relationship with the other. While Bosch believes that Georges's resolution to take care of Anne at home is an act of vulgarity: In later scenes of the film, Anne is often crying out in pain. Why Georges does not seek out hospice care to help Anne with pain management at this point is the huge unanswered question in the film (Bosch, 2013, p. 518). It is the bare manifestation of responding to the alterity of the other –in this case, Anne's deterioration- and keeping an unwanted promise to Anne, that is, never returning her to the hospital.

My intention is in no way to attire Georges with the cloak of an angel or a flawless human being. No doubt, the time comes when he falls short on taking care of Anne after the second stroke. He is having a quiet meal in the kitchen when he hears Anne's scream from the bedroom. Instantly he gets to the bedroom, and he loses it, partly because Anne has tried doing something without seeking his help –thus declaring a sort of freedom from him- and partly due to the fact that she might have hurt herself falling off the bed. He complains, dismissing Anne's sincere apologies.

Georges: what are you doing? Have you completely lost your mind? I can't believe it. See what you have done. Can't you call me if you need something? The lamp is broken too! (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 0:51:53).

Consequently, what befalls Georges is a nightmare; answering the door to an unknown and vanished caller, walking endlessly in search of the intruder, calling out, and hearing nothing in response. Meanwhile, in the background we hear Anne's voice, calling out, inquiring, wanting to know what has happened, which Georges completely ignores. Anne is asking for a togetherness, Georges denies. "Being-with is a meeting of incomplete beings, of deficient selves.. (Bauman, 1995, p. 50). Georges denies Anne that togetherness, facing the unknown together. It has got to be him unmasking the unknown, encountering and resolving it, for Anne -in his consciousness- is the one in need of help. Bauman further clarifies: The intermittence of revelation and secrecy is, as a matter of fact, the major building technique of being-with type of encounter (Bauman, 1995, p. 51).

Eventually, he steps into water ankle-deep, and Anne's hand suffocates him from behind. He wakes in terror, and ironically, it is the same hand that consoles him. The revelation is complete. Anne is taking away parts of Georges, of which Georges has no vivid understanding until it is revealed to him in his dream. The task of sharing the revelation with Anne –a prerequisite of being-with- has proven among the most difficult for Georges now. If he admits that there used to be a life that has been taken away from him due to the misfortune befalling the other, he has to put an end to the misfortune. Long ago Georges has dismissed the idea of Anne inflicting any pain on him; he has got to remain truthful to his statement. To protect the other from helping him, Georges has no choice but to deny his own alterity and merely recognize that of Anne's. And it is not merely the ethical responsibility he has towards Anne, granting her the request –letting her go-, it is certainly the admittance of letting himself go along with the freeing of her.

George is to respond to Anne's death, and that is to be accomplished far from the passive sense of the concept. It is on him to decide for the most intimate other's death; its time, manner, quality, and necessity. Anne is far from "being-towards-death-anxiety" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 310-311). at this stage –considering her almost always painful existence-, rather it is being-towards-life-torture-anxiety. Anne is being tortured with her painful presence, both for herself and for Georges. The previous "mastery/logos" of the balanced and orderly life has given in to the new "exhaustion/silence" (Hassan, 1987, p. 92). Although we witness Georges's imagining Anne's grace and togetherness in the scene that she plays the piano, it is cruelly revealed in an instant when he turns around and switches the stereo off. Both are exhausted at this stage. The friend's nostalgia does not remain with them long enough. Nothing accompanies them, except for the silence that is merely disrupted by Anne's frequent moaning of "Mal". Georges very well knows that time has come to make the unspoken decision; to bring forth and respond to the other's death.

He presupposes on himself now, to be for-Anne rather than to be with-her. Being-for, as Bauman defines:

"Being-for is a leap from isolation to unity; yet not towards a fusion, that mystics' dream of shedding the burden of identity... being-for is entered for the sake of safeguarding and defending the uniqueness of the Other; and that guardianship undertaken by the self as its task and responsibility makes the self truly unique, in the sense of being irreplaceable." (Bauman, 1995, p. 52)

carries with itself a sense of honesty, courage, and uniqueness. The scene where they are having lunch together, and Anne –rather impulsively- asks Georges to bring her the photo album, obviously disturbing him is a clear juxtaposition of her being a burden, having decided to die and giving the responsibility to Georges. The clarity with which she willingly disturbs Georges to leave a few minutes of peace that he has –having lunch- and fetching the photo album –an ordeal that can clearly wait- delivers merely one message: that it is only going to get worse, and it is Georges to be irritated and disconcerted innumerable times more if he does not comply with Anne's wish to go and fetch the photo album.

Undeniably, Georges has got to experience for himself the impossibility and yet inevitability of the task on his shoulders. Eventually, he opts for not solely being-with Anne, rather "being-for" her. Bauman asserts: Being-for

is the act of transcendence of being-with (Bauman, 1995, p. 52). As a result of this choice, he resolves to do the inconceivable.

The anxiety Heidegger defines as the result of being-towards-death then turns into Georges's anxiety rather than Anne's. Anne has made her decision long ago, that to go on would be pointless. The death does not threaten Anne, yet it is to take away all that Georges has left and is left of him. The experience of death as the inevitable is no longer in a deity's hands to be put forward, yet in his own very hands. Critchley in his critique of Heidegger's death explains:

"Despite its baroque linguistic grab, Heidegger's analysis of being-towards-death is exceptionally direct and powerful. However, it is open to the following objection. Heidegger argues that the only authentic death is one's own. To die for another person, he writes, would simply be to 'sacrifice oneself'. To that extent, for Heidegger, the deaths of others are secondary to my death, which is primary. In my view (and this criticism is first advanced by Edith Stein and Emmanuel Levinas), such a conception of death comes into our world through the deaths of others, whether as close as a parent, partner or child, or as far as the unknown victim of a distant famine or war. The relation to death is not first and foremost my own fear for my own demise, but my sense of being undone by the experience of grief and mourning." (Critchley, 2009)

Thus, Georges not only sees the death of the other, but he is the one to be it. By being the death of the other, Georges metamorphoses into the death of himself, hence his remainder being the shady memory of the two leaving the apartment for the very last time.

Georges has got to identify with Anne, to see himself one last time in the other, in the friend. Anne begins moaning "Mal". He sits beside her in bed, caressing her hand endlessly, shares a rather traumatic experience of his childhood, which was meant to make him stronger, yet resulted in his alienation and abandonment. Having put his trust in his mother, he had always kept the hope of leaving the abominable place where he was supposed to grow strong. He recounts a traumatic experience to Anne at the old castle, while she still moans ceaselessly.

"I was to write to her every week. I was to send her a postcard. If I like the stay, I was to draw flowers, if not, stars. She kept the card. It was covered all over in stars... I was taken to the nearest hospital and sent to quarantine. Which meant that mum, when she came to visit me, could only wave at me through a window. At some point, I lost the postcard. It's a pity." (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 1:42:49)

By the end of the childhood tale, Anne has calmed down. Georges lets her know that he felt how she is feeling now, trapped, and only to be waved at from behind the window. Once, she is calm and at peace, the death occurs, bringing with it the annihilation of the Other.

## Conclusion

"I do not define the other by the future, but the future by the other, for the very future of death consists in its total alterity.. in the very heart of the relationship with the other that characterizes our social life, alterity appears as a nonreciprocal relationship-that is, as contrasting strongly with contemporaneity. The Other as Other is not only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself am not... because of the Other's very alterity." (Levinas, 2003, p. 83)

No matter how strongly Georges sees his vitality dependent on that of Anne's, it is Anne's alterity reaching out to him and asking for his responsibility in return. He goes out of his way not only to bring hope back to Anne's life, but more heroically, he dismisses his own ethical belief for the sake of a slight chance of reviving Anne. Georges is very well aware that Anne refuses to go on, and consequently, he isolates her from the world, and from her very own daughter. None of the ordeal is undergone in Georges's framework of the right and just, but in that of Anne's. In one attempt to force-feed Anne, he slaps her, which then clearly weighs heavily on his conscience.

In one of the final scenes, when Eva returns to visit her mother, Georges locks Anne's bedroom door to save her from the unwanted visit. Eva naturally insists, to which Georges responds: She is turning more and more into a helpless child. It's sad and humiliating for her and for me. And she doesn't want to be seen in that state. Even the last time she didn't want you to come (Ménégoz et al., 2012, 1:31:08). Eventually, when Eva forces her way into Anne's room, Anne starts moaning "Mal", sending Eva out of her sanctuary.

To take a clear stance towards the other's death is one thing as Levinas puts it:

"To have a friend, to look at him, to follow him with our eyes, to admire him in friendship, is to know in a more intense way, already injured, always insistent, and more and more unforgettable, the one of the two of you will inevitably see the other die." (Derrida, 2001, p. 107)

Yet to bring forward the death is another. To make the existential decision for another being –considering their alterity-, to refuse to give in to the delirious talks they deliver, while validating them to some extent, and to separate one's morals from those of the other are the arduous afflictions Georges accepts to respond to ultimately; to bring an end to the friend's existence and to the self, for one can only wave at the other through a window.

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# Media and Political Interest: A Case Study on Media and Advertising Mars Party Perindo

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## Abstract

Over a period of three years 2016-2018, (Multi Media Nusantara Cooperation (MNC), RCTI, MNCTV, and GTV received a reprimand from the Indonesian KPI due to the advertisement of Perindo mars politics that was considered to be excessive and troubling the public ahead of the 2019 elections. However, Harry Tanoesoedibjo, the owner of MNC Media and the chairman of the Perindo political party used his own media to achieve the political goals, and it was considered to be in conflict with the ideal function of the mass media in Indonesia. This research is qualitative, and uses constructive approach. Data were obtained through interviews, observation and literature review. In addition, Vincent Mosco's political, and economic theory with three frameworks was used, namely commodification, spatialization, structure, advertising and social responsibility press. The results of this study revealed the data causes, and the use of MNC Media as a political tool by Perindo parties in the form of advertisements, which have an impact on the society. The authorities can freely use theirs for personal (political) interests, while still within the corridors of rules and regulations in the country. Furthermore, it conclude that its uses is indeed very important in the context, but in reality, it does not have much influence on the political choices of the people in the 2019 elections, and it is clear that Perindo party election results only attained 27%.

**Keywords:** Political Advertising, Political Economy of Media, Press Social Responsibility

## Introduction

The mass media using information and communication technology offer the benefits of fast, accurate and educative event (Briandana et al., 2020; Graber & Dunaway, 2018). Furthermore, its speed can also be spread to a heterogeneous audience in a manufacturing and distribution companies and impact industrial society (Gebner, 1967; Jenkins et al., 2018; Lindlof & Taylor, 2017; Nurudin, 2011). In addition, it also relates to the functions of information, sustainability, correlation, mobilization, and entertainment (McQuail & Deuze, 2020; Morrison, 2010). It can be social, political, cultural and institutional tool that places great importance on economic profit (Ejupi et al., 2014; Graber & Dunaway, 2018; Schramm et al., 1971). However, In politics, the question of the



function of media reports has shifted not only for economic reasons but also a political privilege that benefits the owners.

According to Briandana & Mihardja (2020); Doktoralina et al. (2020); Hoynes (2019) mass media trends in terms of economic motivation is characterized by increasing rate and proportion of the program broadcast. Another is the news program impressions that are not in line with the media ethics (Wilkins & Christians, 2020), and It should respect moral values and principles of right or wrong (Altschull, 1990; Wilkins & Christians, 2020; Wright & Hinson, 2015). However, because of the economic importance of broadcasting a program in the mass media, the market factor, that is to say to survive, the role of the communication should practice the selling of professionalism, codes of ethics and the moral responsibility of journalism. Meanwhile, many politicians are interested in the media and tends to present news that are pro-government because they are political figure supporting the government. This is to prevent the masses from getting to know the truth of the information, and the content of the news. This is because they choose news that supports the government and doesn't offer the opposition a balance (Hyden & Okigbo, 2017; Yustitia et al., 2019), and it happens in Indonesia, especially during the general election, such as legislative, regional head, and presidential elections.

Politicians placed mass media in an important position after 1998 reform because of the results of the direct election which lead to the amendment of 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Years of 2002 (UUD 1945). Furthermore, In Direct elections and every other level of the government, from regents, mayors, governors, and the president, the media plays an important role during the campaign. The owner of news television and electronic, Surya Paloh joined politics and established a new political party. Aburizal Bakrie (The owner of Bakrie Group affiliated with the Golongan Karya/Golkar Party) and Hary Tanoesoedibjo (*CEO/Chairman* of Media Nusantara Citra/MNC Group established Perindo party. However, out of the three political parties, the most recent party formed in 2015 uses advertisements and, broadcast on television for the 2019 election.

The method by which Perindo makes it easily known to the public is through a massive performance of political song. However, Mars is broadcasted on various television media associated with the MNC Group, and it shows the high frequency of advertisements displayed, which include 20 spots per day, and as shown in the following table:

Table 1. Data summary of Mars Perindo's toward of KPI reprimands 2016-2018

Years	Description KPI Warning	Spot on	Duration
2016	First Pre-warning	13 times	7 minutes 25 seconds
	First Post-warning	7 times	7 minutes
2017	The Second Pre-warning	13 times	7 minutes 30 seconds
	The Second Post-warning	-	-
2018	The Third Pre-warning	12 times	8 minutes
	The Third Post-warning	6 times	6 minutes

Source: Data Processed (2019)

Due to the routine advertisement in table 1, Perindo received the attention of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI) and that was considered to be a violation of the public interest. However, the declaration of violations submitted by the KPI was rejected by the Perindo general Secretary (kompas.com, 2017; Pedoman Perilaku Penyiaran (P3) Dan Standar Program Siaran, 2012). The party then explained that the ad contained no campaign, but was limited to socialization because Perindo was a new party that needed to be accepted by the public (www.cnnindonesia.com, 2018). Furthermore, MNC Media Group continues to serve Mars advertisement by reducing the intensity, and have a big role to play in filtering out what is good and not for the public and how people should behave.

In several elections, such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia as stated by André, Depauw, Shugart, & Chytilék (2017); Czada & Windhoff-Héritier (2019), the march strategy introduced by Perindo in the media, is a

good way to inform the public, and also provide prospect of election on the long run and foster party reputation. However, the interests of institutions or groups clash with press ethics and the ideology of the mass media, especially with regard to regulations and the needs of the community (Golding & Murdock, 2018; Iggers, 2018). The problem is, what are the factors that led to the emergence of media dynamics and political interests in the MNC Media case and the Perindo mars adverts? Second, how does Perindo uses mars ads for political purposes? Third, what is the dynamics of the media and the political interests of the MNC Media case and the Perindo mars?

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 *Political Economy of Media*

The political economy of the media as an institution has the power to influence the public (Sullivan, 2019). Furthermore, the principle of capitalist industrial system of mass media on production and distribution need to considered. Bettig (2018); Innis (2018) stated that mass media have economic, financial, political & culture consequences. For example, production and distribution systems, with regard to media properties, information practices, industry and radio dynamics, television, film and advertising have global economic-political inter-relationships.

Theoretically, political-economic, blames media ownership for people's reaction (Bardoel et al., 2005; Klaehn et al., 2018). In addition, the contents of media are commodities to be sold in the market, and the distribution of information is regulated according to the requirements. Although, this system refers to conservative and harmless activities, due to the exclusion of programs and dominant media channels, the relationship between economic structure and the dynamics of the media industry and ideology content is significant to the economic and the political system. However, If the impact on the decline of the independent media source affecting the concentration of the audience is avoided, then the negative investors in media are reduced (Bardoel et al., 2005). According to Jamil et al. (2019); Mosco & Nagy(2017; Nichols & Martínez (2019) considering political economy of communication from two angles, namely a special (narrow) and broad (general) perspective. From the narrow point of view, communication is defined as the study of social relations, in particular the power relations associated in the production, distribution, and consumption systems of resources. However, the general definition is about the control and survival in social life. Mosco & Nagy (2017) distinguish three political economy framework conditions, namely commodification, which is the process of transforming use values into exchange values, Spatialization as the process of overcoming the constraints of space and time in social life and Structuration that is regarding the idea relation between community agents, social processes and practices in an analysis.

### 2.2 *Advertisement*

Russell & Lane, (2001) stated that advertising serves as non-personal communication across different media, with the primary purpose of influencing audience behavior reading the content of a message. In Addition,Cant, Strydom, Jooste, & du Plessis, 2009; Kotler, Keller, Ang, Tan, & Leong, 2017) explained that advertising include all forms of presentation that support, promote ideas and goods. However, Burkhalter, Curasi, Thornton, & Donthu (2017); Percy & Rossiter (1992) reported the need for creative concepts that support one another such as heard words, Color, Music, Picture, seen words and Movement elements.

### 2.3 *Press Theory and the Press System*

Siebert, Siebert, Peterson, Peterson, & Schramm (1956) distinguish four types of press theory, namely Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and the Soviet communist concepts. However, in Indonesia, Social Responsibility Theory is generally used. The assumption underlying this theory is that freedom bears the same responsibility, with the press being responsible for informing, educating and promoting society. As such, the media play a role in reflecting diversity and gaining access to views from different perspectives. Furthermore, public opinion, ethics, and consumer reaction are therefore in the control of press performance.

The Country, guarantee the freedom of the press by the fifth amendment of the 1945 constitution in clause 28 (Rendra, 2005: 278). However, the essential differences in media on social responsibility theory as described by Siebert et al., (1956) outlined the need for a commitment to social responsibility for community opinion, consumer behavior and professional ethics. The most important aspect is that the media are forced to fulfill their social obligations, and failure to do will therefore affect its constraint (Ardianto, 2009; Center et al., 2008; Wrong, 2017).

#### 2.4 Theoretical Framework

This research identifies the political ads from Perindo mars which will be broadcast on MNC Media owned by Harry Tanoesoedibjo the chairman, which is considered as a "political tool" described in the following figure:




Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for thinking on media power and political interests  
Source: Data Proessed (2019)

### 3. Method

This research is a qualitative study with a constructive paradigm. Data were obtained through interviews, observation and literature review. Furthermore, it uses an in-depth explanatory case, which examine the role of Perindo and MNC groups with the continuous use of (Mars) political song for advertisement, and campaign, However, it was conducted jn 2018-2019, before and during the 2019 Election.

### 4. Result and Discussion

#### 4.1 Economics and Politics of Mass Media

According to Mosco (2015); Mosco & Nagy (2017), commodification, is an attempt by the mass media to change everything so that it can be used as a lucrative tool for content, audiences, and employees.

The content is commercialized to attract audience attention and is tied to placement of advertisements (due to the large number of viewers participating in a program), which generates revenue for the company. However, Mars Perindo has significant public information value by introducing elements of political parties and other activities. It is an exchange rate that can be sold to the public via television channels and advertising with a creative element.

Audience marketing is made clear by the collaboration between multinationals and advertisers. It is the largest and most popular national private television channel with great diversity, good ratings, performance and very good stability. It has credibility with target audience segments and many loyal viewers.

Price Time	Non Prime Time	All Time	Average Sun-Mon (Week):
SCTV: 19.7 (-0.4)	IVM: 18.3 (3.1)	IVM: 17.5 (3.5)	IVM: 16.8 (1.8)
IVM: 15.5 (4.2)	SCTV: 13.9 (-3.1)	SCTV: 15.6 (-2.4)	SCTV: 16.2 (-1)
RCTI: 15 (-1.6)	RCTI: 12.5 (-0.2)	RCTI: 13.2 (-0.7)	RCTI: 13.8 (-0.5)
TRANS7: 11.6 (1.7)	MNCTV: 12.3 (1.7)	MNCTV: 12 (0.7)	MNCTV: 12.6 (0.9)
MNCTV: 11.3 (-1.6)	TRANS7: 10.9 (2.9)	TRANS7: 11.1 (2.5)	TRANS7: 9.7 (1.6)
ANTV: 7.6 (-0.5)	GTV: 9 (-1)	ANTV: 8.5 (-1.5)	ANTV: 9 (-1)
TRANS: 6.5 (-0.9)	ANTV: 8.9 (-2)	GTV: 8.1 (-1)	GTV: 7.3 (-1.3)
GTV: 6.1 (-0.8)	TRANS: 8.1 (-0.6)	TRANS: 7.6 (-0.7)	TRANS: 7.3 (-0.4)
TVONE: 2.4 (0)	TVONE: 2.3 (-0.6)	TVONE: 2.3 (-0.5)	TVONE: 2.7 (-0.1)
METRO: 1.6 (0)	TVRI1: 1.6 (0.4)	TVRI1: 1.5 (0.2)	TVRI1: 2 (0.3)
INEWS: 1.4 (0)	INEWS: 1.2 (-0.3)	INEWS: 1.3 (-0.2)	INEWS: 1.5 (0)
TVRI1 1.3 (-0.1)	METRO: 1 (-0.3)	METRO: 1.2 (-0.1)	METRO: 1.2 (-0.2)

Source: Data Processed (2019)

The commodification of workers was carried out when work done was eliminated, therefore the pay slips can be manipulated and deducted correctly. However, the commercialization of MNC Media and Perindo employees is a symbol of mutualism between companies. Furthermore, Perindo utilizes media workers techniques for the march production process and screening. If the MNC Media employees are deployed by Perindo, it certainly add to the profit with the cost of production and advertising, and also the higher the profit, but technically the workload is greater than what it is should. The commodification of these findings can be seen in the following table:

Table. 3. Coomodification

Commodification	Detection
Content	Interesting and informative ad content Have educational value that is sold to the public. Advertising which is an income for the company
Audiens	Television stations with good ratings and shares have good credibility for the public Ads are on watches that have a good rating and share
Worker	Technical utilization of workers Pressing production costs The company's income is getting bigger

Source: Data Processed (2019)

Next is spatialization, where media owners use technology to overcome distance and time to maximize work and increase profits. There is also an horizontal integration, which means that a company has to develop its business in various fields, and vertical integration, which is a control effort made by media owners, in order to equate work ideology.

Spatialalization which includes the space and time used by Perindo and MNC Media utilizes an institutional structure, like Harry Tanoesoedibjo position as the owner. The power of ownership, networking and the speed of the negotiation process of advertising through a holding company are easier and faster. Ease of access to space and time of products broadcast by the media to the public, considering that MNC Media is a national television that has reached all parts of Indonesia, it is certain that people easily watch the Perindo Mars advertisement. MNC Media corporation which has been established for decades to gain space and trust in public broadcast program. Furthermore, several television stations display the same advertising content (monopoly of the impressions), this is considered to be more profitable for Perindo. This can be seen on the table below.

Table 4. Spatialalization

Vertical		Horizontal	
Name	Type	Name	Type
RCTI TV	Televisi	Holding	Integrasi
MNC TV	Televisi		
Global TV	Televisi		

Source: Data processed (2019)

The structuring is a continuation of the form of vertical integration in spatialization. However, according to Giddens structure, it influence each other activities in the mass media due to different access possibility between workers and capital owners.

This shows in the power of Harry Tanoesoebidjo's the owner of MNC Media, and Perindo. Having full control on the media and others within, in order to equalize the work ideology. However, this was done by the party in the intensity for frequent Mars advertisements, with the power possessed by Harry Tanoesoebidjo, MNC Media which was considered as a procedures and bureaucracy of ad serving at a television station, was able to comply with the rules and regulations of the supervisory institutions, and ultimately to stun the masses. with Mars Perindo.

#### 4.2 *Song of Political Parties (Mars) Perindo as Political Party Advertising*

According to Wright & Hinson (2015) advertising is a communication process that plays a very important role as a marketing tool that helps in selling of goods, and services, as well as ideas through certain channels in the form of information. Furthermore, it is used for variety of purposes, including political parties, during its development. However, a creative advertising concept has elements that support each other. The mutually supportive idea is the words heard in the advertisements that are displayed, making the viewers understand more about the purpose (Percy & Rossiter, 1992).

Mars Perindo advertisements, is considered to have an implicit meaning as stated by Jamil & Hesti (2019); Percy & Rossiter (1992) This can be seen from the arrangement of words and related sentences that form "Mars Perindo ". In addition, the choice of words that listeners easily remember, the sentence of an invitation to a high sense of nationalism, vision, mission and the lyrics of the song, are considered complete to make the public understand the goals set by the party.

Perindo harmonized the color elements for the image, setting the light in the display of advertising impressions, a mixture of natural images that are art of beauty are combined with the activities. While the colors are technically combined in the shot, there is a very different subject specification between landscape beauty photography and grouping of models according to radio and television standards that meet the technical requirements to be eligible for advertisement.

In addition, regarding the music, the Mars Perindo advertisement, which was unwittingly broadcast for three years, familiarized the public with musical instruments, even though they were only played with or without words for the first five seconds. However, instruments with national nuances and orchestra accompaniments have their own standards and are easily recognized. Including the object, model, and the scene displayed in the landscape beauty shoot image with Perindo activities and its characters, the picture is also arranged into a complete and interesting whole and pleases the eyes of the audience to continue watching until the end of the advertisement. Furthermore, the final message can be finally passed on to the public.

Another thing that also becomes the mainstay of the show is the element of words, which appear on the advertisement impressions that affect the image of the product in the minds of viewers after the first 5 seconds. This often draws the public's eye to the writing, which creates a memorized effect with the slogan, vision and mission of the party. Coupled with the clear display of graphics, logos and writing at the end of the mars for 3

seconds, this is enough to grab the attention of the audience, because the duration of the show is long enough to read and understand the message conveyed by Marsindo.

As for the element of movement, they exist, and are seen in advertising impressions that affect people's emotions which uses angles to make Mars look attractive. Images that have a significant "good cause" are often shown, such as people in need, health facilities, providing means of transportation for the community, scholarships, aid to wagon used for businesses, and agricultural produce. These "good" things are displayed almost from the beginning to the end of Mars with a duration of 30 to 60 seconds. It certainly evokes the emotions of the audience that Perindo has an advantageous vision and mission to help the people of Indonesia.

For this reason, Mars Perindo is seen as a full advertisement on both audio and video for a political party, which is attractive and very familiar to all Indonesians. Furthermore, the three functions of political advertising are First to persuade and convince the public in making their choices. Second, to identify or differentiate between one candidate from another. Third, to provide information on vision (ideological view that is used as a reference in acting), mission (actions or practices to use power resources), and various programs (political concepts that are operationalized, are measured mathematically). In addition, the Perindo's march ad has many versions that are frequently broadcasted on national private television stations under the auspices of MNC Media (RCTI, MNC TV, and GTV). The effect of Perindo's creative advertising strategy by Kasali (1995:83-86) stated that a good advert must meet up with the criteria of AIDCA (Attention, Interest, Desire, Conviction and Action) to avoid the violation of advertising ethics.

In the political context, every party have a certain strategy, game plan, and purpose for their success. One of the methods used by Perindo through Mars is that it has managed to attract public attention. The presence of the Marshall Perindo ad is considered to have reached this stage. The people who were brainwashed during the Perindo walk were remembered and considered good - although this was ultimately seen as a disruptive effect. However, the owner of MNC Media's and Chairman of Perindo, Harry Tanoesoedibjo has eventually become a problem, therefore MNC Media is considered not to be a neutral mass media, because it shows that it is in the interest of a group.

Taking a closer look at the advertising strategy, the authors note that Perindo's Mars advertising level is considered overwhelming for people who have reached the phase of interest, but the results achieved during the 2019 election was just 2.8%. This proves that such an effort made by the party in advertising in many national mass media only reaches the phase of Interest, And does not follow the desire, necessity, conviction and action. However, the performance of Perindo was below expectations and contradicts the efforts made, which made only few people to choose the party. This in turn indicates that, there will be different views in the political sphere of advertising and media. Furthermore, when people are associated with political choices, they are considered "wise" in their decisions. In this case the public only deals with consequences rather the objectives of a political party. More clearly it can be seen on the table below:

Table. 5. Achievement of Mars Perindo's Advertising Strategy

<b>Description</b>	<b>Detection</b>
<i>Attention</i>	V
<i>Interest</i>	V
<i>Desire</i>	X
<i>Conviction</i>	X
<i>Action</i>	X

Source: Data processed (2019) refer to the Ad Strategy according to Kasali (1995)

The foundations of existing institutions in Indonesia are rules, including the Act to Support Broadcasting Policy. The problem with Perindo ads is that there are no regulations that violate the rules, such as the rule that media owners can only participate in politics if excessive advertising content is involved, and they money to get one to display the ad on a public frequency. However, the frequency of the show is regularly taken into account, which has a negative impact on the community, especially on children.

#### 4.3 *Mass Media Social Responsibility*

Since the government uses regulations No. 40/1999, normatively, the press in Indonesia has adopted the theory of social responsibility (freedom of the press which is responsible to the public/public interest). The system has experienced dynamics along with the movement of modern politics. During the nationalist movement, the media was seen as a struggle tool, and During the independence, the press had become a tool for the struggle of political parties. However, after stability and development, the media played a role in the context of communication and commodities (the capitalist press). Today, they are in the context of freedom and commercialization.

The emerging reality is that the press becoming profit-oriented, which places more emphasis on sales and advertising than the need of the public with comprehensive and accurate information about the threat to morals, violation of personal rights and the control of socioeconomic class, business that endangers the market idea, which is free and open. The current state of the press system in Indonesia is inextricably linked to the influence and interference of the rule of a handful of capital owners in the newspaper industry, which is also part of the penetration and expansion of capitalism and global political power.

In this case, Harry Tanoesoedibjo who is affiliated with Perindo political party, has dominated shows in the MNC Media. Perindo advertisements are unconsciously consumed publicly using existing channels in media conglomerates. However, mass media capitalism in MNC Media welcomes political power and at present, many Indonesian press actors are misinterpreting their freedom. Many factors influence it, such as the impact of globalization, adoption of the market system, the absence of referrals for members, society, government and implementation of a free and responsible press.

