Institutional Deficit and its Effect on Afghan Political Order: Narrative of Decay within the Government

1. Introduction

Military forces led by the United States of America (USA) entered Afghanistan following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Then, the Bonn Agreement was signed between the leaders of Afghanistan to establish a democratic government led by Hamid Karzai. Hope increased for the future of Afghanistan as a democratic government with capable institutions that can institutionalize the rule of law, legitimacy, and accountability. Only a fraction of poured dollars were utilized to build infrastructure, schools, or other public services critical to developing inclusive institutions or even restoring order and rule of law. The presence and cooperation of the international community in Afghanistan weakened the government and its laws, instead of strengthening the institutions of the government. Most of the resources were catastrophically corrupted and wasted due to the lack of a strong and accountable government. The suffocating rule of the national and local petty kings who ruled the political and economic life of the people broke the chain of the rule of law or well-functioning legal system. The extreme weakness of the rule of law and the lack of accountability of the government raised the alarm of robberies and big political and economic thefts, resulting in forcing the democratic government born in the Bonn Agreement to go astray and turn into an uncontrollable monster. According to development thinkers such as Robinson and Acemoglu, Afghanistan appears to have become a bankrupt state due to the existence of weak and non-inclusive governmental institutions or the lack of powerful political and economic institutions. The result was disastrous, despite efforts to establish a democratic, pluralistic, accountable, and transparent Afghan government whose orders are implemented throughout the country, indicating that no institution in the history of Afghanistan or any part of this country provides an example of such an extensive effort. Traditionally, Afghanistan has been regarded as a geographical term for a region which was never under the unified rule of any single power, rather than a country in the conventional sense. Thus, the weakness of political institutions in Afghanistan is among the most critical influencing factors in the lack of political order in this country.

In the light of this concern, this study seeks to address how institutional deficit undermined the political order in the government supported by the international community from 2001 to 2021. This hypothesis can be proposed that the institutions insignificance, as well as institutional noncompliance and instability within the government led to the concentration of power and weakening of its efficiency, weakness of the rule of law, and its lack of accountability. The historical institutionalism theory suggested by Robinson and Acemoglu was applied to test the hypothesis. A completely different objective is pursued here unlike other studies. To this aim, the present study traces the course of events occurred a decade before the establishment of the new government during 2001 to show how far the post-2001 political structure actually functioned.

2. Conceptual framework

2.1. Institutionalism

During the past few years, institutions were mainly defined casually in different studies in political science and economy. However, they have attracted a lot of attention due to their critical role in creating the relationship between politics and economy. This change does not stem from the popularization of an academic fashion. Rather, it represents a vital development in the evolution of development theories in political science and a correct understanding of the value of institutions (Steinmo, 2013). The aforementioned development is considered as the product of studies in the field of political development and economic growth in different countries about the role of institutions (e.g., North, 1990, 2006; Huntington, 1973; Fukuyama, 2011; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012) (Nayab, 2016, p.64).

According to institutionalists, institutions are regarded as "stable, respected, and repetitive patterns of behavior" which continue to exist even after the end of the working period of the responsible persons. Institutions are considered as stable rules which shape, bind, and guide human behavior in a certain direction (Fukuyama, 2014, p.16). To understand this point, try to imagine a world where no rules exist: in this anarchic order, every time people encounter each other, they attempt to insure only their own survival and interests. (Steinmo, 2013). Hobbes quoted about societies with no strong and comprehensive government institutions that There is a constant fear and danger of horrible death with life being "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Hobbes, 1998, p.217). Hobbes adds that in such a scenario, there are houses that no one tries to maintain or repair, with holes in their walls and porches; murder is the daily routine of the people. There is no stable trade or commerce; local powerholders are the "gods" and enforcers of laws over society. (Hobbes, 1998, p.23) Therefore, the citizens’ security or appropriate conditions for the growth of individuals are not provided in the absence of a central authority which benefits from a legitimate monopoly on the use of force. Government with central authority does not mean authoritarian government with centralized institutions. Here, the vital principle indicates government with open, yet bound institutions such as political ones which exhibit a high level of social mobilization. Social mobilization means the participation of the whole society, especially non-rulers in political affairs, which appears in non-institutional forms such as revolutions, protests, petitions, and general pressure on superordinates through associations or media, and institutional forms including free elections or legislative assembly (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019, p.19).

The tyranny comes from the inability of the society to influence the policies and actions of the government. To make a government accountable, responsive, and bound by the rule of law a strong social mobilization which actively participates in political affairs is required. Thus, the range and scope of action of a constitution or any other governmental institution depends on the ability of ordinary people to defend its principles and demand what it has promised, even if by resorting to non-institutional means (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2016). Accordingly, most of the backward societies such as Afghanistan are drowning in corruption, destruction, and poverty due to the lack of political institutions with capacity and being involved with the deficit of governmental institutions. Institutional deficit means a government whose political institutions fail to function in a real method, resulting in reducing its capacity in the efficiency of public services and accountability for the society (Fukuyama, 2014, p.63). Institutional deficit indices include the following with which the data of the indicated study is analyzed.

2.2. Institutions' insignificance

The institution's insignificance means that rules and regulations are not followed by actors and cannot alter the behavior of individuals or government officials. An institution such as the constitution or vote of the National Assembly regarding prohibiting the exercise of government is considered as insignificant when any intended result expected by dominant and powerful actors becomes a product. In other words, institutions are regarded as redundant when they fail to play any role in guiding the behavior of the relevant actors. For example, institutions insignificance occurs when the American constitution fails to prevent the manipulation and abuse of its presidents in behaviors such as centralizing power or prolonging the term of service in the form of a dictatorship (Brinks, Levitsky, & Murillo, 2019, p.4).