The importance of press freedom which is ideally has to do with the interests of the public, is now displaced by the powerful factors of globalization and increasing evolving technology. The function of the media as an information tool is considered as void for Perindo, which feels the need to be informed is to attract attention of the public. Even with the use of media functions, the efforts also overlap with existing regulations in Indonesia which is considered lax and allow it to carry out its political efforts. However, in the case of campaigns advocating for socialization, political content, education and nationalism for the community, as well as other strategies that have been defined by regulations, such as the elaboration of vision and mission in song lyrics, implied party elements and musical instruments that are tricked in such a way that the regulations are treated as if they have no place to judge.

This proves that the theory of social responsibility is difficult to implement, due to the complexity of the standoff between the interests of the government and the owners or workers involved. This system is therefore at the interface between the authoritarian and libertarian. In order words, the government steps in to articulate the functions, duties and authority of the media as an expression of its responsibility. However, this system an authoritarianism. On the other hand, the system evolve towards liberalism of the workers and formulate it independently.

Social responsibility theory states that anyone who has something important to say must be given rights in the forum, and if the media is deemed not fulfilling its obligations, there are those that should enforce it. According to this theory, they are controlled by public opinion, consumer action, professional code of ethics, and in the case of broadcasting, by the regulatory authority, taking into account the technical limitations of the media, and number of available frequency channels (Siebert et al., 1956).

In this case, however, public statements are still limited by existing regulations, and not all forms of expression can be published by the media in the forums provided. Like the people who have the right to protest and even punish the press/mass media harming the community. The public may protest or punish the mass media for reporting false news or events and it can be carried out directly by sending a letter of protest to the mass media, or by reporting to the relevant institution such as the press council and KPI. However, its role in, the state, and society is to mutually sustain the country's progress.

In practice, this is done by the community, but based on the rules contested by the interests of the political parties Perindo. A regulations with various types of wings as the basis for regulating the media in Indonesia could not act decisively, and the interests of groups in the mass media may still exist under the pretext that they follow the rules. determined by the state.

In this case, the authors assume that this is seen from two approaches. First, the rule-based states that provided none of the things that violate the rules or regulations in this case are determined by the laws in Indonesia and Ethics of advertising, then it is safe because the existing rules oblige offenders to do otherwise. Second, an ethical approach which means utilizing the public frequency for personal interests or certain groups and its existence is not good in a media management. However, they does not allow owners to intervene procedurally and that follows the established bureaucracy. There is a sense of proportionality, which principles speak of ethics and conscience, not just technical, and this is a sign that cannot be avoided in Indonesia, due to possible regulations.

## 5. Conclusion

The ownership between MNC Media and Perindo as a powerhouse is the most important factor influencing the issue. However, the existence of a conflicting interest in the phenomenon of mass media is at the origin of ideology, which is never separated from economic and political factors. Instead of taking the interests of the public into account, owners always prioritize profits, along with the development of modern information and communication technology. In terms of advertising, media is used as a marketing tool for products and services, also for political parties purposes and as a means of socialization in order to gain public attention in the context of the 2019 election. Furthermore, the economic factors to which the industry belongs, aims at generating much income and profit as possible in order to maintain the competitive market, the rating and the proportion that a national private television considers credible to the public with technical benefits and political factors and that clearly show the role of Harry Tanoe the owner of MNC Media and chairman of the Perindo political party utilizing his property for personal/group interests (Perindo party) directly through holding and integration to achieve political goals.

The advertisement of Perindo march is with a complete and attractive package, which is a means of socialization for the political party. However, there are no conflicts with regard to the law, but at the end the principle of political ethics is expected to be a control for media owners as well as a consideration for regulators or regulatory bodies to be more assertive. The efforts made by the Perindo party in the political strategy that dominates the MNC mass media, apparently are not directly proportional to the objectives of the political party. The results of the 2019 election showed that Perindo only achieved 2.7%, and it can be practically proven that the party is only successful in the phase of advertising strategies of public interest, but has not reached the final stage of good advertising strategy, namely action. Therefore there is a need for good, dynamic, clear and firm regulations. This research is therefore useful in order to invite all media owners to pay close attention to the position of the mass media in the community, which is intended for the society. This study does not address the psychological consequences of a free and profit-oriented press, public morals and the violation of personal rights and socio-economic class control that can undermine the free and open market of ideas. Further research should therefore link the theory of market behavior and its effects on the economy and firms using quantitative measures.



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# Rohingya Refugee and Resettlement Nexus in Bangladesh: Why it Become a Research Agenda?

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## Abstract

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are the identity-less parasites in global politics and lives in the densest refugee camps in world history. The financial and institutional support for refugees is challenged due to many unavoidable factors that the world is facing nowadays while the number of refugees and displaced people is increasing all over the world. The article observes the longitudinal and multidimensional factors that led Rohingya as a stateless in the political geography of the world. The study warrant of permanent solutions for the prevailing crises of Rohingya refugee that indicates extensive research on Rohingya. It is also revealed that interdisciplinary and multispectral research can help to identify the ways to help them for their distress voyage. The paper argues for the combination of an array of non-state, state, and other allied actors for the research on Rohingya for their peaceful and permanent settlement in and outside of their country.

**Keywords:** Rohingya, Refugee, Resettlement, Research, Bangladesh

*“The peoples of the (new) states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly interdependent, and often actually opposed motives- search for identity and demand for progress. These two motives are intimately related because citizenship in truly modern state has more and more become the most broadly negotiable claim to personal significance, and because what Mazzini called the demand to exist and have a name is to such a great extent fired by a humiliating sense of exclusion from the important centers of power in the world society (Geertz, 1963).”*

Myanmar is a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic (Aung, 2016) and multi-religious country and diverse populace with 52.89 million (2016) people comprising Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, and other religions possessing largest land area in mainland Southeast Asia (Aung, 2016). In recent times, one can hardly find a government that has been so dreadful, so brutal and so barbarous in its refutation of basic human rights to a people that trace their

origin to the land for nearly a millennium. In addition, it was a place of anxiety for fifty years with prolonged civil war and pre-democracy struggles under the military (Aung, 2016). The *Rohingya* Muslims are the victims living in the Arakan (now Rakhine) state. They have become the forgotten people of our time (Siddiqui, 2018). About 40 percent of the *Rakhine* population is Muslims who fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar when the ethnic cleansing started decades ago. Many scholars and writers from the different parts of the world were written about *Rohingya* problem as compassionately or as a challenge because they are facing an uncertain future with a lot of violations and vulnerabilities. But they failed to get attention from the international arena when many of them delineate the *Rohingya* problem as historical or political. Myanmar government allows citizenship for those whose ancestors live before 1823 and who are the enlisted 130 documented minor groups where *Rohingya* was not included. An efficient Machiavellian means to seize one's lands is to reject his/her property rights. When this illicit practice has done by the supreme authority nothing could be more awful. The very obvious instance of such a misdeed can be seen in the practices of the government of Myanmar (Siddiqui, 2018) as "a semi-organized social movement with clear political goals" (Klinken & Aung, 2017).

The *Rohingya* conveys the ethno-religious identity of the Muslim minority geographically relates the people of as *Arakanse* Muslim who resided western part of Myanmar, now *Rakhaine* (also known *Arakan* state) (Ahsan Ullah, 2016, Leider, 2018), and claimed themselves as the part of Myanmar citizen however the government always declare them as illegal immigrants (Albert, 2018). However, there have been created many conflicting debates about the origin of *Rohingya*, but it is clear that in *Arakan*, they have resided a large number of Muslims for hundreds of years (Mohajan, 2018) and with this political infection *Rohingya* creates two strong blocs (Pro- and anti- *Rohingya*). *Arakan* was a sovereign kingdom before British colonization (Farzana, 2017) and *Rohingya* reconciled them in Myanmar at the 9<sup>th</sup> century as they lived there, even before the of Muslim came, at the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century (Kei, 1991) and naturally mingled with Bengalis, Turks, Moguls and Persians which indicates the pluralistic demography from the genesis of *Rohingya* at *Rakhaine* state (Albert, 2018). On the other hand, anti-bloc claimed that these people were from Chittagonian Bengali who migrated during British colonial rule and favored by the British along with other minority groups over ethnic Burmans (Knuters, 2018, Tanenbaum, 2017) and fought against the Japanese during 2<sup>nd</sup> World War (Kei, 1991). In addition to that they didn't treat as the people of Myanmar by the government and called "resident foreigner" (Ahsan Ullah, 2016) which indirectly reject the national identity and political membership and become effectively stateless (Farzana, 2017) however they were in a realm of statelessness for over six generations (Milton and Rahman, et.al, 2017). "This is systematic discrimination: laws, policies, and practices, though designed and carried out by people, are ultimately part of or attributable to a system that ensures discrimination even in the absence of discriminatory individuals" (Benjamin Zawacki, Defining Myanmar's *Rohingya* Problems). However the British have given a promise that they will provide an independent state to them after world war-II but the promise was not kept by them and the *Rakhine* remain the part of Myanmar (Kei, 1991). According to Khin Maung Saw(1993), the term "*Rohingya*" was unfamiliar before the 1950s and Red Flag Communists invented the term. Aye Chan (2005) debates that a *Rohingya* MP from the Akyab North constituency invented the term. These people have been browbeaten and deliberately excluded from geographic identity for centuries (Ahsan Ullah, 2016) and failed to get attention, as they considered Myanmar's problem, from Bangladesh.

The political landscape in Myanmar was founded through the British colonial period however there were many ethnic groups but finally they placed under the umbrella of British rule before the independence from Great Britain in 1948 (Kipgen, 2016). It is necessary to know why the alienation of *Rohingya* started (Knuters, 2018) however the transformation of power in Myanmar was non-peaceful in several times and the trust of authority towards the rebellious minority was low and vice versa due to the role of the British in the colonial period as they used different minor groups against ethnic Burmans. Every state has a historical background of its own and, has had an influence of colonizing nations, which combines both general ideology and particular policies to format general and economic ideology (Johnson, 1967). After independence, the country was a flimsy democratic state before the military coup that seized power from the elected government in 1962 and experienced military dictatorship until the 2015 elections (Farzan, 2017, Kipgen 2016).

Military at the 1960s considered, by the developed world, as the agent of modernization (Pye, 1961) that involves changes in the value system as well as economic, political, and social changes. This value system was

“prescriptive” and thoroughly integrated with the religious system and which invokes ultimate sanctions for every infraction (Becker, 1957). Counter-modernization movement’s results—religious, linguistic groups rebel and demand a return to fundamentalism (Hoselitz, 1961). However, secularization is a process, transition from prescriptive to principle society, and does not mean that religion disappears. Where Suu Kyi, is definitely may also be a “*central figure*” (Seligman, 1950) and can “...*personify and integrate many conflicting needs*” (Emerson, 1960) and pivots around a heroic effort to keep them aligned (Geertz, 1963) in a crisis period. But, Yanghee Lee, in Myanmar, as human rights investigator from UN said she and many others in the global society hoped the condition under Aung San Suu Kyi “*would be vastly different from the past — but it is really not that much different from the past*”. (The Guardian, 24 October 2018).

The relationship between militaries and civilian leaders varies, of course, according to the circumstances of historic development (Pye, 1961). As Finer (1962) stated that “*where public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics will be weak.... Where public attachment to civilian institutions is weak or non-exist, military intervention in politics will find wide scope-both in manner and substances*”. During the military rule, *Rohingya* got more severe than other minority groups (i.e., Karen, Shan,) who cooperated, and favored by, British during their colonial period against the Burmese minorities.

The jingoistic factions retained almost after one hundred years (Farzana, 2017) and established “*disciplined democracy*” by military dictator under the constitution to legalize their illegal rule due to terrifying of the vengeance from common people that they would lose their authority (Gravers and Ytzen, 2014) though they claimed their actions “*an attempt to restore the order in an increasingly chaotic political scene*” (Tylor, 2009, Cited in Farzana, 2017:48). In 1974 a new constitution was formed, under the Burma Socialist Program Party (BCPP), which make a hardship rule for citizenship. Several amendments of the constitution ensured institutional changes that comprise civil, political, and administrative aspects and took initiative to unite the nation through mash the rebel groups and securing Buddhism as the state religion. Under this course, “*Operation Nagamin*” was instigated to dissolve the political organizations of *Rohingya* (Frazana, 2017) as to “*take action against foreigners who have filtered into the country illegally*” (Smith 1999, in Farzana 2017) and proven their targeted negative sentiments against the *Rohingya* including other insurgent minor groups.

In 1984 the military instigated a new restraining policy of citizenship that supports the exclusionist policy of insurgent minor groups from mainland citizenship (Farzana, 2017). However previously 135 minor groups were recognized under the law, before 1962, the civilian government recognized 144 ethnic groups including *Rohingya*. But *Rohingya* became *de-facto* stateless by excluding these minority groups through “*Citizenship Laws*” in 1982 when they were termed as “*resident foreigners*” with an extensive list of deprivations (i.e., work, education, medication, etc) (EU, 2017 and Ahsan Ullah, 2016). Before the 1990 election, Burma's economy declares as “Least Develop Country” in 1987 by UNDP but the people were shouting and claiming for democracy to accelerate to their stagnant economy into a dynamic one. Thousands were killed by an armed gunman and arrested. The imperative device to reduce the conflict between ethnicity and national integration is the nationalist party who can dominate the local political scene. The Ayung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory at the 1990 free fair election but not handover the power to them while arrested in their house (Kipgen 2016). Suu Kyi released in 2010 and won a by-election in 2012 got 43 seat out of 44 after that in the 2015 general election she elected as state councilor promising a democratic future for Myanmar but may not able to hold the office due to legal obligation as she has foreign citizenship (McKirby, 2016).

*Rohingya* Muslims are still excluded and victimized while religion and nationalism emerged as a notion of belonging in Myanmar (Farzana, 2017). However, their concern here is with the implications of nationalism for the ideology of religious policy (Buddhism) rather than the problems of social and economic integration. As nationalism engaged with hostility towards other nations or ethnic groups and a tendency to adopt a double standard of morality concerning them, that colors every aspect of attitudes of new nations toward the advanced countries with which they trade and from which they receive aid. Besides, *Rohingya* Muslims does not recognize as a citizen of Burma (Ahsan Ullah, 2016). Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made it clear that *Rohingya* origin lay at the heart of the matter when, on September 16, 2017, he posted to Facebook a statement saying that the

current military action against the *Rohingya* is “*unfinished business*” stemming back to the Second World War. He also stated, “They have demanded recognition as *Rohingya*, which has never been an ethnic group in Myanmar.

[The] Bengali issue is a national cause and we need to be united in establishing the truth” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The *Rohingya* refugees and their statelessness have an international issue to study, and substantial research has been done by many scholars throughout the world concerning this (Ahsanullah, 2016, Albert, 2018, Amnesty International, 2017, Beyrer and Kamarulzaman, 2017, Knuiters, 2018, Milton and Rahman *et. al.*, 2017). It is also internationally recognized as a humanitarian crisis by earlier researchers in their writings (Kaveri, 2017, Kingston, 2015, Murphy, 2018, Hasan and Smith *et.al.* 2018) that suggest the intervention of international organization (OIC, UN, etc.) to concentrate on the crisis effectively (Milton and Rahman *et. al.*, (2017). Multilateral initiatives for political solutions of *Rohingya* issues are emphasized by the neighboring countries especially ASEAN and global communities (Ahsan Ullah, 2016). Because policies can make any ethnic or minority groups into “*identity-less parasites*” but maltreated minority can preserve their identity through memories and culture (Knuters, 2018).

The latest beckon of aggression was termed as “*ethnic cleansing*” (OHCHR, 2017), however, triggered the massive *Rohingya* refugees' influx in Bangladesh and many of them are biometrically restricted and given identity cards by the Immigration and Passport Department of Bangladesh (Oh, 2017) and providing-shelter, relief and medical service (Khatun and Kamruzzaman, 2018) who are totally amounted 918,936 (ISCB, 2018b). Bangladesh sang in different global human rights treaties that indirectly support the *Rohingya* refugees in humanitarian aspects however there is a limitation that they are not enforceable in a local court by domestic law for their misconduct which made questions in the issue of local security (Khatun and Kamruzzaman, 2018). However, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to the repatriation of *Rohingya* between Bangladesh and Myanmar but this may not happen yet due to the reluctance of Myanmar.

The Government of Bangladesh, with different global organizations, has taken several schemes because of the crisis (diplomatic, bilateral, and humanitarian). The state counselor of Myanmar was committed repatriate 330 people daily but many other sources assert that they were not agreed to Bangladesh 10 points proposal (Miaze, 2017, and Khatun & Kamruzzaman, 2018). The Prime minister of Bangladesh was proposed for ‘*safe zones*’ inside Myanmar for refugees to repatriate but it could be dangerous for them as Weir said from the Bosnia and Sri Lanka experience (Richard Weir, Human Rights Watch, 23 September 2017). The UN Security Council urges for stopping the communal violence in *Rakhine* and the EU extends the sanction up to April 2018 (EU, 2017). The Secretary General of the UN visited a refugee camp in Bangladesh and advised for more funds for refugees (UNHCR, 2018).

The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) with its Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief (MoDMR) and international organizations are supporting *Rohingya* in humanitarian aspects. A USD 434 million fund estimated for six months to humanitarian support for *Rohingya* living in Bangladesh at Geneva organized by UN, IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, and co-hosted by Kuwait and EU (OCHA, 2017c). A Joint Response Plan (JRP) adapted to meet up the coming needs along with existing support and considering the future possible threats of future challenges. A total USD 950 million is required as support under the JRP to meet the urgent needs of more than 880,000 *Rohingya* refugees and over 330,000 Bangladeshis in communities affected by the crisis (Khatun & Kamruzzaman, 2018).

Conflict remains the main driver of humanitarian needs, while natural disasters continue to cause many people to need emergency aid. Overall, more than 134 million people across the world need humanitarian assistance and protection – and more funding than ever before (Human Rights Watch, 2019). According to the report of the Financial Tracking system about 135.3 million people need humanitarian support while in 2009 the fund required USD 9 billion for assistance but received the only USD 7 billion. When we are talking about the year 2018 the fun required USD 25.2 billion and received only USD 14.6 billion (OCHA, 2018) and this gap widens gradually and creating risk and anxiety to the leaders of the world in the coming future.

The *Rohingya* refugees in Bangladesh need basic facilities (i.e., food, shelter, education, medical, sanitary, economic facilities, etc) that create extra pressure on GoB while the host country is losing economic, social, and environmental resources. In the year 2017 August to December *Rohingya* Refugees deforested 2.4 thousand hectares (Yousuf, 2017) which are continuing. The report on the *Rohingya* crisis published by the CPD Bangladesh estimated the cost for FY 2019 USD 1211 million for these crises which is amounted to 2.47% of the national budget, 0.47% of GDP, and 3.44% of the total revenue of Bangladesh on FY 2018. In addition to that, if the repatriation starts it per MoU between GoB and Myanmar will take 30 Years, as a 1.5% reproduction rate, the hosting cost will be USD 22,429 billion (Khatun & Kamruzzaman, 2018).

The politics of *Rohingya* Muslim resettlement is pertinent to study as the oppression towards *Rohingya* was brutal and turns into genocide and this brutality amount to a vulgar violation of their human rights (Knuters, 2018) in Myanmar. As the Myanmar governments have estranged *Rohingya* through nationalistic and religious policies so the study is needed to uncover the politics of *Rohingya* Muslims to become refugees and this will be used to discover the way how to resettle of *Rohingya* Muslims. This *Rohingya* issue constitutes in many respects an ideal “laboratory” for analyzing militarism, religious extremism, and exclusion of *Rohingya* from Myanmar and the politics of resettlement. In this “laboratory” certain independent variables, according to Putnam are held constants- “colonial background, nature of the struggle for independence, religious background, and cultural authority patterns”

The unprecedented exodus of *Rohingya* refugees from Myanmar into southeastern Bangladesh is now a huge burden for them in both socio-political and economical aspect where socio-cultural heterogeneity plays a vital role in their social interaction and diversity that create anxiety in urban areas where the south Asian nation is already afflicted by overpopulation and poverty. The role of an ethnic group in providing food and shelter to the unemployed, marriage, and burial expenses, assistance in locating a job has been widely noted. Bangladesh's government is not yet in a position to offer an effective network of such services, because of a lack of resources and personnel. Yet these services would not be provided, widespread social unrest could be expected. *Rohingya* refugees create extra pressure for them and the issue often sparks off conflict is the 'perception' that the one group is gaining at the expense of another, in the governing process. The spatiality of politics research is actively located in social life because it comprises and concretizes the social action and relationship. The purpose of the study is to direct the research to investigate in this *Rohingya* refugees “laboratory” some of the more important speculations about the sources of resettlements in the coming future.

To resettle the *Rohingya* refugee permanently, within and outside of their country, a deep understanding and conceptualization are essential to identify the leading causes of *Rohingya* displacement. The studies may show how state and non-state actors are contributing to resettle the *Rohingya* refugees and how these are interlinked with each other by explaining how changing the role of non-state actors influence the process, welfare, and food security of *Rohingya* refugees. Moreover, to explain such impacts taking into consideration imperfections in the process of resettlement of refugees. The research might help design better resettlement mechanisms through which *Rohingya* refugees can be given an efficient opportunity in allocating resources and also Bangladesh can be benefitted from the resettlement mechanism.

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# The Biological Weapon as a Tool for Psychological Impact in the Context of Hybrid Warfare

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## Abstract

In the last decade, the world has begun to change, transforming from unipolar to multipolar. The new geopolitical battle, whose main goal is to preserve the dominance of the hegemonic country in the crumbling neoliberal and monopolistic world, has prompted world powers to redistribute the leading roles when establishing a new world order. In order to achieve these goals, stakeholders began to use all their available conventional and unconventional resources, including different methods of warfare - a combination of different weapons, terrorism and criminal behavior, unregulated strategies and tactics - from the oldest known to mankind to the newest warfare technologies, called hybrid war by the political and military strategists. In the case of hybrid warfare, the sphere of affirmation is no longer the pure military force. In fact, it affects all spheres of public life - political, economic, cultural. The construction of elaborately combined actions, bypassing the known boundaries of the traditional characteristics of threats and the use of organized violence, have a powerful psychological impact on the mass consciousness of society. It is a well-known fact that there have long been secret and open laboratories for the development of biological weapons, with a main purpose to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over the enemy, either by threats or by the actual deployment on "battle positions" as well as their actual use against enemy countries. Even more worrying is the fact that these weapons could be aimed both at the moral deactivation of the enemy's forces and at their actual physical destruction. In the present report, the authors aim to seek and provide an answer - is there a link between biological and hybrid wars in their virtual or real function as a tool to achieve certain political goals.

**Keywords:** Hybrid War, Biological Weapon, Psychological Impact

## INTRODUCTION

The world has been multipolar for the most part of its existence. After the end of the Cold War, USA, the winning country, imposed a new unipolar model of a single global superpower. However, the expectations of the World Community that this model will be stable and reliable and will guarantee the expected peace in the world, remained unjustified. In order to maintain its position as a world power for as long as possible and to

protect its foreign policy interests, the hegemonic country focused its forces and resources on opposing the competing forces.

With the transformation from a unipolar to a multipolar international political system, the main problem facing the only global superpower is the failure of this change or at least its maximum delay in time. The emergence of new and equal global actors would deal a serious blow to the economy and the financial system of the global superpower. Raising new currencies to their reserve status would have an impact on the global financial system and standard of living in a number of powerful countries, which is expected to lead to domestic political conflicts and social tensions. If the dollar loses its dominant position, then, quite naturally, it cannot continue to be an instrument of influence in international processes. Faced with this reality, the only strategy the world leader can apply is preventing the rise of the other great powers, building powerful geopolitical centres and creating instability and tension on their periphery. The events that shook the international political scene with a massive wave of protests and military conflicts from the recent past (2013) and those from the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020 provoked some analysts to conclude that after the Cold War, the security environment went through changes and the world shifted to a new situation, with renewed competition among the great powers to impose a new international order.

### **HYBRID WARS**

The rapid technological development since the end of the Cold War, which led to globalization, has proved to be a major factor in the loss of resilience in the socio-economic relations.

The impact of the Cold War on the security of the states has led to a shift in the national security paradigm. Through the prism of protecting national interests, the post-Cold War doctrine of military planning attempts to describe the security environment and its potential threats, identifying numerous ideas about the growing complexity of threat participants that do not match traditional enemy characteristics.

The threats of hybrid wars are proving to be a significant challenge for military operational and strategic planning, whose prediction is not an impossible task. However, in general, their chaotic and complex nature proves elusive to analysts and strategists who find it difficult to incorporate hybrid threats into traditional threat methods. For this reason, the strategy of hybrid warfare is rejected by some and accepted and used by others. Of course, the use of appropriate set of tool - strategic, operational and tactical, to identify the desired final state of the threat initiator, provides a prerequisite for a good forecast that ensures an advantage in understanding the possibilities and the intent of their implementation.

If the characteristics of traditional threats aim to minimize the complexity of the potential enemy, which in many cases leads to overestimation or underestimation of its intentions and capabilities, then hybrid methods seek the most accurate description of the enemy and their potential threat, which would allow symmetrical opposition to its strategic goals.

Military strategists view hybrid wars and their threats as the most confusing features of the international security environment, since flexible, adaptive and large-scale military forces are needed to counter and deal with them. To achieve their goals, aggressors use elements of hybrid warfare, focusing on organizational capabilities and gaining an asymmetric advantage over the enemy without having to resort to politically and economically costly, traditional wars. The term "asymmetry" is relatively new and is used to present threats in a new and non-standard way, while in military affairs it is used to identify and use differences in order to gain an advantage over the enemy.

To achieve the desired effects, hybrid wars target their actions towards vulnerabilities in societies in ways we do not usually think about or prepare for. Using deliberate ambiguity, they make attacks invisible, or at least less noticeable, allowing their presence and adaptation below the detection threshold, thus inevitably influencing the decision-making process and the appropriate response action.

To prevent the possible prediction and future counteraction of attacks, the initiators of hybrid wars use various ways to synchronize the means with a wide range of tools and techniques. It is for this reason that such a war may not be "seen" for a long time until its final phase is underway.

In pursuit of its goals, the adversary using hybrid methods seeks to destroy not only the military forces of nations, but also to destroy and destabilize entire societies. Therefore, instead of resorting to costly traditional economic and political wars, aggressors often use hybrid elements, which can be not only in the form of armed battle, but also a combination of well-planned strategic actions, purposefully combining different methods of "conducting of conflicts". Used comprehensively, the methods can be a combination of: military, political, social, economic, psychological or terrorist, with conventional and unconventional actions such as cyber warfare, crime, insurgency, ethnic warfare, detention and many others.

Perhaps the most important feature of hybrid warfare is the combination of limited military and a full range of non-military actions to achieve primarily political goals. In this way, not only the state – a target and an object of informal aggression, but also the international community can hardly say until the last moment and with sufficient certainty, whether a coordinated offensive is being waged against the respective state or not.

Another indisputable advantage of hybrid methods over conventional ones is that one military opponent, regardless of whether they have superiority over the other, has the opportunity to face their stronger opponent for an indefinite period of time, generating the desired effects.

### **BIOLOGICAL WEAPON (BW)**

There are several surefire ways in the history of mankind to place man under someone else's control: by using violence in various forms, be it physical, mental or emotional; by using information techniques such as lack of information, deliberate misinformation, ignorance, lies or by threatening the physical survival of the individual - disease, hunger, thirst, etc.

As early as the Middle Ages, people realized that diseases could be transmitted from the sick to the healthy, and so with the power of new knowledge they set in motion a new kind of war. The use of biological agents has been a practice in war since ancient times and in many conflicts, they have caused far more casualties than the use of real combat weapons. Fighting conflicts were often accompanied by epidemics in which, as a result of heavy losses of armies and civilians, the outcome of battles or even wars themselves were predetermined.

Biological weapons today are living organisms or replicating entities - viruses that reproduce or multiply within their 'hosts'. Their main purpose is to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over the enemy, either through threats or through actual deployment. These agents can be lethal or non-lethal, can be directed against an individual, a group of people or an entire population, and are acquired, stored or implemented by nation states or non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation state uses it illegally, this can be considered bioterrorism. The use of BW is prohibited under international humanitarian law, as well as under various international treaties, and the use of biological agents in armed conflict is treated as a war crime.

Biological weapons, as well as the threat of their use, are often cited as the cause of military conflicts. The Code of War defines it as the deliberate use of microbes and toxins that, through both living and dead people, animals and plants, can be used as weapons.

The main factors that attract the use of biological weapons are that they are difficult to detect, but they are also cost-effective and easy to use. The cost of their production is estimated at around 0.05% of the cost of conventional weapons when looking at a similar number of mass casualties per km<sup>2</sup>. The use of common technology – as the one used to produce vaccines, foods and antibiotics – is a very real possibility and thus, the production of BW is an extremely easy task.

Another significant advantage of biological weapons is the presence of an incubation period - 3 to 7 days on average, which allows perpetrators to "work" undisturbed as well as to be in every possible part of the world, when the results are manifested, too.

For strategic and tactical purposes, BW began to be actively developed during the 1940s and until the 1970s. It was considered a "more humane" tool than the nuclear, because when used - whether by aerosol or through food, water plants, infected objects or bio kamikaze (deliberately sending sick people to places with many people) - it does not lead to the destruction of cities, factories, equipment, cultural sites, etc.

BO is associated with many dangers and this fact led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (UNCCD) by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975. The UNCCD states undertake the obligation not to develop, manufacture, acquire, store or use biological or other toxic weapons, while the universalization of the Convention is considered a key element in the international community's efforts to tackle the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Almost until the very end of the twentieth century, however, political circles and society massively underestimated the potential use of biological weapons, as they relied on the assumption that, first - science was not yet able to cope with the technological production of sufficient amount of bioagents for bioattack, that their use was unlikely, and last but not least - they believed that no state or organized group would violate moral principles by proceeding to the use of such weapons.

Naturally, all these arguments have proved definitely unfounded. We all remember the anthrax attacks in the United States, which began just a week after the brutal terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11.

Globalization and the development of biological science are the main factors for increasing the possibilities for using BW. Globalization, which as a process contributes also to the smooth movement of the population to almost any point on Earth, contributes to the faster and easier infection with pathogens as well. And given the opportunities for covert use of bioagents, the low cost of producing them, and the relatively easy way to acquire them, bioagents are becoming attractive and accessible for diversionary and terrorist purposes.

The development of biological weapons for the purposes of terrorist organizations turns out to be a much cheaper and easier task than the development of nuclear or chemical weapons, and the long enough, hidden period until the disease manifests itself, allows the perpetrators to deploy their "*weapons*" and leave the attacked area long before the infection itself has unfolded.

The twentieth century is saturated with many attempts to deliberately use bioweapons. The development and the achievements in the field of biotechnology have definitely created a precondition for the creation of new species of organisms that have sufficiently durable and reliable characteristics to be classified as BW, thus significantly increasing the risks of such attacks, be they intentional or unintentional.

### **GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS (GMOs)**

As a result of the globalization processes in the world economy, the power of the state began to give way to the power of corporations, and the beginning of their merger marked the beginning of the corporatocratic state. Large companies taking away parts of the SME market are growing more and more, while transnational companies (TNCs) are committed to maintaining American hegemony around the world.

Corporatocracy created the necessary conditions to launch the production of transgenic products, the so-called genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The actions of genetic engineering corporations seem to be aimed at changing the Earth's food chain, since achieving food control is a quick and safe way to control humans.

The fears of the international expert community that the effects caused by GMOs can be defined as weapons of mass destruction, which make GMOs a potential genetic weapon for terrorist acts, are well-founded.

Transgenic microorganisms are living organisms in which, with the help of artificial techniques, one or more genes of another species have been introduced, a process that could not have occurred naturally. The production of GMOs aims to achieve certain characteristics of a living organism, which by nature it does not possess. Genetic modification can be achieved in three ways: by altering the natural genes, by adding additional copies of the genes of the organism, or by introducing genes of another kind.

Although the creation of GMOs seeks to justify humanitarian reasons that accelerating their production covers the ever-growing needs of food supplies for a growing world population, that food quality is improving or that the sustainability of production is being achieved, it is well known to everyone that these modified organisms are also extremely dangerous to human health. Placed in the hands of certain subjects, these powerful tools can prove to be a dangerous weapon against humanity. They can, invisibly but unequivocally, affect negatively the health and life of all mankind.

The development of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) can also be mentioned as an essential component of hybrid warfare, since among the main problems that are taken into consideration when creating transgenic products is the real threat of the so-called GMO terrorism. Accordingly, in 2004 the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) held a meeting of experts from member countries and other countries on the problems of "genetic terrorism". Concluding that GMOs can be used as biological weapons, it was decided that they should be added to the list of substances and microorganisms which, entering the human body through food or water, can be the cause of dangerous diseases. Experts have concluded that spreading a certain modified organism over areas planted with traditional crops will provoke various epidemics, poisonings and epidemic outbreaks, including diseases that have not existed in the relevant country so far.

#### **FINDINGS:**

The threats of hybrid wars are proving to be a significant challenge for military operational and strategic planning. Their prediction and identification is not an impossible task, but their chaotic and complex nature proves elusive to analysts and strategists who find it difficult to incorporate hybrid threats into traditional threat methods. Of course, the use of appropriate set of tools - strategic, operational and tactical, to identify the desired final state of the initiator of the threat, provides a prerequisite for a good forecast that ensures an advantage in understanding the possibilities and the intent of their implementation.

The danger of using biological weapons is growing significantly. The threat of impending or future use of biological weapons or of already used ones, whether secret or open and public, can be catastrophic. Fear, danger and the threat of their use have a powerful psychological effect on society, which clearly linked itself to the theory of hybrid warfare and appears to be another component of it.

The number of infectious agents, in contrast to the limited number of vaccines, can be used as biological weapons to a much greater extent, and this creates significant problems in the development, testing and implementation of new vaccines that should be administered before the onset of infection in doses that ensure immune protection and at the same time are harmless, stable and safe. Their development, testing and storage is very expensive, there is no real market for them, and they may never be used. And that is not the end of the story; through modern biotechnologies it is possible to change the antigenic characteristics of pathogenic microorganisms at any time, which can make vaccine stocks ineffective through genetic manipulation.

On the other hand, the production and sale of seeds from major crops or ready-to-eat products have the power to influence not only certain groups but also entire regions and countries. It is not difficult to imagine what a tool that is to subdue or destroy them. There is also the problem of market monopolization, which can affect any country under the control and absolute dependence of a single producer. While maintaining the current pace of production and distribution of GMOs in the foreseeable future, what is expected is that they will

displace and completely destroy natural organic products, which will be replaced by their modified counterparts, and the conquest of the food market can also be described as a weapon for mass destruction.

## CONCLUSION

At present mankind is expecting the challenges, resulting from the growing risks and threats of attacks which, in the conditions of global conflicts, cold and hybrid wars, a record economic division between nations and social inequality, are unfolding in an increasingly powerful and unpredictable battle and are getting stronger.

The development of modern microbiology has allowed the creation and use of pathogens. The capabilities of biotechnology to improve the fighting qualities of a certain microbe and increase its striking power (causing mass morbidity and mortality) makes it difficult to diagnose, prevent and cope with it and makes treatment ineffective, too. Improving the fighting qualities achieved by deliberately selecting certain strains or by introducing genetic information into a pathogen, increases virulence, expands the spectrum of susceptible host species and shortens incubation periods. In order to overcome the created immune barriers of the hosts, its immunobiological properties are changed, its resistance in external environment against various drugs and disinfectants is increased and new ways of infection are created outside the usual mechanisms for a given infection.

Despite the development of modern microbiology, as well as the very nature of the biological threat, the world still remains relatively ill-prepared for this kind of impact, something we have all witnessed in the last few months in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Leaving aside the many theories about the origin of the new coronavirus, and regardless of whether it originated naturally or was deliberately created in a biological laboratory, whether it was consciously and purposefully disseminated or "dropped" by mistake or carelessness, the indisputable fact remains that from now on this virus, like other similar others, can be used as a biological weapon in the pursuit of certain high-level targets.

Unlike chemical attacks, in bioterrorism the result is not obvious and does not occur immediately. The effects are much more difficult to identify and are delayed, thus very often the first reported cases are not actually the first to be affected, allowing the disease to take on large proportions long before it is detected in a laboratory. In the long run, the likelihood of bioterrorist attacks being prevented is low. In order to achieve successful protection against major biological attacks and organisms with modified genetic composition, it is necessary to work towards progress in the development of vaccines, drugs, warning systems, training of specialists, as well as in the planning of procedures for immediate and timely response to emerging threats.

A key priority for the existence of any state is, first and foremost, to guarantee its sovereignty, integrity and independence. Hybrid wars, reinforced by threats of biological warfare or "*enriched*" with genetic engineering foods, are a set of elements used to assert a number of advantages that determine the nature of war and provide a wide range of opportunities for competing forces to face their opponent.

In counteracting all aspects of hybrid threats, it is necessary to build a strategic security framework that defines national interests and the policies for their implementation in a changing security environment. In this regard, it is necessary to conduct specialized training of professionals, to provide them with reliable information, which will allow a timely counteraction against bioterrorist attacks. Disease surveillance systems that have the potential to be used as biological weapons and be able to quickly identify the source of infection, proof and differentiation should be improved. The safety of laboratories storing or handling hazardous microorganisms and toxins in order to prevent them from falling in the hands of terrorist organizations should be ensured. It should be noted that the capabilities for countering biological weapons and bioterrorism are limited, and failures in disease prevention can have catastrophic consequences for the humans, the flora and the fauna. Close cooperation and collaboration should be ensured between institutions and states to strengthen the surveillance of the identification and announcement of each case, as well as to implement measures to limit and eradicate the disease. Last but not least, the fact that scientific developments can be used with various motives by ill-intentioned subjects should not be overlooked.

All of this has led to the conclusion that at the current stage of social development and in pursuit of certain political and economic goals, the threat of biological warfare, as well as the creation of laboratory-modified food, which can also be used as a weapon, are a powerful tool not only to exert a psychological impact on the population, but also for putting it under control.

These characteristics are essential components of hybrid warfare, requiring more in-depth study, although the topic of biological weapons should never be off the agenda.

**Abbreviations:**

- **BW** –biological weapon
- **GMOs** –genetically modified organisms
- **UNCCD** –The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction
- **WMD** –weapons of mass destruction
- **UN** –United Nations
- **TNCs** - transnational companies



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# Battle on the Ballot: Trends of Electoral Violence and Human Security in Nigeria, 1964-2019

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## Abstract

Over time, the politics of anxiety has increased the tension of winning elections in Nigeria. This anxiety propels candidates or party members to resort to unethical practices such as violence in a bid to win elections because politics in Nigeria has become a zero-sum game. Candidates and political parties prepare for election with the mindset of winning by all cost, including engaging in pre-electoral, Election Day and post-election violence. Hence, the act of violence has been entrenched in Nigeria's political space, such that every election cycle both governments, non-governmental organizations and international community engage in programmes that promotes peaceful election. The study is aimed at examining electoral violence from Nigeria's First Republic to date and its human security implications on democratic advancement in Nigeria. The paper adopted the culture of violence theory as its theoretical construct. The content analysis was used in the interpretation of secondary data. The paper recommends amongst others to strengthen the electoral management board and enforce relevant laws on perpetrators of electoral violence.

**Keywords:** Candidates, Cultural Violence, Electoral Cycle, Electoral Violence, Human Security, Political Parties, Thugs

## Introduction

Globally, most politicians, particularly in developing democratic societies often manufacture violent tactics for electoral gains. Electoral violence has a global footprint and impact, as such deserves necessary strategies to develop an understanding of how and when such violence occurs (or can be prevented) in a variety of circumstances (Stremlau and Price, 2009, p. 5). Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund (2020, pp. 4 & 4) argued that:

Electoral violence can result in casualty tolls that meet the threshold of civil war within days or weeks; when this occurs, it can undo years of peacebuilding and development work, it can undermine democratic institutions, and it can even trigger a civil war. Post-election violence after the 2010 polls in Côte d'Ivoire led to more than 1,000 civilian deaths, one million internally displaced people, and 100,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. Recent elections

in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe were similarly accompanied by high levels of conflict.

One of the consequences of electoral violence in electoral apathy and low participation (Shenga and Pereira, 2019, p. 3), which harms the choice of democratic leadership, thereby eliminating accountability to the governed. Omotola (2008) buttressed that electoral violence is counterproductive, irrespective of the motives, targets, actors, and forms. Whether it is the short or long run, violence poses a huge threat to the democratic foundation of competition, participation, and legitimacy. Hence, the United Nations system, supranational organization, regional, sub-regional, and non-governmental organizations through international observation ensures that international best practices in the conduct of the free and fair election were strictly adhered to. Election-related violence is devastating such as deaths and suffering, destroys communities and cripples local economies and development prospects as have been recorded at the end of every election cycle, which threatens human security. It also harms credibility and faith in democratic processes and institutions. Birch et al (2020, p.4) buttressed that “violence, even at levels below that witnessed in the most egregious cases, undermines the democratic character of elections by substituting free choice with coercion and by deterring participation.” The notion of violence-free elections is encapsulated in the term ‘free and fair’ elections, serving as a benchmark for determining the legitimacy of elections (Höglund and Jarstad, 2010, p.1).

Electoral violence in Nigeria has received international attention due to the devastating effects that are associated with the phenomenon. The pre and post-election violence have become an increasingly observable phenomenon. The existence and destructive forces of elections pose a huge threat to political transitions, some aspects of nation-building, and notions of democratization itself. Nigeria was left with deep scars by the violence that erupted in the aftermath of the Presidential election on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2011. Historically, the first general election that was conducted by Nigeria by Nigerians in 1964 was orchestrated with electoral violence, civil disturbances, abuse of human right, among others, that threatened the internal security of Nigeria, especially in the former Western Region which led to the collapse of the First Republic on January 15<sup>th</sup>, 1965. The electoral violence in the Second Republic 1983 general election adversely impacted on democratic advancement, particularly the Oyo and Ondo states electoral violence recorded over 40 deaths and destructions of properties worth millions of dollars (Egwu, 2007).

After 16 years of military rule, Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999. Since then, the Nigerian State has been engulfed in violence not limited to the election, but ethno-religious, insurgence, militancy, among others (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012, p. 1). In the 2003 election, Nigerians witnessed an unprecedented level of electoral violence and electoral fraud, ballot stuffing, intimidation, killing, assassination, among others. It was a triumph of violence. There were no elections, but merely the intimidation of voters and the selection of already decided the winners by elites and caucuses. Human Rights Watch reported that in April and May 2003, at least one hundred people were killed and many more injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria and most of the violence was perpetrated by the ruling PDP and its supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 1).

In the 2011 general elections, the security challenges re-surfaced in three different stages: the pre-election, election, and post-election violence. Following the figure released by the Inspector General of Police Hafiz Ringim was shocking. According to Ringim, 520 persons were murdered in post-election violence in only Kaduna and the Niger States alone. Kaduna State recorded 518 deaths, including six policemen and two persons were killed in Niger State. Ringim also disclosed that 77 persons were injured in Kaduna State. Over 22 000 persons were displaced by the crisis in the Kaduna State. Ringim revealed that about 1435 houses, 157 churches, 46 mosques, 437 vehicles, 219 motorcycles, among others were set on fire (The Punch, 2 June 2011, p. 6). The devastating nature of 2011 electoral violence led to President Jonathan set up a panel headed by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu in 2011 to take a critical review of the level of violence and make recommendations. President Jonathan in his broadcast recalled that:

If anything at all, these acts of mayhem are sad reminders of the events which plunged our country into thirty months of an Indeed, the nation still bears some of the scars of other similar

events like the aftermath of the June 12th 1993 elections that brought our polity to the brink  
(The Vanguard 21 April 2011, p. 1)

The consciousness of the electoral violence in 2011 influenced the relative calmness in Nigeria. Though, the formation of All Progressives Congress as the nation's main opposition in the country led to several pre-election violence targeted at individuals in 2015. There were few states where electoral violence in 2015. The National Human Rights Commission revealed that over 58 people were killed in election related violence ahead of the 2015 general election. About 61 incidences of election violence happened in 22 states with 58 people killed. For instance, in Rivers State, the pre-election violence and post-election were unimaginable. Over 10 buildings were damaged, 21 properties destroyed, and about 97 allegations of killings (Ezeamalu, 2015). Several bye-elections emanating from the tribunal's cancellation of elections also recorded various pockets of violence in some parts of Rivers State from 2015-2017. 2019 was relatively different from the 2015 general election. Though, the Human Rights Watch disclosed that the 2019 general election was marred by widespread violence that led to the death of 629 people in the country (Nwezeh and Ifijeh, 2019).

The antecedent has shown that the political elites have not fully come to terms with the referents of elections for democratic sustenance and national security. The political elites have refused to play by the rules of the game which demands politics of tolerance, conflict and consensus, bargaining, and compromise. Elections are seen as warfare, characterized by gangsters and political disorder in Nigeria. They prepare for elections as if they are going to war. After the 2003 election, President Olusegun Obasanjo was quoted as expressing worries of the;

... Total absence of any controls on spending by candidates and parties towards elections. I have said that we prepare for the elections as if we are going to war, and I can state without hesitation, drawing from my previous life, that the parties and candidates together spent during the last elections, more than would have been needed to fight a successful war (Smah, 2008, p. 74).

In Nigeria, electoral violence has become a recurring decimal since the first general elections conducted in 1964 by first Nigeria's indigenous Electoral Board – Federal Electoral Commission headed by the first Chairman Chief Eyo Esua (1964-1966) to date. Nevertheless, the paper is aimed at interrogating the causes of electoral violence and its impact on human security in Nigeria. The paper is imperative because there have been repeated outbreaks of electoral violence since the 1964 general election, and yet no serious steps have been taken to address the root causes of this electoral violence. The Nigerian authorities have failed to break the cycle of killings during the electioneering period by holding accountable those responsible.

### **Review of related literature**

In the past decades, there has been a surge in the literature the cause and effects of electoral violence. Ample of it agree to a strategic interpretation of the violence, others argued that it might be minor; however, the endpoint is deliberately geared toward influencing the electoral process (Burchard, 2015; Staniland, 2014). In the process of unraveling the disparity in election violence, the extant literature has pointed to changes that upsurge the incentives of political contenders to engage in violent tactics as a means of achieving a political goal. Some factors that enhance the competitiveness of the contest and raise the potential settlement from swinging the votes to their side include the nearness of the vote (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015); if the incumbent is seeking re-election (Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus, 2017); even if the country appears to has been run properly in power (Ruiz-Rufino & Birch, 2020); and if electoral regulation encourages a winner-takes-all system (Fjelde & Hoglund, 2016). The fact remains that scholars over time, have highlighted changes in the limitations on political actors to engage in violence, which has limited the institution on the decision making powers of the relevant authorities (Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014). Hence, Fjelde (2020) argued that in understanding electoral violence, political parties are important actors. This is based on the fact that they tie elites to voters, which presents ladder to political power. Despite their crucial role in electoral competition, political parties are yet to be considered crucial in the booming literature of electoral violence. Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart (2010) argued that inter-party clashes happen in the most electoral cycle, it is common in the post-

party primaries and during the post-election period, particularly when party supporters feel that the election was rigged against their candidates. The constituency affected usually experience election apathy and there are several cases of missing electoral materials or closed polling booths, or sometimes voters are intimidated into submission. Wahman and Goldring (2020) argued that pre-election violence is used to shrink the democratic space, thereby preventing effective campaign by opposition parties inside the party stronghold. Second, electoral violence is used in breaking the politics of territoriality and consolidate a party's presence within an area dominated by the opposition party. Agbu, Mohammed, and Garba (2019) argued that a political party's campaign in Nigeria is not based on ideology and issues; hence, they employ all form illegitimate means to win elections. The political parties strive to hate speeches to confuse the electorates, thereby diverting their attention and cause dissatisfaction among party supporters. Nigerian elections are characterized by an organized crime such as violence, harassment, killings, intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes, among others. Several factors such as government prejudice, political thugs, regional militia, ethnoreligious, party leaderships, and support groups encourage the electoral disparity in Nigeria. Young (2020) argued that election-related violence is a function of state repression which has been understudied. Over time, it has been empirically acknowledged that governments are common perpetrators of pre, during, and post-election violence, particularly when they anticipate the unfavourable result. This is carried out in various forms such as the incumbent and the ruling party agents use or threaten violence against the political opponents or potential voters during electioneering campaigns, during or after elections. The state-sponsored violence is viewed as the type of state repressive approach geared towards influence the outcome, achieving electoral gains, or election in favour of the incumbent. This is because "politicians want to stay in power" (Collier, 2010, p. 25). Nevertheless, these types of electoral violence have a negative consequence on the quality of democracy. Concerning elections in war turn countries, Smidt (2020) opined that credible elections are better approaches in stepping to democratic governance. Despite, the post-war challenges, the elections increase political competition and provide grounds for politicians to mobilize voters through the use of disinformation campaigns. Sadly, such disinformation campaigns are used as a platform to spread false information, hate speech, and rumours, which may cause panic and legitimize violence, and increase the preexisting tensions into violent protests and riots. These coercive actions are usually directed towards members of other distinct groups.

### **Theoretical framework**

The paper adopted the culture of violence theory as its theoretical construct. The culture of violence theory is an offshoot of cultural violence developed by Johan Galtung. Galtung defined culture as those aspects of humans that symbolizes sphere of our existence (Galtung, 1996, p. 176). Galtung identified religion, ideology, language, art, among others, as an aspect of culture that is used to legitimize or justify violence. Galtung further noted that "culture could be imagined and even encountered with not only one, but a set of aspects so violent, extensive, and diverse, spanning all cultural domains" (Galtung, 1996, p. 176). In this situation, cultural violence may metamorphose to violent cultures which may be warranted. The perpetrators of violence make it look legitimate so that after a long time it is acceptable in the community. Galtung argued that cultural violence makes the direct and structural look, even feel, right... or at least not wrong. Just as political science is about two problems-the use of power and the legitimization of the use of power" (Galtung, 1996, p. 176). Galtung buttressed that:

Cultural violence highlights how the act of direct violence and the fact that structural violence is legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral colour of an act from red/wrong with green/right or at least two yellow/acceptable; an example being murdered on behalf of the country is right, on behalf of oneself wrong (Galtung, 1996, p. 176&177)

The cultural violence over the period has resulted in a culture of violence in Nigeria's political space. The fact remains that the culture of violence has invariably become a political culture since 1964 when the first electoral violence took place in the former Western Region, Nigeria. Political culture is a pattern of attitudes and practices held by people, which over the period have shaped their political behaviour. Every election cycle has experience intensified election violence. At present, political parties and candidates include violence act in their strategic plan toward achieving an electoral victory.

## Research Methodology

The paper adopted a qualitative method of data gathering technique. The paper made use of newspaper publications, journals and books on electoral violence in Nigeria and the world at large. The paper adopted a content analysis in analysing the data collected from the internet and library. These include the trends of pre, during and post-electoral violence in Nigeria from 1964 -2019 with a view of ascertaining its impact on human security. It is imperative to acknowledge that this survey is far from comprehensive of all cases of electoral violence, however, as many cases as possible as reported by the media of electoral violence in Nigeria both printed and electronic.

## Electoral violence and Human Security in Nigeria.

In Nigeria, electoral violence is the type of violence that is associated with elections, such as before, during and after the election. Electoral violence is a common phenomenon among fragile democracy occasioned their inability or failure to meet the expectation of the electorates. Politics in Nigeria is a zone sum game, hence, parties and candidates adopt unethical means of gaining victory in the election which include the use of violence. The threat of violence might be during the electioneering campaign, Election Day and after the result has been declared. However, the human security impact of electoral violence is immeasurable, particularly when it extends to non-electorates such as children who may suffer from physically, psychologically and structural violence. Human security is people-centred security. A kind of security that is associated with human freedom. It is the state protects its citizens from an internal threat. The concept of Human Security became known in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The purpose of the human security concept is to broaden security along several dimensions. The logic is to expand “beyond territorial defence, national interests and nuclear deterrence to include ‘universal concerns’ and the prevention of conflicts, but also crucially a cooperative global effort to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment” (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). Hence, security was “shifted from nation-states to that of ‘people’, and to be ‘people-centred’ was to be ‘concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or peace” (UNDP, 1994. p. 23). Hence, security includes various kinds of threat from different sectors emanating from economic insecurity, food insecurity, the environment insecurity, health insecurity, personal insecurity, community insecurity, political insecurity (electoral violence). Based on the General Assembly of the United Nations resolution 66/290, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2012, paragraph 3 agreed on “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, particularly vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential...” (United Nations, 2016, p. 6). The cycle of electoral violence in Nigeria since 1964 has created fears in citizens, their communities, neighbourhood, societies and the country at large. The risk kept increasing in every election cycle leads to political apathy. The citizens hardly enjoy safety during general election periods. There are various kinds of electoral related threats on electorates identified in this study. They include:

1. Physical assault on individuals during the electioneering campaign,
2. The assassination of political opponents or people perceived as a threat to one’s political ambition,
3. Burning down of public or opponents’ property and cars among others,
4. Shooting, shoot outs by mercenaries or political thugs,
5. The killing of individuals, electorates and party members,
6. Partisan harassment by security agents, arrests, forceful dispersal of rallies, or shooting, wounding or killing of people,
7. Kidnapping and hostage-taking,
8. The bombing of infrastructure,
9. Forceful disruption of political and campaign rallies by thugs,
10. Destruction of ballot boxes and ballot papers from polling agents,
11. Threats against and harassment by security agents of opponents of the ruling regime or party, which create political apathy,
12. Shoot-on-sight orders that breed fear in voters,

13. The terror inflicted by political assassinations, which makes people scared to participate in politics or elections,
14. Publication or broadcast of abusive, insulting, or intimidating material or advertorial
15. Threats to life through phone calls, text messages, among others,
16. Coercion of citizens by the government to register or vote or be denied certain national facilities,
17. Deliberate changes in dates, venue or times of events to the advantages of others,
18. Absence of free campaign,
19. Announcement of false or fraudulent results,
20. Lengthy delays in announcing election results,
21. Delay in voting,
22. Partisan behaviour of police and other security agents, and
23. Discriminatory acts and policies.

## **Trends of electoral violence in Nigeria**

### **The First Republic-1964/65**

Electoral violence can be traced as far back as 1962 following the Awolowo-Akintola clash popularly known as the Action Group Crisis, the NPC-dominated federal government had declared a state of emergency in Western Nigeria, sacked the AG-controlled regional government (under the premiership of Chief S.L. Akintola) there and appointed the Prime Minister's physician, Dr Majekodunmi, as the Region's Sole Administrator. The state of emergency ended on 31 December 1962. The people of Western Nigeria had expected that a fresh election would be held at the end of the emergency, but the federal government merely reinstated Chief Akintola as the premier because the political atmosphere in that Region was not conducive for holding fresh elections (Ojo, 2012, p. 11). Thus, up till 1965, Chief Akintola never properly faced the electorate. He was appointed as premier of the Western Region by the AG leadership in 1959 to succeed Chief Awolowo following the latter's resignation to contest for the position of prime minister. Another regional election was, however, due on 11 October 1965. Generally, African politics are conceived in 'zero-sum' terms, that is, the notion that the winner takes all. This often makes the ruling party mobilize every available state apparatus to entrench itself in power to the detriment of the opposition (Ojo, 2012, p. 11).

The electoral battle between the alliances produced a political stalemate which, for the first time since the 1914 amalgamation, left the country without a legally constituted central government for about two days. The outcome of the election was a breakdown of law and order, killing and burning of properties of political opponents, among others. The resultant violence claimed the lives of several hundreds of people on both sides of the conflict. There was a widespread drenching of houses and people with petrol before setting them alight. Among the casualties of the violence was the governor of Western Nigeria, Chief Odeleye Fadahunsi, whose house was burnt in the Mushin area of Lagos on 3 November 1965 (Tribune, 16 November 1965). The Tribune-press building was burnt on 7 November (Tribune, 8<sup>th</sup> November 1965). The 1965 election represented the ultimate debasement of the democratic process through chicanery and thuggery.

The exact number of the victims and the value of properties lost in the 1965 post-election crisis in Western Nigeria may never be known. According to a Federal Government estimate, the violence had claimed the lives of over 160 persons by 13<sup>th</sup> January 1966 – these were 64 civilians killed by the police, 91 killed by other civilians, and seven policemen among others (Daily Express, 14<sup>th</sup> January 1966). The UPGA, however, estimated that casualties of the 1965 crisis ran into hundreds. Whatever might have been the number of the dead and the maimed before, during and after the 1965 election, one incontrovertible conclusion is that the crisis robbed Western Nigeria of the contributions many of the people who were killed or permanently disabled would have made to the educational, social, economic and political advancement of that region (Ojo, 2012,p.11).

### **The Second Republic-1983**

During the Second Republic, the election rigging was even worse than the abrupt first republic. There was unimaginable rigging during voting, vote-counting, and announcement of results (Olaoye, 2007). The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was the electoral umpire that midwife the Second Republic general election. In 1983 general elections, the umpire was accused of rigging the election in favour of the ruling party National Party of Nigeria (NPN) (Onafagoro, 1981; Kurfi, 1983, pp. 222-223). In a spontaneous reaction to the official results released by FEDECO, mayhem was unleashed on the two Southwest states of Oyo and Ondo. The violence was organized in protest against perceived manipulation of the governorship polls in the two states, widely acclaimed as electoral strongholds of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), in favour of the candidates of NPN, which controlled the centre. There was a loss of lives and properties worth millions of Naira including the headquarters of FEDECO in Oyo and Ondo states were affected (Egwu, 2007). Abe (2008, p. 170) disclosed that the 1983 election was bedeviled intensified violence by the states sponsored thugs, arsonists, and unrestrained assassins that unleashed terror and fear on opponents and voters. The violence continued until the military toppled the Second Republic on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1983.

### **The Aborted Third Republic 1993**

There were many elections with cases of election rigging that took place under the Babangida regime, following the annulment of the results of the June 12, 1993, presidential election. Olaoye (2007) noted that the “1993 election was believed and adjudged by the 3000 accredited local and international observers to be fair and the best in Nigeria’s political history.” On June 14, 1993, the election results were announced in many states. The results showed that the Social Democratic Party (SDP) under the flag bearer of Chief M. K. O. Abiola had won 14 states as announced by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) chairman, Prof. Humphrey Nwosu. Oshun (1999) disclosed that “the thirty (30) states had already indicated a victory for the SDP.” Despite the fairest nature of the 1993 election as acknowledged by electoral observers and Nigerians, the presidential election was annulled on June 23, 1993, by General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida. Obadare (1999, p. 10) disclosed that:

In his 23 June 1993 broadcast, General Babangida had alleged that the two parties subverted the electoral process by bribing voters and that there was an expected conflict of interest between the personal businesses of the presidential candidates (Moshood Abiola for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa for the National Republican Convention(NRC).