2.3. Institutional misalignment

Misalignment denotes non-implementation of laws and behaving against fixed rules by government officials and individuals. Such deficit sometimes appears due to the existence of unequal structure or nature of institutions, resulting in strengthening the context of unbalanced behavior of actors. In other words, in the case of misalignment, institutions due to structural weakness are derailed and subjected to misuse and abuse. In such institutional weakness, political elites or officials decide not to implement or agree to implement the laws based on their interests and expediency. The unbalanced nature of the institutions in this process increases the actors’ self-confidence. However, noncompliance often occurs because government actors decide not to enforce the rules. In most of the cases, corruption, as well as individual and group benefit comes first during the noncompliance. Such institutional weakness derives more from the structural nature of institutions. The actors cannot exploit the weakness of the institutions when they are designed based on the geographical conditions of the country (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009).

2.3.1. Institutions instability

Stability is among the most critical characteristics of an institution, which cannot be. In the case of institutions instability, the vital principle includes the expansion of actors’ preferences and direction of their objectives, which aim to focus institutional changes towards personal goals. Here, institutions instability is defined as an extremely high rate of institutional change, which makes it impossible for political actors to develop stable expectations about the function of the rules or clear strategies to pursue their interests. Institutions which alter with the changing wishes and whims of the political elite cannot be called strong. Political elites in most of the unstable countries seek to direct the laws in line with their objectives under the pretext of institutional reforms (Levitsky & Murillo, 2009). What is explained as the final analysis is considered as a hybrid institutionalism called "historical institutionalism," which emphasizes the political institutions of the government. Historical institutionalism is based on an institutional organization in government management and political economy of the government although it regards the non-governmental social and political institutions as vital in building different national paths (Niknami, 2022, p.352).

2.4. Political order

Students and researchers who work in the field of stability and political order within the framework of institutions always seek to understand how and when political orders are created, maintained, or eliminated at the level of domestic and international actors (March & Olsen, 1998, p.953). How can the anarchic order based on nepotism and corruption alter in a government? What are the indices and pillars of a political order inside a government? The meaning of political order is explained by providing answers to the above-mentioned questions. The political order has three main hypotheses which our data are examined in its framework.

2.5. State

A complete understanding of political order requires focusing on the concept of state. The existence of the state indicates the presence of a set of institutions which organize and regularize the behavior of officials and leaders based on fundamental rules (Vincent, 1987, p.17). The state institution means establishing concrete institutions such as the army, police, strong bureaucracy, ministries, parliament, and the like, which is performed through hiring the necessary manpower, training employees, preparing offices and workplaces, providing the necessary budget, and passing necessary laws and instructions (Fukuyama, 2014, p.43). The ability to employ power to enforce laws, create order, provide services, and procure basic public goods is among the most critical functions of the government. Probably, the control of violence by the state is among its main functions. In addition, the existence of social mobilization and a social contract among citizens are among the influential features in the quality of state institutions (Pippidi, 2015). Eliminating the patronage system and strengthening the principle of meritocracy is probably one of the most basic features of modern states, which can strengthen their capacity and quality in the long run. In this regard, Woolcock and Andrews argued that "imitation or copying the apparent forms of the state in developed countries is among the biggest obstacles faced by developing states, which fail to provide services such as education, health, security, and peace at the level of developed states (GSDPP, 2013).

2.6. Rule of law

Rule of law means that some laws limit and regulate the sphere of action for even the most powerful political actors and government officials in a society. The rule of law should be distinguished from what is sometimes called ruling through the law. In the case of the latter, the law is considered as the ruling order, which does not limit anything (Fukuyama, 2014, p.21). In the rule of law, the laws are regarded as clear and stable, which reflect the principles of justice in a particular society. For the rule of law to be real, the laws should be binding on the most powerful people in society i.e. the king, president, prime minister, religious-local leaders, army, generals, and the like. The society suffers when the people who hold the executive power in a certain society set and implement the laws based on their wishes (GSDPP, 2013).

2.7. Accountability

Accountability means the government response to the interests of the entire society. Accountability mechanisms limit government power to ensure that such power is only used in a consensual and restrained manner (Pippidi, 2015). The government is considered as limited if its institutions can be held accountable to society and citizens. Such government is limited not only due to being bound by constitution but more importantly, people are allowed to complain, demonstrate, rebel if officials deviate from their path and encroach upon the public domain. The presidents, prime ministers, and legislators in this government are elected and dismissed by the society when they do not like their actions. The bureaucrats in this government are subjected to criticism and supervision. Such a government has a harmonious coexistence with the society and listens to the citizens. Therefore, the political order is formed in the coordination of the aforementioned hypotheses. Such order represents a limited government, which is considered as an institution restrained by the society and restraining the society (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019, p.46)

Figure 1: General structure of institutional deficit and political order

3. Method of analysis

The method is based on conceptual analysis with an explanatory approach. To this aim, the researcher seeks to set the logical hypotheses as criteria and interpret the meaning of the concepts in a comparative manner in order to measure their impact on each other. Such method is proposed by researchers who support the approach of logical positivism to operationalize the concepts. The keywords of political order are operationalized based on the framework of historical institutionalism of development and meaning in the geography called Afghanistan. Here, the operationalized meaning differs from other interpretations and studies conducted in this field.

4. Afghanistan’s state and noncompliance

The agreement to establish the interim government in Afghanistan with the cooperation of the international community was concluded in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2001, which is usually regarded as the starting point in establishing the Afghan government. The interim government was announced under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai. Then, a process was defined to form the loya jirga (traditional council of tribal elders) in order to design and approve the institutions of the Afghan government (Latif & Mahmmodi, 2016, p.46). The international community seeks to help form a democratic, pluralistic, transparent, and accountable Afghan government, whose orders are implemented throughout Afghanistan. However, the reality of Afghanistan tragedy does not provide any sign of comprehensive and coherent institution in its history. Traditionally, Afghanistan has been considered as a geographical term for a region which was never under the unified rule of any single power (Kissinger, 2014, p.381). Thus, Afghanistan is not even worthy of being regarded as a real state, despite the international community efforts to create an inclusive and pluralistic government. The local and national petty kings are still considered as a big obstacle to dominating the territory and population of this country and the laws are only on a piece paper since they should be formulated based on their wishes and interests. Otherwise, the laws are nothing more than a piece of paper. The above-mentioned process affects the public trust in government projects and public service provision negatively (SIGAR, 2022, p.35).