One point which deserves to be underscored relating to how political violence in the aftermath of the annulment fed on the realities of social life, especially in Lagos and perhaps other urban centres in the country. Urban centres in Nigeria usually contain a mix of the rich and the poor, with the latter always in a clear majority (Adisa, 1995). The June 12 crisis was mostly in Lagos and other parts of the country where bombs were detonated by the military juntas to install fears. There were few political assassinations such as Chief Alfred Rewane, Kudirat Abiola, among others. Babangida did not only annul the results of the 1993 presidential election, but the presumed winner Chief M. K. O. Abiola was also imprisoned and subsequently died behind bars.

### **The Fourth Republic 1999- 2019**

Historically, in Nigeria, a transition from military to democracy has been rough showing occasional relapse to authoritarianism. The quality of an election conducted by the military is one of the mechanisms for gauging the extent of democratic consolidation, and over the years has shown evidence of progressive decline over the polls conducted. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic has survived six general elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019) with almost all associated of electoral violence without military interruption, except in 1999, however, it is profound evidence of sustainable democratic governance in Nigeria. All of these elections were marked by controversies, just as their processes and end products encountered credibility and legitimacy crises (Yagboyaju, 2011, p. 93). The Fourth Republic has been engulfed by electoral violence with over 4,000 killed since the emergence of the Fourth Republic (Nwezeh and Ifijeh, 2019). However, it is imperative to note that in Nigeria that, when the military is transiting to civil rule; the elections are guarded to deliver the candidates they prefer, there was always minimal violence in regards to the election.



### **The Electoral violence-2003**

In the 2003 general election, there was more blatant and widespread electoral violence that was unimaginable. There were political assassinations, intra-party violence, and community unrest, particularly in the Niger Delta region. The 2003 election cycle marked the unchecked proliferation of another worrisome development, such as the hiring and arming of militias to serve narrow political ends in the Niger Delta region. Politicians and party bosses found a ready supply of unemployed youths, willing to perpetrate violence in exchange for pay and firepower. As a result, these young men comprised a significant percentage of the lives lost leading up to the 2003 polls (Onwudiwe and Berwind-Dart, 2010, p. 3).

Human Right Watch (2003) reported that between April and May 2003, over one hundred people were killed and many more injured during federal and state elections in Nigeria. It was widely believed that the majority of abuses were carried out by the ruling Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP) members and supporters. There were apathy and elections did not hold in many polling centres occasioned by candidates intimidation and threatened voters in a bid to falsify results. However, the 2003 general election was significant for Nigeria as the country's first sustained transition from one civilian government to another.

Based on Human Rights Watch (2003) briefing paper titled "Nigeria at the crossroads: human rights concerns in the pre-election period," disclosed that many politicians took the advantage of increasing poverty and unemployment to recruit young men to leash mayhem on their opponents. For example, in Kwara state, there was a conflict between the supporters of the governor and other political stalwart leading to the killing of state party chairman in August 2002 and the bombing of a newspaper office in November 2002 respectively. Some of the crisis that culminated in electoral violence was the fallout of PDP primaries. There electioneering period recorded politically-motivated killings in the southeast and the southwest. In central and northern states, some politicians relied on religious/ethnic sentiments to mobilize support for their candidature, stirring up sentiments that sparked communal violence in some areas.

Another post-election report of Human Rights Watch (2003) titled: "Testing democracy: political violence in Nigeria" described the degree of violence that was carried out during the election. This report was collected based on daily activities that took place in this period. The incidence includes: Early March – Sokoto: PDP/ANPP clash between armed supporters; March 2<sup>th</sup> – Enugu: ANPP gubernatorial candidate petitions police regarding telephone calls threatening assassination if he does not give up his bid; March 3<sup>rd</sup> – Ebonyi: State chairman for the ANPP reports shooting attack on him while in a vehicle; March 4<sup>th</sup> – Rivers: Explosion damages medical clinic owned by the secretary to the state government; March 4<sup>th</sup> – Edo: At least one person killed in PDP/ANPP clash after PDP state governor's campaign convoy is attacked; bus and several houses burnt; March 4<sup>th</sup> – Ekiti: State ANPP leader dies of injuries from an acid attack in late December 11<sup>th</sup>; March 5<sup>th</sup> – Abuja: Marshall Harry, ANPP Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone, shot dead in his Abuja residence; March 6<sup>th</sup> – Cross Rivers: Several supporters injured and four cars vandalized in an attack on ANPP senatorial candidate's convoy; March 7<sup>th</sup> – Abuja: Protest against Plateau State governor comes under attack by state government thugs, leading to several injuries and destruction of vehicles; March 10-11<sup>th</sup> – Kebbi: PDP/ANPP clash in which two reported seriously injured, eleven homes burned, fifty-three people arrested; March 11-12<sup>th</sup> – Lagos: Seven people feared dead in PDP/Alliance for Democracy (AD) clash; March 13<sup>th</sup> and subsequent two weeks – Delta: Scores of people reported killed in Okerenkoko and other villages around Warri following clashes between Ijaws and Itsekiris in a dispute over additional electoral wards in Warri, and clashes between Ijaws and the military; March 13<sup>th</sup> – Imo: State officials announce armed attacks on residences of deputy governor and secretary to state government; March 14<sup>th</sup> – Ondo: Convoy of Gani Fawehinmi, presidential candidate for National Conscience Party (NCP), seriously injuring his driver; March 15<sup>th</sup> – Oyo: At least seven injured after attack on AD supporters at governor's campaign rally; March 15-16<sup>th</sup> – Kebbi: At least 200 homes burned during PDP/ANPP clash (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.3 & 4); and both Alhaji Ahman Patégi and Dele Arojo who were the People Democratic Party Chairman and governorship hopeful in Kwara and Ogun states respectively were murdered.

The report disclosed that in some cases, political violence has been carried out in locations where violent conflict was already a problem. In July 2002, two people in Taraba were killed and twenty were wounded in inter-factional disputes at the PDP primaries. In Benue, at least seven persons died in a conflict between the PDP and the ANPP on February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2003, in Jato-Aka, the home town of the ANPP's gubernatorial candidate Paul Unongo. The crisis was triggered by the killing of a guard at a hotel owned by Paul Unongo (Human Rights Watch, 2003,p.4).

### **The Electoral Violence 2007**

Alemika and Omotosho (2008) noted that the events preceding the 2007 elections generated controversies, conflicts, litigations and cynicism about the fate of the electoral process and the country's democratic transition such as the attempt by President Obasanjo to secure a third term in office; Intra-party competition for nomination (especially within the ruling People's Democratic Party, PDP) led to violence and assassination of opponents; among others.

The build-up to Nigeria's 2007 general election was characterized by pre-election violence, such as political assassinations, killings and armed clashes between rival political factions. The party primaries among the candidates were selected which led to an increase in violence. Based on Human Right Watch in Lagos, over 70 incidents of election-related violence between November 2006 and the middle of March 2007 across 20 of Nigeria's 36 states. These incidents carried a combined reported death toll of at least 70 people; with many more injured (Human Right Watch, 2007). Ahead of the 2007 general election, thus between the end of 2006 and mid-March 2007, recorded serials of violence, especially from rival factions of various political parties pitted against one another; and the vast majority of these cases involved violence within the ruling PDP. Much of that violence was related to the controversy surrounding a broad range of alleged irregularities in the selection process (Human Right Watch, 2007).

The Human Right Watch (2007) report revealed that between November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2006, and March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2007, over four assassinations and seven attempted assassinations of Nigerian politicians, party officials and other individuals who were directly linked to various electoral campaigns were recorded. And seven of those ten incidents were connected to the PDP primaries or other intra-PDP rivalries. The two most notorious murders related to the PDP primaries occurred in July and August 2006, where the murder of two PDP gubernatorial aspirants Funsho Williams of Lagos State and Ayo Daramola of Ekiti State respectively. Arrests were made in the case of Daramola's murder, although the architects of his assassination have not been formally identified or prosecuted (*BBC News Online*, October 18<sup>th</sup>, 2006).

In Bayelsa and Delta States respectively, over seven attacks on campaign offices, party secretariats and homes of candidates. Most of the incidents were related to factional or electoral disputes within the ruling PDP. The majority occurred during a brief rash of such attacks in Delta and Bayelsa states in late 2006 (Ogwuda, 2006). In Asaba, the capital of Delta State, the homes of the two candidates were bombed and the PDP secretariat, set ablaze in three separate incidents (Folaranmi, 2006).

The climax of the violence was the clashes and armed supporters of rival political factions, the period recorded over 17 factional clashes in ten different states between supporters or thugs armed by opposing political factions. The majority of these arose out of controversies surrounding the PDP primaries Oyo, Bayelsa, Edo, Akwa/Ibom, Lagos, Rivers, Niger, Delta, Borno, Ondo, Bauchi and Ogun states. The Oyo State was known for the clash between faction loyal to Governor Rashidi Ladoja and his estrange political "godfather" Lamidi Adedibu have led to violence on multiple occasions (Human Rights Watch interviews, Ibadan, February 7th, 2007).

Both sides have drawn their armed support from Oyo State's notoriously violent chapter of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Human Rights Watch (2007) revealed that several union members who had been shot and wounded during fighting between the Union's rival factions during the first week of February 2007. At least four people were killed (Oyedele, 2007).

## The Electoral violence 2011

The 2011 electoral violence was different from the others. The electoral violence took ethno-religious coloration. Several events were surrounding 2011 electoral violence ranging from the demise of President Umar Yar'Adua and President Goodluck Jonathan assumption of office as the incumbent president, the submission of Justice Uwais electoral reform committee report, zoning formula of the PDP and their party primaries, to President Jonathan declaration as to the winner of the presidential election. It was estimated that the 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria left over 800 people dead. The protest after the declaration of President Goodluck Jonathan as the winner degenerated into a violent riot and sectarian massacre in the northern states Kano, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Sokoto, Niger, Yobe, and Zamfara and Akwa Ibom in South-South Zone of Nigeria.

In the North East – the presidential rally by the ANPP candidate was disrupted by gunshots fired close to a petrol station led to a stampede that the lives of four persons (Daily Sun 30 March 2011, pp. 1 & 6). In the capital of Borno State, the ANPP gubernatorial candidate Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio was murdered in the broad daylight in Maiduguri on the January 28<sup>th</sup>, 2011 by gunmen on a motorcycle. Governor Ali Modu Sheriff's brother, Alhaji Goni Modu Sheriff, was murdered. He was the former chairman of the Ngala Local Government Area. He was killed along with four people, including a 10-year-old boy (The Nation 31 Jan 2011, p. 1). The eve of the presidential election in Maiduguri, two people were killed; five civilians and two soldiers' sustained injuries emanating from suspected Boko Haram terrorist at Gwange suburb (Sunday Tribune 17 April 2011, p. 5). Maiduguri the capital of Borno State was described as a battlefield. There was an explosion of bombs are two different election venues killing two people and leaving over ten persons injured. A bomb exploded during the accreditation of voters, which left ten persons injured, while another bomb occurred at the Abaganaram Collation Centre and killed one Ahmed Maira Abihud, a student of the University of Maiduguri. Four persons were injured, while another ad-hoc staff of the INEC Abihud died instantly (Sunday Tribune 17 April 2011, p. 5). In Bauchi state, there was a violent clash between the PDP and CAN that left two-person dead. Twenty houses and five cars were destroyed in Katanga Warji, headquarters of Warji Local Government Area in the North East, where the clash took place (Nigerian Compass 30 March 2011, p. 1). Six members of the NYSC were killed in the post-electoral violence in Bauchi State after the declaration of Dr Goodluck Jonathan as the winners. Eighteen people and two policemen were killed by the rioters who alleged rigging of the poll (Nigeria Compass 20 April 2011, p. 1). Migan Local Government Area, part of INEC building was burnt down and injured two voters by the irate youths (Sunday Punch 17 April 2011). Most villages in Tafawa Belewa and Bogno local government areas in Bauchi State were invaded. Over 50 Christians were killed and about 100 buildings were set ablaze by the attackers. The villages attacked include Imbira, Mingil, Goshkarbo, Namu, Gongo Fada, SabonLaji, Yola-Bogoro and Goshe. The youths were targeting their voter's cards were (Nigeria Tribune 9 April 2011, p. 4). In Adamawa, properties worth millions of Naira was destroyed by irate youth. However, the former Governor Murtala Nyako imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. Several youths were arrested (Vanguard, 20 April 2011 pp. 1 & 5). In all, it was estimated that at least 92 at last count had been in the North-East zone concerning 2011 electoral violence.

In the North West Zone - the North-West zone experienced intensified post-electoral violence. The zone did not witness relative low violence in the pre-election era and on Election Day. However, after the declaration of Dr Goodluck Jonathan as the winner, there was simultaneous violence all over the North West zone that led to the destruction of lives and properties. Over 20 churches and houses assumed to belong to members of Peoples Democratic Party were destroyed (National Mirror 19 April 2011, pp. 1-3; 53). In Katsina State, the home state of the General Buhari, irate youths burnt down worship centres, business shops, and private houses in six local government areas and other villages in protest against the declaration of Dr Jonathan. All the houses identified with PDP posters were torched and the party secretariat in the area was destroyed (National Mirror 19 April 2011, pp. 1-3). In Kano State, the stronghold of General Buhari, the irate Muslim youths were uncontrollable as they attacked Christians and non-natives, and other notable politicians such as the two former Speakers of House of Assembly, Salisu Buhari and Ghali Na'Abba. The multimillion Naira factory on Hadejia Road belonging to Salisu Bohr was also vandalized (National Mirror 19 April 2001). No specific number of deaths in Kano State post-election violence. In Kaduna State, more than 65,000 people were displaced and properties worth millions

of naira were destroyed. The Vice-President's house, Namadi Sambo was burnt down by the angry protesters. The irate youths forcefully opened Zaria Central Prison and freed all inmates. The INEC offices in Malabalindo, Trikania, Sabin Tasha, Ungwan Sarkin Naragi, and Kawo were set ablaze. The Christian dominated communities in the southern Kaduna State, including Matsirga, Zonkwa, and Kafanchan left more than 500 dead, burning down their mosque and properties. Hence, the Kaduna State Government imposed a 24-hour curfew on the metropolis and its environs (Human Right Watch, 2011).

In the North Central Zone- The zone witnessed electoral violence. In Plateau State, two people and one was injured in the capital of Plateau State during the registration of voters at Tina Junction in Jos (Daily Sun 18 January 2011, p. 7). In Niger State, two bomb explosions on Thursday 18 January at a PDP rally in Suleja killing at least thirteen persons and injured over twenty persons. Some of the injured security personnel include members of the Federal Road Safety Corps and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence (The Punch March 2011, p. 1). At Sabon Gari, an area dominated by the Igbos, a female officer of the Civil Defence Corp's hand was severed and three cars were burnt. Five churches in Angwan, Maitunbi, Kaje, Shango, and other areas of the town were burnt down. Curfew was declared in five major towns of Minna, Kontagora, Suleja, Bida, and New Bussa to contain the spread of the violence. In Benue State, a gunman shot and killed Emmanuel Ajibo, who was an aide to the ACN senatorial candidate for Benue State. A campaign train was attacked by armed thugs at near Igumale community, the Ado LGA headquarters in Benue State (The Nation 19 March 2011).

South-East Zone - The south-east was relatively calm except in Ebonyi State where six persons were killed in Amuda Ezza North Local Government Area and others sustained various degrees of injuries (National Life 26 April 2011). Three persons were allegedly shot over who takes charge of the Direct Data Capture machines at registration centre at Ndiike Amugu Ikino community in Ebonyi State (Daily Sun 20 January 2011, p. 6).

South-South Zone - the electoral violence took place at Akwa Ibom State where the post-election violence claimed over 50 lives. Members of ACN invaded the PDP secretariat and burnt 800 brand new Peugeot and 500 tricycles packed in the premises. In the Goodluck campaign office, the properties include 200 brand new Peugeot, 307 cars; 500 brand new tricycles; Goodluck/Sambo Campaign office was burnt down, the Fortune International High School owned by Senator Aloysius Etok was also burnt down with school children in session, over 20 Toyota Hiace buses were burnt of Godswill 2011 Campaign Organization, nine Hilux jeeps belonging to the Akwa Ibom State government were destroyed or vandalized. This incident was after the ACN took to the street in protesting the alleged killing of 20 of their party men (Nyong, 2011; Daily Sun 24 March 2011, p. 6). In Delta State, four persons were killed in election violence in Ughelli North and Ogume Ndokwa local government areas of Delta State respectively (Daily Sun 24 March 2011, p. 6).

South-West Zone - since 1964, the south-west has been seen as a flashpoint in every election cycle. In Ondo State, over 10 persons died and many sustained injuries in a violent clash between the ACN and Labour Party at Imeri in Ose Local Government Area (Saturday Punch 19 March 2011, p. 7). One person was shot dead by a stray bullet unidentified hoodlum working for a political party (Saturday Punch 19 March 2011, p. 7). In Ekiti State, two people were shot dead by men in police uniform in the Kota area of Omuo-Ekiti on the 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2011 (Daily Sun 24 March 2011, p. 12). In Osun State, five supporters were killed on 30 December 2010 in Ife town. A cache of arms was recovered by the police in Atakumosa Local Government Area in the residence of a member of the House of Assembly of Osun State. The items recovered include 14 live cartridges and 19 Italian pump-action rifles, expended ammunition, and a long cutlass (The Nation 7 April 2011, pp. 1-2). In Oyo State, a factional leader of the National Union of Road Transport Workers, Alhaji Lateef Salako (Eleweomo), and two others were killed in a clash between his loyalists and other suspected thugs in Ibadan (Nigeria Compass, 31 December 2010, pp. 1 & 50). In Ekiti State, Mr Toyin Akinlade, 27 years old was killed by unknown gunmen (The Nation 30 December 2010, p. 5). Late Akinlade was a former councillor and incumbent PDP Secretary in Ido-Osi Local Government Area (National Life 25 March 2011, p. 35). In Ogun State, at least three were killed at the Labour Party campaign rally in Ikenne L G A (National Life 25 March 2011, p. 35). At least five vehicles were burnt and others were destroyed at the clash between the PDP and the Accord Party on Iwo Road, Ibadan (Sunday Tribune, 13 March 2011, p. 12).

The degree of destruction and loss of lives occasioned by the terrible security situations in two states propelled President Jonathan as cited in The Nation newspaper that:

... they killed and maimed innocent citizens. They set ablaze business premises, private homes and even places of worship. In some cases, they showed utter disrespect to all forms of authority, including our most revered traditional institutions. They systematically targeted population groups. They singled out and harassed nationalistic politicians. They intimidated travellers (The Nation, 21 April 2011, p. 9).

Overall, the destruction of lives and property in the pre, during and post-election in 2011 was unimaginable. Following the figure released by the Inspector General of Police Hafiz Ringim was shocking. According to Ringim, 520 persons were murdered in post-election violence in only Kaduna and the Niger States alone. Kaduna State recorded 518 deaths, including six policemen and two persons were killed in Niger State. Mr Ringim also disclosed that 77 persons were injured in Kaduna State. Over 22 000 persons were displaced by the crisis in the Kaduna State. Mr Ringim revealed that about 1435 houses, 157 churches, 46 mosques, 437 vehicles, 219 motorcycles, among others were set on fire (The Punch, 2 June 2011, p. 6)

### **The Electoral Violence 2015**

The National Human Right Commission revealed that over 58 people were killed in electoral related violence ahead of the 2015 general election. About 61 incidences of election violence happened in 22 states with 58 people killed. Though, most of the violence during the run-up of the 2015 general election, particularly in the northern region was attributed to Boko Haram terrorist organization. However, the electoral violence was serious in the following states - Lagos with eleven incidences and twenty-two people were killed; Kaduna with 3 incidences and 9 people killed; and Rivers with one incidence and at least 6 deaths (Ibeh, 2015). Though, the 2015 election was relatively peaceful until 2011. In Rivers State, the fierce clash between the APC and PDP led to several killings and destruction of properties ranging from electioneering campaign to Bye Elections. Egbueze and Ojirika (2017, pp.6&7) disclosed that:

...violence erupted at a Governorship party rally organized by All Progressives Congress (APC) for their candidate Dakuku Peterside in Okrika, the hometown of President Goodluck Jonathan's wife Patience [in Rivers State]. In a press conference that same day, Dakuku Peterside accused the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) as masterminding the attack. He further confirmed that over fifty persons were critically lying injured at Casely Harrison Specialist Hospital, Port Harcourt. This attack was beside other attacks on the party offices at Andoni, Omoku, Ogu, Okrika and their billboards across the State. The then Governor of Rivers State, Rotimi Amaechi filling an interview on Channel Television openly accused the wife of Mr President Her Excellency Dame Patience Jonathan for the attack at Okrika

In the same vein, Ebiri (2015) cited in Ogele (2020, pp.8&9) disclosed that:

There were incidents of sporadic gunshots in Buguma in Asari Local Government Area and the burning of houses in Bera in Gokana Local Government Area of the State...unknown gunmen opened fire at a vehicle convening security men around Whimpy area of Obio-Akpor, killing one of the security personnel on the shot... A young man was also stabbed to death during a fracas between All Progressives Congress and Peoples Democratic Party supporters at Kpiti in Tai Local Government Area during the accreditation an exercise...A soldier shot dead a voter at Oghale-Elemo in Ward 3, Unit 002 in Local Government Area following a heated disagreement at one of the polling units. Mr Chris was killed because he refused INEC materials to be hijacked by political thugs. In Ozuoha in Ikwerre Local Government Area, one person was allegedly killed and another inflicted with machete cut. In Buguma, there was an incident of sporadic gunshots which enabled the gunmen to hijack electoral materials meant

for Ward 4, 5, and 6. At Bera in Gokana Local Government Area, irate youths torched the resident of a PDP chieftain and destroyed several cars.

The Security agents were not exempted in the violence that emanated in the 2016 rerun of National Assembly election, SaharaReporters (2016) reported that most brutal incidents occurred (during Saturday's rerun) in Ujju community near Omoku in "Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni LGA of Rivers State, where a police patrol team was ambushed. In the ambush, 10 policemen scampered into the bush. The Mobile Police organized a rescue mission. Regrettably, the team discovered that DSP Alkali Mohammed of Mobile Police Unit 48 was beheaded along with his orderly. The patrol vehicle was taken away with the weapons. Three policemen escaped. Five were missing in action."

### **The Electoral Violence 2019**

Based Human Right Watch Reported submitted to President Muhammadu Buhari on Democracy Day on 12 June 2020, the group disclosed that 2019 general election was marred by widespread violence that led to the death of 629 people in the country (Nwezeh and Ifijeh,2019). In the presidential elections, a young officer of the Nigerian Army and six others were killed in Abonnema Town, Rivers State (**Ebiri, 2019**). This killing triggered a reprisal attack on the community that led over the death of a hundred youths in Abonnema town. Okechukwu, Chukwuka and Chikwado (2019,p.89&90) disclosed that 35 death was recorded in the presidential election; a soldier beat up a party agent at INEC office in Bori Rivers State; thugs assisted by soldiers killed an opposition Party agent in Umudo/Umuwala area of Owerri; thugs, assisted by soldiers invaded polling units and carted away ballot materials in Ajaokuta, Kabba/Bunu, Olamaboro, Ijumu; 58 people killed with Rivers State accounting for 30 of the deaths in both the Presidential/National Assembly Election/ Governorship and House of Assembly Election; 20 people were abducted including INEC staff by unknown thugs in Kastina State; and in Khana, Gokana, Ikwere, Eleme Tai, Oyibo, Ogu/Bolo Local Government Councils, in Rivers State. The Police SARS was accused of invading collation centres and abducted some electoral officers, shooting and killed people.

### **The root causes of Electoral Violence in Nigeria**

The nature and character of the ruling class are crucial in the determination of the rules for and the process of political competition. This character shapes the forms of political organizations or parties that emerge or that are allowed to participate in the competition for state power. In discussing the nature and character of the ruling class several factors are important such as the degree of patriotism of the class, the nature of the values that it subscribes to as a class, the degree of its ideological cohesion, among others (**Iyayi,2004**).

Nigeria was integrated into the world capitalist system through her colonization by the British imperialist whose sole aim was to maximize profits through the production process. Capitalism is anchored on exploitation and Nigerian elites inherited a system of economy which was exploitative - the direct use of coercive power for expropriation. In Nigeria, many politicians seek power to promote primitive accumulation. Politics is now seen as a vehicle for making quick and easy money. This rent-seeking and rent - collection mentality of Nigerian politicians can be seen from the desperation of incumbents to hold on to power by any means. The counterweight to this is the determination and the desperation of the elites outside to get into power by any means necessary. To these elites, the result of getting control of political power is justified by whatever means is employed. This means include violence. Ake (1978,p.71) argued that:

...When the process of primitive accumulation is directed against specific factions of the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, it is equally counter-productive... that those elements of the petty bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie who are expropriated and or liquidated by the politically hegemonic faction are likely to be the ones that have entrepreneurial skill. More importantly, using violence to expropriate other members of the ruling class increases the level of insecurity within this class for everyone, including the hegemonic faction. This sets in motion a vicious circle of extremism and political violence. Insecurity makes political actors struggle even more grim and tenaciously for political power and the high premium on political inclines political

actors to use a method which will produce the desired result rather than confine them to a method of competition which is moral or legal.

Nevertheless, as a facilitator of the capital development process, the Nigerian state is a major owner of the means of production. Buoyed by the expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the state effectively dominated all aspects of the national political economy (Jega, 2000, p.30). This is because the imperialist did not even develop an indigenous bourgeoisie in the country, but tied the entire production process of the state. At the juncture, the state became the biggest employer of labour. As noted by Joseph (1991, p.56), the expansion of petroleum products and the resultant increased revenues heightened “the centrality of the state as the locus of the struggle for resources for individual development as well as group security.” Under this guise, entrance to the Statehouse provides an opportunity for primitive accumulation. To sustain state control for economic gains, the politicians employ a series of strategy to carry out the nefarious act. Ake (1978, p.71) argued that:

Sometimes it is done under the cover of political conflict; some people are denounced for many political crimes and then murdered or imprisoned and their property seized. Sometimes, it is done gangster style. Sometimes it is done under the cover of religious or ethnic conflict; a religious or ethnic group denounced for being unpatriotic and subversive or economic exploited of other groups, and popular hatred is built up against them. Then, under cover of this popular antipathy, the unfortunate group is abused, sometimes to a point amounting to genocide, and their property is taken from them...

As the hegemonic faction of the ruling class continue to successfully use force to expropriate another faction of the ruling class as well as peasants and workers, the concentration of energy on politics is reinforced. The consciousness of political power becomes so strong, that once one that has political power can have everything else including economic wealth. At this point, violence becomes inevitable. However, apart from the primitive accumulation which is the character of the ruling class in Nigeria, other factors could be considered as part of what propels electoral violence in Nigeria. Other factors could trigger electoral violence include the degree of stakes; expectations; outcome; and incentive.

**Stakes:** This is a scenario where the politicians involve all it has to stake in politics as an investment, especially in conditions of high scarcity, poverty and inequality. At this point, the candidate believes that winning a state office key to livelihood, not just for an individual, but for his or her entire clan, faction, or even ethnic group, parties and candidates who may often refuse to contemplate the consequences of failure. Sisk and Spies (2009) pointed out that based on the reports from the studies on election-related violence, the perpetrators are often viewed the process as ‘patronage politics’ or a system in which politicians are gang-like ‘bosses’ that control resources (such as access to jobs and income) and dispense public services such as housing, health care, or lucrative government contracts. They further argued that elections in this aspect are often seen as opportunities to engage in corruption and economic rent-seeking. This, in turn, leads to highly fictionalized politics, such as along religious, sectarian or ethnic lines, or along party-political divides.

**Expectation:** This aspect is associated with a higher expectation of the candidates and his supporters on a dividend of electoral success. The candidate and his supporters or party men may expect or imagine the fruits of victory or the perils and risks of loss. Sisk and Spies (2009) argued that elections may exacerbate social conflict under conditions of high uncertainty about the outcomes and situations of high certainty alike; exploring the linkage between expectations and violence is a complicated problem. For example, when there is doubt about the outcome of the election; when the margins of victory are very close; and there is a greater likelihood that allegations of fraud will lead to frustration and potentially too violently clashes, or where parties may use violence to affect uncertain outcomes by trying to limit voter turnout of opponents’ expected supporters.

**Outcome:** This is associated with post-election violence. It is a situation where the announcement of results generates violence. When parties are sure that loss or exclusion in an electoral contest is certain, particularly when they are in the minority (to fail not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence; the post-election violence stemming from the

announcement of 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria seem to fit this pattern. When a party or faction expects to be systematically excluded from political power, they may well turn to violence to either prevent their exclusion or to prevent the election's success. The exclusion could bring about violence, which is often caused by supporters and peripheral elements rather than the party members or officials themselves. That electoral process produces winners and losers is an indicator of their capacity to catalyse or to open 'windows of vulnerability' to violence. When a strongly insecure party or faction expects to be systematically excluded from political power, it may well turn to violence to either prevent its exclusion or to prevent the election's success (Höglund, 2004).

**Incentives:** This involves the roles of so-called ethnic entrepreneurs-political leaders who articulate beliefs in kinship bonds and common destiny, and who mobilize and organize groups to press group claims. The elements are common in Nigeria even before her political independence attainment. They are known for the ethnic entrepreneurship kind of politics. They may be perceived as benign 'interest aggregators' who serve a critical representative function, or as manipulative and exploitative power-seekers who mobilize ethnic themes for their aggrandizement. The manipulation of identity to frame disputes in ethnic terms by political leaders heightens the breadth and depth of inter-group conflict. Ethnic outbidding-and mass responsiveness to 'playing the ethnic card'—is an acute problem because a moderate multi-ethnic centre is often unable to sustain itself against the centrifugal (outward-spinning) forces unleashed by the heated rhetoric of ethnic intolerance.