4.1. flawed separation of powers

The lack of a competent administrative apparatus with laws which neutralize each other while encroaching on the public domain is among the most critical gaps faced by bankrupt governments. Institutions crush each other in the absence of such a mechanism (Fukuyama, 2014, p.61). Separation of powers was proposed for the first time in the 1932 Constitution of Afghanistan, despite its elementary nature. However, meaningful separation of powers was only foreseen in the 1964 Constitution. Based on this concept, a despotic government emerges when only one of the government institutions establishes, implements, and monitors laws and other ones are isolated or exiled (Hamidi & Jayakody, 2015, p.6). According to Montesquieu, institutions and government fail to manifest the public will unless the separation of powers is such that power prevents power (Agu, 2014, p.40). However, limiting the powers of the government is considered as the vital function of the constitution as a set of institutions. The authors of the 2004 Constitution aimed to create a strong executive branch in Afghanistan due to historical and practical reasons, resulting in setting the stage for a constant battle between the institutions of power. The separation of powers was only observed on worthless paper at the desk of the law enforcers, which never materialized in practice, despite its recognition by the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the power was concentrated in the capital of the country and much power was granted to the executive branch to encourage the government system work (Hussaini, 2022, p.5-6). According to the 2004 Constitution, the power and authority between the three institutions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches were heavily weighted towards the government, resulting in neutralizing the effectiveness of the order of separation of powers because this process becomes effective when the distribution of power is equal and obvious both on paper and in the field of action. Therefore, the separation of powers based on the 2004 Constitution shows weaknesses, both on paper and in practice. Power is decisively tilted in favor of the executive branch and at the expense of the judiciary and legislature branches. Based on the 2004 Constitution, the president can enact laws, as well as controlling appointments at all of the levels in government institutions (Hamidi & Jayakody, 2015, p.7), resulting in affecting the separation and balance of power among the three branches of the government. Thus, the overreach of the executive branch has been among the biggest challenges to the implementation of the constitution in Afghanistan under the 2004 Constitution (Hamidi & Giacudi, 2015, p.4), which turned the president into a despotic Leviathan due to the absence of balancing institutions such as strong legislature, independent judiciary, and active political parties. The process of abuse and misbehavior to achieve non-public demands by the president and his cabinet increased institutional noncompliance in the Afghan government (Giacudi, 2015).

4.2. Structural tyranny of Afghanistan 2004 Constitution

Structural tyranny in the constitution means a high degree of centralization of the government, where the executive branch is largely unchecked by the judiciary and legislature, resulting in facilitating the abuse of authority, which is largely ignored (SIGAR, 2022, p.40). Throughout the modern history of Afghanistan, the constitutions have been implemented for the centralization of power and development of the government in remote areas without the supervision and involvement of the people in the political decision-making process. The central government does not accept any accountability in the provinces due to the flawed separation of power enshrined in the Constitution (Ibrahimi, 2019, p.44), resulting in turning the president into a king. The Constitution established an exclusive centralized presidential system during 2004. Based on the Article 60 of the Constitution, "the president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, as the head of the government, exercises his powers in the executive, legislative, and judicial spheres." Therefore, the president found the monopoly of ruling over all of the regions in this country, as well as obtaining the necessary authority to exercise power like a dictator (Hussaini, 2022, pp.6-7). However, the 2004 Constitution emphasizes that the president has enough power in the executive, legislative, and judicial spheres (Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004, 60).

Such delegation which was free from a strong mechanism for accountability and oversight sow the seeds of authoritarian rule. According to Shahrani, the 2004 Constitution paved the way for the emergence of a "president more powerful than a king" (Shahrani, 2018). To understand the weaknesses of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, the list of the President's powers and competencies in the constitution is presented, which identifies a high degree of concentration of power in the executive body of the government.

• Appointing one-third of the members of the Senate (Ibid, 35)

• Monitoring the implementation of the constitution (Ibid, 36)

• Leading all of the army forces in the country (Ibid, 37)

• Making the necessary decisions to defend territorial integrity and maintain independence (Ibid, 38)

• Issuing presidential decrees (Ibid, 359)

• Organizing Loya Jirga (Ibid, 40)

• Opening of parliament and Loya Jirga sessions (Ibid, 41)

• Inviting to referendum (Ibid, 42)

• Accepting the resignation of the vice presidents (Ibid, 43)

• Dismissing or accepting the resignation of ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, head of the central bank, and head of national security

• Determining the heads of political representation in foreign countries and international institutions

• Accepting credentials of political representatives of foreign nationals in Afghanistan (Ibid, 47)

• Approving the law and judicial rulings (Ibid, 48)

• Reducing and amnesty of punishment (Ibid, 49)

• Appointing high-ranking officials, city governors, police officers, heads of courts, and presidents of universities

Carothers argued that the dominance of the legislature by the executive in most of the developing countries is rooted in their constitution, resulting in reducing the quality and effectiveness of the legislative branch against the tyranny of the government significantly (SIDA, 2003, p.28). The relationship between the executive branch and parliament has been relatively hostile and reactive since the first parliament started working during 2005. The executive and legislative branches (both under President Karzai and Ashraf Ghani) have regularly sought to undermine the parliament. The head of the executive branch has ignored a large number of decisions adopted by the parliament including the approval of a law or dismissal of a government minister. Parliament mainly employs the threat of impeachment and vote of no confidence against government ministers to create obstacles for the president, resulting in undermining the effectiveness of the modern constitutional model (Pasarli & Maliar, 2018, p.28). Thus, the president has often exercised his power alone without considering the parliament vote due to the institutional weakness and more specifically the severe weakness of the legislature. For instance, the president has violated the House of Representatives vote of no confidence in the ministers either by their re-appointment as "acting ministers" or referring this vote to the judiciary and deeming their function to be unconstitutional (Hussaini, 2022, p.7). The aforementioned cases have been repeated in Afghanistan for twenty years. For example, Rangina Hamidi, the candidate for the Minister of Education; Mujib Rahman Karimi, the candidate for the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Ajmal Ahmady, the Governor of the Central Bank, were nominated by President Ashraf Ghani to win a vote of confidence in the parliament, while all of the three candidates were rejected by the majority after the vote. However, President Ghani appointed the above-mentioned people as ministers of the aforementioned institutions, despite the lack of a vote of confidence by the parliament (UNAMA, 2021). Rola Ghani, the first lady of Afghanistan, declared in a media session that "the candidates remain in their positions regardless of their acceptance or rejection by the parliament" (Sadr, 2021, p.72). In fact, her declaration was an "obvious contempt to rule of law and separation of powers" in Afghanistan. In addition, 12 ministers were impeached for not spending more than 70% of the development budget of the ministries, and seven in Ashraf Ghani's cabinet were voted no-confidence by the parliament during November 2016. However, the dismissal of the ministers in Ashraf Ghani's cabinet was strongly opposed by the government so that he ordered the dismissed ministers to continue their work contrary to the parliament vote (Pasarli & Maliar, 2018, p.29).

The Afghan Parliament summoned and impeached Rangin Dadfar Spanta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Akbar Akbar, the Minister of Immigrant Affairs, because of Afghan refugees crossing the border of Iran during 2008. The parliament gave a vote of no confidence to both ministers after the impeachment hearing. President Karzai accepted the vote of no confidence in Akbar’s case. However, he rejected this vote in Spanta’s case and appealed the case to the Supreme Court, the judges of which are appointed by the president who has significant influence in this regard. The Court interpreted the vote of no confidence in Spanta against the constitution, leading to its cancellation. The battle between the weak parliament and powerful executive branch ended in favor of parliament (Giacudi, 2015). The parliament took revenge against the government and Supreme Court by enacting the law to establish an independent commission to monitor the implementation of the constitution and tasked it with explicit authority to interpret the constitution to this commission. The president referred the law to the Supreme Court, and the Court declared that the law was in conflict with the Constitution. The parliament rejected the vote of the Supreme Court and interpreted its decision as an order of the president. However, the long battles between the executive branch and parliament damaged the public trust and legitimacy of these institutions (Hamidi & Giacudi, 2015, p.8).

In this regard, the committee for monitoring and evaluating the fight against administrative corruption investigated the nature of the relationship between the government and parliament, reporting that a large number of legislative decrees issued by President Ghani came into force and implemented without being approved by the parliament. For instance, 16 laws including those related to fighting corruption, protecting whistleblowers, state-owned companies, mines, and municipalities came into force without passing through the parliament when its members (MPs) were on vacation during summer of 2019 (Soltani, 2019). This case is considered as a clear example of a despotic government which ignores people and their votes.

5. Nepotism of the judiciary

Nepotism among political institutions indicates the type of mutual trading or bargaining between government officials to achieve their private interests. In a relationship based on nepotism, two people with different status mutually exchange two things which they are interested in. Accordingly, the master gives the supporting and subordinate person the things which he/she wishes in exchange for his/her loyalty and political support. A sharp decrease in the quality of government institutions is regarded as the first and most significant effect of nepotism (Fukuyama, 2014, p.26). In a strong and stable political order, judicial officials should benefit from lifelong security so that their political independence is not limited. However, the behavior of the judicial branch officials changes significantly when the security rules related to the tenure of judges are usually violated so that the judges know that voting and taking action against the executive branch can lead to their dismissal (Brinks, Levitsky & Murillo, 2019, p.11). The independence of the judiciary is considered as a fundamental principle in a democratic system based on supervision and accountability (Ibrahimi, 2019). The 2004 Constitution claims that the judiciary is regarded as independent from the government, which is not influenced by anybody in its decisions (Ibid, 116). However, what has been included in the constitution to separate the jurisdictions of the executive and judiciary has rarely been implemented as the constitution intended. The president controls the formation and functioning of the entire judiciary carefully. None of the established regulations are followed in practice, despite the existence of a well-defined mechanism in appointing the Supreme Court officials. Judges are appointed by the president for a specific period of 10 years in Afghanistan unlike most of the democratic countries where the Supreme Court judges are appointed for life. The above-mentioned factor has led to the emergence of nepotism so that judges do not benefit from lifelong job security and are dependent on the president. In other words, these people expect the president to be appointed to another position after the end of their term of service (Hussaini, 2022, p.16). The president can dismiss the Supreme Court officials in case of disagreement between the two sides. Based on the 2004 Constitution, the president can approve or cancel death sentences and reduce the punishment of the accused. In addition, the president can play the role of judge when the government minister is accused of gross violation the laws. According to Article 112 of the Constitution, the president continuously controls the financial, administrative, and judicial affairs of the judiciary. Pensions, shelter, as well as health and welfare facilities can be implemented with the personal approval of the president, resulting in reducing the independence of the Supreme Court (Hamidi & Jayakody, 2015, p.16).