### **Concluding Remarks**

The electoral violence in Nigeria has been on the rise since the first general election was conducted in 1964. The tactics employed by the political actors kept evolving and unending. A critical appraisal of the Nigerian political system reveals that election violence has been entrenched as a political culture. Each election cycle has been associated with violence leading to loss of lives and properties. The 2011 electoral violence has been the most devastating among all the electoral violence since the attainment of political independence in 1960. Hence, President Jonathan decided to set up Sheikh Ahmed Lemu electoral violence panel of 2011. Amongst others, the report blamed successive regimes for not acting on previous reports on electoral violence by bringing perpetrators to book, noting that was what facilitated the widespread of electoral violence in 2011 considering the degree of impunity exhibited by the perpetrators. Sadly, electoral violence has continued since after Lemu's report, which is an indication that the government lacks the political will to address, make or enforce laws relating to electoral violence.

### **Recommendations**

1. There is an urgent need for electoral reforms to address or eliminate all forms of threats linked to electoral violence such as electoral rigging, vote-buying, overspending by the political parties or candidates, among others.
2. The electronic and printed media must give equal access and attention to all the political parties' jostling for power. Denial of opposition to media space and airtime to sell their programmes may result in unconstitutional means of expressing their discontent and frustration.
3. Political party formation and subsequent inter-party coalitions or mergers must be based on ideological stance as the only way of eliminating violence brought by ethnic and religious bigots
4. The Electoral Management Board (EMB) should be restructured completely to avoid interference and manipulation to earn public confidence.
5. , Nigeria is likely to enjoy a stable democratic system devoid of electoral violence if they level of poverty is reduced, employments are provided for the growing youth population, other basic amenities.
6. The government should establish or where they exist, enforce laws that would effectively sanction or taking punitive measures on politicians found culpable in electoral violence.



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# The Impact of Landlord Classes on Economic Improvement and Political Stability of China, Korea, and the Philippines: A Comparative Study

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## Abstract

As an indispensable part of Feudalism, the landlord classes contributed significantly to the local dominance of the central authority; however, with the collapse of feudal regimes, the landlord classes were widely regarded as obstacles towards the economic modernity and political stability. From the 1910s to 1950s, Korea(colonial Korea, later the Republic of Korea), Republic of China, and Philippines(the colonial Philippines, later the Republic of Philippines), countries shared a similar historic trait, from a feudal state to a foreign colony, then to an independent republic, all under the influence of the USA. Landlord classes in respective countries played an essential role in their historical development and fluctuated their roles with different authorities. The countries all put in efforts towards eliminating or controlling landlord classes to achieve new economic and political models. Using historical data and referencing to the previous analysis, this paper would demonstrate and compare the historic changes pursuing economic and political prosperity that concerned landlord classes of each country to prove the fact that two strategies can be adopted for local state building to achieve economic progress and political stability in that period: either destructing the landlord classes and carrying out land reforms, or having the absolute control of landlords and reaching co-option with them.

**Keywords:** Landlord Classes, Economic Improvement, Political Stability, China

## Republic of China:

### 1. *Sun Yat-Sen's Early Land Policy*

The early attempt to eliminate the landlord classes to reach the equal distribution of land originated from Sun Yat-Sen's three principles of people---the *Minsheng* principle. The *Minsheng* principle incorporated two most essential elements: the "equalization of land rights" and the "control of capital," in which the "equalization of land rights" has an agrarian land tenure reform connotation, and has often been associated with land redistribution, some of its alternative translations being "equitable redistribution of the land"(Cambridge, Mass., 1954). Learning from the ideas and principles of industrial and social revolution in the west, Sun Yat-Sen realized that China could use the Late-developing Advantage to prevent the Western world's chaotic condition

through a socialist strategy. "Where Western material achievement had left a legacy of social disorder, China could simultaneously reap the benefits of both the industrial and social revolutions." (Harold, 1957) Furthermore, based on the theory of Henry George, the author of *Progress and Poverty*, Sun explained the basic meaning of the "equalization of land rights"--- governmental appropriation of all future increases in land value subsequent to the success of the revolution and the modernization of China (Harold, 1957). According to one of the earliest interpreters of the *Minsheng* doctrine, Feng Tzu-yu, the first stage of the *Minsheng* doctrine should be the national socialism that was highly based on land nationalization (Sun Yat-sen, 1953), which, if thoroughly implemented, would be able to eliminate the landlord classes. The state, in turn, could prevent the monopoly and the excessive profits of the landlords, directly collect taxes, and control the land. Quite surprising though, after the resign of Sun, the single tax policy and land nationalization were then inherited by Yuan Shih-k'ai. An American newspaper reported that he would "urge the new cabinet to impose a land or single tax in order to raise money for the government." (Chicago Sunday Tribune, 1912)

However, these particular policies did not bring China a peaceful society, a progressive economy, or a stable political environment. The reason behind it is that the proposals from Sun Yat-Sen (and the implement of Yuan Shih-k'ai) went off-track and failed to point to the landlord classes directly on the executive level. In 1924, the excesses of rural landlordism and the maldistribution of landholdings finally prompted Sun publicly to declare a "land to the tiller" policy (Hu Han-min, 1930), but that was then proved to be a slogan never implemented. This sad fact can be clearly seen from the interpretation of *Minsheng* principle from Feng Tzu-yu, where he did not direct his attack against present-day Chinese landlords-it is still future speculation in land, especially urban land, which is his chief target, which was precisely what Sun Yat-Sen had in mind. The socialist approach he proposed and the aggressive advance from Hu Han-min inevitably aroused the landlords' opposition. Instead of directly solving the problems, Sun avoided directly collision with the local bullies. In Sun's speech in 1912, he assured his audience that "equalization of land rights" did not imply actual land division or nationalization, and in these presentations, the land problem is not identified with prevailing social ills in China; the land problem arises only when land is suddenly made valuable as a result of progress-urbanization, industrialization, and the development of communications (TLCS, VI, ts'e 1, 97.). The interior, agrarian land, on the other hand, was not the problematic land in Sun's mind that time because he finds that the ordinary people can use land freely, "without any restrictions," and in general, "there are no masters who monopolize land." (TLCS, VI, ts'e 1, 224.) Furthermore, the government's option to purchase the land was never meant for an agrarian land tenure reform, and the land nationalization proposal (later proved to be nothing more than George's socialization of rent.) was only for "indispensable land" like railways, highways, and other public development projects (TLCS, VI, ts'e 1, 81), with agrarian land excluded. However, the neglect of landlord classes could be attributed to Sun's great need to compromise when it came to the reconcile of various stakeholders in China; for example, the fund of establishing the government was raised among oversea merchants, which made it especially difficult to attack the landlords. Nevertheless, having failed to either directly eliminate the landlords or gain complete control over them and lose sight of the distinct form of rural injustice in China, this administration lead by Sun, although bearing a visionary intention to conduct land reform, could not stop the ongoing political chaos and economic inflation in the 1920-30s China.

## 2. Cooperative Movement in Guangdong

Inheriting the legacy of the *Minsheng* principle proposed by Sun Yat-Sen, the nationalist government of China initiated yet another land-related policy---the state-scale cooperative movement, most notably in Guangdong province, led by General Chen Jitang. In other provinces like Hebei, Henan, and Shandong (LLOYD E, 1974), similar cooperative movements failed because of the subversion of the local elites---the landlord classes. On the other hand, the condition of Chen's Guangdong was different. Due to the Nationalist Party's factious conflicts, Chen Jitang gained a significant amount of autonomy under Wang's administration in Guangdong in 1931. Even after the abolish of Wang's government because of the 9.18 incident, Chen still had full control of Guangdong province. Unlike most warlord leaders, who usually represent the alliance of local elites and wealthy landlords, Chen Jitang, in order to maintain the political stability and collect higher revenue from rural areas, stabilized local banks, pursue tax reforms, and promoted the development of urban industry and infrastructure (WEISS, LINDA, and JOHN HOBSON, 1995). Right after Chen took office in Guangdong, he put in his efforts in overcoming the resistance against his reform from the "local bullies and evil gentry"---the landlords (however, indirectly), which, in comparison to Sun Yat-sen's early policy, was more assertive and incisive. The major political task of the cooperative movement, as Lin Yizhong, the minister in charge of the Cooperative

Commission, explained, was to reduce the power of “local bullies and evil gentry” in village administration(LIN, 1934). Guangdong's lifeline industry---silk, at that time, was profoundly struck by the worldwide economic depression. By 1934, the sector's incomes in the sector had fallen significantly from 1925 levels, from ¥0.60 to ¥0.20 per worker per day. All six firms that remained in business reduced their demand for sericulture products by drawing on accumulated reserves of cocoon and silk thread(WATSON, 1994). In order to revive the economy to regain the political stability, Chen decided to employ planned economy policy to make up the excessive dependence on external markets and absence of nonfamilial peasant organizations, strengthening the state intervention in local economic affairs by organizing villages, corporatizing village life, corporatizing production, and socializing distribution(ZHEN, 1934), which made the elimination of landlord classes was inevitable. However, Chen soon encountered resistance from not only the landlords but also the peasants who feared that this “good government” aimed to confiscate their capital and assets for military dominance as the Communists did. Even though various methods, including the evening classes to explain the nature of this movement, were adopted, the rumor made up by the local elites associating the movement with the Communists were still widespread, and the incentives of the peasants were still fragile(LIN, 1935). Nevertheless, Chen continued his plan. Based on the *Minsheng* principle, the Cooperative Commission was overseeing a total of 532 state-sponsored village cooperative by August 1935, which served as an integral part of a national scale movement(CEN, 1935). Unlike the European cooperative movement that aimed to build self-reliant villages, this movement was at the cost of local autonomy for a more collective system, fundamentally hostile to the landlord classes. Strict investigation before the application of cooperatives, cooperative education on the cooperativization of land, and the infrastructure improvement were adopted to better achieve its goal.

However, despite all the positive intentions and efforts above, this very movement could hardly be regarded as successful. To start with, the aims of this movement were not entirely for complete land reform. A large part of its purpose was to prevent the central intervention from Nanjing and Communist elements meddling with local affairs, which distorted their efforts less directly towards the landlords. Among the policies presented by Chen Jitang, none of them was targeted on the reclaim of land authority or equal redistribution of land, causing the long-term lack of incentives among the peasants and serious hindrance agitated by the landlords. Without a proper guideline against the landlord classes, the limits against the subsequent policies were everywhere. The peasants were highly influenced by the landlords' mindsets, thereby hindering the development of the cooperative movement; to be more specific, in Shunde county, many of the 41 farmers who pledged membership of the Dongxiang Yunlu Unlimited Liability Credit, Silkworm-Raising, and Consumer Cooperative Society failed to raise their ¥10 membership fees in time for the inauguration of their cooperative(LIN, 1935). Although a total of 532 state-sponsored village cooperatives were founded by August 1935, only 185 of them were fully functional(CEN, 1935). The failure could also attribute to the bureaucratic origin of Chen's regime, manifested by its inner sluggishness and lack of willingness to expand the networks, which could also explain its avoidance of the direct attack against landlords(WEN, 1935). Furthermore, Chen's lack of strong political authority and sufficient fiscal budgets forbade him to eliminate landlord classes or absolute control of them, which needed more than a warlord regime could provide(Fitzgerald, 1997). The lack of effective regional control made the opposition from the merchants of local capital out of hand, which further prevented the substantial improvement of the economy in Guangdong; for example, the Tobacco Manufacturers Guild imposed a ban on the supply of tobacco products to the cooperative and persuaded other manufacturers and suppliers, including the Firewood and Charcoal Guild, to withhold their supplies as well(FANG, 1934). Resembling the efforts done by Sun Yat-sen, Chen's ideology was ahead of his time, resulting in a visionary but unsuitable policy to China at that time. Chen managed to solve parts of the problems for sure; however, conducting cooperative movements without collateral land reform or full compliance from the landlords, Chen Jitang could not bring economic progress and political stability to Guangdong.

### 3. Land Reforms in Taiwan

The post-war environment gave the Nationalist government a once-in-lifetime chance to eliminate the landlords and carry out the land reform. Taiwan, now a developed economic entity, ranks as the seventh-largest in Asia and 22nd-largest in the world by purchasing power parity (PPP). None of those would be possible without the land reform conducted, which ruled out the landlord classes and laid a concrete foundation for the

industrialization and economic boost. Instead of aggressive actions to outlaw the landlords, the Nationalist martial government took a three-step approach: farm rent reduction in 1949, sale of public farmlands in 1951, and land to the tiller in 1953(THOMAS R, 1961). Among the reform actions, the way the Nationalist government reclaimed land from the landlords. Rather than direct compensation from the state to the landowners, the Nationalist government converted 70% of the land price into "Land bonds" and 30% into the public stock shares, which could reach an effect of converting investments in the land into industrial assets and laying a foundation for the industrialization of Taiwan(THOMAS R, 1961). This relatively mild way of land reform not only eliminated the landlord classes but also converted them into a future contribution to the industrialization of Taiwan, paving the way to becoming one of *the Asia tigers*. This particular land reform also fulfilled the dream of Sun Yat-sen's *Minsheng* principle, achieving the scenario of the *land to the tillers*. With the elimination of landlords and the redistribution of land, the economic outcome was remarkable. Food production since 1950 has been increased at an average annual rate of five percent, exceeding the yearly increase in population. Individual crop increases since 1952 have been as follows :

Sweet potatoes	24 percent
Rice	29 percent
Tea	30 percent
Sugar cane	36 percent
Peanuts	63 percent
Citronella oil	97 percent
Hogs	106 percent
Pineapples	115 percent
Wheat	118 percent
Soybeans	154 percent (THOMAS R, 1961)

Along with the agriculture production was experiencing unprecedented success, the livestock production and forestry were also improving. The percentage increase in livestock production during the past five years exceeds the gain in any other agricultural products, while timber production exceeded 140,000,000 seedlings annually(THOMAS R, 1961). Over the 1950s, Taiwan's economic growth was at a constant rate that was never lower than 6%, and the trend continued in the following decades(行政院主計處, 2020). Moreover, the reform also contributed to the reduction of unemployment and universal education in Taiwan(Koo, 1966). All of the sectors mentioned pushed forward the industrialization of Taiwan, which in turn strengthened the nationalist government's legitimacy. The skillful way adopted to eliminate the landlord classes by the Nationalists set up a modern example of land reform and proved that the elimination of landlords indeed paved the way to the economic improvement and political stability.

## **Korea:**

### *1. Colonial Korea*

Although the Japanese colonial authority was indisputably cruel and evil, it did have a lasting influence on Korea's political and economic pattern; besides, its skillful manipulation of the landlords in colonial Korea substantially proved that regarding the national economic growth and political stability, the elimination of landlords was not a "must"; instead, having absolute control over them could achieve an equally effective outcome. Before the Japanese occupation, the capacity of the Yi dynasty in Korea had dropped to its lowest. This administration, lack of the ability and resources to exert control over the landlords (not to mention eliminating them), faced a severe fiscal crisis because they could not collect taxes on agrarian incomes, especially from the powerful Yangban elite, Korea's landowning official class(Palais). The hereditary system and examination system, similar to feudal China, enabled landed power to be deeply embedded throughout the Korean state(Wagner, 1974), which also thoroughly penetrate the local administrative forces. The maladministration finally made people, especially the peasants, victims to suffer, and the Korean government "takes from the people directly and indirectly, everything that they earn over and above a bare subsistence, and gives them in return practically nothing."(Grajdanzev, 1944)

The Japanese colonial power, on the other hand, managed to turn the game around. Its impact successfully transformed once scattered Korea into a well-organized and progressive country. Unlike the mode of Britain, France, and other western colonists, Japan's colonies were relatively close, and Japanese authority played a more direct and decisive role in the national management(Kohli, 2004). Widely regarded as a Korean version of the Meiji Restoration, the reforms conducted in colonial Korea by the Japanese was also highly authoritarian and state-led, with a high level of state intervention similar to those of the attempts discussed above in the Republic of China. However, different from contemporary Nationalist China, the Japanese acquired utter and absolute dominance over Korea by its developed military capacity, creating a Japanese-controlled efficient bureaucratic system. Not only did the Japanese maintain central control, but also they formed highly bureaucratic periphery and local management; for example, the colonial police force was designed along the lines of the Meiji policy insofar as it was highly centralized and well-disciplined and played a significant role in social and economic reforms(Spaulding, 1920). Under such a system, the Japanese authority chose to ally with the Korean landlord classes, mainly in tax collection and local governance. While Japanese civil servants supervised regional projects, Korean landowners cooperated and eventually benefited; local land-investigation committees, for example, responsible for investigating the "ownership, location, boundaries and class of land," were composed of "landowners themselves."(Government General of Chosen, 1911) Although losing some of their regional autonomy, the landlords still maintained strong influence and considerable profits. The state, in this way, further guaranteed its stable tax revenue--- land revenue in 1905, the year Japanese influence in Korea began to grow, was some 4.9 million yen; by 1908 this had jumped to 6.5 million yen, or a real increase of some 30 percent in three years(Kohli, 2004)--- which laid the fiscal foundation of Korea's early industrialization. Not only did the landlords help the state with the economy, but they also contributed to rural stability. The Japanese regime incorporated the landlords into its executive branch to reach the state's goal. With the expansion of controlled land (a reward from the state) (Government General of Chosen, 1911), the landlords help local agents like the police to better maintain control over peasants. The stability in rural areas then created a hospitable environment for the Japanese to implement their agricultural plans. Although primarily for the war cost of the Japanese Empire, the agriculture output of colonial Korea indeed had an impressive increase; for instance, the overall rate of growth in rice production per unit of land for the colonial period (1910–40) averaged on the order of 2 percent per annum(Suh, 1967), which set a concrete basis for economic growth and following rapid industrialization(Park, 2000).

To conclude, the absolute control and skillful manipulation of Korean landlord classes by the Japanese colonists did bring economic progress and political stability under the colonial governance, proving that "The presence of a landowning class does not necessarily inhibit the formation of a powerful "developmental" state. Much depends on the specific relationship of the state and landowners."(Kohli, 2004)

## *2. Rhee's Korea and Land Reforms*

After World War II, Syngman Rhee stepped into the peak of Korean politics. To achieve political and economic stability, Rhee maintained the Japanese-styled bureaucracy and management approach, recruiting former civil servants in the colonial period(Kohli, 2004). Therefore, like the Japanese colonial authority, the Rhee administration formed a highly centralized state, especially with the introduction of martial law. Even as late as in 1968, 75% of higher civil servants came out of the colonial service(Cho, 1975). In the presidency of Syngman Rhee, economic development was not the priority of executive goals, especially the agricultural sector; thus, the early attempt of redistribution of land by the Americans was vehemently opposed by the Rhee administration. However, the Korean War proved to be the game-changer. As the north going straight down to the South, it redistributed the land it captured; when the South took the land back, the Americans, in turn, formalized the distribution made by the North(Kohli, 2004), initiating the following land reform. In the pre-reformed era, the peasants suffered from a high tax rate not only from the colonial government but also from the landlords who possessed a considerable amount of agrarian land, which caused social instability on a local level, especially without the dominant forces of the colonial state. The multiple collective peasant protests in the 1920s and red peasant union protest movements(Shin, 2014), a central form of peasant activism in the 1930s might replicate



themselves if there were not land reforms. Therefore, out of the concern of political stability, the Rhee administration, at last, started the land reform.

This land reform focused on abolishing the land tenure system, created new incentives for agricultural productivity, and eliminated the absentee landlords. In fact, before the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the American Military Government carried out the South Korea Land Reform Law to lower the peasant tax and redistribute the government-vested land, which consisted of 13.1% of the total farmland in Korea (Bank of Chosun, 1948). Significantly influenced by this early attempt, the subsequent land reform followed a similar pattern with the Land Reform Act of Korea in 1950. The Korean government purchased the land from absentee landlords by Land-value Bills that divided the payment into five years associating with annual output and price of crops (Shin, 1950). The government-purchased land, together with the government-vested land (mainly previously Japanese-owned), was distributed to the peasants for production. However, flaws did exist. For example, the Land Reform Act allowed so many exceptions that many landlords could manage to evade the reform; besides, the peasants, even though they eventually possessed agrarian land of their own, had to pay part of their income for the compensation of the landlords (Shin, 1950). That being said, despite all the flaws exposed, the land reform did receive a significant achievement. The deeply-rooted land tenure system was officially abolished, and land-to-tillers was finally reached. From 1955 to 1961, the rice production was in a steady annual increase of 2.62% averaged (Deok, Kim, 2000), contributing to the next level of agriculture development. More importantly, with the lost-out landlords taking their compensations, savings, and energy and throwing them into both industry and education (Kohli, 2004), the land reform directly prompted the industrialization and the "Miracle on the Han River" in Park Chung Hee's administration, which resulted with an annual increase of 10.7% in GDP (1963-1978) under Park's rule (World Bank, 2020).

## **Philippines:**

### *1. Colonial & Pre-Marcos Philippines*

Compared to the two countries above, the Philippines were a negative example of the control of landlord classes. Under the Spanish authority, the basic mode of the landlord-tenant system, the Kasama system (tenants sharing farm expenses and incomes with landlords), was established. Somewhat similar to the Japanese colonists in Korea, the Spanish preserve the local structure and position of local headmen, known as the "caciques," granting them privileges on land occupation; meanwhile, the Spanish also advocated individual ownership of land (Phelan, 1959), which, together with the power local leaders possessed, prompted the reduction of free landholders and accumulation of available lands by influential individuals (Pelzer, 1945). However, unlike the Japanese colonists in Korea, the Spanish authority could not gain absolute control over the landlords; thereby, the early industrialization and the increasing agricultural output did not happen on the Philippines' soil.

Land reforms in the Philippines had a twisted journey, reoccurring but superficial. During the American occupation era, efforts were made to paint the basic sketch of land reforms; for example, the American authority managed to negotiate with the under-protection Spanish friar and persuade them to sell part of their land for redistribution. Moreover, the Commonwealth Act granted the president of the Philippines to purchase, sell, and lease portions of large landed estates, which, together with the Public Act that meant to promote the well-being of tenants and the production of rice, were never enforced on the local level because of the influence the landlords exerted on the executive branch (FRANCIS J, 1972). From that, we can see how deeply the landlords penetrate Philippine politics. Due to the lack of absolute regional authority, the landlords' intensive objections were out of control, with the landlords dismissing tenants deliberately through the amended Act (Pelzer, 1945), which clearly failed to preserve political stability. The Americans then came up with yet another way towards the problems---resettlement on public lands, which the Philippines inherited even after World War II (Sacay, 1963). However, without sufficient funds, excellent management skills, and strong central power, together with the landlords' unrest, this very attempt end up with little success.

After the independence of the Philippine Republic, the Quirino-Foster Agreement was reached between the Philippines and the USA, obliging the Philippines with social reforms in exchange for American aids (Wurfel,

1959). Plus, the following Huks rebellion accelerated President Ramon Magsaysay's subsequent agrarian reforms, in which he promoted its publicity to the barrios, receiving great supports from the peasants (Starnier, 1961). Magsaysay encouraged basic land reforms and fair tenancy practices, including the appeal to redistribute large estates (Starnier, 1961). However, along with the decrease of the Huks rebellion, the pace of the reform went stagnant. Plus, the Congress was reluctant towards the proposal from Magsaysay, and the Supreme Court decisions had interpreted the power to expropriate as limited to those areas where there was unrest (FRANCIS J, 1972), like what the Americans once regulated. With such limitation, the effects were disappointing, and the key issues remained unsolved, resulting in only 300 hectares of land was justified agrarian unrest. Moreover, under the political influence of landlords, this reform was eventually suspended by the Magsaysay administration (Starnier, 1961). Magsaysay's failure once again proved that what mattered most in the reforms was not plain reclaims, but eliminating the hindrance. The lack of incentives for the landlords to sell their lands and the lack of the central capacity to eliminate or control the landlords would only cause continuous opposition against the reforms, no matter how many concessions had been made by the government.

Regardless, the struggle continued. The Agricultural Land Reform Code was introduced by President Macapagal's administration, which placed productivity improvement as a priority to counter the increasing population (Ruttan, 1966). However, no matter how the slogans changed, the same problems were always there, untouched like a forbidden treasure. There were still no proper policies to motivate the landlords and no political power to dismantle the deep-rooted landlord monopoly. Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, the inability to convert landlord capital into industrial one prohibited the Philippines' future development. Although the Code meant to first transform Kasamas to leaseholders, then transfer landownership to cultivators (FRANCIS J, 1972), history proved that with the limits above, the best it could do was to reach a leasehold relationship (tenants taking expenses themselves and paying a fixed rate to landlords), which turned out to be another failed attempt without a competent government that could replace the function of the landlords, including loans, security, etc (FRANCIS J, 1972). There was also one similarity between this attempt and the cooperative movement in Guangdong. Both reforms experienced the reluctance from the peasants. The unwillingness could again be the best evidence that without the central authority being efficient and replacing the landlords, the peasants could easily be overwhelmed by landlords' propaganda and their long-lasting dependence on landlords, thereby rejecting the reforms.

All the pre-Marcos endeavors neglected, or unable to pay attention to, the core problem of the whole issue---the elimination or the control of landlords. None of the policies were directly targeted at the landlords, which sharply contrasted with Rhee's Korea. Also originating from American efforts, the Korean land reforms were much better than those in the Philippines. The direct attack on the tenure land system in Korea brought back the Korean economy's soar, while the Philippines were still stagnant.

## 2. *Marcos' Philippines*

The nation-building under Ferdinand Marcos made this nation more like ruled by a landlord company across the country. As soon as Marcos took office, he promised to bring the land to all tenants farming rice and corn (Association of Asian Studies, 1974). One of the most progressive actions he did was to devise proper policies to compensate the landlords, providing them with incentives to cooperate: Landowners will be compensated either by the former tenants directly in 15 annual installments plus 6 percent interest or through one of several other plans in which the government acts as a middleman (Daily Express, 1973). The Marcos administration also came up with a multi-stage approach, with the focus first on landlords owning over 100 hectares, then 50-100, finally 24-50 (Times Journal, 1974), along with 1.2 billion pesos prepared to reimburse landowners (Estrella, 1973).

However, these attempts were yet another shimmering mirage with broken promises. Like the previous attempts, this reform's main purpose was to suppress existing and potential agrarian unrest, maintaining temporary political stability. Similar to the cooperative movement in Guangdong, the reform under Marcos was most directly targeted to the threat of communist groups in rural areas; thus, his reform was only superficial, and it will push agrarian reform only far enough to keep unrest below a tolerable level or until land reform threatens

other policies of the regime that had higher priority (Benedict J, 1974), which could be manifested by a USAID report, "...the land reform program was found to be in its seventh year of operation with fewer than 2 percent of the nation's small farmers having received any tangible benefit from the program." (USAID, 1971) With such a superficial intention and showcase enforcement, this land reform led by Ferdinand Marcos, one of the largest landholders in the Philippines, was doomed to fail. Aside from Marcos' political agenda, the most fundamental reason why the reform ended up a failure was the landlords' control over Philippine politics. I guess you still remember how the reform led by President Magsaysay failed. Despite all the concessions he made, the pressure exerted by the local elites eventually crushed down the whole project. Similar cases happened to Marcos. Although regarded as a martial-law government, Marcos administration heavily relied on landowners' military forces (Richardson, 1975), preventing the reform from going to the next level. Moreover, in order to hinder the process of the reform, private armies were sent to harass the civilians advocating land reforms, neglected by the law enforcement; just like previous attempts, the agrarian reform agencies, such as Central Bank, Philippine National Bank, and DAR, were generally in the hands of the local elites (Benedict J, 1974), obstructing the entire procedure. Besides the political and military dependence on the landlords, the Marcos regime also relied on the landlords' economic revenue. In Marcos' land policy, commercial crops like sugar cane were exempt from the reform, which benefited half of the country's millionaires who were sugar barons (Sionil Jose, 1970); therefore, to evade the reform, landlords could just turn the rice lands into sugar ones. More concessions were made to cater to the landlords: the government revised its earlier retention limit of 7 hectares up to 25, leaving only 16% of all the tenants still included under the program (Benedict J, 1974). Even for the tenants who actually got the certificate for land ownership, the excessively high tax rate and corrupted officials gradually made the peasants unable to pay for the land, which eventually caused land loss and the return of being tenants. This particular situation brought the peasants back to the Kasama system's vicious cycle, where constant indebtedness forced peasants to surrender their lands (FRANCIS J, 1972). In addition, the supporting infrastructure and service were insufficient and incomplete; for example, government loans were so unreliable and slow that the peasants consequently turned back to landlords for a much quicker and reliable loans (Panganiban, 1972). The only beneficiaries of this land reform were the absentee landholders who were willing to convert their lands into significant monetary assets.

Overall, instead of calling this movement a land reform, it is better called a mere option presented to the landowners to either keep the land or sell it for a considerable amount of money. Besides, this reform changed literally nothing of the overall structure of the Philippine agrarian system. In fact, the central authority was like a parasite relying on the local landlords, which prevent them from either eliminating them or controlling them. As a result of the failure of land reform, the industrialization and economic aspects remain stagnant. While South Korea was creating economic miracles after the land reform, the GDP of the contemporary Philippines averaged 5.46% yearly (World Bank, 2020), only half of that in Korea.