The judiciary has suffered from contradictions in the field of efficiency and implementation of the rule of law due to several reasons. First, the existence of systematic and deep-rooted corruption among the officials and judges of this institution forced the Organization for Monitoring and Fighting Corruption and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to report that one in four people paid bribes to Afghan Supreme Court officials to buy freedom and reduce punishment (UNODC, 2012). Accordingly, President Karzai increased the salaries of judges up to 2000 dollars, which did not reduce corruption. Second, the lack of efficiency of the central government in providing security and establishing a safe environment for implementing the law forced the authorities of the Supreme Court to be impartial in this regard. For example, one of the Afghan prosecutors in Baghlan asserted that "the families of the guilty persons did not allow the situation to calm down when I tried and imprisoned those young men. A murder could happen, and me and my family might be killed" (Eddy, 2009, p.16).

6. Ambiguity in supervision

The 2004 Constitution discusses the vote of no confidence, as one of the most critical supervisory powers of the parliament, ambiguously. Article 92 of the Constitution indicates that the vote of no confidence against the government minister should be based on "convincing reasons" (Ibid, 172) which are not clear. In addition, nobody knows what happens after a vote of no confidence. Does the minister should continue in office until a new minister is appointed? Should the minister resign immediately or should the minister be dismissed indefinitely? (Kamali, 2014) Violations of the constitution are revealed after every vote of no confidence in the parliament. In such scenarios, the executive branch exploits the ambiguities of the constitution to weaken the parliament and vetoes the issuance of a vote of no confidence by claiming the lack of convincing reasons. For example, the executive branch argued that the vote of no confidence was not based on valid reasons when parliament ousted Spanta, then-Foreign Minister, during 2007, leading to his retention in his position. President Ashraf Ghani acted similarly during 2006 to ignore the decisions of the parliament regarding the validity of the vote of no confidence against seven ministers (Pasarli & Maliar, 2018, p.29).

7. A Government that fails to end violence

Afghanistan has always witnessed insecurity and violence in most of its history (Ibrahimi, 2019) due to different reasons including the lack of a powerful and comprehensive government. Hobbes quoted about societies with no strong and comprehensive government institutions that "There is a constant fear and danger of horrible death. Human life is regarded as isolated, poor, miserable, cruel, and short." (Hobbes, 1998, p.34) The lack of institutional and structural mechanisms to ensure order and security has contributed to the increase in violence and victimization of people. In addition, Afghan society and political institutions have always been affected by the nature and context of villages in the ontological aspect of security. In other words, the government authority originates from tribes, not from a central government. A strong society against a weak government is among the most prominent features of Afghanistan. The lives of Afghans have always been full of constant chaos and insecurity due to the lack of effective control of the central government over society (Deshiari, 2020, p.29). Petty kings or local strongmen, benefitting from popular bases rooted in ethnicity, language, and geography, have influenced the politics and government of Afghanistan throughout its history significantly. In this regard, the Transparency International (TI) reported that the influence of local elites and their widespread corruption in the security and defense sectors has weakened the security structure and intensified internal violence and crimes (Osmani & Niakooee, 2022, p.218).

Figure 2: Index of casualties among the civilian during 2020

The influence of strongmen in various government institutions strengthened corruption and trading, resulting in reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of security and defense institutions. In addition, the government failed to implement the laws and provide security by weakening the institutions capabilities (Noorzad, 2021, p.14). The roots of such institutional weakness in the central government should be sought in the failure to complete the process of nation-state building in Afghanistan. The population in Afghanistan is divided into four major ethnic groups including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, as well as several smaller tribes. Ethnicity, kinship, and Islam form the basis of individual and collective identity in Afghanistan and most of the organizations and social structures are formed on these bases. The aforementioned concepts play a critical role in mobilizing social movements and regulating the interaction of individuals and social groups (UNAMA, 2017). In fact, the commanders of the army, national security, and security areas of urban zones were appointed based on the balance between ethnic leaders and the agreement of political parties with local warlords, not based on expertise and competence. The formation of the national unity government between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, where the majority of government departments were managed by supervisors, was considered as the peak of conflicts over the distribution of power resources including security institutions (SIGAR, 2021, p.66).

Figure 3: Casualties and injuries among the civilians due to violence

8. Rule of law and institutions insignificance

The existence of clear rules is regarded as the first element of almost any definition of the rule of law. There can be no discussion regarding the uniform implementation of the laws and subordinating the government to the laws without clear rules (Eddy, 2009, p.6). The rule of law is considered as the main protection of people against the formation of tyrant governments and nepotism. However, the institutions are extremely weak and paper-based in Afghanistan since the government official laws have become powerless and disrespectful to the personal laws of strongmen and local warlords due to their influence (WJP, 2019). For instance, "SIGAR" (2015) reported that the mayor of Khost province was sentenced to seven years in prison due to corruption of about 226,165 dollars. However, he was still free, despite the conviction due to his personal relationships with government officials (SIGAR, 2014, p.157). According to any definition of the rule of law, Afghanistan is far from a government based on the rule of law. Still, petty kings rule in most areas of Afghanistan and refuse to implement government activities when they do not match their interests. Violence prevails in most parts of the country as a natural instrument, and corruption, nepotism, and illegal behavior are found a lot (Eddy, 2009, p.7). In such a situation, the path to institutions insignificance becomes smoother because elites and local actors in Afghanistan tend to strengthen their political power anyway since such power is regarded as the source of income, rent-seeking, nepotism, and other privileges. The effects of reducing the political power by the institutions on the political order and economic growth are observed in the long term (Their & Worden, 2020, p.6). A large number of local and ethnic strongmen such as local petty kings managed to find their way into various government institutions including the parliament and ministries‌ using their power and influence (SIGAR, 2021, pp.59-60). The presence and influence of powerful and corrupt people strengthen the non-implementation and ignorance of law reciprocally. In other words, the lack of strong institutions in subordinating evil and corrupt people to respect and comply with the laws, and institutional weakness plays a vital role in increasing the self-confidence of powerful people in crushing the ruling laws.