## Conclusion

The landlord classes hindered agricultural outputs mainly in two ways as I suspected. Like what happened in colonial Korea. The existence of landlords put on much more burden to the peasants. Not only must the villagers pay taxes to the state, but also they faced the exploitation from the landlords, causing their incentives of production to the lowest. On the other hand, with land reforms came agrarian reform. In order to raise the agricultural productivity, the central government that conducted land reforms always carried out infrastructure projects simultaneously, including irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticides. Local elites were hardly able to provide up-to-date techniques and methods to prompt the agricultural production, incapable and unwilling. Therefore, there was no chance for the peasants to raise their capability in agricultural industry. Without sufficient agricultural outputs as a basis, the industrialization and economic improvement would automatically be an illusion.

From the analysis of the three countries' cases, we can clearly see that without the nation-building of elimination or control of the landlord classes, economic prosperity and political stability could not be insured. The early attempts of Sun Yat-sen and Chen Jitang in the Republic of China neglected the effects of the landlords, and the central government did not have the capacity to resolve this very issue, resulting with a sad fact that Nationalist China continued to suffer from regional instability and economic inflation; however, after the WWII, the

martial-law government of Taiwan, using skillful tactics, successfully removed the obstacle and reached land-to-tillers, bringing back not only agricultural productivity but also industrial capitals from the landlords. Taiwan then became one of the most developed regions in Asia. Japanese colonists in Korea presented us how the absolute authority could incorporate the landlords and make their puppets to achieve the national goals, ending with an efficient bureaucratic system, early industrialization, and economic development; subsequently, Rhee's Korea carried out land reforms that successfully eradicated the absentee landlords, transferred their capitals into industry and education, and improved agricultural outputs, paving the way to one of the most remarkable economic feats---the miracle on the Han River. The Philippines, despite its continuous efforts on land reforms, changed nothing in particular. Highly correlated with the landlord classes, the Philippine government carried out no policies to challenge landlords' monopoly; in contrast, these policies only made the landowners even stronger. With absolutely no authority over the landlords, the Philippines could not catch the chances of the post-war environment to industrialize and improve the economy.

Landlords, not only did they hinder the land reforms, but also, and more importantly, they remained an obstacle to agriculture improvement, without which industrialization and economic prosperity would not be possible. Regional instability resulting from the tenant-landlord conflicts will always be a threat to the nation's political stability. This comparative study on the three countries that shared an extraordinarily similar historic track and post-war environment (martial law, American assistance, and once Japanese colonies) clearly and thoroughly explained the evolution of policies concerning landlord classes and their outcomes in respective countries, which showed that to achieve economic prosperity and political stability, the nation-building of either eliminating the landlords through land reforms or placing absolute control over landlords by powerful central authority has to be a prerequisite.

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# The Case of Jihad Jane: Engendering and Embodying Power, Femininity and Access

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## Abstract

Since the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and before the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in 2013, there has been a small rising number of Americans, particularly white women embracing radical Islamic thought. The two known faces of female homegrown terrorists were Colleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez. Both identified themselves as “Jihad Jane” and “Jihad Jamie” respectively. Their physical appearances and images perplexed and shocked the public and provoked fear in the U.S. national security. Using legal documents and newspaper articles, this paper explores how these women manipulated their images to transcend traditionally defined roles and ideas about gender and race through their engagement with transnational terrorist networks that embrace the discourse of “West versus Islam.” Through content analysis, this paper analyzes how the “Jihad Jane” used her ‘femininity’ to create access, to empower herself and to deconstruct the ‘masculine’ and ‘racial’ models of terrorism.

**Keywords:** Gender Studies, Terrorism Studies, Content Analysis

## Introduction

On October 16, 2009, Colleen LaRose, a blonde hair, blue eye, middle-aged white American from a small town called Pennsburg in Pennsylvania, was arrested for “soliciting funds for terrorists online” and for “recruiting men on the internet to wage a violent jihad on South Asia and Europe, and women on the internet who had passports and the ability to travel to and around Europe in support of violent jihad.”<sup>1</sup> LaRose, who identified herself as “Fatima LaRose” and more commonly as “Jihad Jane,” had a social network profile that amplified her support for radical Islamic ideology. According to media reports, her family and neighbors knew very little about LaRose’s online activities or conversion to Islam.<sup>2</sup> LaRose’s arrest prompted further investigations of her virtual presence on YouTube and online forums such as *My Pet Jawa* and *RevolutionMuslim* where she claimed that she was “desperate to do something to help the suffering Muslims.”<sup>3</sup> LaRose used the internet to connect and recruit people to initiate a “violent jihad” across the globe. She was later indicted and accused of conspiracy in providing material support to terrorists who plotted the murder of Swedish artist Lars Vilks.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the indictment, LaRose was successful in recruiting another woman with similar physical features of her own: Jamie-Paulin-Ramirez, a young white mother from a small town in the Rocky Mountains, Colorado.<sup>5</sup> Like

LaRose, Paulin-Ramirez called herself, “Jihad Jamie,” but “announced to her family that she had converted to Islam.”<sup>6</sup> On March 12, 2009, Paulin-Ramirez was arrested in Ireland as part of an ongoing investigation into a conspiracy to commit murder, possibly Lars Vilks as the target. Later Paulin-Ramirez was released but was also indicted for the same terror plot to provide material support to terrorists overseas.<sup>7</sup> Due to their similar physical appearances and backgrounds, their arrests triggered a concern in U.S. national security in identifying homegrown terrorists.<sup>8</sup>

Today Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the U.S. According to a survey conducted by the Council on American Islamic Relations, about 20,000 people convert to the faith each year.<sup>9</sup> More significantly, the number of American women converting to Islam outnumbered men approximately four to one after 2001.<sup>10</sup> The rising interest of the Islamic faith in America could be described by the effects of September 11<sup>th</sup>, which drew more people wanting to understand the religion. Historically, there were Islamic political movements that grew in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, specifically for and by African American Muslims. These groups of believers in America formed spiritual movements such as the Nation of Islam in 1930, founded by Wallace D. Fard Muhammad in Detroit, and the Five-Percent Nation in 1964 founded by Clarence 13X in Harlem to challenge the economic, social and political oppressions, and systemic racism and to find ways to uplift their conditions and experiences as African American Muslims. The movements were focused on spiritual teachings and philosophies to support African American/Black Muslim communities. These political groups had spiritual roles in promoting civil liberties for Muslims and combating racism and economic exploitation in the U.S.<sup>11</sup> The American radical groups and movements have different agendas and political interests compared to the ones formed in Middle East such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Though, they all aim to challenge their state authorities by varying degrees, the Islamic faith remains a central force to their causes.

Between 2001-2013, a small growing number of American men and women embraced radical Islamic ideology by joining various terrorist groups interested in waging a “jihad” in the West.<sup>12</sup> According to the Council on Foreign Relations, there has been an increasing number of cases of Muslims involved in domestic terror plots, which “ranges somewhere between less than 2 million and upwards of 7 million (U.S. law forbids mandatory questions about religion on the U.S. census and polling and other estimates have produced a wide range in population number).”<sup>13</sup> However, studies have also found that cases Muslim-American terrorist plots have lessened and not as overgrown based on predictions of possible surges by the U.S. government officials.<sup>14</sup>

Though, the numbers may be small, it is of interest to explore the central question of the two Jihad Janes on the intersections of race, gender and citizenship: why would these American women join a transnational terrorist group? There may be several reasons why these women joined this transnational terrorist group: the internet served as an important medium to discover Islam and to find love in a network. Another factor to consider is the “shock” value since their public images clearly deviated from the fixed public perceptions of “Muslim terrorists.” For these two women, their images perplexed the public. As a result of their activities and arrests, they emerged as the dominant figures of female homegrown terrorists in the United States, particularly across U.S. media coverage in 2009-2011.<sup>15</sup> The shock factor attributed to the fact that they would be in the spotlight knowing that they were not the perceived as “typical Muslim terrorists” or “oppressed” Muslim women. Despite their profiles being classified as lone wolf cases, both women found love and connected themselves to a larger transnational network to plot a series of terrorist attacks where their “gender” became a paramount asset to the operation.<sup>16</sup>

By extrapolating from their cases, this paper analyzes how these two women transcended traditionally defined roles and ideas about gender, race and citizenship in the United States: how they empowered themselves by tapping into their femininity and race to subvert the masculine and racial models of terrorism; how their “bodies” and appearances gave them unrestricted access to domains and spaces where their male co-conspirators could not enter. By demonstrating their commitment to the cause, these women played an instrumental role that challenged the normative perceptions of the “oppressed” or “coerced” Muslim women being forced to join a martyrdom cause. This paper examines why such women embrace martyrdom and why they were drawn to transnational terrorist networks. Using legal cases and newspapers, the paper draws on the theoretical



intersections of race, gender and power through content analysis and explores how their cases and narratives disrupt and complicate the construction of terrorism through this “shock factor.” Throughout the paper, both Colleen LaRose and Jamie Paulin-Ramirez are categorized as “Jihad Jane” despite Paulin-Ramirez’s other alias as “Jihad Jamie” due to the fact that they shared very similar features and intentions and were drawn to the same networks.

### **Jihad Jane’s Femininity, Image and Power**

When both Jihad Janes revealed to their families that they converted to Islam, it became clear that neighbors, families and friends had no idea about their deep interest in the faith. Newspaper accounts documented their families’ surprise, shock and confusion of their conversion and arrest for suspicious activities relating to terrorism. Both women announced their conversions to Islam not long before their arrests. In 2009, Paulin-Ramirez enrolled in an online course about Islam and informed her mother that she became a Muslim. LaRose had converted to Islam a few years earlier than Paulin-Ramirez. La Rose became fascinated with Islam first when she met a Muslim man in a bar in Pennsylvania and then went on to various Muslim websites sites to learn more about the faith and converted “via instant messenger.”<sup>17</sup>

Following each woman’s arrest, the public reaction echoed shock and fear. According to various newspapers’ framing on these women, the “female terrorists received significantly increased levels of coverage in the press as compared to their male counterparts” and as a result, the women are framed differently in the media.<sup>18</sup> The arrest of an American white female terrorist drew in more media frenzy and public attention of her background as a Muslim white woman. This shock factor can play a critical role in understanding these white women’s interest in joining transnational terrorist organizations but also subverted and redefined U.S. national security policies.

Due to their appearances, “racial profiling,” as a tool to combat terrorism, was vigorously questioned and scrutinized. The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> brought in waves of support from U.S. politicians and policymakers to use racial profiling as a counterterrorism tool.<sup>19</sup> However, the rise of American homegrown terrorists such as the Jihad Jane disrupted and altered the “image” of the terrorist, making it difficult to detect suspects and culprits. The profiles of LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez, blonde hair, white Caucasian women from small towns with no historical ties to Islamic terrorist groups, completely challenged and ruptured the normative perceptions of a Muslim terrorist as “the male- other” and as a “monster.” According to Jasbir Puar and Amit S. Rai, “Sexuality is central to the creation of certain knowledge of terrorism, specifically that branch of strategic analysis that has entered the academic mainstream as ‘terrorism studies.’ This knowledge has a history that ties the image of a modern terrorist to a much older figure, the racial and sexual monsters of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries.”<sup>20</sup> Their analyses suggest that the modern terrorist possess key descriptive constructs that has entered and remained in the discourse of terrorism: the Muslim and the terrorist are often linked together as a singular representation. Key descriptive constructs of a “terrorist” include the skin color (brown) and the male body; they are deeply embedded in the public mind due to events such as September 11<sup>th</sup> and the saturated media depictions of Islamic militancy.<sup>21</sup> The physical appearances of LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez did not resemble the monster-terrorist image at all.

However, their Islamic fanaticism and motivation to “kill” anyone who insulted the faith are similar to other terrorist groups such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda: these organizations are viewed as “two different heads of the same monster.”<sup>22</sup> They were both different from one another but they shared “the same fanatical obsession: ‘imposing a strict and distorted brand of Islam on all Muslims and bringing death to all who oppose him.’”<sup>23</sup> The two women also shared this radical view by using their femininity as the source of authority to plot their plans. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the Jihad Jane’s “blond hair and blue eyes would allow her to operate undetected in Europe, allegedly to carry out the attack.”<sup>24</sup> Moreover, LaRose used her “appearance to ‘sell’ herself as a potential ‘martyr,’ writing in an email to one of her co-conspirators that her physical characteristics would allow her to ‘blend in with many people.’”<sup>25</sup> In other newspaper accounts, images of LaRose wearing a white hijab or a black niqab were shown on front pages; these images of LaRose reinforced the features of femininity or ‘oppression,’ ‘mystery’ of the wearer.<sup>26</sup> For example, Palestinian women bombers, have been reported to wear a facial veil and covered “themselves from head to toe in dark brown, all enveloping robe at all

times,” because “they must appear unthreatening to Jewish bodies.”<sup>27</sup> The Jihad Jane must also appear unthreatening to the Western body but more importantly, veiled or not, the Jihad Jane’s physical appearance allows her to racially integrate herself in Western societies more easily. A remarkable point is the Islamization and “sexualization” of the terrorist: “Jihad Jane’s notoriety arises from being the ‘wrong’ racial body type for a Muslim terrorist. This [example] illustrates how Muslim terrorist trope is inscribed on a [male] brown body.”<sup>28</sup> The newspaper images of the veiled Jihad Jane can deceive the public by reinforcing this perception of an “oppressed” female victim, but the Jihad Jane actually exhibits more power and authority over her co-conspirators. By distorting the common visual representation of a terrorist, the women specifically LaRose, as claimed in an email exchange with a co-conspirator, could easily gain “access to many places (such as Sweden) due to [her] nationality and that her physical appearance would allow her to ‘blend in with many people’ which ‘may be a way to achieve what is in the [co-conspirator’s] heart.’”<sup>29</sup> LaRose’s body serves as an agent of mobility but also as a white privileged one.

Both women could marry their co-conspirators to advance their causes; their citizenship can be seen as a “Western” or racial privilege, which underscore the constructions of racial identities and domination.<sup>30</sup> In another email exchange, a co-conspirator suggested to LaRose to get married so that he can travel to Europe; LaRose agreed to marry him and to obtain residency status in Europe.<sup>31</sup> For Paulin-Ramirez, she traveled to Ireland on September 12, 2009 and married her co-conspirator in an Islamic wedding. Her marriage was also documented in the Grand Jury Indictment.<sup>32</sup> The status of citizenship through marriage could support the male co-conspirators who lack such privilege. Through marriage, the Jihad Jane shared her power with male peers, but she retains her femininity that her peers lack as well.

Jihad Jane’s body is also essential to the martyrdom operation since her body can “generate less suspicion and is able to conceal explosives.”<sup>33</sup> According to Hassa on female suicide bombers, the female body is often associated with “menstruation, childbirth, heteronormativity, maternal sacrifice and the violated raped-woman,” however, the body of the Jihad Jane destabilized these normative ideals: her body is perceived as an agent of destruction and not as an agent of maternity or reproduction.<sup>34</sup> Because of her body, she has unrestricted mobility compared to her co-conspirators, and hence, her presence challenges the notion of “radical patriarchy” where “the [traditional] role of men is in public life; the role of women is in the home.”<sup>35</sup> The formation of “radical patriarchy” stems from the experiences of the Muslim terrorist, which will be explored later. The Jihad Jane’s unrestricted access deconstructs the traditionally defined gendered spaces as well.<sup>36</sup> According to Mark Juergensmeyer’s report on Islamists in Algeria, author of *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*:

Religious activists often have shown a certain paternalistic respect for women, as long as they remained in their place. During the 1991-92 Muslim uprising in Algeria, Ali-Behlahj, one of the Islamic front leaders said that a woman’s primary duty was to ‘bear good Muslims’; and Sheik Moghni, another Islamic Front Leader, complained about women working and taking jobs from men.<sup>37</sup>

The Jihad Jane disrupts the normative gender roles and spaces: her citizenship, body and mobility are privileges and assets, thus, making her invaluable to her co-conspirators.

### **The Power of Sisterhood and Martyrdom**

What motivated Jihad Jane to participate in this martyrdom operation? There are multiple justifications why LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez joined the cause: both cases reveal several interesting points in the overt acts: on YouTube, Colleen LaRose stated that she is “‘desperate to do something somehow to help’ the suffering Muslim people.”<sup>38</sup> This type of sentiment can be identified as fear. Moreover, in an email exchange with co-conspirator, a resident of a South Asian country, LaRose exclaimed, “she also desires to become a martyr.”<sup>39</sup> Based on these testimonies, the Jihad Jane embraces the discourse of fear, which can be defined as “the pervasive communication, symbolic awareness and expectation that danger and risk are a central feature of the effective environment or the physical and symbolic environment as people define and experience it in everyday life.”<sup>40</sup> Like other extremists, the Jihad Jane justifies her actions by “construct[ing] a narrative that emphasize that [her] preferred way of life is endangered by some Other” and that she believes she needs to do something to save Islam or Muslims.<sup>41</sup> In a different email exchange between a co-conspirator and Paulin-Ramirez, the co-

conspirator wrote, “[T]he job is to [k]nock down some individual[s] that are harming Islam.”<sup>42</sup> It is certain that the Jihad Jane embraces Islamic fanaticism and desires martyrdom status; her desire to defend the “Islamic” community traces to similar radical ideology in the Palestinian context: Maha Abdel Hadi, a woman who joined Hamas, an Islamic resistance movement in Palestine, asserted, “Islam doesn’t forbid women to choose martyrdom. Women have the right to resist the occupation by any means they choose ... Women suffer from the Israeli aggression as much as our men.”<sup>43</sup> Similarly, these women felt the obligation to defend the Islamic community against people or specific groups oppressing Muslims.

In another email exchange, LaRose exclaimed, “It is an honour & great pleasure to die or kill for” the co-conspirator.<sup>44</sup> Her desire to be a martyr is heightened in the court documents, which depicts the Jihad Jane as an extremist. Furthermore, LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez are empowered by such ideology due to their privilege status; their roles have changed from ordinary blonde American women to violent global defenders of Islam. In the same email exchange, the co-conspirator directed LaRose to “kill [resident of Sweden, identified as RS#1, presumably Lars Vilks] in a way that the whole Kufar [non-believer] world get frightened.”<sup>45</sup> The need to shock, disrupt or terrorize the “world” or as they described it as “non-believer” is essential in understanding the rhetoric of the network associated with the Jihad Jane. This binary discourse of “believers” and “non-believers” is often embraced and channeled by radical Islamists; and the Jihad Jane also adopts this distorted reality and projects the discourse of fear. Based on this email exchange, radical Islamic thought and the martyr community are reinforced.

Furthermore, why do people, specifically women embrace martyrdom? According to Kubra Guletekin’s research on women’s engagement with terrorism, “people support martyrdom when three conditions come together: 1. Cultural standards such as belief system, symbolic descriptions and historical customs; 2. Legitimate authorities who promote violence; and 3. Communities who are considered victims and are mistreated by external enemies.”<sup>46</sup> For men, there are evidence to suggest that radical Islamists are willing to become martyrs, to sacrifice themselves to enter the Islamic paradise and be greeted by seventy-two virgins.<sup>47</sup> They desire to defend their territory from occupation, whether geographical or not. For women, some may want to become martyrs to achieve a gender equality or higher status in society. According to a report by the Israel Security Agency, “the main reason women were involved in terrorism was personal, but this motive existed alongside the nationalistic motive.”<sup>48</sup> Both men and women have served as suicide bombers for many different reasons. LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez were compelled to become martyrs because of their distorted perceptions of reality, intrinsic values and attachments toward Islamic fanaticism and more importantly, their desires to connect with others through the internet. In another terrorist analysis study, “group solidarity” provides motivations of individual female attackers, which is similar to number three in Guletekin’s research on community support. In the case of female suicide bombers, they tend to “kill themselves out a feeling of allegiance toward the terrorist group which plays an important role in their identity.”<sup>49</sup> In LaRose’s account, there were hints of depression and suicide attempts but both women did not mention any activities involving suicide bombing, or self-detonation. However, their collective identity is closely related to the collective identity of a female suicide bomber: both women’s motivations are closely aligned with the terrorist network, and group solidarity is formed to support the cause.

The Grand Jury Indictment of Paulin-Ramirez reveals many sociological traits of group solidarity: in an email exchange between LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez, LaRose wrote, “Soon I will be moving to Europe to be with my brothers and sisters ... This place will be like a training camp as well as a home” and another reference shows that one of the co-conspirator explained that “Sister Fatima [LaRose] will be in charge of other sister care ... [W]e have already organized everything for her ... [W] are will[ing] to die in order to protect her no matter what the risk is.”<sup>50</sup> The notion of “sister care” relates to “feminine support,” where LaRose assumes leadership to support other women while the co-conspirator will give up their lives to safeguard the well-being of LaRose. This email exchange offers an interesting take of LaRose’s critical role in the network: her gender, race and citizenship are implied as privilege assets for this terror plot; she can also lead and support other women such as Paulin-Ramirez to strengthen the female or sister-group solidarity. This exemplifies another form of feminine power of the Jihad Jane: she has power over the male co-conspirators by leading the group. One apparent note is that the terrorist organizations tend to be all male-exclusive group. According to anthropologist Lionel Tiger:

The terrorism of Bin Laden harnesses the chaos of young men, uniting energies of political ardor and sex in a turbulent fuel. The structure of al-Qaeda-an all-male enterprise, of course appears to invoke small groups of relatively young men who maintain strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity dramatized and heightened by the secrecy demanded by their missions and danger of their projects.”<sup>51</sup>

This refers to the notion of “radical patriarchalism” which is often adopted by radical Islamists. The development and notion that terrorism is based on a masculine construction is defined by the conception of masculinity and the experiences of these terrorist, “Terrorists acts can be forms of symbolic empowerment for men whose traditional sexual roles – their very manhood - is perceived to be at stake.”<sup>52</sup> In most cases, such as the Palestinian context, men become martyrs to defend their community from occupation, as the trait of masculinity is closely tied to nationalism.<sup>53</sup> There are also traits that are associated with the constructs of masculinity: in the Arab context, they are “bravery, courage, willingness to sacrifice their lives to maintain honour and dignity,” while femininity is often negatively viewed as “economic and political dependence, weakness, empty talk and the inability to defend their honour and dignity.”<sup>54</sup> These sophisticated ideas of masculinity and femininity can reinforce the normative construction of terrorism as a masculine model. Furthermore, the notion of traditional roles of women in fundamentalism is perceived in other aspects. According to Helie, a researcher on gender and Muslim fundamentalism, all fundamentalisms have defined women as collective property in need of protection because: “To conform to the strict confines of womanhood within the fundamentalist religious code is a precondition for maintaining and reproducing the fundamentalist version of society.”<sup>55</sup> However, it is important to note that the Jihad Jane does not need protection and does not identify “her being” as a collective property.

This traditional notion is challenged by the Jihad Jane because she exemplifies the trait of “masculine femininity,” that is “combining genders and blending masculinity and femininity” since she “embodies certain specific ideas of ‘womanhood’ and ‘femininity’ while engaging in a brave fight for their [faith].”<sup>56</sup> The Jihad Jane’s “masculine femininity” is closely tied to Palestinian female suicide bombers who develop the trait of “Arab masculinity” that is defined as “constant vigilance and willingness to defend honor, kin and community from external aggression and to uphold and protect cultural definitions of gender-specific propriety.”<sup>57</sup> For these Palestinian women, they embraced “Arab masculinity” in relations to their Arab leaders against Palestinian resistance.<sup>58</sup> This cross-cultural development of sexuality is also noted in the case of the Jihad Jane: her co-conspirators are weak, and they desire what the Jihad Jane has. Despite being a woman, her place in the network destabilized this type of “male-group solidarity” since her role and trait of “masculine femininity” superseded her co-conspirators.

An additional explanation for their motivation is love. According to various newspaper accounts, the Jihad Jane was searching for love or as the newspaper calls it, “terrorist for the sake of love.”<sup>59</sup> Contrary to LaRose’s indictment, “she used the online sites to search for dates,” and she “flirted with people who commented on extremist videos she posted on YouTube.”<sup>60</sup> LaRose used her femininity to recruit men and women to plan a violent plot but she was also seeking love. For Paulin-Ramirez, she married her co-conspirator. However, it is believed to have been falsified in order to advance the terror plot. Both women had marriages and divorces prior to their engagement with terrorism. In the U.S. presses, their social lives, sexualities and narratives were carefully scrutinized to detect signs of anomalies. These character analyses and representations focus on the abnormal behaviors of the Jihad Jane by characterizing her as a “weak” woman searching for love; she is also depicted as “more depressed, crazier, more suicidal or more psychopathic than her male counterparts.”<sup>61</sup> That may be the case in some accounts, however, she channeled information and utilized her “masculine femininity” to subvert the law, and challenged the images and notions of terrorists and stereotypes of white, non-White Muslim women and men in America.

## Conclusion

Since the Jihad Jane’s arrest, their cases disrupted the perception and construction of a terrorist as a male-brown skinned Muslim figure. Their arrests were sensational because the public could not believe that American white women could join Islamic fundamentalist groups and plot a terrorist attack at a global scale. “the media

fetishizes female terrorists. This contributes to the belief that there is something unique, something just not right about women who kill.”<sup>62</sup> This paper demonstrates their extensive involvement and engagement with a larger transitional terrorist network, which placed them in a position of power. Through content analysis, the legal cases, newspaper accounts and transcripts of the Jihad Janes’ online conversations revealed that their gender, race and citizenship were assets and central to this terror plot; their physical features shocked the public, and theoretically subverted the ‘racial’ and ‘masculine’ models of terrorism.

This paper explores how the Jihad Jane ruptured normative expectations of gender roles, ideas and spaces. LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez played crucial roles in carrying out the terror plot. Their usages of femininity empowered their identity by demonstrating leadership, recruiting and marrying others to participate in a larger martyrdom operation. Their physical appearances and white privileged status as white women also destabilizes the system of “radical patriarchy.” The case of Jihad Jane is a reminder to U.S. national security that a terrorist, homegrown or not, can be anyone believing in anything, who can shatter normative and traditionally defined roles and identities in terrorism intelligence and societal expectations.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> LaRose was indicted and accused of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to kill in a foreign country. See *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division of Pennsylvania, 4, March 2010, <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Ian Urbina, "Views of 'JihadJane' Were Unknown to Neighbors," *New York Times*, 11, March 2010, accessed 11 March 2012, [www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/us/11pennsylvania.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/us/11pennsylvania.html).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> In 2007, Lars Vilks, a Swedish artist living in Sweden who drew a series of drawings depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad's head on the body of a dog. These images were reproduced in three Swedish newspapers to defend the freedom of expression and religion. See Patrik Jonsson, "Jihad Jane Alleged Target Lars Vilks: I have an Axe Here," *Christian Science Monitor*, 10 March, 2010, 1.

<sup>5</sup> See O'Connell, Vanessa, "For the Love of Islam," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12, March 2010, accessed 13, March 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704131404575118103199708576>.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. This international case also involved two others: an Algerian man, Ali Charaf Damache, who identified himself as "Theblackflag," and a Pakistani man, Mohammad Hassan Khalid, living in Maryland. Both men have been charged to solicit funds to support terrorism, including plans of killing Swedish artists Lars Vilks. See Manuel Gamiz, Jr., "Two More Charged with Plotting Terrorist Acts with 'Jihad Jane,'" *Chicago Tribune*, 20

October 2011, accessed 14, January 2012, [www.chicagotribune.com/topic/mc-jihad-jane-new-arrests-20111020,0,6902015.story](http://www.chicagotribune.com/topic/mc-jihad-jane-new-arrests-20111020,0,6902015.story).

<sup>7</sup> See *United States vs. Jamie Paulin Ramirez*, Grand Jury Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division of Pennsylvania, 4, March 2011.

<sup>8</sup> See Jerome P. Bjelopera, "American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat," *Congressional Research Service*, 15, November 2011, 83-84. In addition to LaRose and Paulin-Ramirez's case, two other women were convicted of providing material support to al-Shabaab in Minnesota on October 20, 2011. Al-Shabaab, a terrorist organization in Somalia is a separate network from the Jihad Jane's case. But this case also exemplifies the growing number of female homegrown terrorists. See Federal Bureau of Investigations, "Two Minnesota Women Convicted of Providing Material to al-Shabaab," 20<sup>th</sup> October 2011, accessed 23, February 2013, <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/two-minnesota-women-convicted-of-providing-material-support-to-al-shabaab>.

<sup>9</sup> See Haddad Yazbeck, Yvonne. Jane Idleman, Smith. Kathleen M, Moore. *Muslim Women in America: The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 42.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> See Brian R. Farmer, *Radical Islam in the West: Ideology and Challenge*. U.S.: McFarland, 2010, 90.

<sup>12</sup> Brad, Knickerbocker, "Jihad Jane Joins Growing lists of American Terror Suspects," *Christian Science Monitor*, 12, March 2010, 1.

<sup>13</sup> Toni Johnson, "Threat of Homegrown Islamist Terrorism," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 30, September, 2011, accessed August 1, 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/threat-homegrown-islamist-terrorism/p11509>

<sup>14</sup> See Charles Kurzman, "Muslim American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11." Durham, NC: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 2012.

<sup>15</sup> According to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in the Senate of the United States, homegrown terrorism is defined as "the use, planned use or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual born, raised or based and operating primarily within the United States ... to intimidate or coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States or any segment thereof, to further enhance of political and social objectives." Dragan Simeunovic, "Homegrown Terrorism in the United States and in the EU." *Review of International Affairs*, 62 no. 1141 (2011): 8. For an extensive review and analysis of U.S. press coverage on the Jihad Jane narrative, see Maura Conway and Lisa McInerney, "What's Love Got to Do With It? Framing 'JihadJane' in the US Press," *Media, War and Conflict*, 5 (2012): 6-21.