8.1. Legislators fail to appreciate the law

According to the 2004 Constitution, the Afghan parliament is considered as the most significant and main legislative body of the government, which contains the House of Representatives and the Senate (Ibid, 82). Based on the constitution, the parliament is regarded as the highest legislative authority and manifestation of the people’s will, the representatives of which should be free from any criminal history. The parliament can review the actions of the government, impeach ministers, and make decisions regarding the budget and development programs of government. This institution can vote no confidence on any cabinet minister. In addition, approving laws and proposing to obtain or grant loans is among the most critical powers of the parliament (Ibid, 81-85). Based on the rule of law, the law should be binding on all of the citizens including government officials and even its founders. However, Afghans are widely dissatisfied with the government officials and their opposition in the parliament. The nepotism of the parliament and an increase in their dealings with the officials of the executive branch affected the legitimacy and public trust negatively. The MPs, who should work for the public interest, engage in rent-seeking and bargaining to strengthen their position and secure their personal interests. However, they do not believe in any accountability to the people (Eddy, 2009, p.4). Thus, the laws or institutions become extremely insignificant because institutions fail to influence the actors’ behavior. For example, Farooq Wardak, the Minister of Education in Afghanistan, was accused of embezzling millions of dollars by creating thousands of imaginary schools and corruption in textbook printing contracts. However, the Afghan parliament failed to take any action for his prosecution since he neutralized the authority of laws utilizing his personal relationships and business dealings with the MPs (Mehrdad, 2023).

Afghanistan ranked 117th among 180 countries in terms of transparency during 2005. However, it fell to 176th and became one of the most corrupt countries in the world during 2008. Corruption was shadowing like a black cloud in all of the parts in Afghanistan including its parliament (UNODC, 2012) because most of the strongmen, local elites, land usurpers, and powerful rentier groups dominated the majority of government institutions including the parliament and dominated the majority of ministries through force and bargaining after the establishment of the parliament. This has been one of the strong factors for violating the laws, especially the constitution (WJP, 2019). A large number of people in the parliament were accused of corruption and numerous crimes during the past years. However, they were neither the government officials nor MPs. There is evidence of their punishment so that a large number of people believe that the MPs are above the law and strongly resist its implementation (Soltani, 2019), meaning that laws and institutions lack the necessary capacity and quality to alter the behavior of government officials and representatives. The resistance of MPs and government officials to laws stems from several factors. First, President Hamid Karzai sought to balance the distribution of power through informal deals with ethnic elites and local strongmen during 2001-14, indicating that he needed to be close and achieve the consent of the ethnic leaders and local strongmen to obtain the vote of confidence of the people and win the general elections. In fact, he aimed to achieve this satisfaction through mutual transactions. For instance, Yunus Qanuni was considered as the speaker of the Afghan parliament during the presidency of Hamid Karzai and a representative of the Tajik tribe, who achieved a large number of government posts and resources through cooperation with the president. Second, the Afghan MPs applied their legal powers to engage in cross-dealing with government officials to obtain personal benefits. Taking money from ministerial candidates in exchange for a vote of confidence, employing personal relationships to achieve ministry contracts for special individuals and companies, dealing with ministerial candidates to hire relatives in ministries, communicating with embassies to obtain visas, and corrupting consulates in different countries by MPs are among the most prominent cases of nepotism in the parliament (Karimi, 2021) such as the government contract of Ghori cement, which was negotiated by strongmen and relatives of MPs. Ghori Cement is a state-owned company in Pol-e-Khomri, which was handed over to a private company called "Afghan Investment Company" during 2007. The shareholders of this large state-owned company included Mahmud Karzai, the brother of Hamed Karzai, the former president of Afghanistan, Haji Hasin Fahim, the brother of Marshal Fahim, the first deputy of Hamed Karzai, Ghafar Dawi, the husband of one of the lawyers in the Majlis, and Ubayd Allah Ramin, a MP. The above-mentioned contract was signed for 49 years, while based on the new mining law of Afghanistan during 2005, the duration of contracts is 25 years. In addition, the shareholders of the company should have invested 45 million dollars for the reconstruction of the first and second production center to generate 1000 tons of cement per day, while the reports and evidence represent that none of the articles of the contract were implemented (Pajhwok & Daribi, 2018). The aforementioned case is considered as an example of institutions insignificance by officials and MPs which clarifies the method of turning political power to the source of income and rent-seeking of elites. Most of the MPs competed with each other for their personal interests, and the government took full advantage of the institutional noncompliance of the legislature since the MPs tend to implement laws only when their personal interests are involved. During 2017, numerous evidences were published about the corruption and secret transactions of MPs and ministers of the government with the contracted companies of the ministries, indicating imaginary figures in the contracts such as oil, meat, clothes, construction, and the like, as well as looting millions of dollars (SIGAR, 2016, pp.11-15).

Therefore, the MPs extremely tended to be loyal and bargain where the government could offer more profitable incentives. The MPs aimed to cooperate and unite with the president and government ministers after being elected because access and proper relations with the government could facilitate a wide range of benefits for these people and their families (Hamidi & Jayakody, 2015, p.15). For example, Abdul Rahim Ayoubi, the representative of the people of Kandahar in the Afghan Parliament, severely criticized the existence of mediation and bargaining in the House of Representatives during 2014 and asked the representatives to resign en masse so that this institution does not suffer more. Ayoubi claimed that "ministers pay between 5000-10000 dollars to achieve a vote of confidence from the MPs or make deals to hire their relatives." (Karimi, 2021) In addition, Ramazan Bashardost, the representative of the people of Kabul in the parliament, claimed in one of his interviews that "professional thieves and drug smugglers are present in the parliament as people's representatives." The scope of such statements and criticisms has always existed about this institution (Mezedi & Raja, 2017, p.76). Another example is related to the embezzlement of more than 54 million Afghanis by Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the head of the Afghan Parliament, during 2018 which was spent for the rent of his house from the budget of the House of Representatives. The weakness and absence of strong laws allowed Ibrahimi to commit corruption by using government resources and facilities, and the laws remained powerless and silent in this regard (Soltani, 2019). Based on the TI, Afghanistan was ranked 165th among the corrupt countries in the world during 2020. Further, it was recognized as the most corrupt country in the world after North Korea with 19 points out of 100 ones (TI, 2020).

Figure 4: Corruption index as a big problem for people

The existence of widespread corruption and nepotism in various government departments and even among the people's elected representatives severely affected political legitimacy and public trust. According to TI, corruption and nepotism are regarded as the biggest problems for the people in Afghanistan (TI, 2015, p.20).

8.2. Political crises and sleeping parliament

As indicated, the existence of a strong presidential system created the conditions for various crises in Afghanistan. Power was concentrated in the capital and few powers were observed in the provinces and districts. The legitimacy of government institutions was minimized and the elements of participation were extremely weak (Akbar & Akbar, 2011, p.4). Furthermore, Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system was selected by Afghan and international actors deliberately to eliminate parties partly due to their violent reputation during the 1990s civil wars and partly for avoiding opposition to new government formation during 2001. The SNTV system in Afghanistan strengthened the executive branch (Hussaini, 2022, p.13). Experts consider the proportional representation (PR) or single transferable vote (STV) system to be more appropriate for the participation of political parties in the parliament. However, the Afghan election system utilizes the SNTV system which encourages candidates to adopt individual policies and limits participation or presence of political parties. For example, only 32 candidates (1.2% of all of the candidates) belonged to a party in parliamentary elections in Afghanistan during 2010 (Yazdanfar, 2020). The SNTV system does not allow the parties to grow and institutionalize their presence in the parliament. Selecting this system may be a strategy to weaken the parties and prevent the emergence of a strong opposition in the parliament (Larson, 2015, p.16). According to the constitution, the electoral and presidential system strengthens the ground of power concentration and abuse of the president as a king. The SNTV election system prevents people from joining together around common objectives, both today and in the future, in addition to s hindering the principle of party organization and discipline. This factor has forced the MPs of Afghan to be isolated and pursue personal objectives, resulting in sacrificing the public interest or common goals based on the interest of society for individual interest (Jalali, 2015). For instance, only a tangential connection is observed between representatives and voters under the SNTV system. Voters do not know their representatives and representatives do not need to answer to voters. Thus, parliamentary seats are considered as rent-seeking opportunities, and the creation of legal immunity is regarded as its added advantage. The mediation of elections by a central authority led by a small, yet powerful group of decision-makers creates a large number of incentives for corruption due to lucrative nature of parliamentary office and general climate of impunity (Darnolf & Smith, 2019, p.15). In a parliamentary system, the cabinet is considered as a decision-making structure determined by the parliament, which distributes power proportionally in various departments and layers of the government structure. The leader of the party who wins the majority of seats in the parliament is appointed as the prime minister. The prime minister and his cabinet are constantly accountable to the parliament and nation in their decisions and performance. The opposition and smaller parties can prevent the ruling party from monopolizing by uniting and forming a coalition, even in cases where a single party has the majority of seats in the parliament (Larson, 2015, p.7). Based on the survey conducted by the "Afghanistan Free and Fair Elections Foundation" during 2017, 60% of people seek to alter the electoral system to provide the basis for the strengthening and presence of parties (Yazdanfar, 2020). The lack of the above-mentioned mechanisms increases nepotism and systematic corruption among the MPs and government officials, resulting in affecting the efficiency of parliament negatively. Afghanistan experienced deep political crises in several election periods such as 2014, during which the parliament failed to resolve the crisis, resulting in establishing the national unity government between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani. The crisis was accelerated by two basic factors including the SNTV electoral system with related institutions, which made it impossible to establish a stable political system, and continuation of political dissatisfaction with the nature of the centralized political system with the president's monarchy (Their & Worden, p.7). The crisis intensified when both Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani declared their win in the 2014 elections simultaneously, and none were willing to accept defeat. The crisis reduced months later with the mediation of John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, and with the agreement of the National Unity Government with power sharing between Ghani and Abdullah (International Crisis Group, 2017). "Clear humiliation of the peoples’ will and flagrant violation of the constitution" was accompanied by the establishment of the national unity government, which was repeated during the 2019 elections. The Afghan parliament never succeeded in representing the peoples’ will in any political crisis.

9. Accountability: Governments which breaks the chains

According to the majority of political science thinkers, the laws should be binding on the most powerful people in the society including the king, president, prime minister, ministers, and government officials which should be accountable for their performance in order for the rule of law to exist in real terms. The law fails to chain power and government when it is violated or misused by the law enforcers who are not accountable to any institution (GSDPP, 2013) just like what is happening in Afghanistan. Such government fails to respect any of the limitations in the law and does not set boundaries for its performance. According to Abdul Ali Mohammadi, the legal adviser of Ashraf Ghani, "violating and disregarding the law is common in the Afghan government" (Mezedi & Raja, 2017, p.32).