<sup>16</sup> The Jihad Jane cases are identified as lone wolf cases – a lone wolf is an individual "acting out of his or her own motivation without long-standing or direct connections to terrorist organizations or networks." However, I argue that both women connected themselves to a larger crime network to plot their terrorist acts. The rise of homegrown and lone-wolf terrorists were perceived to be on the rise, but it is difficult for the FBI to detect lone-wolf terrorism suspects. See Massimo Calabresi, "Why Jihad Jane Case is a Win for the Patriot Act," *Time Magazine*, 11, March 2010, accessed 20, January 2013, <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1971245,00.html>

<sup>17</sup> See Tom Leonard, "Blond-haired 'Jihad Jane' Plotted Terror Attacks," *The Telegraph*, 10 March, 2010, accessed 10 August 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7415724/Blond-haired-Jihad-Jane-plotted-terror-attacks.html>.

<sup>18</sup> See Maura Conway and Lisa McInerney, "What's Love Got to Do With It? Framing 'Jihad Jane' in the US Press," *Media, War and Conflict*, 5 (2012): 19.

<sup>19</sup> Daniel Nasaw, "Jihad Jamie: Racial Profiling Under Scrutiny After Second White Islamist Arrested," *The Guardian*, 14 March 2010, accessed 10 January 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/14/jihad-jamie-islam-terrorism-us>.

<sup>20</sup> Puar, and Rai. "Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots," *Social Text*, 20, no. 3 (2002): 121.

<sup>21</sup> The images of Muslims are internalized as "terrorists" and they are recognized and perceived as such in the virtual world. See Raymond Pun, "Digital Images and Visions of Jihad: Virtual Orientalism and the Distorted Lens of Technology," *CyberOrient*, 7 no. 1 (2013), accessed 30<sup>th</sup> November 2013, <http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=8391>.

<sup>22</sup> Puar and Rai, "Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots," 119.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Calabresi, "Why Jihad Jane Case is a Win for the Patriot Act."

<sup>25</sup> Conway and McInerney, Lisa, "What's Love Got to Do With It? Framing 'JihadJane' in the U.S Press," 12. See also *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 3-4.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Frances, Hassa, "Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs," *Feminist Review*, 81 (2005): 26.

- <sup>28</sup> Neil Gotanda, "The Racialization of Islam in American Law." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 637, no. 1 (2011): 193.
- <sup>29</sup> *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 4.
- <sup>30</sup> See Ruth Frankenberg, *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1993).
- <sup>31</sup> *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 4.
- <sup>32</sup> See *United States vs. Jamie Paulin Ramirez*.
- <sup>33</sup> Lindsey A. O'Rourke, "Behind the Woman Behind the Bomb," *New York Times*, 2 August 2, 2008, A15.
- <sup>34</sup> Hassa, "Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs," 24.
- <sup>35</sup> Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 200.
- <sup>36</sup> See Judith, Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York, Routledge: 1990).
- <sup>37</sup> See Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 200.
- <sup>38</sup> See *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 3. In addition, the usages of social media networks strongly suggest Jihad Jane's adoption of the fear discourse: "In a mediated world where extremist's discourse to populations not only comes through the news but also is distributed via social networks, internet websites and blogs, this pervasive sense of dread comes fully equipped daily with the urgency "to do something about it." See R. Bennet Furlow and H.L., Goodall, Jr., H.L., "The War of Ideas and the Battle of Narratives: A Comparison of Extremist Storytelling Structures," *Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies*, 11, no. 3 (2011): 220-221.
- <sup>39</sup> See *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 3.
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- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
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- <sup>44</sup> *United States vs. Colleen R. Colleen Rose*, 3-4.
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- <sup>51</sup> Qtd in Jasbir K. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007): 56.
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- <sup>53</sup> Hassa, "Discursive and Political Deployments by/of the 2002 Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers/Martyrs," 36.
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- <sup>55</sup> Anissa Helie, "Women and Muslim Fundamentalism," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28 (1993): 2455.
- <sup>56</sup> Francíková analyzes the story of Kateřina Marsálova, a female soldier who supported and challenged the notions of the ideal woman by drawing on Judith Halberstam's theory of "female masculinity" and Mimi Schipper's notion of "masculine femininity." Like Marsálova's story, the Jihad Jane's narrative offers similar accounts of embodying gender transgression in the context of deviating from gender and social norms. See Dasa Francíková, "The Queer Story of Kateřina Marsálova: The Female Soldier, Ideal Woman, and Masculine Femininity," *Gender and History* 24, no. 2 (August 2012): 359.
- <sup>57</sup> Anat Berko, Edna Erez and Julie L. Globokar. "Gender Crime and Terrorism: The Case of Arab Palestinian Women in Israel." *British Journal of Criminology* 50, no. 4 (2010): 672.
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- <sup>61</sup> Ibid. 18.
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# Shared Identity as Social Capital in The Chinese-Javanese Relations in Malang City, Indonesia

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## Abstract

This article discusses the relations between Javanese and the Chinese identity in Malang City, Indonesia. How the perception of the two communities and how the social capital construct personal and social (shared) the identity of people's with different backgrounds in the city of Malang, East Java, Indonesia. This research is done with a qualitative approach. The subject of this research is the Chinese and Javanese community in Malang. Data collected by observation, interviews, documents, and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). The results showed that Javanese and Chinese people identified their identities based on physical and character conditions. The construction of shared identities through social capital between the two ethnicities as Malang's resident has been able to attach them. Social capital is essential to create unity, coexistence, mutual need, and complement in daily life. Based on the findings, it can be recommended that to realize the integration of nations with various ethnic in Indonesia is needed to strengthen social capital (trust, value/norms, network cooperation) in various areas of life.

**Keywords:** Social Capital, Identity, Perception, Cross-Cultural Integration

## Introduction

A decade after the political reforms in Indonesia that led to democratization have brought a significant impact on social life in Indonesia. Indonesians are increasingly aware of their political rights. The political participation of society is increasing, and control to the government is also higher. However, on the other hand, there is a problem in this democracy that is national integration. Indonesia is a unitary state with the motto of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (diversity in unity) consisting of various tribes, ethnicities, languages and consisting of more than 17,000 islands. Indonesia's compound, multi-ethnic and cultural, in addition to storing tremendous potential wealth, but also can save potential conflicts due to differences.

Indonesian society consist of people with differences ethnic and religion background. Some disagreements lead to conflicts that are more based on differences in political views. Indonesians who are diverse tribes and

languages should be a unity in the frame to Indonesian. Therefore, it necessary to re-excavate the local wisdom that has been able to become an adhesive between different communities of the background.

The research was as an effort to contribute to national development. Although in a small scope, namely in the city of Malang, East Java province of Indonesia, but the results of this research is expected to be a model and framework for the implementation of the best practice in Indonesian national development. The main problem in this research is related to Indonesian nobility, who faced problems primarily due to ethnic and cultural differences where the difference between tribes and culture is a necessity. Meanwhile on the other hand, the life of society in Indonesia has mostly had its value/norm adopted and run in daily life with local wisdom. It has been embraced by the community to avoid conflicts based on the differences in ethnicity and culture. This situation occurs in the Malang city, where different peoples and cultures and religions can coexist safely and peacefully.

This research has some significance. First, to build a concept of cross-cultural integration that sourced from the real experience of the community. Secondly, this research analyses the element of identity, the interethnic perception, and social capital as well as local wisdom from the community in maintaining different harmony of ethnic and cultural. Third, this research is essential to build nation integration in realizing the unitary Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/ NKRI*).

### **Social capital**

Social Capital is a community's ability to work together, to achieve common goals in various groups. In general, there are 3 (three) main elements of social capital, namely: trust, value, and network. Trust that encourages someone to collaborate with others to bring about productive activities or joint actions. Fukuyama (2002) mentions trust as a hope for the regularity, honesty, cooperative behavior that arises from within the community based on the values/norms embraced with the members of the community.

Social capital is a terminology developed by social experts to enrich understanding of society and the community. Social capital becomes a treasury of debates that appeals to social and development experts, especially the early 1990s. Bourdieu mentions that there are three capitals. They are money, social, and cultural capital. Social interaction or relations among them will make them useful. Social capital can be used for all interests. However, without any physical resources and cultural knowledge, it will be difficult for individuals to build a social relationship. Social relations will only be vital if the three elements above exist (Hasbullah, 2004:9).

Since the first review of social capital was conducted in early 1916 by Lyda Judson Hanifan until the birth of a modern study of social capital in the late 20th century that was pioneered by Robert. D. Putnam, James. S. Coleman, and Francis Fukuyama, have many definitions given by experts on social capital. According to Robert Lawang, social capital refers to all the social forces of the community that are contracted by individuals or groups. It refers to the social structure, which in their judgment and minimizing significant difficulties. Social capital determines how people can work together smoothly.

Hasbullah (2006) puts six critical elements in social capital based on various understandings of existing social capital, namely: (1). Participation in a network. The ability of a group of people to involve the dir in a network of social relations, through various relationships that are mutually adjacent and carried out based on voluntary principles, similarities (equality), freedom, and civility. The ability of group members or community members to always unite in a synergistic pattern of relationships will significantly influence the strong presence of a group's social capital. (2). Reciprocity. A tendency of mutual exchange of goodness among individuals in a group or between groups itself. The exchange pattern occurs in a long-term and short-term combination with altruism feel without expecting a reward. In communities and social groups that have been formed that weigh the reciprocity (3). Trust. A form of desire to take risks in social relationships. It is based on a feeling of confidence that the other will do the same as expected and will always act in a pattern of mutually supportive action. At least, others will not act self-harm and his group (Putnam,1993). Collective action based on mutual trust is increasing

community participation in various forms and dimensions, especially in the context of joint progress. It allows people to unite and contribute to the increase of social capital. (4). Social norms. A set of rules are expected to be obeyed and followed by the community in a particular social entity. These rules are usually institutionalized, unwritten, but understood as the determinant of a good pattern of behavior in the context of social relations so that there is a social sanction given as a rule. Norms socialize to determine the strong relationship between individuals as it stimulates social cohesiveness that positively impacts the development of society. Therefore, social norms are referred to as social capital. (5). Values. A hereditary idea is considered valid and essential by members of the community group. Value is significant in culture. It grows and develops in dominating the life of certain groups and influencing the rules of acting and behavior of communities that eventually form a cultural pattern. (6). Proactive action. The strong desire of group members to not only participate but always find a way for group members' involvement in a community activity. Group members involve themselves and seek opportunities that can enrich social relations and benefit the group. Individuals or groups are searching for information on various experiences, enriching ideas, knowledge—the initiative to form of social capital that is useful in community building. Social capital refers to the potential network, norms, and beliefs on community productivity. However, social capital is different from financial capital. This situation is because social capital is cumulative and increases by itself/self-reinforcing (Putnam,1993).

There are three parameters of social capital, namely: Trust (trust), norm (norms), and network (networks). Trust is growing hope in a society that is demonstrated by the behavior of honest, orderly, and cooperation based on the value being embraced together (Fukuyama,1995). Social confidence is a product of adequate social capital. The existence of good social capital is characterized by the existence of a robust social institution and give birth to a harmonious socialistic life (Putnam,1995). Both are the norm and social values (norms and social values). Norms consist of understanding, values, expectations, and objectives. They are carried over and run together by a group of people. Norms can be sourced from religion, moral guidance as well as secular standards as well as a professional code of ethics. The norm is a standard that will serve to regulate and control the behavior of society. Norma can be a pre-condition or product of social confidence. Value is a hereditary idea considered valid and essential by a group of people. Value has always been instrumental in societal life; the value will distinguish between right and wrong, what is good and evil.

The third is the network. The community is inherently dynamic concerning other communities through interaction and various relationships, which are woven voluntarily, mutually adjacent, commonality, freedom, and privacy. The network is usually intertwined with a typology with group characteristics. Groups are traditionally formed based on similarities in lineage, experience, and similarity of belief. Human relationship means as an individual. It can be said that we, at least partly, are interpreted by whom we know. More broadly, the bonds of humans also serve as a boundary wall for broader social structures. The central idea of social capital places on social networks as a valuable asset (Field,2005:16). Networks provide a basis for social cohesion where people cooperate and get a mutual benefit. Healthy communities tend to have a robust social network. The close social network will strengthen the feelings of cooperation of its members and the benefits of its participation (Putnam, 1995).

Based on these parameters, several key indicators that can be used as the size of social capital (Spellerber, 1997 in Edi Suharto,2005). They are identity, alienation, belief system and ideology, values and objectives, fear, attitudes towards other members in society, perceptions of access to services, resources, and facilities (e.g., work, income, education, housing, health, transportation, and Social Security). Then, opinions on the performance of governments that have been conducted earlier, confidence in community institutions and people in general, confidence level, satisfaction in life and other community areas, and hopes that want to be achieved in the future. It can be said that social capital was born from below (bottom-up), not hierarchies, and based on mutually beneficial interaction. Social capital, therefore, is not a product of government policy; however, social capital can be increased or destroyed by the State through public policy (Cox,1995).

## **Cross-Cultural Integration**

The concept of cross-cultural integration refers to the concept of culture, social capital, and integration. This concept discusses how a different cultural background owns social capital. Then, it can be unified, integrated into specific communities where there are norms and local values that maintain the relationship between the people remain harmonious and avoid conflict.

People in urban areas such as Malang have changed socio-cultural changes according to the development of Malang itself (Astutik, 1997). The people of Malang have a wide variety of backgrounds in their problems according to their social and economic status. As in the impoverished communities, the problems they often experience are access to public service and also the problem of empowering the urban poor (Astutik, 2012; 2013; 2014). In the context of this mentoring and assistance, of course, society does not distinguish ethnic and cultural backgrounds. However, this problem is undoubtedly different from the middle and upper classes. Ultimately, the problem can create gaps or gaps in the problems of each community. However, differences in ethnic and cultural backgrounds do not necessarily cause problems or open conflicts. It can be seen from the harmonious relationship between the Chinese and Javanese people in Malang city. The public relations of this group can take place well due to substantial social capital (Astutik, 2014).

Also, there are elements of local wisdom. It is owned by the people of the city of Malang different tribe that is the similarity of identity as a citizen of Malang or known as *Arek Malang* (Astutik, 2015). Especially to the Chinese community, despite having ancestors from China, they have been born and lived together in Indonesia for decades. This situation makes them more familiar with local culture and is not uncommon to have been related to local cultures (Effendi, 2016). So in the context of identity, this local identity is what is more formed or awakened than its diasporic identity. The existence of substantial social capital and accompanied by elements of this shared identity build networks between different peoples and cultural backgrounds. It creates an integrative network model in which the different communities are actively participating in building the integration of the nation (Astutik, 2016).

## **Identity and social identity**

Self-identity is an individual trait or circumstance or is also referred to as self-esteem. The word identity is derived from the English that has a literal sense, feature, sign, or self-attached to a person, group, or something that distinguishes it from others. Identity is also a whole or totality that demonstrates the specific traits or circumstances of a person or identity from biological, psychological, and sociological factors underlying individual behavior.

Psychologically, self-identity is a continuation of being a single and personal person recognized by others. From a personality psychology perspective, self-identity is a concept used to distinguish one individual from another. Thus, self-identity is a sense that refers to the specific identity of the individual. Self-identity can be called self-consciousness sourced from observation and judgment, which is the synthesis of all aspects of self-concept as a whole unit.

Social identity theory states that identities are tied to classify group membership. Social identity theories are meant to see the psychology of social relations between groups, group processes, and self-social. According to Jacobson (2003:236), Social identity theory focuses on individuals in identifying and classifies themselves based on their personal and social identities. Henry Tajfel defines social identity as an individual knowledge where a person feels like part of a group member who shares emotion and value. Social identity is also a person's self-concept as a group member. Identity can be in the form of nationality, race, ethnicity, working-class, religion, age, gender, ethnicity, descent, and others. Usually, the approach in social identity is closely related to inter relationship relations, as well as the natural life of society and society. According to social identity theory, individuals are not absolute individuals in life. Consciously or not, individuals are part of a particular group. In this case, the concept of social identity is how a person is socially able to be defined.

A common assumption about the concept of social identity, according to Tajfel, has some points. 1) Every individual always strives to nurture or elevate his or her self esteem. They strive to form a positive self-concept. 2) groups or social categories and members of them are associated with the connotations of positive or negative values. Therefore, social identity may be positive or negative depending on the evaluation (which refers to social consensus, even on cross-groups) that the group contributes to the individual's social identity. 3) Evaluation of one of the groups is trying to determine and also as reference material in other groups, specifically through social comparison in the form of attribute-value or characteristic. Jacobson (2003:5) explains that social identity is assumed to be the fundamental part of each individual's self-concept derived from their knowledge of a group. Or, social groups along with the value and emotional significance of the membership.

## **Perception**

Each person certainly has his or her views or opinions in the look of the same thing. These differences of opinion and views will, of course, be followed up with different responses and actions. This view is then called a perception. The perception of a person will determine how to look at a world. Perception is also called by views, descriptions, or assumptions because, in perception, there is a person's response to one thing or object.

According to Robbins (2003:97) describing that perception is an impression gained by the individual through the five senses than in the analysis (organized), interpreted and then evaluated, so that the individual gained meaning. Perception is a process preceded by sensing, which is a stimulus received by individuals through receptor tools that are the senses. The sensory instrument is a liaison between individuals and external worlds. Perception is the stimulus that the individual senses, organized, and then interpreted, so that individuals realize and understand what it senses. Perception has personal properties, as it relies on the abilities and circumstances of each individual so that it will be interpreted differently by one individual with the other. Thus perception is the process of individual treatment, likes giving feedback, meaning, description, or interpretation toward what is seen and heard. Then, it shapes individual behavior.

## **Research method**

This research is a qualitative study by taking case studies in the city of Malang, East Java province. Observation, interviews, documentation do data collection techniques, and focus group discussion (FGD). The objects of this study are prominent person form Javanese and Chinese community who active in social and cultural activities which involve both communities. Primary data obtained by interview and FDG to the object of study. While the secondary data obtained from documents, news, and articles from the media of the time, books, and journals as well as research reports. Data analysis is done by text analysis by analyzing the implied and expressed things in the data of interviews and secondary data.

## **Results and discussion**

### **Characteristics of the people of Malang**

The majority of the people of Malang are Javanese, but because of the high urbanization in Malang increases the diversity of composition, characteristic of the population to language in Malang. The majority of the languages of Malang are Javanese, and some are using the Madura language. When referring to the writings of Ignatius Kristanto and Yohan Wahyu on the Kompas (21/07/2008), the name "Java" attached to "East Java" was not described as a monoculture society.

Malang, the second-largest city in East Java after Surabaya, has expanded further, more characterized by a multicultural society that is driven by high urbanization flows. The predicate, as the largest city in East Java, makes many people from other regions come to find a decent livelihood in Malang city. Moreover, Malang, as the city of education, both college and *Pesantren* spawned the feature of Malang as a multicultural city. Malang City community tends to be accommodating and open as well as appreciative differences. Malang City Community is more known not to like the base of stale, if not glad they will reveal it. The people of Malang are

characterized as sportsmanship, dare to be accurate, firm, unyielding, easy to recite to anyone who has acknowledged the mistakes he has made.

The language that is used daily is Javanese (*ngoko*), but more subtle compared with the Javanese story, which is used by the people of Surabaya. The association is known as the slang *Arek Malang* (Malang youth), which is the *Walik-an Ngalam* language. The language of *Walikan* is one of the cultural traits of Malang city. *Osob Kiwalan* or *Boso Walikan* in ordinary Java is one of the unique languages or dialects that is owned by the people of Malang. This language is commonly used in daily conversation, from young to old. Although it is a common language, it is used as a unique password and code in the struggle for the war of independence. According to Dukut Imam Widodo in the Book of Malang Tempoe Doeloe, the language of *Walikan* was created by the People's guerrilla group of the city around 1949. It was used as a tactic to confront the many spies of the Dutch. At that time, the fighters were thinking of a certain way to send a message that is by *Boso Walikan*. Also, to ensure confidentiality and communication tools, this language is considered as an identity identifier between friends and opponents. The language of *Walikan* has become an identity language Malang people.

### **Culture of Javanese Arek**

According to Koentjaraningrat (1990:203), seven cultural elements cause the culture to be distinguished from its characteristics. The elements are religious systems, community organizational systems, knowledge systems, livelihood systems and economic systems, technological systems, tools, languages, and arts. Referring to Koentjaraningrat, the term "*Tlatah*" aims to describe the uniqueness and richness of culture and local wisdom of East Java owned. Based on the division of the *Tlatah*, then Malang is included in the culture of *Arek* other than Surabaya.

The term cultural *Arek* is born from history and sociological development. It comes from the melting culture (syncretism culture) of *Mataraman*, *Pendalungan*, and the effect of modern and industrial culture in Malang and Surabaya. Therefore, it is not surprising in our society often find the use of the word ' *riko* ' which means you/you who is a unique language *Banyuwangi Osing*. So, the Madura culture is so influential in the culture of Malang, one of which can be seen in the dance arts of *Sakerah* and *Marlena*, which is often found in cultural degree in Malang. Also, the traces of Madura culture can be found from typical clothes of Malang, such as the use of *Udeng*, *Beskap*, and so forth.

Similarly, the influence of *Mataraman* culture in Malang, one of them because of Malang adjacent to the more dominant Blitar area *Mataraman* such as traditional art, folk art, and modern art in Malang. Similarly, the cultural pattern of the people outside East Java, outside Java, and even the Western culture also thrived in Malang city. The *Arek* people are known to have a high fighting spirit, open and adaptable. The one that characterizes the *Arek* community is the "*bondo nekat*." Malang becomes one of the cultural centers of *Arek* because of the complex and diverse social situation. Malang also the center of education, economics, and tourism in East Java. After industrialization came in, the area became attractive to migrants. They are making it one of the cultural melting areas in East Java. Migrants from various ethnic groups are here to seek better livelihoods.

Following the vision and mission of Malang under the mayor of Malang H. Anton (The elected mayor from ethnic Chinese) is "to make Malang city as *bermartabat* (dignified) city." The term dignity refers to the self-esteem of humanity, which has the meaning of glory. Thus, the vision is expected to materialize a condition of glory for the city of Malang and its community. This situation is a direct translation of the concept of Islam on the *baldatun thoyyibatun wa robbun ghofur* (a prosperous country that is blessed by God).

To be called a dignified city, the local government seeks to realize a safe, orderly, clean, and beautiful city of Malang. The Malang society is independent, prosperous, prosperous, educated, and culturally. It has a high value of religiosity based on the attitude of tolerance to the differences in society. Besides, the vision of dignified can be an acronym of several priorities of development. It refers to the conditions that are to be realized from 2013 to

2018, namely: clean, prosperous, fair, religious tolerance (religious-tolerant), prominent, safe, cultured, beautiful, and educated.

Religious-tolerant, the realization of a religious and tolerant society, is a condition that must be embodied throughout 2013-2018. In a religious and tolerant society, all citizens practiced their religious teachings into ways of thinking, being, and doing. Any form of difference among the community is appreciated and used as a contributing factor for regional development. Therefore, with a tolerant religious understanding, there will be no conflict and disputes between communities based on the differences of SARA (*Suku, Agama, Ras, and Antar Golongan*/ ethnic, religion, race, and group) in the city of Malang.

### **Characteristics of the ethnic Chinese community in Malang City**

Geographically ethnic Chinese people in Malang City settle in elite areas, such as Chinatown, Blimbing Indah Residence, Araya Residence, Tidar Residence and Villa Puncak Tidar. Chinatown is identified as the region of ethnic Chinese. It is adjacent to the large market complex of Malang city, which trade activity in it mingled with traders from tribes of Java, Madura, Padang, Arab, and others. Thus, the boundary of Chinatown with Javanese ethnic communities is increasingly blurred because of the economic growth in the surrounding area. The environment now transforms from residential to trade areas with buildings in the form of a shop complex. Various ethnic traders in the big market of Malang City run their trading efforts by mutual respect.

According to the reviews of Radar Malang (16/02/2018), there are many ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, especially in Malang city. However, there are six great ethnicities, among others; Fu Qing, Zhang Quan, Guang Zhao, Hakka, Hubei, and Heng Hwa. The feature of the economic activity of Chinese society in Malang is describing which ethnic they are belonging. Many Chinese citizens come from the Fu Qing ethnic, struggling in the textile business. Some of them also worked as an important position in the government. The Fu Qing was the largest ethnic community compared to other Chinese ethnicities. Then the Zhang Quan many who were involved in agricultural products. Guangzhou is involved in the furniture business and sells household appliances. While the grocery store business that is widely found in the central area of Malang comes from Hakka and Heng Hwa opened a bicycle shop while the Hubei tribe opened an optic shop.

Ethnic Chinese in Malang are generally the second generation, and the third generation that most of them are young. There is the influence of ethnicity on the type of business, but in the character development are increasingly blurred. Many of them have expertise beyond their tribal characters or in the profession outside the trade. Like the narrative of HEM, a member of the Advisory board of *Forum Komunikasi Warga Tionghoa Malang Raya/FKWTMR* (Communication Forum of ethnic Chinese in Greater Malang):

"If first, there is an ethnic that excels in specific fields. However, now I think it is already a complex of their expertise. Decades ago, the Hakka opened a grocery store. However, now many have penetrated other professions, such as doctors and architects".

Nevertheless, the association of the tribes is still needed as a container to accommodate issues between members of the association, such as economic difficulties, arranged marriage, funeral ceremonies, and others.

Unlike Haris Emerta, a peace activist from Batu, Lilik Sugianto Lie argues that the ethnic identity no longer determines the profession or type of business. because the profession of Chinese now is diverse, but in the case of finding a tribal identity is no longer held. "Today, Chinese citizens are already freely married between tribes. If the anciently, circa 1970, could not marry different Chinese ethnics. "

The ethnic Chinese community in Malang has an organization that oversees them, namely the Communication Forum of the ethnic Chinese in Greater Malang (FKWTMR). Greater Malang consists of three local administration: City of Malang, City of Batu and Malang Municipality. The organization has 16 members, the Bimasakti Malang Foundation, Guang Zhao Association, Hubei East Java Association, Panca Dharma, Malang Xin Li Xiao You Hui, Fu Qing Association, Eng An Kiong temple foundation, Fajar Dharma Social Association,

Zhang Quan Association, Association of Ma Chung Alumni, Huang Clan Association, Guang Zhao Group, Kwan Im Tong temple foundation, Vihara Samaggi Viriya, the Social Society of Panca Budi, Hakka Association, and the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI).

Vice-chairman of FKWTMR Sutjipto Goenawan asserted that the KWTMR objective is to unite the ethnic Chinese in Malang. Also, to support tolerance in order to maintain unity and unity. Tolerance is not merely caring for harmony among religious people but also Chinese ethnics themselves. According to the Chinese people should be tolerant and have a profound social concern. Therefore, the Chinese citizens of Malang through FKWTMR always provide logistical assistance to the victims of natural disasters. He said, "The mission of the FKWTMR is to be a tolerance to safeguard unity. Tolerance is not merely caring for harmony between religious people, but also among ethnic Chinese. Chinese people should have a sense of tolerance and care. "

### **Shared identity of ethnic Chinese and Javanese in Malang as Arema as social capital**

Society is a unity of human life that interacts according to a specific conventional system that is continuous and bound by a sense of mutual identity (Gillin, 1948). The process of maintaining ethnic pluralism cohesiveness in the community can be done by a shared identity that awakens between them to eliminate or slightly reduce the differences and identities of each of them.

The city of Malang, with its plural community conditions, both tribes, religions, and races, have the potential to trigger conflict, especially when the conflict is a national political product. The 1998 tragedy is a bad experience for Indonesians who leave enough trauma, especially for ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia, which is no exception in Malang. One crucial aspect that can minimize the clash between ethnics in Malang City is the importance of shared identity building. Identity crisis can create a vulnerability conflict, but on the other hand, the plural society that is bound by a sense of mutual identity can reduce any potential conflicts. In this section, we will discuss the construction of shared identity between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Javanese in Malang city.

Identity is an individual who refers to a specific trait not only physically, but more than that. Identity includes the value of the essentials inherent to a person, such as self-esteem and a dignity, honored and appreciated in daily life. Refers to the cultural studies perspective, identity is entirely a social culture construction. No identity can exist beyond the representation or acculturation of culture. The identity of a person or group then becomes vulnerable to any changes occurring around it, such as domination, minority, or the hegemony of a ruler that causes the identity to change.

Some ethnic Chinese figures demonstrate the work hard for the sake of Indonesia. Yap Thiam Hien, Teguh Karya, Teguh Srimulat, and Tan Tjeng Bok became a prominent figure in their field. There are some international athletes like Susi Susanti, Rudy Hartono, Liem Swi King, and Alan Budi Kusuma. While in economic, there is some prominent business person like Liem Soei Liong, Ciputra, Sudono Salim, and others. The assimilation of ethnic Chinese identity is demonstrated with various activities manifested in the sense of nationality. According to Effendi (2017), the Chinese community can be divided into three groups based on their generation. First is the old generation. This generation is an ethnic Chinese citizen who has been educated in Chinese education until the year 1965. Therefore most of them can speak Mandarin. These older generations had the closeness to China. However, for matters relating to the Indonesian nationalism, they also have the same feelings of nationalism as the indigenous peoples of Indonesia. However, unique feelings of nationalism did not soften their proud feelings as Chinese.