9.1. Issuing legislative decrees of the president

According to Article 79 of the 2004 Constitution, the government can issue legislative decrees in cases of "urgent necessity" when the parliament is in recess. These decrees are automatically enforced with the approval of the president. However, all of the orders issued under Article 79 should be submitted to the parliament within one month following the resumption of the parliament. The houses of the parliament can reject the decrees when both agree. Practically, this provision of the constitution was applied by the executive branch in countless cases. However, there was no "urgent necessity" for legislation during the shutdown of the parliament and most of the decrees were enacted without the review and approval of the parliament (Giacudi, 2015, p.7). For example, 16 laws including those related to fighting corruption, protecting whistleblowers, state-owned companies, mines, and municipalities, were enacted by the order of the president without passing through the parliament during its shutdown in the summer of 2018. Rostam Ali Peyman, a member of the Parliament Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, approves the entry into force of some of the president's decrees as official law (Soltani, 2019). Contrary to the law, President Ghani managed almost 50% of the cabinet of the government for two years by acting ministers during the second term since the ministers who had the temporary title were easily removed unlike those who received a vote of confidence from the parliament, resulting in opening the space for negotiation with those who sought to create trouble among opposing groups (Mehrdad, 2023). This authority and competence enables the president to bypass the legislature and issue arbitrary orders. The president seeks to ignore this issue, even in cases where the parliament exercises its powers according to the constitution. For instance, the plan proposed by the government during the COVID-19 disease crisis, called "National tablecloth," was decisively rejected by the parliament. However, the president insisted on his position, resulting in implementing the plan by support of the World Bank worth 240 million dollars, despite the corruption (Sadr, 2021, p.60). Dawood Sultanzoy was among the most loyal associates of President Ghani. At that time, he was regarded as the mayor of Kabul and conducted the biggest corruption case in the "National tablecloth" project, as well as embezzling more than 10 million dollars without being prosecuted by the government (Mehrdad, 2023).

9.2. Illegal democratic government

According to Article 68 of the 2004 Constitution, the first vice president is considered as the second person in the government, who has extensive powers in the executive field after the president (Ibid, 68). Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, the first vice president of Ashraf Ghani, was out of Afghanistan for more than two years due to a dispute with President Ghani. In fact, his absence provided the ground for President Ghani's isolation (Constale, 2020). During the second term of his government, President Ghani ruled through a selected and narrow circle of loyalists without listening to the people's voice and answering their questions, resulting in destabilizing the government at a critical point. At this point in time, a circle of power was formed by President Ashraf Ghani with the presence of Fazel Fazli, advisor to the president as chief of staff, and Hamdullah Mohib, as national security advisor. During the last two years of the government, Mohib dismissed and appointed the heads of security institutions with no experience or knowledge in this field. The people, who suffered greatly from a non-participatory and non-democratic government, humorously called this circle of power "three-member republic" (SIGAR, 2021, p.60). This type of governance by Ashraf Ghani increased the distance between the government and people, resulting in weakening the legitimacy of the government severely. "SIGAR" identified the lack of internal legitimacy or people's dissatisfaction with the actions of the government as the most significant factors in the failure of the Ghani government (SIGAR, 2022, p.27). President Ashraf Ghani always claimed that "I am the elected president of the people in Afghanistan and I have come to power based on free elections and people's vote." However, his claim was nothing more than a joke in the opinion of the majority of people because only less than 10% of the 20 million eligible citizens went to the polls in the 2019 elections in which Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah faced with each other. In addition, widespread allegations of fraud at all of the levels in the electoral process led to a five-month delay in announcing the winner (SIGAR, 2023, p.12). The same thing occurred during the 2014 elections. In this regard, SIGAR declared that democracy in Afghanistan is far from a stable Jeffersonian one since democracy is regarded as the source of legitimacy for leaders and government actions, which never existed in Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2022, p.28).

10. Conclusion

Afghanistan is still among the poorest and most devastated countries in the world, despite 20 years of the presence in the international community and spending hundreds of billions of dollars to establish a developed and modern government. Accordingly, the people of Afghanistan and international community should know what went wrong in this country. This issue helps understand the future path of Afghanistan and gives the insight to avoid repeating the fatal mistakes made after 2001. Here, the deficit in government institutions was found to be the main obstacle faced by the political order and the main reason for its deterioration in Afghanistan. Every political order is based on institutions such as government, rule of law, and accountability. The government is considered as a centralized and hierarchical institution which benefits from the monopoly of employing legitimate force in a specific territorial area. The lack of political order in Afghanistan is among the most critical challenges to the formation of a powerful and comprehensive government throughout the history of this land. The weakness of the government political institutions has severely challenged the political order in Afghanistan over the years, leading to great and permanent suffering of the Afghan society.

Noncompliance in government institutions with the 2004 Constitution, which was hastily prepared and approved, did not match the existing ethnic and political realities. The constitution designed a "centralized and autocratic structure of government." The president enjoyed unbridled powers and authority in the absence of meaningful separation of powers and strong presidential control. The concentration of power in the institution of government weakened the foundations of its legitimacy and turned the government into an authoritarian one. President Ashraf Ghani took a position contrary to the parliament vote, vetoed its resolutions, and implemented his decrees. Corruption, coercion, and abuse of power became a delicacy for Afghan officials. President Ashraf Ghani became known as the three-member republic by concentrating power and abusing his powers. This opportunity was provided for Ghani by the flawed structure of the 2004 Constitution. The government refused to respond to any political institution such as public opinion or legislature because the legislature was stuck in the swamp of corruption, nepotism, and dealings with political officials. The MPs tended not to violate or implement the laws in order to obtain their personal objectives and achieve their own interests, resulting in spreading the institutions insignificance. The MPs were busy looting resources for their own benefit and their families, instead of eliminating obstacles and addressing people's demands. Friends and relatives of the MPs were never punished and imprisoned for violating laws and criminal acts since they enjoyed extensive relations with government officials using their power and competences. The candidates for cabinet ministers should make personal agreements with the MPs to obtain their votes. In addition, the SNTV system played an essential role in paving the way for tyrants, corrupt people, and warlords because it was regarded as a big obstacle in the participation of active and democratic political parties, resulting in providing the basis for corruption, ethnocracy, bargaining, and looting for the government and parliament. Weak institutions which lacked necessary authority to control government officials were considered as the main element which eroded the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the people, resulting in deteriorating the political order in Afghanistan.

Author Contributions: All authors contributed to this research.

Funding: Not applicable.

Conflict of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Informed Consent Statement/Ethics Approval: Not applicable.

Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to Sayed Reza Hussaini, a former professor at the Faculty of Political Science at Balkh University-Afghanistan and a senior researcher at the Faculty of Law at the University of Hertfordshire, England, for sharing his experiences to write this study in the journal (Asian Institute of Research).