Second, the younger generation. This generation is the children of the descendants born in the year 1970s to 1990s. They do not experience Mandarin education like the old generation. Therefore it is natural that most of them do not speak Mandarin and do not know much about Chinese culture. Third, the new generation. This generation is a derivative of the ethnic Chinese who was born after the political reform. They engage more with Indonesian identity or as an Indonesian citizen. They have no closeness to China and are more moderate. Particularly for the young and new generations, even though on one side retains the ethnic identities that they inherited, but it does not separate to feeling as Malang's people.



According to Mr. Rd. C, some of those Chinese citizens, especially the older generations, still have felt that the settlers were from China. However, related to the feelings of nationalism, R. Chandra has a little difference with Effendi. According to him, to change the feelings of nationalism towards that old generation is not easy because the old generation is indeed born in China, then migrate to Indonesia. The development of nationalism itself was complicated by political issues during the New Order regime, so that Chinese identity was more durable than the Indonesians, such as the following quotation:

"... However, it is based entirely on the old ethnic Chinese, and they were born in the land of China, is not easy to change it. The mindset that has formed during the New Order further strengthens the ethnic identity of the Chinese itself. "

Chandra's statement reinforces that the mix is not easy to bring up feelings of nationalism as the Indonesian nation and blend with the local ethnic Javanese. It primarily relates to the identity of the culture of each ethnic. An essential point in research is also found that there is a cultural pragmatism applied by the ethnic Chinese people of Malang in associating with the majority of Javanese in Malang. Cultural pragmatism is demonstrated by not having any question about national identity when associating. They conform to the environment and culture of their residence without having to remove their original identity as ethnic Chinese derivatives. They can become adaptive to characterize both *Arema* and Chinese simultaneously, depending on whom they gather. Togetherness, as an *Arema*, is a big excuse to mingle with other ethnicities. It is as acknowledged in the following quotation:

"It is fully acknowledged that in the ethnic groups of Javanese-ethnic Chinese, each has its own culture, a strong identity that characterizes it. Without eliminating each other's identity, as a community of Malang city, we live in a togetherness atmosphere that all characterize the identity of Malang – *Arema*. So there is no more partition between us when associating with the people of Malang. Because when we ethnic Chinese interact with our fellow ethnicities, we show our ethnic identity. However, if it is already in the community forum, then we should be part of the Malang society. It means we must be able to put ourselves where and in the atmosphere of what."

The older generation of the ethnic Chinese in Malang became the original cultural holder. With them, Chinese customs and culture as their identities are still well maintained. The significance of the elderly class is vital amid the diminishing attention of the young generation and the new generation of the original culture of their ancestors. It is the case that continues to preserve the richness of pluralism in Indonesia, especially in the city of Malang.

The general public perception of the exclusivity of the lives of Chinese in some ways is not entirely accurate. Thus, ethnic Chinese are very open to Javanese culture. Many Javanese famous artists in Malang are ethnic Chinese. One of them is Sudarno, a chairman of *Paguyuban Tosan Aji Sangga Braja* in Batu City. Sudarno is an artist that examines the cultural and *keris* (weapons tools) of the archipelago, especially the Javanese *Keris*. Besides, Bambang Andrian Wenzel, a culture, painter, novelist, cartoonist, who is the advisor to the modern organization of ethnic Chinese people (Indonesian Chinese corporation). As an artist, the problem of Chinese identity is not an obstacle because they are born and grew in Java, so they still feel like Malang people. The Chinese identity is used as a communication language between Chinese people only.

According to Bambang AW, many ethnic Chinese do not distinguish itself from the Javanese in Malang. When asked, they came from where they proudly said himself, *Arek* Malang (*AREMA*). Their ethnicity is specific to ethnic Chinese. Besides demonstrating the similarity or identity between fellow Chinese citizens, ethnic identity is also used to develop a business network and negotiation. Chinese citizens in Malang have melted into one with ethnic Javanese people through many social and cultural approaches.

However, the exclusivity of the Chinese community still occurs. To understand this phenomenon need to learn the history of the Chinese people of Malang different from the Chinese people in other cities in East Java.

Malang is the center of the Dutch military during colonial times. Some Chinese people in Malang can be entrepreneurs from outside the city of Malang who are looking for security in the area of Malang. *Arema* as an identity. We can not say it as a shared identity, but has a great potential to be a forerunner of shared identity between ethnic Chinese and Javanese in the city of Malang. In the context of social integration between ethnic Chinese and Javanese in the city of Malang, *Arema* is already a form of social capital even though it is not a collective identity. *Arema*, as an actual identity, arises and is maintained due to football. Through this sport, the 'we feeling' as a community of Malang is constructed firmly. It is no exception to those of the younger generations of Chinese ethnic and new generations.

### **Perception of Chinese society on identity**

The perception of the ethnic Chinese self is divided into three groups. They are *totok*, *peranakan* and ethnic Chinese with a Western-oriented lifestyle. This section described how the interaction between ethnic Chinese as a minority group with ethnic Javanese as the majority group that is more dominant in power and role in the social, cultural, and political fields. Their relations mainly in economic relations that happened centuries ago.

The perception of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia is substantially not separated from the understanding of identity and the placement of personal positions that are themselves as foreign citizens, or Indonesian citizen, or even Peranakan Chinese residing in Indonesia. The Chinese perception of him in this regard to his ethnicity can be seen from the six grouping perceptions consisting of; Perception of ethnicity, perception of cultural behavior, perception of social class, perception of religion in social life, perception of Gender difference, perception of different age (Agus Salim,2006:143).

First is the perception of the Chinese people of Malang towards their ethnicity. Chinese people love to associate with fellow ethnic groups. It is later known as exclusivity. However, if it is judging again, the exclusivity itself is not separated from the political history factor of separation applied by the new Order regime. In addition to political-historical factors, the exclusivity of the ethnic Chinese in Malang derived from the political economy position during the Dutch colonialism. They were the majority of the large entrepreneurs who approach the ruler in the Central military area during the colonial rule in the area of Malang. To secure the assets and their company, then ask for protection to the military. Then, it is the pride that being a Chinese is proud. This pride affects the behavior of maintaining ethnic identity by way of learning languages or writing Mandarin, living in groups, and using Chinese names and languages. The last Chinese have a high working ethic that is seen from their persistence in work.

Second is the perception of Chinese society on culture. The Chinese are very respectful of the ancestor's culture. The respect for this ancestral cultural heritage has kept them preserving the symbols of the Chinese ethnic culture as their characteristic or identity. Thirdly is the perception of the Chinese toward social class. They recognize that there always a social stratification in the life of a society where rich and poor. It is a consequence of human behavior that is not detached from the work ethic, lazy behavior, education, and others. The rich man did tend to be arrogant, therefore making a gap and far from togetherness. At the same time, poverty occurred because there were people who were lazy to work and could not regulate commercial use.

Fourth, the perception of religion in social life. Ethnic Chinese understand that religion is teaching that regulates human life. Therefore each man has his own beliefs that are sourced from the teachings of religion. The Chinese have ancestral religions that are still being embraced. The diversity of religion is grace and cannot be distinguished. Religious people are, therefore, to respect and cherish each other. Every sharp distinction will make obstacles in the harmony of the lives of humankind. The understanding of religion is still very superficial will bring out the distinction so that it can cause conflict among religious people.

The fifth is the perception of gender differences. Given gender issues, the ethnic Chinese people of Malang have the view that gender differences are prejudice to society. Man is a pride in the family that a boy has a huge responsibility in the family as the successor generation of the family. Meanwhile, girls should be more

protective. Sixth, the perception of their age difference has the view that young children must respect their parents or ancestors. Instead, the old generation should respect each other also to the young.

### **Javanese people's perception of identity**

Javanese people's perception of self can be depicted in a few points. First is the perception of its ethnicity. Javanese sees the Javanese have a mental superiority of its character, more like to help, like to group, cooperative, but also can be selfish and rude. Secondly, the Javanese perception of cultural behavior is the similarity and obligation to respect each other. More refined Javanese culture in behavior and language must be high and preserved. One part of the belief of Javanese people, there are still many who are very confident in the things that are mysterious and unseen.

The third is the perception of social class. Javanese think social strata are given. It is a reality that is outlined by God, where the establishment of social distribution is based on destiny. Therefore there is a rich, and some are poor. The concept of living "*Nrimo*" in the Javanese people's view is not separated from the perception of the distribution of resources as given. The rich and poor belief of creation requires the people to give each other and cooperate in life so that life is balanced. Fourth, the ethnic Javanese view of religion in social life. The difference is a reality that must be understood so that people must respect each other for the differences that exist and complement each other's shortcomings. Fifth, against gender, Javanese tends to be patriarchist, where men tend to be more appreciated than women because of their position as the head of the family, in-house captains, and respected in society. They look at women is a weak creature that must be protected, and women's beauty is an appeal to men against him. Sixth, the community has the view that reverence towards the older is essential. Young people must have "*unggah ungguh*" and *tata krama* (manner) against the older, and vice versa, the elderly respect and "*ngemong*" to the younger.

### **Perception between Javanese and Chinese society**

This section describes how the perception between ethnic Javanese and Chinese regarding other ethnic groups, in this case, how ethnic Javanese view ethnic Chinese and otherwise ethnic Chinese look at ethnic Javanese.

First is the perception of other ethnicities. In the Javanese view, in their daily associations, the ethnic Chinese love to group with their fellow ethnicity and exclusive. However, ethnic Chinese is considered to be positive in terms of hardworking and resilient work ethic. To understand more about how ethnic Chinese has required the experience of associating with other ethnic. While in the ethnic Chinese view, ethnic Javanese love to live in groups by associating his fellow ethnic. Javanese people like to look down on other ethnicities, mainly ethnic Chinese. From the behavior, ethnic Javanese are unbelievable and somewhat lazy, less diligent in work.

Second is the judgment of cultural behavior. Javanese look at ethnic Chinese has a must-respected ancestral culture, and there are many Chinese who like and pursue Javanese culture. Also, the Chinese are happy to live on their own and pragmatic. This pragmatism, according to the Javanese people's view that the Chinese are associating with the Javanese when they have a need. On the other hand, ethnic Chinese view Javanese as slow to work and strive, but they have a subtle speech and practice. Then, the Chinese view there is no distinction between the Chinese and Javanese, even the mix is not questionable and questioned again because of the cultural understanding and interest between the Javanese and Chinese people.

Third, the perception of social class, ethnic Java sees that the Chinese are wealthy and more proud and willing to win themselves. However, the Javanese realize that the concept of rich and poor is destiny (given). Instead, the Chinese saw that when the Javanese people wanted to change, they had to be hard workers and to be skilled in life. Fourth, religious perception in social life. Both Javanese and Chinese people are not necessarily a contradiction because each person has their way of choosing beliefs and no compulsion towards one's beliefs. Mutual understanding and respect are essential to prevent and keep conflicts of religion. A superficial understanding of other religions will cause conflicts. The difference is that Javanese tend to avoid debates

between religions and the importance of understanding one another to avoid conflict. At the same time, the Chinese view of interfaith opposition is an effort to strengthen confidence.

Fourth, is the perception of gender. Javanese see Chinese boys getting better treatment from their families. According to the concept of patriarchy, there is a similarity between Javanese and Chinese. It is influenced by patriarchy that the position of men is higher than women. These two ethnicities also tend to be the same in looking at that women are more concerned about the feeling of more rational male approaches. However, for the Chinese people, the position of women in Javanese society tends to be risky than men. Lastly, in terms of the ages differences, Javanese and Chinese view that young people should be more respectful to the elderly, and vice versa, the older ones guide, the younger.

### **Construction of shared identity through social capital (trust, value/norms and network of cooperation)**

#### **Trust**

Trust is growing hope in a society that is demonstrated by the behavior of honest, orderly, and cooperation based on the value being embraced together (Fukuyama,1995). Social confidence is a product of adequate social capital. In comparison, good social capital is characterized by the existence of a robust social institution and gives birth to a harmonious social life (Putnam,1995).

The history strongly influences the implementation of social capital on Javanese-Chinese relations. The early Chinese arrival in *Nusantara* was found in the history of several kingdoms in the past and relics of ancient objects. Some argue that the Chinese had come to the archipelago long before the ad century began. According to Koentjaraningrat (1993:3), the oldest Indonesian human beings existed about a million years ago. They lived when Sunda Plain was still land or when the Southeast Asia continent was still united. The Sundanese people (Malaysia, Sumatra, Java, Straits of Malacca, and the Java Sea Now) have physical characteristics of *Pithecanthropus Erectus* whose are found in a cave near Peking and other East Asia. The characteristic of this fossil is also found in the fossil in Bengawan Solo Valley.

Setiono's analysis (2004:7-8) show different processes but provide the same final findings. According to natural disasters, wars, and other causes, Malays spread from the Southern Asian continent to Southeast Asia. Some of them arrived and settled in *Nusantara*. The first wave of Malay propagation was called the old Malay or Proto Melayu. They spread occurred in 1,500 BC. Negrito and Wedda, which was the first race of the inhabitants of the *Nusantara* archipelago, was finally blended and pressed into the suburbs by the old Malay group. The distribution of the 2nd Wave group is called the young Malay or Deutero Melayu, which occurred around 200-300th BC. They are from Yunnan, South China. Then blend in with the old Malay group that eventually became a significant part of the Nation of Indonesia (Paul Heryanto,2006:3)

An interview with Mr. Rd.C suggests that:

"Javanese trust in Chinese is complicated and takes a long time. It is considering the history when during the Dutch colonial period, ethnic Chinese were utilized by the Dutch to supervising the work of the indigenous peoples. The Javanese regarded that the Chinese oppressed, blackmail, inhumane, help foreigners do not help the indigenous. From this situation, there arose a high sense of distrust, even the prejudice of racism in Javanese society against the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia".

In the relations with the family business seems to be an exclusivity considering the company/business was established, built by family, and reserved for the survival of the family. Therefore it is impossible to have the leadership of the company fell to others, especially ethnic Javanese. It is also related to the belief in business development. There have been collaborations (partners) between employers (ethnic Chinese) with employees (ethnic Javanese) or in sociology known as "Patron Client." It based on the interview with Mr. Rd.C, who is driving that:

"Today there has been a good change shown by ethnic Chinese in giving confidence to the business that run with one of its employees in the "Momon" shop located on Gatot Subroto Street in Malang. This shop sells building equipment, including iron, with various types and sizes. When one of its employees also opened the same business as the location in the area, the employee took the goods all from his employer without capital. However, given the trust to develop themselves, once the new goods are paid following the price while taking. Until now, it remained sponsored and no problem. With the principle of business must continue despite a slight profit."

## Value

Norm consists of understanding, values, hopes, and goals that are believed and run together by a group of people. Norms can be sourced from religion, moral guidance as well as secular standards as well as a professional code of ethics. The norm is a standard that will play a role in regulating and control the behavior of society. Norm is a pre-condition or product of social trust.

Value is a hereditary idea considered pure and essential by a group of people. Value has always been instrumental in societal life; the value will distinguish between right and wrong, what is good and bad. Each ethnic has a value (value) that is high and obeyed in daily life. Paulus Haryono (2006:225) suggests that the value can be distinguished into two, namely: 1) Cultural value and 2) social value.

The Chinese have three beliefs that are the traditions of the ancestors, namely Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. The highest level that man can achieve is the position of "wise wisdom." It is something that his self is already "equal" with the universe (identification of the individual with the universe). Confucian teachings heavily influenced the work ethic of the Chinese. In Confucianism, there is a teaching called "triangular relations," which is the relationship between Confucianism, family, and work. This relationship has a close connection with each other.

Confucianism gives much attention to family institutions. Three of the five public relations are family relationships (husband-wife, father-daughter, old brother/sister, and younger brother/sister); Even two other relationships (ruler-people, friends) should also be treated as a family relationship. The first moral planting should happen to the family. If in the family, there is a harmonious relationship, then the society of the world will be orderly and peaceful. The child's devotion to parents takes place in the family; Forms of adoration to a still-outlined ancestor are also talking about the family. The use of the surname, a family title taught and meticulously given by Confucius, speaks about the interwoven of the family. Most of Confucius' teachings are addressed rationally to justify the family's Community system. His teachings about the family were theoretically and ethically expressed.

Work ethic is connected with family. One form of respect for parents is if one can demonstrate their work correctly. Confucius said, "though your father and mother have passed away, if you can work properly, it will show how you have been to scent the great name of your parents and all your dreams will be accomplished. But conversely, if you work not well, then you have given the disgrace of your parents, and you will not reach your minds "(The Saying of Confucius, 1985:9). When a person is put to the name of the parents, the person has the meaning that he has committed no devotion and respect to the parents (put Hao). People who are not able to work correctly, it is not devoted to parents and getting punishment in the hereafter. People who can work well, give understanding to parents (Hao) will gain rewards in the hereafter.

A child should show his or her spiritual taste to both parents in a variety of ways. If a parent is still present, a child must be able to care for and entertain the elderly. When the parents were gone, he had to worship as a sign of his devotion. All things to care for, entertain, and worship will undoubtedly cost a lot. However, there are many Chinese festivals to be celebrated in a year, when they will love the celebration, the partying of the family that overpowers families and worship the ancestors. The higher the celebration, the festivities, and the cult performed, then the more fragrant their parents' names and the higher the reward received. But that is all with the record, the higher the cost to be spent. Therefore, for the sake, good name, for the sake of ideals and the future reward, one must work hard to finance all sorts of feasts and festivals.

The Chinese's work ethic lies in the desire for devotion to family and gain reward later in the hereafter. It is a resemblance to the Christian work ethic with the Protestant ethics propounded by Max Weber. The difference is on the work ethic of China's happiness in the hereafter gained much through intervening variables around The family. In contrast, happiness in the Protestant ethic work will be obtained directly towards The Rightness. The social value inherent in ethnic Chinese is based on the Confucianism teachings that instill: 1) The value of harmony, which resists violence and bases itself on mutual trust, indicating the value that distanced itself from the conflict, plus his teachings on Jen (goodness), Chun-Tzu (like to serve/help others, great-soul and Taoist teaching that invites to understand other people, 2) The principle of respect, Li in a Confucian concept that has the meaning of politeness and respect based on age and family relationships, based on the teachings of Pat Tikyang contains eight human beings obligations including devoted (Hao), Humble (Tee), Satya (Tiong), Susila (Lee), uphold the truth, justice, obligation and sincerity (Gie), Holy Heart (Lian), trustworthy (Sien) and know shame/recognize self-esteem (Thee). 3) Policy ethics teaches that wise men are prudent people who can establish a relationship within the community from a moral point, 4) the Middle Way (Chung Yung), whose meaning should not be excessive, 5) marriage for life.

By understanding the social value of ethnic Chinese people is the same as the social value of ethnic Javanese people. Different social values are related to the respect of ethnic Chinese respect based on age and family relationships. In contrast, for Javanese society, the value of respect is based on the position of a person in the supervision of the hierarchical society. The difference in social value is also on the understanding of marriage. In ethnic Chinese, marriages are intended to continue family, clan, and family customs, so the selection of prospective couples, many get the consideration of the family party. While in Javanese marriage, society is intended to form households and get marital status in the community, so the selection of prospective couples is more based on individual consideration.

As for the thing that distinguishes between socio-cultural values in Chinese and Javanese society is about the work ethic, the value of respect, and the philosophical understanding of marriage. The work ethic of ethnic Chinese is aimed at families. In contrast, in ethnic Javanese, it is oriented to the efforts to gain a top position in the arrangement of community hierarchy. The value of Chinese respect is based on age and family relationships. While for Javanese society, it is based on the degree of one's position in the arrangement of societal hierarchy, as well as about the value of marriage.

Whatever the difference in the value of social culture between two ethnicities, but they are paying respect to typical values as Malang people or *Arema*. Mr.Rd.C suggests that:

"Fully recognized that on Chinese and Javanese, each has a culture, a strong identity that characterizes its attitude. Without eliminating each other's identity, as a community of Malang city, we live in a togetherness atmosphere that all characterize the identity of Malang – *Arema*. So there are no more barriers between us when associating with the community of Malang. Since we ethnic Chinese interact with our fellow ethnicities, we bring our ethnic identity. However, if it is already in the community, then we should be part of the community of Malang city. It means we should be able to put ourselves where and in the atmosphere of what the value that we have to run and keep is the value that binds us as inhabitants/citizens of the city of Malang. Therefore, our activities no longer reflect ethnicity, but as part of the community of Malang. I think the same value is embraced ethnic Javanese and Chinese, as respect for older people (ethics of modesty in behaving, the value of togetherness in families who must uphold the good name of the family) ".

## Network

The society is inherently dynamic concerning other communities through interaction and various relationships, which are established voluntarily, mutually adjoining, similarity, freedom, and privacy. The network is usually intertwined with a typology with group characteristics. Groups are traditionally formed based on similarities in lineage, experience, and similarity of belief. Strengthening social capital is the most crucial element in national

development, especially those involving the problem of national integration. Social capital, with its elements, namely network, norms, and trust, is a collaboration (coordination and cooperation) of social in togetherness. It is the necessary foundation as a capital for the sustainability of life and the lives of people to achieve common goals.

Nation integration is needed because, in life in society, there are different characteristics owned by the community, such as ethnic, religious, and racial differences. This situation shows that there is diversity/multiculturalism in people's lives. Referring to the opinion of Agus Salim (2006:7) suggests that one characteristic of a multicultural society is the recognition and celebration of differences in the array of both individual and cultural. Multicultural Society grew beginning with the realization that human life in a society and culture is pluralist. It is realized that diversity is the norm and the potential to understand each other. Thus the implementation of a multicultural approach contains the assumption that every culture and society has its way of life. It must be understood from the context of society and culture in question.

Another concept that is almost similar to multiculturalism is pluralism or diversity in a cross-cultural psychological approach. In this view, the multicultural community is a compound society (a population in general, a variety of patriotic that is in the constellation). Moreover, governments value and allow diversity to remain sustainable (Berry,1999 in Agus Salim,2006:7). A multicultural society is a society that receives integration as a common means of dealing with cultural diversity. From a multicultural statement, the need to be met by a diverse cultural composition is social integration, where this integration is essential and urgent for the sake of the community itself. Until now, many issues related to and posed by a multicultural composition that composes the imagination of the Indonesian nation is the relationship between Chinese and indigenous ethnic (Javanese).

A multicultural society is a concept to refer to the harmonious and diverse social relations that each culture has been autonomous. To avoid the bias of cultural ethnocentrism and *jug aide*, which states that one culture is superior to the other culture, it takes a good conflict management strategy. Multicultural society, in its development, will link to the concept of living together. To achieve living together in the life of the need to avoid cultural bias, that is ethnocentrism, cultural domination, and a top-down approach. Instead, the consistent approach is used to provide more data from the social, economic, and political systems of holistic to explain the interrelationship, the characteristics of the multicultural, and the success of life together.

The characteristic of this multicultural society can be seen in various activities of the inter-religious communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama/FKAUB*) that always conduct communication and conduct activities together. This forum uses to increases religious tolerance in the city of Malang. It is affected by the conflict between ethnics or among religious people. The value of tolerance is not only done during religious or social activities but also in various areas of life. The event was also confirmed by Mr.Rd.C, as the General Secretary of the Board of Eng An Kiong Temple:

"Not only tolerance in the religion and social relations, but we also open a Mandarin language education that can be accessed by the public and a free health facility for the poor people without differentiating their background or status. We also invited by the government to discuss public policy related to ethnic and religious relations."

Based on the analysis relating to the mix of attitudes, it has been explained that prejudice is an attitude of suspicion against other ethnicities. It is usually negative, as the Chinese ethnic *Missal* is said to have economic life by debuting all sorts of ways. In contrast, ethnic Chinese think the Javanese are reluctant to work hard but want a high income. This prejudice occurs because there is a difference of view in understanding material and work.

The existence of Eng An Kiong temple is not only a symbol of the existence of the people of *Khong Hu Chu* in Malang but also as a place, media, the means of various elements of society, including the communities around Malang, to blend into the community of Malang. To foster the harmony of religious people in Malang, the inter-

religious communication Forum was established. In its declaration, it not only involved the religious leaders of each but also involved the police department and local government of Malang.

Mr Rd.C, a community leader and education figure, stated about the long journey of the establishment of the forum:

"To maintain the harmony of our religious people with other religious figures in the city of Malang, we established the inter-religious communication Forum in September 1998. It aims to assure security in the religion, especially with regards to the implementation of the feast of each religious people in the city of Malang. Where the agenda is made together with mutual agreement on the date and place of the gathering. Each month, the discussions are interchangeably in places of worship. All the representatives of various religions in the city of Malang give positive comments, even until now continue with involving the police department and local government (the mayor) "

Based on the interview, there has been tolerance and cooperation among cross-religious figures, police departments, and local governments. They realize the unity of people in Malang, and this characterizes the multicultural society.

The Chinese tend to have a mindset of functionalism so that the various ways to reach the goal. The way to worship Confucianism by a people is considered as idolatry. Confucianism is not recognized in the past. Therefore the worship ceremonies get reaffirmation. However, by political reform, the government recognize Confucianism as one of the official religions in Indonesia. Even in the city of Malang has stood the oldest temple, namely Eng An Kiong Temple, which witnessed the history of diversity of ethnic in Malang City.

This temple has programs to improve the tolerance of the people of Malang. Every year the temple held free medical programs and social activities that were done together with the community around the temple. Also, this temple is working together with an organization called PITI or *Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia* (Indonesian Chinese Muslim Association). Before establishing cooperation with the organization, Eng An Kiong Temple conducts activities that can unite among religious tribes in Malang city. The phenomenon is the effort of the local government of Malang City and all its ranks because following the vision of Malang makes Malang City "dignified." One of the most critical points is religious-tolerant. All citizens practiced the teachings of their respective religions into the form of thinking, being, and doing. Any form of difference among the community is appreciated and used as a contributing factor for regional development. Therefore, with a tolerant religious understanding, there will be no conflict and disputes between communities in the city of Malang.

Chinese Indonesian Muslims established an organization named *Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia* (PITI). It was established in 1986, which is in the direct head by Chinese indigenous or Javanese. Mr.Rudi, as the general secretary of the caretaker Eng An Kioang temple, explained that in holding an event, the temple always involving the local people from different ethnicity and religious background.

"We always do activities together. It is not only those who have the important influence that we invite but also the people of the city who want to come to help or just look at our activities".

In this respect, the vision and mission that is always carried out in multi-ethnic and religious activities is "togetherness and mutual respect among the people." The value of tolerance becomes a high value in the life of inter-religious people in Malang. In hopes of the harmony of inter-ethnicity. In Malang, itself values of togetherness, which is coupled with the value of tolerance, proved to unite the society of the multicultural city of Malang and this religion. Mr. Rudi also explains it:

"Every time we do, our worship feels calm and comfortable because we feel a strong sense of tolerance in the community of Malang. Also, if other religions such as Islam that are doing the Eid prayer lack the place to do the activities, we always open to provide a place for prayer. As well as when we perform the worship in the temple, Muslims also appreciate and support our worship activities".



Activities such as social events (*baksos*) are always done together, especially with the PITI organization that each month routine helps to raise funds and help the implementation of the activities. Social services like provide raw food and also second-hand clothing bazaar donated by donors who are in the temple and from the PITI members. It is also emphasized by the statement of the daily chairman of the PITI organization. Slamet, as the chairman of the PITI, explained that the activities are done by collecting clothes that are not in use but still worth wearing, then in a deposit to the head office of PITI or Eng An Kiong Temple. Mr. Slamet said:

"PITI members themselves are always demanded to donate clothes with the criteria it has been determined by the manager so that even if the clothes used, still look like new. The used clothes we sell for Rp. 15,000 per cloth. Even our activities are also in the example by the PITI organization outside the city of Malang. They sell cheaper than the price we have set for Rp. 5000,- per cloth, "

These activities have been a routine agenda carried out from the year held by the PITI and Eng An Kiong temple. Also, PITI always held regular studies every month. This activity is also open public even non-Muslims can also be present to listen to lectures by Islamic scholars who are in law every month. This activity was done to introduce Islam to the Chinese people who are interested in studying Islam and converted to Islam. However, in this case, PITI will not force members to enter Islam. This organization hosts not only the Chinese Muslim community but also the non-Muslim Chinese community also can join as the members, even the committee.

"We never force people to become Moslem. We just want to introduce what is Islam to them; the thing they are entering Islam is the right of each person. However, when the Chinese have converted to Islam, we also facilitate it, because sometimes they are ignored by family and needs to find his livelihood independently. "

PITI itself now has no permanent office, but the year 2016, it has been assisted by the government to build a central office to devalue all activities that are channeled by PITI. The abundance of activities that are carried out in the joint and a high tolerance sense will always bring peace to people who have a diversity or multi-ethnic and cultural as in the city of Malang. The existence of organization and Forum of Communication among the religious people proved that the city of Malang could create the middle of the difference in the city of Malang.

## Conclusion

We have several conclusion on the relations between Javanese and Chinese identity in Malang City:

1. The identity of the community is not separated from the historical background of the society. Therefore, the identity inherent in each ethnic has a specification that characterizes the peculiarities of each. Javanese people have an identity or identified with the physical characteristic like skin color, long hair (for women), round eyes, while the social identity such as: polite, uphold the value/norm/grammar/customs, easy to associate, like to help (*Guyub* and *gotong rotong*). Ethnic Chinese having a physical identity of narrow eyes, bright skin, round face, and straight-haired (non-wavy), while his social identity is exclusive, hardworking, fisted.
2. Community perception is strongly influenced by a few factors, such as age, education level, life experience. From the subject of this study has resulted in Javanese ethnic perception
3. Construction of identity and perception between ethnic Javanese and Chinese people formed through social capital (honesty, value/norms, and network).

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